

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

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REPLACES BOATS—Newfoundland fishing areas are now patrolled by helicopter. The Fisheries Department of Canada operates this Sikorsky S-55, leased from Okanagan Helicopters, Limited. The versatile S-55 does more effective work than the several boats it replaces, and is available for official inspections and any emergency use.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS

PIONEERING AIRLINE—Mohawk Airlines has added a Sikorsky S-55 to pioneer scheduled helicopter passenger service on part of its certificated routes. It is the second scheduled American passenger airline to use Sikorskys. Large, twin-engine helicopters eventually may be used by the airline to replace some of its fixed-wing equipment.

COPTERS ON THE MOVE—First helicoptor of the Army's 328th Helicopter Transportation Company comes aboard a Navy Carrier bound for Germany. The Company is the first such Army helicopter unit sent to Europe. Equipped with 21 Sikorsky H-19s, its mission includes medical evacuation. air supply and cargo or troop movement.

WINGS OF MERCY—A Sikorsky helicopter, with rotors whirling, is shown in battle-torn Dien Bien Phu receiving French soldiers wounded in the heroic defense of the Indo-China stronghold. A stretcher bearer (right), rushes off for another casualty to be evacuated to a military hospital at Hanoi. The Sikorsky S-55 helicopter flew mercy missions in the thick of the Indo-China battle.

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Vol. 5, No. 1 August 1954

EDITORIAL POLICY

The Army Combat Forces Journal is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The **Journal** strives to

¶ Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

¶ Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

¶ Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

¶ Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

¶ Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

Association's *Journal*

Seven new members of the Executive Council were elected to office at the Sixteenth regular (quarterly) meeting of the Executive Council on 21 June. They are Maj.Gen. Earl S. Gruver (OrdC), Maj.Gen. James M. Gavin (Inf), Brig.Gen. K. F. Hertford (CE), Col. W. B. Bunker (TC), Lt.Col. Barry Ryan, USAR (Inf), Capt. B. G. Schneckloth (Inf), and Capt. S. W. Sacra, USAR (Armor). Generals Abendroth and Stewart and Colonels McCarthy and Thomson were reelected.

The Association owes a deep bow to the officers who are leaving the Council. Most of them have given many hours of time to the work of the Association and JOURNAL. So we salute Maj.Gen. Albert C. Lieber (CE), Maj.Gen. Egbert F. Bullene (CmlC), Brig.-Gen. Harry H. Semmes, USAR (Armor), Col. C. V. Clifton, Jr. (Arty), and Col. Carol V. Cadwell, USAR (MPC).

As you may recall, the Council voted at an earlier session, beginning next year to resume the practice of having the membership elect officers. As provided by the by-laws, such elections were suspended at the time of the Korean war.

THE PUBLISHER

COVER

The Army's New Heavy Tank

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

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Bachelors, Arise!

● There is a great deal of alarm in high places over the "failure" of the armed forces to attract young men to a service career. Examine the complaints and you'll find that every one *is a married man's complaint.*

The decision to follow a military or civilian career is usually made at a very early age—perhaps somewhere between 18 and 25—when the great majority of young men have little or no thought of marriage. Trying to attract young men to the service with such things as supermarket-type commissaries and increased baggage allowances is as pointless as baiting a fox trap with spinach. As any bachelor or ex-bachelor knows, marriage in the young male mind is usually something for the vague and distant future (even if, unsuspectingly, he is just about to be caught). Nothing could interest him less than improved lying-in facilities at the station hospital or a new teen-age club. What does interest him is an attractive way of life *now* and in the immediate future.

But paradoxically, present trends, instead of making the young bachelors' life in the Army acceptable by *improving* the conditions which are driving them from the service in droves, seem to be in the *opposite* direction. Some of them are exasperatingly, smugly discriminatory or indifferent to the bachelor's well-being—like providing garages only for married officers; cutting down on authorized floor space for bachelors (not that many bachelor officers ever enjoyed these "authorized" living conditions); prohibiting the old type, independent officers mess that promoted so much camaraderie and esprit de corps; and depriving bachelor officers (and only bachelor officers) of their quarters allowance when traveling on PCS.

It is time we realized that the great majority of our new officers are bachelors, and if we want them to remain in the service, we will have to do more about improving *their* lot.

MARRIED OFFICER

The Army Wife

● Why has the Army wife been forgotten in the current fuss about enfranchising all of us? She serves at our side—the policies of the Pentagon permitting—yet many states that permit us, and even Red Cross girls, to vote say that she must be in the state to have a voice. Can you help?

LT. COL. JOHN C. H. LEE, JR.
Hqs IX Corps
APO 264, San Francisco, Calif.

Regimental Esprit

● Major Julian Paget, Coldstream Guards [June], takes the words right out of my mouth and I am moved to relate one striking incident illustrative of British esprit.

One night last year we were driving slowly down a Korean road looking for the lately arrived Royal Scots, when we saw three men wearing the OD tam o'shant characteristic of Scottish units. My lie tenant (formerly in the Black Watc though now a United States citizen) call out "Hey, Jock, where are the Royal Scots

And without any hesitation, one of tl trio (all privates, as it developed) answer loud, clear, and chip on shoulder, *"We'* the Royal Scots."

Not to labor the point, may I contra this with the numberless times I have ask the whereabouts of a U.S. unit, only to he "You mean the CP, or what?"

They have something we don't and we better get it, fast.

MAJOR JAMES W. KERR
1133 11th Loop, Sandia Base
Albuquerque, N. M.

● In view of the greater emphasis nece sarily placed on Army Reserve and Natio al Guard units by the "New Look" curta ment of the regular establisment, Maj Paget's point that the "Regimental Systen strengthens relations between regulars, r servists and citizens of the country seems special merit and I would be interested learning more about it.

One point of interest is the manner which the British system handles casual replacements within regiment.

One point for certain—it is dishearte ing to work and build a combat team ba ancing and counter-balancing weakness

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ıd strengths throughout the unit and then :e that splendid *team* stripped for replace-ıents for other units.

Let's have more information and discus-on. . . .

CAPT. JOHN H. BOLTON, JR.
2214 Judson Rd.
Vheaton, Md.

* * *

My sincere thanks to Major Julian Paget f the British Coldstream Guards Regiment ɔr placing before us the answer to 90 per ɜnt of our Army's problems. The principles f honor and comradeship pointed out for s in the article are well worth our con-deration and subsequent employment.

We will do well to drop about 80 per ɜnt of our "poster campaigns" and give ur soldiers honor and tradition to live up ɔ. We will do better by devising a system ıat will place our soldiers in a unit re-ruited from and defending the honor of ıeir respective states.

Give me a unit that fights for honor. ou take the hydrogen bomb, and we will eat you with our bare hands.

M/SGT. T. N. HORTON
try B, 501 AAA Gun Bn.
Camp Hanford, Wash.

aratroopers and Helicopters

"Front and Center" [June] had a couple f discrepancies. First, although you recom-ıend ground troops for the relief of Dien ien Phu, you specify airborne divisions. I elieve that additional airborne troops in ıeir "Flying Boxcars" would have just in-reased the number of prisoners the Reds ere able to pluck from the air as they ame drifting down, and those flying box-ars would also increase the targets for ıose all too accurate antiaircraft guns lo-ated around the Dien Bien Phu perimeter. econdly, on the same page you chide the ır Force, and probably justifiably, for be-ıg such poor shots on the drop zones, after ll these years of practice. This casts further oubt on the wisdom of an airborne attack y the conventional paratrooper.

Let's face facts—regardless of the fact ıat the Army's high command is loaded ith paratroopers—and recognize the ob-olescence of the airborne trooper who uses parachute to reach the enemy. On the ther hand, helicopter-borne troops could ave pulled off the operation pretty success-ully because of their low-level flight and in-point accuracy of hitting the drop zone, nd this would lessen casualties immediate-, even though they would still have been eavy. Also, this type of attack would re-ılt in no jump pay, sprained ankles, or igging of heavy equipment out of the ice paddies.

However, the school solution would seem ɔ me to be, in this situation, a ground re-ef column, maybe in conjunction with a elicopter-borne assault of troops on Dien ien Phu itself. An overland attack by a einforced division with air cover from the nearest landing beach or Hanoi would have been feasible.

CAPT. HENRY W. TUBBS, JR.
6th Special Inf. Co., USMCR
Cumberland, Md.

• *Capt. Tubbs has understandably overlooked our deadline. We wrote that item before the Dien Bien Phu perimeter was compressed during the few weeks preceding the end of the struggle. Frankly we cannot believe that helicopters would have been less vulnerable to the Reds' antiaircraft fire than paratroopers. As to the accuracy of Air Force over drop zones we have never heard a paratrooper who wouldn't say that the Air Force could be more accurate, nor have we ever heard of a paratrooper who said "I won't go because they won't drop me at the right place." There is room for improvement, as in most all human activities.*

Co. B, 35th Infantry

• "The Defense of a Battery Position" by Captain Russell A. Gugeler [June] particularly interested me because it mentioned the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, which I had the privilege of commanding during its first six months in Korea.

In describing the general situation leading to the specific situation involving Battery A of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion the article states that "One penetration fell against the 35th Infantry, a regiment of the 25th Division, soon after midnight on the morning of 3 September. The enemy pushed Company B from its position, surrounded Company G and the 1st Battalion command post, and then attacked several batteries of artillery."

Since the article is contained in what I presume to be an official history under the supervision of the Chief of Military His-



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

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

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tory, Department of the Army, I would like to make one correction for the record. The statement that the enemy pushed Company B from its position, I can state categorically, is incorrect. Company B, commanded by Captain Robert J. Dillard, occupied a key terrain feature in the 1st Battalion zone and although the company was subjected to repeated attacks by vastly superior numbers it did not at any time while on the Pusan perimeter lose one inch of ground.

It is easy to understand how errors of this nature will appear even in official histories of combat. However, in fairness and in tribute to the courage and tenacity of the members of Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, I must call attention to the error that has been made.

LT. COL. BERNARD G. TEETERS
PMST, St. Norbert College
West De Pere, Wisc.

Suggestion

● In your April issue you asked for comments on what would help to make a better Journal. The Journal is tops with me now, but I do think more could be devoted to platoon and company level material, and it should not all be devoted to combat action. I try to plug for *CFJ* in my organization, but the answer I get is that the magazine has too much tech service material and high level material that the squad leader, platoon sgt and platoon leader don't need.

I would say let's have more material like "Battle Future of Our Army," "Stars, Stripes and A-Bombs." But let's break them down to company and platoon level. Material like "The Rifle Squad, Key to Movement" is what I look forward to.

SFC WALTER JOHNSON
APO 178, New York, N. Y.

Le Pont Patton

● Attention Third Army veterans! If you rolled with General Patton, an unusual opportunity presents itself to honor his memory. The French Government has agreed to name the new bridge nearing completion at Fontainebleau, France, "Le Pont Patton" after our beloved Commander, if an appropriate statue of General Patton is erected on the site prior to the completion of the bridge this year. It is estimated that $5,000 will assure the completion of the statue. It is requested that each Patton man send his check for $10 as soon as possible to General Hobart R. Gay, Commanding General, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, addressed to the General George S. Patton Memorial Association Fund.

COLONEL C. E. CHEEVER (Ret.)
San Antonio, Texas

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

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Speed Control Division, Wickliffe, Ohio • Stretos Division, Bay Shore, N. Y.

Front And Center

Major David F. MacGhee, a likable, 34-year-old redhead with 13 years' service as an Air Force navigator and observer, spent 1,030 days in Communist prison camps in Korea and was tortured for not cooperating with the Reds. Now on duty in the Pentagon, he considers the failures of commissioned and non-commissioned leadership in POW camps a national disgrace, begging for official attention. "There was an agonizing shortage of leadership which . . . degraded the armed forces [and] played directly into the hands of the Communists" he has written in a document designed to get action. He warns that "to ignore our national interest and subvert leadership responsibilities to psychiatric rationalizations or to individual considerations of human desires for personal survival, is to embark on a national course of moral bankruptcy."

✓ ✓ ✓

Airborne Association, Inc., has been organized by five former paratroopers at Fayetteville, N. C., hard by Fort Bragg. Purpose of the organization is to "unite fraternally and for mutual benefit, protection, improvement and association, former, present and future airborne troopers."

✓ ✓ ✓

The Department of the Army has received a resolution of the Fort Benning Parent-Teacher Association that calls for an integrated, uniform school system for military dependents that would make the transfer of a child from one post school to another easier on the child. Present laws restrict post schools to a per-pupil cost that is comparable to local public schools. And, as is well known, public school standards fluctuate widely throughout the 48 states and the territories. The Department of the Army hasn't received similar expressions from other post PTAs and the Benning resolution will probably rest in some file. Actually the Department of the Army is merely the agent of the Commissioner of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare so far as dependent schools are concerned. Congress, which votes the money, also voted the stipulation that post schools should conform closely to local standards.

✓ ✓ ✓

The transfer of AFF Board No. 1 to The Artillery School, Fort Sill, and the establishment of AFF Board No. 5 at Fort Bragg will assist the Army's pursuit of greater mobility and increased fire power. Board No. 1 will specialize in field artillery and Army aviation equipment while the new Board 5 will specialize in airborne equipment. Board 2 is at The Armored School, Fort Knox; Board 3 at The Infantry School, Fort Benning; and Board 4 at the AA & Guided Missile Branch of The Artillery School, Fort Bliss.

✓ ✓ ✓

Biggest news in the revised Department of the Army reorganization plan is, of course, the creation of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. This office will have command control of the technical services and will assume the "operating activities" that have been performed by G4. G4 will, in consequence be somewhat down-graded. The plan will give the D/A four assistant secretaries in addition to the Secretary and Under Secretary. The latter will be deputy and general manager while the four assistant secretaries will be responsible respectively, for Financial Management, Logistics, Manpower & Reserve Affairs and Civil-Military Affairs. It is expected that these secretaries will have close control over the General and Special Staffs, and the technical and administrative services. The Army Comptroller will continue to be a uniformed officer. The Office of Legislative Liaison and Chief of Information will be shifted from the Chief of Staff to the direct control of the Secretary of the Army. The new plan retains the proposal to create a Continental Army Command replacing Army Field Forces, and gives it added responsibilities.

REUNIONS

The information listed here was furnished by officers of the various associations. For further information we suggest you write directly to the organization in which you are interested.

4th Infantry Division. Hotel Alexandria, Los Angeles, Calif. 5-8 August. For details write: Lewis W. Smith, Reunion Chairman, 4517 Marmion Way, Los Angeles 65, Calif.

1st Infantry Division. Hotel Statler, Washington, D. C. 20-22 August. For details write: Society of the First Division, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.

7th Armored Division. Statler Hotel, Detroit, Mich. 27-29 August. For details write: Reunion Comm., 7th Armd. Div. Assoc., c/o Hotel Statler, Detroit, Mich.

37th Infantry Division. Morrison Hotel, Chicago, Ill. 4-6 September. For details write: Jack R. McGuire, 1101 Wyandotte Building, 21 West Broad St., Columbus 15, Ohio.

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

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

Signal Corpsman demonstrating the value of television on maneuvers.

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General Gavin, And We Don't Mean 'Slim Jim'

WE have yet to find an officer who isn't aware that General Gavin recently wrote an article called "Cavalry, nd I Don't Mean Horses." Many of the officers we have alked to had read it either in this magazine, in *Harper's*, r in *Armor*. And most of them seemed to agree with vhat he had written (a few took mild exception to porions of it). But none of them seemed enthusiastic. Not single officer said, "I sure did read it and I'm going to et behind him and push for that kind of an Army."

Most officers seemed to find the article of curious, ather than of serious, interest. And this, we found, was ecause of their interest in the author as one of the abulous soldiers of our times. One consistent reaction vas a discussion of General Gavin personally. This led s to conclude that here was a case of a tremendous repuation creating a block between the reader and the meang of the words he had written. They were so intent on eading "Slim Jim" Gavin that the serious thoughts General Gavin had expressed eluded them. This illusion something like those created on television programs hat use puppets. You become so entranced by the action f the puppets that your mind simply accepts what the oices are saying without conscious comprehension of heir meaning.

It is palpably ridiculous to feel impelled to say that General Gavin is not a puppet contorting on the end of string for the enjoyment of the multitudes. But we ay it because we are hopeful that General Gavin will ot have to say in a year or three years from now, as he as said about an earlier article he wrote on the same ubject: "I accomplished little."

What is it General Gavin is saying today, as in 1947? He is saying that the Army must shake off the encumrances that shackle its freedom to move fast, hit hard, nd move again.

In short he is saying that the Army must be mobile.

That ought to be clear enough, but unfortunately it sn't.

Mobility used to be a simple word that everyone undertood perfectly. In those days it was a soaring word that pened wide the windows of the imagination. But in ecent years the windows have been shuttered and locked y a certain segment in the Army that has tried to make he word the exclusive possession of its arm.

Mobility truly means, as the dictionary says it means: he ability to "move readily." The key word is "readily" vhich means promptly. This may mean moving fast or may mean moving far. Both the sprinter and the distance runner are mobile. An infantry outfit that grinds away a couple of thousand yards a day in a tough battle may actually be more mobile in spirit and performance than a tank outfit that moves eight miles when it could have moved sixteen. The ability to move readily is relative. It depends upon the situation and there are limits in an imperfect world where friction, the elements, and man's own limitations hamper the fullest possible freedom of movement.

Truly defined mobility isn't the exclusive possession of armor or airborne, of air power or sea power. No single arm or service, weapon or vehicle has exclusive possession of the capability of moving readily.

It may be well to run down a few homely examples of the lack of true mobility, the inability to move readily.

The capability of moving readily was not possessed by the tank battalion in Korea that had to wait for five days for the engineers to blast a track up the tortuous Suipchon River valley so armor could help put the finishing touches to the 2d Division's battle for Heartbreak Ridge.

The capability of moving readily was not possessed by the infantrymen of the 32d Infantry Division who hardly survived the terrible ordeal of marching over the Owen Stanley Mountains in New Guinea in 1942.

The capability of moving readily was not possessed by the Ninth Air Force in Europe when weather in the winter of 1944 kept it from striking at Von Rundstedt's counter-offensive in the first days of the Battle of the Bulge.

IT is said that a good heavyweight boxer will beat a good lightweight more often than not. But take them out of the ring and put them on a steeply pitched roof in a blinding snowstorm at 2400 hours and the smart money probably wouldn't follow the adage. The good light man would have a powerful equalizer in his superior ability to move readily. And so it is in war on the earth where there are few areas as level as the boxing ring and many areas as difficult as a steep roof. On the relatively level Sahara and perhaps in a few other nearly riverless, mountainless, swampless, jungleless areas of the world the good army, heavy with armor and accompanied by infantry riding in armored carriers, might, more often than not, defeat the good army, light in armor but skilled in moving readily. But elsewhere on the earth's surface the smart money wouldn't be quite so sure.

There is another point here that must be emphasized. The good army, heavy in armor and armored accoutrements, is a heavier consumer than the lighter, faster army.

This obvious point is worth mentioning because we so often hear such damning adjectives as wasteful, swollen and inefficient thrown at the services of supply. When we hear this we ought to shout halt and utter a little lecture ending by saying that so long as that heavy army up front consumes so much, the very act of keeping it alive will create a Frankenstein's monster behind. Until combat armies reduce their capacity for consumption we can't expect the services of supply to attain a leaner appearance and receive fewer damning adjectives.

WHEN we reach the promised land of true mobility, of being capable of "moving readily," our armies will be "leaner and meaner," faster and nastier. This will probably come about through the sanctification of the marriage of the airplane and the tank. Some might say that this marriage will come off when the encrusted traditionalists are finally laid to rest, but that wouldn't be quite true. There are other thorns in the path of this desirable union.

Some of the sharpest thorns are directives of higher levels than the Army and agreements between the Army and the other services, notably the Air Force.

Whatever the virtues of Unification with a capital U, as they are now or as they were between 1945 and 1949, it can be said that in 1954 it is hardly debatable that the Army gave away too much to get Unification. Some of the give-away preceded 1945, going back to the days when the Army Air Forces, strategic *and tactical,* became nearly autonomous. The substitution of written agreements and coordination for actual command and control of those elements of air power that the Army must have if it is to survive as an effective force was too high a price.

Close air support exists only by sufferance today. The system for employing it is cumbersome and time consuming and lacking in the capability of moving airplanes readily. There is evidence that since the development of smaller atomic bangs and tactical aircraft that are larger, faster and possessed of greater range (along with Ficon and refueling-in-flight techniques) the tactical air people are taking dead aim on some of the missions of the Strategic Air Force. That is about as far as you can get from a concept of close air support of ground forces faithfully and earnestly performed. If you doubt this, read the leading article in the July issue of *Air Force* magazine.

The article says that there is a school of tactical airmen that believes "the ability to destroy targets progressively deeper within the Soviet Union brings tactical aircraft into an ever-closer partnership with the long-range bomber. Thus, tactical airpower has acquired usefulness far beyond its ability to localize and win peripheral wars and, in fact, has become at least a junior partner of strategic air in the role of deterring all-out war, and winning it should it come."

Plainly, the Army had better look elsewhere for close air support. And where else but to itself?

The article does make a bow to tac's close support mission. And it sees an advantage in its ability to carry atomic bombs. Here's the word from *Air Force* magazine:

"The targets associated with the close support mission —the enemy's forces on the ground—are likewise vulnerable to atomic attack. For example, it is comparatively easy to spot artillery emplacements from the air, but not so easy to knock them out with conventional bombs. With nuclear weapons the need for accuracy is not nearly so great. Close is good enough . . ."

We don't doubt it. But where are the controls to insure that the bomb doesn't fall on one of our gun emplacements rather than the enemy's? Artillery emplacements are "easy to spot" but harder to hit. Also harder to be sure you are hitting the right one. The wrong ones are also easy to spot.

And what assurances are there that the outer reaches of the bomb will not reach our own forces if the emplacement is self-propelled, "accompanying artillery"—which the Russians are said to like very much and specialize in?

In last month's JOURNAL, H. A. DeWeerd wrote and italicized: *". . . a start on the tactical air support problem cannot be made until after the nature of the ground force atomic units and the doctrines governing their employment have been worked out."* We doubt if many in the Air Force would agree with DeWeerd. The quotations we have made from *Air Force* magazine suggest to us that the Air Force is not at all interested in the size and character of ground units or their tactics in atomic combat. We hope we are wrong but we don't believe we are.

IT is *not* all very well to have joint boards for techniques and developments. Impressive though they be in name and concept it must be underscored that *split* papers are common with them.

Higher directives and agreements in the name of Unification have other potentially baleful influences. It may be unwise to venture the opinion today, but is there not evidence that in the past few years the services have gone slightly "helicopter happy" and are now beginning to recognize its limitations? This may be self-adjusting except for the Army tied down as it is to a 5,000-pound limitation by the Army-Air Force agreement. Even a convertiplane that will do the job better than the helicopter will not solve the whole problem. So long as that agreement remains it will be a millstone around the neck of Army searchers for mobility and a whip that drives them towards trying to do things with helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft that may be uneconomical and impractical. It leaves the Army dependent upon the Air Force for troop transport and the development of troop transport aircraft.

If the Army is to have the capability of moving readily, the marriage of the airplane and the tank must be pursued with relentless singleness of purpose. The union is clearly a partnership proposition. On the one hand transport aircraft must be developed that can carry the necessary weapons and vehicles and land and supply

hem in combat areas. On the other hand effective weapons and vehicles must be designed that can be carried in he best possible planes aeronautical engineers can turn ut for that purpose. But what is being done? Whatever he degree of activity, it is obviously not a hand-in-hand ffair of one set of like-minded people working intimately nd wholeheartedly with another set of like-minded eople.

Look at the record! For five or more years the Army as been after an assault transport that could land on nd take off from a road, a meadow or a beach, and for a arge part of that period one version of such a plane (not ltogether satisfactory) has been "on order." And after hat order of C-123s is filled, what then? What new nodels or concepts are now on the drafting boards or are eing built into prototypes? Whatever the record is, conrast it with the unending models of new fighter aircraft he Air Force has pouring from the factories of several roducers.

One of them, Republic Aircraft, currently is proudly dvertising that in a period of ten years it has produced uccessively the World War II Thunderbolt; the Thunlerjet, used in Korea; the Thunderstreak, now in service; nd the Thunderflash just coming out. Contrast that ecord with the record of Fairchild transports. The C-82 ppeared at the end of the war and was followed a few ears later by the improved C-119. Since then the latter as gone through several modifications. There has been o succession of transport aircraft of improved design uilt to carry tactical formations into battle. Such cargo raft as the C-124 and other such cannot be classed as ircraft suitable for the assault uses of the Army.

OLONEL WILLIAM B. BUNKER, the Army helicopter expert, recently headed a committee of military nen and civilians that looked into the problem of convertible aircraft. They found, it has been reported, that nanufacturers of fixed-wing planes are not much interested in performance factors involving landing and takeoff. Designers, the committee observed, are "loath to propose any developments which improve these areas which re regarded as secondary if they entail, as they usually lo, some sacrifice in the speed or empty weight of their ircraft." This leaves the field to the helicopter people nd, applying it to the situation facing the Army, means hat the Army must try to do things with helicopters and iaison planes that could be done better by properly deigned fixed-wing planes.

The Army can carry cargo on planes that come within he established weight limit. For example, Cessna, which uilds the L-19 for the Army, has an advertisement which oasts: "The Cessna 'Bird Dog' Is a Pack Horse, Too." The ad explains that the L-19 is capable of carrying up o 500 pounds of supplies in containers fastened to the vings. All very fine! Of estimable usefulness in particuar and limited situations. But why not two 250-pound ombs to hit that enemy strongpoint the observer in the L-19 sees when he sees it? He'd better not. It's illegal under the terms of the Army-Air Force agreement.

Within the Army itself the need for an improved capacity to move readily is not being translated into lighter, faster, harder-hitting hardware fast enough. The new jeep is heavier and costlier than the old and so are the new cargo trucks; the new family of tanks is heavier and more costly than the World War II family of tanks; communications equipment is lighter; engineer bridges are getting lighter and more capable of moving readily; but the new light and medium field artillery weapons are probably no lighter in weight than the old.

It may be that more progress is being made to produce the weapons and machines that will signify that the marriage of the airplane and the tank has taken place than is suggested here. Those not in the know can with justification be "from Missouri." However, it is of interest to know that there is an effort outside the services to consummate the marriage. This is the effort by retired General Jacob L. Devers, working within the Fairchild Aircraft and Engine Corp., to produce satisfactory prototypes of airplanes and weapons that are matched to each other. They prefer that not much be said of their work yet, but their concept is intriguing. It includes an airborne "tank" carrying a 90mm gun. Whatever the eventual outcome of this private effort it is a laudable one, impelled by a desire to make it possible for the Army to move readily—to have true mobility.

ONE of the officers who discussed General Gavin's article with us observed: "Well, he's G3 now and so he ought to be able to get what he wants." That officer was speaking lightly. An old hand in the Pentagon, he well knows that action is not that simple. We are reminded that even such a bluff personality as the late Colonel Frank Knox found that he couldn't buck his own admirals and move the office of the Secretary of the Navy from Constitution Avenue to the new Pentagon.

But though it will not be easy to overcome the barriers that impede the way to the capacity to move readily—it can be done if every one of us gets on the job. We must at every opportunity talk of the restrictions that fetter the Army. And if we do this well and faithfully, eventually public opinion will swing around. On the day that public opinion whispers on Capitol Hill, on Pennsylvania Avenue, in the E ring of the river side of the Pentagon that the Army should be loosed from the fetters that hamper its mobility, the fetters will be removed—just like that.

And what then? Then there will be outcries that the obstinate, prejudiced, fogy-ridden Army has all but thrown away the nation's security by being so blankety blank slow in preparing itself for atomic war!

That the Army can take. What the Army (and the nation) don't dare take is for the men who seek to achieve true mobility for the Army to have to say now and later: "We accomplished little."



The Pros

The unpredictable cash customers are more likely to boo than to cheer so the practicing professional must look to himself and his fellows for the rewards that go with duty well done



COLONEL A. T. McANSH

TO our *young* uniformed Man of Distinction—we older ones have learned it already—it seems that the nation he so proudly serves must be waiting with interest to applaud him for the hard career to which he has set himself. He adjusts his uniform, straightens his Combat and/or Expert Infantryman Badge, his Parachutist Badge, and other accouterments, and waits for his due reward. He waits . . . but he hears no applause. The people have their minds elsewhere. Our young uniformed MofD feels let down.

It is time to tell him, the practical professional soldier, some additional facts of life. How in the final analysis he will have to look within himself and to others of his kind who have gone before him, for the necessary resolution, firmness, and staunchness that his job demands. I shall try with three personal examples to give him the word.

JANUARY, 1928. Newspapers had been carrying reports of fighting going on between Marines stationed in Nicaragua to preserve the peace, and Sandino, a revolutionary who had refused to quit when his chief did and who had gone into the hills to fight on. Clashes between Marines and Sandino's troops had been sharp and bitter, with some killed and wounded on both sides. I took an interest in this for some of those Marines had been my buddies. I tried to describe some of this to a friend one day at lunch. I did not have much luck. He was deep in the stock market page of the newspaper we were sharing, and was debating what to buy. Finally he heard what I was saying. "Nicaragua? Where's that? What in hell are they doing down there anyway?" And by inference, "That's what they're paid for, isn't it?" He went back to the market quotations, I to my lemon pie.

JULY, 1943. In the cocktail room of the dear old Saint Francis Hotel in San Francisco I was busily polishing off a few last ones before moving on to the west. The scene was quite plush, even for a warring country that could afford to lose three cruisers in as many minutes. Tables were filled and the long bar was packed, service people, but more of Rosie the Riveter and her escorts. The talk was fast and loud—"Got two steaks from the butcher yesterday, no points needed." . . . "Aw, I never use a gas ration card" . . .

My attention was caught by a young Army Air Forces lieutenant colonel seated nearby. He was alone. From his ribbons I could tell he was back from the South Pacific and from his drawn face I could see it was recently. The scene he had just left had not been so plush.

There was another look on the colonel's face too, besides the tired drawn look. A combination of disgust, amazement, sadness and a few others that plainly said: "So this is what I was sticking out my neck for."

I could see he had not got the word. I started to lean over and cheer him up, tell him everyone was rooting for him, then thought of his fifty per cent flying pay and drew back. He looked sharp. He could see for himself, anyway, and I had to go. I paid my check, finished the last of the old fashioned, took a last look at the crowd, and at the officer's face—the look was still there—and left. Still thinking of the scene, I decided that whether the shooting lasted a few more days or a few more years, I was not coming back until it stopped, else I might find a look like the fly boy's on *my* puss.

IN the months I spent in the Sixth Army in the long haul from Finschhafen to Kobe, I almost forgot the plush scene at the Saint Francis (or the Moana). In spite of the rain, humidity, jungle and Tojo's friends, there was something satisfying about it. Perhaps part of that feeling was caused by the fact that the austerity program we were under, and it *was* austere, started with the army commander. He lived like the rest of us. There were few castles—all in Spain—but they were not missed too much. Everyone got on with his job San Francisco seemed far away.

But some got back. During the breathing spell between Baguio and the OLYMPIC show, some of our people went Stateside on short leaves. To those who would listen and wondered why I did not go, I told them about looks on people's faces. They went away mumbling about "some people missing too many boats." Time marched on and as

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COLONEL A. T. MCANSH, Infantry, an occasional contributor to this magazine, is presently Commanding Officer of The Psychological Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, N. C.

'e prepared to mount up for OLYMPIC with the first team of ıe Division melting away from under our feet under the 'orkings of the point system, our officers gradually came ıck to us. And they had one thing to say, "You were right." felt more sad than smug when they told me.

FEBRUARY, 1951. Another hotel, the Broadmoor in Colo- ıdo Springs. Another plush scene, a semi-official gathering 'here I was an invited guest. I was present with mixed motions. In my pocket I had a brief note received that day 'lling me my best friend was missing in action in Korea. I ad selected him to head the battalion my 14th RCT had een directed to ship posthaste to Korea, when higher au- ıority stipulated that the best be sent. So Lieutenant Colonel dgar Treacy, Jr., got the job—the job he wanted. In an- ther pocket I had a transcript of a telephone message from)epartment of the Army telling me I was being detached rom the reconstituted combat team—the one I wanted to take) Korea—and was being assigned to mission duty in Brazil.

The conversation swirled around me—much like I had stened to at the Saint Francis. Business was good, tourist ade was good, and Camp Carson was being expanded. The ir Force was moving back and the City Council had just oted to take off rent controls. Yep, looks like a good season. could almost see the AAF lieutenant colonel of 1943 at the ext table.

But help came from an unexpected quarter. My mind ıshed back to a pre-war scene at the Chicago Stadium. It as one of those bruising playoffs for the Stanley Cup, be- veen the Chicago Black Hawks and the Boston Bruins. he audience was frenzied. In a melee right in front of e, a Chicago and a Boston player came together. When ıey parted, the Boston player had one cheek laid open by ıe stick of his Chicago opponent, unintentionally, or other- ise, probably otherwise. As the player staggered momentari- against the boards, a sweet old lady in the first row bopped m over the head with her handbag.

That player had an interesting look on his face as he ated off for repairs. There was no trace of self-pity, resent- ent or righteous anger—either at the lady, or the other ayer, now parked in the penalty box. He was a practicing ofessional, hired to put on a show. His look was one of ild wonder as he probably reflected: "These cash customers ant a hell of a lot for their money."

Ten minutes later he was back on the ice, patched up, ıecking his opponents into the boards with enthusiasm and ıying no attention whatever to the little old lady.

That helped. I thought, "Well, bud, that's what you are, pro, and if the cash customers—or the management—ap- ar to want a lot for their money, well, that's part of the me, and you can like it or lump it." I chose to like it. I lt better.

1928. 1943. 1951. And I see nothing in our changing ene that will place a different picture before my quizzical ze in 1958.

I have no rancor in my heart. On the contrary, I like my). I like the fine people who pay me. I marvel that every- e does not want to get into the act, for that would be too d; I would have to go to work. But I have no illusions out it either. In the newspaper I read a fine tribute to our gallant fighting force and their forward-looking leaders, I take my tongue out of my cheek long enough to do the author proper homage. I turn the page again and read about some worthy individual deploring the effects of the closed military mind on future warfare. I put my tongue back in my cheek, reflecting with Babe Ruth, "You're a hero today, a bum tomorrow, so what the hell," and turn another page. Ah, Li'l Abner.

WHEN Li'l Abner palls I can always turn to the books and read of my own kind, those who are still around and those who have gone before. And my reading covers a wide range: I read of DeCastries of Dien Bien Phu, Smith at Chosin and Hodge at Okinawa; of Krueger at Leyte and Vandegrift at Guadalcanal; of Huebner at Omaha Beach and Alexander at Dunkirk; of Rommel and his Afrika Korps and Stilwell of Burma; of Spruance at Midway and Keyes at Zeebrugge; Callaghan at Savo Island and Beatty at Jutland; of Butch O'Hare at Tarawa, Doolittle at Tokyo, and Bishop at Cambrai; of McAuliffe at Bastogne and Cambronne at Waterloo; of Lejeune at Blanc Mont and Haig at First Ypres; of Von Sanders at Gallipoli and Smith-Dorrien at Le Cateau; of Grant at Shiloh and Jackson at Chancellorsville; of John Paul Jones and his *Bon Homme Richard* and Nelson and his flagship *Victory;* of Napoleon at Austerlitz and Bragration at Znaim; of Kitchener at Omdurman and the Light Brigade at Balaclava; of Wellington on the Peninsula and Marlborough at Blenheim; of Drake and the Armada and Cromwell and his Ironsides; of Leonidas at Thermopylae and Caesar at Neuf-Mesnil—the list stretches on and back.

It all makes for fine reading, these leaders of the trade. One hundred percenters all, these wearers of the Red Badge of Courage. Not a "five percenter" in the lot. And as their shadowy faces parade in front of me across the printed story of their deeds, I can see in spite of their differences in dress and headgear a common, or rather uncommon characteristic about them all—a look of selflessness in their eyes, a look of self-sacrifice on their faces. Strange. Ed Treacy had that look too.

I put down my book and go back to my job with a tranquil mind. I feel I am in good company. Their way of life is good enough for me. The newspaper with its article on the Military Mind drops to the floor unnoticed.

AND this I would tell our young uniformed Men of Distinction: "If you are not to find your morale moving up and down with the morning headlines, you must come up with a philosophy relating to yourself, your job and those you defend that will give you inspiration to carry on your duty.

"So stick to your job. Keep your mind on the game—and off the cash customers in the stands. It is easier on the teeth that way. For when it comes your turn to carry the ball for a good gain—or to get hurt on a play, or both—you may find *that they are all looking somewhere else.*"

And if that cheery thought does not comfort you sufficiently, turn to Marcus Aurelius and others of his kind and read that the mighty Romans were not always a vast cheering section for their legions either, but that the legions managed, nevertheless, to turn in some remarkable victories regularly.

The search for methods that will win

Ground Tactics in an Atomic War

COLONEL EDWARD L. ROWNY



Battalions are the logical units to disperse beyond mutual supporting distance



NO less an authority than Admiral Radford, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, has publicly stated that "Today, atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our Armed Forces."

This face-to-face challenge to soldiers was expressed forcibly by Lt. Col. H. A. DeWeerd in last month's issue of this magazine. What are proper tactics of ground forces in a war that uses such weapons? Is it not now quite clear that our emphasis on certain tactical principles must be shifted if we are to win an atomic war? We must be prepared to fight an atomic war if the necessity comes, yet we can foresee many situations where the use of the atomic weapon tactically would be militarily uneconomical, or where its use might be avoided.

I believe that it is possible for us to make certain changes in our tactics which will allow us to win an atomic war, and which, with minor changes, will permit us to fight a non-atomic war as well. Our problem is to examine the influence of atomic weapons on our methods to see what can be done without destroying our capability for fighting a non-atomic war. The changes discussed here are based on the conviction that it is far better to be prepared to fight an atomic war and to make minor modifications if such a war does not materialize than to be unprepared to fight an atomic war and try to make the changes under atomic or thermonuclear fire.

We can make three generalizations concerning the influence of the weapon on our tactics:

- We realize maximum overall effect when the weapon is used in conjunction with the maneuver of troops.
- There is an ever-present problem of protecting our forces from the enemy's atomic attacks and from the fringe effects of our own weapons.
- Atomic warfare magnifies the importance of the time factor in all operations.

THE first generalization calls for ground forces to move into the blast area, to move to skirt the blast area, or to execute other maneuvers which maximize the damage, shock, and confusion created by the explosion. If such exploitation is to be effective, we must reconsider certain of our tactical principles. In the first place, we should think in terms of larger or deeper terrain features. Because of the magnitude of destruction involved, stress can now be placed directly on capturing or killing enemy rather than on the seizure of a series of intermediate stepping-stones which facilitates that end.

Concentration of our forces will require a new interpretation. The use, or threatened use, of atomic weapons may well cause the enemy to disperse his forces widely. As a consequence, heavy concentrations of attacking forces will be called for less frequently than heretofore, and small, rapid-moving elements can form the basis of our tactics. Further maneuvers which force the enemy to mass and thereby create atomic targets for us, should be planned and used. Atomic warfare de-emphasizes those concepts calling for forward assembly areas, concentration and positioning of forces well in advance of an attack, and similar traditional practices. Thus the first generalization—exploitation to gain the full potential of the weapon—puts new emphasis on rapid movement and on the control and operation of separated forces.

CONSIDERATION of the second generalization—stress on protection—must start with the following basic observation: It is patently impossible to draw a circle and say that within this circle all persons will be killed and all objects de-

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COLONEL EDWARD L. ROWNY, Infantry, is a 1941 graduate of the Military Academy who transferred from the Corps of Engineers to the Infantry. This is his second appearance in this magazine; the earlier one being in the September 1953 issue as the author of "Tanks and Infantry." He is on duty at The Infantry School.

troyed, and that outside it no persons or quipment will be harmed. Depending ıpon the configuration of the ground, he yield of the weapon, the height of urst, and the delivery error, the non-ethal but significant effects will apply at ome distance beyond the circle's edge. 'o us, as users of the atomic weapon this arries a simple message: Our troops ıust be physically protected or they must e at some greater distance from the edge f the circle. As far as physical protec-ion from enemy atomic attack is con-erned, we can provide active defense gainst air and ground-launched missiles, onceal our troops from enemy observa-ion and furnish underground positions nd shelters. Physical shielding from an tomic explosion, since it is by all odds he surest form of protection, creates nother danger: our combat forces may ose their offensive spirit. But what in-erests us here are the ways by which ve can use tactics to increase our pro-ection. One immediately apparent meth-d is to disperse more. Greater disper-ion makes troops less vulnerable to tomic attack by presenting to the ene-ny a less dense and hence less profitable arget. A second tactical way to increase rotection is to increase movement. A tationary target will generally be more ulnerable than a moving one. More-ver, a unit on the move will tend to nove in column formations rather than s a circular mass, and hence will present less likely target to enemy atomic veapons. Still another way to increase rotection is to concentrate as close to the nemy as possible. These "bear-hugs," f made close enough, will inhibit the nemy's atomic retaliation. An unscru-ulous enemy might sacrifice his troops o an atomic blast in the hope of de-troying greater numbers of ours, but ıe will probably not do this if his troops re protecting critical localities. In mass-ıg, we should adopt Rommel's concept f concentrating in time rather than in pace. Furthermore, in view of the ene-ıy's atomic threat, concentrations should e made for as short a period of time as ossible. In short, there is a direct rela-ionship among dispersion, mobility, and rotection.

THE third generalization is that atomic warfare places great emphasis on time actors. Although speed is an essential ıctor in all types of operations, it as-ımes unprecedented significance when ve are dealing with a mass destruction veapon. Tactical targets will most often e fleeting targets available for only a ıort period of time. An enemy troop oncentration may begin to dissipate

before the target can be properly identified and the strike made. Rapid transmission of information about the enemy and immediate action based on that information are indispensable. Following a successful strike, rapid exploitation is equally imperative to prevent the enemy from reorganizing or otherwise minimizing his losses. Conversely, failure to respond quickly to information concerning an impending enemy strike may spell our disaster. These are but a few of the myriad ways in which the importance of time will be magnified. Words like "fast," "quick," "speed," and "now" will inevitably dominate the language describing the techniques of conducting atomic warfare.

From the effects of atomic weapons we have made several generalizations on methods of fighting. These in turn have emphasized three important tactical factors: mobility, dispersion and time. If we consider that time—the need for speed—is a necessary element affecting *all* tactics, we can then concentrate our attention on mobility and dispersion.

First we need to decide how much mobility and how much dispersion we want. Then we need to determine what tactics best achieve that desired degree of mobility and dispersion.

HOW much mobility do we want? We want as much as we can get within these limits: We do not want it to lead to easier detection, we want to retain the ability to do a certain amount of fighting en route, and we want the cost to be reasonable. Until our organization and equipment are changed to give our units increased capabilities for movement, we must increase mobility through what we now have. More trucks will move more men. Tanks and mechanized vehicles can be put to greater use. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft can be used to the fullest extent. Mobility should be limited only by the difficulty in supplying and maintaining this transport. Complete mobility of the infantry can be attained only by making personnel carriers organic to small units.

How much dispersion do we want? This is a more elusive question. On the one hand there is the desire to spread men out, thus making our forces less vulnerable. On the other hand, there is the desire to have men fight closer together in order to retain maximum control. The solution, necessarily a compromise, lies in retaining control by maintaining the currently prescribed distances between individuals within a unit while increasing dispersion by widening the interval between units. This raises another problem. For what unit level should increased interval be prescribed? Should it be at platoon, company, battalion or regiment? Or should it be at varying levels at different times?

This latter seems the most sensible.



Figure 1. ***Attack through a crust***

When out of direct contact with the enemy, units can be dispersed by increased intervals between companies or even platoons if the area is large enough and there is no requirement for immediate concentration. When in contact with the enemy (attacking or defending), I think increased interval beyond the point of mutual support between units can best be taken between battalions. This preference is based on the range of organic and supporting weapons involved, and on the range of radios with which the units must be controlled. Further, the battalion is the smallest unit with a staff to assist in command, and its current organization permits it to fight semi-independently. Since the battalion appears to be the best size unit to be considered as the basic fighting team, the remainder of this discussion will be primarily concerned with the employment of battalions. These battalions are visualized as operating semi-independently; within each battalion subordinate units do not go beyond mutual supporting distances; between battalions, however, intervals may be extended beyond mutual supporting distances.

When We Attack

In offensive operations, the tactical use of atomic weapons can be visualized in one of two general situations. In the first situation we must break through a continuous, well-organized enemy defensive position with which we are in contact. In the second situation there is no continuous enemy defensive position and opposing forces are relatively far apart.

IN the first situation, *Figure 1* suggests several methods of using atomic weapons to facilitate breaking through continuous enemy positions. Atomic explosives can be placed on the enemy's rear-area positions or on his reserves. *(Targets A, Figure 1).* This will not necessarily assist in breaking through his forward positions or destroy his forces in contact, but will undoubtedly facilitate the stages of the attack following the initial breakthrough of the position. Atomic weapons can also be used to assist the rupture. This is feasible only if we are able to destroy the enemy's forces without endangering our own. Theoretically, we might do this by pulling our troops back until after the blast. As a practical matter, however, this would be both difficult and dangerous. Unless the enemy has been completely surprised, he will simply advance as our troops pull back. This will expose our troops to the hazard of being put to rout while moving back, or may force them to defend in more hastily prepared positions in the rear. Thus, the advantages of using the weapon to create the initial rupture must be carefully weighed against the risks involved in placing the burst close to our own troops. One answer is to use relatively small yield weapons which would place maximum effect on the enemy but leave our forces in contact unharmed. *(Targets C, Figure 1.)* Another way of accomplishing the rupture is by using a higher yield weapon and moving its ground zero farther into the enemy position *(Targets B, Figure 1).* Thus the total front-line distance which is affected can be made to equal that of the lower yield weapon, with an additional bonus of partial destruction of the enemy's rear.

What deviations from present doctrine are necessary in the first situation? A study of *Figure 1* will suggest a few of them. Widely dispersed battalions move to their respective points of attack at the last possible moment by the fastest means available without stopping in assembly areas. Stress is placed on prescribing axes of advance as a means of controlling direction of attack. The column formation becomes the preferred formation. Battalion attacks are conducted independently and rapidly. Seizure of intermediate terrain features is less important than maximizing the destruction and confusion created by the blast and seizing the final objective prescribed for the attack. During the attack, the range capabilities of our current weapons will result in less emphasis being placed on mutual support between battalions, and little if any emphasis being placed on physical contact between battalions. Because of communications limitations and difficulty of control, greater reliance is placed on initiative and skill of attacking commanders.

IN the second situation *(Figure 2)* where limitation of contact to patro action is assumed, most of the tactica concepts envisaged above still apply. Pro tection of our own forces is accomplishec with greater facility due to the ease witl which the smaller forces in contact cai be withdrawn. Since this situation af fords even more freedom of maneuver greater emphasis would fall on commanc initiative and the speed with which unit move forward.

In both of these situations there is ai obvious need for stressing protectioi against enemy atomic weapons. Protec tive measures must be followed before during and after an attack. In the latte case friendly troops must immediatel adopt physical protective measures an must disperse to the maximum degre consistent with maintenance of contrc over the newly-won area.

THERE is a need for good intelligence, efficient alert systems, the best communications possible, and swift planning and execution. The importance of surveillance in the intervals between units becomes greater. The higher commander must assure himself that these intervals are covered in order that there be no voids in which any sizable amounts of enemy can remain undetected. The requirement for units and commanders to function independently and in accordance with an overall plan is likewise evident. In the first situation there is a requirement for smaller yield weapons which can be used close to our own troops. In both situations we can see the tactical value of using higher yield or megaton weapons either alone or in conjunction with smaller yield weapons. The use of these larger yield weapons is especially indicated in areas where enemy troop concentrations are suspected but cannot be pin-pointed. The integration of tactical air power with ground maneuver needs emphasis; it not only enhances the advance of the ground maneuver but helps provide timely intelligence and assists in protecting our troops from air-delivered atomic attacks.

When We Defend

The type of defense to be adopted in a war of atomic capability will depend upon whether the unit is ordered to hold a specific terrain feature or is permitted to exchange ground. In either of the two principal types of defense, position or mobile, it appears that the infantry battalion should again be considered the basic tactical unit.

In the first type of defense the battalion is part of an extended defensive position. It organizes a single terrain feature or a system of separate but related terrain features. As in current doctrine, a battalion can still be held responsible for a frontage not more than two miles in width. In a position defense, therefore, a division can defend a frontage of from eight to twelve miles.

THE mobile defense visualizes the defeat of the enemy by a combination of defensive and offensive actions. The enemy is canalized into an area of the defender's choice and is attacked by all available fires—both atomic and non-atomic. Where such action does not repel or completely stop the enemy his destruction is accomplished by offensive action, utilizing reserves and other non-committed forces that may be available.

Troops are disposed so that a portion of the force is used in security missions to warn of impending attack and to delay and disorganize the enemy, a portion of the force is used in holding organized positions to canalize the attacking forces into terrain favorable to the defender, and a portion of the force is held in reserve to be used alone or with other non-committed elements of the overall force to destroy the enemy by a combination of firepower and offensive maneuver (*Figure 3*). In this type of defense a battalion would occupy a position of from one to two miles, with intervals between battalions extending far beyond mutually supporting distance. Here the division can defend a front from eighteen to thirty miles wide.

For both types of defense we need good intelligence, efficient warning systems, long-range communications, all-around protection, and emphasis on speed. The matter of surveillance in the intervals between units is of vital importance in the defense. The higher commander must assure himself that the enemy cannot infiltrate in these intervals in sufficient numbers to threaten the integrity of strong points, reserves, or critical installations. The higher commander must either provide additional means to the strong points which will allow them to cover these intervals or he must fill the intervals by means which he retains under his own control. While the methods adopted are largely a function of the amount of distance involved between the strong points, the method of solving the problem when the distances become great is one which will be difficult to achieve with our present organization and equipment. The methods of surveillance of the intervals require considerable study. An additional requirement exists for extensive barrier planning for canalizing the enemy into "fire sacs" where he will be forced to concentrate and hence become vulnerable to an atomic blow. This may be done by the skillful use of terrain, by the erection of

Design Contest Ends 30 September

Time is getting short so enter the $100 prize contest for the design of a seal for the Association of the United States Army now. Final entries must arrive at the Association offices no later than 30 September 1954. A postal card to the Secretary will get you a set of rules.

One hint to contestants—the accepted design will be the basis for ROTC medals, and possibly lapel pins, so there is a limit on the amount of detail the design can carry. In other words: keep it simple.



Figure 2. ***Attack when there isn't a crust***

dummy positions or other deceptive measures, and by the use of mines and obstacles. In general, we need a concept of defense which strives to stop the enemy at precisely the place and time of our choice, rendering him vulnerable to an atomic counterattack.

AT this point we again ask the question: What deviations from our present defensive doctrine are necessary? That aspect of current doctrine least applicable is the "defense on a desirable frontage." This type of defense, built around two closely-positioned front-line battalions with the remainder of the regiment relatively close behind, lacks dispersive possibilities, and is totally impractical in atomic warfare.

Movement-to-combat and retrograde operations lend themselves quite readily to atomic warfare simply because they involve movement, and protection goes with movement. A detailed discussion of these operations will not be undertaken here. But it can be said that when such movements are effectively executed by semi-independent, controlled, mobile and self-sufficient units, properly dispersed, they are capable of winning an atomic war. Here, as in the offensive and defensive operations discussed above, only three major capabilities are needed by these units to enable them to achieve the acme of tactical performance: gaining and evaluating intelligence rapidly; having sufficient mobility for infantry units; and being supported by tactical atomic weapons rapidly and effectively.

Training

Training, which increases the probability of success in any operation, becomes an absolute necessity in an atomic war.

Each soldier must have a thorough indoctrination in and understanding of the three major effects of an atomic explosion, and he must learn to protect himself from them. This is the best method of minimizing the effects of an enemy attack. One of its important results is the dissipation of fear caused by lack of knowledge about atomic effects, for fear of atomic warfare could conceivably do more damage to a unit than the physical effects of an atomic explosion.



Figure 3. *Mobile Defense*

Deception is a most important technique for insuring individual protection. Unfortunately we have underemphasized it. It needs revival at all levels. For the individual soldier, what is required is simply a stressing of camouflage and concealment. All positions and troop locations must be completely and cleverly camouflaged and concealed to deny the enemy information on which to base his selection of targets.

There must be extensive instruction in first aid. Present medical facilities are not provided in sufficient quantities to administer adequate first aid to more than a fraction of the anticipated number of atomic casualties. Up-to-date instruction must be given on the treatment of severe burns, the prevention of shock, and the stoppage of severe bleeding.

Training in erection and maintenance of hasty field fortifications must be reemphasized. The great value of even the most rudimentary shielding from heat radiation needs to be fully understood. Even shelter-halves placed on tent poles will shield soldiers who are digging in and thus prevent casualties. The deep foxhole with overhead cover is a minimum requirement. For this, individual training in the use of explosives, engineer entrenching tools, and earth-moving machinery needs to be taught.

Other factors to be considered and emphasized in training are: night movement and night preparation for an attack; the use of fog and smoke to conceal troops and to protect them from the heat effects of the atomic weapon; individual and unit dispersion; the effect of weather on atomic blasts; and other general tactical implications of offensive and defensive use of atomic weapons.

IF we soldiers are to live up to our vowed responsibilities, we must face the challenge of the atomic age. We can neither duck our responsibilities nor panic in the face of them. We must seriously and thoughtfully go about the task of making necessary alterations in our tactical concepts, training, organizations and equipment. We who must adjust the tactics and direct the training should now be preparing for the time when the revised organizations and new equipment become available. We must not permit any lag in our thinking. We must proceed at utmost speed to exchange thoughts, ideas, and opinions and arrive at a meeting of minds. The ideas I have expressed here represent a point of departure whether you accept them or improve upon them, apply yourself to them now. Time will be on our side in this race only if we use every fleeting minute of it.

ESSAYONS

The Combat Engineer

is the Division's

POWER-PACKED PLUS FACTOR

COLONEL MARVIN C. ELLISON

IN every U. S. Army combat division there is a battalion highly trained in skills designed to advance our forces, impede the enemy's forces, and, when necessary, to fight as infantry with as much skill and fortitude as the proudest wearer of the Combat Infantryman Badge. This is the organic combat engineer battalion, an outfit that every experienced commander counts as a heavy plus factor on his side when he compares the full power of his force with that of the enemy.

And behind that organic engineer battalion are other power-plus engineer outfits at corps and army. A full appreciation of the engineer potential available in the U. S. Army would make this plus factor much more effective. I hope to show why this is so.

PROPERLY trained and led, the engineer battalion as now organized and assigned to infantry, airborne and armored divisions can perform the engineer support normally required by the division. With corps and army engineers furnishing engineer support for stream crossings, attack on heavily fortified areas, amphibious operations and actions where heavy reinforcements of engineers are required, the engineer battalion concentrates on supporting its own division to the utmost.

To fully appreciate the capabilities of combat engineers you must comprehend their mission: "to assist the advance of our troops, to impede the advance of the enemy, and to increase the comfort of our troops." In addition to normal missions, combat engineers are trained and armed to fight as infantry when

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COLONEL MARVIN C. ELLISON, Corps of Engineers, has been a National Guardsman, an Army Reservist and is now a Regular.

called upon to do so. In the proud annals of the American Army some of the proudest are infantry actions fought by engineers.

It is during periods of combined training that a full appreciation of the worth of combat engineers must be acquired. For it is at this time, and not later in combat, that the efforts of the engineer battalion must be integrated with infantry, armor and artillery. Infantry commanders from platoon to division must be thoroughly familiar with the organization and equipment of the supporting engineers. Coordinated training can teach them the capabilities of the engineer units that support them.

Too often combat team training has included all units of the combat team except the combat engineers. This is sometimes due to the limited size of the training areas but is more often caused by a lack of appreciation of the importance of having the engineers take part in combined training. In the training phase combat engineers are usually underexercised in field operations and overworked in "increasing the comfort of our troops."

THE divisional combat engineer battalion has four line companies, permitting the normal assignment of one company in support of each of the three divisional combat teams. The fourth line company serves as division reserve and for direct support to the division artillery and division service troops. The airborne division's engineer battalion has three companies rather than four, and each company is slightly smaller in size than the companies in the battalion of the infantry and armored divisions.

Combat teams formed around an infantry regiment are a formidable mobile striking force. But the mobility of such a force is in direct proportion to the available engineer support. In any advance it can be assumed that bridges will be blown and obstacles placed in the path of movement. The engineer company is trained and equipped to clear a way for the combat team. Every infantry field problem or map problem of battalion size or larger should "play" the supporting engineers. They are the people who will keep you moving.

Combat teams can gain much needed experience in cooperation and integration of effort by taking part in prolonged problems and maneuvers. Nothing takes the place of friendships made and cemented by mutual enduring of field hardships experienced in a typical combat team maneuver. A poorly prepared field order or a sloppy message in maneuvers will bring down the wrath of the Old Man, but the same mistake in combat may well bring down a rain of steel.

Infantry officers can learn a lot about combat engineers in combat team training but to gain even closer coordination it is better to give infantry officers short assignments to the combat engineer battalion. Combat team assignment of engineers should be planned so that normally the same units train together and thus gain essential mutual confidence.

Engineer units are assigned in support rather than attached in order to provide the division engineer with flexibility of engineer effort. Except in unusual situations, the division engineer should retain control of the entire battalion, placing engineer support where needed. Conditions will often arise that require attachments of engineer units to regiments or battalions, as in amphibious or air-transported operations. When such operations are completed, the attached unit should revert to the control of the division engineer.

JUST what can a combat team commander expect from his supporting combat engineer company? The infantryman will know how to make use of the fire power in the engineer battalion. Those 145 M1 rifles, six caliber .30 machine guns, four caliber .50, heavy barrel machine guns and nine 3.5-inch rocket launchers look like a Christmas bonus to him. This engineer fire power is wonderful in a pinch but it should always be considered strictly as "mad money," to be used only when the alternative is a long walk home.

This is because an engineer company committed to infantry combat cannot perform engineering work until the commitment ends. If the situation calls for the attachment of the engineer company it will be under the command of the combat team commander and he can use it as he desires, but he can be more certain of success in the showdown if he has used it wisely and with a thought to its reason for existence.

The principal capabilities of an engineer company are revealed by its equipment. Normal combat engineer tasks are performed by squads and platoons. Each squad is mounted on a 2½-ton dump truck and has a carpenter set, a pioneer set and a demolition set. Platoon headquarters has a similar set of equipment.

An engineer line company can be expected to furnish nine well trained squads equipped to perform normal field engineering tasks. Company headquarters is equipped with a bulldozer and a motorized air compressor to back up the platoons and squads. Some of these tasks are: organization of a defensive position; supervision of tactical wire defense; laying of mines; removal of mines; repair of bridges; construction of trestle bent bridges; construction or repair of culverts; repair of roads; channelizing the advance by establishment of blank barriers and road blocks; construction of hasty shelter for the first aid station and

Engineers use miles of barbed wire. Here they are wiring in a minefield in Korea.

In modern warfare mines by the millions are used by all armies, and engineers detect and plant them. At left a combat engineer outfit of the 25th Infantry Division sweeps a road leading into Inchon, Korea; this was in February 1951. At right an engineer plants an antitank mine along a Korean road. This was in April 1951.

:ommand post, and engineer reconnais-
;ance.

COMBAT engineers of all echelons are schooled and trained in the technique of stream crossing. In the infantry divi-
;ion the engineer battalion is equipped with a fixed steel treadway bridge. In the armored division the engineer bat-
:alion is equipped with a fifty-ton fixed and floating bridge capable of spanning a maximum of 355 feet when con-
;tructed in a combination of a fixed and floating bridge.

Each company in the engineer battal-
on knows how to put up a bridge, but normally the job falls to the reserve company rather than one of the com-
panies assigned to direct support of combat teams. This leaves the support-
ng engineer company with its regular assigned combat team to assist in the initial assault crossing and front line support in establishing a bridgehead. The critical zone in a stream crossing is the bridgehead or area on the far shore, the possession of which will deny the enemy observed artillery fire on the main crossing site. Once the assault echelons have gained the far shore the close support of the combat engineers is essential to continued success. Mine fields must be located and lanes cleared and marked, and the road net improved to provide a rapid exit from the crossing sites.

All combat engineer companies receive training in construction of the Bailey bridge, which is not organic to the divisional engineer battalion but could be available from corps or army dumps.

Engineers purify the water you drink. This is a diatomaceous earth water purifier in use in Newfoundland.



Construction of this type bridge will most likely be assigned to corps troops. Stream crossings which involve more than one division can be more certain of success if the corps engineers operate assault boats, construct and operate ferries, construct footbridges and the principal floating bridges within the corps' zone. This leaves the division engineer battalion free to put full effort into the task of supporting the infantry in breaking out of the bridgehead.

Training in stream crossing expedients should be conducted by each combat team under the supervision of the supporting engineer company. Tailor-made methods are often impossible and therefore infantry, artillery and armor should be trained in the many improvised methods that engineers know.

Combat engineers are especially trained and equipped to play key roles in the reduction of strongly fortified positions. This type of attack requires detailed reconnaissance of the fortified zone followed by rehearsals, terrain appreciations by the engineer assault party and supporting troops.

THE combat engineer battalion of an infantry division is equipped with

four 35 GPM portable diatomite water purification sets operated by the supply personnel of the battalion. Each combat team is supported by a water purification team operating one purification set in its zone of operations. The fourth purification set is retained as a reserve or for supply of water to division troops. In a rapid advance, purification sets are leapfrogged forward to provide water supply to advancing troops.

Amphibious operations are supported by amphibious brigades and engineer units of corps and army. The division engineer battalion must be free to furnish close-in support of the combat teams as they move across the beach into dispersal areas or into assault of beach installations. The division engineers assist in unloading heavy equipment and supplies from the landing craft but are principally concerned with organizing dispersal areas for the division, removal of mines and construction of access roads required to get the division clear of the beach area. Combat engineers should be trained in the techniques of shore party operations so as to be prepared to assist shore operations in an emergency. Priority for landing of engineer equipment depends upon information as to requirements obtained by study of maps, aerial photos and intelligence summaries.

TRAINING of field forces continues to emphasize the importance of being able to air-transport any and all divisional units. The engineer battalion must know how to load men and equipment in standard planes for air movement. The establishment of an airhead in enemy territory will require that the combat engineers arrive early and with essential equipment to insure that the area is organized to protect supplies and support further operations. The division engineer should recommend a loading plan that will provide a high priority for landing of engineer personnel and equipment for an air-transported opera-

You name the kind of bridge you would like to have and the engineers can build it. Above, the 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company—an Eighth Army outfit—is putting in the last section of the foundation for a ponton bridge across the Hantan River in Korea. This was in August 1951. Below, the same outfit is moving in to swing a temporary bridge across the Han River. This was in March 1951.



ion. The pay load must of necessity be boiled down to essentials. Except for the heaviest engineer equipment, the engineer company assigned to the combat team making the air move should arrive in the airhead shortly after the first elements touch down. Engineers will be needed at once to supervise laying of mine fields, establishment of road blocks and to repair access roads preparatory to breakout.

Engineer reconnaissance is coordinated and supervised by the reconnaissance section in battalion headquarters but all engineer troops are trained to make sure that engineer reconnaissance is continuous. Success of combat operations depends largely upon information gained through engineer reconnaissance and that, to a certain extent, is information that all combat commanders must have either from engineer sources or from other troops under their command. Combat engineers are especially trained to reconnoiter routes of communications, bivouac sites, mine fields, fortified areas, bridges, stream crossing sites, and unusual terrain obstacles, and report such additional information as required for the division engineer to fit in a pattern of information for the division Commander. Engineer intelligence is coordinated with division G2 and in addition to normal combat intelligence operations provides the necessary technical intelligence survey of captured enemy material.

THE division engineer serves as commander of the organic engineer battalion and as a special staff officer for the commanding general. He maintains constant liaison with members of the general staff by means of his assistant division engineer who is a field grade officer on his staff. The division engineer is an important member of the division planning staff and should be called upon for plans and recommendations to dovetail into plans formulated by the division staff.

Planning staffs sometimes fail to obtain recommendations from the engineer officer and this may result in plans that are doomed to failure.

The combat engineer battalion must have highly trained specialists. Untrained men are no good to it until they are converted into topnotch engineer soldiers.

I must again emphasize that the plus factor that is the combat engineer battalion can be fully realized only if the engineer is integrated into combined training.

Combat engineers destroy as well as build. Above, a couple of them set a charge in a dike in Korea. This was in August 1950. And below, a bridge across the Han that was blown in November 1950.



Managers and Leaders

LT. GEN. GEORGE H. DECKER
Army Information Digest
June 1954

While it is easy to say that the Army should base its solution to management problems upon the latest approved methods prevailing in commerce and industry, especially where these closely approach civilian conditions, it must always be kept in mind that the Army is imbued with the doctrine that it is proper to sacrifice money, material or facilities when necessary to preserve lives. The Army, it is true, is engaged in many types of business, but it faces management problems more diverse and complex than those found in any single commercial firm. The managers of industry, for example, are rarely if ever faced with decisions that may mean life or death of thousands of individuals—or affect the actual security of the Nation.

By virtue of his role in the Army organization, the Army officer must be primarily qualified to lead men in combat. But he must also be able to provide effective leadership in non-tactical situations.

U. S. Learns from Turkey

GEORGE C. McGHEE
Foreign Affairs
July 1954

The Turkish attitude is perhaps best shown by the reaction to the United Nations' request for help in repelling the aggression of the North Koreans. Turkey had at that time received no commitments from the Western Powers for her own defense, but on July 22, 1950, the Turkish Government announced that it was sending a brigade of 5,000 men to Korea—the first to respond to the appeal after the United States. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes stated at the time: "It is only by way of a decision similar to ours, to be arrived at by other freedom loving nations, that acts of aggression can be prevented and world peace can be safeguarded. A sincere attachment to the ideals of the United Nations requires a belief in this basic principle."

Relations between Turkey and the United States have developed harmoniously not only because both have the same basic attitude toward the issues of the cold war, but also because Turkey has no colonies or areas of special political or economic interest and has no desire to recover territories that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Hence she is able to take what might be described as a symmetrical attitude with respect to world problems. Some of our Western European allies do have such areas of interest in Asia and Africa, and their policies toward them are superimposed upon common policies arising out of the cold war. The cross-currents of these sometimes conflicting ties in North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China create problems in relationships with Americans which do not exist in the case of the Turks.

American understanding of the problem of dealing with the Soviet Union . . . seems now to have caught up with that of the Turks. The Turks have also shown us that it is possible to live in equanimity, without yielding, alongside an implacable enemy. They have been able to do this because they maintain a high degree of military preparedness and a strong national unity. "Why didn't you ask *us* about the Russians?" they frequently say. "We could have told you about them. Our attitude toward them did not change during and after the war because *they* did not change. Indeed, they have been the same for the hundreds of years that we have known them."

Rebirth of an Army

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL ALBERT KESSELRING
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record
William Morrow & Co., 1954

What was the Reichswehr itself up to [during the 1920s]? As an executive at the time I can answer that. The brains of the Reichswehr Ministry were concentrated on sifting war experience, incorporating its lessons in technical, organizational and educational programmes and framing new operational, administrative and technical directives. It goes without saying that "estimates" were a very important consideration. The main target was to keep abreast of technical improvements made by the Allies after the conclusion of peace and—when the time should be ripe—to resurrect the German army equipped with modern weapons. In training there were two main objects: first, to establish a prototype body of combined arms; and secondly, to train the private soldier for non-commissioned and commissioned rank. The political conditions prevailing dictated that our operations be restricted to "the defence of the Reich"—primarily, therefore, to the fortification of the eastern frontier and East Prussia and to securing them by a frontier defence force to be formed in an emergency. An effort was also made to close the obvious gaps in the Reichswehr by training ex-officers and NCOs and a limited quota of short-term volunteers. All in all, this glimpse of the work of the Reichswehr should suffice to show that life in the army was no *dolce far niente.*

Much of my time was occupied with the reorganization f the Ordnance Department. Here the fusion of the two ranches, construction and supply, resolved the conflict of leas that had previously subsisted between them. The General Staff's conclusions about the conduct of any future ar formed the basis of clearly defined requirements in eapons, which were given by the Ordnance Inspectorate the experimental stations for construction and to the Ordnance Supply Department for placing orders. These echnical departments dealt directly with the industry. Trial ieces delivered by the factories were thoroughly tried out n the different experimental ranges of the Ordnance Department for serviceability. If they were passed, individual xperimental units subjected the weapon to the severest tests n service conditions, any faults discovered being later liminated by the supplying firms. It will be clear even to a ayman that the interval between the placing of an order nd the date of general issue to the troops ran into years, nd in the case of heavy pieces, such as big guns, to six to even years. A new type of gun, for example, was therefore ometimes already obsolete by the time it was issued to the rmy. For technical and financial reasons this was the right vorking method in peacetime. In wartime it had to be bandoned, though the departure from the established system had many repercussions and was often unsatisfactory o the forces in the field.

Soviet Power Grows

FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY
U. S. News and World Report
4 June 1954

From 1947 to the present time, the numerical strength (175 divisions) of Soviet ground forces has remained fairly onstant. Nonetheless, significant changes have been made in avor of increased mechanization with sturdy and efficient nodern equipment. Sixty-five divisions of the present establishment are tank and mechanized divisions. Moreover, the ifle divisions have been provided motorized equipment; they also now have organic tanks and additional artillery. Thus, he mobility and firepower of all Soviet divisions have been ncreased through the introduction of improved weapons and equipment.

The U.S.S.R., Eastern Germany and the East European satellites today have over 6 million men under arms. Approximately 4.5 million of these are in the ground forces. A high state of preparedness is maintained by a rigorous training program.

The number of satellite divisions has almost doubled since 1947, bringing their total to about 80 divisions.

The U.S.S.R. has a ready-made spearhead for a rapid advance into Western Europe. This spearhead is composed of 22 Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany, the bulk of these armored divisions with nearly a complete complement of tanks and self-propelled guns. Behind this spearhead there are an additional 60 Soviet divisions located in the Eastern European satellite countries and Western U.S.S.R. (This does not take into account satellite divisions.)

Their mobilization system is exercised periodically to insure its effectiveness, and by M 30 (thirty days after mobilization day) the Soviet and satellite ground forces could number 400 divisions.

Loose Concepts

COLONEL GEORGE REINHARDT
"Atomic Warfare—Targets at Home and Abroad"
From a speech at Boston

Two other widely . . . and loosely . . . mentioned aspects of tactical atomic warfare are "dispersion" and "profitable target." Again a definitive solution is impossible but here we can state parameters of measurement. Both dispersion and profitable targets are relative concepts . . . like the principles of war. Both are meaningless until the specific situation is known. Then they attain the importance usually, and erroneously, conferred upon them as general formulas.

A British comment best epitomizes "profitable target." "Had Lord Wavell possessed a single atomic bomb in North Africa his most profitable target would have been Rommel's command car, when the Desert Fox was in it!"

Tactical urgencies may dictate using an atomic missile against a lone company deeply dug into a key location, while an assembled regiment, posted where it cannot influence the action in progress, remains unmolested.

The other fetish, dispersion, degenerates into absurdity when applied to deploying a battalion so it cannot be shattered by one atomic missile. Were that done the battalion commander could neither control nor communicate with his subordinates. His unit's combat effectiveness would disappear. Clearly atomic dispersion applies *between* units of battalion size or larger, not *within* those units.

Silver Bullets

LEWIS MUMFORD
The New Leader
28 June 1954

With the invention of the atom bomb, the United States stepped into a role on the international stage not unlike that of the Emperor Jones in Eugene O'Neill's play. We believed, officially, that the atom bomb made us invulnerable; but as we stumbled through the jungle of the postwar world, secure in this self-imposed delusion, we gradually lost our own sense of direction; presently, as night overtook us, menacing fears and specters arose in our own minds, making ever louder the ominous beat of the distant Russian war-drums. None of our wild random shots has caused these frightening images to disappear; and, at the end, we find that we have nothing left by way of an effective answer to our fears except the magic of a silver bullet: first the atom, now the hydrogen bomb. Perhaps the figure would be a little more accurate if one said that we have a whole cartridge belt of silver bullets, but, like so many of the magic gifts in ancient fairy stories, there is an unexpected penalty attached to their use: The result of using all of them might be to wipe out our friends and allies as well as our enemy. In O'Neill's play, you will remember, silver bullets killed the Emperor Jones. They were fired by savages who had copied his magic.

TACTICS

The Copter Cavalry Raids the Eleventh Army CP

MAJOR BERT DECKER

ILLUSTRATED BY CHARLES M. BARNES

CAL STUART, CO of the Fifth Helicopter Cavalry Squadron, was excited. His men sensed it even if his face had his usual calm expression.

"We have a very intriguing mission," he told them. "I'll give you the facts first. Maps and air-photos will be here in a minute. Then we will work out the answers."

His twenty-three pilots, sprawled in the grass at his feet, all grinned at him. One muttered, "Intriguing! I'll bet!"

"Intelligence claims that the enemy's Air Marshal Bigwig and General Brain, his Chief of Staff, visited their Twenty-fourth Army Headquarters last night and left around noon headed north. We have a hunch they will next visit the Eleventh Army CP." He paused.

"That's right," he said, "the Eleventh. The Army CP and JOC that I have been harping we should get a crack at. As you know, it is well beyond our range. Neither our jets nor bombers can get at it because it is in a deep, narrow canyon. Because we might catch their two Big Shots there, the old man has finally given in. We leave tonight and hit them at dawn.

"We'll all have to memorize routes in and out plus alternate routes. Also, we will have to stop for gas somewhere in enemy territory. Anybody got any ideas? It will have to be in this general area." He pointed to the map.

His second in command, Joe Sloan, put his finger at a spot on the map a couple of soldiers had fastened to a board behind the CO. "There's an enemy gas farm about five hundred yards from where those five roads come together."

"No! No!" said Stuart. "That will endanger our mission too much. We will haul our own gas in. I want a good, safe spot where we can set down and hide for a couple of hours. If we steal gas, they'll know we're going deeper. And how 'bout coming back?"

Double-Doug Davis, leader of Flight E, jumped up and hurried up to the map.

"I've got just the spot, Cal," he said, "just the spot. Right here, see, right here. It's an old tunnel, a deserted tunnel. Those Underground chaps I took in the other night use it for a headquarters sorta. It's a dream—that I can tell you."

Stuart grinned at him. "You're sure it is safe, safe?" he asked.

"Sure, Cal, sure!" protested Doug, not even realizing he was being kidded. "It's safe. The bridges were knocked out. Bridges on both sides of it were knocked out months ago. No roads within miles of it. Wild. Hilly. Very wild. That's why those partisans use it. It's big. Very big. We could fly the squadron—the whole darn squadron right in." He stopped for breath.

"That's it, then," said Stuart. "Good boy, Doug. A Big Banana will haul in our gas. It can bring back prisoners if any. We will also take four other Bananas loaded with 48 Rangers. Half will be assault and demolition men, the rest snipers with telescopic sights. Two squadrons of our jets will stage diversionary raids, one on each side of the general area. Other squadrons will be keeping most of their jets busy while we are coming and going. One squadron will even be at our beck and call in case we need help. We really rate on this one. I'll give you call-signs later."

STUART pointed to a large air-photo. "Here's the layout. The Eleventh CP and JOC are in mines at the very base of the canyon's west wall. You can't see the openings but you can see where the old railroad beds lead into them, here, here, and here. Notice the

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MAJOR BERT DECKER, USAF, enlisted in the Army in 1942, was trained as a radar mechanic and then attended the Signal Corps OCS. He was assigned to Army Air Forces communications outfits and participated in the assault on Iwo Jima as the commander of the Shore Party of the 386th Air Service Group and earned the Purple Heart. He left the service in 1945 in the rank of major and returned in 1951. Since then he has served with NATO in Europe and is, he tells us, one of "Juin's Junior Jokers." His interest in helicopters is a long one, going back to the days "when almost everyone laughed at my ideas."

nyon is less than five hundred yards ide at this point. The floor is rough. ›me of these big boulders are large ıough to hide a copter behind. The ananas would fit into these gullies and safe. Down-canyon, that is, south—see ı this other photo?—the canyon opens › into a broad plain.

"This is the key. See this spot high p on the west rim? That's a concrete ›servation post. We hope four of our ıngers will get that just before dawn. our of you—Flight B—will take them › within a couple of miles of that ob-ervation post at midnight. There is ›me remote radar and radio right next › it. The Rangers will knock that out ›o. We are hoping that with that radio ut the JOC will be silenced, at least on s short-range fighter-control net. In-elligence can't locate their alternate site they have one.

"The plan in general is this. The two ig Bananas with snipers will land on ıe east rim so they will be shooting cross valley into the mines. Six of ıem will be moved down to the rim at he canyon's mouth to cover anything hat tries to come in. We will go over he rim here and drop straight down on hem. One Banana with assault and lemolition Rangers will come down can-on from here, the other will come up anyon from the mouth. We'll blast he entrances and give them a chance o surrender. We're taking a lad who peaks their language and a PA system."

"We'll all go in at once?" asked Joe Nash.

"No! Flight F will be our reserve, ınd the only ones loaded with napalm. They will stay on the rim, take cover, ›erhaps in these trees, and wait my call."

The CO was still giving them details ın hour later when five big helicopters wung into the clearing and cut their en-gines. Rangers began to pour out of four ›f them. They were a tough-looking ›unch loaded down with equipment. A small, slight captain left them and walked briskly over to Stuart.

"Major Stuart?" he asked, saluting. "I'm Sam Brown."

"Glad to know you, Sam," smiled Stuart. "This is my Exec, Joe Nash."

"Hell-o Joe. Sir, we're all ready. But I would like to talk to the men who will ›e taking the advance party in to get hat observation post."

"Good deal," said Stuart. "Who are you going to have for that detail?"

"I'll be one of 'em," said the captain.

"Yourself?" Stuart asked.

"Myself," said the captain.

"Oh," said Stuart.

"I feel it's an important mission."

The little man was almost belligerent.

"It is," said Stuart drily. "We'd better get to business," he said, "we have a lot to talk over."

IT was just dusk when the five Big Bananas took off. The squadron, twenty-four single-seater cavalry copters, slipped out of the hideout ten minutes later. They caught the Bananas just before they hit enemy territory and fell into pre-planned formations. They split into six groups. All but Flight E covered a Banana, each Banana leading a flight over a different pre-planned route. From ravine to ravine they dipped, whirled through railroad passes, skimmed up and down small rivers. Overhead, comparatively low, both enemy and friendly jets flew, a lot of them. Some ack-ack pounded in the distance but not at them.

They found the railroad tunnel easily. They flew up a small valley until they spotted a bombed-out bridge with their infrared and followed the railroad tracks to the big black blob which was the tunnel entrance. As Double Doug predicted, they flew right in, even the Big Bananas. As planned, all flight leaders and Captain Brown reported to Stuart at the entrance.

"Who's missing?" asked Stuart.

"Alsop, Flight F," answered Carl Lyons, flight leader of E. "He rolled out. I couldn't see what happened except a machine gun opened up on the Banana with tracers, Alsop clobbered it, and another gun opened up on him. John and I silenced the second machine gun but it was too late."

"Do you know where that spot is?"

"Yes, sir, I have it well marked."

"Good!" said Stuart. "Tell me later. Have all pilots memorize it as an 'Avoid Spot.' Alsop knows the return routes?"

"Yes, sir."

"Good! Maybe some of us will spot him tomorrow night returning. Captain Brown, please have your men help gas-up, except those being used for security guards."

"I've already given the order, Major."

"Thank you. Lyons, you will take my number four with your flight. I want at least four copters loaded with napalm. I'm glad we brought that napalm in the Banana or we'd have lost one already."

"Yes, sir," said Lyons. "I'll tell Four."

"We have hot coffee," said Stuart. "Let's get back in a Banana where we can have a little light. This way."

Back in the Banana, they were sipping coffee and the Ranger captain spoke up. "I have one question." He was looking at Stuart. Stuart just raised his eyebrows and kept sipping his coffee.

"Why do you have the Bananas go first?"

"That's a good question. It took us quite a while to realize that that was the best way. The idea is this. The element of surprise is the most important factor. You are low to the ground, the engines are comparatively quiet, and you are moving right along. The first copter is usually on a person and almost gone before he realizes what's happening. If he gets a shot at whoever is first, it is usually a go-away shot. Notice that tonight we lost a copter which was second in line, not the Banana which was first. That is in spite of the fact that the Banana is a much bigger target, can't weave and duck like a copter, and has no fire-power. They don't like to shoot at us when we are shooting at them. Moving, we're harder to hit than they are, and they seldom have a floating sight like we do. Our fire is just more effective. However, it's just the opposite to infantry. We seldom lose the lead man. It's our tail-end Charlie that gets shot up the most." He went on, explaining copter tactics. The others sipped their coffee and listened.

At 2330 hours, Flight B, Captain Brown and his three Rangers, were ready. Brown and the Rangers had blackened their faces. They wore sneakers, had wicked-looking knives, .45 automatics, and tommyguns.

At 0145, Flight B returned, fifteen minutes late. Stuart was fretting. "What caused the delay?" he asked as soon as Mike reported.

"We were jumped halfway there," Mike said. "No matter what way we ducked, someone else cut loose at us. We were so busy for a while we got lost. Scattered, naturally. Joined up at the objective. Brown has a slight wound in the leg. I bandaged it; suggested he come back. He just growled, 'I rank you,' so we took off. Came back another way."

"Is that all?"

"Yes, except I had to go up to a thousand feet once to get a quick radio bearing."

"What?"

"Gees, Major, they knew we were in the area with all that shooting. It was over twenty-five miles from here," protested Mike.

"Damn!" said Stuart. "Just what I was afraid of. I hope they don't alert the Eleventh. Did it ever dawn on you that the lads that shot at you might not bother to phone in, but that the radar that picks you up automatically reports to the JOC?"

Mike didn't bother to answer that. After a long uncomfortable silence, Stuart growled.

"Okay, okay, good work otherwise. Try to get a couple of hours of sleep. Think, next time. You're a flight leader!"

THE whole outfit pulled out an hour before dawn. Again the different groups took different routes. Stuart heaved a sigh of relief, when he saw the slight, small figure of Brown standing on the round concrete top of the observation post. Brown's arm was in a sling but he waved them on through the morning mist with his good one. "I thought he was wounded in the leg!" thought Stuart as he started to look around for the rest of the squadron. As he looked they materialized out of the mist. One flight was missing. It had to be Flight F because all the Bananas were there. He had sent their Banana with E when F had loaded their napalm. Well, F is my reserve—if they get here. No use waiting. The squadron was forming on him fast. Out of the corner of his eye he saw a Banana pick up Brown and his three Rangers and head south for the canyon's mouth. Stuart took the squadron over the rim, right down through the soup. The engines were quiet at quarter throttle. It was eerie, that drop. Stuart's tummy was up around his throat somewhere.

They broke through the ceiling after dropping less than a hundred feet. The canyon floor came up fast. Stuart spotted a mine opening but no signs of life. One of the copters in Flight C opened up with his thirties but Stuart couldn't see what he was shooting at. Two more copters opened up. Stuart saw a running man cut down. He glanced up canyon and saw the Banana coming down low. The Rangers already had the door open. No sight of Brown from down canyon.

Three men charged out of a mine opening. They tried to stop but a copter cut them down in their tracks, flew over their bodies, and slammed his whole eight rockets into the opening. Stuart hovered and watched the other openings getting the same treatment. The Rangers were piling out of the Banana. Stuart glanced down canyon. Where was Brown? Something must be wrong.

"Fool One to Fool Two and Three. Check on that Banana coming in the canyon mouth."

The two copters darted down canyon.

"Ranger Ten to Fool One. Sir, this is Ashley on the rim with five men. There is an ack-ack outfit up here about 400 yards from us. Four guns, so there must be thirty or forty men up here some-

vhere. With the racket you guys are naking and the way this fog is lifting, ve may be having trouble soon. One of ur boys just sniped their guard."

"Roger," snapped Stuart. "Fool One o Banana One. Get all your snipers ack up on that rim to Ashley."

"Banana One says 'Wilco.'"

"Fool One to Fool Six. Check both ims for any signs of other ack-ack outts."

"Fool Six to Fool One. Wilco!"

"Fool Two to Fool One. Brown's Banana crashed. A machine gun here id it. We clobbered it from the rear. Most of the Rangers are clear. Captain Brown wants . . ."

Brown's voiced interrupted.

"Send me the other Banana, Stuart. 've got three wounded!"

"Wilco, Brown! Banana Three, did ou hear that?"

"Yes, sir! We'll get them!"

Stuart grinned to himself. "That little ocker Brown, can't wait to get into the vorst of it," he thought. He watched 'ool Two take Brown right up to a mine pening where some of the Rangers were ugging in demolitions. As he watched, Ranger slumped over holding his leg nd everyone jumped away from the enrance. He could see Brown yelling and waving his arms. A big Ranger with a flame-thrower came trotting up, angling to get to one side of the entrance.

"Fool Six to Fool One."

"Report, Fool Six!" snapped Stuart.

"I spotted another ack-ack outfit. It's about two miles north of the observation post, a mile off the rim. No activity."

"Hide yourself, watch it from the ground. Report any activity."

"Wilco!"

The Banana from the mouth of the canyon was returning. Rangers poured out and joined Brown's group which was heaving demolitions into the entrance.

"Sir," Ashley's voice broke in. "This ack-ack outfit is pulling out! My scout located their quarters back in the woods. They are headed out on the double, south."

"They're not pulling out! Someone from the CP must have phoned them. They are trying to get down around and in the mouth of the canyon. Follow along on top of the rim and lay sniper fire down in them when you can."

"Yes, sir, out!"

"Fool One to Fool Three. Are you still at the mouth of the canyon?"

"Fool Three, sir. Yes, sir, I am. Fool Two told me to cover this Ranger taking care of these wounded."

"Fool One to Banana Three . . . Banana Three!"

"Banana Three, sir."

"Pick up those wounded at the mouth of the canyon and get them up to the rendezvous on the rim. Fool Three, you cover. There is an enemy unit coming around from the east on foot."

STUART's was the only copter hovering. The rest of the squadron were perched all around the canyon, their machine guns pointed at the mine openings. The Rangers seemed to be having their own way at two of the openings, lugging in demolitions as if they were on a picnic. They were in the third one but they were going in and out cautiously in rushes as if some fire were still coming from inside somewhere.

"Fool One to Fool Nine and Flight C."

"Fool Nine to Fool One."

"Did you hear me talking to Ashley about that ack-ack outfit?"

"Sir, yes."

"Take your flight up over the rim and hit them once from the rear. Once only. Use channel Two for communications."

"Wilco!"

"Ashley, did you hear that?"

"Yes, sir."

"Can you see any of them from where you are?"

"No, sir, but our men are scattered along the rim for almost a mile and they are getting a shot off once in a while. They don't waste bullets on nothing."

"Good. Ashley, get one man up high to keep a good watch far to the south. There is a tank-farm down there somewhere."

"Yes, sir. Sir, Flight C just went over. One of our men is pointing out the enemy for them. Gees! They're really scatterin' 'em. Our lads are getting some open shots at 'em too. I don't think you have to worry much about this bunch."

"Good, Ashley, keep a watch south. Out!"

Stuart looked at his watch. 0423. Only seventeen minutes ago since they came over the rim. What's holding up Brown? He lifted his copter over to the mine opening where he had last seen him. He cut his motor and leaned out.

"Where's Brown?" he yelled.

A Ranger standing by the entrance dabbing at a bloody forehead peered into the entrance.

"Brown!" he roared and gestured. Brown came limping out. "He is wounded in the leg," thought Stuart, "and the arm."

"Gees Us! Stuart! We wrecked the JOC and cleaned out the other two openings but there are some jokers in here, a big bunch we can't get at. Get that PA system down here and the lad who speaks their lingo. They'll either surrender or we'll bury them alive." Brown turned back to the mine.

Stuart gave rapid orders.

"Ranger Ten to Fool One."

"Yes, Ashley."

"There are two tanks coming up a ravine about a mile from the canyon mouth. Two trucks of troops are following them about two hundred yards. That ravine is east of the canyon mouth. They will be on you in three or four minutes."

Stuart wondered if his reserve squadron had arrived.

"Fool One to Flight F. Did you hear that?"

"Fool Twenty-One of Flight F. Yes, sir. Shall we napalm them?"

"Drop over the rim on them as they come into the canyon. Ashley, have your snipers make those tanks button up so they can't see. Stop those trucks now, Ashley. Your men should be able to hit them at a mile from your height. Use channel Two for orders, Fool Twenty-One."

"Ashley here, sir. Sir, there is also something moving far to the south. Can't quite see what it is, trucks or tanks or something. Sir! There's enemy jets overhead too."

"Damn!" swore Stuart, "I hope Flight F heard that." He glanced at his watch as he switched on his long-range radio. It was 0429.

"Fool One to Control X-ray."

"Control X-ray to Fool One."

"Execute Plan . . ." Stuart almost had his ears torn off as the enemy jammed his long range frequency.

"I wonder if he got my execute," thought Stuart as he switched to his FM short-range band. "He should know damn well I wouldn't call unless I wanted help." He switched to channel Two just in time to hear Flight F going into action.

STUART started to lift his copter. He looked south and saw the two copters dropping over the rim of the canyon. They were dropping like stones straight down. He couldn't see the tanks so he gunned his copter to climb. He thought he saw a napalm bomb start to drop when a jet plane zoomed by from the north missing him by five feet and leaving him a nervous wreck fighting for his copter's control in the terrific back-wash.

"My god!" Stuart recognized Fool Four's horrified voice. He could see black napalm smoke billowing up from the canyon.

"Fool Four, report!" he cried.

"That jet crashed headlong into Carl. Just a second after Carl got his tank. He only missed me by three feet. They are scattered all over the canyon."

"Fool One's to all Fools. Stay low. Get behind a rock if possible. They will be sending another through here for a look see when that one doesn't report. All even Fools, point your weapons up canyon. All odd Fools, point your weapons down canyon."

"Ranger Ten to Fool One."

"Yes, Ashley?"

"There are both tanks and trucks to the south. About three, maybe four miles."

"Watch 'em."

"Yes, sir, your copters shot up those two trucks. Got 'em burning. The copters are coming back into the canyon. Plenty jets overhead."

"Watch those jets. If one starts a run on the canyon, let us know."

"Yes, sir!"

Stuart looked at his watch. 0433. Where the hell was Brown? Those tanks would be here in five or six minutes.

"Sir! sir! Ashley here. A jet is coming in again from the north."

He had no sooner heard Ashley, than Stuart saw the jet. It was coming down canyon about a hundred feet high. Stuart didn't have time to get into action but the jet ran into a hail of fire from the other copters. It blew apart in mid-air and crashed to the canyon floor in a long burst of flame about 300 yards.

"They won't send any more!" thought Stuart. "They are not that crazy." He looked over at the mines and a Ranger dodging towards him. He leaned out of the copter. "Where's Brown?" he yelled. "Tell him tanks coming." He looked at his watch. 0437. "Tell him he's got two minutes, that tanks are coming and we only have two napalm bombs left."

"Fool One to Ranger Ten."

"Yes, sir," said Ashley.

"How far are those tanks?"

"About two miles, sir."

"Any jet coming from the south, low?"

"Can't see any, sir."

"When those tanks get close, make them button up. You two with the napalm!"

"Yes, sir?"

"Get up on top of the rim. We'll use you one at a time, that will slow them down. The first one might even stop them cold. They're not that tough."

"Wilco."

NOW where was this damn fool Brown? Better get the Bananas down here and start picking up Rangers.

"Ashley?"

"Yes, sir."

"I can't see any jets overhead. Can you?"

"No, sir, . . . none overhead . . ." His voice grew excited. "There are some coming from the south, low. I think they are . . . sir, they are making a run on those tanks. Oh boy! They're napalming the hell out of them."

That was it. Five minutes later Brown strutted out of the mines with four high-ranking officers walking in front of him. They had too many prisoners and had to leave about thirty behind. They were back at the tunnel by 0615. They lay around all day and sneaked home.

Stuart always wondered why that second ack-ack outfit never got into the act. Even if Brown cut their phone lines when he cut all the wires near the observation post, they should have heard the racket. Maybe it was just too early in the morning. All in all, it was a good jaunt. With the JOC buried, the enemy's air defense should be poor for several weeks. Should be able to figure some more interesting jobs. "I wonder if Intelligence knows where a juicy enemy army group headquarters is located," he mused.

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 12 | *Selection for Senior Military Schools*

MANY officers who visit the offices of the Combat Arms Career Branches have a keen and understandable interest in the way we select students for senior service schools. It is apparent from their questions that they generally have an erroneous impression of that process. This article will discuss the specific method by which infantry, artillery and armor officers are selected for attendance at schools of the levels of the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the War Colleges.

ALL officers should appreciate that the Army's school system is limited by time and money. Fewer than fifty per cent of all combat arms officers can be accommodated at the Command and General Staff College and of those who graduate from this school, less than half can expect to attend top military colleges. This means that many able officers will not be able to receive such schooling, but it assuredly does not limit the mental or practical development of such officers. It has been proved again and again that selection criteria have never been perfect, nor does the present Career Management Organization expect to ever achieve such perfection. Officers should not become discouraged and unhappy because they are not selected to attend one of our top schools. There are many examples that support this statement. A sizable number of general officers of World War II were not among those who had the advantage of privileged school training.

Basically, the selection system is predicated upon the following principles:

- An officer is required to compete only with his contemporaries. To facilitate such consideration, officers are divided into basic year groups. These year groups are delineated in the case of Regular Army officers by their basic date of rank as published in the Army Register (certain readjustments are made in the case of competitive tour officers). Reserve officers are segregated into year groups by years of active commissioned service.
- The individual's record speaks for itself as regards broadness of his experience and manner of performance. It is assumed that all officers want to attend these schools so all records are considered regardless of whether an application is made. Special recommendations are carefully evaluated but ultimate favorable decision depends upon demonstrated merit as indicated by the overall record.
- Fair, unbiased, consistent consideration is given each officer.
- Annual review at various echelons within the Department of the Army insures that selection lists are accurate and appropriate.
- Each eligible year group is given a "fair share" of a branch quota. This share is commensurate with the strength of the year groups, considers the timeliness of the schooling, and is intended to maintain the maximum sized reservoir of school-trained officers.

ACTUAL selection in the branches is made with consideration for the following weighted factors: (1) command duty; (2) staff duty; (3) instructor duty (includes civilian component and certain MAAG and mission assignments); (4) combat experience; (5) troop experience (branch qualification); and (6) Overall Efficiency Index. The order of arrangement of the above factors is not significant.

In recognition of the fact that declared specialists are at some disadvantage with regard to such factors as command and troop duty, provisions exist for comparison of specialists among themselves.

A small portion of the quotas for Army War College and Regular Command and Staff Officers Courses are designated for Reserve officers, with final competitive selection giving consideration to the above weighted factors and civilian experience in fields of value to the Army.

Normally three times the number of officers needed to fill a school quota are tentatively selected. Such selections are based upon the order of merit derived from scores obtained from the weighted factors, except that unusual achievement and special factors can be the basis for recommending changes in the simple mathematical listing. The selections are then arranged in order of merit.

The next step in selection is for each branch list to be reviewed by the branch chief, after which the recommended order of merit is submitted to Chief, Career Management Division, for approval. Once the lists are approved, the availability of individuals must be determined. There are several principles related to availability which are considered:

- A nonstudent tour (usually three years) must normally be served between schools.
- Curtailment of overseas tour for the purpose of attending the Command and General Staff College is done only under exceptional circumstances.
- Completion of at least one year, and normally of two years, in current assignment is required immediately prior to school attendance, except for interim assignments en route to school.

Final approval of lists of officers to attend a given course is made by Chief, Career Management Division, TAGO, for Command and General Staff College and Armed Forces Staff College level courses; and by the Army Chief of Staff for War College level courses.

IN the implementation of the above system, the Career Management Division seeks to do two things:

(1) Insure fairness and impartiality in the treatment of each officer. Final selection to be based on demonstrated performances of duty unaffected by bias or personal considerations.

(2) Select for further schooling those officers whose potential service will be of maximum benefit to the Army.

Any method that seeks to conform to the above standards must be flexible and constantly under study. Provisions exist for continued study and revision as required. The ultimate objective of the entire system is to provide in time of peace the best possible training of key personnel who it is expected will, in time of national emergency and crisis, provide the top leadership so vital to victory.

Getting a center bull by aiming at six o'clock is like trying to hit the head of a nail by watching the hammer handle

BULLS or HALF-BULLS

LIEUTENANT JAMES D. PENDLETON

Coach and pupil on the firing line

LET'S look at some of the principles we teach the U.S. rifleman and see what we can find. Take the new soldier as he comes into the Army. His entire life is undergoing a change and he is pretty bewildered. He doesn't especially want to be in the Army, but, since it's a job everybody has to do, he's willing to do his job.

Shortly after he enters the service, the new soldier is introduced to the M1 rifle. He's going to be an infantryman and shooting that rifle is going to be his number one responsibility. So he takes the rifle and cleans it and learns how it functions and then he is sent out for preparatory marksmanship training.

His first step is sighting and aiming. He is told that to align his sights properly he must have the tip of the front sight blade centered vertically and horizontally in the rear sight aperture. Then he is taught that when aiming at the bull's-eye he must take the correct sight picture by placing the bull's-eye on top of the front sight blade so that it looks like an apple sitting on a fence post, aim at six o'clock on the bull.

Somewhere in the back row of the preparatory marksmanship class we find our new soldier. He is a young man who has been shooting all his life outside the

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rmy and he has a question. He raises s hand. "Why do you aim at the bot- m of the bull's-eye?" he asks the in- ructor. "I thought we were trying to it the center of the bull."

The instructor tells him that it is done the shooter can take the same sight icture for every shot; the rifle will be eroed so that the bullet will hit the enter of the bull's-eye when the firer ms at six o'clock.

And the new soldier says, "Oh, I see. he rifle shoots higher than you aim and ou have to aim at the bottom of the ull in order to hit the center."

The instructor says that the student is bout right, but that it will be covered detail when the class gets to sight djustments.

O they continue through training un- til they get to the step on effect of vind, sight changes and use of the score ard.

The instructor tells the class that "hold ff" or "Kentucky windage" went out vith the muzzle loader and that the ights on the M1 can be adjusted for arying winds and ranges so the firer can lways aim directly at his target and hit . He tells the class that one click of ither elevation or windage will move he strike of the bullet on the target as ittle as one inch for each 100 yards of ange.

Then, amid windage formulas, our ew soldiers are taught how to call their hots and how to zero the M1 so that hey can hit the center of the bull by iming at six o'clock.

As the class comes to an end, our new oldier asks one more question: "Sir, you aid that we don's use 'hold off' or 'Ken- ucky windage' with this rifle, but it eems to me that by aiming at six o'clock n the bull we have a six to ten inch hold off for every shot."

"Of course we could zero to point of aim," says the instructor, "but, if we aimed at the center of the bull's-eye, we couldn't see the black front sight against



U.S. Bull's-eye Canadian Half-Bull's-eye

the black bull. We zero the way we do so that we can see the front sight clearly and take a consistent sight picture."

"I guess it's all right when you have a big black disk, but when we get into the field, I don't think people will like the idea of aiming at one point you don't want to hit in order to hit another point you do want to hit," the soldier says. And he sits down, but we don't forget him. For he has grasped immediately a paradox which has become inherent to our marksmanship training: with none of the small arms of the U.S. Army is the soldier trained to aim directly at his target. He is trained always to aim at a point several inches below the point he wishes to hit.

IF all firing were done on the known distance range at standard size targets, it would make little difference whether or not we use a round bull's-eye, but this is not the case. Targets in the field are of varying sizes and at varying ranges. A firer cannot always make an accurate estimate of the hold off for which his rifle is zeroed. In most cases he will not even consider it.

Of course, in range firing at the A or B type target, aiming at the bottom of the circular black bull enables the firer to take a standard sight picture and to see the front sight clearly, but what iron law requires us always to fire at a circular black bull's-eye? It seems that method has grown out of proportion to the objective. The Canadian manual, *Shoot to Live,* when speaking of the black disk bull's-eye and the six o'clock aiming point says, "[it is] just as if you hoped to hit a nail on the head with a hammer and watched the hammer handle instead of the nail head." A little exaggerated, perhaps, but psychologically accurate because a firer naturally wants to aim at the point he is trying to hit.

The Canadians have found their solution in the half-bull's-eye. The scoring area of the bull's-eye is the same, but only half of it is in black. This enables the firer to take a consistent sight picture and allows him to follow his natural inclination to aim at the point he wishes to hit. An *auxiliary aiming mark* has been added in the center of the horizontal line so that firers can get better sight alignment and a more clearly defined sight picture. The rifle is zeroed to the point of aim.

Such a target as this better enables the beginning shooter to perform an important part of his marksmanship training: *calling* his shot; that is, being able to tell where the shot should strike the target according to the sight alignment and

Aiming



sight picture at the moment the weapon fires. If a firer can learn to call his shots, he can discover his own errors and correct them, he can make necessary sight adjustments easily and accurately, and he is well on the way to becoming an excellent shot. However, with the black disk bull's-eye, calling a shot is one of the most difficult things for a beginner to learn. Frequently students can tell where the front sight blade was at the time the weapon fired, but they forget that the bullet strikes above the point of aim. Even after extensive instruction on calling shots, a large percentage of students will persist in calling their shots at the point of aim.

Since it is only natural for a firer to aim at the spot he wishes to hit, the students revert to this natural tendency in the majority of cases when calling the shot except when there is the ideal of perfect sight alignment and perfect sight picture. And sometimes, even when this ideal situation exists, many students will persist in calling that shot at six o'clock on the bull instead of center bull. It is difficult to see any real advantage to be gained in requiring soldiers to deviate from their natural tendencies when it is unnecessary.

Even old army shooters will admit that in firing at field targets it would be better to zero a weapon to point of aim. But it isn't taught. And, even if it were taught, why should the new rifleman have to learn two methods?

Known distance firing at a circular black bull's-eye is stereotyped training designed to make better known distance marksmen, and once the firer is taken away from the stereotyped situation, regardless of his experience or his ability, he returns inadvertently to his natural inclination, nature's logical method of aiming at the point to be hit.

On the M1 rifle the sight is the aperture type sight designed to take the utmost advantage of all natural phenomena. When using this type sight, the firer looks through the aperture and not at it, the principle being that in searching for an object through a circular opening, the eye automatically and naturally becomes focused in the *optical center* of the field of vision. Vision is concentrated into a funnel naturally and perfectly centered without necessary conscious effort on the part of the firer. Around this *funnel of sight* the field is hazy. When the firer's focus is on the front sight blade, the front sight becomes naturally centered in his funnel of sight.

Now, to derive maximum benefit from



It is only natural that the target should be centered in the funnel of sight.

these natural phenomena, it seems only natural that the target also be centered in the funnel of sight. When the firer is required to hold at six o'clock on a circular bull's-eye, the target is, of necessity, placed high and it is no longer in the optical center of the funnel of sight.

But, in direct antithesis of the six o'clock aiming point principle as taught on the known distance range, when firing at field targets, the soldier is taught to aim at the *center of mass*—but without zeroing to point of aim.

In using the Canadian type bull's-eye on the known distance range, the entire target, bull's-eye and frame, can be perfectly centered in the cone of sight. The weapon can be zeroed to point of aim and the principles learned on the known distance range can be carried over directly into the field.

WE come back to the natural tendency of a firer to aim directly at the point he wishes to hit. To help him centralize that point, the Canadian soldier is given an aperture sight which helps him center his points of interest in his cone of sight, taking advantage of all natural phenomena in the optical center of his field of vision. But as the U.S. soldier is trained, he is required to use "hold off" with a weapon capable of pin point accuracy.

Many of our soldiers are "expert" on the range, using the black disk bull's-eye and a six o'clock aiming point, but are we getting maximum effectiveness and efficiency through teaching them that way?

Carbine on the firing line

Assault Fire Is Specialized Indirect Fire

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN C. FRALISH

WHAT is assault fire? It is not, as many persons seem to believe, the same thing as direct fire. Assault fire is a pecial technique of indirect fire to attain pinpoint accuracy or the destruction of targets such as pillboxes, gun emplacements and cave entrances. All combat officers should have an understanding of the techniques involved in assault fire.

First of all there are some basic elements in assault fire hat must be considered. Firing is conducted at short ranges rom defiladed positions, and the gun-target range must be ufficiently short to make successive hits on the same portion f the target a possibility. In addition, the target (normally cave, pillbox, or other fixed fortification) must have sufficient vertical dimensions; targets without significant vertical limensions or on flat terrain may be more suited to another nethod of artillery attack, such as precision destruction or attery concentration with converged sheaf.

Thorough planning, reconnaissance, and coordination are nusts; the best gun positions and routes of approach are nandatory. Consideration should be given to night occupaion and organization of position. And, since the most lesirable positions normally are well forward in the area ccupied by the supported infantry or armor, close coordinaion with the supported unit is essential. Detailed target inormation—to include such data as the type of construction, he number and location of gun ports, and the placement of ntrances—is essential.

Similarly, the best possible initial data must be obtained o reduce the time required for adjustment. Incidentally, site s a critical element of initial data because of the short ranges nvolved. A variation of 1 mil in the quadrant elevation may esult in range changes of from 100 to 150 yards. The slower he adjustment, the more susceptible the assault-fire weapon s to counterfire.

ANY artillery piece may be used for assault fire, but the most efficient weapons, in order of preference, are the 8-inch howitzer, the 155mm gun, and the 155mm howitzer. Self-propelled versions are best suited for the mission because of their maneuverability and ease of emplacement and displacement. Maximum effective ranges using maximum charge are 3,000 yards for the 8-inch howitzer and 155mm gun and 2,500 yards for the 155mm howitzer.

It is possible to use the 105mm and 75mm howitzers to close caves in soft, unconsolidated material; but the number of rounds required for each mission is much greater than for the larger caliber weapons. Ranges should not exceed 1,500 yards for the 105mm howitzer and 1,000 yards for the 75mm howitzer.

The 240mm howitzer, on the other hand, is not suitable since it is extremely difficulty to elevate the trails to permit firing at elevations below the minimum elevation (267 mils) for which the carriage was designed. As of this writing, no tests of the 280mm gun in assault fire have been conducted; whether or not such trials are conducted, it is doubtful that the 280 would ever be exposed to such risk of loss.

HIGH-explosive shell is normally used. The highest charge that will clear intervening crests and strike the desired portion of the target is used to accomplish maximum penetration and reduce probable error. (However, with the 155mm gun, deeper penetration against such surfaces as hard rock may be obtained by using armor-piercing projectiles fired with supercharge. The crater obtained with AP is small in diameter and usually requires the firing of shell HE as every fourth or fifth round to widen the crater and clear away rubble.)

Concrete-piercing fuzes are appropriate for the destruction of fortifications. Fuze, concrete-piercing, nondelay, is used for adjustment and to clear away rubble; while fuze, concrete-piercing, delay, may be used for fire for effect to effect penetration. Or, fuze M51, quick, may be used to cut through a parapet or earth covering, after which the appropriate concrete-piercing fuze is used to effect destruction of the fortification. If concrete-piercing fuze is not available, fuze M51, delay, may be used in fire for effect. If excessive ricochets result from the use of concrete-piercing delay fuze, nondelay fuze should be used until enough cratering has been effected to prevent ricochet of the delay fuze.

ADJUSTMENT of fire is made by using a modified procedure in which the observer exercises complete control throughout the mission: he adjusts each gun to fire. In addition, the observer must be as near the target as possible, and, if at all practicable, on or near the gun-target line.

Corrections in yards are applied by the observer to each successive round until the point of impact is on the desired portion of the target. An off-line burst is brought to the

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line through normal adjustment procedure except that deviation corrections are given to the nearest yard. The target is bracketed for range, and the bracket is split successively. When the observer is able to estimate vertical error more accurately than range error, he makes corrections of site rather than range; and thereafter the smallest correction appropriate in direction or site is one-half yard. The point at which the observer begins adjusting site instead of range cannot be prescribed exactly; it depends on terrain, vertical dimensions of the target, and the observer's experience and ability. It is reached when the bursts are very near the target. Thus for a target such as a cave entrance on a steep forward slope, the average observer probably will find that after he splits a 50-yard range bracket he can adjust site more easily than range.

Fire for effect begins when the point of impact is on the desired part of the target; it is continued until the mission has been accomplished. Rounds are fired singly to permit the observer to make desired corrections or changes in ammunition.

The fire direction procedure used in assault fire is designed to obtain maximum accuracy and speed through use of a separate fire direction center for each weapon. Fire direction centers follow standing fire direction procedures except that tabular firing tables are used to determine elevations for the short ranges fired.

When the observer splits a 50-yard range bracket, the fire direction center considers that it is entering fire for effect. Data for the first round in fire for effect are measured from the firing chart; thereafter the chart is no longer used for the mission. Observer corrections are converted to fire commands by computation and by use of the "deflection shift card" *(Figure 1)* and the "quadrant change card" *(Figure 2)* which are prepared in advance for the gun-target range. And the chart operator and the computer become, respectively, the quadrant computer and the deflection computer for the remainder of the mission.

THE deflection computer, using the C and D scales and the YD index of the Graphical Site Table, prepares in advance a deflection shift card for the gun-target range to be fired. The values shown in the right column of his card are rounded off to the nearest mil for observer corrections greater than 2 yards; to the nearest ¼ mil for observer corrections of 2 yards or less. Consequently the new deflection is determined by applying with the "Left Add, Right Subtract" rule the appropriate deflection shift (read from the card and based on the observer's correction) to the previous deflection fired. For example—

Previous Deflection Fired	Observer's Correction	Deflection Shift from Card *(Fig. 1)*	New Command to Gun
2610	R7	R5	2605
2605	L4	L3	2608
2608	L2	L1¼	2609 L ¼
2609 L ¼	R1	R ¾	2609 R ½
2609 R ½	L ½	L ¼	2609 R ¼

As in the case of the deflection computer, the quadrant computer, using the C and D scales and YD index of the Graphical Site Table, prepares in advance the quadrant change card for the gun-target range to be fired. The values shown in the right column of his card are rounded off to the nearest one-tenth mil. To determine a new quadrant based on the observer's correction, the required quadrant change

Deflection Shift Card Observer's Deflection Correction (in yards)	Chart Range 1500 Yds Deflection Shift (in mils)
½	¼
1	¾
2	1¼
3	2
4	3
5	4
6	4
7	5
8	6
9	6
10	7

Figure 1
Deflection Shift Card

Quadrant Change Card Observer's Site Correction (in yards)	Chart Range 1500 Yds Quadrant Change (in mils)
½	0.3
1	0.7
2	1.4
3	2.0
4	2.7
5	3.4
6	4.1
7	4.8
8	5.4
9	6.1
10	6.8

Figure 2
Quadrant Change Card

(read from the card) is added algebraically to the previous quadrant fired. Quadrant elevations fired are rounded off to the nearest mil until bursts are very close to the target (within 2 yards); when observer corrections of 2 yards or less for site become necessary, quadrant elevations to the nearest one-tenth mil are fired. For example—

Previous Quadrant Elevation Fired	Observer's Correction	Quadrant Elevation Change from Card	New Command to Gun
30.0	Up 4	+3	33
33.0	Down 2	—1.4	31.6
31.6	Up ½	+0.3	31.9

The piece is laid for direction by any conventional method initially and later by use of a deflection board which permits the setting off on the piece sight of deflections to the nearest one-quarter mil. The board is graduated with alternating black and white bands the width of which is determined by computations. At 50 yards, 1 mil will subtend 1.77 inches. By establishing a band 1.77 inches right and another 1.77 inches left of the center of the board, 1 mil can be measured right or left by traversing from the center of the board to the appropriate band. By establishing additional bands 0.44 inches and 0.88 inches from the center of the board, ¼ mil or ½ mil can be measured.

This board is attached to the near aiming post, exactly 50 yards from the piece; the far aiming post is not used.

On recept of a deflection command, the gunner sets the whole mil portion of the deflection commanded on the scales of the telescope, then applies the fractional portion by laying on the appropriate space on the deflection board. The piece is traversed in the appropriate direction until the cross hair of the piece sight is centered on the proper black or white band on the deflection board. To move the tube ¼ mil, the gunner moves the line of sighting in the appropriate direction by traversing the piece so that the adjacent black or white band is covered; to move ½ mil, the cross hair is moved two bands.

Changes in elevation are made initially to the nearest mil. The gunner's quadrant is used. When corrections sent by the observer are small, it becomes necessary to lay for elevation to the nearest one-tenth mil.

Those are the procedures involved in assault fire. At the very outset of this article, three distinct missions were mentioned: seal a cave entrance with rubble, reduce a concrete gun emplacement, and destroy a pillbox. No better summary of the procedures involved can be achieve than following a mission all the way through. This we do on the facing page.

How Artillerymen Using Assault Fire Seal Entrance to Cave

lission: *To seal cave entrance with rubble.* Observer-target distance 1,000 yards

OBSERVER TO FDC:
This is Forward Observer E
Fire Mission
Coordinates 4824 3762 Altitude 420 Azimuth 4820
Cave entrance
Fuze quick
At my command
Will adjust

FDC TO OBSERVER: ON THE WAY



Observer Correction: Left 10 REPEAT RANGE

Sensing is DOUBTFUL, 10 RIGHT. With field glasses, observer measures deviation of burst 10 mils right of OT line. Observed deviation = 10 yd. (10 X 1.0). Shift to bring burst to OT line is Left 10.

Round 1

C TO OBSERVER: I THE WAY



Add 50

The burst has been brought to the OT line. Sensing is SHORT, LINE. Since initial data has been obtained by precise methods, a 50-yard change in distance along the OT line should bracket the target.

Round 2

FDC TO OBSERVER: ON THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: DOWN 25

Sensing is OVER, LINE. Observer splits a 50-yard bracket, and hereafter will make changes in site.

Round 3

C TO OBSERVER: N THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: DOWN 10 REPEAT RANGE

Sensing is OVER, LINE. Observer estimates that a vertical change of 10 yards will place the burst on the target.

Round 4

FDC TO OBSERVER: ON THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: RIGHT 3, UP 3, FUZE CONCRETE-PIERCING NON-DELAY, REPEAT RANGE

Sensing is SHORT, LEFT. Burst struck lower left portion of cave entrance.

Round 5

C TO OBSERVER. I THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: LEFT ½ DOWN 1 REPEAT RANGE

Sensing is OVER, RIGHT. Burst struck upper right portion of cave entrance.

Round 6

FDC TO OBSERVER: ON THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: DOWN ½, FUZE CONCRETE-PIERCING DELAY, REPEAT RANGE

Sensing is OVER, LINE. Burst struck too high above cave entrance, partly sealing it.

Round 7

C TO OBSERVER. N THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: REPEAT RANGE

Sensing: TARGET. Rubble now almost completely sealing entrance.

Round 8

FDC TO OBSERVER: ON THE WAY



OBSR TO FDC: END OF MISSION Cave entrance sealed, cave unusable

Sensing: TARGET. Cave entrance completely sealed.

Round 9

Irons in the Fire

1,000 Times Louder

A new electronic power megaphone recently developed makes it possible to project vocal commands over wind and noise farther than ever before possible with a self-contained, all-in-one power megaphone. The new Audio Hailer is a small, well-built unit weighing only 5 lbs. with batteries, designed for one-hand operation. The secret of its tremendous power is that it has a

complete vacuum-tube amplifier built into the speaker housing, which provides sufficient amplification to magnify the human voice 1,000 times, approximately 16 times more powerful than any other one-unit power megaphone. Up to 5,000 ten-second messages may be given without battery change. It is designed and manufactured by Audio Equipment Co., Inc., Great Neck, N. Y., suppliers of electronic equipment to the U. S. Navy.

Miniature Computer

An analog computer component of cigarette-pack size (approximately three cubic inches) has been developed by the Arma Corporation, designers and builders of instrument control systems. The computer does its calculations by the interchange of heat, has no moving parts, and is



mass producible. The computer adds, subtracts, multiplies, divides, integrates, and performs basic operations of vector algebra and vector calculus as well as other mathematical wizardry five times as fast as the swiftest previous machinery for solving such problems.

It enables engineers to make control systems for such purposes as navigation at supersonic speeds, automatic gun-laying, guiding missiles, and automating machines and processes.

Mechanical Mule

The Mechanical Mule, built by Willys Motors, is designed solely for off-the road operations in forward combat areas and is capable of carrying 1,000 pounc although it weighs only 750. Its overall length is 100 inches; its width 46, an its chassis only 27. The driver can operate it while walking or crawling at th rear or side. The steering wheel and steering column are adjustable and spee as low as one mile an hour is possible. The gear shift is conventional. It ha "four wheel steering" and can be turned in an 18-foot circle, like a hook-anc ladder truck. It is made of lightweight alloys. A vehicle similar to this has bee under consideraton for several years by soldiers interested in airborne equi ment. The present version is under test by Army Ordnance at Aberdee Proving Ground.

Self-Loading, Non-Recoiling Shotgun

The new Winchester Model 50 shotgun is self-loading with a non-recoilin barrel. The breech bolt is activated by a "slip chamber" which moves only on tenth of an inch when the gun is fired. This reduces the spring force require to close the action and overcomes the feel of a "double shuffle" between th hand and shoulder. The minute movement of the independent chamb starts into action the unlocking and extracting mechanism with no disruptio of aim, and absorption of much of the recoil in firing. Prices start at $120.50.

CEREBRATIONS

t's SOP!

ASSUME the Army is firmly convinced that its field manuals fill a useful purpose. This being so, I think it is ime we soldiers should ask ourselves whether manuals are doctrines or only a guide. If this question seems foolish, let ne defend myself by citing a few exaggerated experiences that point up the question.

Somewhere in basic training I heard of FM 22-5 which was considered to be he "bible" on drill and ceremonial natters. Diligently, I applied myself to he task of learning its secrets and, after onstant study, left for a new assignment ecure in my knowledge of how things hould be done.

Imagine my surprise when, drilling ny company, I gave the command, "Colmn Left, March," and watched the ivot men executing a weird maneuver alled "half-tracking." I was further bewildered when I reprimanded the men or the movement and was told that it vas SOP in this outfit to do it as they ad done because it was easier to keep he alignment of the platoons. A hurried earch through FM 22-5 eased my fears hat I had overlooked something. My lilemma was soon resolved by the receipt f a thousand-page book with an imposng title: "Standing Operating Procedure f the Autocratic ('We Do It Our Vay') Division." Sure enough, tucked way in its pages was a paragraph saying hat the Army had been outvoted and a ew movement had now replaced the olumn. It had evidently not occurred o the command to inform Washington f the matter.

I became quite familiar with the ewly discovered guide and was amazed o see how the Autocratic Division had mproved upon Department of Army iterature. Here are some of the changes uncovered:

General Flushbucket had decided that he wearing of the first aid packet on he right side of the cartridge belt gave it disorganized appearance. Hereafter, he packet, bayonet, canteen and comass would be worn over the left hip and hereby present a compact and uniform ppearance, not to mention the fact that also made a convenient resting place or the left arm after it became bruised om hitting the array of objects. My ry of lopsidedness was met with the urt suggestion that I look at paragraph Z, page 901 of the SOP. How stupid of me! Paragraph Z answered my criticism, "to offset the added weight to the left side of the body, rifles will be carried at Right Shoulder at all times. It is also suggested that all other items such as loose change, cigarettes, pencils,

etc., be carried only in the right pocket. To further balance the individual, helmets may be worn slightly inclined toward the right. The above is to be construed as a guide only. However, at no time will a commander alter the arrangement as it is the desire of the Commanding General that the Division present a uniform appearance to the public."

After a time I was assigned to the staff. Here too the SOP was a constant source of information. I had the occasion to write some correspondence to higher headquarters and, not wanting to appear ignorant, I looked up the latest D/A instructions on military correspondence. Following the directions closely, I completed my letter and sent it forward. The harsh ringing of the telephone awakened me from my daydreaming. "What are you trying to do, Lieutenant?" bellowed the Battalion Adjutant. "If you're going to send paperwork through my office, it has to be correct." I hastily explained that I had followed the directives of the Department of the Army. My excuse evidently soothed his feelings. "Oh, that," he condescended. "You must be new here." My attention was then invited to paragraph H of Section II on page 10 of the SOP. I hunted up same. It reads: "Regardless of D/A publications pertaining to Military Correspondence, the following SOP will govern all concerned. Correspondence will be prepared in twenty copies, the last five of which will consist of pink second sheets bordered in blue. All copies must be signed." It continued, "Five copies will remain in the originating unit files and the reminder will be sent forward. No agency will detach a copy from this correspondence. If a copy is desired, the unit will type four copies and retain them in their files. When a file becomes obsolete, all copies will be turned over to the Division Waste Disposal Officer with an accompanying letter explaining why the correspondence is being turned in. (Letter will be prepared in only ten copies.) This practice will assure the Division of maintaining its lead in the Command Paper Drive and will add greatly to the morale and the prestige of the men of this organization."

During the course of my stay with the Division I became a disciple of the SOP. Had anyone the effrontery to quote a certain manual to me, I was immediately able to refer him to the appropriate section of the SOP which superseded the offending manual. I had even been toying with the idea of drawing up an SOP to be followed in writing an SOP. However, orders arrived transferring me to a different command and my project was forgotten.

I packed my meager belongings in my bag, making certain that I followed the current directives. Upon my arrival at my new station, I was assigned as Battalion S3. This was right up my alley! I was qualified for the job since I knew all the new ways of doing things. My first inspection of training was a sad experience. I was in the process of correcting the arrangement of equipment on the belts of the men when I was interrupted by the Battalion Exec. "What kind of mess is that?" he growled, pointing at the belts. "It's the new look, sir;" I assured him as I whipped out a copy of the SOP. "Throw that damned thing away and look at your field manual, Lieutenant."

Reflecting on the injustice of things, I returned to my desk and prepared a request for a range, in twenty copies, attaching a few extra copies clearly marked, "to be detached by interested parties." It was quitting time by now and I headed for the door. My progress was halted by the Exec. "Come into my office," he ordered.

"Regiment is raving because you sent twenty copies of a letter to them. What's the idea?" he asked. I brightly explained the SOP to him, finishing weakly as I noticed a glassy stare in his eyes. "Who in the hell do you think you are?", he roared. "Did you ever read TM ---?" I informed him that it was superseded by

my SOP but my explanations were cut short as he continued. "The Army spends a lot of money on field and tech manuals and, if it's good enough for the Department of the Army, it's good enough for you. In the future, follow the book."

I stumbled from the office and into the dayroom where my gaze encountered a copy of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. I would write to the editors and ask for advice.

LT. EDWIN F. O'BRIEN

• *We pass the buck to our readers.*

Rangers Are the New Look

THE key to success in atomic war is the heart and mind of the leader. The soul of the infantry is inspirational leadership. The key to invincibility is our leadership "standing tall" before the challenges of atomic conflicts. The challenge is to train and condition the reflexes and thoughts of men to embrace atomic tactics in practical field applications; to prepare men and leaders for the dynamic impact of any-directional attack or all-directional defense; to exert pressure upon the individual's maximum will to win battles of increased fire power; to even faster movement, and to the possible enlargement of the battlefield to the breadth of hemispheres.

Dispersion of forces without dissipation of power virtually hangs on the threads of fine leadership. Knowing this full well, commanders bear a most solemn obligation in the procurement, training, and employment of that leadership. Sound training creates confidence in the hearts of commanders. Confidence in the commander inspires loyalty in the leader. Gone should be the platoon leaders ordered "to engage" by division, regimental, or battalion commanders. Gone will be the platoons committing squads by orders from binocularized commanders in their OPs. Atomic tactics will force commanders to have faith in their leaders. Atomic battle will impose faith in the training, the judgment, and the actions of leaders.

To bolster that faith we must apply Ranger training throughout the infantry.

In 1950, in Korea young officers from the USMA, ROTC and from other sources suffered from a lack of drilled, polished field training. Not so with commanders and staff officers. The Army diligently pursues the development of staff and command officers; it must similarly pursue the training of its leaders. As diligently as combat leaders are drilled, so must they be allowed to anticipate change. They must be encouraged to accept and anticipate transitions and developments that fuse their fighters to atomic action and tactics.

Apply Ranger training! It is the training which best serves as a base to expand future small-unit task force concepts and to develop skills the leader needs. It is, in fact, the framework or skeleton on the New Look in infantry; a small force of highly destructive capacity.

Little modification of Ranger training would be necessary to approximate future infantry operations. Use of helicopter transport and qualified parachutists is part of it. So is the reestablishment of foreign arms familiarization firing. It should also emphasize contour marching as a CBR defense measure, put intense emphasis on survival training as a practical problem, adjust patrol course (leadership training aid) to average situations; accent atomic development and encourage anticipation of atomic tactics. Finally the Rangers and the Infantry School can encourage individual research in the problems of graduates of the program.

Providing the Infantry with a hard core of Ranger-schooled officers and NCOs is the best guarantee for a high standard cadre for a mobilization base. In time all infantry officers would be Ranger-trained. Ranger training should be a prerequisite to promotion to NCO grades.

Ranger infantry is the New Look in ground combat forces!

LT. RICHARD J. BUCK

Roads Are Here to Stay

Motor vehicles have quite successfully replaced the horse but some of the characteristics of the horse have been carried over in our military vehicle designs. Whoever decided to build military vehicles with power applied to each wheel was sticking to a horse-and-buggy idea that is outmoded.

It is true that Stateside we have replaced our tactical vehicles in administrative motor pools with modern (and practical) commercial vehicles. But what do we find in our tactical motor pools? Tactical vehicles that remind me of our four-footed friends of the past.

Our Corps of Engineers spend lots of time (and money) building roads—for what? Vehicles that don't need roads? Of course not. Our old stand-by, the World War II 6x6, is still with us, in a modern shiftless version. My limited experience includes Europe and Korea and in both theaters I saw vehicles transport troops and cargo—over roads.

I think roads are here to stay. So why don't we have vehicles that are suitable for operation on roads? The Army is big business and we should endeavor to run it economically. While it is now too late to change our tactical vehicles into practical vehicles, future procurements could undergo some changes.

Sure, we need *some* all-wheel-drive vehicles for off-the-road towing of guns and other specialized requirements. But we also need *many* commercial type vehicles for our commercial type hauls.

A staff study should give us the answers to the questions that this brings up. Here are my recommendations:

(1) Stop building, buying, operating and maintaining too many transfer cases, drive shafts, and live axles in military

vehicles. (Almost forgot, waterproofing too. It costs too much.)

(2) Build, buy, operate and maintain vehicles suitable for roads. It's cheaper.

(3) Make the component parts of our practical, tactical vehicles interchangeable with those of our special purpose (present M series) vehicles.

(4) Continue to build roads.

(5) Reduce the taxes that my children will have to pay, by replacing horses.

CAPT. WILLIAM D. BOYER

Rotation of Assignments

DID you hear of the officer who was sent to the Far East and spent his whole tour at a corps, army or theater headquarters?

Did you hear of the officer who was sent to the Far East and commanded a rifle platoon or company or an infantry battalion in combat all the time he was there? I'm sure you have.

Some while back COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL had this paragraph on one of the series on "Career Management and Your Future":

"Career Management cannot alone develop a profficient officer corps. Successful development of an outstanding officer corps depends primarily on the initiative, willingness and ability of commanders to rotate officers in various types of duties."

Now, I should like to set forth an idea

r two on how I think the assignment ıd reassignment of officers might have een done in the Far East to provide the rmy with more fully experienced offi-ers for the future.

First, let me say that the point system ; it existed during the last year of the ar in Korea seemed to be generally ac-epted as the fairest and most feasible vstem under the circumstances. This vstem, to refresh your memory, credited ıen in front-line battalions (plus others ıch as artillery forward observers) with ɔur points per month; men in rear of ont-line battalions and extending on ack to division command posts were edited with three points monthly; all thers in Korea received two points each ıonth. The number of points needed ɔr rotation home was 36 for those in ıe front-line battalions and 40 for all thers.

With this point system as a basis, I elieve the most effective system of ssignment would have been to send veryone, except for the rare specialist ırmarked for a special slot somewhere ong the line, as far forward into the ɔmbat zone as his rank and branch of ervice would allow. A lieutenant colo-el of infantry would have been assigned ɔ command an infantry battalion. An ıfantry captain would have been as-gned to command a company, prefer-ɔly a rifle company.

After such initial assignments, lasting variable number of months, these offi-ers would have then been rotated to aff jobs. They would have been as-gned to battalion, regimental and divi-on staffs, and to corps, army and thea-r staffs. These staff assignments would, course, have been appropriate to each ficer's rank and experience.

Eventually these officers would accu-ıulate enough points to return home.

Admittedly, the administration of an ficer assignment program such as this ould have been difficult, but I believe ɔt impossibly so. And the advantages such a program, it seems to me, ould have more than compensated for ıe administrative troubles entailed.

And what advantages would have ac-ued?

Practically every officer from second eutenant to lieutenant colonel (at least the combat arms) would have re-ived both command and staff experi-ıce in combat.

A more equal distribution of the risks front-line duty would have been ef-cted.

Finally, officers assigned to staff jobs ter completing command assignments ould have been more alive to their staff responsibilities with respect to the troops and, generally speaking, would probably have been more responsive in satisfying the needs of the troops.

LT. COL. GEORGE JUSKALIAN

Piecework Pay

A SOLDIER fights for several things —and one of these things is his pay —and the system under which we pay our fighting men is as antique as the flintlock.

Consider what the soldier of Genghis Khan gained by fighting: land, food, women, and wealth in the form of precious metals. The better he fought, the more loot he got and kept.

We don't allow looting. We pay our men by the month. A definite sum of money. They don't get any more, whether they advance two miles, ten miles or seventeen hundred miles. Most of them, that is. Of course, some privates become corporals and some corporals rise to sergeants, and some sergeants get to be lieutenants. But everyone can't be a lieutenant. There are only a few colonels. There are fewer generals. So, most of them remain privates. Of course, they do get additional sums (small) for being sharpshooters and for winning certain medals (very few). That is as it should be. They also get increases in pay for length of service. That's a good idea, too. And for jumping out of airplanes, flying and submarine duty, soldiers, airmen and sailors get additional sums. There's nothing the matter with that, either.

However, there is no system which cannot be improved. A sub-machine gun is not a sub-machine gun until it's moving forward in the hands of a man who knows how to use it, and will spit out a burst of eight or ten bullets when the index finger of his right hand presses the trigger. It's not a sub-machine gun while it's in pieces, on an assembly bench at the factory, in a box on a truck on its way to the cargo plane. It's not a sub-machine gun even when it's at company supply. When Corporal Maguire gets it, and puts a clip in it and fires a practice burst and is satisfied and slings it over his shoulder and the strap gets stained with the sweat coming through his uniform, and he's got it ready to use in one and two fifths seconds—*then* its's a sub-machine gun.

The problem is: How can we get the gun to Maguire faster? The speed of its delivery depends, let us say, on a series of operations involving decisions, proper work and actions by forty-three men. Suppose one of those men is like the jeep driver who, when told that his headlights were on in daylight, answered: "It don't make a damn bit of difference to me!" There's a good chance that, as Maguire's gun passes through *this* man's hands, it will get dropped and broken, or it'll get the wrong legend stencilled on its box and somebody won't load it on the truck, thinking it's a box of something less useful, like garrison caps.

Shouldn't it be possible to set up a system of incentive pay in the services —for certain jobs, at certain places, under unusual circumstances—for guys like the jeep driver, so that it *would* make a difference to him whether Maguire's gun got on the truck?

Let us suppose that he were to get a fifth of a cent for each gun, over a set daily quota, which he delivered and that, in addition to being eloquently complimented by the sergeant, he were to get this money at the end of the week.

Wouldn't the driver work harder to get that extra money to send home to his wife, or to his mother, or to buy beer? There isn't much doubt what would happen. Maguire's gun would get into the jeep, and the jeep's lights would not have burned all day and the engine would start and the gun would get to the plane and the plane would take it up into the air and drop it where it should go and at company supply somebody would hand the gun to Maguire and he would try it out and sling it over his shoulder, where it ought to be.

All kinds of successful civilian companies have incentive pay systems. Successful little companies. Successful big companies. They find that it pays. What they want done gets done. So why don't we consider it in the military services? And while we're considering it for the military, for guys like the driver, let us remember Maguire. I think it would please him.

I hear the little guy with the derby hat, over in the corner there, saying, "It can't be done." I guess he means that he knows it should be done, but he doesn't think we can do it. Well, I don't mind if he says that to me. But I don't think he should say it to Maguire.

LT. CMDR. CHARLES STUART
U.S.N.R.

WHERE ARE YOU?

That's what our Circulation Department is asking about those of you who haven't sent in a change of address. We suggest that you do it now. Address:

CIRCULATION MANAGER
1529 Eighteenth St., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

Two Readers Write About

Lament for a Skulker

Two of our readers, who are also occasional contributors, took prompt and lengthy exception to some of the points Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener made about the execution of Private Slovik in our July issue.

Colonel Shillelagh graduated from the Military Academy in the 1920s and has been a Regular Army officer ever since.

Mr. Webster is a West Coast newspaperman and was, as he writes, a paratrooper rifleman in the 101st Airborne Division during the Second World War.

For reasons of space we have been forced to condense both articles and in the case of Mr. Webster to eliminate a few minor points. We have, however, taken pains to keep intact the major arguments of both of our correspondents.

Our readers are well qualified to decide for themselves about the correctness of the interpretations of Colonel Shillelagh, Mr. Webster and Colonel Wiener.

Necessity, But Not Justice

Colonel Shillelagh

IN "Lament for a Skulker," Colonel Wiener corrects some of the obvious errors in the Huie book and adds pertinent background information which helps to sharpen the Slovik case. In holding that the mistake was not in executing Slovik but in failing to execute others who were equally guilty, Colonel Wiener fails to comment on other important issues.

It is most important in reviewing the Slovik case to keep in mind that it is the extremely rare case which is likely to occur once in the mobilization of ten million men. Drawing conclusions from this case about the American will to fight is obviously improper. Drawing conclusions about our system of military justice is permissible because that system purports to administer individual justice.

The Huie book is the finest tribute to the Army training system which I have seen. It is truly amazing that the Army could take a man with Slovik's background and determination not to become a soldier and make him one in spite of himself. It did the job. Then, there was a fumble in the replacement system and the pawn was lost in the tremendous jaws of war.

It might have been otherwise. Let us not conclude, however, that we can design a replacement system which would prevent it. No workable system could have given Slovik the personal attention he required. It might have happened by chance.

* * *

I do not agree with Colonel Wiener's conclusion that Slovik got justice. The legality and the justice of a sentence are two different attributes, with legality providing only a general cloak for justice. It is surprising that this aspect of the case was not mentioned by the reviewing judge advocates. Their opinions reflect an understandable but unfortunate preoccupation with discipline.

There is an even quality to justice which is lacking in this case. However legal, it is not just to go for eighty years excusing and extenuating desertions and then to exact the death penalty in one case. It may be necessary, but it is not justice. Slovik was entrapped by an expectation based on long-established precedent, an expectation which was recognized by his contemporaries and apparently by the court which sentenced him. . . . Justice requires the even exaction of like punishment for like offenses so that all may be continually aware of the consequences.

Did discipline require the execution of Private Slovik? If so, it was the indiscipline of the Bulge that required example and Slovik died not for his own offense but for the deserters in the Bulge. This is the tragedy of our system of justice. If there was a military requirement, it was for the prompt execution of those who deserted in the Bulge. . . .

Was Slovik executed, as he claimed, for his youthful offenses? It seems likely that in an important degree he was. The judge advocate who was charged with principal responsibility for clemency consideration could find no basis for it. Apparently the social reform of Private Slovik and his establishment as a good citizen did not appear on his record along with his earlier offenses. The character references which might have been given by his buddies in the service were not produced because the system had separated him from his buddies and because in the beginning he was adamant in seeking his own conviction. Under the pressures of battle and Slovik's attitude, the provisions of military law requiring conviction on the evidence and not on a confession were skipped. It was not that the evidence of desertion was lacking it was too pat. I cannot believe that Slovik's company or division commanders would have permitted a new recruit, who really had never joined the outfit and felt its spirit, to persist in his obviously fabricated desertion if they had realized that he was in fact misguidedly courting his own death . . . Surely there were more flagrant and serious desertions, if an example had to be made. It seems that our judge advocates were deceived by the tight legality of the case and that they lost touch with reality.

Yet, the most serious charge in Huie's book is not made by Huie, except by omission. He does not indicate that any commander, from company to theater, ever talked directly with Slovik after his conviction. If commanders are to deserve discretion in capital cases, they cannot leave these decisions to their lawyers.

Did the execution of Private Slovik save the life of one staunch soldier who might otherwise have been exposed to death by a potential deserter? The high probability that it did lends a quality of justice to the execution in spite of all the failings of our military justice system. Let us keep in mind also that the failure of our system was in not protecting one misguided American from himself. We need not apologize for

system on which we impose such a standrd.

Colonel Wiener indicates that irrational entimentality has since World War II noved our system of military law away rom the requirements of justice. What is anyone doing about it? It should not be impossible to convince a panel of eminent American jurists that the requirements of discipline and justice are compatible and that our system of military law must be designed to serve both.

The Generals' Anger

David Kenyon Webster

OLONEL WIENER read *The Execu- tion of Private Slovik* and wrote a venmous review called "Lament for a Skulkr." I read the book, and if I were to write review, I would call it "Private Slovik nd the Generals' Anger." Though neither lawyer nor a colonel—I am a reporter who vas a paratrooper rifleman with the 101st irborne Division for three years—I would ke to take issue with Colonel Wiener on everal points.

Not that I am defending Slovik. He was deserter who deserved to be punished as ther deserters were punished: By a twentyear prison sentence. I maintain that he id not deserve to be shot, that his secret xecution failed to serve the very purpose f a deterrent for which it was ordered.

In the parachute infantry regiment with vhich I served, it was generally understood nat rape was death and desertion was wenty years. Before our combat jumps in Normandy and Holland, our officers told us nat refusal to jump in combat would be onsidered desertion under fire and would e punished by a twenty-year prison senence. I cannot recall any mention of exeution as a punishment for desertion . . .

I believe . . . Slovik . . . knew from earsay that deserters got twenty years, that his would probably be commuted after the var, and that he acted on this hearsay nowledge. Being not altogether bright, he vrote out a declaration of desertion, to nake doubly sure he got in the guardhouse. This was, I maintain, his major error. If e had not provided an angry division staff nd an angrier division commander with his bald, infuriating declaration, I rather oubt if he would have been executed. . . .

. . . Slovik's trial came up in the winter f 1944-45, and all the circumstances comined against him: the written note, the attle losses, the German breakthrough in he Bulge . . . Looking back . . . it seems ke some bleak and ancient, half-forgotten ra, and we forget how the front bogged own, how the great drive of the fall irned into a slow, dismal battle for every rrain feature. Desertions were mountig; men left their holes at night and never ime back; the ETO replacement system always complained of, never corrected) as showing signs of strain and increased efficiency. The generals were mad and nderstandably so. They needed an example. This fact was completely overlooked y Colonel Wiener in his review, but I think it is one of the major points of the Slovik execution. Making an example is a delicate and generally distasteful practice and it backfired in this instance, at least to my way of thinking. . . .

Slovik was tried by a court composed of the 28th Division staff. For a parallel, farfetched though it may seem, picture a factory hand who breaks a mill window during a strike and is then brought into a court where judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense attorney are all members of the board of that factory. Without emphatic warning that his is a capital offense, he is then sentenced to death under a law not enforced for some eighty years.

The court gave Slovik what it had given others: Death by musketry fire. This was, as one member told the author, the usual sentence and merely a formality that had always been reduced to twenty years in prior cases. Nobody on the court thought Slovik would be shot.

General Cota thought differently. His division was being ground to bloody rags in that terrible Hürtgen Forest . . . He needed an example, and Private Slovik gave it to him—in writing.

Furthermore, the lieutenant colonel who reviewed the case for General Cota got an FBI report on Slovik's criminal record . . . [Neither he nor General Cota] (nor, it is apparent from the way he writes, Colonel Wiener) understood the meaning of such a criminal record, how a man who has once been arrested and convicted of a crime is arrested every time thereafter that such an offense is committed in his neighborhood. These arrests go on his record and appear at first glance highly alarming to the uninformed. Slovik's crimes were actually of an extremely petty nature . . .

Slovik had not reckoned on being shot. After all, no deserter had been executed since the Civil War. He had no recourse and no appeal. A private in the infantry overseas in wartime has less rights than a convict in a civilian jail. The convict has contact with the outside through visitors; the private has nobody. . . . The inspector general? Sheer myth. How does an enlisted man contact an inspector general? He is boxed in completely, and no amount of Army lawyers, citing book after book and regulation after regulation, can ever convince a person who has been an enlisted man in the infantry overseas that it was ever otherwise.

Slovik wrote General Eisenhower, and General Eisenhower never read the letter. But he signed his death warrant. There was no place for Slovik to turn to; the Army does not maintain a Supreme Court. And so he was marched out in the snow and shot. That example was made.

Is it too much to ask why, if this execution was to serve the purpose of discouraging other desertions, it wasn't publicized beyond the 28th Division? Perhaps it might have cut down later desertions considerably. S. L. A. Marshall, Army historian and author of a series of splendid battle studies, was ETO historian at the time, and he says that he never heard of Slovik's execution. As a rifleman, I occupied a somewhat lesser role, and I never heard of it either . . .

In other words—and this is a point that Colonel Wiener missed—a vindictive, arbitrary, and implacable execution served no purpose whatsoever . . .

Thousands of men died in that war to preserve the basic freedom of the individual, his right to fair play. These men died accidentally; they were not coldly tried, condemned, and executed. The principles that they died for have made our nation great and strong. How can the Army expect men to serve willingly in the infantry if they realize that they may have to lose these human rights?

Nobody objects to discipline if it is fairly administered. I am sure that all most of us asked of the Army was a manly fairness. If a man's life can be taken away in a moment of anger for a crime no greater than that of thousands of other men, then the Army is going to find a great dearth of volunteers for its basic arm, the infantry. And unless we have a strong infantry, we will not have a strong country. Talk of the Air Force and the atomic bomb is comforting, but an airplane never took a piece of ground and never will.

* * *

[Colonel Wiener's] errors are the minutiae upon which lawyers thrive and grow rich; they are not important to the basic story, which I believe was well told.

It is to be hoped that if we have another war, a firm policy on desertions is established and proclaimed at the start, so that all men may know where they stand and none may make the mistake that Slovik did. As I said in the beginning, my unit understood that the penalty for rape was death. The result: precious few rapes. If it had been clearly established that the penalty for desertion was death or a full twenty years (not discharge after a few years in a detention training center), then there would probably have been as few desertions as there were rapes . . . Men like to know where they stand, and if an Army law is strict, fear will force them to obey it. But if it is subject to the whims of angry generals, then it will arouse only furious resentment, and you will have desertions on the scale of the Germans and the Russians.

COMBAT BRIDGE

CHINESE-BUILT FOOTBRIDGE

The Communist solution was a footbridge in the shadow of the high-level span

The Mojin Bridge in April 1951. One 100-foot Bailey is in place and a 300-foot Bailey was being prepared for the far end.

Major John C. Bell

THE Mojin Bridge, across the Pukhan River almost exactly on the 38th parallel about ten miles downstream from Hwachon Dam, had a turbulent existence during the Korean conflict. The high-level, steel-deck, girder bridge lay in a zone which changed hands several times during the yo-yo stages and consequently became an object of interest to those engaged in rapidly building and rebuilding over-water structures.

United Nations engineers can take some solace in the fact that they were not the only ones harassed by the Mojin Bridge. There is evidence that the Communists expended many man hours on this troublesome gap in their "road to Pusan." An expedient footbridge, built by them during their last tenancy, is of interest to soldiers who may some day have the task of putting men across a stream without engineer equipment or support.

When the Chinese Communists approached the Mojin Bridge on 26 April 1951, they found several gaps in the 849-foot, nine-span steel-girder bridge. The fourth span from the south end had been neatly cut out, and the first and second spans from the north had also been dropped. In addition, the 100-foot triple single Bailey across the southernmost gap was now nestled closely atop the dropped Mojin steel in the waters of the Pukhan. It must have splashed water on the Chinese when it fell, for it was shot down by United Nations *tank fire* (a neat expedient in itself), the day the Chinese approached it.

UNABLE to cope with such a situation, but needing a crossing for *men* more urgently than a crossing for vehicles, the Chinese constructed a footbridge out of local materials. The floats were empty 55-gallon fuel drums, the treads, transverse bracing and "outriggers" were Bailey Bridge chess, and the whole was secured by lashings of common telephone wire. Four chess abreast provided a walkway a bit more than 35 inches wide.

The footbridge was located so as to take advantage of the best features of the site. The placement just on the upstream side of the bridge allowed it to rest against the original fixed bridge piers without requiring any guy lines —at least during the low waters prevailing at the time. Its lines blended in well with the lines and shadows of the high bridge and of the wreckage in the water, so that it was extremely difficult to see from the air. This was probably of importance to the Chinese, harassed daily by warplanes.

The Communists threw this footbridge over gaps in the bridge when they "owned" it in 1951.



The Communist-built footbridge rested against the upstream side of the piers of the bridge.

The Word from the Schools

HE INFANTRY SCHOOL

wo Classes Lengthened

The six-month Officers' Advanced Course as been extended to nine months and only ne Advanced Class has been scheduled r fiscal year 1955.

Basic Infantry Officers' Course has been xtended to 15 weeks. Twenty-five classes ave been scheduled for fiscal year 1955.

iring Team Selections

Final competition for selecting a rifle nd pistol team to represent the U.S. in the 5th Annual International Shooting Union Vorld Championship Matches will be held Fort Benning from 27 October to 7 ovember.

The Infantry Center will conduct a nall-arms firing school designed to teach rmy marksmanship instructional methods. he school will coincide with the National rophy Matches and is open to members of e armed forces as well as civilian organi- tions.

lew Film

Movie crews have filmed the story of the .S. Infantryman at Fort Benning. "All ar Team," a semi-documentary picture r national television distribution, recruit- g service and military release, will show l phases of the Infantry and its elements.

lational Guard OCS

Infantry School officials expect approxi- ately 200 National Guardsmen to take lvantage of the special officer candidate urse offered at Fort Benning this summer.

The eight-week course is designed to ve selected National Guardsmen an op- rtunity to qualify for commissions in all anches except artillery during summer onths. However, final approval for com- issions will still be determined by State ational Guard boards.

HE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

ew Commandant

Maj. Gen. Edward T. Williams is the w Commanding General of The Artillery enter, and Commandant of The Artillery hool. He succeeded Maj. Gen. Charles Hart, now commander of V Corps in rope.

FF Board 1 Moves

Army Field Forces Board No. 1 has com- eted its permanent move to Fort Sill from rt Bragg, North Carolina. The mission this board is the testing of all types of ld artillery weapons.

ROTC Summer Camp

Sixteen hundred senior ROTC cadets participated in summer camp training here; this figure made Fort Sill's encampment the largest within the Fourth Army area.

Intensive practical training was the keynote. Students received field experience in the performance of tactical, technical, and administrative duties. Also stressed were physical development, athletics, military bearing, discipline, and sanitation. Camp, battalion, battery, platoon, and individual competitions—with suitable awards—were employed to engender military excellence.

Doughboy Statue

A "Follow Me Fund" to finance construction of a base for a life-size statue of a U. S. Infantryman to serve as a permanent memorial at The Infantry Center is under way. The bronze statue of the combat foot soldier was cast in Germany in 1946.

An estimated $2,500 is needed to erect a terrazzo concrete base. The monument will be located in front of The Infantry School Building. Two Infantry combat veterans, Staff Sgt. Thomas E. Love and Technical Sgt. Donald W. Remmerl, were used by German sculptor Ernest Kunst as models.

Two-Channel System

The two-channel method is now being emphasized as the primary radio system by TAS in its communication instruction. Reasons for the switch from the four-channel system:

(1) Additional channels (or further frequency allocation) are presently improbable due to universal crowding of the frequency spectrum and design of today's equipment;

(2) Trends in new developments and doctrine for fire direction are towards use of the two-channel system, which greatly reduces the crowding of frequencies.

Heretofore, there has been a requirement for a minimum of 173 FM frequencies for the artillery in the type corps. Now, by having the divisional 105mm battalions convert to the two-channel system, the requirement can be reduced by 18, for a total of 155 channels. No reduction has yet been made in nets of other FA units, such as the FA Battery (Searchlight) and FA Battalion (Observation).

Among benefits accruing from use of the two-channel system:

(1) Equipment workload and power supply problems are diminished proportionately by the few frequencies monitored at FDC; vehicular engine operation for radio power is similarly reduced.

(2) More frequencies can be used in counterjamming activities.

(3) Units trained under this method can readily employ more channels; while units trained under the four-channel system require considerable reorientation in conversion to a two-channel system.

Admittedly, there will be some overlaps of frequencies within a corps. Nevertheless, since the Artillery's most powerful FM receiver-transmitter, the RT-67, has a rated transmitting range of 10-15 miles (something less than the front occupied by the type corps), artillery frequencies, if properly allocated and spaced, can be repeated from corps to corps without causing unacceptable interference. (Corps artillery guards against inter-battalion interference when units are moved about by changing frequencies of the moving units.)

The two-channel system is now being used effectively by medium battalions. Despite the presence of seven additional radios, the only problem in light battalions is training and discipline to insure the most effective use of assigned channels. During World War II and the Korean conflict, almost all battalions used the two-channel system (from necessity) since the four-channel method made the assignment of interference-free channels a virtual impossibility.



General Gavin, who leads off these pages this month with his review of Cavalry of the Sky, *needs no introduction to most* JOURNAL *readers. General Phillips is the military correspondent for* The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, *and has been known for years as a forward-thinking military writer. General Fry is Chief, Career Management Division, and commanded the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Captain Fair recently completed a tour as S3 of the 3d Infantry. Colonel Thomson is a member of the Brookings Institution. General Blakeley, well known to* JOURNAL *readers, has been reviewing books for us for several years.*

Modern Tactical Mobility

CAVALRY OF THE SKY
By Lynn Montross
Harper & Brothers, 1954
270 pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.00

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN

It is a long way from The Halls of Montezuma to the hills of Korea. It is a way filled with combat accomplishment and adaptability to the ever-recurring changes in the pattern and hardware of war. Along the way our associates in the Marine Corps have laid solid claim to a place of distinction in the warrior's Valhalla. Not only have they fought well, but they have displayed timely nimbleness in adjusting to the changing character of combat. And at the same time they have sung their own praise with admirable immodesty.

Cavalry of the Sky is the story of their contribution to the development and combat use of helicopters. It is written by Lynn Montross, whose last volume was *Rag, Tag and Bobtail.* He is one of our best and most readable contemporary writers of history. Writing on this occasion for the Historical Division of the Marine Corps, Mr. Montross sticks to the Marine facts and statistics and makes excellent use of plenty of both. Perhaps the slant of the book is best suggested in the Foreword by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in which he refers to the latter as "*the* nation's force in readiness." (Italics mine.) It is an assertion that will come as somewhat of a surprise to the battle-worthy U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. Likewise to the hard-working, combat-ready Seventh Army in Europe, and to the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, a volunteer outfit that maintains a state of combat readiness and a strategic and tactical mobility second to none.

Cavalry of the Sky is a valuable, well documented record of the Marine Corps' search for modern tactical mobility. Characteristically, the Marines followed the Army's efforts in the same field with careful and discriminating interest, rejecting what appeared to be unsound and accepting and developing ideas of promise. In 1942 the USMC had both glider troops and paratroopers. Having made a half dozen jumps with the latter and sensing their unusual combat potential, I never could quite understand why they gave them up. The clue seems to be in Mr. Montross' comment, "Marine demonstrations brought to mind the object lessons of World War II which taught that paratroopers were often too scattered for an effective surprise attack after landing."

That, too, was the Army's first experience. Nevertheless it went ahead and developed the methods to make parachute units combat effective. Expanding from a platoon in 1940 to five divisions by 1944, they contributed decisively to Sicily, Salerno, Normandy, Corregidor and Bastogne. It is interesting to note in passing that Russian parachute officers expressed the same view in Berlin in 1945, stating that what stopped them in their efforts to create large airborne units was an inability to develop the methods and equipment to handle large airborne formations in combat.

While the Marine emphasis on amphibious operations in World War II is understandable, the Army nevertheless went ahead and solved the problems of airborne operations, and their major units never were, to my knowledge, too scattered for an effective surprise attack after landing. The most plausible reason for the Marine interest in airborne combat via helicopter is to be found in General Geiger's letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 21 August 1946, after Bikini. As quoted by Mr. Montross: "Under the assumption that atomic bombs can be produced in large quantities, that they can be used in mass attacks against an enemy objective, and that our probable future enemy will be in possession of this weapon, it is my opinion that a complete review and study of our concept of amphibious operations will have to be made."


LYNN MONTROSS
Helicopter Historian

Mr. Montross' book is a comprehensive record of the Marine Corps' response to the concept contained in General Geiger's letter. Tracing the airborne concept from Leonardo da Vinci's projected flying machine to the present-day air vehicles, it describes the most significant events in detail. There was no such thing as a practicable helicopter in 1921 when the U.S. Army first financed a design for one. The years immediately following were barren of significant progress. However, in 1939 tests conducted by the Army Air Corps showed unusual promise, and finally in May 1942 the U.S. Army flew the first helicopter from Connecticut to Wright Field, a distance of 761 miles, in six days.

The first cold-weather test took place in the winter of 1943-44. As reported by Mr. Montross, "One of the earliest military tests took place in the winter of 1943-44 when an Army YR-4 was taken apart and flown 4,000 miles to Alaska in a C-46 transport plane. This helicopter was equipped with pontoon gear and used for simulated rescue missions under Arctic weather conditions. The machine performed surprisingly well at low temperatures." In 1944 interest in its development was intensified, and as reported by Mr. Montross, on March 2, 1944 Colonel Gregory of the U.S. Army Air Corps set a new world record in making a nonstop flight from Washington National Airport to Patterson Field, Ohio.

In 1946, thirteen helicopters were assigned to the Army's 82d Airborne Division for test. The results were promising and efforts were then made by the Army to obtain more, both in numbers and varied types. Unfortunately, they had to be procured through the Air Force and it was difficult to obtain acceptance of this odd appearing contrivance. Despite the need of the Army, as late as 1949 a senior office

f the Air Force made the observation hat, since it was one of his responsibilities o pass on the suitability of requirements of his character, he considered it appropriate o say that the helicopter was "mechanically nreliable, aeronautically unsound. It is ike lifting one's self by one's bootstraps, nd shows no promise for the future."

The Army's experience suggests clearly he lack of wisdom in a system that at that ime denied to a service authority to proure means necessary for its combat moility. For mobility is the essential comonent of combat power, surprise is born f it and it is the talisman of success. Naoleon captured this in his ninth maxim: 'The strength of an army, like power in nechanics, is estimated by multiplying the nass by the velocity . . ." And Clausewitz n his Principles of War, "It is the most mportant element of victory." Yet years vent by and the Army was unable to proure helicopters adequate in numbers and ypes to its war needs.

Then came Korea. One of the impresive lessons from Korea was our lack of tacical mobility. At the outset, effective reonnaissance was entirely dependent upon and vehicles, vehicles that were frequently mmobilized by terrain and weather. As Mr. Montross observes in his fine book, "It vould appear that reliance on outdated orms of mechanization was the actual andicap of U.S. forces against an Asiatic easant army." To offset this, the Marines id a first-class job with the limited number f helicopters that they brought to Korea. *Cavalry of the Sky* tells how it was done.

The form and substance of progress in ny new field of development usually mirrors ne personalities of the people who actively ontribute to it. The helicopter program vas no exception. An unusual and attracve feature of this book is the biographical ketches of the individuals who shared a art of the development program. They vere an imaginative, hard-working lot. 'ortunately, also, much of their work was ecorded in pictures, particularly the work n Korea. The book includes a good numer of them.

The concluding chapters explore the fuure of the helicopter in atomic warfare. 'assing mention is made of the flying rane and the one-man helicopter, both of vhich have been developed during the past everal years to meet expressed Army reuirements. Surprisingly, no mention is nade of the convertiplane and assault ransport, both of which have been under udy by the Army for several years. Offand, they show greater promise of fruitful ombat application than any air vehicle ow on the drawing boards or flying.

All in all, *Cavalry of the Sky* is an exellent historical record of the development f the helicopter and the tactics for its nployment. And it is well to know and nderstand this new form of mobility. For ne helicopter and its close relations among ne air vehicles will play a major combat ole in the future. To read and retain much of the significant material in this book is to gain a beachhead in the vast unknown of the nature of future combat.

The Great Deterrent

STRATEGY FOR THE WEST
By Sir John Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force
William Morrow & Co., 1954
180 Pages; $3.00

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS

In this short book, Sir John Slessor, formerly Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, expounds some radical ideas about the kind of struggle the Western powers are facing and about the nature of the armed forces required. He believes that air-atomic power is the Great Deterrent, in capitals, and should be the first charge on our resources. The deterrent effect of the air-atomic weapon is so great, he believes, that there is small chance that an atomic war will occur.

The Third World War, instead, is in progress right now, according to the author, in the form of minor aggressions, revolutions and subversion. Since this is the case, Slessor advocates adequate ground forces in readiness to put out communist-started fires. It is in regard to the type and organization of ground forces that Slessor's ideas are radical.

As for navies, it is quite obvious that Slessor believes they are approaching obsolescence. "If further economies must be found in defense expenditures," he writes, "it is impossible to resist the conclusion that they must and can be found in the sea service." He would concentrate upon defense against the submarine and mine as principal threats to sea communications.

As for carriers, he says "we must satisfy ourselves that the carrier has a reasonable chance of remaining afloat in the face of modern methods of attack." Slessor believes that guided bombs lauched from ranges beyond the power of interception from ships' fighters may spell the end of great naval vessels, although he admits that it is not inconceivable that a defense may be found.

Amphibious operations also are downgraded by Slessor. "We should set our faces against heavy expenditure," he writes, "on special craft and equipment designed for large-scale operations on the lines of the 'Overlord' landings, which will never again be practicable in the face of a first-class enemy."

Airborne operations of any size are too vulnerable, Slessor believes. They may be valuable in small wars and a few units of this type might be retained. This is also his position on amphibious operations.

Basically, Slessor believes that "we can no longer afford to superimpose the new atomic air strategy on top of the old conventional strategy of armies on the early twentieth-century continental scale with their great supporting air forces." In searching for a solution he turns, as most airmen do, to the air-atomic weapon. It is, however, "an unlimited instrument, and must be supplemented by forces of the type that can deal with what are, or should be, limited commitments by limited means." He fears, in other words, that the use of atomic weapons in small wars risks bringing on the major atomic war which must be avoided at all costs.

Slessor's case for the deterrent power of the air-atomic weapon is not overly convincing. He was in a city in Baluchistan which was wiped out, along with most of its inhabitants, in 55 seconds. "When people talk lightheartedly about that sort of thing on a widespread scale not being decisive," he writes, "I have to tell them with respect that they do not know what they are talking about. No country could survive a month of Quetta earthquakes on all its main centers of population and remain capable of organized resistance."

In Germany, for example, Slessor declares: "that what it took us five years to do last time we could do, and much more, in five days another time, and they could do nothing to prevent it." And there is no reason to doubt the ability of British and American air power to reach into the Soviet Union. Just as long as we keep that capacity, the threat of retribution will prevent a major war, in Slessor's strategy.

This is the heart of his strategy and possibly the most doubtful element. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a major policy speech in January said that "Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power," and that "The basic decision (made by the President and the National Security Council) was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."

Shortly thereafter it was reported by the press that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been authorized to include the use of atomic weapons in their war plans.

The point of this is that fear of Russian retaliation is not preventing us from planning to use atomic weapons. Similarly, it seems unlikely that fear of retribution from the United States will prevent Soviet planners from following the same path.

When the time came that the political

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

LINES FROM A NEW BOOK

. . . One can encourage the troops against England without talking to them; and nothing could be more absurd than to write them a pamphlet. It suggests distrust and intrigue, and the army needs none of it. Tell Barère, whose rhetoric and sophistry ill accord with his big reputation, not to do any more writing of this kind. He is always thinking the mob must be roused to excitement: on the contrary, the right way is to guide them without their knowing it. . . .

9 Sept. 1804 *Napoleon's Letters*

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ATLAS OF MEN. By William H. Sheldon with the collaboration of C. Wesley Dupertuis and Eugene McDermott. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 357 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00. A guide and handbook on somatotyping for those concerned with the problems of human physique, including physicians, geneticists, psychologists, physical educators, actuaries, nutritionists and human biologists. The first comprehensive review of age, height and weight standards since 1912.

THE COMPLEAT STRATEGYST. By J. D. Williams. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954. 234 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. A primer on Game Theory for home study that enables the reader to formulate and solve simple problems.

DESPERATE SCENERY. By Elliot Paul. Random House, 1954. 302 Pages; $3.75. The author of *The Last Time I Saw Paris, The Life and Death of a Spanish Town, Linden on the Saugus Branch,* and many other books writes of Pocatello, Idaho, and the surrounding country with his usual entertaining and roistering style.

DON'T TREAD ON ME. By Capt. Walter Karig with Capt. Horace V. Bird. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 442 Pages; $4.00. A novel, rather than fictionalized biography. Captain Karig, the author of the *Battle Report* series and *Zotz,* uses an exciting historical era for the background of one of his skillfully contrived novels.

THE DRIVE TOWARD REASON: In the Service of a Free People. By Lyman Bryson. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 148 Pages; Index; $2.50. Examining "our present effort to realize the oldest of American dreams, the betterment of ourselves, and to look for those favorable factors that may help us along." An inspirational book for those who are tired of listening to the prophets of doom.

THE EDGE OF THE SWORD. By Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley. Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1954. 275 Pages; $2.75. The Adjutant of the 1st Battalion of the famous Gloucestershire Regiment writes of that unit's glorious stand at the eastern crossing of the Imjin River, and continues with an account of the author's period as a prisoner of war. Captain Hockley's literary abilities are a bit above those of most of the American writers of similar books.

A FABLE. By William Faulkner. Random House. 437 Pages; $4.75. William Faulkner's latest and probably crowning achievement. The scene is France in 1918 and the AEF figures prominently.

FAR EASTERN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS: China and Japan. By Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath W. Burks. D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1954. 630 Pages; Index; $6.50. A college-level text by three recognized experts. Designed also for reading by interested general readers. Complete and accurate and with a minimum of "special language."

GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ACTION: A Sourcebook for Citizen Volunteers. By Mark S. Matthews. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 434 Pages; Index; $4.00. In these days of PTA, civic associations, volunteer fire departments, youth councils, brotherhood organizations, "little leagues," and many other community and wider groups that depend on volunteers for operation, a handbook of this type was inevitable. Here is the guide for the leaders in community volunteer efforts, complete with information from initial organization, through financing and public relations, down to "Sources of Aid." Readable and complete.

AN INNOCENT ON EVEREST. By Ralph Izzard. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 319 Pages; $3.75. A true adventure story by an English newspaperman who was assigned to try to beat the official stories in the conquest of Everest. Exciting but not particularly important.

THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR. By Benjamin Graham. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 272 Pages; Charts; Index; $3.50. A revised version of a book that in its earlier edition received wide acclaim from many readers in the financial world. Realistic, and can be understood by the layman.

IWO JIMA: Amphibious Epic. By Lt. Col. Whitman S. Bartley. Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954. 253 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. Another in the beautifully-done series of official Marine Corps histories. To be reviewed in the JOURNAL at length.

LIFE PLANNING FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS. By William J. Reilly. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 173 Pages; Index; $2.50. Designed to help the college student toward a wise choice of career. It purports to show how to plan "scientifically" toward achievement of life goals—if a short book can be used as a scientific tool toward the attainment of such an abstract goal.

MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR FOOD FREEZER. By Marie Armstrong Essipoff. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 371 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.95. A revised and enlarged edition of one of the better books on the subject.

ME AND MY RUSSIAN WIFE. By Eddy Gilmore. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 313 Pages; $3.75. Mostly personal reminiscences by an American correspondent who spent twelve years behind the Iron Curtain and was finally able to bring his Russian wife and his two children out of the country after the death of Stalin. The author admits to no profundity but the reader will learn what it is like to live in Russia even with the preferred status of a foreigner.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND SOCIETY. By Stanislaw Andrzejewski. Grove Press. 195 Pages; Index; $4.50. A Polish author investigates the influence of military organization on social life.

MY LIFE IN THE MAINE WOODS: A Game Warden's Wife in the Allagash Country. By Annette Jackson. W. W. Norton & Co., 1954. 236 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. A game warden's wife tells of life in the deep forest, complete with deer, bear, snow and four children. A homely unpretentious story of life far removed from the city.

NOW I CAN TELL. By Quentin K. Y. Huang. Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1954. 222 Pages; $3.50. A Chinese bishop's own story of imprisonment by the Chinese Communists. An intelligent and astonishingly objective description of life in the new China.

PUBLICITY IN ACTION. By Herbert M. Baus. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 335 Pages; Index; $4.50. Designed for business enterprises, public agencies, service organizations, volunteer groups and charitable agencies, this book describes publicity techniques in layman's terms. Offers a down-to-earth approach.

RIFLE SQUAD AND PLATOON IN ATTACK—Illustrated. By Major Frank F. Rathbun; Illustrated by Charles G. Rebeles. The Military Service Publishing Co., 1954. 96 Pages; Index; $2.00. A graphic presentation of basic tactics by a member of the staff of The Infantry School. The text is readable and the illustrations, though hardly artistic, are clear and convincing.

SHIPS, MACHINERY AND MOSSBACKS: The Autobiography of a Naval Engineer. By Harold G. Bowen, Vice Admiral, USN (ret.) Princeton University Press, 1954. 397 Pages; Charts; Index; $6.00. Admiral Bowen's forty-six years in the Navy ended in June 1947; this period covered many engineering advances. Admiral Leahy says in his Foreword: "We have had in the Navy during my time many successful engineering officers, but insofar as I know, no other than Vice Admiral Bowen made so many improvements . . ." Written in salty, no-punches-pulled style.

THE STORY OF OUR CIVILIZATION. By Philip Lee Ralph. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1954. 319 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. A history of the last 10,000 years of Western man; a masterpiece of compression.

"STROBE"—THE LIVELY LIGHT. By Howard Luray. Camera Craft Publishing Co., 1954. 144 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. A second edition of a standard text on Strobe photography techniques.

TARAWA: The Story of a Battle. By Robert Sherrod. Duell, Sloan & Pearce-Little, Brown, 1954. 196 Pages; $3.50. The reissue, on the tenth anniversary of the original, of one of the most stirring volumes of reportage to come out of World War II. Twelve pages of statements by high-ranking participants in the original battle have been added.

WIND TUNNEL TESTING. By Alan Pope. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1954. 511 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $8.50. A new edition of a standard work first produced in 1947. Well illustrated.

ecision had to be made to use atomic eapons, the political decision might be gainst the military planners. In that case ıe nation which has depended upon the ir-atomic weapon as the greatest force in s arsenal, might find itself hopelessly out-assed by its failure to maintain a sufficient onventional force.

The deterrent theory is a risky one on hich to chance national survival. Slessor ıinks that small wars in the future will e fought with conventional light forces. his reviewer doubts that in any future nall war our military commanders will be eprived of the power of atomic weapons.

Although Slessor believes that new eapons have added greatly to defensive ower on land, especially against tanks, he ıvisages a core, to stem the first rush of vasion in Europe, of "highly mobile ar-ored divisions with powerful self-pro-elled artillery, covered and supported by ctical air forces." The first-line forces ould be supplemented by some infantry visions for the mobile holding role, but ainly by local semi-static home or terri-rial guard forces on an inexpensive odel. It may be doubted that many sol-ers will agree with this idea of Airman essor.

Strategy for the West is a thought-ovoking book. Very few will agree with the ideas, but almost everyone will agree th some. In a time when weapons de-lopment has been so revolutionary as the esent, thoughtful books on the effects of w weapons on tactics, strategy and or-nization are just as important as millions dollars spent in research. It is historically ıe that armies have shown themselves ıch more ready to adopt new weapons ın they have new ideas. Weapons deter-ne tactics almost entirely, and influence ategy. Tactics and strategy are not ma-ial things like weapons—they are ideas. ıat is why a book like this, with which v will agree, is of very great value.

allant Gloucesters

THE EDGE OF THE SWORD
By Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley
Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1954
275 Pages; $2.75

viewed by
ıJ. Gen. J. C. Fry

The Edge of the Sword is a calm, dis-sionate, and obviously authentic account the British author's experiences in battle l as a prisoner in North Korea. The e serves to symbolize the Infantry as the mary fighting instrument of ground rfare. The tale begins with the epic tle staged by the famous Gloucestershire giment on Castle Hill, where they stood arely astride the avenue the Chinese ny sought to follow toward Seoul. In opening stages of the battle, the ucesters were led to believe that they ıld be reinforced or relieved. However, he violence of the conflict spread, the h command indicated that this was im-sible.

The colonel of the Regiment received orders to "hold at all costs." Every military student has used that term, but few have appreciation of what it means. An order of such finality is equivalent to a death sentence for many of the recipients. The picture sketched of the colonel lighting his pipe with shaking hands, his face paling from knowledge of what the order means, is one to be savored by officers who may endure the responsibility for units in violent combat.

The outcome of the defense by the gallant Gloucesters is now history. No other unit of all those that made up the United Nations forces in Korea can boast of greater demonstrated valor. Every thinking man who has worn the uniform of his country should be thrilled by this detailed account of grim conflict. To those who died and those who survived, the free world owes an undying debt of gratitude.

It was inevitable that by sheer force of numbers, this small British unit would eventually be submerged. The picture the author draws of treatment meted out to the prisoners should be required reading for all members of the free world whose duties in any way involve the shaping of policy toward nations behind the Iron Curtain. Within these pages the character of our enemy stands out clearly—a vile, deceitful, calloused, cruel, ignorant, and savage mob, entangled in their own web of lies, treachery, and deceit. The description of unimaginable tortures inflicted upon helpless prisoners forms a pattern that quite obviously reflects the policy that the end justifies any means.

Entwined within this tale of valor by the Gloucesters and the hideous behavior of their captors are a multitude of lessons that thinking men should evaluate. The picture painted of the hordes of Asians describes an ill-fed, ill-equipped, poorly trained, and ruthlessly controlled army. Although frightening at first thought, the Chinese lacked the essentials for gaining final victory over the West. One thing they most assuredly lack is the full support of their own people. One can feel this in the repeated indications that both the Chinese and Koreans are basically more humane than the treatment given our prisoners would seem to indicate. The evidence points to the fact that Communism has been embraced in desperation rather than through free choice. The full meaning of this should be assayed by all of us.

The tale includes repeated efforts to escape and the tortures endured when recaptured. Through this pattern of death, sickness, hope and desperation, men's characters stand starkly naked. Physical welfare gains strength from peace of mind and confidence that God guards the welfare of the free world. The author tells repeatedly of his trust and belief in God and cites instances where his prayers were answered, the culminatian being his passing under a wooden arch marked "Welcome to Freedom."

"Follow Me"

RIFLE SQUAD AND PLATOON IN ATTACK
By Major F. F. Rathbun
Illustrated by Charles G. Rebeles
The Military Service Publishing Co., 1954
96 Pages; Index; $2.00

Reviewed by
Captain Robert L. Fair

Major Rathbun has discovered the formula for writing a tactics textbook from which the aspiring young leader will find it a cinch to learn.

Adapting his material from FM 7-10 and current Infantry School pamphlets, author Rathbun presents the basic fundamentals of squad and platoon attack doctrine in such a logical manner that it should receive the commendations of all leaders from the Assistant Squad Leader to the Division Commander. In the foreword, Major General J. C. Fry, the Army's Career Management Chief, states, "The small-unit commander who masters the principles contained herein will never feel inadequate on the battlefield."

That Rathbun's technique is relatively simple is a tribute to his skill. His secret? —present the lesson by the use of graphic illustrations and use only a few well-chosen words. Consequently, the book's ninety-five pages contain no less than seventy-nine excellent illustrations.

Rifle Squad and Platoon in Attack begins with a brief discussion of the attack in general, including fire superiority, maneuvering force, and the principles of find 'em and fix 'em, fight 'em and finish 'em. All of this discussion is written in a clear-cut, down-to-earth style easily understandable even by the novice.

Artist Charles G. Rebeles then lends his talent by graphically presenting the organization of the rifle and weapons squads and the rifle platoon. These drawings are followed by realistic pictures portraying various squad and platoon formations.

The preliminaries out of the way, the author then takes us through the step-by-step movement of the rifle platoon in an attack. No phase of the attack is overlooked. After the company attack order is issued, the leader is led through a detailed description of troop leading. Our platoon leader, his preparations for the operation completed, issues his attack order. Here, the author thoughtfully presents the reader with both an outline of the attack order and a platoon leader's check list for planning the attack.

The platoon is now ready to move. Major Rathbun describes the action of the leaders and their units in the assembly area, the movement to the attack position, crossing the line of departure and moving toward the assault position. After arriving in the assault position the leader learns about shifting his supporting fire and making the assault. Naturally, the leader and his platoon take the objective and study reorganization and consolidation. The platoon leader receives another valuable check list, this time for the attack.

The author takes the rifle and weapons squads through the same process, also providing check lists for the squad leaders.

The text ends with the presentation of a sample platoon leader's and squad leader's attack order.

By maintaining the same thread of thought throughout the presentation, continuity is obtained seldom found in such a work.

While it is true that all the doctrine presented may be found in field manuals, it is much easier to learn small unit attack doctrine in the "Rathbun manner."

Rifle Squad and Platoon in Attack is specifically designed for the junior leader since it is a simple and straightforward insight into the details and ramifications which go into the motto of the Infantry —"Follow Me."

FAR EASTERN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS: CHINA AND JAPAN
By Paul M. A. Linebarger, Djang Chu and Ardath W. Burks
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1954
630 Pages; $6.50

Reviewed by
COL. C. A. H. THOMSON

This study in comparative government, offered partly as an introduction to the Far Eastern tradition of the government of men, is more than an ordinary textbook in conception and execution. Its long historical perspective assures that it will continue to be useful to the reader, no matter what emerges out of the immediate turmoil of Far Eastern politics.

The book is almost evenly divided between China and Japan, with slight preponderance to the latter. The treatment is in many parts interwoven as the authors indicate relationships between the two governments and with the other Asian and Western powers.

The treatment of modern China gives some insight into developments which led to Mao's victory, and offers some basis for estimating the future. The outlook for the Nationalist Government is dim: although a forlorn hope, it is still alive, "a long-shot in the perennial gamble of Far Eastern history" (p. 145), but resting on a base no worse than the Chinese Communists enjoyed in 1935. The record of governing Formosa is good. The prospects for recapture of the mainland depend—if not on successful exploitation of global war—on possession of non-Communist revolutionary ideology, the power of the overseas Chinese community, and the revolutionary ferment of China itself. There is no easy road back; guerrilla warfare, increasing liberation of mainland areas from Communist control, organization of passive resistance, the development and use of a dynamic revolutionary situation, face the Nationalists.

Mao's victory was founded on shrewd, hard-headed exploitation of the lessons learned and experience gained in fighting the Kuomintang and the Japanese. The Communists learned not to sacrifice real power for the appearances of it. They built a solemn, self-assured and powerful regime, led by a realist more Western in his thought than Chiang. Yet it is not a regime which would sacrifice power to Marxist or Leninist ideology. This explains the inclusion within their coalition of little bourgeois and capitalist elements, thought necessary during the first stage of revolution. Whether the authors are right in concluding that the Communists have come to "final" power, only time will tell.

The authors offer little hope either for a Titoist shift or for an overturn. They suggest no lines on which the Communist regime might founder, and do not compare the possibilities of weakness and defeat which face this regime with those which emerged from the Kuomintang effort to teach democracy by tutelage.

The task of politics in China is to find and extend "shareable belief." This is the task of politics everywhere, but in China it is especially difficult, since rifts go so deep and the basic question of "Who are we Chinese, and where are we going?" is so far from common answer.

The part on Japan is equally valuable, if not so sprightly in style. A modest estimate of the impact of United States occupation is given: the Occupation affected the deep roots of Japanese society very little. The long perspective of Japanese political development suggests that no one should dare predict the manner in which the Japanese will absorb and reshape the influences of "democratization."

Political Interference

V-2
By Walter Dornberger. Translated by James Clough and Geoffrey Halliday
The Viking Press, 1954
281 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Major General Dornberger, former commander of the Peenemunde Rocket Research Institute, tells in this book the story of the development in Germany of the liquid-fuel rocket between 1930 and 1945. The rocket, he says, is "an invention which is certain to exercise a decisive influence on the future of mankind." He is not, he makes it clear, merely considering the rocket as a weapon: "We have led our generation to the threshold of space—the road to the stars is now open."

From the military viewpoint, however, the current value of General Dornberger's book lies in the fact that he gives an authentic account, valuable as background, of the development of the weapon which he regards as the ideal artillery projectile possessing the characteristics of long range and accuracy, and cheaper to manufacture and simpler to service than an airplane.

General Eisenhower has said that "it seems likely, that if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons [the V-1 and V-2 rockets] six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible." No on who saw the great assemblage of troop ships, and landing craft in the Portsmouth Southampton area and in the vicinity c Plymouth, and who also saw the damag done to London and Antwerp by th rockets, could possibly disagree with th opinion. It is clear from General Dorn berger's account that the vital six month or more of delay was due not to technic difficulties but to political indifference an interference.

The Army's difficulties with Himmle the head of the thoroughly political S are of particular interest. He told Dorn berger that once Hitler had decided to giv the V-2 project his support the work cease to be the concern of the Army Weapo Department, or indeed of the Army at al and became the concern of the Germa people. "I am here," he announced on h first visit to Peenemunde, "to protect yo against sabotage and treason."

Later, because of SS pressure, the st tion commander at Peenemunde was r lieved without warning from his comman Investigation by Dornberger developed t fact that the basis of the relief was u founded charges contained in a lett from Himmler.

It may well be an understatement to s that political interference of this type co tributed to the defeat of Germany World War II.

Finland's Giant

THE MEMOIRS OF MARSHAL MANNERHEI
Translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt
E. P. Dutton & Co., 1954
540 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $6.

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

It could be argued, and admittedly t debate might be hot, that the three o standing individuals of the first half of t twentieth century started their careers professional soldiers. Each, under ve different circumstances, eventually beca the head of the government of his cou try. The stories of Churchill and Eis hower are well known; that of Finlan Mannerheim is, in America at least, little known that it may seem a little abs to group him with the other two.

S. L. A. Marshall recently referred Mannerheim as "one of the earth's giant Only the fact that Mannerheim's coun was a little one buffeted between Russia a Germany will obscure his place in histo the same fact emphasizes his stature a leader. Of Swedish-Finnish ancestry, was graduated from Russia's Nikolaev Cavalry School in 1889 after a previ start, at the age of fifteen, in the Finn Corps of Cadets School had ended abrup His boyish boast that he would enter Russian Cavalry School (he didn't e speak Russian) and become an officer the Chevalier Guards, the top regiment the Czar's household troops, was not ta very seriously, but he did just that. In thirty years in the Imperial Russian A

e rose to the rank of lieutenant general ıd had extensive combat experience in the usso-Japanese war and against the Gerans and Austrians in World War I.

The Russian revolution terminated this ıase of his military career, but he almost ımediately became the Commander-inhief of Finland's armed forces in their ar of liberation, and later Regent. In)39, when Russia attacked Finland, Manerheim was again given the Supreme ɔmmand, and later became President of e republic.

Mannerheim was an outstanding horsean and a pupil and friend of James llis, an equestrian well known to officers all armies in the days when the horse ıs the principal factor in mobility. The ɔry of Mannerheim's two-year ride of arly a thousand miles through the whole central Asia from Russian Turkestan arly to Pekin is told with such simplicity ıt the hazards of freezing weather on nd-swept mountains, of the monotonous ɔssing of the Gobi Desert, and of unendly treatment on the borders of Tibet ıphasize more the character of the writer ın the dangers involved. At seventy, :identally, his idea of a vacation was to to India on a tiger-hunting expedition.

His memoirs were written in 1950, and died, at the age of eighty-three, in Janu- of 1951. His comments on the Russians d on military tactics and weapons are, course, dated, but not without value. r example, he says that it is "typically ssian" to minimize the importance of a t because for some reason it does not ord with preconceived ideas—certainly langerous characteristic in war. He says t in the Russian high command, parılarly in the "winter war" of 1939-40, re were "signs of a kind of inertia": his displayed itself in the formalism and ıplicity of the operative plan, which exded maneuvering and was obstinately :sued to victory or defeat. The Russians ed their art of war on weight of maal, and were clumsy, ruthless, and exvagant."

A Russian innovation which seems to e possibilities in the field of personnel iers was armored sleighs drawn by tanks : bringing up infantry."

Marshal Mannerheim believed that thing except extensive maneuvers can pare the troops for the many demands war, and nothing else can bring officers men so close." Current military thought ourse regards maneuvers as an essential nent in training but tends to the idea there is a time limit beyond which ıing value, for smaller units at least, ɔs rapidly. The difference here may ly depend on the Marshal's concept of ensive maneuvers."

his book etches a picture of a man of t character and varied abilities and of a ll country which fought hard for its dom. It also highlights the amazing ıges in all matters military in less than a century.

Pass In Review

It isn't often we devote space to a discussion of fiction titles. This month, however, saw the publication of a novel that we consider well worthwhile. *The Fall of a Titan* ($4.50) was written by Igor Gouzenko, the cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Canada whose break with the Reds led to the roundup of the Canadian spy ring in 1945. His story is laid in Russia during the time of the great purges of 1930. The book contains a wealth of interesting and apparently factual detail about Soviet control of population, labor camps, production, and the like. Certainly the reader gets a powerful indoctrination in the creeping paralysis of individual thought and action which encompasses all those who must live under the shadow of the Hammer and Sickle. Books like this and Admiral Stevens' *Russian Assignment* contribute to a better understanding of the menace of communism on the personal level. Gouzenko's book will provide several evenings of fine entertainment as well.

Having heard for years of that colorful British hero, Chinese Gordon, I was quite pleased to see a copy of Lawrence and Elizabeth Hanson's recent biography of him. *Chinese Gordon* ($4.00) substantiates fully all I had ever heard about this bizarre fighter. He certainly is an intriguing personality and as a leader of troops he has had few peers.

We're always happy to see our "boys" get ahead. Our boy in this instance is Paul Linebarger, contributing author to our JOURNAL and author of our Combat Forces Press' best-selling title *Psychological Warfare* (now out of print but a new edition is in the mill). Linebarger has just produced, through another publisher, a scholarly work of current interest entitled *Far Eastern Governments and Politics* ($6.50). If this new book is half as successful as our own *Psychological Warfare* ($25.00 for a copy in second-hand book stores now), his current publisher will be happy indeed.

As a faithful reader of every volume published in the official World War II Army history series and the reviewer of four or five volumes, I have never failed to be impressed by the high quality of the workmanship that has marked all but one or two of the books. There is still another officially sponsored historical effort that has not received as much attention as it should, the current series being published by the Marine Corps Historical Division. Some thirteen volumes have already been published, of which *Iwo Jima* ($4.75) is the latest. These Marine historical accounts are understandably smaller volumes than those of the army but mechanically are every bit as good. While I have not read all thirteen of the Marine works, I have read over half of them and find them to be top notch in almost every respect. In comparison, I would have to say without malice, that the Marine histories are less prone to discuss and analyze mistakes than has been the case in the Army's histories. But even so, they provide hard hitting, well mapped studies of the campaigns involved. Incidentally, you can get them all through our Combat Forces Book Service—see the book list in the back of the JOURNAL.

There are so many Civil War titles published that we have a hard time keeping up with them all and rarely mention those that are not straight history. However, over a period of years there have been some excellent fictionalized biographies of Civil War leaders and a new one caught my eye recently and reminded me that it might not be a bad idea to mention it. The title is *Farewell My General* ($3.50) and is written by Shirley Seifert, a Civil War fan and author of long standing. This fine novel is based on the life of Jeb Stuart and rates as high entertainment. While this is essentially a historical novel, Shirley Seifert knows her Civil War well enough to keep her work factually correct and consequently does not irritate the true Civil War fan who is by his very nature persnickety, to say the least.

With the fighting in Asia so much in our thoughts these days, I was particularly interested in a new book written by a British Army major about the war in Malaya. *Jungle Green* ($4.00) describes the dirty jungle fighting at the platoon level and gives an exciting picture of the prolonged guerrilla warfare which has been going on for so long.

R.F.C.

Selected Books For Military Readers

ALL TITLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

World War II

Admiralties (Historical Division) ..... .50
Army Air Force in World War II (Craven & Cate)
Vol. I Plans and Early Operations.. 8.50
Vol. II Europe: Torch to Point Blank 8.50
Vol. III Europe: Argument to VE Day 8.50
Vol. IV Guadalcanal to Saipan..... 8.50
Vol. V Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki 8.50
Bastogne (Marshall) (cloth)..... 3.00
(paper) ..... .25
Bradley: A Soldier's Story (Bradley)... 5.00
Calculated Risk (Clark) 5.00
Churchill's Memoirs (Churchill)
Vol. I The Gathering Storm 6.00
Vol. II Their Finest Hour 6.00
Vol. III The Grand Alliance 6.00
Vol. IV The Hinge of Fate 6.00
Vol. V Closing the Ring 6.00
Vol. VI Triumph and Tragedy 6.00
Command Missions (Truscott) 7.50
Crusade in Europe (Eisenhower) 2.98
Fleet Admiral King (King) 7.50
Forrestal Diaries (Millis) 5.00
Four Stars of Hell (Critchell) 3.75
From Down Under to Nippon (Krueger) 6.50
History of Marine Aviation in World War II (Sherrod) 6.50
History of U. S. Marines in World War II (Historical Division)
Battle for Tarawa 1.75
Bougainville and the Northern Solomons 2.25
The Guadalcanal Campaign 4.25
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Marine Aviation in the Philippines... 2.50
Marines in the Central Solomons 2.75
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Iwo Jima 4.75
History of U. S. Naval Operations in World War II (Morison)
Vol. I Battle for the Atlantic 6.00
Vol. II Operations in North African Waters 6.00
Vol. III Rising Sun in the Pacific.. 6.00
Vol. IV Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions 6.00
Vol. V Struggle for Guadalcanal .. 6.00
Vol. VI Breaking the Bismarck Barrier 6.00
Vol. VII Aleutians, Gilberts & Marshalls 6.00
Vol. VIII New Guinea & the Marianas 6.00
Island Victory (Marshall) (cloth)..... 2.00
(paper) .... .25
Iwo Jima (paper)..... .25
Kesselring: A Soldier's Record (Kesselring) 5.00
Life's Picture History of World War II. 10.00
Makin (Historical Division) ..... .35
Omaha Beachhead (Historical Division) 1.75
Patton and His Third Army (Wallace) . 3.50
Small Unit Actions (Historical Division) 1.25
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

Green Uniform Gets Green Light

The Army's proposed green uniform finally caught the approval of the Senate Appropriations Committee and orders for six million yards of cloth, enough for 1,400,000 uniforms, will be ordered soon. Enlisted men will probably be wearing the uniform late in 1955. Officers may be authorized to buy and wear it sooner. The Army promises a long wear-out period for the present uniform. Army recruiters may show up in it first in order to compete with the Air Force uniform.

Training Problem for National Guard Medi

National Guard medical units on summer training get lo of experience in treating sunburn, poison ivy and relat itches and miseries, but a major job of surgery seldo comes their way. It was different this year at the Delawa training camp of the District of Columbia National Guar D. C. medics successfully performed two major emergen operations: one an appendectomy and the other for herni The patients feel fine now—and so do the medics who g a letter of commendation from the Surgeon General.

The Month's Pictures

Armor Trains at Camp Stewart

A sizeable segment of the 280,000-acre reservation at Camp Stewart, unused by the AAA Training Center, has been turned into a training area for Third Army tank outfits. The area is the only one east of the Mississippi River where 120mm guns can be fired at maximum range and it is probably the only post in the U.S. now used for tank training where combined arms (artillery, armor and infantry) can engage in a river-crossing problem. Preparation of the ar for tank training began in January when the 423d Engine Battalion moved in to build tank trails and firing rang Since then a "tent city" has been erected 25 miles from t main cantonment area. The photograph shows ammuniti being unloaded for the 194th Tank Battalion on one of t area's firing lines.

Army Engineer operating collapsible aluminum combat bridge.

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Vol. 5, No. 2 September 1954

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The Army Combat Forces Journal is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The **Journal** strives to

¶ Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

¶ Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

¶ Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

¶ Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

¶ Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

Journal's Journal

It was just about a year ago that our Editor reminded us that 1954 was the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of *Infantry Journal,* the older of this magazine's predecessors. He proposed a special issue devoted not to the glorious history of *Infantry Journal,* creditable though it is, but to an examination of the tremendous social changes that have affected the Army the *Infantry Journal* (and *The Field Artillery Journal*) served for so many years. As he said, the technological changes are all about us where we can see them, but the social changes, every bit as revolutionary, are less easily apprehended. In 1904 our nation was just beginning to sense that it was inseparable from the world beyond our shores. Today, three wars later, our Army is spread all over the world. What happened to it in the process? The explanation of this subject, written by Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy (retired), will appear next month. My advice is: Don't miss it.

THE PUBLISHER

COVER: Map Reading For National Guardsmen. *Photo by District of Columbia National Guard.*

THE CURRENT SCENE

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Front And Center

Recognition of the quiet but persua-ve efforts of General Matthew B. Ridg-ay to change the trend of the "New ook's" de-emphasis of land power is eginning to pervade Washington. Re-ntly Roscoe Drummond, the reliable Vashington bureau chief of *The New ork Herald Tribune* devoted his col-nn to General Ridgway and his views. eneral Ridgway "is not waging any ublic controversy," he wrote. "That is ot his way of doing military business. ut within the Pentagon, within the oint Chiefs of Staff and within the Na-onal Security Council, he is pressing s convictions with renewed vigor. The sult is that the New Look is being oked at again."

✓ ✓ ✓

How persuasive the Army Chief of aff is may appear when next year's udget is made public. A few months o it was said that the reduction of rmy strength in the present fiscal year ince slowed up) was only the begin-ng and further reductions would fol-w in the next several years. But now appears that the budget for Fiscal 956 will call for some increase in rmy strength.

✓ ✓ ✓

The theory that the only purpose of arching drill is to move groups of men om one place to another in an orderly ay is getting the lumps from the Ma-ne Corps which is going back to the ght-man squad for drill purposes. Ma-nes believe that the drill field is impor-nt in indoctrinating men in habits of edience and instant response to orders id in developing command presence id voice in leaders. The advantage of e eight-man squad for this purpose is at it requires more complex maneuvers than the simpler movements of the larger squads and thus gives leaders many more possible orders. The Marines will retain the 13-man squad for tactical purposes.

✓ ✓ ✓

The new I&E film, "This Is Your Army," is worth the substantial plugging and support the Army is giving it. While a bit long—the world-wide commitments and activities of the Army are breath-taking just in enumeration—the picture is well put together and altogether one of the finest military documentaries ever filmed. Every soldier is supposed to see it, so don't duck that detail when it is announced.

✓ ✓ ✓

One paragraph "declassified" from a National Security Council report by Dr. John A. Hannah during his final press conference (*see page* 28) had to do with the need by the services of men with skills that take a long time to learn and the consequent need for four-year enlist-ments. The paragraph reads in full: "Efficient and effective operation of the Active Forces requires a large core of professional career service personnel around which can be built in an emer-gency forces of the size and quality re-quired to carry out the military assign-ments. Modern warfare requires large numbers of men possessing many skills that require long-time training. A rea-sonable return on the training cost re-quires the encouragement of four-year enlistments in all four services."

✓ ✓ ✓

Airborne soldiers who have been say-ing that the new green uniform doesn't have a garrison cap (overseas cap to you old-timers) are wrong. Headgear for the new uniform includes both the field cap (formerly garrison) and garrison cap (for-merly overseas). The troopers fear was that the new uniform might result in los-ing one of their most cherished symbols: the airborne cap patch. Actually their concern may be well placed. The new garrison cap will be made of green cloth without *branch piping and special in-signia may be prohibited. It will be recalled that a few years ago when the airborne cap patch was banned along with other such devices troopers made such a fuss that it was restored to them.*

✓ ✓ ✓

A few months ago Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, retired World War II com-mander of the Ninth Army, wrote an article for *This Week*, a Sunday maga-zine appearing in many newspapers. In the article Gen. Simpson observed that one of his minor irritations was that he and some other World War II army com-manders had not been given post-retire-ment promotion to four stars, although it would not cost the Government addi-tional retired pay and some army com-manders had four-star rank. What effect this article may have had is unknown, but since then Congress has promoted Gen. Simpson and 10 other World War II lieutenant generals. As first pro-posed, the promotions would have gone to the late Lesley J. McNair, wartime commander of AGF; the late Simon B. Buckner, Tenth Army; the late Alex-ander M. Patch, Seventh Army; Ben Lear, who commanded AGF after Gen. McNair's death; Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Fifth Army; Robert L. Eichelberger, Eighth Army; Leonard T. Gerow, Fif-teenth Army; and Gen. Simpson. Added to the list later were the names of the late Robert C. Richardson, wartime com-mander of the Central Pacific areas; Al-bert C. Wedemeyer, commander in CBI after the recall of Gen. Stilwell; and John L. DeWitt, commander Western Defense Command. Other wartime army or army group commanders who retired or died while wearing four stars include the late Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., Third Army; Gen. Walter Krueger, Sixth Army; Gen. Courtney B. Hodges, First Army; Gen. Jacob L. Devers, 6th Army Group; and Gen. Mark W. Clark, 15th Army Group, also Gen. of the Army Omar Bradley, who commanded First Army before taking 12th Army Group.

IN THIS ISSUE YOU'LL FIND

Why the soldier and the states-man are partners Page 26

Reasons why we must revitalize the spirit of the Regular Army Page 30

Three reasons why riflemen in Korea didn't shoot more Page 35

More Information

● It would seem that the articles "Time of Atomic Plenty" and "Design for Defeat of Red Armor" in the July issue are hardly in consonance.

"Design for Defeat of Red Armor" would have us descending on task assembly areas at night with men armed with 3.5-inch rocket launchers. I agree with "Time of Atomic Plenty". It is time that we started some discussion on use of atomic weapons for destruction of armor in assembly areas rather than men armed with 3.5 rocket launchers.

The principal handicap to a wide discussion on the tactical use of atomic weapons is the lack of information in the field.

Lt. Col. Robert M. Huston
Office of the Senior Army Advisor
PO Box 1632
Wilmington 99, Del.

Mixed Nightmare

● Colonel Sloan's "Design for an Atomic Army" [June issue] invokes mixed emotions . . . like the henpecked husband who watched his mother-in-law back his new Floatmaster 89 over a 500-foot cliff. An army with sizable "in being" forces, wholly transportable, waging a daring campaign deep inside enemy territory would be a dream come true—but there are several items reminiscent of the lost Floatmaster.

The "small force rapidly extending its control over all of the enemy country" has a nightmarish aspect. Some 200 million people (less, of course, those removed by Strategic Air's "preparation") spread over nine million square miles calls for at least the Texas Rangers' quota of "one riot, one Ranger."

Of course if that "small force" went in as liberators, that would be one thing—but after a thorough treatment with "thermonukes" they might smell like invaders. History says that the Mongols conquered Russia and occupied it 200 years without establishing anything approaching control over all of the country. Too much country, guerrillas, swamps, forests, and Russian stubbornness. Think of all the occupation ribbons the Mongol government awarded in those two centuries before they weakened and the "indigenous inhabitants" threw them out!

Then there is the matter of that vague pronoun in "if we accept the idea—as the Air Force and the Navy have—of fighting with forces in being . . ." The key word is "we."

Congress has always kept a tighter rein on the Army than on the other two steeds pulling the Defense chariot. Just how big a part does the horse have in deciding what road he shall take?

The United States has always placed the civil above the military power. Perhaps the "we" refers to the American people. That puts the biggest selling job in history up to the Army . . . and more power to it But let's not confuse the issue with suggestions that the Army itself can effectively "accept the idea" first put forth by George Washington as commander-in-chief, ably supported by Upton's classic tract, and not exactly unknown to George C. Marshall or his successors.

A combat-ready army doesn't have to be sold to military men. Colonel Sloan's irrefutable logic, like Gordon Dean's "mass production lines don't function under a rain of atomic bombs" should be directed at the people who pay the taxes whose votes spell out the doorplates on offices up on the Hill.

Before we spread the report on the record, however, it might be wise to review those logistic requirements: "200 tons per division/day" over an "average air distance of 1,200 miles." Without arguing the merits of the nebulous 560 tons/div/day from our well-thumbed copy of 101-10, the item of POL alone merits mention. Today's armored division needs 900 tons to move 100 miles! Tomorrow's will be smaller. It will also have to invent some means of radically reducing POL consumption if its Class III is to support it in the "fluid" warfare over the "spongy" battlefields Colonel Sloan logically conjures up for us.

Suppose magic does cut the requirement to 300 tons? The Air Transport Command, using C-124s (to become available

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ɔuld burn up at least 1½ tons of fuel for ery ton (POL or other) delivered from ıse to air head! Thus even Colonel oan's 200 tons/div/day—when handled is way—becomes 500 tons/div/day ɛeded at base section.

Finally, my map of Russia, post World /ar II, embarrassingly locates in the vicin- / of Moscow the "single base section oviding direct support via air lanes to all the varied task groups in the field." owhere else would my compass, set at 200 miles radius, cover even half of the ne million square miles to be occupied.

Col. George Reinhardt
he Engineer School
ɔrt Belvoir, Va.

olonel Sloan's Way

Thank you and most especially thank ɔlonel George B. Sloan for "Design for ı Atomic Army," [June].

If we ever have to send another army 'erseas to finish the job the other services r up, Colonel Sloan's way is the only way. ɔu will never get them over by ships, other an for another police action.

Sometimes I am shocked by apathy and ıreality, then I read something like Colo- ɛl Sloan's stuff, and I have hope again. ıre hope that it gets into the right places.

Major Harry W. Morse
laff Amphibious Group One
PO, San Francisco, Calif.

'e Are Worth Our Salt

Your June issue was fine for the ideas it stered on bringing *esprit de corps* back to e Army. We have been lacking so much r so long. "The British Regimental Sys- m" bore down on one aspect of low mo- le in our armed forces, the feeling of be- nging.

Just as important though is that of being spected which is ably brought out in the ong and Rocky Road" by M/Sgt Gor- ɔn. Give the NCOs the necessary backing ıd see what a big difference it will make. othing would be better than to see what happening in the 33d Infantry spark ug a similar movement throughout the ɛmy.

I would like to offer one suggestion. In aj. Banigan's letter he states, "Back ıues of the Journal make the best refer- ce library a military-minded officer or ıncommissioned officer can possess." How ght he is. Wouldn't it help us if the Jour- ıL had an index at the end of each year? ıis would facilitate the finding of needed ticles. Any magazine worth its salt has e. Couldn't you also do the same?

Sgt Albert J. Berube, Jr.
USAR
7 Clermont Ave.,
ooklyn, N. Y.

We publish an index each year and ɛmbers desiring a copy need only address request to us. The index for Volume 4 ugust 1953-July 1954) has just been de- ered by our printers.

Private Slovik

● Colonel Wiener, in "Lament for a Skulker" [July issue], poses some problems in military justice and military discipline which, I strongly suspect, are hardly capable of solution in the framework of our society. . . .

Would any useful purpose be served by making execution for desertion mandatory? I doubt it. As any combat soldier knows, there are more ways to desert a battle (though perhaps not in the legal sense) than simply to walk away from it, and most of them are safe from charges. A wave of executions for desertion in time of war might dissuade a few, but would probably only spur others to greater heights of ingenuity. The resulting outcry from the tender-hearted would probably do more harm to military justice and military discipline than any possible good that might come of carrying out the death sentences.

What, then, of the other alternative offered Private Slovik before his trial: to go back into the line and do his duty? This makes very little sense either. A man of Slovik's mental background is hardly capable of holding a concept of duty, much less doing it. Had I been his company commander, I would not have been happy at the prospect. A man who is not dependable is very often worse than no man at all. I can, of course, speak only for myself, but I have no strong conviction that the Private Sloviks should be shot because they desert. I simply want them put somewhere where their derelictions will not endanger me or my outfit.

One cannot help but feel that the member of the firing squad who said ". . . his leaving could have caused a whole company of good men to have been slaughtered by Jerry patrols . . ." was a man with a distasteful duty looking for something to justify it. I have never heard of a company of good men being slaughtered by German patrols or any other patrols. Furthermore, the company had a much better chance of not being slaughtered, by whatever force, with Slovik out of there. Presumably the rest of the men could be counted on to stay at their posts and fight, or at least warn of the presence of the enemy. Could Slovik have been depended upon to do that?

No, the solution for the Eddie Sloviks is not to shoot them or to send them back to the line—at least not to send them back without finding and correcting the condition that caused them to desert in the first place . . . The real problem is to correct the conditions of society that breed our Eddie Sloviks. . . . But that is not the Army's problem. It is a problem for all of us . . .

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

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Speaking for myself, I would rather know that a deserter from my outfit was doing something to move the war along than to know that his usefulness was at an end. I do *not* say that a deserter should not be punished, but it might be that his imprisonment, if that is to be his punishment, could be served *after* the war without possibility of parole . . . it does seem wasteful to shoot him.

INFANTRYMAN

"Attack Along a Ridgeline"

● I read "Attack Along a Ridgeline" [May issue] with mixed emotions, since I had the very dubious honor of being mentioned in the article. It is extremely interesting to read of the exploits of a unit with which you have been associated. This holds true, even when the action described is of a period of combat where we took it on the chin before attaining the strength to seize the initiative.

Confusion has always played a large part in any war. Perhaps this state of affairs was greatly assisted by the fact that the men directly involved in fighting the enemy were too busy to record all of the data which could serve as the basis for after action studies. This may account for numerous discrepancies and omissions in the article describing the action of Company A, 34th Infantry on 15 August 1950, which, unless my memory and medical records are at fault, occurred on *14* August 1950.

If the discussion by Lt. Canzona had been prefaced by remarks similar to those included in his original critique, my anger would not have been aroused, as it has been, by certain conclusions and inappropriate remarks. Granted, there were more mistakes made by those of us who participated in the action, than would have been made if the intelligence information and academic solutions available to an analy at a later date had been ours at the time c need.

An object like a burial mound or th infantry's well-known "lone pine tree does not make a very safe observation po in troop leading procedure as a genera rule. "My burial mound" was not quite a conspicuous as the article suggests. Whe my platoon was forced down by "relativel close range" machine-gun fire, I found impossible to move my platoon over th crest of the knoll to our front and move them slightly to the right to gain defilad from the machine gun fire believed to b coming from the left. As this was a tempted, additional machine-gun fire wa delivered from the right and, I believe from the peak to our front. I immediatel built up a base of fire and we tried to locat the machine guns so that we could neu tralize them with fire and continue th attack. The North Koreans were very ur cooperative in their camouflaged positior and wouldn't let me stick my head up t observe their locations. This made it nec essary for me to move farther down to th right to gain defilade from the machin guns on the left. After removing m combat pack to present a lower silhouett I crawled up to the left of a burial mounc This gave me some protection from th machine gun to the right front. While a tempting to locate the enemy positions, was struck by rifle fire, apparently fro the peak which towered above us to th front, and not from the enemy machin guns, as was so critically stated in th article. Did this make me "reckless"?

Lt. Shea did not join me in the "narro confines of the tempting target" but wa about fifteen feet away, on the opposit side of the mound, from where he coul also have some cover.

A close examination of the facts woul have revealed that as a platoon leader had no map, no radio, no telephone, n rocket launcher, and no light machin guns. I was fortunate (?) in having a wri compass and one well-worn automatic rif in my understrength platoon. The situ tion was little or no better in the othe platoons. There were no 60mm mortars c recoilless rifles in the company with whic to deliver "a devastating barrage of ste and fire," and our organic machine gu consisted of one light and one heavy calib .30 machine gun, although I believe the was one, or possibly two, heavy machir guns under company control from th heavy-weapons company.

The artillery preparation before our a tack was of very limited duration and wa over before the jump-off. The forwa observer was with the company command and the platoon leaders had no method c communication except runners. The mo tar observer who started up the ridge wit me couldn't keep up and reportedly die of wounds from two rounds of HE whic hit my platoon as we moved up the ridg I could find no further sign of the observe or his radio and had to continue the attac

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

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

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I have no need to give excuses for my :n or myself because we did the best we uld in spite of the adverse conditions. y sole purpose is to provide some impor- ıt details of Company A's action on the ıktong . . .

CAPT. M. D. SCHILLER

ɔlumbus, Ga.

Amplification

Lieutenant Colonel H. A. De Weerd, "Time of Atomic Plenty" [July issue], mmented on certain deficiencies in the ncepts set forth in *Atomic Weapons in nd Combat.* In particular, he suggested ıt the authors had not taken into account ɜ increasing plenty of tactical atomic ɜapons and the organizational changes in ɜ Army structure which reliance on tac- al atomic weapons dictated. While this ticism is valid, it should be recognized ıt it took two years to obtain clearance : this book and that clearance require- ɜnts necessarily imposed upon the authors conservative treatment of these problems.

The second revision of this book is now the press. The authors believe it meets ɔlonel De Weerd's hope that "Colonels inhardt and Kintner will try their hands writing a new book based on the assump- n that atomic weapons will be plentiful ɔugh in the future to fight through an tire ground campaign without relying in y important way on HE for fire and ɔck power." The new edition will stress ɜ entirely new type of ground organiza- n required in atomic warfare.

COL. G. C. REINHARDT
LT. COL. W. R. KINTNER

ashington, D. C.

ror

You had an error in the biographic ɜtch of Major General James M. Gavin your June issue.

You state that he was recently in com- nd of V Corps in Europe . . . he was command of VII Corps with head- arters in Stuttgart.

LT. FRANK GRBINICH

'O 696 c/o PM
ɜw York, N. Y.

Lt. Grbinich is right. It was the VII rps.

hy Don't Theys

The other day I was reading a column some publications called "Why Don't ey." This is a column to which readers ɔmit various ideas for new inventions or v methods of doing a thing.

Some years of service give me a few 'hy Don't Theys" for the Army.

Why don't they make a second award the American Defense Ribbon for all Regulars who at the outbreak of the Korean War?—were serving.

¶ Why don't they issue or award an Honorable Service Ribbon? There could be an award for each 10, 20, and 30 years of honorable service. Make the thing hard to get and really something to work for.

¶ Why don't they award a Marksmanship Ribbon instead of the Marksmanship Badges? This would encourage more people to wear such awards. Might even make for some better scores on the range.

¶ Why don't they issue a Company Supply Records cabinet of some sort? This would be a good use for old trunk lockers. That's what we used in the 1st Cavalry.

¶ Why don't they have a company stock card instead of the company property book form? It would be faster to post, neater, and easy to handle.

¶ Why don't they have a general supply form instead of the issue slips, turn-in slips, ammo requests, and so forth? The Air Force shipping document and requisition form is a good example of what I mean.

¶ Why don't they issue OVM books with tanks and other vehicles that have a large number of OVM items? This way you could tell what you received with the vehicle, and what was turned in. It should always be with the vehicle.

¶ Why don't they have a special stock record card for unserviceable property accounts, one that would have columns to show the accountable officer what is in the shop, what is in the laundry, and what is on hand at all times?

¶ Why don't they drop all mess personnel and equipment from line company T/O&Es and form such personnel and equipment as a Mess Platoon in the Headquarters and Service Company?

¶ Why don't they have a pin-on type rank insignia for enlisted men? Think of the sore thumbs and cussing this would save.

¶ Why don't they have a system where organizational clothing and equipment would be set up in sets and marked with the company letter and set number instead of the individual laundry marks? This type equipment passes hands several times during its service. And it's hard to re-mark some of it.

¶ Why don't they issue a Table of Allowances to show the number of tools authorized for so many vehicles instead of issuing tool sets? This would make for better accounting of tools.

¶ Why don't they do away with the hash marks and overseas bars? A guy who gets all that stuff sewed on looks like a walking mass of stripes.

¶ Why don't they let enlisted men use the ID card as identification while on pass in place of the Class "A" pass? Think of the typing, signatures, and paper this would save.

SFC RAYMOND R. BOWLES
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The Legislative Record

What Congress did for and to yo during the session just ende

AT the beginning of each session of Congress the Department of Defense and each of the services have neat lists of "must" legislation they hopefully send to Capitol Hill for enactment into law. At the end of the session the Legislative Liaison officers who have custody of these lists find that many of the items have been entombed by congressional committees and that other items on the lists have been so mutilated and patched that they are hardly recognizable. Experienced LL officers, always optimistic, will tell you that on balance Congress is more than decent to the services.

You can make your own judgment as you follow this run down of what happened to some legislation of interest to soldiers during the 2d session, 83d Congress. We should make it very clear here that this is not a complete list of either Army or Defense legislation, but just items selected for your presumed interest.

Your pay is of course, of more than presumed interest to you. But the less said about why you didn't get a pay raise this year the more joyous this report will seem to be. A bill to raise your full pay 10 per cent—basic pay, subsistence and rental allowances—had gotten exactly nowhere up to press time. And at that late stage Congress seemed undisposed to do anything about it.

Fringes. Soldiers and their families talk a lot about fringe benefits, but this Congress didn't. Maybe you can add to your list of blessings the fact that commissaries and post exchanges were left alone. So was medical care for dependents, but in a different way. A bill was introduced that provided for medical care for dependents, but in truth it hardly got a decent diagnosis before it was laid to rest.

Housing. Congress approved the building of some family housing in the ZI, none overseas for the Army or Air Force. The Army's request for housing funds was cut drastically, especially funds for the construction of BOQs and barracks.

The best news in housing was the 1954 Housing Act which liberalized FHA loan policies for civilian home-buyers—and, glory be! added provisions that permit servicemen to buy homes on similar easy credit terms with the mortgage insurance being paid by the Department of Defense. You can now buy a home costing up to $18,000 and the FHA will underwrite the mortgage up to $17,100. The formula is that you pay five per cent down and the rest in easy monthly payments over the next 30 years (with interest, of course). To buy a house under this law you have to get the Department of Defense to certify that you are in dire need of a house and that you will remain on active duty for at least two more years. You have to live in the house or certify that your military assignment in Iraq or elsewhere doesn't make it feasible for you to commute back and forth. Incidentally, you don't lose your GI Bill home loan privileges when you buy a home this way. And you can do it more than once.

Now follows a brief description of some miscellaneous pieces of "defense" legislation passed by the 83d Congress.

Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954. Imposes limitations on the numbers of officers who may serve on active duty in grades of major and above. This law also repealed two provisions in last year's appropriation act that affected promotion and retirement.

Warrant Officer Act of 1954. Established a career pattern for warrant officers that is similar to the OPA of 1947.

Collection of overpayments. Made it possible for indebtedness resulting from erroneous payments to military and civilian personnel to be paid off in "reasonable" monthly deductions.

Soldier deposits. Gave statutory authority for the deposit of savings of enlisted persons. At least $5 must be deposited each time and four per cent interest is earn Deposits cannot be used for indebtedn nor are they subject to forfeiture by s tence of court-martial.

Uniformed Services Contingen Option Act of 1953. Deadline extend to 1 November 1954.

Colonels, Medical Service Corps. I leted proviso which limited the number colonels on active duty in the MSC, Re lar Army, to two per cent of the authoriz RA officer strength of the corps.

UMTS law was amended to make it p sible for physicians, dentists and allied s cialists to be used in professional capac as enlisted men if they fail to qualify f or won't accept a commission.

Veterinary Corps officers may be al to get three years of constructive serv credit under an amendment to OPA 19

Missing persons. Pay and allowan of missing, interned or captive persons w continue to be paid until 1 July 1955. L also provides for initiation and discontin ance of allotments for dependents and ins ance; movement of dependents and hou hold effects; and authorizes presumpt findings of death and other determinati under appropriate circumstances.

Commissioned officers retired for c tain types of disability are exempted fr dual compensation laws.

Foreign decorations. Authorizes U. soldiers to accept and wear decorations, ders and emblems of foreign nations w had forces under the U.N. command Korea.

Appointment to Military, Naval a Air Force academies authorized for s of men killed in action or who die or sh die as a result of active service in b World Wars or in the period beginning June 1950 and ending on date to be p claimed by President or Congress.

Homesteaders. Veterans who want file homestead entries may take credit military or naval service earned during Korean conflict.

Armistice Day—11 November—is n redesignated Veterans Day.

$28.8 billions. The appropriation for fiscal 1955 gave the Army $7.5 billi as compared with $11 billion for the Force and $10 billion for the Navy. Fis 55's total was $28.8 billion (including partment of Defense) as compared to $3 billion last year. The Army took the bigg cut! The total figure was about $1.2 billi less than the President asked in his bud message.

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

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☐ Send information on Insurance covering household effects. ☐ Send information on automobile insurance based on following data:

Car Year	Make	Model	Body Type	Pass. Cap.	Serial Number	Motar Na.	No. Cyls.

Factory Price	Cast	Purchase Date	New/Used	Current Year	Car License State	Name in which car legally registered

Is the automobile customarily used in the occupational duties of any person except in going to and from the principal place of occupation?_____

Is the automobile customarily used in driving to or from work?_____

If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way?

How many operators under age 25?_____

Age of each:_____

Are any of the operators under 25 owners or principal operators of the automobile?

If any of the operators under 25 are owners, or principal operators, of the automobile,

(a) are all such operators married?_____

(b) do all such operators have legal custody of a child resident in the household?_____

Name & Rank_____

Military Address_____

If car not at above address, give location of car_____

The Loyal Corps of Army Wives

General
Matthew B. Ridgway

TODAY's Army is composed more largely of married men than ever before in our experience. Eighty per cent of our officers and thirty-two per cent of our enlisted men are married. The fact that so many of our soldiers have families depending upon them means that those soldiers must be concerned about the availability of acceptable housing, of medical care, of educational and religious facilities, of survivor benefits.

A RECENT study which was carried out showed that the average officer was having a so-called permanent change of station every eighteen months. If we extend that rate over the period of an entire career, it would mean that, normally, an officer would make twenty major moves in thirty years—and that is not making any allowances for the much more rapid changes in assignment which have to be expected in time of war. The situation is even more acute with respect to enlisted men. The same study showed that enlisted men were making permanent change of station moves on an average of every ten months.

While every effort is being made to make assignment tours as stable as possible, that old phrase which we all know so well—"the exigencies of the Service"—is still with us. The Army has a vital mission to accomplish, and while we carry it out with as much consideration for families as possible, the effectiveness of its accomplishment can never be subordinated to convenience.

I would not want to be misunderstood. Far from being a liability, our Army families are distinct assets to the Army. The loyal support of Army wives is today, as it has always been, an invaluable source of spiritual strength for the men who wear the uniform.

I KNOW that it is not easy for women to face and share the hardships and difficulties of a soldier's life. It never has been easy. But the dauntless courage and unselfish devotion of Army wives have given them the strength to brave the dangers and endure the hardships of military life in many climes and many lands, far from the comforts and amenities which their sisters can take for granted. Army wives today may not be called upon, as their grandmothers and great-grandmothers were, to have a loaded weapon on hand in case of Indian attack and to remember always, as a last resort, to save one shot for themselves. But they just stand as steadfastly beside their husbands. And the knowledge of that steadfastness is no less vitally important to soldiers today than it was to the soldiers who blazed the trail of civilization through the forests and across the plains and over the mountains.

Condensed from an address before the Army Relief Society

The Chief of Staff and family when he was Supreme Commander in Tokyo

On the following pages . . . what Army life means to the Army wife as two of them have lived it . . .

The Army Yesterday

When We and the Army Were Younger

Genevieve Craig

MY father graduated from West Point in 1871, but had been through the Civil War before he went there. His was an unusual case. He went into the War when he was sixteen, was wounded several times, and finally quite seriously in the leg at the Battle of Cold Harbor. He with a number of other wounded men was loaded into a springless wagon and driven over a rough road to the coast. Five hundred wounded men with only three doctors to care for them were put on a ship bound for New York. Unfortunately the weather was stormy, so instead of three days they were five in reaching their port. My father was sent at once to his home state, Vermont, where the surgeons prepared to amputate his leg because gangrene had set in and it was in serious condition. He was even placed on the operating table, but remonstrated so forcibly against losing his leg, that against their better judgment, the surgeons gave up the idea. He spent over a year in the hospital and almost every day his leg had to be scraped and dressed.

A year or two passed and he found himself longing to enter the Regular Army. He surrendered a pension, probably the first case on record, and was given an appointment to West Point, passed mentally but failed physically. However, the Secretary of War waived that on account of his war service—the age limit was raised for the same reason.

He graduated in 1871 and joined the 7th Infantry in Montana. He and my mother were married in 1874. Their first station was Fort Shaw, Montana, seven hundred miles from the railroad. There was a stage line running as far as Helena with stations, having most miserable accommodations in most cases, every thirty or forty miles. This was a day's trip, though sometimes one travelled day and night. In the former case the trip took about three weeks under favorable conditions. Once my parents made the trip in February,

(Continued on Page 18)



The Army Today

Only Uncertainty Is Certain

Emilie M. Rigg



MILITARY wives have adventures just like their husbands. They also have problems, many of them "little ones"—a fact quite visible at any camp, post or station. But sometimes problems become adventures, which is one big difference between military wives and their civilian sisters. In 1947 Virginia Collins, five-ninths a mother, arrived in war-torn Changchun, Manchuria. She had hardly settled down when the China Civil War flared up and Changchun was isolated by the Chinese Communists. We could occasionally hear artillery fire in the distance at night. My husband and his assistant, Major John W. Collins III were on-the-spot U.S. observers.

Our husbands made a routine jeep trip to check Nationalist positions one morning and they were late for lunch —about eight weeks late. The jeep came back with four bullet holes in it. The horrified driver and interpreter tumbled out with their hair standing on end.

"Major Rigg and Captain Collins have been captured by Communists!" the interpreter gasped.

They had been ambushed by the Communists thirteen miles away from our house, and were last seen being led off with tommy guns at their backs.

The late General Robert H. Soule, the Military Attaché, sent General (then Colonel) Frederick Dau, his executive officer, in a plane to fly us to Peiping. Colonel Dau was persuasive and diplomatic. We said thank you just the same, but we'd rather stay here—besides, what would our husbands think if we skipped town before they got back . . . Finally, the insistence began to ring a bell and we realized he'd been sent to evacuate us. Ginny asked, "Colonel Dau, is this an order?" He said pleasantly, but definitely, *"Yes!"*

We thought our husbands would be released as soon as they reached a higher headquarters where their "diplomatic immunity" would be recognized. I even pictured the soldiers



EMILIE W. RIGG is the wife of Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, Armor, and the mother of three children: aged fifteen, six and three. Before her marriage she was a professional artist and had studied at the Art Institute of Chicago and graduated from the American Academy of Art. In the course of the Rigg's military peregrinations they have lived at several posts in the U.S.A., in Manchuria, China and Germany. They only recently returned from Germany and Colonel Rigg is now stationed in the Pentagon.

being reprimanded for their blunder, and apologies coming from the Red command. But days turned into weeks before it became apparent that there just isn't any Chinese Communist headquarters high enough to recognize diplomatic immunity.

Because of Ginny's expectant condition they got her out of Changchun fast. And, after a few weeks in Peiping she was further evacuated. The Army wasn't satisfied until she was safely situated in Nanking with General and Mrs. Soule and near the only U.S. Army hospital in China.

The question became: which Collins would arrive first, Jack or the baby? Jack eventually won that race, but he lost the final sprint to the hospital.

After two months of imprisonment (including 34 days of solitary) and being tried for espionage and other false charges, our husbands were released by the Reds. Jack joined his wife in Nanking.

In the small hours of one night, Ginny prepared to take her expectancy to the hospital for a leisurely production. Jack drove General Soule's Army sedan, the car most immediately available and already designated for the important trip. Due to back seat "reports on the situation" Jack careened down the dark streets. He overshot the hospital and had to whirl around when the first wail of a baby announced the arrival of Miss Judy Collins—right in General Soule's sedan!

Courage and conviction

Many service wives have exhibited great courage and tenacity. There was Shirley Bender who never gave up. Her Marine sergeant husband was a prisoner of the Chinese Reds for three years in the period just before the war in Korea. She spent those years not just sitting and lamenting, but travelling the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department as well as Capitol Hill in an effort to hasten the release of her husband. Her vigor and hope were not only a fine example, but they also inspired and spurred Government officials into more rapid action in obtaining his freedom.

Service wives and children in China during the civil war who remained on until 1949 were suddenly evacuated to rather dismal quarters in the Philippines. In 1950 another group of U.S. military dependents hastened before an onrush of Red armies in Korea. Somewhere between 1,500 and 2,500 American women underwent the hardships of sudden home breaking amid atmospheres of war and panic, and in circumstances far removed from comfort. Yet this group of service women endured these inconveniences without resorting to despair, hysterics or despondency as ke noted by the tearful tone of an article about service peopl in the July 1954 issue of *Redbook* magazine. The article b Donald Robinson was called "The Divorce Scandal in Ou Armed Forces."

Mr. Robinson decried the high divorce rate among servic families. He listed four main causes for the marital breal downs: (1) separation of husbands and wives; (2) th housing situation; (3) Money (lack thereof); and (4) diff culty of adjustment to military life. The divorce rate ma be high, but if the self-pity that prevails in the case historie he mentioned is at all widespread, then it is probabl amazing that the rate isn't higher.

Some of these four causes can be alleviated. The Army gradually improving the overseas housing situation, and tha will help the husband-wife separation problem. Congres could aid the money situation by voting appropriate pay ir creases to keep pace with the cost of living and by allowin us to keep our "fringe benefits." Certain civilian communitie could help morale by giving the most rather than the least fc our rent money.

But as for the fourth point, adjustment to military lif that lies within the flexibility of personality and strength c character of the persons involved.

Complaint Department(?)

The *Redbook* article expresses crying sympathy for ser ice wives who have the "dirty work of packing and shippin their belongings" after the husband has received orders t proceed immediately to a new post. It feels sorry becaus perhaps in the new house their furniture won't fit, c their electrical appliances will be AC instead of DC. Anc it is even more sorry because the windows will probabl be wrong for the curtains!

Why, I am moved to ask, should we of the present gener tion of service families be pitied for something that ha been accepted as a part of military life all through the years

Redbook laments: "From one day to another service fam lies do not know how long they will remain in one spo They are continually being transferred from one post t another . . . The Pentagon insists . . . transfers are essentia to . . . efficiency . . . This may be so, but many expert believe that a large percentage of the transfers is merely th result of bad management and a lack of consideration fc the feelings of military personnel."

There are false impressions in that lament. Families c any longevity or experience *know,* and often predict thei

ınsfers. The Pentagon is right. Rotation gives military en broader experience, and prevents cliques and empires ɔm forming out of the "homestead system." Mr. Robinson's xperts," whoever they are, will find it hard to prove "bad anagement," and if they are experts they should acknowlge that the military considers the *mission* first; the feelings families second. That is hard on us but we learn to accept e hard necessity of it.

he Old Army

Every new Army wife should read histories and tales of ıe "old army" so that she can appreciate the advantages ıe has today. The women of the old army had long sepa-tions from their husbands during which they were both ı peril. They had long periods of waiting for news and tters. No airmail in those days. There was no radio to ırn on in evenings "just to hear a man's voice in the room" ; some lonely wife wailed (and got quoted in *Redbook*).

Those families of former years moved their children and ossessions to distant posts in the wild west. It sometimes ɔok three weeks to reach a railroad town. They traveled by age coach, river boat, and sometimes by open sleigh. They vere often in danger of Indian attacks and always threatened vith epidemics. Medical service was almost non-existent.

Those women adjusted to military life the hard way. I oubt if they spent much time bewailing the fact that they ad to "live such an unnatural life."

Rotation and Separation

Army strength is one figure. The number of men who ıave been rotated through it since the end of the Second World War is much greater. Many of today's career soliers were conditioned to family separation by World War II. They don't like it but they accept it as "being in the best nterests of the service." However, since 1945 hundreds of housands of married men who never experienced the 1941-5 separations have passed into and through the service. For hese young families new to the service, separations are ıarder to take. It is not a pleasant interlude for anyone. But as we say about many things: even this will pass—and t does.

Privates and corporals cannot get their wives overseas at government expense. This is nothing to cry about. They represent the youngest and least married group. Under the present draft many will be out of the army soon. Those who stay simply must work up to a higher grade. It is a simple case of logistics and RHIP (rank has its privileges). However, in Europe, medical care, PX, commissary and school privileges have recently been granted to the lowest ranks whose families can manage to join them.

Today in Germany new housing units are being built. In the Northern Area Command, General Thomas Herren, the NAC Commander, has made sweeping changes, thus cutting down the waiting period and in many cases permitting concurrent travel. The overall Army goal for next year is for concurrent travel to all overseas posts.

Stay home, Yank wife

There are some who seem to think that we dependents shouldn't get there at all. Several magazine writers have said that overseas dependents are a liability, a logistical burden and that the services endanger families in potential war areas. These writers call for withdrawal of dependents, but they never seem able to quote any service family survey or opinion. The majority of families want to stay and will take their chances. As the commander's wife in two battalions, I have known more than a hundred Army families living within fifty miles of the Iron Curtain in Germany, and only four I know of showed momentary anxiety. The decision on dependents at overseas posts lies with the high commands which are after all the best able to judge the risks and factors.

Past casualties among military dependents are nil. In the cold war no American children have been casualties. If hot war comes, the families will be in more danger in big cities than on military posts. Furthermore, I have enough confidence in the U.S. Army to believe that evacuation plans for dependents are well worked out.

Housing—Junction City to Mukden

Nearly every service family has enjoyed (?) extremes in housing. My personal experiences include an interval in a small, hot hotel room in Junction City, Kansas, and later, Emperor Pu Yi's former suite in the Yamato Hotel at Mukden, Manchuria. One thing about all housing situations, good and bad: we usually don't spend enough time *anywhere* to get spoiled by the better ones, or depressed by the lesser ones!

Many of us have known tours where housing was in great demand; where civilians were flinging up garage apartments in their backyards. These were built at the least possible cost. Wintry blasts of wind swept into the car area

World travel is broadening especially when going through customs

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

OK, Soldier . . . Now up, up an down on one fo fifty times

below and swooped up through the floor. The only object in building them was to make money at the service family's expense.

There have been areas near military posts where old buildings, shacks and shanties were rented to military families at a robbery level. In some places the post medical section was kept busy inspecting and placing these below standard dwellings off-limits.

The Wherry Housing Projects, such as they are, made it possible to avoid lining the pockets of those greedy civilian landlords who are unwilling to provide adequate housing facilities for service families.

By contrast there are towns where the citizens have done their utmost to make life pleasant for military families. One town, Paris, Texas, assumed the responsibility of providing a "home away from home" for soldier families of Camp Maxey during World War II. Their courteous hospitality created cordial relations. The military's appreciation resulted in friendly cooperation with the town's civil affairs to the extent that Paris citizens wanted the camp to become a permanent Army post.

The Department of Defense Housing Commission has concluded that the government can never build sufficient housing to take care of all military families, and that rental allowances must substitute in this gap. This commission was established to submit recommendations which "could remove, to the greatest extent feasible, the disadvantages suffered by military personnel with respect to facilities for the enjoyment of normal living conditions. These occupational disadvantages have existed ever since the original organization of the Armed Forces in this country . . ."

Money isn't everything, but . . .

We have our so-called "fringe benefits" but these are under attack almost constantly in Washington. Service wives, like their husbands, have always been reluctant abo writing our Congressmen. We shouldn't be. After all, w have our hometowns and for some of us, it may be our ne door neighbor who is now sitting in the House of Represen atives.

Those "fringe benefits" you hear so much about hav long been an established part of military life and they cor pensate in both money and convenience for some of th difficulties in our nomadic way of living. When the benefi are curtailed, it means that we take a pay cut and we can be expected to like that very much in these days of stee prices.

We know that the Army's representatives in Washingto are alert to these headaches and the newspapers tell of steac appeals to Congress from the White House on down to pr tect our benefits. But there is no reason we can't speak our Congressmen, too.

Probably the question of medical care is foremost amor the "fringes". While such care is almost always availabl and the doctors do a wonderful job, they are often in sho supply. This is a matter of closest interest to the Army wi and mother.

In Japan in 1949 the shortage of Army doctors was acute that a medical services announcement in "Stars ar Stripes" said in effect: do not bring your children to the di pensary with a fever or sickness until it has developed f several days. Give them aspirin and a rest in bed—wait for change for better or worse. If it becomes serious or critic then the dispensary will handle the case!

It is an accident when we see the same doctor twice. Th is hard on the Army wife for every mother wants to have meeting of the minds with her children's doctor. A civilia can select a family physician (and pay the bills). In th Army you pay few doctor bills. You take the advice of th available doctor, get free medicine, innoculations and lab

tory tests. In civil life these add up to dollars. Here is one inge benefit that must not be slighted by shortsighted onomy. Adequate free medical care can balance the scales hen advantages and disadvantages of being in the Army e weighed.

"The only thing certain about the Army is the uncerinty." That is a favorite family cliché recited at irregular tervals when changes of scene and assignment occur. If cepted as normal routine the uncertainty is more fascinatg than fearful.

This doesn't mean that we must never complain, register ghteous indignation, or rave and rebel to a degree. We omen have our rights! One is the right to blow off steam f we stop in time to pack up and move! Let the shock wave ss—readjust your vision to new horizons, and then get sy.

Service wives early learn to be flexible. Adaptability is imperative quality for us and our possessions. Each new ting is a challenge to our imagination and ingenuity. One ample: our furniture has to be selected with more than e home in mind. Sectional furniture is fine.

An Army wife can be a burden or an asset to her husband d his career. By her attitude she can either inspire him hang like an albatross around his neck. When civilian utine is temporarily shattered by a draft call a wife can ke that period a more profitable and pleasant experience her husband—if she possesses self-discipline and not f-pity.

Even in peacetime the military profession is not as safe as t of a doctor, lawyer, merchant, or Indian chief (1954 sion). Any girl who plans to marry a man in uniform st face the fact that her husband has to take some risks in ning. I stood my hospital vigil when an explosion in listic training severely injured my husband. But I try er to forget that more Americans have been killed in omobile accidents than in all of our wars put together!

my Brats

There has been a fairly uniform level of schooling and rse of study in Army schools. My eldest daughter, now een, has experienced eighteen changes of schools. She never spent two successive years in the same school. She once attended four schools in one year. Scholastically she has not suffered.

Most children adjust to the military pattern of life quite well. Of course the grass is always greener. A civilian child wishes to see the world instead of reading about it, while my Army child at the age of nine had lived in twelve different places at home and abroad and stated that her one wish was to live on a ranch and never move again. My boy Billy loves tanks; he had his first ride in one when he was five.

After a few years and a few changes of station children experience the joy of reunions, and discover the reason why we never say goodbye to favorite friends. Paths cross again.

Children who are old enough to remember living in a foreign country look back on it later with interest and pleasure, even though they may not have appreciated it to its full extent at the time. The many experiences and memories of people and places are theirs forever.

The World is our oyster

How many of us could afford to take a trip to the Orient or Europe—or both, in our lifetime if we were not in the service? How many civilians who do make a trip abroad stay two or three years? Army families have the opportunity to get acquainted with the countries they visit, and to know and understand the peoples of many lands. It is a rewarding experience.

In an Army community you do not have to seek friends —you are among friends. Social life is ready-made with many more activities available than you can possibly participate in. It is a tight little group and you are a "part of the family." You never realize how intensely loyal that family is until trouble strikes. Help comes in swarms. Both the official Army and the local Army community are beside you in an instant. It gives you courage to know that "the Army takes care of its own."

This paraphrase of a bit of World War I verse tells my story in four short lines:

Your husband's your allotment man
  Your kids your next of kin:
But a mighty close relation
  Is the Army that takes you in!

rever they may rmy family quar- ire a bit of trans- nted Americana

The Army Yesterday

(Continued from Page 12)

part of the time in an open sleigh and with the temperature often fifty and fifty-five below zero.

Two rooms and a kitchen

Quarters were not plentiful in those days—the juniors had to double up. My father and mother had two rooms and a kitchen in one set while others had the rest of the house. There were a few fresh vegetables raised by the companies, but in the main they lived on what the commissary provided, and it was not an Army War College Commissary either. Fruit was prohibitive in price. The only water that was to be had was brought around each day and put in large barrels in the kitchen, this for bathing, drinking, washing the dishes, everything. Each summer for about six months the troops went out to round up the troublesome Indians, leaving a very small command in the Post. In 1876, just before they started, my mother and her baby girl and several of the ladies of the Post drove to the nearest point on the Missouri River, Fort Burton, the head of navigation, where they boarded a boat that took them down the river to Yankton, South Dakota. They were three weeks making this trip, much of the time spent on sand bars, from which the boat had to be dragged. From Yankton they went by train to Omaha. The boat was loaded with Army women and children and others fleeing from the peril of the Indians. There had been measles on the boat and three days after my mother reached home her baby was taken ill and died of the disease. That summer, while my mother was still grieving over the loss of her baby, news came that the 7th Infantry had been massacred. After several days it was corrected to read the 7th Cavalry, the Custer massacre. My father was adjutant to General [John] Gibbon and their command was the first on the field after the massacre, found all the officers and men stripped and mutilated—all but Custer. The Indians wanted him to be recognized.

Goodbye message from Big Hole

The next summer most of the ladies remained at Fort Shaw when the troops went out, and in August came word of the battle of Big Hole. The command had encountered a large body of Indians and almost met the fate of Custer. They were completely surrounded by Indians, who finally set fire to the woods to burn them out—fortunately the wind changed. Every officer and many of the men of the command were wounded and they all had their revolv ready to kill themselves should the Indians get to them. T only meat they had was my father's horse—as adjutant of t expedition he was mounted. That night a courier slipp out to try to get reinforcements. My mother has a little n he carried, to be sent to her if he reached civilization, telli of their desperate circumstances and saying good-bye to h for my father never expected to get out alive.

But help came and they were rescued. When Fath wounds healed sufficiently for him to travel, General Gibb gave him a Dougherty wagon and a driver and he crutches and my mother and my oldest brother, a baby three months, started their long three-week trek to railroad. Twice they had to pass wickiup villages of the N Percés Indians, the very ones who had fought at the Big H where father was wounded. But fortunately the Indians not have the bitter feelings for the Army that they h against the settlers, who often were responsible for the of their lands and their being forced to move on. At first stage stations refused them food and shelter, both be very scarce, but when they learned of the wounded offi they could not do enough.

My father was so severely wounded that he had to t a year's sick leave and planned to retire and study law. an appointment in the Subsistence Department, where would not have hard, active duty, was obtained for him. went to Leavenworth and later to Santa Fe, where I born.

Kansas to Arizona *via* San Francisco

My husband's father graduated in 1874, married on g uation leave and took his bride to Fort Laramie, Wyom The next year the regiment, the 6th Cavalry, was ord overland to Arizona. Mrs. Craig returned to her h Saint Joseph, Missouri, where my husband was born. W he was three weeks old she set out to join her husband, the train to San Francisco, a ship around Lower Califo and up the Gulf of California and then to old Fort Y their first station in Arizona. Later they were in Thomas, Grant, and Lowell in Arizona and Fort Wi in New Mexico. In those days promotion was in the ment and officers remained with the same regiment for years. The Apaches were very bad at that time and ca constant trouble. Mrs. Craig has told me of one time

GENEVIEVE CRAIG was the wife of the late General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1935 to 1939, and the daughter of Brigadier General Charles Albert Woodruff (1845-1920). General Craig's father was Colonel Louis Aleck Craig. This article is drawn from a talk Mrs. Craig made to the Society of Daughters of the U. S. Army in Washington during the time her husband was Chief of Staff. Mrs. Craig died in 1941, four years before her husband.

'onderful things e found in books First Graders, hether at Stuttgart hown here) or at Sill well know

ey were changing station. The troops were out after the dians so only one man could be spared to drive Mrs. Craig d her two children to the new post. He had orders to kill em, all three, at the approach of any Indians. Once they w dust in the distance, and she thought the time had come, it fortunately it was caused by our own troops. My husnd's sister was the first white child born in Fort Huachuca n a condemned Government tent.

If you can picture all these experiences as vividly as I, o have motored over the Southwest when we met not a use nor a person for 170 miles in one stretch—in 1921, not the 1870s—and through the Northwest country where lay one can drive all day and hardly find a town in which buy a sandwich, if, I say, you can picture what our old my experienced then you will know why I hesitate out telling you the events of my early married life.

'ays of Empire'

I was married in Manila, where my father was stationed, 1901, the Days of the Empire, as we called them. Our ry almost ended on our wedding trip, for we encountered severe typhoon between Hong Kong and Manila. We re on a small liner, the *Diamante*, all the life boats were shed away, the steering gear broken, and as each wave ack us we thought it would be the end. This lasted from ee in the afternoon until the next morning, when the calmed and we staggered into Manila. At that time my sband was an aide to General Thomas Barry. When we l been married four months, his troop of the 6th Cav- was ordered to northern Cebu, where the natives were ing considerable trouble. He resigned as aide and went h the troops to this new station, Bogo, in the northern of Cebu, a most inaccessible place, letters very often a nth on the way. Boats of any size could not land and the l south to the city of Cebu was most hazardous, only a d-sized party was allowed to take it. I expected to join husband, as it was a very lonely place for him, but my doctors advised strongly against it. Four months later, the troop was ordered to Luzon, Biñan on the Laguna de Bay, only five or six hours from Manila. When my boy was five weeks old I boarded an old boat, went up the Pang River and across the lake to Biñan.

We lived in a small native house that we rented—slept on a native bed—just like the cane seat of a chair with a straw mat covering it. Over the latter we put the sheet. We always used mosquito bars—no screening in those days, bugs and gnats and beetles and flying cockroaches galore, especially when the lights were on. They were a great trial to me. I had not been there long when I discovered that the house was infested with the worst of all. We stood the bed legs in cans of kerosene oil, but the creatures would walk along the ceiling and drop onto the netting and try to get at us. After much labor, using much carbolic acid, as I remember, I cleared the house of the pests.

It was the custom in those days to have one general mess in the town, and all the officers and their families belonged to it. There were only five or six officers—three married—and mine was the only child. Three times a day we had to walk four or five blocks to this mess, managed by the wife of one of the officers. When I had been at Biñan about three weeks, cholera broke out. It had appeared in Manila just after my boy was born, and now it had reached Biñan. The government of this province was still under military control, so our officers had full charge. They had been on the lookout for cholera for several weeks, knowing that the natives would not observe the rules and regulations that would have kept it confined to Manila. One morning they noted an unusual crowd in a house and went to see what was going on—it was a wake. As they left the house they saw in a wood box under the house two objects that looked very strange and proved to be the bodies of two small children, plainly dead of cholera. Due to the party in progress, the disease, of course, spread in no time all over the town. It was a rather

small town, and yet the dead frequently numbered as many as fifty a day. They had to be buried under the supervision of the Army—laid out in trenches and covered with quicklime, as long as the lime lasted. A house-to-house inspection had to be made by our officers each day, because the people would not report cases and would bury their dead if not prevented under their houses in shallow graves.

Epidemics and baby food

In the first few days of the epidemic two enlisted men were stricken while the troops were on the target range. They were removed to a tent and died in four or five hours —strong, healthy men of about 175 pounds when stricken, they wasted away to about a hundred before they died. The shock to the men was so great that from that time they observed every rule and regulation. The germ of the cholera has to be taken through the mouth. We could eat only such meats as were cooked a considerable time, no fresh vegetables or fruits, canned food almost entirely, no crusts of bread, had to wash our hands in bichloride before eating and dip our silver in boiling water. The strain was considerable.

I had a funny old nurse for my baby. She had been turned over to me by another Army woman. She could nc speak English nor Spanish nor even Tagalog, of which m husband knew a little, but somehow I managed to get alon with her—a sort of sign language, I suppose. We urge upon her not to buy anything from the market, but whe we were packing to leave Biñan after eight months of th strain, we found fresh vegetables and fruit among her thing

Another great trial in Biñan was the feeding of my bab After four or five months I had to find something for hi and it finally had to be malted milk, which was not goc but was better than any of the poor selection I had. Tl two doctors knew nothing of babies, neither one of the tw Army women had ever had a child, and I knew practical nothing. The great wonder was that he ever lived, but l was a poor delicate little ten months old baby when w reached San Francisco.

* * *

But we came through it all safely. We were young at th time, so nothing seemed so bad.

And now I hope that I have not tired you out but ha told you enough for you to feel that in spite of the risi cost of living we are better off in our good old Army th we used to be.

A scene enacted thousands of times since 1945: an Army family is reunited after months of separation

Panther jets wing their way home to the USS *Princeton* after a successful strike on ground targets in Korea



Let the USAF pursue its predilections for strategic bombing and give the close support mission to an outfit that understands and wants to do it. The author says that the idea isn't as radical as it sounds, so he would have us

Put Tac Air in Navy Blue

ck from a strike at Korean ground targets, Navy pilots gather in the wardroom of the *Princeton* for coffee and conversation

COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT

REALISTIC appraisal of a future global war accepts the fact that the United States and its allies cannot match aggression's hordes man for man, tank for tank. We strive for scientifically, technically, tactically superior unified land, sea, and air forces.

To be effective against superior numbers, small elite land forces must cherish their mobility and enjoy unequalled air and naval support. That support must encompass not only strategic bombing of enemy heartlands and naval control of the sea lanes; but effective action against

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enemy land forces, on and near the battlefield, by every weapon air/sea power can provide.

As a nation we rediscovered this forgotten truth in June 1950 when we initially opposed Red aggression in Korea with only sea and air elements. The realities of that combat quickly forced us to commit sizable ground forces and ground support aviation despite a national fixation that land armies were outdated.

It is clear that our present military establishment is not designed to extract the maximum value from our great air potential in the support of surface conflict. We are inherently weakest on land, the element where our worldwide commitments are greatest. How can we bolster our land arm with more effective —not necessarily greater—air support?

Evaluation of all factors suggests a solution, startling in its precedent-shaking simplicity: charge Navy/Marine air with all surface support, whether land or sea. This solution will permit the Air Force to concentrate on its two monumental responsibilities: strategic bombing and air defense of the U.S.

The advantages are apparent. They do no violence to total war strategies in that the Air Force, already divided into a Strategic Air Command and a Tactical Air Command, apparently believes that the two are entirely different and distinct, as the prophet of air power, Giulio Douhet, declared. It doesn't entail strange new responsibilities for sea power since Navy/Marine air already operate a highly efficient tac-air setup.

If you are shaken by this proposal, calm down and think it over; national security cannot pander to precedent or prejudice. American combat effectiveness, as atomic weapons intrude upon the battlefield, depends upon how much we strengthen outnumbered ground forces by unified combat participation of the other services.

LOGICALLY we should evaluate air support capabilities and performance before estimating the future. In Korea, a smaller United Nations army frustrated, but could not destroy, larger Communist ground forces despite the aid of absolute sea supremacy and very nearly complete air superiority. Korea was in fact a testing ground for the United Nations' optimum military combination: a relatively small, superbly equipped land element, whose combat effectiveness is multiplied by sea/air power. Unfortunately, results fell short of complete success.

Toward the end of the Korean struggle, Communist military forces, intended originally to defeat superior techniques by sheer weight of numbers, had almost equalled our technical attainments. Simultaneously, it became evident that our air power could not influence ground combat to anything like the promised extent. Indeed, unbiased evaluation reported a decreased effectiveness in air support compared to that demonstrated in World War II. Admittedly, the rugged terrain of Korea hampered close support air missions but the paucity of highway and rail networks presumably facilitated battlefield interdiction.

What actually happened? North Korean communications centers were battered into rubble. Sinanju's more than 50,000 inhabitants were mostly evacuated. When the Armistice was signed only a few hundred remained in that important railway junction. Sinuiju, a key "port of entry" on the Yalu, once a wealthy city of nearly 100,000, offered only a basic existence for a fraction of that number in its ruins.

Chongjin, center of the North Korean iron industry and a major seaport sixty miles south of the Chinese border, was almost entirely destroyed; barely 10 per cent of its quarter million former inhabitants are there today. Much the same could be said of Hungnam, on the east coast.

Throughout North Korea it was easy to drive right through town-sites without recognizing them as such. Factories, schools and essential services had been relocated in mountain caves.

These scenes impressed international armistice teams, viewing them first hand at the end of hostilities, as no Air Force "after action report," however conscientious, could. Over-all effects were reminiscent of Germany in the summer of 1945. There was one outstanding difference. Our armies did not march victoriously into North Korea as they had into Germany. Our Navy commanded the seas, our Air Force roared supreme, during both campaigns. But in Germany our armies outnumbered their foe. In Korea the reverse was true.

In the Korean campaign the enemy's formal transport system was smashed, his communication centers and seaports neutralized but his supplies never, after the spring of 1951, dwindled to critical shortages. Indeed, during the last months of hostilities the Communists matched us gun for gun; achieved remarkably high rates of ammunition expenditure in heavy, if limited objective, attacks all along the line.

The Navy's blockade, which hermet cally sealed North Korean ports, wa unable to close the inland border alon the Yalu. Air power did not measur up to its potential to break the backbon of the enemy's logistic system. Nor di it tip the combat balance in any lanc locked sector along the 150-mile fron

TAC-AIR interdiction turned out to b ineffective against little men wit A-frames carrying supplies on the backs. But the quantities of artiller ammunition fired by the Communists i their 1953 attacks, as much as 15,00 rounds per day (including mortars) int a single battalion position, do not jit with any theory that all supplies wer hand-carried from the Yalu. Communi trucks could, and did, operate freely night in small convoys—even with hea lights blazing. Such movements, beyor effective artillery range, were often vis ble from outposts.

Experiences of Korean combat ve erans soured them on the "curtain c the battlefield" theory. Interdiction d not interdict.

Neither coolies nor vehicles offer targets for aircraft unless the pilot w willing to fly down against the antia craft and take his chances. As a rule t Air Force did not bomb below 5,000 fe Marines and Navy flyers, operating u der a different policy, flew low enou to get hits. The net result was on partial interdiction of enemy suppli Longer-range air interdiction did preve full-scale Chinese offensive operations.

A scrutiny of close air support combat discloses mistakes. Prisoner war interrogations confirmed what U troops suspected; front-line tac-air stril were stereotyped. Set routines, with or minor variations, warned the foe to ta cover in the underground shelter he w certain to have nearby. Colored smo markers, spotter planes, or "flak suppr sion" missions signalled every air pun which, consequently, attained slight su cess.

Effective use of the good earth in p sition warfare plus plentiful manpov was the Chinese rebuttal to our batt field air power. Caves were dug as jun off points for assaults right in front UN outposts. It takes a big explosi precisely placed, to blast troops out a cave.

We should not forget that the wh Korean conflict was not position warfa "Fluid" was frequently and aptly us during the first nine months—right to the start of truce talks. Statistics tac-air effectiveness in that period



A Navy fighter pilot shot this photograph as he dived to bomb Chinese forces that were holding up U.S. infantry and tanks. Our infantry were pinned down behind the irrigation ditch (upper right) and tanks were on the road on the right. Enemy mortars hidden in buildings in the center had been holding up the U.S. push. Navy bombs hit these positions in the area where the smoke is rising. The Communist troops were forced to drop back after the attack of the Navy fighters.

carce. Air Force General O'Donnell's omment after heavy bombing of the North Korean attempt to cross the Nakong was less than optimistic: "We topped 'em today but they'll come again omorrow."

That, insofar as it has been revealed, s the record. Not proof of sea/air power ailure to offset enemy manpower but vidence it was not fully achieved in Korea. In search of flaws, doctrinal or rocedural, let us delve into "surface-ir" concept and operation.

IR doctrine tries to liken interdiction to naval blockade. Lt. Gen. Anderon, commanding Fifth Air Force, aserted when the fighting stopped that with the air force available it was imossible to stop the flow of supplies rom Manchuria to the battlefront." He rgued, reasonably, that the Air Force ided by Army ground activity preented a Communist supply buildup adeuate to launch an all-out offensive. Less alidly, in relation to the tactical air mison, he asserted: "Once the stuff gets arted, some will get to the front lines. ou've got to get 'em at the source."

Just as the Navy, forbidden to blockle China, could not strangle Communist armies by closing North Korean orts, so, claimed air exponents, they ould not be expected to bar reinforceents and supplies from the Korean batefield, since they could not bomb the lanchurian "sanctuary."

The analogy is not valid. Blockades slowly strangle the "source" of contraband. It may take years to starve out a foe. Air interdiction can work faster. The farther from the source enemy material and supplies are destroyed, the greater the loss to the enemy. At the factory only the material is lost. Near the battle end of a long line of communications, destruction wastes the tremendous effort expended in getting supplies and equipment to that distant point. The blockaded army can fight while national stockpiles last. The army interdicted by air is immediately emaciated.

TWENTIETH century warfare has proved the inseparable bond between efficient joint operations and victory. Neither land, sea nor air power alone nor, except under the rarest circumstance, any two of those three, can win decisively against serious opposition. Least of all can a portion of but one of them—strategic bombing—do the whole job.

Airpower *is* essential to victory—just like surface (land and sea) power. As the latter requires two distinct (but cooperating) phases, i.e., armies and navies, air power too, as Douhet originally insisted, must have its tactical as well as its strategic forces. Omit any one of these and we lose the essential "balance" that brings victory.

Devotees of Douhet forget that prophet's own assertion: surface-support air is necessary in addition to strategic air; both are entirely different and distinct. Douhet was farsighted in an age of TNT rather than KT bombing. He realized that destruction (or capture) of hostile air bases, not aerial combat, won air supremacy. Today, scores of bombing planes are no longer required to flatten an enemy air base. One plane, reaching the site with nuclear bombs, can complete the job. The types of aircraft most appropriate to execute these missions are rapidly losing all resemblance to types desired for close support of ground forces, those needed by a surface-air force.

Tac-air requires equipment, training and doctrine different from airpower designed to contest air supremacy and conduct deep bomber operations.

CLOSE air support pays off only when it hits, and hurts, the enemy. This kind of effective air support can be provided. Procedures essential for success are no mystery. They approximate Navy/Marine operations closer than those of the Air Force.

The first fundamental is acceptance of the idea that support of surface forces has top priority. Targets ranging from rearward supply dumps to the line of contact are those whose destruction best advances the ground battle. Crucial ones are often fleeting—to be hit swiftly, aggressively.

Surface commanders' judgment re-

garding target selection, both close support and interdiction, must govern. Not only on, but immediately beyond, the battlefield he is most concerned with the tactical impact of every air strike upon enemy capabilities. He wants especially to take full advantage of tac-air's heavier punch.

Tac-air is flexible. There are things that it alone can do: hitting a target on a steep reverse slope, strafing the enemy ahead of our advancing troops, smashing a bridge beyond artillery range, pounding reserves concentrated in defilade. Able ground commanders will not waste air strikes, where artillery or mortars can accomplish the mission, any more than they would squander their other resources.

THE priority system now in effect for interdiction targets is generally sound. Enemy transportation approaching the front and within the battle zone comes first. Enemy stockpiles of POL, ammunition, equipment and food at and immediately behind the battle front come next. Massed effort at specific points or sometimes a coordinated series of small strikes, both imposing heavy demands upon tac-air, will constitute interdiction efforts.

Unlike interdiction's systematic operation, close support may often be most effective in "penny packets." Two or three planes instantly available can squelch almost any target reported from the front lines. A single plane dropping an egg in a cave can often do what massed artillery battalions cannot achieve.

The Navy method of having planes armed and circling at initial points, ready to go, fits beautifully into ideal tac-air specifications. Critics complain that airplanes used a few at a time in pinpoint bombing on call are being wasted. But the fleeting nature of battle zone targets generally requires this use. A limited number paired off with particular divisions would not go to waste. Air-ground teamwork improves when ground fighters work constantly with the same group of pilots upstairs.

The technological complexities of combat flying render highly improbable development in any pilot of equal ability for close-support and long-range bombing assignments. Behind a well executed surface mission lie hundreds of hours of training, not only in flying but also in acquiring intimate knowledge of the surface force supported. Unit recognition, map reading, trajectories of mortars and howitzers, instant identification by smoke puffs of different explosions, tactical significance of ground phenomena, all enter into a successful tac-air strike. Such technical training is important, but more vital is the will to move in on the target. This last requires an understanding of ground combat and ingrained belief in the importance of unified effort.

THE last word has by no means been written in the field of surface air-support techniques. There are many ways which can and should be explored for moving a pilot and his plane close enough to the target to hit it and get out again in the face of murderous flak. Unless the men responsible for air-support training concentrate on these problems our hardware will continue to improve faster than our skills.

Improved air reconnaissance for surface warfare is another essential if air support is to achieve maximum results. There is little question that some of the skill achieved in photographic intelligence in World War II has slipped away since. Then, too, the Chinese competence in digging and camouflage severely taxed air reconnaissance. Cameras, recon planes and their techniques for surface warfare can all be improved if the necessity is recognized and acted upon by sympathetic agencies. We need a better means of analyzing an enemy's communication system. Although primitive systems move underground more readily than technically complicated ones, even the little men with the A-frames must have assembly areas and pass through defiles. Better analysis may reveal these weak points in the enemy's communications system.

Effective coordination between land forces and support aviation with its split-second timing comes readily only to forces that know each other's limitations and capabilities. A key reason for Navy air's effectiveness is the fact that Navy aviators serve sufficient time on surface ships to know naval operations. Likewise Marine pilots are Marines first, pilots second.

Tomorrow, if not today, we will have atomic weapons which hugely increase tac-air's combat potential. That potential constitutes a primary reason for concern over close support and interdiction performance levels. Tac-air, either directly or as the eyes of other agencies, delivers atomic missiles on and near the battlefield. Understanding its impact on a future war requires an appreciation of three neglected facts: (1) the enormous tactical prowess of atomic weapons; (2) their optimum employment by th United States would be in conjunctio with small elite forces opposing masse manpower; (3) such use would strike a aggressor's military establishment onl not civilian populations.

HIGHLY effective tac-air will be esse tial to enable relatively small lar forces successfully to counter the ma power an aggressor may throw at us i any of the world's half dozen remo "hot spots." Experience in Korea illu trates how comparatively ill-equipp military forces—designed to fight again superior technique—are approachir equality with us in every field except a and atomic weapons. Our lead here mu certainly be maintained and preferab lengthened, to overcome our permane deficiency in manpower.

The presence of 280mm atomic art lery on the battlefield will not elimina the need for tac-air. Limited gun ran is the most obvious reason. Planes mu deliver atomic blasts required for int diction missions.

Tac-air will still furnish reconna sance to spot, report and track targe for atomic missiles whether delivery by artillery or plane. The Army's "lig aviation" is too fragile and slow for su sweeps behind hostile lines. Essent post-explosion surveys also require swi powerful planes. Last, and by no mea least, the majority of targets assigned tac-air must still be hit with conventior weapons, tac-air delivered. Few w justify expending an atomic bomb, ev a "small" one.

Nor will addition to land combat not yet available guided missiles invol major alteration in the outlook. Tacti atomic warfare, whatever its agenci accentuates, not diminishes, the role surface air support.

We need the means to make peri eral wars as unattractive to an aggr sor as our fission/fusion power spc (we hope) his appetite for global w We can meet another Korea with sma ing atomic blows against the invad field army on and near the battlefield we possess a "surface air force" w atomic capabilities wedded to some t notch mobile divisions. Unfortunat that "if" seems insurmountable with some adjustments in our military est lishment. This means relatively sm overwhelmingly effective, atomic we on-equipped, integrated air-surface for

A SINGLE major alteration of Arr Navy-Air Force doctrine would ate the surface air force we need wi

ıt weakening our structure for all-out ar. This change would charge Navy/ larine air with all surface support over nd and sea; place in the custody of the ir Force the dual mission of strategic r offense and air defense of the United ates.

The proposal is less radical than it ›pears at first glance. Divorcing "tac- r" from the Air Force may be a blow to ide, but the move might be secretly elcome, particularly if accompanied by tle or no reduction in combat wings.

Rising clamor for continental air de- nse consumes more and more Air Force fort. Public discontent over "protec- ›n," postulated mainly upon the de- rrent effect of a retaliatory striking rce, deserves and receives increasing tention. Interceptor squadrons appear greater number—and cost—as plan cceeds plan. Losing the contentious adache of "ground support" might cretly appeal to many a high-ranking rman.

No violence is done to the current ıtus of our inter-Service balance by the ggested shift. Detailed specifications r a "surface air force" remain a highly ıssified subject, whoever provides it. owever, the principles involved are adily discernible. It must possess ough wings to balance the Army's visions plus Marine divisions. It must ıin realistically with ground forces in ıneuvers; exchanging knowledge and perience, getting intimately ac- ıainted.

To provide the Army with its own mbat air force would be an untenable oposition for all that it has been re- ested by some ground commanders. ıere are already enough "air forces" the United States military establish- ent.

Naval, and Marine, air outlook is eady beamed toward surface support, ›eit much of that "surface" is water stead of land. A highly organized, perbly motivated, equipped and skilled ce is in being. Whether expanded by nsfer or other means it could absorb new role without disrupting shock.

The Air Force predilection for stra- gic bombing orients that Service almost ıolly toward total war. The Navy, m long experience, must prepare in lition for sudden, small peripheral rs. As American policy moves percep- ly toward the elite striking force ked by air/sea power, naval resources more and more committed to tradi- nal tasks with consequent lessened erest in sharing the strategic bombing

A flight deck officer signals "Go" to the pilot taking off for a mission over Korea

NOT only does Navy and Marine air offer a going concern capable of handling surface support missions; they offer one better designed, with respect to military characteristics of the job to be done. The military effectiveness of a fighting force can be determined by analyzing its doctrines, organization, concept of command, and participation in joint operations. Gauged by all these keys, the Fleet Air arm and its companion, Marine Air, are well suited to execute the surface support mission.

If the Navy/Marine combination were given the entire air support mission they would stress familiarity between pilots and the forces they support. Marine air wings and carrier groups already set the example.

In the realm of equipment, the rapid strides of air technology approach a point where that designed for strategic air missions may be unsatisfactory for surface support; where planes developed to wrest air superiority no longer fit the air support harness. Naval air has been accustomed to developing planes for specific tasks. Near misses won't sink ships or knock out bunkers. The Navy has never gone overboard in the search for a single aircraft which incorporates air support, interceptor, and air escort qualities. It can be counted upon to foster the types support missions require, much as it already operates mobile (floating) airfields to serve until fighter strips can be built.

But phenomenal technical progress in every military field cannot overshadow the human element in war. We cannot bank on machines alone. Tactics and pilot skill provided by training are equally important. As previously noted, it is in the realm of training that the advantages of the Naval/Marine air support combination become most evident.

AN old rule for anyone providing service is: give the customer what he needs. Charging Navy/Marine aviation with all air support of ground operations would be endorsed by most Army men. Navy/Army cooperation in amphibious operations has never given rise to the intensity of disagreement instanced by Navy/Air Force or Army-Air Force disputes. The two older services have, after all, fought side by side for generations, leaving their bitterest rivalries to the football field, their most acrimonious disputations to guest night at Army-Navy Clubs around the world.

The Soldier and The Statesman

Military planning must conform to political goals . . .
political determination must fit military capabiliti

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

EXCEPT, perhaps among certain barbarians, war is never an end in itself. No one in his right mind can want war. But it occurs when a nation comes to believe that the only alternatives are even worse. These alternatives may be the continued acceptance of an adverse economic, political, or strategic situation; or the loss of an economic, political, or strategic advantage. In other words, war is simply a device for achieving national objectives by force, usually resorted to only when other methods fail.

As a result, in the execution of national policy, the soldier is the statesman's junior partner. This relationship is emphasized by the fact that the apparent ability to make war successfully adds to and strengthens the capability of a nation in the peaceful intercourse with other nations which we call diplomacy. The absence of a reasonable capability to support diplomacy militarily in case of need can weaken foreign policy to the point of ineffectiveness. On the other hand, the excessive and deliberate use of military capability as a diplomatic device is both immoral and dangerous. History provides examples in which "saber-rattling" precipitated rather than prevented war.

The purpose of war, when it occurs, is for one contestant to impose its will, by force, upon the other. . . . The method by which this end is achieved has remained fundamentally the same throughout history. That method is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces.

FOR centuries, mankind has been seeking some simpler formula to achieve this goal. There is the eternal idea that in the enemy's total capability there must be some key element by whose destruction or injury his will to resist can be paralyzed.

This search has affected not only strategic but even, for a time, tactical thinking. Tactics, however, vary with weapons capabilities, so that they are constantly changing. Since strategy is more fundamental it is to strategy that most of the effort to discover a single determinis formula has been devoted.

As a matter of fact, through this search a great d has been done over the years to increase knowledge a understanding of war. Mahan codified and explair a strategic philosophy in terms of sea power. Mackin paralleled this contribution in terms of political geog phy. Douhet and Mitchell made a beginning in int preting the role of air power.

While each of these thinkers contributed much, thesis which each propounded contained the flaw of be applicable not in general terms, not absolutely, but o in terms of specific circumstances. Beyond that, the position of any single one of these theses alone was a is based upon a fallacy—the same fallacy which ex when an attempt is made to explain history in terms any single deterministic influence, be it economics ideology or wars or even sun spots. While each su influence may be significant at a given time under spec conditions, none is ever the sole determinant of course of history.

NEVERTHELESS, the search for the simple solut goes on. Today, it is given impetus by the fact t mankind has in the past decade developed a capabi for tremendous destruction, on a scale never e dreamed of before. Such a completely new poten must, it is assumed, put a completely new face u the conduct of war.

Since the consequences of such destruction are dreadful to contemplate, there are those who say that mere possession of this destructive capability by nation constitutes so great an implied danger to its e mies that they would never provoke its employment. must realize, however, that when rival nations both sess this capability, its effectiveness as a power giv weight to diplomatic action tends to be balanced.

Be that as it may, in studying warfare as in study

CONDENSED FROM AN ADDRESS BEFORE THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, HARRIMAN, N. Y. 30 JULY

ıy other human activity, the only guide which we have ır the future is the record of the past. I am unable to :call any example in history of a nation at war losing its ill to resist until its armed forces had been defeated.

* * *

Actually the fact that a nation will continue to resist ntil its armed forces are rendered impotent is testimony ı the indomitable courage of the human spirit, regardless ; race or nationality. If a people has faith in its cause, it ill not lose its will to resist the opponents of that cause ntil the last reasonable hope of success is destroyed—ntil its formal means of resistance, its armed forces are roken.

On purely pragmatic grounds, therefore, if on no :her, it would be an error of the greatest magnitude for ıy nation to become over-committed to a strategy which, hile designed to destroy or damage life and industry in s enemy's home territory, left that enemy's combat forces elatively unhampered.

HE fact is that the weapons properly suited to one of these objectives are not necessarily suited to the other. I ave already mentioned the situation in which rival na-ons' destructive capacity is equivalent and thereby is ba-nced out as an influence supporting their foreign policy ms. Consider further a situation for such nations if war ctually occurred and in which mutual fear of retaliation ı kind might prevent both opponents from resorting to ıe use of their most destructive weapons. Or consider situation in which such weapons were used but the ıaterials and facilities required for the production of ıose weapons were, respectively, expended or destroyed, ıd no decision was reached. In any of these eventuali-es, the military element which would necessarily deter-ıine the outcome—the only element capable of tipping ıe balance one way or another—would be the superiority ; one side or the other in the more accustomed means, ıe more conventional forces.

I do not by any means minimize the vital importance ; the portion of strategy which is primarily aimed at estruction of an enemy's war-making potential in his wn homeland. I merely warn against undue reliance pon that one aspect of strategy at the expense of the :her equally essential aspects. In other words, a sound rategy must stand firmly on all of its legs.

I do, however, believe that it is vitally important to emember that wars are won by the achievement of omination over human beings, and the territory they ıhabit, and that only land forces can achieve and main-in such domination. To do so, they require strong ıpport from the air and from the sea; but in the final ıalysis it must be the land forces which assert control ıd thereby determine the victory. There is a direct ıalogy from football—air and naval forces run vitally nportant interference, but land forces carry the ball over ıe goal line of military victory. If your ball advances ɔu win, if it is pushed back you lose.

In all of this, a primary conditioning factor in any emocratic nation, and certainly in the United States, is ıat the soldier is an adviser and an executor, not a formulator, with regard to the policy determined by the civilian authorities of the government. This is the only proper allocation of responsibilities. Bearing in mind that war is a device for achieving national objectives by force, it is therefore fought to achieve political goals. It is a means to an end. In determining which of several means to follow to achieve a military end, the one offering the greatest political gain is accordingly the one which should be chosen unless it entails such military risk or cost as to outweigh the possible political gain. Such a consideration must be carefully weighed in the determination of strategy as a whole. And if utter annihilation of the enemy is the means chosen to win victory, that victory would be empty indeed.

By the same token, foreign policy has a military aspect as well as a peaceful aspect, and military considerations must enter into its formulation. Thus, while military planning must be carried out in the light of political goals, policy determination should be carried out in the light of military capabilities. A policy which depends for effect upon military capability becomes nothing but bluff—and obvious bluff—when the military capability for backing it up is patently inadequate.

THE soldier and the statesman must work together in close coordination. It is the statesman's function to formulate the policy to be followed. Upon him rests the authority of decision. But among the many factors he must weigh and assess in reaching his decision, the military factor must be given appropriate consideration.

The soldier's responsibility lies in the professional military field. His over-riding responsibility is to give his honest, objective, professional military advice to the civilian authorities over him. If what he is given to work with is less than the minimum he regards as essential to accomplish the military task assigned him, he must give his superiors an honest, fearless, objective opinion of the consequences, as he sees them from the military viewpoint, of this shortage. Finally, whatever the final decision may be, he has the duty to do the utmost with whatever he is furnished.

The soldier is dependent upon the statesman not only for allocations of men and materials, but for the climate of international agreement in which he can successfully carry out his tasks.

* * *

Such organizations as NATO are based on international military agreements, and international military agreements can stem only from international political agreements. Thus, the statesman is the trail blazer who makes it possible for the soldier to build the organizational machinery with which, if need be, he carries out the policy determined by the statesman.

The statesman and the soldier both necessarily depend for their effectiveness upon each other. The military man, within his specialized field, must keep in mind that he is called in only when other methods have failed. The statesman should remember always that the soldier's effectiveness in supporting any national policy is only as great as his capability.

EDITORIAL

Echo in the Summer Doldrums: "Where Are the Men?"

THE endless Washington debate over military means was in its mid-summer doldrums during July, despite the splitting of Indochina and other evidences of Communist advance. The Alsops tried to stir things up with gloomy forebodings of Russian progress in the development of hydrogen bombs and intercontinental carriers. Senator Stuart Symington, the former Air Force Secretary, debated the same issue in a lively and knowing manner on 21 July, but raised few objections from his colleagues except that they were reluctant to admit any need for the U. S. to engage in an all-out crash effort to keep ahead of the Soviets in the production of hydrogen bombs and IBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles).

Neither the Alsops nor the persistent Senator from Missouri were able to make much headway against the record-breaking heat wave and public apathy. Such excitement on military problems as Washington could muster had to wait until the last week end of the month. On Friday the 30th, a brisk breeze was stirred up at a press conference called by the retiring Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower & Personnel). Dr. John A. Hannah, who was going back to his old job as President of Michigan State College, revealed to the newspapermen some aspects of the Administration's thinking about what should be done about the military reserves, meaning principally the Army and Air Force Reserve and National Guard. The breeze Dr. Hannah kicked up was to blow open a door of the White House out of which the Press Secretary would emerge with some comment. It also was to stir a headline from Mr. Wilson.

Much could be written about what Dr. Hannah had to say, but briefly stated his program has three points:

- Continue the draft; it is now scheduled to expire in June 1955 and Congress will have to extend it.
- Make service in the reserves compulsory by recalling to active duty any man who failed to fulfill his required obligation.
- Abolish the Army and Air Force reserve organizations and put all civilian components into the National Guard which would become a "National Guard of the United States."

Up to now most such programs have called for a relatively short period of active duty before men were embarked on their reserve obligation. But, as Dr. Hannah described the new program, most men will serve a period beyond that required for basic training. Indeed, he said that men who voluntarily join a reserve organization before they are inducted may still be required to serve for a minimum period of active duty. This would remove one of the best recruiting gimmicks the National Guard has had for 17- and 18-year olds: "Join us and you won't be drafted and you won't go on active duty except in ca of emergency or war—when you would be drafted an way."

DR. HANNAH'S idea about how to compel a man perform his legal reserve obligation was hardly ori inal. This magazine has mentioned it before; the la time in August 1953. The difficulty is not in finding way to make service compulsory but in getting Congre to pass a law that will actually compel, and in getti the people to accept it.

As to the third part of the Hannah plan—the Nation Guard of the United States idea—it can only be said th both Reservists and National Guardsmen were so asto ished as to be rendered speechless temporarily. This w most unusual, and before they fully recovered their no mal facilities that White House door blew open a Mr. Hagerty was heard to say that Dr. Hannah's pl did "not reflect fully the attitude of the National S curity Council."

A day later Mr. Wilson backed up his ex-subordina The National Security Council had approved the co pulsory feature "in a broad sense," he said, but admitt that political considerations might make the Administ tion settle for "90 per cent instead of a full 100 per ce of the plan." He also said that the condition of the serves "would be a scandal very disturbing to the Ame can people" if the nation had to go to war.

The latter was really rather old-hat, although the da press made quite a bit of it. Surprising because it su gests that Mr. Wilson (and the press for that matte didn't have much faith in the memories of the Americ public. It has been told more than once in the past f months that the reserve situation wasn't a rip-roari success. Among those who had said so were Preside Eisenhower, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and Gene Matthew B. Ridgway.

THE President has mentioned it more than once. T last time was on 27 July. In a letter to Sen. Saltonst Mr. Eisenhower wrote that "deficiencies and irritatic and half-measures . . . for more than 30 years ha characterized that part of our defense program whi involves the training and administration of the civili components of the armed forces." A plan "for rec structing, revitalizing and reinforcing the Reserve a Guard structure" will be "a top priority item in Januar he wrote. The President's earlier comment was in State of the Union message last January. "Evident we nesses exist in the state of readiness and organization our reserve forces," was the way he put it then.

Admiral Radford's comment, made last March in a ress interview: "It is my opinion that we have to make ır reserve programs more realistic and more responsive current and future needs."

General Ridgway, testifying before the Senate Appro- ciations Committee: ". . . the strength and proficiency the Army Reserve components must be increased in der that the Army may be prepared to execute its sponsibilities for the defense of the nation."

The history of attempts to get legislation that would eate a vigorous and effective reserve force is depressing read and certainly frustrating to any man who believes ry strongly that reserves are needed. This includes any thousands of patriotic, hard-working Reserve and ational Guard officers who contribute more time and ergy to the security of the nation than their fellow x-payers will ever know.

The most recent history is typical. In his State of the nion message in January of this year, the President id that "measures to correct these weaknesses [in the serves] will be later submitted to the Congress." Nine onths have passed and now the hope is that it will be bmitted in January 1955. What happened in those ne months? The story begins even earlier.

ONTHS before January the President had received a recommendation from the National Security Train- g Commission and had sent it to the Office of Defense obilization to find out if the nation had enough men the right ages to put the program into effect.

The program recommended by NSTC would require at every young man be given six months of training d then be transferred to "compulsory reserve activity" r a remaining three and one-half years or more (de- nding upon how active he was) and finally moved to standby status for the remaining period of his eight ars of obligation. Men could volunteer for active duty ter their six months of training and men who refused participate in reserve training would be ordered to tive duty (this was the punitive feature that would ake the compulsory feature effective). In addition to ese men the active forces would be kept up to strength the drawing of lots by all of the men in the NSTS pool.

When Arthur S. Flemming, Director of ODM, got e NSTS recommendation he appointed a civilian com- ittee headed by Lawrence A. Appley, President of the merican Management Association. The Appley com- ittee attempted to reconcile the manpower needs of dustry and the civilian economy with the requirements the military in the event of mobilization. The com- ittee concluded that a program could be effected. Mr. emming then recommended that the President direct e Department of Defense to establish its needs for an nmediately callable reserve" and a "selectively callable serve" and that the National Security Council then termine the size and composition of the military re- ve forces.

The President accepted the Flemming recommenda- n early in January and directed the Department of efense to make its report by 1 April. The Department missed that deadline but sometime later it did report to the President who sent the whole thing to the National Security Council. Obviously some progress had been made there for it was an NSC paper that Dr. Hannah quoted during his swan song press conference.

If Congress should pass a law similar to the plan out- lined here, more problems will immediately face the Regular Army. It might reduce the number of men volunteering (enlisting) in the Army for the simple rea- son that a youth, weighing his choices, might doubt if a four-year hitch, plus two in the inactive reserve would be better for him than two years of active duty (and a chance of escaping even that) and four years of active reserve duty, plus two years of inactive. Furthermore men sent to active duty because they didn't fulfill their reserve obligation would hardly be the highest type of citizen- soldier. Finally men who were "drawn by lot" for active service would feel imposed upon. The feeling of equality of sacrifice is all important in selective service and these plans simply cannot provide for it. A tip off is the not uncommon query of the worried mother of 1950-53 who wanted to know why her Johnny was in Korea while the neighbor's boy on one side was in Germany and the boy on the other side was in college.

Despite these reservations it is quite probable that the compulsory features in Dr. Hannah's plan are as good as any that could be devised. So the catch is not in the in- strument, nor can there be any question of the need for a workable reserve system. The big question is whether any compulsory system will ever be enacted into law. We cannot escape the feeling that Mr. Wilson's ninety per cent is too optimistic. We feel that reserve component commanders will be saying a year from now as they have said so often in the past: "Where are the men?"

We concede that we are not visibly moved. We are inclined to believe that Mr. Wilson was completely accurate in an unintended way. The American people show every indication of refusing to be scandalized over the military reserve situation until war comes.

IT is not nearly so depressing and much more fun to speculate as to why the hard-working Dr. Hannah chose to comment on such an explosive subject as the reserve situation before the Administration's plans had hardened into specific legislative proposals. This was quite unusual. Details of National Security Council projects aren't ordinarily bruited about at a press confer- ence—even a Presidential press conference. The answer may have been made by a service newspaper several weeks before the Sage of East Lansing departed from Washington. In its "gossip" column it commented that Dr. Hannah "was counting on National Security Coun- cil endorsement of the new plan for Reserve Forces as [his] last major achievement. . . ." It is not uncommon for public figures who are bursting with pride of parent- hood to suffer premature birth pains. It is one of the sources of news leaks in Washington and so it is surpris- ing that the reporters at the conference seemed not to have noted this, even though the retiring Secretary failed to pass around the cigars.

Now, in an unparalleled period fraught with uncertainties of grave import to us and our institutions, some shadows have seemed to fall across our Army, some doubts too have arisen in some minds as to its integrity.

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

Soldiering Is a Way of Life

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONOVAN YEUELL, JR.

IT is not belittling the many serious problems in the fields of strategy, tactics, organization and weapons to say that the foremost problem of the Army today is the lack of one-ness, the solidarity that is the mark of a spirited, vigorous fighting force. Soldiers of all grades and ranks in the Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve, yearn for a re-birth of faith in the military profession.

The outward manifestations of the taint on the Army's soul are numerous. The "evidence" includes these obvious facts:

- The reenlistment rate is lower than it should be, not only among draftees but among noncommissioned Regulars of several years of service.
- The number of officers who have resigned, many of them of field grade.
- The difficulty Army Reserve and National Guard units have in maintaining authorized strength.
- The lack of interest in a military career by young men who possess qualities of leadership; this is shown by the number of men who apply for West Point and Officer Candidate Schools, and in the small number of ROTC graduates who express an interest in a Regular commission.
- The fact that many soldiers believe that inspired and dedicated leadership, while not dormant, is not nearly so prevalent as it ought to be.
- Finally, the deplorable fact that many officers and noncommissioned officers deliberately evade troop duty, especially command assignments.

The Army is certainly not shot to hell, but there are enough danger signals to call for some soul-searching by all of us. General Ridgway has addressed himself vigorously to the situation by co mand action and by stirring statemer directed at strengthening the Army's l lief in itself. Secretary Stevens has g lantly supported the Army's good nam But the Secretary and the Chief of Sta cannot themselves restore the Arm spirit. All of us, at every echelon, oug now to be following their lead. He are my thoughts on what can be done make soldiering a life free of shado and doubts.

The creation of an effective fighti force depends upon factors both wit and without the Army's control. Bei soldiers, we must concentrate on the ternal, or Army, side of the problem.

The surest way to meet difficult d is to stick by the clear-cut standards proper soldiering. An honest, prof sional attitude is the one hope of army in unsettled times. But gr danger lurks when professional sta ards are lowered for reasons of expe ency. Any compromise of personal tegrity and honor in the performance duty soon debases a military force. S less, courageous and honest cond must be upheld. If it is it will beco the rallying point for the re-birth high standards of professionalism.

It is the Regular Army that must the tempo for this re-birth. This is to say that the Regulars are the o

Lieutenant Colonel Donovan Yeuell, Jr., *Artillery*, is presently working for an advanced degree in foreign affairs at Georgetown University under the Army's civilian school program. He is a graduate of the Military Academy, Class of 1940. Before entering Georgetown he was on duty in Germany where he commanded the 32d Field Artillery Battalion and also served on higher staffs.

›rofessionals." Many non-Regulars are ghly professional and some Regulars ll short of the mark. However, as it is ıe Regular Army that determines the ldierly life and sets the standards, the ıll-time Regular must lead the way in stilling in all components a profes- ›nal outlook that is derived from those ›liefs and practices that have always stinguished soldiering.

A professional army has a solid basis fundamentals held together by what e may call "frills." Both are essential. ver a period of nearly two centuries the nited States Army has developed a ›dy of fundamentals and frills that ›mprise a set of operating rules. Typi- lly American, this set of "rules" has oven itself adaptable to the changes means of warfare, military thinking, ıd domestic and foreign affairs. Ap- ied with common sense, the rules are ›xible enough to meet a wide variety of rcumstances.

It is safe to say that many of the rmy's difficulties, past and present, can › traced to violations of these "rules."

N Army cannot enjoy the self-assur- ance that is so vital to its being un- ss it is confident that its highest leaders e competent professionals who will act courageously in the face of public ›inion as they do on the battlefield. he high command will not be blamed Congress refuses to raise pay, or if no ıy can be found to get dependents erseas more rapidly; but there will be › forgiveness unless the rank and file e confident that their chiefs have done within their power to alleviate such nditions. Downward loyalty begets ›ward devotion. So also much is ex- cted of the senior leadership in fur- ering the role of the Army in modern ır, and the Army's place in the sun. en know when great principles appear be compromised without a fight. Any spicion that the Army lacked the urage of its convictions would be de- essing to the rank and file.

HATEVER the reasons for the reluc- tance of many leaders—commissioned d noncommissioned—to lead, the trend ıst be reversed. Strong and confident dership at every level is absolutely lispensable to an army.

A leader should be able to feel that he more or less a prince in his own right d that, so long as he produces, he may ın his show" within the set bounds of responsibility. It is in the nature of ›d soldiering that command duty ›uld produce deep personal satisfac- tion. If it doesn't something vital is missing.

One of the great virtues of our Army has been that it gave a man a job to do and let him do it; conversely, failure to perform at a high level of excellence traditionally has been rewarded with firm and immediate disciplinary action. Within reasonable bounds, the criterion of leadership is *results*. Responsibility is supposed to carry commensurate authority. The "hard but fair" attitude remains sound. Such principles are the only basis for inspired and reasonable leadership. Yet these obviously sound principles often have given way to over-centralized control whereby mediocrity thrives and good men wonder whether strong leadership is really desired.

ANOTHER distressing influence on leadership has been a tendency to try to prevent trouble before it happens. An officer requisitioning supplies may find himself making as many as three or four certifications of his honesty, and half a dozen clerks up and down the line may "check" his veracity. Numerous restrictions have been placed by higher headquarters upon troop units, to keep down the rates of AWOL, to reduce minor disciplinary infractions, to "insure" obedience and for other purposes that should be the personal business of commanders. Preventive measures designed to make mistakes almost impossible can have the effect of making leaders



Spit and polish is part of the soldier's trade and its complete absence is as debilitating as too much of it.

mere relay stations. The way to reduce failures in leadership is to strengthen the leadership and not to cut out its guts with excessive "command by prevention." Proper performance is achieved when commanders demand high standards and deal summarily with failures.

Poor leadership can be blamed for almost everything that ails an army. But the truth is that the U. S. Army is rich in leaders with a wide variety of experience. The problem is to get the most from these proven leaders, to develop leaders who show promise, and to weed out the incompetents. Nothing should ever deter the removal of poor leaders; quality of leadership counts far more than quantity.

It may well be that we have too few Regular officers and that this affects the leadership. Something less than one-fourth of the officers on active duty are Regulars. The recent decision to seek authority next year to add 4,000 Regulars is a good start.

SOMETHING must be said about the corroding tendencies that came to a head in the Doolittle Board Report in 1946. Whatever merits it may have had, that report developed inhibitions against leadership. Officers and noncoms got the idea that the old tenets of leadership were improper. It didn't intend to, but the Doolittle Board did untold damage to the Army's self-confidence by discouraging good leadership. Furthermore, it blackened the Army's reputation.

Inevitably, there were some abuses of rank and privilege during World War II, but they were far from widespread. The abuses were not the fault of the system, but of slackness in enforcing it. Such gaps and distinctions as may exist officially and socially between officers and enlisted men are there for practical, proven purposes.

The officer idea has honorable precedent in the record of every great people. It works as nothing else will. The notion that it is "Prussian" and undemocratic is a product of ignorance and misunderstanding, certainly as regards the U. S. Army. The few fools and villains who abuse military rank give credence to the ignorant critics. The only solution is ruthlessly to eliminate them. The status of a military leader is quickly accepted by the vast majority of soldiers.

There have been attempts to transform leadership into a scientific technique using the methods of big business. Certainly scientific research and development and business methods and industrial production have military application and should be used. It goes without saying that the scientific, industrial, and business resources of the nation are invaluable assets to the Army. However, they are *adjuncts* only; the Army must not assume their character but should fit their contributions to the Army's needs. *Military leadership is an art.* It may use science and technical know-how but it cannot be governed by them. My objection is not to the civilians who have made indispensable contributions to the military profession and national security or to civilian control of the military establishment. I object to the growing tendency to seek *civilian* solutions to problems that can more effectively be solved by *military* methods.

Enormous administrative burdens have been allowed to fall upon the Army's shoulders in the name of more efficient personnel and business management. The mania for "business methods" is all too familiar to any officer or senior noncom who has served with troops in recent years; a visit with a company supply sergeant will send one reeling with IBM reports and stock records. Undoubtedly the administrative load has developed from well-meaning efforts to improve the Army's functioning, but the pay-off has not been greater efficiency and it has led to a diversion of effort from the main purpose of the Army. My skepticism on this score is shared by so many that I gladly risk the charge of "reactionary."

When activities not germane to military effectiveness get too much attention, professional excellence becomes incidental. If too many things are given top priority, the old principle of first things first goes by the board. A dangerous condition arises when a commander is ordered to do more than reasonably can be expected of him, when he is told over and over how to do it, and is in a constant turmoil over many matters that contribute little to the mission of his command. One gets the impression that non-essentials and essentials are lumped together indiscriminately. In such circumstances, even the best leader can become hopelessly frustrated and find that in trying to do all that is directed, his unit is doing few things well.

WE are over-enthusiastic about putting "how to do it" in writing. Every directive and order issued at every echelon should be withheld unless it can pass the test of military necessity. There has never been a more complete and sound literature on every phase of Army activity. It is safe to say that some adequate publication is available to meet nearly all the needs of training, administering and maintaining the Army. In general, if more is needed, the troop will ask for it. Present doctrine is large sound and sufficient. Commanders c not thirst for guidance; what they nee is breathing space.

The Army is tough and resilient b it cannot work at peak pressure inde nitely. Jack the Soldier becomes a du boy if he works without letup. Witho the stimulus of battle, overlong perio of field training tend to exceed the poi of good returns. Without lulls betwe the storms, the Army may one day fir itself too worn out to last through real heavy weather—this especially menac our leadership. For more than a deca the Army has been working at fu steam. Good soldiers do not resent hone work, but they expect to get a break c casionally. A life of grim tedium is n necessary to produce a good army.

A high peak of soldiering ought to l attainable with considerably less tin and effort than we now expend. W need a deliberate reduction or elimin tion of activities that are not essential the legitimate functions of the Arm

With the leaders allowed to lead, a the tasks directed toward the main bu ness of soldiering, a proper military w of life will come into better focus.

THE binding force of discipline is fundamental of prime importance. the better units a high state of discipli obtains today. Where lack of ability the cause of poor discipline, the leade regardless of rank, should be remove Where knowledge is at fault, lead should be set straight by their superio

There is no excuse for poor discipli The policy of the Department of t Army is to insist as strongly as ever th firm discipline is the cohesive force the Army. Coddling will not make s diers. In his war memoirs Preside Eisenhower quotes the late Lt. G Lesley J. McNair on this subject, "C troops are capable of the best of dis pline. If they lack it, leadership faulty."

Based on firmness, fairness, und standing, and obedience, the time-test American version of military discipli can achieve wonders. Contrary to po lar fancy, Americans are amenable discipline. The standards will be just high as the leaders make them. W proper discipline, a well-trained a well-led soldier is inevitable.

I have concentrated upon intangib because the Army can do somethi about them. We depend upon others weapons, supplies and creature comfo and the Army usually has the finest r terial support. I am stressing the int

›les because they, more than anything e, are what make a military force out arms and men.

The appeal of soldiering and the ›rth of an army come out of the human irit. The French *esprit de corps,* the itish *sense of otherness,* and the Amer- n *unit pride* all have a common ırce. An army in which spirits flag es not enjoy self-confidence, public pport, or success in battle.

When the Chief of Staff takes public ɜnizance of shadows across the Army, is fitting to raise the question of ıether *esprit* has suffered neglect. *prit* is nourished by the hard work of ders; it appears when men believe ɜy are doing a difficult job that others ıld not do as well; it shines out when ɜroup of men go through a dangerous trying ordeal together; it cannot be ɜn to men—they must earn it through rformance of duty, courage, self- nial, perseverance, honor, and integ- y.

Esprit cannot be turned on and off. is more a reflection of soundness than lescription of a condition. It is steeped professional excellence and sound dership. The attainment of high *rit,* based on a careful blend of fun- nentals and frills, is the certain sign ıt a military force is fit for its role.

Esprit is not easy to define, but every ›d soldier knows when his outfit has When a soldier believes that *he* is nehow different from other men, and outfit is better than other outfits, and army has no peer, then *esprit* exists. d the chances are you will have a su- ·ior military force.

)OD *esprit* appeals to the heart and mind. In recent years there has been ıch concern over answering the sol- r's "why?" Soldiers have always asked at they are fighting for. Once in a ile the answer to "why" is pretty ob- us, but more often it is complicated. neral Ridgway's revival of the Eighth ny in late 1950 and early 1951 is a king example of how leadership can nish the "why" that soldiers will ›ond to.

Competent commanders have always ›gnized the need of furnishing troops h truthful and convincing answers to ir "why." The current troop infor- tion program is probably the best the ny has had and within bounds worth- ile. However, most soldiers are satis- that their country has a job for them do. B. H. Liddell Hart has rightly erved: "In most professional armies ional spirit has been a factor second- ary to the soldierly spirit."

Military men *are* something special, for no other group has taken the same oath of allegiance, shares the rugged training and high standards, or faces such hazards and discomforts. A commander's responsibility and authority over life and death have no parallel in civilian pursuits. It is right and proper for every member of the Army to live in a belief that he and his outfit are doing a job that the Army and the country cannot do without. Vainglory is to be despised but pride is to be cherished, and a good leader knows the difference. Pride is the life blood of an army and of every man in it.

SOME armies have built *esprit* and the sense of otherness around the regiment. The British Army, for instance, has resisted having a corps of infantry in preference to retaining the traditional regiments. There was an excellent article on this subject by British Major Julian Paget in the June issue of this magazine. Although the regimental system has organizational and administrative drawbacks, it does foster high unit pride and a strong individual sense of otherness. The system is too involved to discuss here, but the gist of it is that men look upon their original regiment as "home," and may serve several tours in it. The regiment's very name instills a strong sense of otherness. Perhaps some such plan could be evolved in the United States Army by relating Regular units with corresponding units in the National Guard and Army Reserve. The regimental spirit is one of the more powerful aspects of real soldiering. If the U. S. Army's planned unit rotation system develops into battalion and regimental rotation, a historic step will have been taken towards sustaining unit pride.

It is important to understand that while tradition is important, it is not indispensable. Many a new unit, wholly lacking roots or history, has performed superbly well. The point is that while a revival of tradition is all to the good, as in the series of posters on Army battles, tradition by itself serves no useful purpose; a good soldier does not rest on laurels won by others.

Another distinctive feature of Army life is the personal integrity expected of each member of the service. Soldiers must be truthful, honest and decent. Many soldiers find that association with men of high integrity is one of the Army's finest attractions. It is a pleasure to live among men of honor and decency.



Traditional customs help create "one-ness." This is the awards ceremony held by the 32d Field Artillery Battalion on its Organization Day in 1951.

There is also the high premium the Army places on courage. Soldiers are subject to tests of moral and physical courage that are not present in other walks of life. It takes a man to be a soldier. The ability to take it as well as to dish it out sets a soldier apart. It is not medals or outer trappings, or cockiness, that measure a soldier's courage. It is his belief in a code that says, "You are expected to master your fears and do what must be done."

These are some of the fundamentals that breathe life into an army, and can

give to military men their distinctive sense of "otherness." When a soldier senses an "otherness" about himself; about his uniform, tradition, and customs; about his outfit and his Army, he can withstand the trials of service and the shock of battle. An Army composed of such soldiers has untold strength. This is the only kind of army worth having.

There are frills that need to be attached to the fundamentals. These are certain customs that have proved their military worth when applied wisely. While the fundamentals must be sound to hold men to a life of soldiering, it takes frills to draw men to the colors.

AMONG the more important frills or props of the military profession, the uniform is first. In recent years the Army's uniform has undergone so many changes that a soldier is unlikely to look upon it as a very strong symbol of his profession. It is unfortunate that both the current and projected semi-dress uniforms have little connection with tradition, except for shoulder patches and unit insignia. American military lore is rich with ideas upon which to base a handsome and meaningful uniform, rather than "just another suit."

The Army has long practiced false economy in respect to the full-dress uniform. Officers and enlisted men should be required to have and frequently to wear dress uniforms. Some version of a blue uniform would do very well. It is a basic part of soldiering to "dress up."

The armored and airborne forces have developed a few minor peculiarities of dress that set them apart. If such practices as a different hat or special buttons were to become Army-wide, the effect would far exceed any inconvenience to the Quartermaster.

Unfortunately we have fallen into the habit of not wearing all our ribbons and qualification badges. Regardless of inequities that may have occurred in the granting of awards and decorations, every soldier should wear those he has earned. And on formal occasions he should wear the full medals and decorations. It is a slur on the Army and the nation for a man to spurn the recognition, however great or small, that has been bestowed upon him.

When in uniform, a soldier should be immaculate, correct, and of proud bearing. All ranks should be required to wear the uniform correctly and respect it. A soldier's uniform is his trade mark; it is worth many times whatever it may cost in money. Distinctive, handsome, and significant articles of uniform can go far in holding high the Army's appeal and pride.

Not long ago the salute was not required off-post or in metropolitan areas of the U.S. This letdown in one of the more binding frills of Army life came at a time when military customs should have been getting an uplift. Except in the heat of battle the salute is a recognized part of soldiering. Even when in civilian clothes, military men should register recognition by a polite greeting and a gesture like tipping the hat or nodding the head. The salute should never be discouraged. It is good that it has been restored.

Although the "old days" should not be allowed to retard progress in fields like strategy, tactics, organization, and administration, many of the traditional customs have great value in developing unity and *esprit*. There seems to be no particular reason, for instance, why regiments and battalions should not be known by their names as well as their numbers. The 3d Infantry is a respected title, but perhaps "The Old Guard" is more stimulating.

Hanson Baldwin recently offered "more brass bands" as one cure for the Army's troubles. Undoubtedly he meant to suggest a return to more of the customs that typified garrison life. Spit and polish is part of the trade. The bases of discipline can best be established in garrison. Extended field service takes a heavy physical and moral toll on troops and so periodic return to garrison duty can do much to restore discipline and integrity. I do not suggest that the Army should adopt a sterile life of morning drill, guard duty, and whitewashing rocks. But I do say that it is in garrison that basic and technical training and officers' and noncommissioned officers' schools are best conducted.

GARRISON life used to be one of the attractions of the Army, and an up-to-date version should be revived. This involves a restoration of some of the customs that gave zest to Army life. Ceremonies should be colorful and exciting events, not perfunctory formations. Premium should be placed on perfection of drill and appearance. Competition among units should be encouraged.

Social life should be made more formal and obligatory. Clubs should be more than bingo halls. Enlisted clubs should be pleasant social centers to which a soldier can proudly escort his mother, sister or girl friend.

Service clubs, soldier shows, a hobby shops serve a splendid purp But if such attractions savor too stron of civilian life, they can create a f impression of soldiering. Soldiers v seek their own civilian-type intere Surely it is not unwholesome for Army's recreational facilities to be tinctively military.

Consideration should be given to viving separate messes for officers a noncommissioned officers in addition clubs. Mess life has definite value welding units together.

Such old customs as the depart commander's presentation of a trophy a piece of silver would provide co nuity to *esprit* and set a distinctive t for the unit.

Admittedly, these ideas are subjec existing conditions. For instance, so l as housing shortages require some n ried men to live at considerable distar from their duty stations, a full returr garrison life is impossible. (All the m reason for the Army to press with creasing vigor for a solution to the h ing shortages at home and abroa Meanwhile, a modified version of old customs and garrison life should adopted whenever possible.

A host of other thoughts comes mind, but it is enough to say that a tinctive Army way of doing things is sential to developing unit *esprit* and individual *sense of otherness*.

IN this article I have considered s of the things that can be done strengthen the Army's confidence appeal. I have tried to show the relat ship of fundamentals and frills in a g military institution. I have stressed the Army is different and must cap ize on the differences to gain app This is not a staff study but an atte to stimulate thought among soldiers look upon the Army as more than ju job. In the process, many searc questions have had to be by-passed, serious problems have gotten the o over lightly.

The idea that the old ways are suited to the "new" Army is nonse Over the years the Army has develo proven methods of doing things owes no apology for them. They effective and they give the soldier p of service and self-confidence. These qualities the Army must have in t days of tension and crisis. So le pursue them relentlessly and in knowledge that if we are honest ourselves we will be faithful to the t placed in us by the American pe

Why Didn't They Shoot More?

- Too much artillery
- *Bunkeritis*
- Failure to include riflemen in coordinated fire plans

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE JUSKALIAN

JRING the latter stages of the fight- ing in Korea when the front was sta- ized, more than one position was lost ause infantry weapons, particularly close-range, flat-trajectory weapons, re not used to their full effectiveness. hile artillery fire was being brought vn in torrents, infantry weapons were nt. As a result, once the enemy pene- ted our barrages, he frequently faced y random resistance from infantry apons.

Why wasn't our infantryman in Ko- doing more—and better—shooting? as it a lack of proper basic training? isolated instances, perhaps, but as a eral rule unlikely.

The principal reason why our infan- man didn't fire enough was his over- endence on artillery. At times this r-dependence reached ridiculous ex- mes. It was not uncommon for ndly ambush patrols, already in posi- , to call for artillery fires upon an suspecting enemy patrol of equal or aller size instead of waiting until the my moved into effective small-arms ge. Such action invariably alerted enemy, caused him negligible casual- , and, in effect, helped him out of trap. And commanders who honored h calls for artillery fires instead of isting that patrols use their own in- try weapons to advantage, were abet- g the attractive but false idea that the lleryman can fight the infantryman's tle for him.

LDIERS in the trenches are suscep- tible to a strange malady—Bunker- It sometimes proved fatal. Gener- speaking, fighting bunkers in Korea e misused. There were too many of them. Not only were automatic weapons emplaced in fighting bunkers, but also riflemen—riflemen who would have been far more effective from fire positions (known variously as fighting positions, fighting bays and fighting steps). Fire positions afforded better fields of fire and observation, greater freedom of movement, and easier means of communication. These advantages were sacrificed for the edge in protection afforded by bunkers, an edge largely offset by the more prominent targets which bunkers presented to the enemy.

Despite these drawbacks, fighting bunkers had an understandable appeal to the infantryman. They gave him relative comfort and a false sense of security. As a consequence, when the crucial moment for close combat with the enemy arrived, the infantryman all too often found that his bunker, far from being the bulwark he naïvely believed it to be, had turned into a trap in which he was caught.

Their was still a third reason why the infantryman in Korea did not use his weapons to the fullest possible extent. Thorough as it usually was with regard to artillery, mortars and machine guns, the coordinated fire plan often failed to reach down to the level of the individual rifleman and BAR man and fix specific sectors of fire for them. Consequently front-line soldiers did not know the part they had in the firing pattern for the defense of their own and adjacent sectors.

What can and should be done about these weaknesses so that they will not bedevil us in the future?

FIRST of all the infantryman—from regimental commander down to the last rifleman—must be ready, willing and eager to engage the enemy in close combat. Know-how isn't enough; to it you must add the will to win. Certainly the infantryman must exploit the support rendered by the other arms, but he must do this together with maximum use of his own weapons. In short, the infantryman must fight his battle to the fullest.

Then, the commander must carefully evaluate the use of fighting bunkers in his organization for defense. Bunkers tend to generate a passive attitude on the part of the defender; hence, bunkers should be used moderately. They should be used for crew-served, flat-trajectory weapons (except the BAR) and should be properly constructed and camouflaged. Riflemen and BAR men must not be cooped up in bunkers. Instead, they should use fire positions. For it is by use of fire positions—or positions similar to them—that the front-line soldier can retain the freedom of action and the fighting spirit needed to close unhesitatingly with the enemy should the latter threaten the defensive position.

Finally, the coordinated fire plan must encompass all weapons—including the individual rifleman. All likely enemy avenues of approach and objectives must be covered by the fire of the greatest possible number of weapons. Sectors of fire for small arms should not be restricted to the immediate front of the sectors in which those weapons are located but should include adjacent terrain features wherever feasible. Too many a front-line soldier in Korea slipped into the role of curious spectator when an adjacent friendly position was being attacked instead of taking part in the fight as he should have. Had prior coordinated fire planning given him a specific job to do in such an eventuality, he'd have been a helpful participant instead of a helpless onlooker.

The mistakes brought out in this article are not new. Neither are the remedies. They are recounted here in the hope that the remedies will be remembered and the mistakes not repeated.

UTENANT COLONEL GEORGE JUSKAL- AN, Infantry, recently completed a year f study at the Armed Forces Staff Col- ge and is now on duty in the Pentagon.

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Peripheral Strategy . . . Littoral Tactics . . . Limited War

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. HAYES

IN 1615 Francis Bacon, the English philosopher and father of the scientific method, wrote, "He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits." This reasoning from the history of the ancients was made at the beginning of the geographic age. Mahan proved the validity of the first part of this statement by illustrations from later British history. Two Twentieth Century wars proved that the second part was also valid.

Today the military profession of the United States must determine whether Bacon's thesis still holds in this air-and-atomic age. If war is to be used to settle man's issues and forward his progress, it must be at a price less than weapons are now able to exact. Can the American people today take as much or as little of a war as they will?

Before a military man can attempt such an investigation, he must accept two premises that his countrymen impose on him. The first is that war is a means of fulfilling the dictates of a political will and only enough warfare to achieve political ends is justifiable.

The second is that the methods of employing the armed power of the United States must be consistent with the philosophy of our national life. In essence this philosophy is that individuals and nations are to be allowed to work out their own destiny within certain minimum rules and that, above all, the United States must preserve itself as it is.

So much for American idealism. What about the reality of the modern world? There seem to be three stark facts in today's world that transcend all others. The first is that our knowledge of t physical world is increasing at a rate f in excess of our ability to use this knov edge for our own good.

The second is the Communist ide ogy coupled with Russia's historic i perialism and that country's inhere strength has caused the world to beco bi-polar as it has not been since t rise of Mohammedanism challenged t Christion world.

The third is that the Twentieth Ce tury wars, total both in emotion a extent, stalled the dynamic forces th dominated Western Europe for four ce turies. This last is perhaps the m significant of the three, for it does n merely mean that changes have tak place but that the world as we ha known it is no more.

THE nature of these two great Twe tieth Century wars convinced Ame cans that in this industrial and scienti age war could only be total. Once w is undertaken it should be neither li ited nor stopped until the enemy s

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Task Force 77 executes a high-speed turn while on patrol duty in the Sea of Japan. Four attack carriers, a battleship and several destroyers are in the force.





ıders unconditionally. Only complete tory would bring total peace. But it ; not worked out that way. Total ıce remains an illusion while the scars total war are grim reminders that such rs destroy but do not settle.

The awful reality of the absolute apon was imposed upon this disillunment. In the hands of opposing pow- this weapon can extend destruction ncomprehensible proportions. If anyng could be settled it would be only ınacceptable costs. This dilemma has ılted in the continuance of the *de to* state of hazardous armistice been atomic camps while adjustments international differences are accomshed by some other means. Several have been used with success. One of these, power politics in a cold war, has already been demonstrated by such examples as our aid to Greece and Turkey, by the Berlin air lift and by the Communist success in China. Another is warfare for limited aims and in limited form.

We call the condition of continued and recognized antagonism short of war that has existed since 1945 a "cold war." *War* is used here in its widest connotation, to denote the continued struggle between Communist expansion and U.S. containment. The adjective *cold* suggests operations lying between diplomacy and armed combat. However, there was something unreal about this concept, for how could *cold war* be waged without risking *hot war* which would become total in extent? Korea furnished the answer.

THE cold war over Korea did produce actual war but it remained limited because neither side chose to extend it. This fact brought into focus the fundamental truth that international relations, like all other human matters, have many causes. Attitudes between nations cannot be kept in the easy categories of peace and war. There are various conditions of peace and there are types of warfare such as "cold war," war of limited aims, general war and total war. More important than these designations is the continuity that exists between

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them. A nation cannot be sure of peace if it is unwilling to be ready for war. A cold war cannot be effective unless there is a willingness to use armed force to back it up. A nation cannot keep a war limited unless it is in a position to fight a general war. This the Japanese learned.

Relations between the Communist's and non-Communist's worlds have passed through three of these stages—peace, cold war and limited war—all under the shadow of atomic weapons. The thinking consensus of the world still is that a general or total war could not be fought in this bi-polar world without using the absolute weapon. Therefore, if war is to be what Clausewitz said it should be, an extension of national policy, if it is not to become just a synonym for destruction, *it must be kept limited.*

AN acceptance of limited warfare as an instrument in international relations will require some radical changes in American thinking. Limited wars are usually agonizing, drawn-out affairs and Americans are impatient about war. Limited wars never seem to get settled or settle anything. But man's affairs never get settled anyway. Life is a process of living with problems, not of settling them; of resolving contradictions, not of removing them. If limited wars cannot settle, we must be ready to accept a corollary: negotiated settlements. Negotiated peace seems all that military people can achieve in the present state of the world. The permanent stopping of a dynamic Communist ideology has to be done by some other profession.

The specific assumptions in this hypothesis can now be restated:

¶ Limited warfare can accomplish the purpose of war in its traditional sense as an extension of national policy.

¶ Limited warfare can be conducted within the atomic threat without extension to general or total war.

¶ Negotiated peace is the only arrangement we can expect to make with Communism.

The general assumption is that the realities of both Communism and the absolute weapon have initiated an era of limited warfare and of negotiated peace. If this assumption is valid, the military man must have a plan to fulfill his role in such a future. I propose in the next few pages to show that a strategy and a system of tactics applicable for limited warfare are available to the United States in this atomic age.

Within recorded history, nations have conducted warfare in two general fashions, dictated by their geographic conditions. These manners of warfare, or strategies, have been termed continental and maritime. In this air age with the United States in indisputable control of the oceans, the maritime can appropriately be called peripheral. Continental strategy is one in which military strength is projected direct at the enemy, either by driving in or sweeping over and crushing him. Peripheral strategy probes the enemy's outside points for weaknesses, and seeks to make him diffuse his strength in extended efforts. Continental strategy has been exemplified by Napoleon and codified by Clausewitz, while maritime or peripheral strategy has been exemplified by Great Britain and codified by Mahan.

SOME nations have subscribed to, or have had powerful advocates for, both strategies. Japan was one once. The United States is another, and this is understandable. The U.S. Army has fought three continental wars within a century, and the efforts of the U.S. Air Force have been concentrated on strategic bombing. It is natural for these services to advocate a continental strategy. On the other hand, the maritime strategy of the U.S. Navy was used to defeat Japan. The fact that few sailors read Clausewitz and few soldiers and airmen read Mahan emphasizes these separate military viewpoints which have so confused their worried countrymen in the last few years.

This confusion is now aggravated by the question of whether strategic air warfare is a new strategy or is continental strategy in a new form. My own contention is that it is essentially continental strategy. It is directed toward the heart of a land mass; it drives for the enemy capital to stifle the functioning of government; it prostrates a nation by destroying its industrial complexes instead of by occupying its territory. It also has the continental warfare characteristics of all-out effort, commitment, and lack of freedom of action. Above all, it is Clausewitz's war of annihilation, not his war of exhaustion.

Contemporary history has indicated clearly that modern continental strategy and limited warfare are not compatible. Continental strategy can be used only with general war, and deciding on a continental strategy means choosing general war. In World War I the commitment of a limited military effort in France cost Great Britain a generation of her manhood. The limited aims of our low order continental strategy in Korea produced an insoluble stalemate with opposing forces poised on each side of a line that had neither military nor political nificance.

BEFORE the air age peripheral str could validly be called maritime major characteristic is that it allows dom of action, both geographically in the context in which Francis B defined it. Limited warfare can be ecuted by means of maritime stra provided the aims are kept limited do not include "liberating" large graphical areas, subjugation of peopl unconditional surrender.

Peripheral strategy on external lin made possible by the mobility of transport. A peripheral strategy o terior lines, which the Soviet has with success in the political area, is f ble militarily only with an immense net. Such a net exists nowhere in world except in the United States Western Europe. Air transport may change this and we can neglect su probability only at our peril. But not the case yet. Sea, rail and road t port are still the bases on which pre warfare rests.

The great advantage of peripl strategy for us is that it can use all military specialties of land, sea and Strategic bombing uses only one of t specialties, air. Continental warfar quires only two, land and air (sea pl a supporting role). The island-ba maritime strategy of the United S in the Pacific also used only two, and air (ground forces had a bloody, minor, role).

Despite much lip service, the ar services of the United States have n used military power in an integrated tern. Experience has taught some i gration at the theater level and in l tics. But an integrated strategy, No! three services shy away from that. Navy wants an offensive role. The A wants a zone of communications betw its fighting forces and its ports. The Force wants intercontinental bombi

TO effect a sound integrated stra there must be a system of tactics wl will fully employ all military special Such a system of tactics for periph strategy is one that uses the littora the world as the new borders of United States. The littoral becomes line from which operations are proje in offense, the line on which defen conducted. The striking power of forces, the mobility of sea forces and holding power of land forces can al used on this line. It is the line that tains a continental enemy.

Since the enemy can be kept behind s line without too much difficulty, it es not have to be held at all points as es a line in land tactics. Our strength ed only be concentrated at selected nts chosen for their political and mili- y significance. Ground forces will face continental land mass with its con- ued support insured by naval forces. ie striking power of air forces will be e main weapon of offense, and airborne erations from the littoral will be used ien feasible and suitable.

All military specialties integrate them- ves quickly when defending on a lit- al. Such was the case at Dunkirk iich was evacuated and at Guadalcanal nich was held. The air forces main- n local control. The navy keeps the nvoys coming despite an enemy air rce that can be continuously reinforced om inside the large land mass. Above , the ground forces must stay as a func- ning entity. The U.S. Army, accus- med to plenty of maneuver room, may ve to emulate in peripheral strategy ch classics as the defense of Gibraltar om 1780 to 1782 and of Malta in the st war. It may find itself in positions ce that of the British force under Gen- al De Burgh, who refused to leave Elba 1796 when Nelson on orders from e Admiralty withdrew from the Medi- rranean with his naval forces. If a sit- ition does become unacceptable, it is ie Navy's duty to withdraw the ground rces under any circumstances. This has een the tacit understanding between ritish admirals and generals for cen- iries. It was done at Dunkirk and gain at terrible naval costs at Greece id Crete. American independence was chieved because it could not be done Yorktown.

BILITY to occupy is a necessary func- tion in warfare and it is a function hich only land forces can perform. Man is a land animal and there is a reali- , a decisiveness about land warfare that arfare in the other two media has not een able to achieve. Ground forces must ossess and hold the bases from which ie other arms can strike. On a littoral here ground forces can be either rein- rced or evacuated by sea, a minimum rce should be able to perform this hold- ig function. In a cold war situation, ven small occupation forces have a olitical significance such that any action gainst them means accepting real war.

The function of a naval task force in eripheral strategy and littoral tactics hould be exactly the same as that of the ixth and Seventh Fleets on the international scene today. These fleets, as mobile military forces containing their own bases, cruise about the frontiers of the world, available anywhere either for political purposes in a cold war or for littoral offenses and defenses.

AIR transport is the great fact of modern power. It most likely will be the great fact of future warfare. When a philosophy of air warfare finally is derived, it probably will be built around the transport aircraft rather than the bomber. Atomic energy in the engine of an airplane will mean replacing peripheral strategy by an enveloping strategy, for then large, bulk-carrying airships will bypass oceans as small German transport aircraft once bypassed the narrow waters of the Mediterranean between Greece and Crete. An enveloping strategy will mean that the airplane will be able to position and maintain military force anywhere in the world, as ships do now. The great challenge to air-warfare thinkers is that this capability must also be granted to our enemy. With no sea transport and the prospects for land transport always poor by reason of soil conditions, the Russians are forced to develop air transport and with their economy of priority may get far in the lead of us.

But that day of reckoning can be put off until air transport is able to provide quantity as well as quality support to military forces; until it can carry bulk as well as critical cargoes. In the meantime there will be plenty of tactical and special functions for transport aircraft in peripheral strategy. The most apparent could be the use of paratroops to replace assault waves in over-the-water landings. However, with the freedom of action that littoral tactics permit, it is not likely that there will be much need for assault waves in future amphibian operations.

Air transport properly supported can be used to make incisions into enemy territory to cut transportation lines, to destroy vital installations for keeps, even to hold some "islands" in the heart of a land mass.

The function of the atomic bomb in peripheral strategy will be that proper to its weapon status; that is, to create a favorable tactical situation of the highest order. Against our peripheral strategy an enemy will find few opportunities to use the atomic bomb commensurate with its tactical potentialities, whereas it will give us the same freedom of action that is inherent in the strategy itself.

Victory in World War II and the increased international commitments that came with it changed the position of the United States in world affairs. Our foreign policy became that of open and continued opposition to imperialistic communism while reviving the military and economic strengths of the free world. Control of the seas, peripheral strategy and limited warfare offer the military means of sustaining such a foreign policy and the role of the armed services should have been changed accordingly. But during the five crucial years after 1945, Americans, out of their past experiences, continued to think militarily only in terms of continental strategy and total war. As a result China was allowed to go by default because the American people refused to take the chance of another total war, this time on the land mass of China. They could conceive of no other way of saving it.

THERE was another way. We might have stayed on the coast of China instead of retreating behind a water bastion. Whether or not the Communists could have driven the forces of the free world from the littoral of China is an academic question. The fact is that neither the Americans nor the Nationalist Chinese are there now while the British are still in Hong Kong. American naval officers for a century had known China as a country of a long coast line and great rivers but they failed to remind their countrymen of this geographic fact. Instead the American people had to get their ideas of China from small-scale maps that emphasized its similarity and proximity to Russia.

Had we supported the Chinese Nationalists in their defense of the major rivers or of the ports of China, Chiang Kai-shek might now be the head of a considerable sea state ranging from Shanghai to Canton with Formosa as his capital and economic heartland. Had our forces remained in Tsingtao there probably would have been no Korean incident. Had we refused to allow the seas to be free in a cold or limited war, the routes from the Russian Maritime Province and along the coasts of China could not have been used for supporting the Communist effort in Korea.

Ancient Greeks, mediaeval Byzantines or eighteenth century Englishmen would have recognized the advantages that the sea gave us for the struggle in Asia. But continental-minded Americans could not be expected to know this instinctively and it was not explained to them. As a result China went into the Communist orbit. We cannot make many more mistakes of that order.

Helicopter Patrol

Give the I&R Platoon helicopters and it can collect more information faster

MAJOR GEORGE H. REID

THE mission of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon during combat is simply stated and broad in nature: the securing of information of the enemy. The mission in itself is no problem; it is its performance that is so vastly different in different units, and under different S2s and regimental commanders. But irrespective of these, who can doubt the correctness of the statement that "the dominating factor . . . insofar as it affects the . . . Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, is the terrain"?

This means that the ability of the I&R Platoon to perform its mission is affected by the geography of the local area. What will work in Korea may not work in North Africa; what may work in Northern Italy may not work in Northern Germany.

If the I&R Platoon could overcome the limitations imposed by terrain it could increase its ability to perform one of its most important functions, namely, that of patrolling.

Ground patrols have definite limitations, particularly against an aggressive and callous enemy who has little regard for his own casualties. However, if the I&R Platoon could patrol by air, then immediately certain of these restrictions are eliminated or reduced. The Platoon is not equipped to fight to gain information and if, on a road reconnaissance mission, it runs into enemy roadblock it is usually compelled to report that it has been stopped and can proceed no further. But, if that same patrol took to the air, the effectiveness of that same roadblock in preventing continued reconnaissance by friendly forces would be reduced materially. The I&R Platoon could pick up the roadblock, report it by radio, and continue.

Similarly there were many situations in Europe during World War II where reconnaissance patrols were forced to turn back because of blown bridges or other similar obstacles. If the I&R Platoon were equipped with helicopters, blown bridges or unfordable rivers could hardly be considered barriers.

In a 1945 report on the activities of regimental reconnaissance agencies, the Sixth Army stated: "Daylight patrolling has been found feasible only in very fluid or fast moving situations and even then are liable to ambush or well-aimed fire of all types." Again the helicopter could help overcome this obstacle.

CERTAINLY the use of the helicopter by the I&R Platoon in combat would not eliminate the need for some ground patrol activity. Obviously there are certain installations the regimental commander might desire more detailed information about than could be achieved from observation from the air. But the helicopter is potentially a very useful additional or supplementary means. It does have limitations of its own. Weather is one serious problem. Enemy air superiority is another. Maintenance of the aircraft is a third. Qualified pilots and observers are a fourth.

The addition of the helicopter to the I&R platoon really is only an extension of the latter's present mission of manning observation posts. The importance of our own observation posts and location of those of the enemy, like the need f patrolling of all types, cannot be unde estimated.

Ground OPs could be supplemente with air observation posts. The value the latter in Korea is a matter of recor General J. Lawton Collins, former Arm Chief of Staff, has repeatedly said th the present use of the helicopter to su plement ground observation has on begun.

The effective use of aerial observatio posts is not new, of course. The Sixt Army, during World War II, had co siderable success with them in terrai which severely limited other types of r connaissance. A typical report said: "Ba talions, regiments, divisions and cor are unanimous in their acclaim of th outstanding accomplishments of the a OPs. Undoubtedly the observers i these planes have made one of the maj contributions in the field of combat i telligence . . . Many have stated th the Cub planes provided more ene information of direct value to the troo than all the U. S. Air Forces combine Their great success justifies full develo ment."

In the helicopter we have an eve better method of employing an air ob servation post than we had in the liaiso plane. It is able to hover, fly at very lo speeds and land and take off in confine spaces.

MAJOR GEORGE H. REID, Infantry, enlisted in the Army in 1943 after graduation from Lehigh University and was commissioned the same year. He served overseas in Europe and later in the Philippines. In 1944 he was commissioned in the Regular Army and in 1949 attended Syracuse University where he earned a Master's Degree in Political Science. After a tour of duty in the Pentagon he attended the Army Language School.

E helicopter could have its effective-
ess as an aerial observer further in-
sed by the addition of camera equip-
it capable of accurate pictures and
dy film development. A XIX Corps
rt states, "The equipping of air OPs
cameras, developing and printing
ipment would greatly reduce three
ires now current—the failure to get
tos to a using unit in time during
l warfare, the failure of the regular
to planes to exploit brief breaks in
weather and the failure of regular
to planes to pinpoint specific areas of
ediate importance."

he failures mentioned above are in-
ent in any system where the servic-
element is not an organic part of the
ed unit. The helicopter would be
e beck and call of the infantry regi-
tal commander and could fly the
ion at a moment's notice. No com-
ication difficulties could arise, be-
e the pilot in all probability would
or adjacent to the command post.
he development and application of
ic weapons, tactically on the battle-
, is an additional reason for making
helicopter an organic part of the
Platoon. It is anticipated that both
sive and defensive operations will
nducted on wider fronts than here-
e experienced. Reconnaissance of
pes, forward of the battle position,
of necessity, be over greater distances. Speedy transmission of accurate information will be, more than ever before, of inestimable value to the receiving unit. Experience in Korea, with helicopters almost in their infancy, has proven that they can cover a much greater area of ground than any foot or motorized patrol.

HELICOPTERS can help in situations that require close ground observation. Let's assume that the I&R Platoon is given a mission of securing information concerning a suspected guided missile installation, well forward of the regimental front lines. The desired information must be obtained as quickly as possible and the terrain over which the mission is to be accomplished is extremely rough. In this instance we combine the air capability with the ground requirement. By prior reconnaissance a suitable landing location can be picked out for the helicopter. The helicopter then flies a small patrol to the location, unloads and returns to the comparative safety of its own lines. Later, at a predetermined time and place, the helicopter returns and picks up the patrol which has had ample opportunity to accomplish its mission.

Use of the helicopter in this manner provides two qualities to the ground patrol which it might otherwise not be afforded. In the first place, through its ability to move rapidly and easily over terrain extremely difficult to foot troops, it puts the ground patrol close to its objective while the patrol still has not expended any of its energy solely in the traverse of terrain.

Secondly, the "air lift" given to the I&R Platoon ground patrol by the helicopter enables the overall mission to be accomplished much faster. Speed of reporting intelligence information is of course a primary consideration. Information of the enemy is like eggs—better when fresh. General Patton said that.

Use of the helicopter in the air patrol role may well prove to be more economical in the use of men. If the achievement of a three-jeep, twelve-man motorized patrol, for example, can be exceeded by a two-man helicopter, manpower is saved.

The modification of the T/O&E to include helicopters in the I&R Platoon must be accompanied by the assignment of trained aerial observers. There is a vast difference between observation from the ground and observation from the air. Until we have trained aerial intelligence observers, the full value of the helicopter as an aerial OP will not be possible.

In the final analysis the use of helicopters by the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon would be limited only by the degree of ingenuity possessed by those responsible for its operations.



Armor and Atomics

MAJOR GENERAL H. E. PYMAN
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution
May 1954

I would now like to give you my ideas about defensive operations because they are particularly encouraging. It seems that not only have armor and air forces a special affinity, but also armor and atomics [atomic weapons]. Consider a normal defensive battle front with some form of obstacle in front of it, perhaps a river, or a mountain range, or a swamp, or a forest. Assume, and be safe in assuming, that you will not have enough soldiers to defend the whole area in strength. There will be strong points and there will be areas that are only screened by light mobile forces. Perhaps we might consider an army composed of three armored and four infantry divisions, in such a situation. Let us have the infantry divisions in firm localities with plenty of anti-tank weapons and ammunition. Behind the infantry, who will have local armored support, let us put three armored divisions out of range of the bulk of the enemy artillery. Two of them will be deployed each behind two infantry divisions. I mean deployed, so that they will avoid becoming atomic targets before the enemy assault begins. Further back and again deployed will be the third armored division.

Eventually the enemy will attack and, for the purposes of my argument, eventually he will obtain a penetration. The breadth of his penetration will be restricted by the frontage he can attack, and by his inability to dislodge elements of our static defence. Immediately his penetration begins to show its direction getting through the depth of the static defence, it must be brought to a halt. One of the two armored divisions deployed at the back must counter the penetration, and must seal the enemy spearhead in, wherever he goes. Armored divisions are well designed for such a role. They have mobility and tremendous fire power, and both of these they must use to the utmost. Once the enemy is thwarted in this manner, he will have to bring up reserves. He will probably have to move a proportion of his guns and other heavy equipment over the original obstacle in front of the defence. He will, unless I am mistaken, be greatly tempted to concentrate in space to obtain success. As the opposing army commander that would be my precise aim—to make the enemy concentrate in space. When he does, I shall ask for atomic assistance. Provided that my armored division, which no doubt will be stretched almost to the point of limit, can hold the enemy thrust with the assistance of parts of the infantry divisions which are still firm on their ground, then the battle must turn to my advantage. I have produced an atomic target and, moreover, I have rema one and possibly two armored divisions to exploit the tion which the atomics will create, by destroying comp what remains of the attacking force. It is interesting to sider how close Alem El Halfa was to this techn though Montgomery did not go in to kill at the en reasons we know.

Battle Proves the Allies

BRIGADIER A. L. PEMBERTON
The Journal of the Royal Ar
July 1954

[Aristides] was a typical aristocrat of the old sch strict disciplinarian, abstemious in his own habits, h respected by all who knew him, and chiefly admired b contemporaries for his sense of justice and his pe integrity. He had a great veneration for Lycurgus a both his private and public life he was a pattern o Spartan virtues, which he carried to the point of gl in his own poverty. As a general, though brave and a sive enough in battle, his leadership appears to have of the cautious, unimaginative kind that is characteris the institutional. As a diplomat he was correct and re rather than sympathetic or subtle; as when, durin preparations for the battle of Plataea, he settled a d between the Athenians and the Tegetae for the hon fighting on the left wing. "The post" he said "neither valour nor takes it away . . . We are not come hit quarrel with our allies, but to fight our enemies . . . a battle will soon show what value our country should every state, every general, and every private man."

Air Power at Dien Bien Ph

AN COSANTO
The Irish Defence
June 1954

French domination of the air over Indochina w promise but no achievement. A reader of the reports be excused if, generalising, he condemned the effic air support as a whole and for all operations.

Air power cannot be represented by aircraft which a in number and inadequate in quality for the role thrus them. Tactical air support, in the modern sense, was at Dien Bien Phu; there were too few aircraft and ever were of a poor vintage.

If it is conceded that air power did not exist in Ind

n the plain inference is that such power is an expression military strength so demanding as to be incapable of inment by any but the few major powers.

)f course, the idea of placing on aircraft the onus of ıking a stranglehold, such as was maintained by the Viet ıh, was a misconception of the capability of tactical air ;er operating with conventional armament.

Ieans certainly exist, in the form of atomic weapons, to tralise, if not to destroy, such concentrations as were le by the Viet Minh, but even so the task would have n no simple matter of a few hours bombing. The fact ains that with the means available—some 200 combat raft—the desired end could not be achieved.

'here are some valuable lessons to be learned from the of aircraft at Dien Bien Phu. Until we read what the nowledged commentators on air matters have to say, the :age infantryman can see in the story only the failure of power.

'easuring Human Beings

VANNEVAR BUSH
Quarterly Report, Carnegie Corporation
July 1954

he real difference between these two great branches of ıce [material and social] lies in the fact that the social ıces deal with the performance of human beings. It is nore difficult to "measure" human behavior and to reduce ırguments about it to numbers than it is to do the same g with molecules. But it is worth noting that even the sicists, when dealing with interactions inside the nucleus, : abandoned all of the usual mathematical formulations are proceeding in terms of arguments which at times ler on the mystical.

ne cannot specify a human being in the same way that an specify a chemical compound. But again be it noted the chemists, in dealing with proteins, are in much the : situation for they can neither specify the atomic ar- ements involved nor can they predict what characteris- one of their chemical modifications may produce. The rence is hence a matter of degree as far as the use of surement is concerned. Also one should note that there been enormous progress in the last decade or two in re- ng to measurement many matters in the field of the l sciences which were formerly thought to be beyond ı from this standpoint. And one cannot disregard the that there has been great science which involved very in the way of measurement and mathematical formu- ı. Science does not always lean on the deflection of a le or the dip of a balance.

:rman Rearmament

KARL JASPERS
Foreign Affairs
July 1954

ıe main question which will decide our [German] demo- future and our freedom, both at home and abroad, is of the new German army. In view of the total loss of om which threatens us from outside, rearmament is a hard necessity. In contrast to former days, German youth now has no inclination toward military service. Nobody wants a war. Yet there are strong pressures to rearm. The regular officers of the Hitler era push forward into public life, anxious to rehabilitate themselves while building a new army. America wants German rearmament because without it no secure dam for the protection of Europe can be created. The European countries favor it for the same reason, despite misgivings about reviving an army which has proved once before that it can achieve the inconceivable. Among the German people themselves additional confusion has been caused by what they have been told from abroad. In 1945 they heard that every military activity must cease altogether, once and forever, and that it was wrong even to have a future military aim in view. Now they hear that military activity should be revived, indeed that it is a necessity, and that it would be morally wrong to try to evade [it] . . .

Rearmament cannot be discussed parenthetically. Yet a few of the possible dangers which it represents for the democratic system of thought should be called to mind. Would not the spirit of the Hitler army, through its many regular officers who are still available today, kill at the start all chance for the creation of a German political spirit? Would it not be disastrous for German freedom and indeed for world freedom if the new German army were not built up in radical denunciation of the spirit of the Hitler army and after a conscious break with that tradition? Must not the new army discard that tradition in favor of the soldierly spirit of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and the old Moltke? In this connection it should be realized that the German military spirit lost its dignity under Hitler. Nobody who owed his position to Hitler and had served him could save his honor except by sacrificing his life as did General von Treskow and others. . . .

At one time in the eighteenth century Prussian army instructors helped the Americans to build up their army. Would it not be possible for American and Swiss instructors to train the new German soldiers and officers now? That would take too long, I am told, the matter is too urgent. Doubt is also expressed whether the spirit of an army in the old sense can be revived at all. Instructors for the mechanized modern army are totally different from the officers of the past; Hitler's officers were efficient technicians, and so would be useful.

At this point I am overcome by terrible pessimism. Whoever wishes to save the possibility that there will be democracy and liberalism in Germany should find a way to free those people and forces who would start at the beginning and build up, in a technical age, a spirit that is soldierly and yet humane. They would not build on the immediate past —except as something to push away from—but on centuries-old memories of German and Western honor, finding new forms to suit the new conditions. When I imagine how, in the framework of a European Army, German contingents might be trained in France and French contingents in Germany, what possibilities for mutual sympathy and esteem might flourish as a result of direct contacts on a basis of equality, how the spirit of democracy would develop naturally—this dream seems to me the most natural thing, and still a dream.

Irons in the Fire

Big Camera

The special 100-inch telephoto lens in this new long-range camera makes it possible for the Signal Corps, using infrared lens, to record images up to 30 miles away and more, depending upon the weather. At six miles it can pick out in detail a jeep or comparable vehicle across the one-third of a mile it takes in. At 500 yards the coverage is 105 feet and at 20,000 yards it covers 3,000 feet. The camera was built under Signal Corps sponsorship and the lens was manufactured by Eastman. The shutter has 10 speeds, the fastest 1/200 second. The camera takes a 5x7 inch still picture with cut film or plates, and can also handle 30-exposure roll film. A second type of 100-inch telephoto lens takes pictures with ordinary "visible" light. It is being tested for still and 35mm motion picture use.

Big Wheels

R. G. LeTourneau, Inc., the builders, calls this the Sno-Buggy, a veh for use in heavy snow, boggy swamplands and shifting desert sands. T tires are 10 feet high, 4 feet wide and carry only five pounds of air p sure. The four dual wheels are each driven by a separate electric mo

Mobile Crane

A crane that can convert any standard truck into a dual-purpose hauling and handling unit has been developed by Truck-Crane, Inc., of Chicago. The crane will lift up to 5,000 pounds, swing it onto the truck, lift it off, and spot it anywhere within a 16-foot, 280-degree radius of the truck. The unit takes up only 18 inches of space behind the cab. The mechanism is hydraulic with controls on both sides of the truck. Two models are available. Model HB-50 *(pictured above)* is the one described here while the EB-50 has a telescoping elevating boom with extensions up to 22 feet.

Multi-Channel Radio Relay



This new multi-channel communicatio lay can link points 25 or 30 miles apar radio transmission. It was developed by Telephone Laboratories for the Signal C and was manufactured by Western Ele Company. The military designation is R Set AN/TRC-24. It consists of transm and receiver components, from power so to antenna and provides frequency modul radio transmitting and receiving facilitie the range of 100 megacycles to 400 megac for relaying a broad band signal of 25 68,000 cycles per second over a line of s path of transmission. For field use the eq ment is packaged in transit cases with the foot antenna mast divided into nine sect

CEREBRATIONS

; with a Purpose

E British habit of wearing a distinc-
'e tie to show membership in some
usive institution is far from being
ined to the "old school tie." Col-
s, universities, athletic clubs and
the armed forces all have their
ial neckwear.

he practice of wearing ties as "iden-
ition tags" began in the British Army
World War I, chiefly as a means
eeping touch among veterans. It
reached the stage where almost
y regiment (in the British sense)
its own tie, so that it became possi-
to identify a man in mufti as be-
ing to, say, the Gloucestershire Regi-
t.

he privilege of wearing a regimental
s very jealously guarded, and in
in itself, no one would dare to be
wearing a tie to which he was not
led. However, such rules are un-
en and many regimental ties have
exported just because the colors
attractive. One of the many sur-
s I had on my first day in the
ed States was finding that the por-
hifting my baggage was wearing a
rds tie," one of the most sacred of
gimental ties.

e pattern of these ties is fairly
lard, usually being either diagonal
s of varying size and color or a
background with some symbol on
That of the Airborne Forces, for
ple, has small silver parachutes
oidered on a maroon background,
on being their color. In the same
the Light Infantry Regiments,
e symbol is a silver bugle, have a
ith silver bugles on a dark green
g.

e Royal Navy and Royal Air Force
have one tie for the whole Service,
he Army never felt the need for
since it had so many regimental
Within the last year, however,
have adopted an "Army tie" which
oon be in use. The design will be
rmy badge of two crossed swords
crown, and it will be embroidered
ld on a maroon background. The
torial Army (National Guard) will
a tie of the same design, but with
dge in silver on a dark green back-
d.

e Army tie will be for wear by all
equally (and voluntarily) when in
clothes, whether they are serving
soldiers or in the reserve. It is thought unlikely that this tie will be worn by anyone who is not entitled to it, since he will be laying himself open to the risk of being arrested by the Military Police!

In addition to the Army and regimental ties, there are also ties for most branches of the service and for Army colleges and schools. The British School of Infantry, for example, has a bayonet as its symbol, as does Fort Benning, and they have a tie with the bayonet on it. That is worn only by the staff of the School, but any officer who passes successfully through the Staff College course can wear the Staff College tie (and has usually earned it!).

The privilege of wearing the tie of his regiment is not only useful as an identity tag. It is one more way of adding to a soldier's *esprit de corps*, and that gives it real value.

MAJ. JULIAN PAGET
British Army

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Counting Combat Noses

THE enemy has landed in North America. The Nth Division, Michigan National Guard, after engaging the enemy, has returned, badly battered, to Fort Brady near Sault Ste. Marie for rest and rehabilitation.

The Commanding General, Fifth Army, informed that the enemy had dropped paratroops with the purpose of capturing the Sault locks, grabs the phone and calls his G1.

"How many troops do we have at Brady?" he asks.

"Well, Nth Division is there. It reports 12,000 effectives, but . . ."

But! Nth Division had left 8,000 casualties, mostly from the infantry, on those beaches. What about replacements? Can the division still put up a good fight?

The division commander rates the morale and efficiency of his men as "excellent." Excellent in comparison to what? Two weeks ago the army commander presented a Distinguished Unit Citation to the division and pinned on four DSCs at a review. It was a gallant crew, but do the old men trust the new? Do the replacements have confidence in themselves and their units?

The army commander will decide whether Nth Division attacks enemy drop zones or mans a perimeter defense around the locks. But behind his decision there will be more art than science.

Can't something be done to help commanders dispose their troops more scientifically in fluid situations? Where can we look for guidance? What about the experience of other armies?

Back during World War II, when the Germans began suffering reverses in Russia, they faced such problems daily. Harassed commanders trying to organize defensive positions and delaying actions had difficulty assessing actual strength. Reports which included convalescents, soldiers on furlough, personnel away on detached service, members of a tremendous supply organization and hordes of functionaries were no help. The commanders needed to know how many men were ready and able to fight.

By spring 1944 the German high command had licked this headache. Ignoring assigned or rations strength, it called for reports of *effective combat strength, combat efficiency,* and *critical armament.*

The German staff defined *effective combat strength* as that portion of a combat unit which engaged directly in the fighting. It omitted personnel on leave, convalescence, or detached service; those who were back with division trains; cooks and bottle washers, oil jockeys and tinkerers, company clerks and supply sergeants; and all drivers except those of serviceable combat vehicles. The effective combat personnel were those up front who got shot at, including messengers and battalion medics. Some persons farther back who managed to get counted, like the communications men whose radios were a lucrative target and whose job was repairing shot-up wire, were the personnel

at infantry or cavalry regiment CPs.

The main body of combat effectives were those comprising the infantry rifle companies, reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and antitank companies as well as the staff members of infantry and cavalry battalions. Artillery personnel in observation posts and at gun positions, staffs of artillery battalions, and soldiers who carried ammunition forward to the firing positions were also counted. Those manning operational tanks and staffing tank battalions were also included. Of the engineers, however, only men assigned to companies made the list; in tank destroyer units, only the ones in firing positions or observation posts.

Division CP, division artillery, and engineer headquarters and the trains were left out. These men could be used in an emergency. When a division neared exhaustion, overhead personnel became surplus; rounded up into alert companies they, too, became combat effectives.

From week to week reports informed commanders at all echelons of the actual fighting strength in the field.

Reports and more reports. How were commanders of divisions in combat to count noses?

They didn't have to. Weekly reports were only approximate. The basic unit of report was the battalion. Any battalion commander could tell within a hundred men how many combat effectives he had. That was close enough. A "strong" battalion was code for one with over 400 combat effectives; a "medium strong" battalion had more than 300; over 200 combat effectives made it "average"; more than 100 made it "weak"; and, if a battalion had less than 100, it was listed as "exhausted." Adding up median figures from ten or fifteen battalions in his division gave the commander a pretty good estimate of his effective combat strength.

A large margin of error? Certainly. Perhaps as much as twenty or thirty percent. But how significant is this margin? The attacker needs a superiority of at least two or three to one; that's two or three hundred percent. An error of twenty or thirty percent is insignificant.

The advantage of this system over other strength reports is that it does not add much to the work load of already overburdened staffs. As a matter of fact it may knock out some time-consuming work. A good division commander can very likely shake this estimate out of his sleeve; he won't even have to trouble his staff at all.

So far so good. But how efficient will these men be in combat? A good division commander loves his men. If asked whether they're good or not, he'll give them the best rating he can. What a commander needs is an objective scale that won't tempt his loyalty or leave room for misunderstanding. German division commanders rated their organizations according to four categories of *combat efficiency:* (1) divisions capable of launching difficult attacks; (2) divisions capable of making limited assaults; (3) divisions capable of defense; and (4) divisions which could be called on only in extreme emergency. Though ambitious for the glory of his outfit, a responsible commander would hesitate to report his division "category one" if he knew that the men needed another month's training before taking to the field. The subjective hazard was diminished.

Fine, but you can't throw dead cats at the enemy. What about *critical armament?* Will the infantry have adequate artillery support? Can the division stop the enemy's tanks? Can it mount an armored assault itself?

The commanders of corps and armies don't care about the deadlined vehicles for which there just are no parts. They want to know what sort of a punch their troops can throw. Where does that punch come from? From operational tanks and guns. More reports? No more than already outlined. An artillery commander knows offhand how many of his pieces can shoot. A tank company commander knows how many of his tanks can roll. If the division commander tells corps and army how many light, medium, and heavy tanks, assault guns, artillery pieces and antitank guns he has ready for action, higher headquarters will know what to expect of him.

Effective combat strength, combat efficiency, and *critical armament* are three unknowns every commander wants filled in. How can he obey the principle of economy of force unless he really knows his own strength? Back to our hypothetical situation. Had the German system of reporting been instituted, the Commanding General, Fifth Army, would have received the following report from his G1:

"Nth Division reported as of last Saturday a total of 6,000 combat effectives; six strong and five weak battalions; combat efficiency "two"; ten light and three medium artillery pieces; ten medium antitank guns; ten medium tanks; twelve medium assault guns."

On the basis of this report CG, Fifth Army, could make wise decisions ab tactics, reinforcements, and supply. S of his own strength or weakness, could concentrate on worrying about strength of the enemy. *Effective com strength* extends the idea of the "divis slice" to the tactical sphere.

On our home ground we have ne been hard pressed like Germany. have never needed this reporting syst as badly. Perhaps we never shall. why wait, as did the Germans, until minutes before midnight to adop sound practice?

JAMES HODG

Artillery-Infantry Intelligence

THE division commander is denied rent artillery intelligence because few hundred yards—the distance mally separating the division CP and division artillery FSCC.

When the division is heavily enga either offensively or defensively, the vision commander could use the artil intelligence to better plan the emp ment of his reserves or to better allot fire support. This becomes appa when we consider the difference in information on the G2 situation and the information on the division tillery S2's situation map.

The artillery situation map will sl targets that have been originated by artillery FO and their locations corre from firing data. Because of the na of the communication channels, information gets to the division artil S2 with maximum speed, so we speed and detailed locations.

We find on the division situation that the same target information come through an operational cha in which each intermediate headq ters has taken action on the informa before relaying it. Since these steps taken, the information reaching divi arrives later and is usually more ger in nature and less specific as to locati Although, fundamentally, both pre the same information, the time dela infantry channels and the generaliza of information is unavoidable.

We could give the division mander, or those members of his concerned with current operations, picture presented by the artillery s tion map as well as the present pic presented by the G2 operations map. that is necessary is a means of tran ting this information those few hun yards that separate the division CP the division artillery FSCC.

Perhaps the artillery liaison part division would be the agency to per

relay. However, this would put the ›nsibility with the G3 rather than the intelligence section.

he G2 air, whose place of business ›rmally at the FSCC, could be used. ›ir could be the relay—phoning the ›mation to division.

ill another solution is to equip G2 ›tions section with a radio receiver onitor the division artillery fire con- net. In this way the fire request l be received and plotted as a matter ›utine on a separate situation map. e present the division commander two sets of information concerning same action, the overall picture ld be clearer and more accurate and eflected in the division commander's ion. The promptness of the artil- information also would give the ion commander the benefit of the saved by the use of the faster artil- fire control net.

ıe division commander can influ- the action by committing his re- s, by use of his support fire, and ›nally. We can assist him in all of these functions by keeping him erly and promptly informed.

MAJ. RALPH H. COWAN

sion Duty

E evening not long ago in a bar of ıe Ankara Palas Hotel at Ankara, ey, I and a friend were sampling of the local fermented grape. This d had spent more than eight months driven many thousands of miles on training team duty as an infantry or to Turkish Army units. I asked what he would tell any hypothetical essor in the way of advice on how to rm his job. "Bone up on how to tain a pickup," was the answer I Not much advice, is it?

ore and more of us are in foreign serving as advisors on all sorts of s to all kinds of people. Mission has become a big thing, but there l little in the way of a guide to this of work. Direction (and restriction) gher authority are, for the military e, amazingly scanty. Therefore follows may be of help to some of ellow soldiers. It is based upon my iences in Turkey and my observa- elsewhere, and emphasizes field

ost of the countries to which you be assigned are to a greater or degree "backward" areas, so the problem is one of personal adjust- . The plumbing is bad, rooms are ated, trains get snowbound for extended periods during the winter. The best answer to that sort of thing is the philosophy of the Chinese maiden: ". . . relax and enjoy it."

The hunting and fishing in these places are always really wonderful. There will be many spots of historical interest that you can visit. Life generally is varied and interesting. You will be extended every possible courtesy; in Turkey, for the year I was in the field, I was the "guest" wherever I went. And, of course, the minimum tours of duty out here are shorter than the normal. So keep loose.

Adjustment to your job is another large problem. Since we do not have command authority in any of the missions, your effectiveness is measured almost wholly by the extent to which you are able to "sell" yourself to the people whom you must advise. You must "sell" yourself both professionally and personally; your hosts *must* both respect and like you, or you will not succeed.

Respect comes fairly easy—we have a good reputation—but is easily lost. Top performance and prime leadership are required here.

Liking is another matter—it comes fairly hard, but once acquired is not easily lost. The American temperament does not always go very well with that of foreigners; history and race have made many of these people value "face" and the outward façade much more than we do. A rather rigid social system has been necessary to enable them just to get along. Exact consideration for the customs of others is the answer to this one.

Technique is simple, but must be followed carefully. The units with which you work will have plenty of things wrong with them (by our standards), or else you wouldn't be there. By the numbers:

(1) Stick to the mission to which you are assigned. Especially, don't meddle in local customs or methods of discipline.

(2) Don't try to "make corporal" on your first enlistment—take your time. Be absolutely sure of what you are doing before you do it.

(3) Don't criticize anything for which you do not have a feasible completely-staffed solution.

(4) Don't criticize too much all at once—this tends to discourage the people we are trying to help.

(5) Don't fight any battles your good sense tells you you will certainly lose. Tilting at windmills just uses up the available good will (and patience) with which you need to work.

(6) Don't waste any time protesting the things which may have to be done inefficiently because of local politics. In these cases the longest way around is the shortest (and for you, the required) way home.

(7) Take the easiest things first.

If at all possible, learn some of the language of the people with whom you work. Start with the most common courtesy phrases—Good morning, Thank you, Please, Good-bye. Once you start, learning becomes progressively more easy. This is, among other things, an indication to your opposite numbers that you personally are willing to meet them more than halfway. Anyway, quite often just when you need an interpreter, you haven't got one.

The last thing is perhaps one of the hardest for many of us to get used to. In the type of area to which you will most likely be sent, there is a terrific curiosity about America and Americans. There are also no secrets—the natives know absolutely everything about their neighbors. You will have almost no private life. You are Mr. America. You will therefore have to live up to the highest standards of personal and professional conduct every minute of the time. You are continually on stage, and it is *your job* to come through.

On a mission you are freer than you have been in a long time—professionally and personally. An assignment to a field training team is one of the greatest challenges and one of the finest opportunities you will ever have. It is also potentially one of the pleasantest and most satisfying assignments you will ever have. If you are really fit to wear the uniform—if you can live the traditions of the service—you will succeed. If not, you will be found out. This sounds trite, but it is the absolute down-to-earth truth. You are strictly on your own and the job involves more than just keeping your vehicle on the road.

CAPT. CHARLES W. KOBURGER

WHERE ARE YOU?

That's what our Circulation Department is asking about those of you who haven't sent in a change of address. We suggest that you do it now. Address:

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The Word from the Schools

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Atomic Thunderbolt

In a lightning blitz that swept 200 miles in 24 hours, Battle Group Thunderbolt, 10,000 men strong, consisting of nine "Battle Teams", decisively defeated an enemy army group armed with atomic weapons. This victory in Operation ANNIHILATION was won by the 8th Engineer Officer Advanced Class.

The key to its success was the organization of a unit, designed and equipped for atomic warfare, by student committees. In developing the TO&E full use was made of available or reasonably developable equipment: light amphibian armored carriers of all types capable of almost unrestricted cross-country mobility; communications of automatic encoding and decoding (lighter, smaller, and of longer range than current standard radios); compact multi-purpose rapid-firing rockets; light rifles of greater firepower; surface-to-surface guided missiles with atomic warheads; and atomic artillery and rockets.

Departures from traditional practical exercises included presenting the tactical solution as well as the situation and mission. The student committees organized and equipped their numerically inferior unit in such a way that it could accomplish the assigned mission. The accepted, but nebulous concept of a small, highly trained unit was then developed into a detailed TO&E.

Leadership a la Harvard

The case study method, pioneered by the law school of Harvard University, has been used by the Department of Military Art, The Engineer School, to fill an awkward gap in the curriculum. Students are required to submit solutions to leadership problems developed for each class level from sergeant to lieutenant colonel. This provides a much improved instructional vehicle which is a radical departure from the usual "Catalogue of an Ideal Leader's Characteristics" type of leadership instruction.

An advanced class case study might include the following principal steps:

Situation: A number of substandard engineer units are to be regrouped into a larger unit (details are given). You are assigned as CO of the new unit.

Requirements: What measures do you take to start the new unit off on a sound basis?

Class Discussion: Student committees present their solutions; the solution is critically analyzed by the other committees. It is from this "attack and justification" discussion that the student learns to solve any problem in leadership. There is, of course, no "school solution" but always heated argument—hence learning.

Third of Atomic Employment

TES has devised an aid more simple and certainly easier to use, than its proverbial "slide rule." A current TES publication, "Atomic Weapons Reference Data," provides easy-to-read charts and tables giving the effects of bursts of various energies, elevations and distances. Simple formulas and illustrative problems present all the calculations normally required of a field commander or his staff.

This unclassified pamphlet was compiled initially for instructional purposes. But it might well serve as a ready reference for the practical solution of problems connected with atomic warfare in the field.

Use of this practical but unclassified text also enables Al students to participate in the numerous exercises which inv atomic weapons.

Another special text, also prepared by the school staff, is 5-7-1, "Engineers in Atomic Warfare," now in its revised sec edition. This text gives each new student a searching rev (or preview) of his profession as it may evolve in the ligh current and foreseeable super weapons.

Night Sight for AFFE

To offset the disadvantage of night combat, the U.S. fo in Korea turned night into day with artificial moonlight and flies (reflected searchlight beams and flare planes). In addi TES teams recently supplemented UN night fighting pote in the Far East by conducting instruction in the use of a model Sniperscope. Designated the Sniperscope, Infrared No. 1, 20,000 volts, the weapon is greatly improved over models used in WW II and Korea. In absolute darkness, average marksman can obtain daylight accuracy at a rang 125 yards.

Two instruction teams of one electronics officer and t special electronic device repairmen each were sent by TE introduce this new model Sniperscope to AFFE. These t presented a thirty-six-hour course to nearly all regimental in the Far East. Training included operation, mainten characteristics, circuit familiarization, disassembly, and asser trouble-shooting, zeroing and night firing.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Service-of-the-Piece Charts

Commencing with the publication of FM 6-75, "10 Howitzer M2," pull-out charts of by-the-numbers opera have been inserted in each manual of the new service-o piece series. Covering sequential activities such as "duti preparing for action" and "inspection duties and mainter after operation," these columnar displays are on a single and show all individual duties within the section. The intended to facilitate reading and instruction.

Examples may be found between pages 22-23, FM pages 24-25, FM 6-81; and pages 26-27, FM 6-87.

Comments and suggestions on this particular feature in manuals are requested by The Artillery School. Get the not later than 1 September 1954.

Do pull-outs meet the purpose for which intended? Can be improved? If so, how? Should they be accompanie photos? Do you use them in any special way? Are they ac ble as training aids? Do you desire additional copies? S such copies be enlarged? If so, to what size? Address your ments to: Commandant, TAS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma (Attn rector, Department of P&NRT).

Change in Initial Fire Request

The sequence of elements in the initial fire request has changed. The new sequence places the OT azimuth a fourth element in the observer's request when the target lo is given by coordinates or by shift from a known point. ever, when target location is by polar coordinates, the seq remains as formerly; that is, the azimuth follows the wa order. The change provides FDC with fire request inform

the order which provides the most expeditious production of ing data.

ELEMENT	EXAMPLE
) Identification of Observer	(1) This is Keel 28
) Warning Order	(2) Fire Mission
) Reference Point (or Co-ordinates)	(3) From Base Point (or Co-ordinates 42833145)
) Azimuth	(4) Azimuth 230
) Location of target—shift (Omitted if coordinates given in (3) above)	(5) Left 450, Up 20, Add 800
) Remaining elements of fire request: No change.	

Change 4 to FM 6-40, soon to be published, reflects this inor change in the initial fire request.

owitzer Blast and Noise Investigated

Reports from artillery units in Korea indicated certain types powder fired from the 8-inch howitzer subjected cannoneers excessive blast and noise level; occasionally, blast even de-oyed camouflage nets and ripped clothing. In conjunction th current Ordnance investigation of these reports, TAS cently conducted test firings here for Ordnance.

Both 8-inch and 155mm howitzers were used in the test. sitions were so selected and dug in as to approximate closely ose found in Korea. Firing was conducted during rain, fog, d clear weather. Blast was measured in pounds per square ch by "blast meters;" while an audiometer measured noise level decibels.

From test firing with white bag propellant (zones 5, 6, and , it was determined that excessive blast and high noise level curred only when there was a flash. Charge 5 always gave a uzzle flash accompanied by blast and excessive noise. In the gher charges (i.e., 6 and 7), frequency of flashing rounds was nsiderably less; but when charge 6 or 7 rounds flashed, blast is much greater than that obtained with charge 5. It was also und that flash reducers (M2 for 155mm howitzer; M3 for nch howitzer) eliminated flash and reduced the accompanying ust for all charges.

The Ordnance Corps is now considering redesign of white g propellants for both the 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. Until ese characteristics of excessive blast and noise are greatly minished or eliminated by other means, flash reducers may be ed; but it must be noted that their use produces smoke in such antities that position disclosure may result during daylight ing.

niform Powder Temperatures Pay Off

Effects of non-uniform powder temperatures on muzzle ve-cities of weapons in a battery have been strikingly illustrated chronograph at the TAS.

Item: On a typical hot day, two 105mm howitzers fired at nge 6000 with charge 5. From previous chronographing, the o pieces were known to have about the same shooting ength; yet OP reports indicated the left piece was shooting out 100 yards beyond its companion. Boresighting and piece tings were checked and proved correct. The chronograph licated that the left piece was shooting about 10 f/s faster in the right piece. The answer to the apparent discrepancy s read on the dial of the powder thermometer. Ammunition the piece on the right was protected and the powder tempera-e averaged 90 degrees; ammunition for the piece on the left s exposed and the powder temperature averaged 115 degrees. his 25-degree temperature differential produced the equivalent a 7-mil error in elevation. Firing was continued with an "appropriate" special correction applied to the site of the right piece.

Item: The left piece was subsequently designated to fire a check point registration. The chief of section allowed his supply of ready ammunition (temperature 115 degrees) to be exhausted with the result that the last three rounds in fire for effect (temperature 80 degrees) were fired fresh from the packing case. The variation on the ground was so apparent that the registration was invalidated, and the adjustment phase resumed.

Item: A 25-degree temperature differential (75 to 100 degrees) would thus have produced these effects in various weapons:

Weapon	*Charge*	*Range*	*f/s variation*	*Yard Effect*	*Mil Effect*
155 How	5	8000	8.5	62.9	4.5
155 Gun	Super	21000	11.5	98.9	5.0
8″ How	5	9000	7.5	53.3	3.1
240 How	4	20000	17.5	201.3	8.8

Conclusions and Recommendations: No new principle is implied in the foregoing examples, but they do emphasize the need to practice established rules. Ready ammunition should be kept off the ground and protected from wind, moisture, and the direct rays of the sun. It should be opened sufficiently in advance of firing to allow all rounds to reach approximately the same temperature. Proper care of ammunition to insure uniformity of powder temperature is essential to avoid the distortion of normal range dispersion and to improve results.

Errata Sheets for TM 20-350

Errata sheets for TM 20-350, "Army Ephemeris for 1954" —containing corrections to tables 7, 8 and 13 thereof—are now available by writing: Commandant, TAS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma (Attn: Director, Department of Observation).

Other discrepancies existing in the manual are corrected in an additional errata sheet, to be published and distributed by The Adjutant General.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

New Training Films

Fire and Maneuver, Part I (Squad) TF 7-1868, 24 minutes in length. This film combines actual combat scenes accompanied by a chalk talk. It shows how a squad advances, and stresses the need for accurate fire.

Fire and Maneuver, Part II (Platoon) TF 7-1899, 22 minutes in length. This motion picture illustrates the basic concept of maneuvering all three rifle squads under protection of supporting fires. "Leaning into fires" is demonstrated.

Changes to Field Manuals

Change 1 to FM 23-80, "57mm Rifle M18A1," has been printed and distributed. It is devoted to describing, illustrating and explaining the operation of the new 57mm rifle, M18A1, which has replaced the M18.

Change 2 to FM 21-18, "Foot Marches," has been printed and distributed. This change adds more information about march hygiene, march safety and march sanitation.

Change 4 to FM 23-30, "Hand and Rifle Grenades," has been printed and distributed. This change supersedes all previous changes. Additions include a discussion of the *new* M26 hand grenade and a new hand and rifle grenade qualification course.

Change 4 to FM 23-92, "4.2 inch Mortar, M2 and M30," has been printed and distributed. It contains new information on the use of smoke and the new subcaliber assembly for the M30 mortar.

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CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 13 | *What Can You Do About Your Career?*

NEVER volunteer for anything!" Thus the old-timer to the recruit since time began. There is some sound advice in it but not all of the time or under all circumstances.

Each soldier must establish his own professional goal, and there are few who do not aspire to reach the top. Several years ago, the Department of the Army published a manual which laid down guides or career patterns for professional development. This manual, TM 20-605, Career Management for Army Officers, is a compilation of time-tested ideas which over many years were developed and practiced in the Army. You should turn to it occasionally as a check-up on your progress towards the top.

Career patterns (there is one for each branch of service) do not purport to guarantee a way to success. Nor do they establish stereotyped inflexible stages through which each individual must pass. But these patterns do establish broad areas in which individual ability should be tested and potential assessed. Like a runner in a footrace who checks his equipment, tests the track and finally, in running, paces himself to win, so must the Army officer determine the factors and periodically measure his advance.

What areas of individual development are significant? "Selection for Senior Military Schools", recently published in this series, gave them to you. Briefly, here they are again: command, staff, instructor, troop and combat experience. A void in one or more of these areas is not necessarily fatal, but satisfactory performance of duty in each is highly desirable.

"OK, this is all very fine," you say, "but how do I get the experience I need?" Three persons are concerned about your career and are in a position to influence its course: the Chief of your career branch, your commander and *you*. Let's see how each can help.

The Chiefs of the combat arms career branches stand in the place (personnel-wise) that the Chiefs of Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery and Cavalry did before WWII. Despite the fact that the career branches are handling many times more officers than the old Chiefs did, full consideration is given to the personal ambitions and needs of every officer. Your career branch controls your assignments when you are assigned from CONUS to overseas, overseas to CONUS and between major CONUS commands. Also, it selects officers for all PCS schools. By careful and fair consideration, your branch estimates your career needs, ability and potential and strikes a balance between them and the requirements of the service. Yet, the efforts of your branch may be (and often are) spoiled by your commander or yourself since Department of the Army assignment orders serve primarily as a device to move you from Point A to Point B and do not, except when a directed MOS is used, require that you perform duty in the stated MOS.

IN a sense, your commander has the greatest influence on your career development because he controls your actual duty assignments. Professional development through experience gained in on-the-job training is directly dependent upon his desire and capability to give you opportunity for performing varying type duties. Since professional growth is largely governed by duties performed and the experience gained, each commander has a profound responsibility in officer development.

You can help, too, by knowing what duties you need and by being alert to opportunities that will contribute to the development of your career. First, you must have a clear understanding of the factors contributing to development of individual capacity. These are: experience in varied fields or duties; performance of duty in positions of progressively greater responsibility; and, formal training in schools. Second, recognize t gaps in your development and seek c portunity to fill them. The importan of schooling has been over-emphasiz by some. Formal schooling offers opportunity to gain broader knowled and encourages reflective and origir thought, but performance of duty what pays off in the long run—r academic learning itself.

There are some who persist in follo ing the easy way, always seeking t most comfortable job or station. Th can be sure that when responsible a important assignments (and the rewa for completing those assignments) co up, they will not be considered for the

During the fighting in Korea, so soldiers assigned to the Far East sou staff jobs in Japan. Thus they avoid the responsibilities of command, t leavening of troop duty, and the test combat. These individuals may w suffer because, being untried in vi aspects of their career, their potent cannot be measured.

There are also officers who, believi they alone know what is best for the selves, actively charge about, seekin particular job or commander, or as f quently happens, a certain station theater. They deceive themselves- they will eventually discover. Self tachment to one man or one type duty breeds narrowness of view a decreases the ability to arrive at sou decisions.

TOP flight commanders are selec from those officers who can han many duties. They must have dem strated capacity for leadership, br vision and an aptitude for performin variety of duties. They are not to found among those who leave th career development entirely to others allow golden opportunities to pass unrecognized. Nor will they be am those who indulge in personal com and security.

The Month's BOOKS

With a couple of exceptions, our reviewers this month are old-timers in this Department. One of the exceptions, Colonel A. T. McAnsh has made two recent appearances in the JOURNAL—*in June with "The Making of a Marine" and in August with "The Pros." Jonathan Carmen is the pseudonym of a Washington journalist with more than ten years of military service. Our other reviewers have been identified in previous issues.*

ıgh Pork Chop

IWO JIMA: Amphibious Epic
By Lt. Col. William S. Bartley, USMC
U.S. Government Printing Office
243 Pages; Index; Maps: $4.75.

iewed by
ONEL A. T. MCANSH

'he assault and capture of Iwo Jima by U. S. Marine Corps was a fitting climax drive that carried United States forces ss the Central Pacific to within 660 s of Tokyo. Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan Guam lay behind along with many erful enemy strongholds that had been passed and neutralized. But Iwo Jima become too important strategically by 1944 to be neutralized. It had to be n and made into an operational base.

wo Jima looks like a pork chop from air; in profile from the sea it has the earance of a half-submerged whale. ninating the entire area is Mount Suri- ıi, 550 feet high, an extinct volcano, ning the narrow southern tip of the Is- l. A dome shaped northern plateau is ed to Suribachi by a narrow stretch of l covered with coarse, black volcanic This northern plateau is about one in diameter, and the ground sloping ither coast is rough and broken by rocky s. The plateau itself is interlaced with ges and ridges.

Vith the invasion of the Marshalls in ruary 1944, the Japanese started to ngthen Iwo Jima in earnest. By May l strength was 7,000 men. With the of Saipan, this strength was doubled.

'he new commander, Lt. General Kuri- ısha, planned and later directed an te defense. His plan was simple and adapted to the terrain and size of the ıd (7½ square miles). In a departure ı traditional Japanese defensive doc- e, he abandoned the idea of all-out ıterattacks against the beachhead and ly banzai charges. Instead, strong mu- ly supporting positions were to be occu- prior to D-Day and defended to the h. Mount Suribachi area was made a -independent defense sector. An elab- e system of caves, concrete block houses pillboxes was commenced soon after fall of Saipan and construction work inued until the island was assaulted. defenders dug underground passages ıecting different defense sectors.

he responsibility for preparing and ex- ing the landing force plans was given to Major General Harry Schmidt, commanding V Amphibious Corps. His major units were the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions. The 3rd and 4th were veteran units, but it was the first combat action for the 5th.

The basic plan of operations was not complicated:

(1) The 4th and 5th Divisions would land abreast on the southeastern beaches, with the 5th on the left. The 3rd Division when released from Corps reserve would land over the same beaches on or after D plus 1, prepared to assist in the attack.

(2) Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines of the 5th Division would attack on the left flank of the Corps and straight across the narrow neck of Iwo, then turn southwest to secure the Mount Suribachi area. The other RCT of the 5th was to attack to the opposite shore, then turn and attack northeast.

(3) The 4th Division on the right was to capture Airfield No. 1 in its zone, then turn and attack northeast.

(4) The entire landing force was then to drive northeast and exterminate the enemy.

Before Marines set foot on Iwo Jima that island had endured the longest and most intensive preparation given any objective in the Pacific during World War II. Carrier raids, air assaults of the Seventh Air Force from the Marianas, pre-D-Day naval gun fire bombardment and pre-H-hour bombing by sea and air units showered the island with explosives. It seemed all will to resist must surely be broken. But it was to prove otherwise.

General Schmidt, Corps commander, had other problems than with the Japanese. Naval plans called for three days of preliminary naval bombardment. Based upon experiences at Tarawa, Saipan and Peleliu, V Corps officers had asked for a 10-day bombardment. This was refused. A second request was made for nine days. This was turned down. The third time General Schmidt asked for four days. Another refusal. For the fourth time the Corps commander asked for additional time. But Navy planners still insisted that their schedule would provide adequate preparation without even one more day.

On D-Day initial resistance was light as the LVTs disgorged the Marines who hit the volcanic sand at a run that slowed to a walk as their feet sank ankle deep into soft, loose, volcanic ash. However, prearranged fires from Suribachi and the other commanding positions soon covered the beaches. Island garrisons came pouring out of well prepared underground positions when fires lifted.

By 1030, D-Day, the island had been crossed, and Mount Suribachi isolated. But it took four days of bitter combat before the crest was captured and the well known flag-raising ceremony performed. D plus 5 the 3rd Division (less one RCT) started landing. This division took over the job of driving down the center of the island. Boundary lines and scheme of maneuver were changed. Three divisions now fought abreast.

The following fourteen days, D plus 6 to D plus 19, follow the same theme for all units. An alarming number of completely unscathed enemy positions were found. General Kuribayashi had concentrated the majority of his forces and installations in the central and northern part of the island and had used every conceivable means to make this defense impregnable. Masterful camouflage had prevented detection of many of these positions, and it took a direct hit to accomplish destruction. Few were hit before landing. It was tragically apparent to leaders that human flesh would have to succeed where heavy armament failed, and much of the fighting was uphill as well.

The critical central portion of the Motoyama Plateau was covered with rough volcanic sandstone. At places pent-up sulphur underground bubbled up through fissures and made the surface so hot foxholes were almost uninhabitable. Marines labelled this area "Dante's Inferno." This area lent itself to strong defenses, and the skilled and disciplined camouflage of the defender and the use of smokeless powder rendered detection difficult. The Japanese, as always, fought and died in place.

The battle tested 3rd Marines of the 3rd Division, held in Expeditionary Troops Reserve, was sent back to Guam on 5 March without having set foot on the island. The division and corps commander had earlier requested use of this unit to give added punch to the slowly moving attack, as casualties had been heavy. Vigorous efforts to obtain release of the unit continued, but General Holland Smith, Expeditionary Troops commander, reasoned enough troops were ashore and another regiment would aggravate already crowded conditions. He denied the requests, and the 3rd Marines sailed away.

The attack slowly but relentlessly ground forward. A Japanese night counterattack on 8-9 March was stopped, and the final drive to clear the island began on 11 March. On 16 March, the island was declared secured but mopping up continued. The 147th Infantry, USA, arrived on 20 March to take over the defense of the island. The capture and occupation phase of Iwo Jima was announced completed 26 March.

In the fighting, 25,851 casualties were sustained by U.S. forces, including 738 doctors and corpsmen. Marines suffered 22,056 of the casualties. It was estimated that 21,000 Japanese defended the island. Up to 26 March only 216 prisoners had been taken.

The first chapter in this book gives a background of events leading up to the planning. Succeeding chapters describe planning and preparation, the landings, the isolation of Mount Suribachi, and the long, exhausting grind northward. Chapter 9 describes the final fight, and Chapter 10 describes the supporting elements. Appendices contain detailed information including twenty excellent color maps.

Colonel Bartley and the Historical Branch, G3, Marine Corps, have done a superior job on the story of this operation. Numerous photographs highlight individual unit actions. The study of the landing and sustained attack, told in restrained language, is worthy of study by military students. The 24 Medals of Honor awarded for valor reflect the high level of individual and collective heroism characteristic of that action. A fitting tribute to all who participated was voiced by Admiral Nimitz: "Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a comr virtue."

Optimum MPR

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND SOC
By Stanislaw Andrzejewski
International Library-Grove Press, 1
209 Pages; $4.50

Reviewed by
COLONEL CHARLES A. H. THOMSON

This book examines the relations betw military organization and social struct In other words, it seeks to show how r tary affairs affect the ways in which pe live with one another, and compete wealth, power, and prestige. A former h sergeant in the Polish army, prisone war, escapee from two tyrannies, beg smuggler, student at the London Schoc

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ARMED FORCES SPORTS ALMANAC. By Colonel Charles O. Kates. The Military Service Publishing Co., 1954. 577 Pages; $3.00. A complete listing of who's who and what's what in Service sports.

CALL TO GREATNESS. By Adlai E. Stevenson. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 110 Pages; $2.25. The recent presidential candidate analyzes his experiences in his recent travels in thirty countries from Seoul to Berlin. He finds that democracy has a will to survive and the ability to compete with totalitarianism.

COMMUNIST GUERRILLA WARFARE. By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1954. 229 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50. A British officer and an American civilian, who interrogated Hitler's generals who fought the Communist guerrillas, offer a study of Communist guerrilla warfare. Their conclusion is that guerrillas can be trained quickly and easily and that in any war against Communism or Communists their importance cannot be underestimated.

THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE IN MALAYA. By Gene Z. Hanrahan. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. 146 Pages; $2.00. Includes some valuable Communist documents which should be instructive to those who may meet the Communists in guerrilla-type warfare. This mimeographed booklet was not written for popular consumption but is well organized for students of this subject.

ELECTRONICS FOR EVERYONE. By Monroe Upton. The Devin-Adair Company, 1954. 370 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. A popular history of electronics with easily understood illustrations. Not a book for the technician but particularly valuable for the layman who wants to have a smattering of electronic knowledge without hard study.

THE FIGHTING SUDANESE. By H. C. Jackson. St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1954. 85 Pages; $2.00. The World War II record of a fighting race little known in this country.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Robert Strausz-Hupe and Stefan T. Possony. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1954. 826 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.50. A second edition with new material covering technology, war, international law, ethics, the economics of the nuclear age, the colonial question, and the problems of international racial tensions. Other sections have been brought up to date.

KAGNEW: The Story of the Ethiopian Fighters in Korea. By Kimon Skordiles. Radiopress, Tokyo, Japan, 1954. 244 Pages; Illustrated. The story of the Ethiopian battalion in Korea, written by a Greek correspondent.

MAN AGAINST NATURE. Edited by Charles Neider. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 483 Pages; $5.00. Forty-five stories of daring and adventure from Boccaccio's story of "The Plague" to "The Strange Death of Louis Slotin," the atomic scientist. 479 pages of stirring stories, no two alike. Schweitzer, Hillary, Lindbergh, Costeau, Francis Parkman and Herodotus are among the others.

THE MAN IN THE THICK LEAD SUIT. By Daniel Lang. Oxford University Press. 207 Pages; $3.50. A layman's tour of the world of the atom.

MUSSOLINI: The Intimate Life of a Demagogue. By Paolo Monelli. The Vanguard Press, 1954. 304 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. A translation of an Italian biography with new material added. This is in no sense a sympathetic estimate.

REBEL ROSE: Life of Rose O'Neal Greenhow, Confederate Spy. By Ishbel Ross. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 274 Pages; Illustrated; $4.00. The biography of one of America's most famous spies.

RETURN TICKET. By Anthony Deane-Drummond. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1954. 254 Pages; $3.50. One more of the long series of books by British personnel detailing their escapes from enemy hands during World War II. Drummond was a parachutist and was taken prisoner twice. Here is real military adventure.

STRATEGY. By Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers. 420 Pages; Index; Maps; $5.00. One of the world's foremost military writers offers his thoughts on the theory and history of military strategy.

THE TREASON OF THE PEOPLE. By Ferdinand Lundberg. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 370 Pages; Index; $4.50. An indictment of the American citizen's lack of interest and sincerity in pursuing the American ideal of democratic government. One chapter, "Arms and Democratic Man," finds that weakness in our military system lies in the people and not necessarily in the services.

WE REMAINED. By Col. R. W. Volckmann. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954. 244 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. The story of the American-Philippine guerrillas of Northern Luzon, written by their commander. A really stirring story of a too-little known incident in American history.

WHERE LAND MEETS SEA: The Tide Line of Cape Cod. Written and engraved by Clare Leighton. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 202 Pages; Illustrated; $4.00. A gathering-together of personal impressions of the tide line of Cape Cod with woodcuts by the author. A beautiful book for the library and one that most New Englanders will be proud to own.

omics, and translator, the author has teaching sociology since 1947 at les University in South Africa. He gs wide experience to bear on his sub- as well as an impressive range of ry, anthropology, and sociology. The ome is a personal, somewhat difficult, but enormously suggestive book, valu- for lay reader as well as for the pro- onal student of military affairs or of logy.

ilitary organization influences social ture mainly by determining the distri- on of naked power. Power, naked or d, is inescapable in our world of strug- or wealth, power, and prestige. The power is seized and used affect social ifications—the arrangement of people ciety into aggregates according to their l roles. The author invents terms and ols to carry on his analysis: biataxy, mity, and the MPR (military participa- ratio). Biataxy (Greek *bia*-violence) esses the degree to which the distribu- of power is determined by naked force. mity is the proportion of military en- to total energy used in a state. The tary Participation Ratio (MPR) ex- es the degree to which people in a ty are specialized for military affairs. optimum MPR is that which yields imum military strength, other factors l. Military organizations are classified rding to a combination of three factors: R, cohesion, and subordination. A cubic ification ensues of six types (two are ally impossible). Each is given a ed name: our frontiersmen are dubbed enic, and grouped with Tallensi tribes- and Trekboers because they all show gh MPR (most frontiersmen had to), low subordination (Indian fighting 't call forth elaborate systems of leader- and hierarchy) and low cohesion ntiersmen were notably independent as ers as well as settlers).

he extent of governmental regulation is ly correlated with military activity; not xtension of governmental control is due ilitary factors. Ferocity in war does always increase with the military par- ation ratio. Aristocrats and profession- end to be less fierce; they develop codes onor and procedure. But the change- to mass armies usually coincides with eat intensification of ferocity. Compare courtesy of the British and French com- ders at Fontenoy, each offering the r the first chance to fire, with the eness of the French mass armies en- lered by the Revolution.

oth democratic and totalitarian forms overnment are compatible with a large unt of "vertical mobility"—the rising or ng of individuals in status. Why so talitarian states, often thought oppres- of the masses? Two reasons at first: the despot finds his allies in the masses; nd, and more important, is the fact that main pillar of a despot's power is his ty to promote and degrade." Such mo- y is less in democracies, not because ocracies disfavor it, but because there is less distance between social strata, hence less range of movement.

The final chapter—a guess (1950) at the future—is least systematic, most readable, and most provocative. There can be a balance of power, leading to periodical wars. Such wars may lead to the collapse of civilization or disintegration of the globe. One state may win to world hegemony, or there may arise some kind of world federation assuring universal peace. The author deals shortly and sharply with each possible case. His comments are sure to produce argument, if not violent disagreement. Consider his prediction that the chances of survival of democracy and liberalism in the USA would be very slim, if we were to win world hegemony. Such traditions, however deeply rooted, could not, in the author's view, resist indefinitely the pressure of the actual distribution of power. Such proconsuls as MacArthur would become too independent of civil authority, too accustomed to disregard of the wishes of subordinate majorities.

Convinced of the soundness of Malthus' assertion that population must always press with increasing weight on resources, he puts hunger at the bottom of causes of wars. The solution is logical: birth control. No other population controller will suffice in the long run. Moreover, "the money spent on perfecting an infallible and comfortable contraceptive appliance would undoubtedly do more to assure peace than much greater sums spent on promoting international understanding by exchange visits, etc. . . ."

World federation is possible, if less probable than world hegemony of one power. In any case, it is wrong to think of the future solely as a contest between the USA and Russia. Other power centers may arise: a unified Western Europe, or China. Maybe even India. The task for Western diplomacy, so far crudely bungled, is to sow discord among Communist allies. Their community of faith is no guarantee of friendship. If world federation were to come about, it would be prosperous, peaceful, technologically sluggish (the control of research by bureaucrats would surely arrest it), standardized in culture, with a slow tempo of aesthetic and cultural change. Life might be much like that of a South Sea Islander, playing at work, cultivating the arts (including love-making), cooking, chatting, singing, dancing, joking. Sighs the author, "Paradise regained . . ."

Phony

CHINESE GORDON
By Lawrence and Elisabeth Hanson
Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954
256 Pages; Index; $4.00

Reviewed by
JONATHAN CARMEN

General Charles George "Chinese" Gordon was an Army "brat," the son of a lieutenant general of artillery, and the great-great-grandson of a Highland soldier who was the founder of the family. A few years after he had left Woolwich Academy as a sub-lieutenant of engineers, Charles George became a hero to Victorian England and remained such the rest of his life. His fanatic evangelism and his reputation as a greater leader of irregular forces caught the fancy of an England that was very sure of itself and of its place in the world.

The truth is that the public picture of Chinese Gordon was as synthetic as the public picture of movie stars and gangsters of our day. He came close to being a complete phony. Barring his one solid accomplishment as the leader of the Ever-Victorious Army in China in 1863 (in eight short months he drove the Taipings from town after town and captured Soochow), his military career was an unredeemed series of failures. If the Victorians who held him in such high regard as a Christian general had understood the well-springs of his religion, they would have been appalled. Had they understood the perverted sordidness of his private life, they would have been aghast.

He was in truth a very unpleasant person who spent most of his life quarrelling with colleagues, superiors and himself—especially himself. As the Hansons write at one point: "he could not brook authority of any kind, he could bow to no judgment but his own."

His life between the victories in China in 1863 and the final disaster at Khartoum on 26 January 1885 was a mess, a squalid moral mess. And yet through those 27 years he was a hero: "Chinese Gordon," the general who sought to bring the civilizing influences of Christianity and trade to the outcasts of the earth.

The people who saw through him were maligned and criticized by the press, the pulpit and the pub. And here is a most revealing side lesson in this highly fascinating book. That lesson is that the brass-plated, plush-bottomed fat cats in the War Office (and, by reasonable extension, in the Pentagon) are not always as fat-headed and obstinate as popular fancy and fiction paint them. Sometimes (and probably oftener) they are very right in their stubborn adherence to fact, whereas the public of even a free country is at times very misguided about its heroes and therefore very wrong.

No Sure Thing

THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR
By Benjamin Graham
Harper & Brothers, 1954
272 Pages; Index; Charts; $3.50

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

The intelligent soldier wouldn't think of deciding on a course of action in war without making an estimate of the situation. But too often the intelligent soldier is a most unintelligent investor. In fact he frequently isn't an investor at all; he is a speculator looking for a sure thing. And the only sure thing about speculation is, almost inevitably, total loss.

Unfortunately, investment itself has nearly as many uncertainties as the battlefield. It, too, has its principles of strategy

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and tactics. To avoid being mystified and misled in investment, a sound leader is essential, and Mr. Graham has the sanction of past success to qualify as one of the best advisers in the management of funds destined for the purchase of stocks and bonds.

Mr. Graham's book is not concerned with the entire business of investment, but is limited to the securities markets. His assumption is that his reader is a novice and that he needs guidance in the most elementary phases of the subject. No previous knowledge of the securities markets is required to understand the recommended procedures. Mr. Graham describes in clear language and without hedging the sources of economic intelligence and an appropriate program for two kinds of investors. One approach is designed for the passive individual interested primarily in safety of capital and unwilling or unable to devote much time to the study of investment. He is the so-called defensive investor. The other program is for the aggressive investor who wants a higher return and is ready to risk more and to put more time and thought into the selection of his investment media. Without regard to which class the reader may belong, he will find the book a clear, authoritative and reliable guide to the selection of stocks and bonds for investment.

Everybody's Business

THE SEVEN MEN OF SPANDAU
By Jack Fishman
Rinehart & Company, 1954
285 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

This is the "authentic inside story of the world's most important prisoners in the world's most carefully guarded prison." The prisoners are Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Deputy Fuhrer Rudolf Hess, Hitler Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach, Reichsbank Minister Walther Funk, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Minister of War Production Albert Speer, Foreign Minister Baron Constantin von Neurath.

The author, a London newspaperman, thinks that "Spandau is everybody's business," that two of the prisoners, Hess and Doenitz, have been chosen to carry on where Hitler left off, and that there are in Germany two powerful organizations "determined to assert their claims." Hess is under sentence of life imprisonment, and Doenitz, although he will be released in 1955 or 1956, is now sixty-three, a rather advanced age at which to lay the foundations of another Nazi movement when he gets out. Certainly some such development is likely in Germany as it struggles to regain its place among the nations of the world, but the argument that the seven men in Spandau are the key figures in such a possibility is hardly convincing.

Even if Spandau is "everybody's business," most of this book will appeal only to those who take a morbid interest in the details of what is admittedly a unique prison setup, in the mental and physical abnormalities of the prisoners, and in the details of the prisoners' correspondence with their wives. Among military readers, only the specialists in German intelligence will find much to interest them.

POW Alcatraz

MEN OF COLDITZ
By P. R. Reid
J. B. Lippincott Co., 1954
287 Pages; $3.95

Reviewed by
RICHARD G. MCCLOSKEY

The recent war certainly produced the most ingenious lot of escapes of any war, and far and away the best written escape stories. This new one by P. R. Reid, who told of his own escape from Colditz in *The Colditz Story*, continues the drab, tragic, sometimes outrageously funny, and always exciting narrative of the escapes from Colditz from 1942 until the fortress was relieved by the American First Army in 1945.

Colditz was peculiar. It was the one German camp which housed only those who had tried to escape from some other camp. This fact concentrated the most imaginative, daring, and patient (but unlucky) prisoners of all nationalities. The guards outnumbered the inmates, and after 1942, escaping had to be highly scientific and meticulously planned to evade German countermeasures. The variations of escape methods devised at Colditz were almost infinite—including the almost incredible feat of building a glider which was to take off from the roof. The liberation, not the Germans, foiled this attempt.

The Colditz story is particularly interesting because it deals with an international grab bag of prominent and recalcitrant prisoners: English, Poles, French, Dutch, Belgians, and a small clutch of Americans. With humour and without malice, Reid contrasts national modes of behavior as they were revealed in conduct as prisoners, attitudes towards discipline (German, and that of their own CO), and escape techniques.

Apart from the excitement, Reid presents some well-thought opinions on escape technique, especially on the advantages of dribbling a few men out at a time, instead of flooding them out in mass escapes.

Put this book at the top of your list of escape reading.

Death of a Town

THE RAID
By Laurence Greene
Henry Holt & Co., 1953
246 Pages; $3.00

Reviewed by
ORVILLE C. SHIREY

The Raid is the biography of a most unusual town, and the story of the event that was at once the most dramatic thing that ever happened there and the death of the town. The place is Harper's Ferry, West Virginia; the event is John Brown's raid on the federal arsenal there.

Harper's Ferry was apparently a pl that was born for a violent end. It han what's left of it, to the mountainside wh the Potomac and the Shenandoah ca together in violence millenia ago. Beca of its water power it was an ideal place a gun factory. The gun factory attrac Irish and Pennsylvania Dutch who parently hated each other on sight fought incessantly, with or without ben of spirits. Because the route of the Po mac was a passage to the west, the B Railroad and the C&O Canal Comp fought bitterly for a right-of-way which mountains at Harper's Ferry cut down t bare shelf. Because there were guns th John Brown decided to seize them, helped mightily to fan the spark t burst into the flame of the Civil War. A because the arsenal was indefensible was destroyed, and the railroad was vuln able to raiders all through the war, H per's Ferry was, for all practical purpo killed off.

But the site of Harper's Ferry, with heights towering over the coming toget of the rivers, is one of the great natu sights in America and has been acqui as a national monument. So it may be t Harper's Ferry has seen the end of lence.

Greene has not written a formal hist His book, like a good many histories th days, is almost in novel form, and makes liberal use of quotes from do ments of the period. The result is a w researched, unusually dramatic biogra of a town.

Military readers will be most intere in the account of John Brown's raid makes up a large part of the book. Gre has added little to the total of our kno edge of the raid, but the material he pulled together from many sources give well-rounded a picture of a fantastic op tion as there is in print. Certainly it is most readable of all the studies of Bro raid.

Greene touches only lightly the C War operations around the Ferry on grounds that these have already been ered by swarms of Civil War writers.

Cloak and Dagger

THE SCARLET THREAD
By Donald Downes
The British Book C
207 Pages; $3.50

Reviewed by
COL. R. ERNEST DUPUY

This is a farrago of counter-spy ad tures, in Oppenheim style, purportin be the author's own experiences as agent first for Britain and later for own OSS in World War II.

The best that can be said for it is the author writes well. His opening ch ter, a tale of high adventure on the Sal beachhead, is the best piece of writin the book. Perhaps that is because it tains no counter-spy folderol.

The accuracy of the author's historical spective is shown by his gratuitous re- k that Gen. William J. Donovan was only officer to receive the Congressional dal of Honor in World War I, an error gallant "Wild Bill" would be the first denounce.

o on History

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1775-1783
By John R. Alden
Harper & Brothers, 1954
294 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00

WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1910-1917
By Arthur S. Link
Harper & Brothers, 1954
331 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00

iewed by
COL H. A. DEWEERD

ohn Alden's book presents the American olution not so much as "a reaction to ated injuries and usurpation" as a re- of clashing economic interests, admin- tive friction, and the "incompatibility" nglish and American political concepts practices. He devotes about one half is space to the military aspects of the olution but without effecting any im- ant change in earlier interpretations. makes his most valuable contribution in ling with the Loyalist problem and in hasizing the political, social, and eco- ic aspects of the break with the Em- . The book contains a number of well- sen illustrations and is amply provided maps.

rthur Link's volume on Wilson and the gressive Era is the product of many s of research and reflection upon the lems of this period. His work on a ti-volume biography of Wilson has al- ly forced a revision of some opinions d on Ray S. Baker's work. The present me covers the period from 1910, when break-up of the Republican Party was ending, to the entrance of the United es into war in 1917. Sentimental irers of Woodrow Wilson will find s of the present work hard to take. For, ut it briefly, Mr. Link does not believe Wilson was a progressive at heart and s that he was singularly inept in the l of international affairs.

Vilson's attitude on child-labor laws, gro rights, female suffrage and related ters caused Mr. Link to conclude that igh he was intelligent and sincere, Wil- was "not a progressive of advanced uasion." His efforts at lowering the f, at reorganizing banking and cur- y, and at anti-trust legislation were ied out "with a minimum concession to nced progressive concepts. . . . To try ortray such a man as an ardent social rmer is to defy the plain record."

ecause this volume ends with our en- ce into the European War in April 1917, es not show Wilson as the moral lead- f the Allied world, a position he won eason of his statements on the purposes e war and the objectives of the peace he period from January 1918 onward.

Pass In Review

When Douglas Southall Freeman died about a year ago, he had already published five volumes of his monumental work on George Washington. He had also completed the final edit of sixteen chapters of Volume VI carrying Washington through his first term as President. This sixth volume, entitled *George Washington: President and Patriot* ($7.50) will be published next month. All of these handsome boxed volumes are available through our book service at $7.50 per volume.

Another new book out next month that will be of great interest is Samuel Eliot Morison's ninth volume in his History of U. S. Navy operations in World War II. This volume covers Sicily-Salerno and Anzio and will sell for $6.00.

A few months back, our book service launched a sale of overstock books at greatly reduced prices. Most of the titles went fast but somewhere along the line somebody dropped a stitch and we failed to list one of the best buys of the lot. So herewith for a special offer until we run out is *The Stilwell Papers* which retails for $4.00, on sale for $1.00. If you recall the reviews which the book received when it came out right after World War II, you'll recognize this offer as a real bargain.

This magazine's staff is well stocked with ardent book readers. I wasn't around here very long before I discovered that one had to be reasonably agile and alert to lay hands on the good books before they disappeared from view. While my batting average is pretty good, I bobbled on one title I badly wanted to read and finally wound up borrowing a copy (from a non-staffer) in order to get it read. The book in question was Elmer Davis' *But We Were Born Free* ($2.75) and I can say that it was well worth the effort. Davis is a fierce adherent of the basic American right of free speech and his latest book is not only highly pertinent for this day but resounds with encouragement for Americans who are concerned with the trend toward infringements on our basic rights.

We've added two new military handbooks to our list of stock books that our doughboy readers will welcome: *Rifle Squad and Platoon in the Attack* ($2.00) and *Infantry Unit Leaders Guide* ($1.50).

The Book-of-the-Month Club's August selection undoubtedly will find a top notch on forthcoming best-seller lists. It's *The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill* ($5.00) by Herman Hagedorn. This highly entertaining biography of Theodore Roosevelt and his family has already gathered a list of ringing indorsements from an imposing list of advance readers of note.

I read Eddie Gilmore's *Me and My Russian Wife* ($3.75) and enjoyed it thoroughly. Gilmore spent eleven years behind the Iron Curtain working for A. P. and has written entertainingly of some of his experiences. I was a bit disappointed not to get a better "feel" of Russia out of his long experience, particularly in view of his profession, but I can't quarrel a bit with the enjoyment he provided.

Two more candidates for up-coming best-seller lists are Irving Stone's *Love Is Eternal* ($3.95) and Thomas B. Costain's *The White and the Gold* ($5.00). Stone's book is a fictionalized biography of Mary Todd Lincoln and if it measures up to the standard of his previous "famous wives"—Jessie Fremont and Rachel Jackson—it will be a big success. The name Thomas B. Costain on any book is like money in the bank to the publisher. This latest effort is the first in a series of books which he will write on the early days of Canada.

R.F.C.

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

SPECIAL SECTION—
THE JOURNAL'S FIRST HALF CENTURY

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The Sensitive Adjustment of Men to Machines

In the age of the atom the prob
tary psychologists cover every asp

COMMANDER JACK W. DUNLAP

PERHAPS at first glance the phrases "push-button warfare" and "a bigger bang for a buck" suggest that the physicists and engineers are eliminating human participation from warfare and thereby reducing the need for the psychologist's contribution. Those of us who live with these problems know that quite the opposite is the case.

The cold war and the new technologies have created new frontiers and these frontiers beg for fresh, bold, and imaginative approaches.

In order to maximize the effectiveness of any man-machine system, we must have quantitative information about human performance under various conditions. Within recent years we have begun to take giant steps toward developing techniques for obtaining such quantitative information. At various laboratories—either at military bases or under military contract—psychologists working with other disciplines have begun the development of mathematical equations to represent human performance. By applying some of the most modern techniques of mathematics, and by making use of high-speed computers and simulators, we are beginning to open vast new areas in the study of human performance —areas which eventually will have direct bearing upon the design of complex military systems.

The new techniques of warfare have not reduced the number of persons involved in military operations. Rather they have changed the nature of the tasks they perform. One of the common assumptions in the design of military systems is that the human component in the prevailing systems is too unreliable. This has led to his replacement in many operations with equipment which often lacks a satisfactory degree of reliability. Human monitors are then put back into the system to obtain the necessary degree of reliability. The result is a system usually with greater performance capability but with more operators and maintenance personnel.

COMMANDER JACK W. DUNLAP, USNR, is President of Dunlap and Associates, a research organization with offices at Stamford, Conn. The address condensed here was made in his role as President of the Division of Military Psychology of the American Psychological Association.

At present there is a shift of emphas
from component development to weap
ment. The psychologist can make an
contributions in determining how the
into the system, and in fact can outlin
which men and machines function toge

EQUIPMENT is another area in whic
been opened for psychologists. Mil
become so complicated that it requires
keep up with operations alone. Techn
so rapid and broad that it is a full-time
the latest advances in this field. As
has been a breakdown in communica
tions and technical personnel.

We must devise new ways of establis
between these two agencies for the eff
equipment. Effective communication is
of the requirement problems are really
tion. A great many psychologists are i
application of operations analysis techn
lems.

Nuclear weapons have increased by
nitude the requirements for reliable
offensive and defensive weapons syste
of these systems can be compromised b
but they are much more frequently com
failure. Those of us who feel that there
frontiers in the "push-button" release o
missiles are simply unaware of the fac
leave human control, they have been a
stored, checked, maintained and mad
beings. It is just this contact that may a

MORALE is an old problem needing
tive solutions. There are morale pro
war as well as during a hot one. We

(Continued on page 5

Condensed from an address at the convention of the American Psychological Association

JOB . . . not "on the way"

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

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LONDON—Sabena Belgian Airlines recently linked England with Europe by an experimental helicopter flight, first ever made from the center of Brussels to the center of London. One of the airlines' Sikorsky S-55 passenger helicopters flew the cross-channel route in 2 hours 45 minutes, landing at London's South Bank heliport.

ANTARCTIC—Flying over ice-choked seas, S-55 helicopter from the Argentine Navy recently rescued 20 men vir tually marooned for the past two years on Graham Land peninsula. The Sikorskys, operated from the deck of ar Argentine transport vessel, made six round trips t bring the stranded men to safety.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS

JAPAN—One of eleven Sikorsky S-55 helicopters built for Japan is pictured above being test flown with new flotation gear. This model is for Japan's official Maritime Safety Agency. Other Sikorsky S-55s are being delivered for service with air and ground branches of that country's National Safety Agency and Maritime Safety Agency.

INDIA—Civil purposes such as crop dusting or sprayin illustrated above, will be one major mission of thr Sikorsky S-55 helicopters being delivered to the Indi Air Force. Because of their rugged dependability a large cargo capacity, versatile Sikorskys are in wide u for military and commercial purposes around the wor

TEXAS—Once more relief and rescue from flood hazards came with the whirling rotors of Sikorsky helicopters, this time during early summer floods along the Rio Grande River in southwest Texas. In one big airlift alone, thirteen H-19s from Gary Air Force Base at San Marcos, carried 266 passengers from a railroad train stranded by the flood at Langtry. They flew precious drinking water and vital supplies to isolated areas, lifted victims from the torrent and marooned people to safety.

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The Army Combat Forces Journal is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The **Journal** strives to

¶ Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

¶ Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

¶ Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

¶ Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

¶ Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

Journal's Journal

I AM happy to announce the addition to our editorial staff of Mr. Norman S. Poser as associate editor. The happiness is double-barrelled. Mr. Poser will ease the work load on the editor and other members of the staff and he will, we are confident, help us produce a more interesting magazine for you. Mr. Poser had valuable experience in military journalism during his two years of Army service that ended last November. During most of that time he was on the staff of the *Infantry School Quarterly* where he performed routine editorial chores and also contributed by-line articles. He has also written for *Coronet* and served an apprenticeship as a reporter on the Daytona, Florida, *News-Journal*. Mr. Poser is a New Yorker and a graduate of Harvard University in the class of 1948. Between his Harvard years and his induction into the Army he was able to squeeze in a year of study at the Sorbonne in Paris.

THE PUBLISHER

PAST AND PRESENT

THE JOURNAL'S FIRST HALF CENTURY

The Turning Wheel .....
Pass in Review ..... *Col. R. Ernest Dupuy*

THE CURRENT SCENE

The Sensitive Adjustment of Men to Machines, *Cmdr. Jack W. Dunlap* **Cover**
What Is the Army's Story? ..... *Maj. John H. Cushman*
What Is a Soldier Worth in "Civilian Equivalents"? .....

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Self-Propelled Guns Can Be Dropped. .... *Capt. John C. Burney, Jr*

DEPARTMENTS

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Front and Center 14
The Word from the Schools .
Irons in the Fire .....
The Month's Books 59

The special section devoted to the JOURNAL'S *Fiftieth Birthday cro out a number of regular departments this month.*

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Doughboys' Protector

● "Life of a Jaycock" [July] was interesting as well as an enlightening note to me.

Wish to let you know that we artillerymen appreciate one outstanding sentence: "But to me the most useful show of all was the demonstration of types of supporting fires staged by artillery elements . . ."

Of course, one of the primary missions of artillery is to protect the hide of "Honorary Doughboys" by the massing and maneuvering of artillery fire on the battlefield.

We shall strive to accomplish this mission continually.

LT. COL. ARLEY L. OUTLAND
99th Field Artillery Bn
Camp Crawford, Japan

Soldiering, a Way of Life

● I have just read Lt. Col. Donovan Yeuell's "Soldiering is a Way of Life" [September]. Colonel Yeuell is to be complimented on an article which pinpoints, in a most lucid and unequivocal fashion, some of the major ailments which have plagued the Army since World War II. His solution is as simple as it is logical, to give the Army, at all levels and echelons of command, back to the individuals charged with commanding it. Also, his reiteration of the ancient principle, that loyalty is a two-way street, is a happy and timely one. Further, I feel that few can dispute his thought that the Army is full of leaders longing for the opportunity to lead; to lead, that is, free of the innumerable hobbling influences which have, in recent years, tended to surround the leader with a nauseating wall of frustration.

COL. WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER
Washington, D. C.

August Editorial

● Congratulations from a 2d Armored Division soldier for your great editorial in the August issue: "General Gavin, and We Don't Mean 'Slim Jim'."

I am one of many who were impressed by General Gavin's article and I am surprised and a bit worried about the reaction you so ably described in your opening paragraph. Let us hope that other high ranking officers will ally themselves with General Gavin and push for true mobility. . . .

I had the privilege of serving as an enlisted man under both General Patton and General Walker and if they were still alive I am sure they would wholeheartedly support General Gavin in his efforts to create a new "cavalry." And so will many able commanders who want to create a fast moving, hard hitting, effective fighting force.

CAPT. FRANCIS L. LION
APO 185, New York, N. Y.

● Your . . . editorial shows courage; makes its point clear and emphatic. It a arouses questions, at least to me. You h so clearly explained what is wrong. W are these errors hampering our natio defense? My father always insisted t ignorance was the root of all evil, wl admitting that some people were hard educate. Yet, if we could see a clear ture most of us could go ahead with as ance.

Is not the basic question: how do truly unify? . . . Let's get our prioritie the right order.

"Long hairs" reach their acme of th in "how many A-bombs equal a divis equal a bomber wing, equal a carrier force?" Unfortunately that weirdly phr formula is in essence the key to U survival.

Should world war engulf us, D-day lutions will be too late. If we concede, it is folly to do otherwise, that our f will not have a complete monopoly courage, stamina, and skilled leader the right combination of the right wea at the critical times and places will p ably be decisive. How do we make t vital decisions far enough in advance t able to translate them into weapons ganization, and doctrine?

This calls for priorities to be devel under true unification. If we should termine that "n" battleships are esse upon war's onset, while "r" divisions

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be needed "y" months later, it becomes the duty of every soldier and airman—as well as every sailor—to strive uncompromisingly for "n" battleships.

What value all of these wonderful troop carrier, cargo airplanes if hostile fighters and bombers rule the air? You say, "the Army is left dependent upon the Air Force for troop transport and the development of troop transport aircraft." Is not the Army equally dependent upon the Navy for sea transport? Is not the Air Force dependent upon the Army for construction and defense of its air bases and upon the Army and Navy for most of its logistics?

Isn't the question: What do we (the U.S. and not any single service) need for defense? In what quantities do we need each group of requirements? In what priority do we need them? What value the mightiest ground force in the world, lacking air and sea supremacy? Or reverse the question if you like.

More strength to the JOURNAL as you plug for Unification. Continue to hammer against "little accomplishments" by the services. But look at the whole problem. Budgets can't be divided into thirds, or on a personnel strength basis, or because of political (or other) influence. We can't —in these United States—afford the separate luxuries of "air power," "sea pow and "land power". We must have nati power to retain our freedom, our wa life. We must seek that national p through true Unification. . . .

COL. GEORGE C. REINH
Retired
Santa Monica, Calif.

• *Our thanks for a penetrating l by a distinguished soldier just rec retired. To reverse the question a suggests, we would ask how can ground force—the Army—achieve ground supremacy that the air an forces (and the U.S.) are deper upon? Only by creating an army th superior in every respect (except in bers) to the enemy. This include best possible organization at all l the best men, trained better; the weapons for superior fire power; the vehicles (ground and air) for superio bility. True unification does not taking away a single essential from one of the services. It means furni everything each needs, but in an or priority. Thus the question bec What order of priority should be the Army's need for mobility? In a sonableness we say a much highe ority than it has had in the past de*

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

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Soviet Strength

● I was interested in the reprint of Field Marshal Montgomery's statement of Soviet strength which appeared in "The Month's Reading" [August]. It may be of interest to your readers to know the Soviet Army has been steadily increased since 1950 and as of 1 January 1954 numbered 247 mobilized divisions of the following types: 67 tank divisions, 61 artillery divisions, 55 rifle divisions, 41 mechanized divisions, 10 arctic warfare divisions, 8 paratroop divisions, and 5 cavalry divisions.

Viscount Montgomery omitted the inclusion of some 239 Chinese Communist divisions, 12 North Korean divisions, and 8 Viet Minh divisions when mentioning Soviet satellite strength. Mobilized Communist divisions now number upwards of 586.

Another point is the motorization of Soviet rifle divisions. As early as 1938 the Soviet Army included some 30 rifle divisions motorized to company level. However most of these were destroyed during the summer and fall of 1941. An important change in the last six years has been the reduction of cavalry divisions (horse) from 15 in 1948 to 5 in 1954.

The Red Chinese forces are currently undergoing reorganization along Soviet lines. Two tank divisions are being entirely equipped with Russian tanks. The Chinese Air Force has 4,000 Russian advisors attached and is rapidly completing new bases. Red China also has granted eight na bases to the Soviet Navy (Malatow, Tsi tao, Lienyunkung, Chusan, Amoy, S tow, Kwangchowan, and Yulin) and 3,000 Russian experts (mainly submari attached to the Red Chinese navy.

JOHN S. ARVID

San Francisco, Calif.

Cover Soldier

● I was surprised to find my picture

The May 1954 cover:
35th Infantry OP on Old Bald

the May 1954 cover (*see cut*). The p graph was made several months ago regimental observation post in the Baldy" sector. Our main purpose w observe the enemy positions on the side of the demilitarized zone.

It was an honor to be used as a cov your magazine.

SFC WILLIAM R. H

APO 25, San Francisco, Calif.

Functional Insignia

● Right now, at the time when the is reviving specialist ratings, it would to be a good idea for all of the servi bring their insignia up-to-date by ir ing the name of the specialty withi traditional insignia. For example, the "Medical Technician" would appe neat and legible letters within the in of such a specialist.

One big advantage, as I see it, is t the event of an atomic or thermon attack on an American city, armed specialists of every kind will be in demand, but civilian ignorance of m insignia will make it difficult to use to the fullest possible extent.

SGT HUGH M. MILL

APO 45
San Francisco, Calif.

'Decay of Duty'

● Mr. Don Murray's "Virtue of In and Col. Wiener's "Lament for a Sl [both July 1954] can profitably be together. Mr. Murray's editorial rep what must be a rather rare associa military fortitude in a patriotic caus pathology; "glorious insanity" indee insanity. Has such an aura of men ease ever attached to the defen

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

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

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Thermopylae, or of the Alamo, or to the attackers at Balaclava? In other than peace-loving societies, they could well be taken for granted.

The common denominator of the criticisms of Mr. Murray and Col. Wiener might be summarized as the "Decay of Duty." High performance of duty is bracketed with psychosis; while condoning its evasion helps build a "fine record." Authority goes all out for obligations and ends up with no rights; liberty goes all out for rights and ends up with no obligations. Our freedom takes pride in having produced the highest living standard yet known. But what do high living standards produce—what have they always produced among nations? Softness, physical and moral; then tougher peoples move in.

I am reminded of a sentence from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's *The Last Galley* which refers to the Carthaginians in their final conflict with Rome: "And they understood too late that it is the law of heaven that the world is given to the hardy and the self-denying, whilst he who would escape the duties of manhood will soon be stripped of the pride, the wealth and the power, which are the prizes that manhood brings."

Sir Arthur meant this as a warning to Britain. It went largely unheeded, with results that we know. The parallel with our own half-century later situation is not too distant.

FREDERIC L. WELLS

Newton Highlands, Mass.

Co. B, 35th Infantry

● I enjoy very much your excellent publication but a sense of pride for a fine fighting rifle company forces me to call your attention to an error in "The Defense of a Battery Position" [June]. Capt. Russell Gugeler, in describing the September action in the Pusan Perimeter, states: "These attacks [by the North Korean Army] achieved limited success and carried combat into the rear areas of the American front lines. One penetration fell aga the 35th Infantry . . . soon after midn on the morning of the 3 September. enemy pushed Company B from its p tion . . ."

I was at this time a platoon leade Baker Company of the 35th, commar by Capt. Robert Dillard, which occupi key position on a high mountain overl ing the highway from Chinju to Ma From early August, when we attacked captured this peak with intense fightin weather above 105 degrees to mid-Sep ber when we marched down to attack in September "Breakout", Baker was atta heavily, shelled frequently, and suff approximately a 50 per cent casualty t over but never lost an inch—the com perimeter was never broken. The arti fought as courageously as described rear area action was heavy but Compa was unmoved and still firing. The pany was supplied by air-drop for a period, but communications were opened and our dead and wounded transported to the rear.

Baker Company of the 35th later ca a proud record into North Korea and selected to become a part of the fa "Task Force Dolvin" in late Novemb 1950.

I protest the phrase "pushed Compa from its position."

CAPT. ALFRED M. A

Hqs Det 7822 Sta. Comp. Unit
APO 696, New York, N. Y.



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

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



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Front And Center

Any attempt to soften the responsibility of men captured by the enemy to reveal any information beyond the traditional "name, rank and service number" will receive the determined opposition of the Army. The subject is under study by an *ad hoc* committee appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and the Army representatives—Brig. Gen. H. P. Powell and Col. Elmer Schmierer, both of G1—are girded for battle with a general staff study that adamantly opposes any softening of a prisoner of war's responsibilities for withholding military information from the enemy. It may be a difficult position to maintain as it is anticipated that a more lenient attitude will be proposed.

It must be a rare soldier indeed who hasn't become aware that the Army is using a great number of psychologists on a large number of research projects. Psychologists under government contract have ranged all over the world studying soldiers and their ways of doing things. According to Jack W. Dunlap, the President of the Division of Military Psychologists of the American Psychological Association (see Cover 2), *there are 242 members of the Division, all engaged in some activity of military interest.*

The old problem of how to keep the Army up to a high standard of efficiency in the face of a declining re-enlistment rate and 24-month draftees was mentioned by the Vice Chief of Staff, General Charles L. Bolte, in his talk before the National Security Commission of the American Legion. The re-enlistment rate for eligible Regular Army soldiers dropped from 24.8 per cent in Fiscal Year 1953 to 17.4 per cent in 1954, General Bolte said. The problem caused by large numbers of 24-month draftees was pinpointed by General Bolte when he observed that "we must continue to expect an extremely high turn-over rate and thus a heavy training burden which is not only expensive in terms of money but also occupies the time and effort of a significant number of our career personnel."

Legal battles are in process in a number of states over whether local tax collectors can levy taxes against Wherry project housing on federally-owned land. If it is finally established that such taxes cannot be levied, tenants stand to get a rebate. In some cases court action has resulted in a lower rate of taxation rather than no taxes at all.

The American Legion's National Security Commission which has long advocated Universal Military Training is less than enthusiastic about the Administration's current advocacy of a compulsory reserve law. The position of the Legion's NSC is that "as long as there are millions of men yet to perform their military service, we will oppose slapping a penalty on the veterans who refuse to take an active part in the Reserve program." President Eisenhower answered that more or less directly in his speech to the Legion convention. The administration's program, he said, "will not unfairly burden men who have already served." The President did not spell out the program but he did say it would be a "No. 1 item" in 1955.

Medical notes from all over. All U. S. soldiers are to be immunized against influenza before 15 November using a modified vaccine incorporating a recently isolated virus strain. Last year only soldiers in overseas commands were given the vaccine and in earlier years the vaccine was given only after cases of respiratory disease broke out. . . . The water systems of certain Army installations will be treated with fluorides in the interests of the teeth of Army brats. The Corps of Engineers will provide the equipment and install the process upon the recommendation of the Surgeon General. The fluorides will be added to water systems that have insufficient natural fluorides; and where it is warranted by the number of children and adolescents.

The transfer of the Army Aviation School from outgrown facilities at Fort Sill to Camp Rucker highlights the boom in the use of Army aircraft. Another item is the announcement that the Transportation School at Fort Eustis will add a number of Aviation organization maintenance courses to its curricula. The Aviation School at Rucker will begin operation in mid-October and it is expected that all courses will have been transferred from Sill to Rucker by February 1955. Basic training of Ar Aviators will continue to be the resp sibility of the Air Force, conducted San Marcos, Texas. Another str blown up by the Army Aviation w is the creation of an Army Aviation D sion in the G3 section of Third Ar headquarters.

There are now thirty top level civil jobs in the Department of Defense the services, and Secretary Wilson admitted it is difficult to find men w can fill these "big important jobs." C didates for the jobs have to meet th five requirements, he told reporters: They must be honest. (2) They m know something about the work t will be doing and be interested in le ing more. (3) They must like the w and must not think they are sick w they sweat. (4) They must have g habits. (5) They must be damned fo otherwise they would stay where t are.

The psychologists who have b working for several years to improve fantry training techniques have fo that they get better results when sc tific methods are teamed with mili know-how. In consequence, psychol cal research outfits engaged in infa research have added retired infantry ficers to their staffs. Dr. Francis E. Jo director of Human Research Unit N at Fort Benning, said recently that fessional psychologists needed ex help from soldiers and engineers. " important to have available within tcam military-professional and engir professional skills of the highest orc he said.

The many changes Congress w into the 1954 income tax law will little effect on the average soldier. of the changes affect the taxes of per who have income from sources o than salary. If you fall in that fortu category it would be wise to mak investigation. The law does sim income reporting procedures for l salaried persons who are without inc other than salaries and this will a some soldiers. When the Internal F nue Bureau regulations, based on 1954 law, are published, the Army probably make the necessary inform available to all commands.

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

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

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

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Vol. I JULY, 1904 No. I

JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES INFANTRY ASSOCIATION

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

The cover of the first issue of *Infantry Journal*. The border and type were printed in blue ink on white cover paper. The size of the page was six by nine inches.

The first page of the first issue of *The Field Artillery Journal*. The first few bound volumes in the Association's archives do not include outside covers of the several issues. They may have been removed to facilitate binding.

The Field Artillery Journal

Vol. I JANUARY-MARCH, 1911 No. I

THE UNITED STATES FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION

Soon after the separation, in 1907, of the field artillery from the coast artillery, the question of the organization of a field artillery association and of the publication of a magazine in the interest of that arm of the service began to receive attention, and during the next three years there was considerable correspondence on and discussion of the subject. By the first of June, 1910, the correspondence had shown so much interest among field artillery men in the formation of an association and so many had expressed an earnest desire for and their willingness to support a field artillery journal, that it seemed evident that an organization could be made a success. A number of officers of the field artillery of the regular army and the organized militia were assembled at Fort Riley, Kansas, to participate in a school of instruction, and on June 7, 1910, a meeting of these officers was held to take the subject under consideration. At that meeting an organization was formed and a constitution adopted. The constitution contains the following provisions:

The Association shall consist of (1) active members and (2) associate members.

The following shall be eligible to active membership:

Commissioned officers on the active lists of the field artillery of the regular army and of the organized militia of the several states, territories and District of Columbia; provided, that officers of the regular army when separated from the field artillery, by promotion or detail in staff departments, shall not thereby lose their status as active members.

The following shall be eligible to associate membership:

(a) Commissioned officers on the retired lists of the regular army and of the organized militia of the several states, territories and District of Columbia.

(b) Those, who, as commissioned officers, either regular, militia or volunteer, have served with batteries or larger units of field artillery in time of war.

(c) Commissioned officers of the regular army and of the organized militia of the several states, territories and District of Columbia, not now belonging to the field artillery, who have served at least one year as commissioned officers in field artillery.

(d) General officers of the regular army, except as provided in Section 2 of this Article, and of the organized militia of the several states, territories and District of Columbia.



The Journal's First Half Century

THE WHEEL OF TIME

HE wheel of time had made 129 turns for the U. S. Army when the *Journal of the United States Infantry sociation* was born—and delivered in a cover printed infantry blue ink *(see cut opposite page)*. It was 1904 d a time of ferment for the U.S. Army. An energetic esident and a capable Secretary of War had so vigorously rganized the topside of the Army that tremors were felt ough every echelon. The new magazine was the product of an Army that was the sum of its several parts rather than an integrated whole, and an infantry arm disturbed by the changes and determined to match the dominant influence Cavalry and Seacoast Artillery were reputed to hold in high places of government.

The name of the new magazine made clear its legitimacy. The U. S. Infantry Association was an organization of Regular Army infantry officers formed in 1894 from an

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Infantry Society that had been organized a year earlier at Fort Leavenworth. At its very first meeting, the Infantry Association had voted to issue a "publication of a literary character," but it wasn't until ten years later—and after a war that had added little public luster to the Army's good name—that the magazine appeared. For some years the Association had been dormant, but in March 1904 it was reorganized at a meeting in the offices of the War Department and plans were prepared for early publication of a magazine whose purpose would be "to promote the efficiency of the infantry arm . . . by maintaining its best standards and traditions, by fostering *esprit de corps* . . ."

The very first issue started off with a bit of *esprit* by publishing a "Toast to the Infantry" which had been evoked a year earlier in Detroit by General H. S. Hawkins at a banquet of the Society of the Army of Santiago de Cuba. In a few pages of random comment under the heading "Editorial Suggestions" there appears in that first issue a sentence that could quite appropriately be reprinted today with little change in context or emphasis. It reads: "Target practice and physical training are of vital importance, and the one great question before the military world today is: How shall Infantry advance to the attack?" In the final sixteen pages of the first issue, the full membership list was printed; a total of 1,117 names (including some duplication). Among the members were two second lieutenants of the 30th Infantry: Walter Krueger and George C. Marshall, Jr. Other members included the Chief of Staff of the Army (and President of the Infantry Association) General John C. Bates, Major General Arthur MacArthur (his son, an engineer lieutenant, was then in the Philippines and within a year would be an observer with the Japanese in Manchuria), and Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss—the first of the century's "soldier-statesmen" in Newton Baker's phrase. Among the colonels, majors, captains and lieutenants were men whose names would be familiar to newspaper readers of two continents fourteen and forty years later.

THE first issue of the Infantry's magazine did not go unnoticed by other elements of the military press. Significant comment on its appearance came from the respected "Journal of the Military Service Institution," an all-service publication, founded in 1878, published from Governors Island with the consent of the Secretary of War, and the editorial assistance of members of the West Point faculty.

"The Journal of the U. S. Infantry Association is the latest recruit to the small but increasing army of service periodicals," the Journal of the MSI told its readers in its issue of September-October 1904. And it added: "So far the reason for the existence of the new association is clearly expressed and does not necessarily imply undue competition with or independence of other branches of the service."

The editorialist may have had his tongue in his cheek; he continued with a stricture: "In the past, one of the weak points in our 'officers' corps' has been a lack of cohesion in the promotion of army interest and a tendency to break up into cliques, each working to improve its own condition, regardless of the welfare of the others. . . ."

The author of those words was no young, forward-looking upstart, but a retired brevet brigadier general of Civil War cavalry. But he and the magazine that gave him space were bucking too powerful a tide and before many turns of the wheel of time the "Journal of the Military Service Institution" would wither and die while publications dedicated to a single arm or branch proliferated. *The Field Artillery Journal* began publication in 1910 and the magazine that was to become "The Military Engineer" in 1909; others appeared after World War I, notably "Army Ordnance" and "The Quartermaster Review." And during or after World War II organs of military communications, transportation and chemistry began publication.

THE strong currents that washed away the "Journal of the MSI" and swept in the branch magazines were not capricious creations of men either seeking dominance for their respective branches, or motivated by jealousy. Without doubt both of these were present, but the moving force was the existence of a very real need for technical information and training. The Army school system was uncertain in 1904. There was no infantry school as such (Fort Benning became the infantry's "home" in 1918). The Field Artillery School was established at Fort Sill in 1911. Only the Seacoast Artillery and the Cavalry were well fixed in 1904. The former had had a school at Fort Monroe since 1824 and the Cavalry School at Fort Riley had been opened in 1892. Did the fact that the two arms with strong service magazines were the arms that had firmly established schools lead infantrymen to believe that the existence of a strong infantry magazine would lead to the establishment of a school for infantry officers?



This need not be debated here. The point is that in 1904 the government did not provide its professional officers with all of the opportunities, technical literature and equipment they needed to advance in their chosen profession. The flood of manuals, bulletins, directives, schedules, aids, and texts that spew from government presses today did not exist at this time. For many turns of the wheel of time officers had to look to themselves for more than bare professional nourishment. In consequence the service press grew because it had a clear mission to perform and performed it. This was advantageous to the service, but there were also two disadvantages of large consequence, neither of which was immediately apparent. One was the growth of branch loyalty at the expense of Army loyalty. The other was the development of officers well trained technically but lacking a balanced, broad view of the larger problems that affect military operations.

First there was the problem of combined training. Maneuvers and field exercises were rare and when they were held few officers had an opportunity either to work on a higher staff directing several arms or even to observe other arms in action. The second issue of *Infantry Journal* reported on four small maneuvers held during the summer of 1904. From the tone of the reports it would seem that they were the most ambitious exercises the Army had been able to put on in several years. Two of the maneuvers were what we would now call field training periods of California and Ohio National Guard units. The other two also included National Guard units with Regular Army units and were more nearly like maneuvers as we know them. It is interesting to note that the published critiques of both observers and umpires emphasized problems of small units; march discipline, for example. If there was a special effort to consider the best way to effect team play between field artillery and infantry, for example, there is no mention of it. Nor is there any mention of the work of higher staffs.

In this same year the school at Leavenworth was reorganized with a two-year course, the second year being devoted to staff study. (There is a great temptation to say *again reorganized* as the record shows that the school was in an almost constate state of flux.

Such problems as military and industrial mobilization and higher logistics were beyond the interest of the great majority of officers in 1904. Few of them had more than a vague notion that soldiers ought to know something about establishing requirements in order that munitions of war could be produced in time and in quantity in the event of war.

Line officers wholeheartedly accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that the men and animals in their command were properly cared for. But they seemed not to look beyond the nearest supply head. It would appear that they had great faith in the Quartermaster, Subsistence, Ordnance and other supply departments.

They knew what it was to serve in far off lands, but the logistics needs of the forces in the Philippines and the pipeline requirements seem not to have disturbed many



line officers. (Although it would be naïve to believe that every soldier in the Islands always had everything he needed when he needed it!)

Although there seems to have been much certainty in those days that Western civilization would bring peace and prosperity to all of the world, war in Manchuria between Japan and Russia was being waged. The lessons of the Boer War were just breaking into the service magazines. In its fourth issue *Infantry Journal* was to print in its entirety the famous military best-seller of the Boer War: *The Defence of Duffer's Drift* by then Captain E. D. Swinton of the British Army. "Duffer's Drift" is a small-unit tactical study that was still in demand during the Second World War. Many U. S. Infantry and other officers are familiar with every detail of the six dreams of Sir Backsight Forethought!

In its time Sir Backsight's story was an excellent way to teach tactics and this magazine still receives an occasional "modernization" of it, written by an officer aspiring to break into print.

SIR BACKSIGHT expressed opinions neither on the origins of the Boer War, nor on the problems that would be created for the British Empire by that war, nor on the expanding German Empire's interest in Africa and the Boers. Sir Backsight had no reason to be concerned with these problems. He was a soldier fighting for the Empire wherever it needed him and he relied upon No. 10 Downing Street and the War Office to handle the larger problems of the domain without confiding in him.

And so it was with his American comrade in arms. The problem of allies, of creating an effective coalition force, was beyond his terms of reference. The idea of working with other peoples, sympathizing with their aspirations and helping them realize them by giving them military equipment and know-how, was also beyond him. Others could speak emotionally of "our little brown brothers", but when the soldier used the phrase it was in derision; he knew how much cunning treachery and hatred the native had for the white man, whether he came as a conqueror or a liberator. Education and liberation could only follow pacification—a nice-Nellie word for a cruel and difficult kind of war.

In short there was really no reason for the soldier of the line to be concerned with logistics, allies, military missions

—or atomic warfare. So his branch journal filled his needs admirably and performed a worthwhile function.

It also increased his branch consciousness beyond the needs of normal *esprit*. In this it was blameless for it is the nature of any organized association that becomes institutionalized to represent the most selfish interest of its membership. We must not be too harsh; compared with some business, fraternal and professional groups, the military associations have been (and are) paragons of broad-minded tolerance. The comparison is not entirely apt, because the arms of the association are elements of, and have a common loyalty to, the United States Army. Soldiers of different branches are not rivals but comrades in arms with a common mission and a common goal.

THE wheel of time has turned a full fifty times and again the Army is in a state of ferment and soldiers are uncertain. The original objectives of the branch associations have largely been taken over by the splendid Army school and training systems. The problem today is not one of branch survival and recognition, but of Army survival and recognition. It is time for a closing of ranks.

The story of the turning wheel from 1904 to 1954 is a fascinating one. But the true story is the story of the Army and not the story of Infantry Journal, The Field Artillery Journal, *or* THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. *To follow the turning wheel, the editors asked Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, Artillery-retired, to tell the story of where the Army was in 1904 and what happened to it on the journey into 1954. It is not a story of wars and battles, of derring-do and fortitude, or tactics, or organization, or matériel, or logistics. All of these are treated very incidentally. It is the story of soldiers and their womenfolk; of how they lived the Army life; of what they thought and why; of what they did to the Army, and of what the Army did to them.*

It is a magnificent formation. The proud banners of a momentous half century whip in the breeze as the review approaches . . .

THE military life of **Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy,** Artillery-retired, comes close to spanning the half century he reviews here. The editors have gathered from a number of conversations with him that he had chosen the military profession while still a boy. In 1904, when the *Infantry Journal* was born, he was a seventeen-year-old student in a military school, and six years later, when *The Field Artillery Journal* was founded, he had been a member of the New York National Guard for more than a year. He entered the Regular Army during World War I and served in France with the Coast Artillery Corps as a battery commander, regimental adjutant and operations officer, earning three battle clasps. After the war he transferred to the Field Artillery and subsequently served in the U. S. and the Philippines. He attended the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill and the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. During the Western European campaigns of the Second World War, COLONEL DUPUY was supervisor of press, radio and pictorial coverage for SHAEF and was a member of the official surrender party at Berlin on 8 May 1945. He retired at his own request in 1946. During his military career he wrote a round dozen books, chiefly on military subjects, and fiction and non-fiction for the military and popular press. His latest book is the excellent, *Men of West Point,* written for the Military Academy's Sesquicentennial. COLONEL DUPUY makes his home at Ashburn, Virginia, in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

PASS IN REVIEW

Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy

I am a soldier and unapt to weep
Or to exclaim on fortune's fickleness.
HENRY VI

FIFTY years ago *Infantry Journal* was born; a modest professional quarterly written by soldiers for soldiers. Among the past editors and editorial assistants one finds such names as Nolan, Marshall, Muir, Ansell and Benedict. Among its authors one notes such names as MacArthur, Krueger, Stilwell, Patton, Patch and Palmer, to name but a few.

Much has happened to this Army of ours since *Infantry Journal* first went to press. The magazine has witnessed the tremendous growth and transformation of the old Indian-fighting Army to a clanking, mechanized array as the horse and the mule faded from the picture to be replaced by the motor. It has seen the development of tank and antitank. It has noted the disappearance of the old Krupp 3-inch field piece, the coming—and going—of the French 75mm, and a later tide of more powerful weapons, from the 105 and the 155 to the electronically directed Skysweeper and the monstrous 280mm "atomic cannon." Its birth was almost coincident with the birth of air power, and it has watched war become three-dimensional.

When the *Journal* first saw light, the combat forces were talking of horse-mounted infantry as means of hustling increased fire power to vital points. We still seek that hustle, but now we use air power instead of animal power.

The atomic bomb, beginning with the first dread mushroom blast over Hiroshima; guided missiles, hovering helicopters, radar's electronic path-finding; all these the *Journal* has witnessed as our Army's battle equipment grew to Jules Verne space-probing dimensions. It has seen them, its editors and authors have argued about them, and pleaded for them. The *Journal* has not been a quiet, sidelines observer, but an active participant in the passing scene. There has never been an ivory tower for *Journal* editors, and few hidden inner sanctums where an editor could retire for thought and contemplation—although such a refuge is a needful thing at times.

When the *Journal* was first launched our Army consisted of thirty-one regiments of infantry, five of artillery, and ten of cavalry. It was more an aggregation of arms and services vying with one another than of one highly integrated battle team. The spate of service journals springing to life during the 1890s and early 1900s, each of them touting, so to speak, the component whose name it bore, indicates the truth of this observation. The team concept began to crystallize with World War I, but not until many years later would the unhealthy splintering effect of intramural bickering begin to be recognized.

SIX years after *Infantry Journal* appeared, *The Field Artillery Journal*—mouthpiece of that arm whose pride it has always been that it exists to support the infantry in battle—sprang into being. And in 1950 both magazines combined as today's ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, dedicated to the proposition that the Army should be a unified whole.

Since their inception these magazines have been an intimate and unofficial forum for the airing of the aspirations, trials and professional opinion of the Army in general, and the combat forces in particular. More than that, they have provided for the American people a window flung wide upon the activities of that Army and its intellectual processes.

Peering now at our Army trudging past the 1954 milestone on the long road from 1904, we call to mind an old adage—new lamps for old. We've traded in our old Army for a new one.

And for what gain?

Increased efficiency, new weapons, more fire power, slide-rule operations and machine records to insure that round pegs go into round holes, square pegs into square. Specialization, career management, mechanization of both men and matériel; such are the keynotes of today's brave new Army in a not-so-brave old world.

It's an Army complete in weapons, education and American uplift, from atomic artillery and guided missiles to USO strip-tease girls and pinball machines. It is—so blares the recruiting publicity on radio and TV—the best-fed, best-paid, best-clothed, best-quartered army on God's footstool. It should be the best-led army, too.

Why, then, is it said that "the Army's gone to hell in a bucket"? Why do Regulars resign? Why do young men, their draft boards breathing down their necks, act as did that youth on a TV quiz program several months ago?

Flung on the screen in sailor's uniform, and asked why he had joined the Navy, this man grinned and answered:

"So I wouldn't have to go in the Army!"

A great gust of applause moved the speaker to add that he was a bo's'n's mate, and well contented with his nautical lot: groundkeeper of a baseball diamond at a naval base. That's the Navy's business; someone has to be groundkeeper, and maybe he rates a petty officer's crow.

The point is that today, if we are to believe what we hear and see and read, Army service is unpopular, either as a profession or as temporary required civic duty. Has it always been so?

The 'Big Change'

It was not like this in the ald armee,
In the days beyond recall,
In the rare old, fair old army days
No one ever worked at all.

JOSEPH F. WARE

WE can find out only by making an inventory of the accumulations of fifty years of Army life. Such an inventory cannot be the precise listing of stock-control systems, for it is an inventory of soldiers' ways of thinking and doing and living. It is first and foremost an inventory of human beings. The late Major John H. Burns, brilliant editor of *Infantry Journal* in the late 1930s, put it in these words in 1937:

> The officer who believes that American civilization as it is evolving will give him the same human material that fought at Gettysburg or in the Argonne is living in a fool's paradise. . . . Whether this American will make a different or better soldier, no one can say. . . .

The inventory of fifty years of soldiering cannot make a claim to even reasonable thoroughness if it does not take note of the background—of the nation that created the Army and supplied it with its every resource. In recent years historians, social scientists and students of technology have explored and reported on what happened in America and to Americans between the end of the Spanish-American War and the beginnings of the Korean conflict. And they all agree, no matter what their specialized field of study, that the half century is most aptly described in the phrase given it by the late Frederick Lewis Allen. "The Big Change" was

in politics and government, in education, scientific research and invention, in industry and business, in society—the way Americans lived and what they thought and dreamed—and in the military services.

What a fifty years it has been!

When the *Journal* made its bow in 1904 the machine age was budding. Two madmen named Wright had actually lifted themselves off the ground in a flying machine. Another man named Ford felt that the automobile—that millionaire's playtoy—had come to stay. Female suffrage was a live issue. Gargantuan fortunes and stark poverty went hand in hand in a land where the horse, the bicycle, the cable- and trolley-car constituted the sole prime movers of local land transportation.

THE Newport set, odd mixture of pseudo-aristocracy and robber baron, was, one learned from the Sunday newspapers, bartering its daughters and its money for European antiques—human, architectural and artistic. The national melting pot was simmering in city slums and factory districts, with new ingredients added by the stream of immigration flowing through Ellis Island: the Polak, the Wop, the Hunky and the East European Jew were replacing the Irish, German and Scandinavian immigrants of a previous day. Many of them and their sons and grandsons were to be staunch soldiers and excellent battle leaders of their adopted country on the battle grounds of two world wars and a Korean conflict. Look at the roster of Medal of Honor winners. Here are a few names picked at random from men who earned the Medal of Honor in Korea:

Cafferata, Desiderio, Gomez, Jecelin, Kouma, Krzywski, Miyamura, Oullette, Rosser, Simanek—and even a Red Cloud, the only original American, perhaps, but only one of a great host of true American men.

In 1904, the Grand Army of the Republic was fading as a factor in American politics; its surviving members a bit on the crotchety side. Their noses were put out of joint by a younger generation of veterans relating new, strange tales of war in odd places; of black-eyed señoritas, of El Caney and San Juan Hill, of battle and death in rustling *cogon* grass, of loot in Pekin.

There were no radios, no television, no electric labor-saving devices. The telephone was a rarity in homes where, while the discreetly covered spittoon was bowing out, the antimacassar and the what-not were still standard front-parlor equipment.

Most Americans of that period would give you a blank stare at mention of the name of Karl Marx, though every once in a while out of Europe came black tales of anarchists and nihilists who went about blowing up Tsars and pistolling Empresses. We had our own Mafia scare, drowned in blood by an irate citizenry of New Orleans; before that we had the Hay Market "massacre" in Chicago.

In the White House an irrepressible extrovert named Theodore Roosevelt was doing much to bring about what Frederick Lewis Allen has aptly termed "a revolt of American conscience." Capitalism, it appeared, was slowly but irrevocably becoming democratic, economics evolving as a science, and all to the betterment of the American people. The brash young giant among nations was coming out of swaddling clothes.

In the midst of this ferment sat a little Regular Army, in semi-cloistered life in some forty-odd military posts scattered through the United States in a pattern mostly based on the exigencies of just-ended Indian-fighting days.

The Cloistered Army: 1904-16

There's Sergeant John McCafferty and
Corporal Donahue,
They make us march up to the crack in
gallant Company Q.
The drums they roll, upon my soul, for
that's the way we go—
Forty miles a day on beans and hay in
the Regular Army, oh!

AUTHOR UNKNOWN

IT was a tight little Army of some 3,000 officers and 50,000 enlisted men; shirt-sleeved and slouch-hatted in the field, but with dress uniforms, parades, and spit and polish in garrison. There was no Organized Reserve Corps—that was still nine years away. There was in fact no reserve at all, for although the Dick Bill of 1903 had for the first time brought the militia of the various states into focus as a potential component, there was no federal authority to order it into service.

This Army, too, was undergoing change, under the Rooseveltian influence. His Secretary of War, a bril-

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liant, patriotic, far-seeing but at times most irascible lawyer named Elihu Root, was rebuilding. There was no financial betterment, of course; a parsimonious Congress had too many other things to think about than any changes in the Pay Act of 30 August 1842, which still governed the cash drawer. A year would pass before the thirteen dollars a month for the lowly private soldier would be upped a princely two bucks.

But Root, recognizing the necessity for progressive military education, had brought about the institution of a Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and on the quiet little peninsula of Washington Barracks, where his War College had been established in 1902, the cornerstone of its new edifice had been laid. Uplift had hit the Army; its impact still very gentle indeed.

OVER in our new-gained area of trusteeship the flames of the Philippine Insurrection had been quenched. The volunteers—those citizen soldiers who had gone to war singing "There'll be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight," and "Ta-ra-ra Boom-de-ay"—had come home. The Regulars were establishing there a rule of life which would forty years later pay immense dividends from a proud and sensitive people. There was still stiff fighting in the Moro islands.

The leader of our first adventure in allied operations —the Boxer Expedition—General Adna R. Chaffee, himself an active link with the Civil War, was now Chief of Staff. And over in Korea young Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur, one year out of West Point, was seeing war at first hand as an observer with the victorious Japanese armies in the Russo-Japanese War. Lieutenant George Catlett Marshall's commission was a scant two years old, while Lieutenant Lesley J. McNair had just doffed cadet gray.

The ruckus caused by mismanagement during the Spanish-American War with its "embalmed beef" scandal, its utterly incompetent and outmoded system of supply and transportation, and its holocaust of disease in mobilization camps, had died down. The remedial steps of instituting a general staff, and the ousting of the bureau-chief system in the War Department, were begun in 1903.

Out of this war with Spain and its aftermath had come the problems of rehabilitating Cuba and the Philippines. Soldiers like Leonard Wood, Scott, Bliss, Pershing, McCoy and many others were showing the nation—not that it gave a tinker's damn—by their wise administration, that the military mind was not so narrow, after all.

Ours was an Army without vote. True, a statute stood on federal books to the effect that military service did not affect legal residence. But few if any states had an absentee ballot provision, and many still had laws stipulating specifically denial of franchise to "idiots, paupers, Indians, soldiers and sailors." So our 1904 Army, though its personnel might sometimes engage in hot political argument, rarely went to the polls. Far different this from today, when with few exceptions, the States recognize the absentee ballot for all members of the armed forces.

CLASS-CONSCIOUS was this Army· 'e hierarchy of rank and command a living thing—from the Chief of Staff down to the most junior corporal who ever impressed his fist upon a slothful recruit, and from Mrs. General to Judy O'Grady, the corporal's wife. It was a class-consciousness that embodied a healthy professional and communal pride.

We should look well upon this aspect of military life at the beginning of the century, for unless one can understand it, this attitude of RHIP—"rank has its privileges"—can be misunderstood by those outside the circle, and abused by some of those within. Here was a deep-rooted condition which would withstand the buffets, the ridicule and the hatred of the people who did not understand, until a very few years ago.

To examine this, one must begin at the beginning. Socially, the status of the commissioned officer of the Army and the Navy was unquestioned; the military ranked with the Church, the law and medicine as the cream of the professions. But that was all.

THE average American civilian knew li[illegible] about and cared less for the Army in 1904. Civ[illegible] memories had faded into mellow reminiscence[illegible] panish-American War and the Philippine I[illegible] in sharp contrast with today when few i[illegible] a the American families without some affiliat[illegible] the armed forces, had drawn but lightly [illegible] next generation. The continuous bickering[illegible] the Indian wars, and the accomplishments of the Regulars on the plains were embraced, so far as the man in the street was concerned, in a nebulous atmosph[illegible] "U.S. Cavalry to the rescue," Custer's last stand [illegible] Buffalo Bill's Wild West.

Hero worship there was, of course. [illegible] roll of great names of the Civil War had been a[illegible] those of Dewey at Manila Bay, and Roosevelt a[illegible] Rough Riders at San Juan Hill. (Kettle Hill it [illegible]ually was.) But the Army—and the Navy, too—as a liv[illegible], breathing entity, part of the national structure, w[illegible] *terra incognita.*

The most interested segment of that 19[illegible] population was the generation of male teen-agers who, between dips into dime-novel exploits of the train-robbing James boys, and of Nick Carter, were revelling on the more succulent fare of G. A. Henty and our own Captain Charles King. More than one member of the West Point classes graduating during the next decade, as well as the young men coming in from civil life, had imagination titillated and career settled by King's vigorous entertaining and veracious novels of Army life.

The general lack of civilian interest may be laid in part to the difficulties of transportation. To visit the average Army post in 1904 meant spending time and trouble

One had to have a definite reason to take the trip to these little islands of isolation. Those civilians who did participate in social events on nearby posts—with exception, of course, of relatives and close friends of Army people—saw in fact only what might be termed the tinsel of Army life. Conversely, the Army had but a partial and disorganized glimpse of civilian life. In consequence, a somewhat self-centered and certainly self-sufficient and self-contained Army and an uninterested civilian population had no common bonds of interest.

THUS the enlisted man coming into the Army in 1904 found himself in an isolated community; a monastic society of sorts, whose father superior was a two-fisted first sergeant and the abbot his company commander. This recruit was a volunteer, who had held up his right hand and solemnly sworn to devote his services to his country for a specified period—usually five years at that time. He slept, ate and worked by bugle call; even his baths were regulated, and God help the uncleanly one—a pair of huskies armed with scrubbing brush and yellow laundry soap took quick action to wash any body odors as well as dirt.

Even in those days, when eggs were selling at twenty-five cents a dozen and bar whiskey at ten cents the glass, wh[illegible] good pair of shoes could be had for three



dollar[illegible] excellent civilian suit for twenty-five dollars, [illegible]en dollars per month and found was no princely [illegible]lument. To say it lacked attractiveness would [illegible] understatement. So the man accepting this contra[illegible] would be one to whom it offered more than the pa[illegible]

Was the [illegible]raction, then, security? Was it a chance for adventure? Was it—remembering that in those days the present [illegible]stem of criminal investigation and identification was in its infancy—was it evasion of the law's clutch? Yes; these and many other considerations affected enlistment. When the nation was prosperous, enlistments fell; in times of panic and depression they rose, and with them rose the quality of the man enlisting.

To sum it up, the enlisted man with a few exceptions was not the cream of the crop of our citizenry. Ours was a combination of Kipling's British Army and the French Foreign Legion. Not for nothing was it customary for first sergeants at monthly muster to warn recruits to "remember your Army name." The private soldier was the ne'er-do-well, the adventurer, and sometimes—but this one either mended his ways or was thrown out—he was a bum. But the American people, sad to say, felt that way about all enlisted men.

Certainly the fact is significant that by 1911 Congress had to place on the federal statutes a law imposing a fine of five hundred dollars upon the proprietor, manager or employee of a public house or place discriminating against soldiers in uniform.

The writer well remembers, too, the furor and front-page stories in the New York City press during the middle 1900s, when one Brigadier General Pershing, in mufti, about to enter a swank hotel, observed that the doorman was clad in the full-dress uniform of a general officer of the Army. He called a policeman and insisted on the arrest of the man on the well-taken charge of impersonating an officer. His action had a very salutary effect.

RETURNING to our recruit, he lived in a red-brick barracks. He ate—usually well, although the food was not Delmonico's—from thick ironware crockery laid upon an immaculately scrubbed bare table top. He learned the feel of his rifle, he shot for record—there were two extra dollars per month for the man who made marksman and five dazzling bucks to him who qualified as expert rifleman. Were he in the artillery, there was extra pay to be gained, too, for those who qualified as gunners, observers, gun pointers, and the like. Other branches also had extra pay to offer for qualified specialists.

He learned his way to the post exchange, where, at prices well below those on the outside, he could obtain his toilet articles, tobacco and other knick-knacks. More than that, he speedily found that did he keep his nose clean, he could obtain those things on credit, to be later subtracted from his pay.

Receipt of this pay was contingent upon two things. First, he had to be present at the monthly muster—a ceremonial roll call dating back to the times when a regiment was the property of an individual, who received its pay in bulk and might, therefore, have interest in padding his payrolls. Next, our soldier, to the merry notes of "Pay Call"—one of the first calls he learned—lined up in dress uniform, side arms and white gloves, the right one neatly folded in his belt, and when his name was called stepped smartly up to a blanket-covered table, saluted and received his pay from the paymaster, over whose shoulder breathed the first sergeant and the company commander to identify him.

Then, carefully herded back to his company office in barracks, he would undergo the painful process of subtraction, to pay his accrued debts to the post exchange and the company tailor and barber; all carefully listed by the company clerk on a large collection sheet. If he was a Regular, he gave up 12½ cents each month for the Soldiers' Home in Washington.

There might be an additional subtraction, too, from his now rapidly melting thirteen dollars—illegal this,

but widely prevalent. For there was always in a company some individual Shylock, ready and eager to lend to his impecunious comrades, and requiring in return only what barracks slang termed "the soldier's one per cent"—a dollar per month for each ten dollars advanced!

And on payday night, in some carefully curtained back room of barracks, or down in the stable area, might be found the musical click of the ivories rolling on a taut blanket, the muffled thumps of a blackjack game, or the tense concentration of poker, to bring clandestine pleasure and pain to the gamblers' senses. Strictly against regulations, this, but the wise company commander was he who left this matter to the noncommissioned officers, after insuring, by drastic action if necessary, that noncoms and privates did not gamble among one another.

On the other hand, there were always some men who found it quite possible to save money, depositing a few dollars at a time with the Army, toward a tidy nest egg payable at expiration of enlistment.

FOR entertainment, this soldier of 1904 had comparatively few outlets as contrasted to today. But then neither did his civilian contemporaries. In barracks there was the dayroom, fitted up with easy chairs and pool tables, where a man might sit and read—the company subscribed to a variety of periodicals, with *The Police Gazette* the mainstay—or play pool or just chew the fat. There was a post library, too, usually, but movies had not come into vogue, so that post movie theaters would not come for a decade.

Athletics, in the shape of unit baseball and football teams, were popular, as was boxing. But not until after World War I would they become an organized cult and soldier athletes gain special privileges. Not infrequently officers played on these teams. One of the best soldier baseball teams this writer knew had as its battery the skipper and the topkick, a very appropriate combination!

Men whose conduct was good could always obtain passes to seek in the nearest town what slight entertainment was offered to those with slim purses. Payday, of course, brought a rash of requests for passes. Above all, the old soldiers—the men who for a month, two days excepted, were models of deportment and discipline—sought passes for that essential periodical roaring drunk in some civilian dive.

Well knowing this, the company commander would issue these passes with a sigh, perhaps, but then, "single men in barracks don't grow into plaster saints," and he could only hope that he would not later get a message to come to town and bail his erring lambs out of the local calaboose.

THIS brings up the post commander's problem with relation to the adjacent civilian population. The town nearest to an Army post in 1904—is it so much different today?—made money out of the Army. Its shops were patronized, as were its public utilities. And, on the seamy side, its red-light district and its gin mills depended upon Army pay. In some towns, municipal officials found there was money to be made by jailing soldiers "on the loose." And the very pillar of the local church who complained of the licentiousness of the garrison might be drawing fat rents from purveyors of illicit pleasures.

As a result, relationships depended upon the tact and efficiency of the post commander. The local chief of police and municipal judge frequently found that better conditions would prevail if, although erring soldiers might be locked up, they could be called for next day by the provost guard and attended to at home by military courts, and that went for cordial relations. But if the post commander was tactless, or if the venalities of municipal organization waxed fat upon the bonds and fines extracted from frothing company commanders, relations could be and were sometimes very strained.

All in all, it was a tough, two-fisted aggregation into which our recruit of 1904 was dropped. The company commander was king; he would remain so for many more years. Army opinion in 1904—and in fact until World War II—was unanimous in agreeing that by far the finest, most exacting and most exhilarating command in the service was that of company, troop or battery commander.

EXCEPT in line of duty, the enlisted man spoke to the company commander only after he had sought and obtained the first sergeant's permission. He spoke, too, in the third person. Since the first sergeant was appointed by the company commander and held office only at his pleasure, it might be expected that the sergeant could make appropriate decision as to when and why the skipper should be disturbed. However, the company commander usually made it plain to his top that permission should never be refused unless the request be absolutely unessential.

Somewhat similar was the first sergeant's authority for confining men, in emergency, to the guardhouse; a delegated authority, recognized in the slim blue bible —Army Regulations. One might add that in our 1904 Army this measure was infrequently used; no self-respecting first sergeant would normally hide behind regulations when he had a strong right arm to use.

The officer-enlisted man relationship, then, was both autocratic and paternal. It was a very real relationship, for the platoon and company commanders knew their men. Units might change station, but individual rotation of officers was comparatively uncommon. As a result, warm friendships grew up between faithful men and appreciative officers—friendships lasting for lifetime, much to mutual pride.

It was a tough, two-fisted Army, this, with a line between commissioned and enlisted personnel plainly marked. It was, however, a line and not a barrier, as

many fine, self-respecting young soldiers had already proved.

Didn't the official record of the Chief of Staff himself, General Chaffee, lead off with this terse listing: "Pvt sergt and 1 sergt K 6 cav 22 July 1861 to 12 May 1863"? And James Guthrie Harbord, one-time private, corporal, sergeant and quartermaster sergeant in the 4th Infantry, was now a captain in the 11th Cavalry. German-born Walter Krueger, who after a Spanish-American War hitch with the 2d U.S. Volunteers had enlisted in the 12th Infantry, had since 1901 been sporting the then blank shoulder straps of a second lieutenant, 30th Infantry.

And over in the 10th Cavalry, a Negro officer who would be personally respected by two generations of American Regular officers, had stepped across that line, too. Benjamin O. Davis, first commissioned a lieutenant in the 8th U.S. Volunteers, and honorably mustered out at the end of the Spanish-American War, had promptly enlisted in the 9th Cavalry. Rising from private to squadron sergeant major in two short years, he had won his commission in 1901. He would bridge our half-century to see his soldier son, a graduate of West Point in 1936, wearing colonel's eagles in the Air Force.

No, that line between enlisted man and commissioned officer in our Army of 1904 was no caste barrier; rather was it a challenge to the ability of him who would raise his sights beyond it.

IT was a bachelor Army, in the main, our Army of 1904, as far as enlisted men were concerned. Old noncommissioned officers, true, were frequently family men, and quarters were provided for them on post so far as possible. Or they could live off post and draw separate rations. But mainly because of the quarters and financial situation, the marriage of private soldiers was looked upon with disfavor. There was no law or regulation against it, but an enlisted man who married without the permission of his company commander could be refused the right to separate rations, and he was not entitled to quarters on the post. More than that, he could be denied reenlistment, and that meant a great deal in a professional army.

What of the officer—the leader of this aggregation of professional soldiers—whose trade, as Kipling has it, was parade? In 1904 the officer corps—a cross section of our citizenry—was a formalized group, governed by a rigid etiquette and century-old customs of the service. Its segments were West Pointers, men from the ranks, men from civil life, and men who had come in from the Volunteers and the militia after the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection. The pattern was fixed; immutable, some would say. There had been a ripple of unrest and some bitter feeling when the so-called "crime of 1901" brought the last new increment into the group, but by 1904 all was peaceful. Not for another year would the Presidential appointment—perfectly legal at the time—of Captain John J. Pershing to be brigadier general, over the heads of many heavy-breathing oldsters, cause another ripple of dissatisfaction.

One thing all these officers had in common: they were in uniform because they wanted to be in the Army; it was their chosen profession.

Certainly it was not chosen for financial gain. The

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Pay Act of 1842 gave a new second lieutenant $116.67 per month. He might expect, before he reached the age of statutory retirement, to rise perhaps to the grade of colonel for a brief space (generals were another matter, politically appointed, and therefore a gamble) and the princely salary of four thousand dollars a year. (In fairness, $4000 was worth a great deal more in 1904 than it is today.)

Out of his salary the officer provided his own uniforms, his food, his required arms and equipment—from saber and revolver and field glasses to mess kit and bedding roll—as well as the civilian clothing he needed. Were he in the mounted service or on staff duty he provided his own horse—field officers without any compensation, the lower grades drawing an additional one hundred dollars per year with, later, fifty dollars additional for any second mount. And, of course, the mounted officer furnished all his horse equipment.

Out of what was left then of his salary the officer of 1904, were he so minded, could also support a wife and children. Or could he? Well, he did. And, unless the fortunes of war intervened and he went to the Mexican border to live in an adobe hut, or to the Philippines under *nipa* thatch, the officer of 1904 did have spacious quarters in which his family could live with a graciousness certainly far above most of those extant in the Army today. A light-and-heat allowance governed by a complicated seasonal and isothermic chart was of bare sufficiency; loud cries of anguish frequently followed the post quartermaster's presented bill for excess use!

THESE factors, plus the medical care for himself and family, and the right—privilege, if you will—like the enlisted man, to purchase at commissary and post exchange at lower prices than on the outside, were ameliorations to the small pay. After all, there was that guaranteed retirement pay—theoretically two thirds of active duty but actually about one half—when the old war horse was turned back into civil life.

But these things, these so-called "fringe benefits," do not tell the whole story of why a man should choose the Army as a career. They do not explain the relinquishment of that basic right of every American to battle with other Americans in the field of individual enterprise in which—it was certainly apparent by 1904—the good man could rise to financial and social success by survival of the fittest in business or the professions, other than military.

They do not explain why a man, foregoing these opportunities, should willingly embrace a life governed by rigid concepts of discipline and all that goes with the *noblesse oblige* principle of leading men to war, and possibly death on a battlefield.

The answer to the *why* is both simple and complex. "Arms and the man I sing," wrote Virgil. There is no space here for psychological research, so let us leave it at this: the Army officer of 1904 was a man with a vocation for a profession of honor and prestige that demanded a complete self-abnegation to duty and country. The "fringe benefits" constituted a pat on the back.

RECTITUDE was one common characteristic possessed by this corps of officers. The corps was governed by a code—partly written, partly unwritten—some of whose principles reached back through the ages since the profession began and which may be expressed very simply. An officer was expected to be a straight shooter. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman was punished by dismissal from the service. So read the Draconian Articles of War. There was no quibbling; no sliding scale of punishment. Read it:

"*Art. 95.*—Any officer or cadet who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service."

This concept of honor by no means meant wearing a halo. Nor did it mean that every individual who took that solemn oath "to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies both foreign and domestic" was by that act endowed with this precious characteristic. Individuals from time to time fell short of the standard; the group itself did not.

Some of these officers—graduates of the U.S. Military Academy—had had this quality instilled in them by virtue of their four-year stern novitiate, governed by the precept of Sylvanus Thayer: "A cadet does not lie, cheat or steal." Others had attained it first through background and upbringing, retained it later by virtue of the unseen pressure on the West Point leaven on the Army.

Newton D. Baker, our World War I Secretary of War, expressed this essential quality in language explicit and crystal clear: ". . . Men may be inexact and even untruthful in ordinary matters and suffer as a consequence only the disesteem of their associates or the inconvenience of unfavorable litigation, but the inexact or untruthful soldier trifles with the lives of his fellow men and with the honor of his government."

The very fact that this corps of officers lived in a close 24-hour-day contact—socially and professionally

-made this code a living thing, not just a posture assumed during an eight-hour job and to be cast aside in leisure moments. Its expression cropped out in a thousand different ways, of which perhaps one example suffices: The officer's word was his bond. He did not—except for the initial act of accepting his commission and during the process of military justice (an inheritance from the common law)—take oath or make affidavit. He *certified* that such and such was the case when necessary. That was sufficient.

THE officer's basic responsibility—as any shavetail soon found out—was to the enlisted man, whose health and physical well-being were paramount, be it in garrison or in the field. Only when he had been bedded down, so to speak, could the officer take his leisure. That, be it said, was the foundation, too, of the system of soldier-servants—strikers, dogrobbers—voluntarily serving for a few extra dollars out of the officer's pocket, and who would relieve the officer of the little drudgeries of life while that officer was attending to *his* duty of looking out for his men.

The majority of these officers had had combat experience either in the Spanish-American War or in the Philippines. Except for a very few these operations were small-unit stuff. Few indeed were those officers who had as yet attended the Staff College or the War College. And the restricted life of a small garrison was no breeding ground for grand strategy.

GARRISON life was an ordered existence, with practically all work, except courts-martial and boards, completed by noon for officer and enlisted man alike. Each officer in turn did his routine chore as officer of the day and officer of the guard. Let's not minimize these routines, either. No one does who has turned out at midnight into pelting snow at 20 degrees below zero at Fort Ethan Allen, or crawled on hands and knees against a typhoon's clawings in the Philippines, or fought Texas floods to inspect a sentinel on post.

Schools were carried on at each post—garrison schools in which officers studied regulations and manuals, military law, and the techniques and tactics of their respective arms, all expounded by older officers whose experience was more technical than tactical. Methodical precision was the rule; close-order drill, the alignment of a row of tent pegs, the parrot-like memorizing of the manual for interior guard duty, the exact respective dimensions and use of garrison, post and storm flag (what officer can tell you that today?), the layout and drainage of a camp site, the customs of the service. Such things were paramount.

Perhaps they went in one ear and out the other. But certainly the men who in 1904 were reciting, and insisting that their enlisted men recite, letter-perfect, the general orders for a sentinel on post, never dreamed that a day would come when both the commanding general of an immense fortified island outpost, and the admiral commanding the fleet supporting that outpost, would forget them!

The immaculate uniform, the varnished wheel spokes, the glistening metal work, the shining pots and pans, that shocking speck of dust on a locker shelf—all these were things occupying the mind of our 1904 officer. Minutiae, idolizing of technique and eyewash? Yes. But also stimulation of a sense of responsibility and self-discipline; therefore good up to a certain point.

Tactics were something else. Volley-firing, advance by rushes, even—shades of Balaclava!—the forming of square to repel cavalry, rather than the use of cover or the fine points of holding force and maneuvering mass. Parades and ceremonies carried out with minute precision and rubric—beginning, as one remembers who was at "tin school" in those days, with that sonorous "Pass in review! Companies break from the right to march to the left! Right company, right forward, fours right!"

But mark this well: it was a hard-shooting Army. The Springfield rifle, Model 1903—still admittedly the finest military rifle ever produced—had just been issued to our infantry when the *Journal* made its bow. Individual marksmanship was becoming a fetish: a doctrine definitely opposed to that of most if not all foreign armies, whose conscript soldiers were given but rudimentary training in small-arms firing. Over there—even for Britain's professional army—the rule was the cone of fire; that is, the spraying of an area by men incapable of better aiming.

SO American infantrymen, by a gamut of incessant training—from sighting and aiming exercises to the gruelling competition of the firing range (and for the gun bugs, the rarer altitudes of Camp Perry's perfection) were building a reputation. It was one which would pay off handsomely at Belleau Wood and on the Marne a decade later, when amazed Germans were dropping at a thousand-yard distance from cool, competent marksmen firing at will. These men who could

judge distance, adjust for windage, and find their individual targets at ranges which led the enemy to believe they were being machine-gunned.

As for strategy in this "old" Army, it was true that Moss's *Officer's Manual,* bible of the shavetail in the mid-1900s, listed suggested readings of the Great Captains and of past campaigns, and Wagner's *Service of Security and Information* was on many an officer's shelves. Upton's *Military Policy of the United States,*

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just rescued from the oblivion of dusty War Department files and published to the Army by Elihu Root, would be there, of course The cavalryman, too, probably had Carter's *Horses, Saddles and Bridles*. And the West Pointer, although memory of Dennis Hart Mahan was fading, had been indoctrinated by Fiebeger. But in general it was not a studious officer corps; the club was so comfortable, and the evenings so frequently taken up with post entertainment and visiting.

Actually, the minimum requirements for an officer's professional reading in those days consisted of four volumes. These were the slim, blue-bound *Army Regulations,* with its incessant changes neatly pasted into its pages; the *Manual for Courts-Martial, Manual of Interior Guard Duty,* and the short, fat, pocket-sized *Drill Regulations* of his arm or service, which contained all the answers.

GARRISON life was pleasant, on the whole. Once in a while came field maneuvers—and always, of course, there was small-arms firing. But the mess, the bar, the club, with occasional trips to town, took up the bachelor's spare time. The married officer had his own home life. Both met on the frequent social occasions, garrison dances and card parties—ingrown affairs, one might call them.

The officers' mess was a formal association, with its own quite rigid rules of decorum. The seating of the senior officer present governed the opening of the evening meal; officers arriving late made stiff, formal apology to him before taking their chairs. Blues—or, in summer, whites—were worn; the officers of the day and guard alone might be excused for appearing in service olive drab; one appeared in civilian clothing only if he were hurrying off post on leave, or returning therefrom. The mess was a man's world, too, for although all officers of the post were members, ladies were accommodated only in a side room, and this but in emergency.

If the garrison were large enough to include a regimental band, it was in frequent demand on social occasions, with its concerts in fine weather, its orchestra for the post dances.

There was open house, of course, at the Commanding Officer's quarters on New Year's Day, when the garrison officers and families went calling *en masse.*

A few times each year both officers and men intermingled quite formally. Attendance by most of the officer population, male and female, was expected at enlisted men's dances. The CO had to go—custom of the service. He and the sergeant major's wife led off the opening grand march, followed by the sergeant major and the ranking lady of the post, and other officers and ladies present. And then the commissioned personnel quietly and gracefully withdrew. On Thanksgiving and Christmas, attendance of officers and their families in the unit messes was expected and relished.

Evening parade was the highlight of daily garrison life. As the troops formed, the edges of the parade ground would sprout little groups of femininity, together with the children, in chattering clumps, upon which, as the line stiffened and the sunset gun boomed, silence fell. Down would come the colors slowly to the strains of the National Anthem, while all faces turned to the tall flagstaff, the tots emulating their elders, with hand salute. Something never to be forgotten, always heart-catching, was and still is, this simple poignant ceremony, to that cynical sentimentalist, the Regular.

ALL this post life was bound up in a rigid code of etiquette, a composite of customs of the service that could not be learned at once, and violations of which would stamp the violator as being outside the circle. For instance, in that Army of 1904, so military in many other things, officers in uniform doffed their hats to ladies instead of saluting. Just why, even Moss, the

Army's Emily Post, could not explain. One called at once on newcomers, they—who by custom on arrival also called immediately on post commander and immediate superior—rendered return calls upon the garrison, cards being exchanged in all cases.

All, however, was not always beer and skittles. Were the post commander a martinet, his officers' official life could become uncomfortable indeed. However, individuals of this type were usually ramroddy characters motivated less by spite than by zealous interpretation of regulations, and their lashes fell impartially. One unwritten law there was: that official and social relations were two different things. Thus the frosty commander who had verbally crawled up and down an unfortunate subordinate's frame during the day's work could and did dine and drink and joke with that same subordinate at the club or in quarters that evening.

Among the officers of the garrison there was, of course, the normal cordiality to be expected in any group of gentlemen. There were also, for all these men were human, the other cross currents and frictions of human relationships. And no matter how cordial the relationship, even if the senior did socially call the junior by his first name, rarely indeed would the junior call any officer of captain's grade or higher by his. In the first place, there was a wide disparity of age between captains and lieutenants; in the second, it wasn't done. And while the senior might call his subordinate "Jack" or "Bill" off duty, it was "Mr. Soandso," for the lieutenants and the rank for the others, on official occasions.

THUS far we have surveyed the scene on the larger posts where garrisons were of at least battalion strength. In the smaller posts, one- or two-company affairs—and there were not a few of them—life could be grim, as it always is where men and women are isolated for long times in small groups. One remembers, for instance, an island one-company artillery post where there were but two commissioned officers, whose respective wives were not on speaking terms!

That brings us to the ladies of this Army—God bless 'em!—who were and still should be part and parcel of its life and customs. The wives of officers and soldiers were as far apart as were officers and soldiers—and also just as near. The soldier's wife might be the officer's cook or laundress, if she so chose. These women knew one another. Their children played together, went to school together, visited one another's homes, and made lifelong friendships. But aside from the formal occasions mentioned previously, there was no social intercourse between the adults on Officers' Row and "Soapsuds Row."

Soapsuds Row no longer exists. It dates back to the days when women, as laundresses, so many to each company, were actual components of the Army, and lived on posts. These were respectable married women, wedded to soldiers and noncoms. Hence, in Army slang, the noncoms' row of quarters had become, without any intentional slur, Soapsuds Row.

There was other contact, however, between the wives of officers and enlisted men, outgrowth again of this close association. No soldier's wife ever hesitated to come to the company commander's wife for advice and counsel in times of trouble. And, by custom of the service, she was kindly and warmly received.

AT the top, the commanding officer's wife—the COW to the initiate—could make or break the serenity of post life. And we must remember this, too: the bosomy dowager in shimmering evening gown who ruled the garrison's social side, whose dinners were impeccable from napery to dessert, had once been an Army bride. A shirtwaisted young woman, she probably rode in a Dougherty wagon on a hundred-mile hike from railhead to join her lieutenant in a stockaded post in the Bad Lands. Like other Army women of her vintage, she had come to know the chilling sound of the Indian war whoop. She had probably known, too, the sharp pang of a hurried Call to Arms in the night, and the tense waiting until the column came riding back, gaunt, unshaven and hungry, bearing behind them on pack mules or escort wagons grim, 'paulin-covered bundles. In that case, too, she had heard the shaking sobs of Army sisters from both officers' and enlisted rows, to whom the sight of those bundles meant the end of happiness.

She had sent her husband off to Cuba, and to the Islands. She had later made that nightmare trip across the Pacific on a trooper to join him in a *nipa* shack somewhere in the *bontocs*. She had, not infrequently, cooked, and slaved for her family under primitive conditions. And her children, as the "old" Army had it, cut their teeth on a bugle.

You could, if like Owen Wister's cowboy you smiled when you said it, call her a camp follower; for that was how Army Regulations and the Articles of War rated women. But had you termed her a "dependent," she would probably have risen in all her wrath. No dependent she, indeed.

Small wonder, then, that *Mme. la Colonelle* should consider most of her civilian sisters with some indifference—those women who didn't know, and never would know. Small wonder that she bossed the younger Army wives, clucking and fluttering among them like a mother hen with chicks. They had joined *her* Army; they must learn its pains and its pleasures, and they must obey its customs. One of these, by the way, was that while flirting and philandering might be part of human relationships, the Army wolf was supposed to confine his more serious depredations to the area "ten miles beyond the post flagpole," as the old service unwritten law put it.

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Most of these women contributed to the Army's welfare, but there were vixens, too—female martinets scaring the wits out of younger women, meddling at times through weaker husbands with the careers of such officers as they disliked.

The arrival of such a one on a post was something to think about. Should she be not satisfied with the set of quarters provided for the CO, and prefer those already occupied by Major X—who at his own expense had just redecorated the interior, perhaps—out went the Xs, to oust in turn the Ys, who then nudged the Zs. There was one case where seventeen officers moved because the new COW "ranked out" someone else! Thankfully such characters were the exception rather than the rule.

THE Army wife of 1904 led a more leisurely life in garrison than her sisters of today. She had a servant, of course; nearly all American middle-class families had servants in those days. And the government houses were built that way; with big kitchens, butler's pantries, and third-floor servants' quarters. She didn't have to spend hours in line to shop, although at times she might visit the commissary to choose groceries and meats. But it was much simpler to write the order out in the book she left on the back porch to be picked up by the QM messenger who passed daily. And before noon the groceries would be delivered.

She had to count her pennies, of course. Pay checks could be stretched just so far, and the demands for entertainment and other social intercourse were exacting. But she made do, and she kept up a front. There was no necessity for keeping up with the Joneses however, for officers' pay was no secret; everyone knew just how much each one was drawing; knew that Mrs General had more money than Mrs. Lieutenant. Outside income was something else, and rare.

Purchases from commissary and post exchange were on credit; all bills rendered promptly on the first of the month. A delay in payment beyond the tenth day following not only would result in tart official demand for explanation "by indorsement hereon," but it also just wasn't done.

And the Army wife, by contrast to her Navy sister, usually accompanied her husband when the unit changed station. Exceptions were, of course, when field exercises or campaigns took the troops out. Up until World War I, when the influx of replacements flooded each post as the troops moved out, the families remained in their government quarters while the men were in the field.

That unit change of station! Who, having made one, could ever forget it? Usually it was by train, although infrequently Regular Army units went hiking across country from camp site to camp site, like a group of disciplined gypsies, while families followed as best they could by commercial transportation and—be this remembered—at the expense of the individual officer and man. This was true also when the unit moved by rail; wives and families would not move at government expense until 1920.

The long ride on a troop train was tiresome. The writer recalls a move from Fort Hancock, New Jersey, to Fort Scott, California; eight days of cross-continental jolting, the men, three to a section, in tourist sleepers —the few officers (and one wife, one small boy and one bulldog) in the last car, and a caboose trundling behind. The view of the Feather River Canyon and the Royal Gorge from the cupola of a caboose is unforgettable.

A boxcar carried the kitchen—the Buzzacott field ranges embedded in sand—with the smoke pipes poking jauntily out the door. There were at least two scheduled long halts per day at some dreary way station, to let the men get out, march and double-time to take the kinks from their muscles. But half the time was spent, it seemed, waiting on sidings while passengers and legitimate freights slid by; troop trains until long after World War I rated behind freights in priority.

In such fashion our Army in the continental United States went through life for another decade.

THERE were interservice frictions, true. And there was one intraservice break which would for a number of years lead to some hard feeling. In 1907 the Artillery Corps had been rudely split into Coast and Field Artillery—the "redlegs" became, respectively, "cosmoliners" and "wagon soldiers." The former were highly scientific, the latter played by ear, so to speak. The field artilleryman, become a virtuoso of improvisation, sneered at fire control which included plotting boards, wind-component indicators and mathematical computations of conditions of the moment. The coast artilleryman, waving his slide rule, hooted at the idea of popping little white shrapnel bursts into the air to bracket a moving target. Ten years later, on the stricken fields of France, it would be proven that both were right, that each had something to learn from the other. And out of that would come the magnificent American system of artillery fire control and direction that so

amazed our allies and confounded our enemies in the Second World War.

Here at home, while big business spread, skyscrapers rose, and dynamos hummed, the Army drowsed in its isolation. Dot-and-dash telegraph was spanning land and sea, a national road system was evolving, to knit together an aggregation of American villages, towns and cities into an articulated whole. Automobile-building was becoming a national industry. But hitching posts still dotted the streets of Army posts, and garrison business moved on foot or behind clopping hooves.

From time to time the soldier did emerge, but it was momentary and quickly forgotten. The San Francisco earthquake, Mississippi floods, great forest fires, strikes, in turn brought it out to save, salvage and bring order. And, of course, the Army Engineers and Medical Corps were building the Panama Canal. Goethals and Gorgas —and Walter Reed—were household names.

The National Guard became a real federal reserve, the ROTC was growing, and additional officer-instructors thus came in some contact with civilians. The service schools, too, were growing, although as yet but a fraction of the officer corps had felt their influence. Some few combined field maneuvers from time to time brought the professional and part-time soldier together for a short while.

Army pay had been boosted a bit. The buck private was getting $15 a month now, the topkick a minimum of $45, the shavetail $141.66. And the country was still on the gold standard. There was the Cuban Pacification of 1906-09—the peaceful occupation by five regiments of infantry, two of cavalry and several batteries of field artillery—tactfully carried out without ripple or friction.

And, although there was much grumbling from chair-bound staffers and foot-conscious doughboys, the officer corps each year went through Teddy Roosevelt's famous hundred-mile ride physical endurance test, now long forgotten.

The 'Days of Empire'

The end of the fight is a tombstone white
with the name of the late deceased,
And the epitaph drear, "A Fool lies here
who tried to hustle the East".

KIPLING

BUT overseas, in the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama, the national expansion was doing something to the Army. It had exchanged the old frontier of the West for another frontier: exotic, romantic, and of the utmost importance to the national welfare. All areas had certain common climatic and ethnic elements. Not only were these new areas all tropical, but their peoples were strange to most Americans and their languages foreign. In the Philippines, too, the established legal code—the Code Napoleon—was foreign except to Louisianians.

What had happened was that the United States by now had assumed what our British cousins, already bearing it, chose to call "the white man's burden." Consequently, the Army was becoming increasingly engaged in an overseas service having a number of points in common with that of the British Army in India. Particularly was this true in the Philippines, and since this service, bridging World War I, could continue until 1941, materially affecting not only Army life and thought, but also—through that Army—our national destinies, it will be well to linger on it for a moment.

From the beginning the Army took a tremendous part in the role of the United States in the Philippines: the role first as a conqueror, then as administrator, educator and advisor, while at the same time developing the fields of commerce and industry. One can definitely say, it seems to this writer, that without the Army nothing advantageous either to our own nation or to the Filipinos could have been brought about. Without pursuing the subject farther, one simply points to the fact that when the Japanese in 1941 launched the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Plan in its sea of blood, the Philippine Commonwealth maintained full allegiance, alliance and support to that flag and nation.

During those long years from 1904 to 1941, two generations of Army officers fought and lived in the Philippines. Hard it would be to find an Army family, some member of which had not at some time been stationed there. More than that, the higher commanders of World War I served their apprenticeship of combat in the humid wildernesses of Luzon, Samar and Mindanao. And when in our own United States, the high cost of living began to curtail the little leisures of life, tropical service became all the more popular.

GARRISON life in the islands was intriguing, from the first installation of Army homes in *nipa* shacks, to the later developments of fine concrete barracks and quarters. All the concurrent trials and pleasures of life in the Orient were experienced, from flying cockroaches to deft and nimble servants. It began, of course, with the month-long voyage out, in one of those ancient, creaking wayfarers of the sea we had purchased in 1898. Cattle boats they had been, on the North Atlantic run—the *Sheridan,* the *Sherman* and the *Thomas* and their smaller and even more ancient sisters.

One remembers such things as the crowded troop quarters, the diapers on the lines rigged athwart the officers' promenade deck, the steady sway and thrust of the ship's movement, the band tuning up for the afternoon concert, the bridge and poker parties in the smoking room, the early-morning setting-up exercises on the troop decks, the Abandon Ship drills, the boxing matches on the forward deck, and the baby-food packages stowed about the staterooms (you bought and brought your own in those days).

Soldiers of all ranks found a social system strikingly different from home. In the first place, Filipino "boys" were available for kitchen and barracks police, taking away much of the normal drudgery of soldier housekeeping. For the Army wife and her husband, too, as well as for the bachelor, servants were plentiful and cheap. Houseboys took care of the officers from changing buttons to ironing the stiffly starched uniform always laid out; khaki for the morning, whites for evening wear. The *lavandera* was constantly on the job, washing and ironing. The *amah* rode herd on the children. The cook could do amazing things with canned milk—there was no fresh, of course—and such other staples available from a commissary where Stateside delicacies arrived in small quantities and were exhausted promptly after each transport's arrival. Were he a Chinese cook, he was really a prestidigitator.

Such things were some compensation for the friendly little green lizard which might plop from the dining-room ceiling into the soup, or the army of ants suddenly appearing from nowhere to march in column of battalions across the living-room floor.

Of course, one kept bed- and table-legs in cans filled with kerosene to discourage creeping things like tarantulas, scorpions and centipedes, and only a fool would disobey orders and sleep without a mosquito bar. One boiled the drinking water, and scalded the fresh vegetables—for obvious reasons.

Incidentally, the common practice of keeping the drinking water in the icebox in gin bottles—after the original contents had been removed—necessitated some care in selecting the ingredients for the evening cocktail.



Dinners and dances were frequent. Probably one of the most intriguing things about those affairs was the amazing facility with which the houseboys and cooks rallied to help one another at parties. Somehow the grapevine always brought the news, with details of the guests expected. So one might find one's own houseboy serving at someone else's table, and one's own cutlery, napery and china eking out the hostess's store. The only unpleasant elements were the continuous feuds between Chinese and Filipino house servants, which sometimes turned into battles royal, ending only when a file of the guard came charging down to disperse the howling combatants. A berserk Chinese cook, spitting like a cat, with cleaver or carving knife swinging free, chasing a screeching Tagalog houseboy down the back row of the officers' line, was something to see!

MANILA was, of course, the locus of official and social life, not only for the posts in and near the city but also for transients, on leave from provincial stations, the most important of which was Zamboanga, down south on Mindanao.

Fascinating was the former Spanish stronghold, old Fort Santiago, where department headquarters was situated, as was also the 31st Infantry—the one American regiment that had never been stationed in the United States. Army life pulsated inside its frowning escarpments and battlemented curtain walls four hundred years old.

Pinpin Street in Manila was a favorite rendezvous for soldiers on pass, while shopping took the ladies along the Escolta or into the little musty Chinese shops of Binondo and the Japanese Osaka Bazaar.

Golf was indulged in by Army and the European civilian colony along the greensward in the old moat of Fort Santiago and the Intramuros, the walled city. Tennis, too, was popular, while the equestrian-minded rallied around the Polo Club. Socially, Filipino and European mingled little, with two exceptions: the official functions at Malacañan Palace and the swank Spanish Club—almost exclusively Filipino—where annually the King of Spain's birthday was celebrated lavishly.

UP in the mountains, Baguio was a mecca for Army folk on leave. Occasional visits to China were also popular, to obtain china, rugs and furs, to visit friends in the 15th Infantry in garrison at Tientsin, and to get a real glimpse of the mysterious Orient.

The jungle was always close by, with its hazards, such as pythons. They told a story up at Stotsenberg of the python, found wrapped about a limber wheel, and which, in his dying convulsions when shot, snapped the stout spokes like so many matches. James Ravine on Corregidor's slopes was named after an unfortunate lieutenant who never came back from a ride there—having met a python who left only the officer's hat behind as evidence. And it was the sight of a battery

pounding along a Luzon jungle trail that inspired Edmund L. (Schnitz) Gruber to write the Field Artillery's song in 1908.

Professionally, there was fighting—and hard fighting—in the Moro islands—Mindanao and Jolo—for many years after 1904, as small punitive columns beat their way through tropical jungles to the fastnesses where fanatic Mohammedan warriors of robber-baron type held out. And throughout the period, as the defense of the archipelago grew in importance, particularly after World War I and Japan's bid for Manchuria developed, the Army was intensely interested in strengthening our positions.

WHILE defense plans coalesced, with the path of conquest down from Lingayen Gulf plainly marked, the Army again and again in paper war and maneuvers operated through central Luzon, with Corregidor—Gibraltar of the East—as the keystone of the arch of defense. We must not forget that the withdrawal to Bataan Peninsula in 1941 had been long planned and practiced; since 1921, in fact. As for the means available, for defense, it was always a case of make-do, particularly in the years following the Washington Disarmament Conference, which halted, in transit, additional armament for the islands. One well remembers in 1922 the single antiaircraft gun mounted on Corregidor's Malinta Hill—a 75mm piece—mute evidence of national somnolence. For the breechblock for this gun still lay in a Honolulu warehouse, a victim of that conference.

Of such stuff was the thought that lay in every Army mind in the Islands during the early 1920s. The U. S. Army in the Philippines was earmarked—its destiny plain—a pawn to be sacrificed to Congressional indifference. But black clouds faded in tropic nights, with the haunting scent of the hibiscus, and a jazz band playing in the Army and Navy Club, where beaming Ah Moon presided over the dining room; or over across the square in the Manila Hotel.

It might be later than one thought, but why consider the inevitability of Japanese invasion when caressing a frosted julep on the Polo Club veranda, with the moonlight rippling across Manila Bay? Why think at all when swaying to "Three O'Clock in the Morning" with plenty of Watson No. 10 and Tansan water waiting on the table? Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die.

So it was Kismet, the Brussels ball before Waterloo, or life on the slopes of Vesuvius, with a run later to Santa Ana's rattan-divided dance floor and a glimpse of the piquant little Filipinas with their quaint shoulder-of-mutton-sleeved dresses, and a final tour to Tom's Dixie Kitchen for ham and eggs before going home to bed. Tom himself, black as the ace of spades, and his brother-in-arms, Casey of the famous "Hospital for Shoes," where every American woman in the Islands had her footgear made, were notable, for these two were ex-9th Cavalry soldiers who had married Filipinas and settled down to a new life after a tour of duty in the Islands.

And all the while, a stout military organization—the Philippine Scouts, little brown warriors loyal to their salt, was slowly growing to become the nucleus in a later day of the Philippine Army. Some of its officers were Americans, others Filipinos. Some, old-time Army noncoms, dated back to the early days, as did a few of the native officers.

There were some Filipinos, like one elderly major, whose living room in a pleasant set of quarters was festooned in true Filipino fashion with drying fish! And there were others, graduates of West Point, like stout Vicente Lim—"Cannibal" was his Academy nickname—and gallant Pastor Martelino, who one day would make the supreme sacrifice for their Stars and Stripes.

Recreation for this overseas Army fell into several categories. Baseball, which became a national game for Filipinos, was most popular in both American and Scout units, as well as in civilian circles, and fierce was the competition in the Island leagues.

SOLDIER diversion off post followed what might be called normal channels with Oriental trimmings. The soldier drank his beer in Pinpin Street barrooms, he walked and talked and haunted the dance halls with attractive Filipina girls. One of his most popular and harmless stunts was to pile with several comrades into a *calesa* and go singing and shouting down the street. *Calesas,* two-wheeled pony-drawn gigs, with the native driver perched almost over the animal's rump, were long the sole means of public transportation except carabao carts, and vied with the later automobile practically to the end. Everyone took *calesas.*

IN Panama, while the tropical garrison life resembled closely that in the Philippines, the setting was somewhat different. In the first place, the Canal Zone was within easier reach of the United States and so there was less sense of isolation. And while military maneuvers were incessant and rigorous, the alerts continuous, there never was any of the jungle warfare of the earliest days in the Philippines. Thanks to the vigorous sanitary precautions, life was as pleasant as tropical life can be. And for the ladies, the free-port facilities of the Zone and of the Republic of Panama brought wide variety of bargains in fine English chinaware and linens at this busy crossroads of empire.

The early days in Panama, while the Canal was a-building under the imperious but just rule of Goethals—"the man who stood up in Panama and the mountains stood aside"—had been hectic, of course. They were seven years of toil, in an atmosphere of dogged determination and fiery enthusiasm, while Goethals conquered incessant obstacles. Monumental was the task. Take, for instance, the great slide at Cucaracha in 1913, when slimy mud engulfed in a moment months of heart-breaking work.

"What are we going to do?" wailed one of Goethals' eutenants in a frenzy of despair, when the leader ar-ived on the scene on the run.

"Hell!" barked Goethals. "Dig it out again!"

Well may the "old" Army be proud of that accom-lishment; proud of Goethals, and of Gorgas, magician f preventive medicine, without whom this magnificent ictory over Nature would have been impossible.

But the great job having been accomplished, the rmy settled down to the development and maintenance f an impregnable fortress area guarding the Nation's ital military trans-hemispheric bypass.

Hawaii, like Panama, had developed into a protective astion. Both expressed, in theory at least, the inter-ependence of Army and Navy in joint cooperation. here they differed from the Philippines, where the rmy garrisons dangled before the maw of potential panese invasion. Thus in both Hawaii and the anal Zone areas the garrisons became larger, the mili-ry aspect more vigorous.

AWAII, differing from both Panama and the Philip-pines in that its climate was even and salubrious, was pleasant place to live in—with much the atmosphere a summer resort. While the Coast Artillery on Oahu anned its forts ringing the great Navy base of Pearl larbor, the mobile forces up at the growing canton-ents of Schofield Barracks spent a great part of their me in incessant maneuvers and field operations. They orked hard in Hawaii, and they played hard, too, for was there that the Army really developed its system athletics. Some feel—and this writer is among them that the semiprofessionalism of Army athletics has een overdeveloped. In any event, it was on Oahu that e old hit-or-miss Army sports programs began, in 1919, change, for better or for worse, into a regimented heme, and Army athletes to receive preferential treat-ent. In that respect the author of *From Here to Eter-ty* had something.

Up in Alaska, another side of this new frontier was veloping, as tiny garrisons wrestled with totally dif-rent problems of life in that wilderness. Cut off from mmunication during the winter, Army folk, fur-clad, equently on snowshoes, went about their work. Living sts were high in so far as supplies from Stateside went, t there were compensations—provided one was either nter, fisherman or both—in this sportsman's paradise.

And over across the world, in Tientsin, China, was other sort of outpost again. There the 15th Infantry part of the Allied occupation force imposed on China a result of the Boxer Rebellion—rubbed elbows with e mysterious East. Spectators rather than participants, e doughboys and their families watched the warlords me and go, saw the encroachments of the Japanese, d attended to battalion maneuvers in the hills. Trips Pekin, short summer leaves at Peitaho, occasional rneys to the brooding Great Wall, and some hob-nobbing with their colleagues of the European garrisons were all part of the 15th Infantry's life.

But if by 1914 this overseas frontier phase of Army life was developing, back in the States the Mexican Revolution of 1910 had started a chain reaction startling the nation to some realization of its paucity of armed strength. Up to that time combined maneuvers and large-unit training had been practically nil. Occasional-ly, it is true, Congress had been induced to spend a little money on such folderols, but it was only a drop in the bucket. There had been an attempt at concentration at American Lake, Washington, and the writer remem-bers two combined field maneuvers in the East; one at Pine Camp, New York—now Camp Drum—in 1909, with both Regular and National Guard units attending, and another the next year in Connecticut. Of this latter one recalls two events: The daylight charge of the 1st New York Cavalry in column of fours, up a long hill road closely defended by the "enemy"; and the

presence of two old biplane crates, one belonging to the Regular Signal Corps, the other to the New York Na-tional Guard.

TO concentrate one so-called "maneuver division" dur-ing 1911-13 along the Rio Grande absorbed practically all available Regular and National Guard troops, in-cluding the Army's fifteen "military aviators." When the border flared in 1914, resulting in the Vera Cruz Expedition under General Funston, and, two years later —following Villa's raid upon Columbus, New Mexico— General Pershing's Punitive Expedition into Mexico, the military power of the Nation was shown to be so pitiably small that Congress did take some reasonable steps. Leonard Wood's "Plattsburg idea," stimulating military interest among professional and business men in 1915, contributed.

The National Defense Act of 1916 was the greatest piece of really constructive military legislation this coun-try had yet seen, embracing as it did the Regulars, the Volunteers, the National Guard, and an entirely new

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thing—the Officers' Reserve Corps. The plan called for a peacetime Regular Army of 175,000 fighting men, organized into divisions and brigades upon tactical basis. The rub was that peacetime was running out, and except for paper wars at the schools, the Regular officer was without professional experience with large units.

Let's look at it as that soldier-historian, Colonel William A. Ganoe, in his *History of the United States Army*, saw the picture:

> When April 6, 1917, tossed the American spectators onto the European gridiron, they had not even a high school squad to meet the professionals. The 1916 Defense Act had been merely the promise of a team for which only a few freshmen had reported. The army had no large tactical units in a modern sense, few weapons, a dearth of officers, no experience with trench warfare, little training and less strength. It had 9,750 officers of all grades and experience, while 180,000 of the utmost efficiency were immediately necessary.
>
> On the other hand it had received a signal blessing in disguise. Few have ever regarded Pancho Villa as a benefactor. But his crossing our border the previous year had given our President the excuse for training a large portion of the Regular Army and about 150,000 National Guardsmen on the Mexican border. The hardening, discipline and schooling in the field were the finest to date for the army and made possible later the ability of the American forces . . . to turn the tide in March, 1918, in France. There has been much speculation since as to what might have happened had not Mr. Villa done us this temporary or ultimate ill-turn or favor.

The First Crusade: 1917-19

Good-bye Maw, Good-bye Paw,
God-bye Muley with the old hee haw.
I don't know what this war's about,
But I bet by gosh I soon find out.

AUTHOR UNKNOWN

SIX weeks after war was declared Congress passed a draft act putting the country's manpower at the national disposition. It also abolished the old volunteer system, and—because all officers above the grade of colonel were to be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate—there would be no State-made political generals leading men to death in the valor of ignorance. It put all officers and enlisted men of the new army on the same footing as Regulars for pay and allowances. Having done this much, Congress pushed up its specs on its startled forehead as it realized there would be voters in this new army—and raised enlisted pay all around: the buck private beginning at a dollar a day.

Cantonments blossomed all over the nation; some around existing Army posts, others in isolated areas. The Regular and the newcomer found themselves thrown into a hectic life totally different from the past. Gypsying wives, following their menfolk, found lodgings where best they could. Some newcomers, brought into immediate contact with existing garrison life, floundered, bewildered by a code and customs of which they had known nothing. Welcomed warmly by some, they were snubbed by others of the "old" Army. Both newcomer and oldtimer suffered equally from scrounging landlords and shop keepers where they attempted to settle in the vicinity of outlying camps. It was an era of frustration and anxiety.

How the military problem itself was solved, how the little Regular officer corps equipped and trained some four million men and, overseas, led a million of them to victory, is on the record. Summed up, by 11 November 1918 the United States could well be proud of its Army. But the build-up had been painful.

In the first place, the Army of the United States that sprang into being in 1917 was composed for the most part of drafted men, cross section of our citizenry, poured into the mixing pot whose other components were the Regulars and the National Guard. The former had first looked down its nose at the latter; then both had ganged up on the draftees. Sergeant Alexander Woollcott of *Stars and Stripes* told of how the drafted men of a National Army division made a counter thrust against a passing National Guard regiment: "Draft dodgers!" they taunted. In the great corps of new officers, something the same sort of thing happened. The Regulars first sniffed at the National Guard, and then both took a good hefty sniff at the "ninety-day wonders" of the Officers' Training Camps—predecessor of OCS. It was, of course, just what happens to new boys at school, and just as childish and at the same time serious. All did join together as an irresistible team after the shakedown but the duration of the war was too short for the civilian soldier's amateurish inferiority complex to have been erased.

The Regular found out that the civilian made a good soldier, and took the lesson to heart; but the civilian remembering only the iron discipline that had trod on his personal toes, took back to civil life a dislike for those taskmasters whom—frequently inaccurately—he lumped as "West Pointers."

It was a smart Army that Pershing led in France. Gone were the slouch hats and shirt sleeves of 1898; collars were tight-hooked, blouses buttoned, saluting fast and furious. But it was light-hearted; one heard slogging doughboys sing on the march and in bivouac "Pack Up Your Troubles in Your Old Kit Bag" and "Tipperary" we had borrowed from the British but "Mademoiselle from Armentières"—praise her bawdiness!—became our very American own.

Many old-time officers, it is true, soon found that their years of restricted service had so lowered their sights that they were unable to see the divisional wood for the company and platoon trees. Such men went to "Blooie," as the reclassification center at Blois was popularly called.

Others, around the hard core of the few graduates of the Command and Staff School, went on to high places

And that handful of Leavenworth graduates—the men who had studied war despite the childish tantrum of a President shocked in 1915 by a newspaper article asserting that the General Staff was preparing a plan "in case of war with Germany"—found they could do it. An interesting angle to this War College study was the fact that in its early days the school, hard put for maps, had been forced to place its problems on German-made maps of the Franco-German border of 1870-71. So in 1917-18 our leaders in the AEF found themselves working out the real problems of a real war over terrain already familiar to many of them!

The Regular learned in this conflict the dependency in war of the armed forces upon the civil economy, of which, as MacArthur once said, they are "but the keen, cutting edge." So industrial preparedness went into the books and into the schools, and the Regular, particularly in the technical branches, moved out into the world of production.

The Semi-Cloistered Army: 1920-40

Oh, why the deuce should I repine,
And be an ill foreboder?
I'm twenty-three, and five feet nine—
I'll go and be a sodger.

ROBERT BURNS

THE Armistice concluded, the Nation at once began to take its Army apart, as it has always done. The Regular and his family looked forward to returning to the familiar life of the garrison. Some fortunates would see service in occupied Germany or in the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. But in the continental United States, while some reoccupied good quarters on permanent posts, many found themselves living in makeshift huts in squalid cantonments.

This writer, for instance, from 1919 to 1921 occupied, at Camp Lewis, Washington, a former dental clinic. The first floor consisted of two rooms at opposite ends of a large central area—probably a waiting room—which served as an admirable race track for the boy of the family to exercise his toy auto. There was no kitchen equipment; all cooking was done on two small portable electric grills we were fortunate enough to own and on which the lady of the house performed culinary miracles. Upstairs was what had been the dental operating room, with battery of wash basins still installed. The propensity of this formidable apparatus to freeze in winter and, upon thawing, to flood our living quarters, furnished interesting seasonal thrills. Incidentally, the reason for staking out this claim was the fact that this was one of the few buildings in our brigade area having indoor plumbing!

Picking up the pieces from 1918 to 1920 was a nightmare, as was the two-year period following. The great mass of former emergency officers now commissioned in the Regulars had to be assimilated, with all the vexing problems of indoctrination of both them and their wives. Some of these people did not fit; the majority did and were welcomed into the corps to be welded into another generation of Regulars.

The famous "promotion hump" with its actuarial tables proving to the youngster bent on a military career that if all went well he might retire as a major, affected morale to some degree. (That some of these same puzzled youngsters are today sporting two or more stars is due not to the Congress, but to Tojo, Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, with an assist by Chamberlain.)

CAME the fine blueprint of the National Defense Act of 1920, with a much-needed pay increase of twenty per cent all along the board, and with its dream of a

National Army organization complete with regular and civilian components. But hot on its heels came, too, the reduction of 1922; with all promotions stopped, more than six hundred line officers thrown out and with them a hundred thousand enlisted men.

We could stand the loss of the enlisted men. For in 1920 the increase had been recruited by a drum-pounding ballyhoo promising an education and a trade for a one-year hitch. Want to play the flute, learn wood-carving, be anything—except a fighting man? The answer was prompt, as a puzzled Regular corps soon found out.

They came, these one-year men, from all over the country—a number of them one jump ahead of the sheriff. They went to school while the older Regular

soldier did the chores. And the depredations of the riff-raff among them shocked nearby civilian communities.

But in 1922 we couldn't spare the officers who were spread thin. The Army's obligations to the civilian components—a growing National Guard, an ORC seventy thousand strong, an ROTC of 223 units—and the increased attendance at service schools—bled troop units white of leaders. The necessary shuffling of individuals rotated for such detached service knocked out a major prop—that intimate mutual acquaintance of officer and man so essential for teamwork. What was left of the Army was still further burdened by summer camps—and particularly by that new element, the Citizens' Military Training Camps, which for more than a decade would annually attract thousands of fine youngsters. Good things, all these, in themselves; they would pay off in the future. But the Regular scratched his head as he tried to make a 24-hour day contain a 48-hour schedule.

SUCH was the Army world of 1922; the "old" Army was gone, said the pessimists. So it was; gone with the America of the Gay Nineties and Life with Father. The age of Volstead's Noble Experiment was upon us, complete with hip flasks and rowdiness. The Newport Set surrendered to Café Society, the rest of the nation to flappers, Rudolph Valentino and cheesecake art. The gangster became a force of national evil. A cynical younger generation was tired of war and the mistakes of its elders. A few years later undergraduates were to form "The Veterans of Future Wars" as a collegiate prank if not social protest that was based on common misinformation.

An America transformed by the machine age was money-crazy. The click of the stock ticker kept pace with the rumble of earth movers widening our network of concrete roads. Air expansion, wanderlust, religious scepticism marched side by side with the flouting of the Prohibition laws. It was not for nothing that a wag at the Field Artillery School in 1924 nicknamed the post "Fort Still."

It was during this period that a long-smoldering schism in Army circles flared with the court-martial and conviction of General William (Billy) Mitchell. Ever since the Army had first taken to the air, in 1908, the new power had been in the hands of a few devoted souls in the Signal Corps. Not until 1914 was there established a nucleus for air power—the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, to become, when aerial combat became a fact in World War I, the Air Service, and later, the Air Corps.

After the war was over the devotees of the air arm quite naturally waxed vociferous in urging its development as a major element of our military forces. Loudest of all was General Mitchell. What developed was the clash of a militantly proselytizing group with the reactionary elements of the old faith. But when the crusading Mitchell overstepped the bounds of propriety by publicly accusing our high military and naval commanc of "incompetency, criminal negligence, and almost trea sonable administration of national defense" he was trie —not for advocating air power, but for his violation o the Articles of War. Regretfully, a court composed o high-ranking officers who were to a man close persona friends of Mitchell had to find him guilty.

Public opinion made Mitchell a martyr to the nev cause. The ill feeling thus engendered would continu through the years, ameliorated to some extent as botl airmen and ground soldiers began to realize both th growing powers and the limitations of the new arm.

BY 1935 the service schools had evolved a doctrine o air-ground operations, which as time went on woul be elaborated. The magnificent performance of th Army Air Forces during World War II needs no furthe accolade. Many ground soldiers—the writer among then —continued to feel that the airmen carried always chip on their shoulder. The intense argument in th AEF air components that air units should "cooperate tactically with ground troops, rather than "support them, was an indication of this feeling. It was indee best for all concerned that the Army Air Forces witl its tremendous and ever-growing responsibility in th strategic field, should attain complete independence a a member of the trinity of military power.

By that time the ground forces had developed thei own observation and command aviation—the little liai son planes first initiated in World War II by the fiel artillery and then adopted throughout the combat forces The Navy had long since gone its own way successfull in the air. Korea would see the flowering of the heli copter as an adjunct to ground operations. And th end is not yet in sight.

But we have gone far ahead of our story.

Dress blues were back by 1927—voluntarily. The would not become obligatory until 1937. But thos prewar officers who had all these years kept their ex pensive uniforms carefully tucked away were in for costly disappointment: the cut and specifications ha been changed. Everyone was in the same boat, nev officers and old, and military tailors chuckled fiendishl

as they prepared for a killing. Slacks, too, had beer decreed; innovation at first deplored, then welcomed The Sam Browne belt, one of Pershing's few mistake in the AEF, and one of General March's abhorrences



ecame regulation for all. And a fetish was growing p for harmony in leather—not a bad thing in itself so r as looks went. Unfortunately, different command- s held differing views upon the hue; as a result, a ange of station might mean a costly reinvestment in elt, boots and shoes, if one's leather did not match that shionable on the new post.

MONG enlisted men (and officers) there was first the debate over whether the roll-collar blouse was mili- rily superior to the traditional choke collar. Choke- llar wool blouses—remnants of World War I over- ocks—were still being issued as late as 1927, complete ith black-painted buttons and collar insignia. An listed man paid ten dollars to the post tailor to convert e blouse to the required roll-collar for off-post wear. s for converting the buttons and insignia to standard ass—that was solved by several nights' application of int remover and elbow grease. To go with the snappy ll-collar blouse, he must wear a white, collar-attached irt—not an article of issue, either. You couldn't leave e post in a combination of roll-collar and khaki shirt. There was that "peg" in the breeches. From no peg all, in some years and some places the peg became nost a skirt flapping at every step. But always there s the detestation of "wrap leggings"—spiral puttees. en those soldiers who had the secret knack of being le to encase their ankles and calves in taut and neat ds of woolen o.d. had little use for them. And old diers whose legs were blue with varicose veins in- iably blamed them on the wrap leggings. Men who abhorred horseflesh and the odors of the stable were jealous of the mounted soldier's canvas leggings with facing leather on the inner sides. Wrap leggings were to stay for many years and through several changes in uniform cloth. In the early 1930s the Quartermaster Corps came out with a new cotton uniform for summer wear in a shade still known as "sun tan." It was a neat uniform, and handsome. But in Panama by command decision the sun tans were dyed a sickly green and soldiers returning from the Canal Zone to Stateside outfits to finish out the last year of their three-year enlistments, found themselves buying new uniforms out of clothing allowance savings that represented cash in hand at the end of the enlistment for the soldier who thriftily cared for his clothing.

And the fatigue uniform! Was a more demeaning, respect-destroying, unsoldierly garment ever devised? Its cloth was cheap, its tailoring abominable. The hat was beyond belief. The first time a soldier wore fatigues he felt more like a candidate for the chain gang than an honest American soldier-workman. Only the fact that all of one's fellows also wore it, saved the situation.

THE Army had other things to think about, professionally. The officer was reading more, studying more. The urge to go to Benning, to Sill, to Leavenworth and to the War College was rampant, and that was good. Not all the men best fitted did go to the last two, unfortunately; favoritism expressed in efficiency reports sometimes broke hearts. But the important thing was that the Regular officer was becoming a professional theoretician of the art of war.

The Army's roof blew off, like most American roofs, in the chill tornado of the Great Depression following 1929. Aside from personal losses for those individuals with outside income, and those who had been dabbling in stock gambling, an administration reaching for straws forced upon the Army a payless furlough annually, which meant a net pay loss of 8⅓ per cent. The dawning New Deal in 1933 went farther; a straight 15 per cent cut in federal salary and the freeze of all longevity pay increases, left bitter tastes. And small though Army pay was, many an unemployed civilian father or brother received financial help from his soldier relative.

It was at this time that another new problem came into Army life: the Civilian Conservation Corps. The Regular officer assigned to this duty had an interesting problem while smarting over his own pay cut, to explain to the Regular private soldier also so detailed just why that private's pay had been cut to $17.85 per month while the pampered pet of the CCC for whom he was caring got $30 plus complete immunity from military discipline!

But this hurriedly conceived CCC hurled into the Army's lap—there was no other element of the government capable of the task—had, as it turned out, beneficial effect upon practically all officers involved. It was a

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

job to be done, and a tremendous challenge to personal leadership to be met. These CCC men were not the malleable youth of the CMTC. They were youth in the raw, with more than a dash of Dead End Kids and of irresponsible veterans added; both tough. In handling this conglomeration successfully, the Regular and the Reserve officer learned a lot that would stand him in good stead in 1940 and 1941 when our great dumb draft armies stirred in unrest.

Infantry Journal was not unmindful of the impact of the CCC on the Army—as its index of articles of that period attests. And the culmination came in 1940 when a Reserve officer wrote of the advantages of that duty to the expanding army in an article appropriately entitled "Ore from the CCC Hill."

BY the mid-thirties the Regular officer's mind was, to put it mildly, confused. He was closer to the civilian than he ever had been in past years; and the civilian should know more about him, too—but with some few outstanding exceptions there was no more meeting of minds than there ever had been. Something had happened to the American civilian and his viewpoint. Overseas the handwriting was already plain on the wall, but indecipherable to our public.

Over here the Pied Pipers of Fascism, Nazism, Communism and Pacifism were tootling their cacophony into the ears of a generation embitted by the Depression and cynical of the motives behind our War to End Wars of 1917-18. The Ku Klux Klan and shirts black, brown and silver strutted. The Oxford Oath, the accusations hurled at "international bankers" and Merchants of Death, and not infrequently the direct objurgation of "butcher" and "warmaker" applied to the military, met all arguments for preparedness. Patriotism was a laugh; "What's in it for me?" a slogan.

It is doubtful if the officer corps as a whole realized what was happening, although a few devoted souls in Military Intelligence here and abroad kept fingers on the feverishly throbbing world pulse, and followed by watching the hate campaigns of sedition in the United States. Modern Cassandras, they laid their findings before the higher-ups, to no avail. But what all Regulars did know was that things were in bad shape and that there was no money forthcoming to mend our military fences.

Another thing that all Regulars knew by this time was their profession. Sill, Benning, Leavenworth and the War Colleges had well accomplished their job, and had the other service schools. So when the dam burst there was ready a corps of professional officers, talking a common language, thinking along common lines. It was a corps ready and able to divide and subdivide itself again and again to provide commanders and staffs for combat army groups, armies, corps and divisions; to train a huge new crop of emergency officers, and to gear the national resources to the national common effort the world over.

The Second Crusade: 1941-45

Oh, clash the cymbals, sound the tabor!
For Cpl. Doyle, his gun and saber,
His tanks and artillery (self-propelled)
With which the enemy shall be quelled.
Already in dread the Nazi blenches;
By Christmas we'll be out of the trenches.

CPL. JOHN J. DOYLE,
Yank, 28 MAY 1943

'HE wheel had made a complete turn. Instead of what Ganoe characterized as "not even a high school quad to meet the professionals" in 1917, a competent rofessional officer corps was now leading an amateur rmy. This corps was able to spark the latent intelli-ence of the draftee—who had a higher IQ rating than is 1917 forebear—and penetrate the flabby façade of difference to and ignorance of world events which in 940-41 characterized the heroes of "OHIO" ("Over ie Hill in October") and "Yoo-hoo!" And, more to ie point, it led these men to victory all over the world our greatest national effort yet.

The Regular, planning for war on what Frederick ewis Allen terms "a truly majestic scale," found that s plans could be activated. The American economy, ice the brakes were off, produced in amazing quantity id quality the new engines of war of the machine age, id thanks to sea and air power, could supply and sub-st its soldiers the world over. In the doing, our Regular und his own horizons broadening as he plunged into e world of industrial technology and science.

Gone in the shuffle was the tinsel; gone the buttoned-, shiny side. The Army, which in 1937 had ridiculed hnson Hagood's recommendation that soldiers get into ingarees to do their work in the field found itself in 42 climbing into overalls and baseball caps to do its b. Dennis Hart Mahan's precept that the musket and ade went hand in hand in war was still valid; but is time it was the bulldozer that went side by side with e self-propelled gun and the 2½-ton truck.

The war, as in 1917, brought complete upheaval to e Regular's social life—as it did to the citizen soldier, . Once again we had the spectacle of Army wives d families—there were more enlisted families this time an in 1917-18—traipsing about the country to huddle makeshift housing as their soldiers shifted from camp camp. Once more gouging landlords and shop keep-s had their innings, at the expense of Army folk—egular, National Guard, Reserve and draftee. This ne the gypsying would be of longer duration.

We won't discuss battles and campaigns; the record eaks for itself. But we must note the changes in Army ought and manners brought about during the conflict 1941-45. In addition to those things just mentioned ere were other and very unpleasant experiences in re for our Regular—the run-of-the-mill Regular.

He would learn that sometimes the lust for power can do strange things to individuals who should know better; leading them to climb over other men's necks to attain it. He would see expediency, quibbling and political juggling enter into the rat-race of burgeoning staff empires. He would see civilians commissioned over his head.

The older Regular, too, was slapped in the face by an arbitrary combat-age limit unnecessary in fact, since endurance could be measured accurately by physical examinations plus demonstrated efficiency. He would see the wastage of money and much-needed professional experience caused by such practice.

Worse, officers unblessed by stars would learn, too, the hard way, the humiliation of such things as "Yankee Doodle Rooms" and other conveniences reserved "For General Officers only." Up to this time the American officer, like his British colleague, had been accustomed to an age-old code which, while acknowledging the right of any commander to rule his own headquarters mess, yet defined other common social meeting places such as clubs and general messes as gatherings of gentlemen, where rank *per se* was momentarily laid aside.

If he traveled as a casual, he was in for another humiliation. Generals, of course, moved in state, with their personal orderlies to handle their baggage. But the sight of a group of other officers, including colonels of thirty years' service, bent low under the burden of their own bedding rolls and baggage, bobbing like a line of weary stevedores past crowds of staring, much-amused enlisted men, was helpful neither to the self-esteem of the one nor the discipline of the other.

Lest this last observation be misconstrued, be it noted that this writer, while observing such things frequently, never was subjected to this himself. Upon the one occasion he found himself alone, cluttered with hand baggage, his firm insistence brought an orderly scampering down the transport companionway to take care of him.

Socially, it appeared, American officers in the AEF were, like all Gaul, divided into three parts: generals, who were the landed gentry; colonels, the poor relations; and lieutenant colonels and under, *hoi polloi.*

Of such spiritual saddle galls was the material first fashioned to impair morale.

ON the enlisted men's side the stresses of war and the sudden heady blooming of temporary rank produced sufficient injustices and unnecessary hardships to rankle. The majority of these men impressed into the Army didn't understand it, therefore they didn't like either its restrictions or its discipline. Some of them found themselves to be better educated than the leaders assigned to them by the fortunes of war.

Magnificent, of course, was the record of the individual American soldier in this war—in the slimy morasses of Oriental jungles, the crumbly djebels of North Africa, Italy's grim hill masses, the hedgerows of Normandy. From Okinawa to the Elbe he proved himself a warrior.

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But once the fighting was done, his resentments, real or fancied, came to the surface, and all too frequently he began to cry havoc upon the men who had led him and his country to victory. A vocative minority it was, with, ironically enough, its principal gripe against what it termed "regimentation," although it is hard to see how one can make a regiment without regimentation.

In the end when peace and the "I wanna go home" frenzy set in, these things popped out. The stage was set; "Momism" and the usual American urge to get back when the business was over combined to bring about a partial chaos of insubordination. We had had taste of this in the past. When *Infantry Journal* was aborning the soldiers were singing, "Return us to our own beloved homes." They thundered it in 1918. But the bedlam in 1945-46 was appalling. General Eisenhower's term for it was "near-hysteria," an understatement if ever there was one. The flames were fed by a skillful communistic manipulation.

Probably the region least affected by all the uproar was the Pacific Ocean Area, commanded by the late General Robert C. Richardson, whose prompt action and efficient leadership snuffed out the first smouldering flame.

THE Regular became, as always, the whipping boy, target for a barrage searching—so it seems to this writer—to break down completely the authority of the officer corps of which our Regular was the hard but tiny core. The tomtoms beat in rhythmic tune—an old tune, now

played in frenzy. "West Pointer arrogance," "caste privilege," "double standard," were some of the more polite allegations. In a democracy, whispered the party line, officers and men should be equal in all things; above all, that horrid custom, the hand salute, must be abolished. The stooges lapped it up and roared.

In September 1939 there had been in the Army some 15,000 officers, commissioned, warrant and flight. By July 1945 the officer strength had reached a peak 897,777. (These and the following figures are quot from the Doolittle Board report.) Two per cent of tl grand total were Regulars—half of them graduates West Point; approximately three per cent more can from the National Guard, and fifteen per cent we from the Officers' Reserve Corps. Thirteen per ce additional came directly from civil life—doctors, de tists, chaplains and other specialists. The remainii sixty-seven per cent came, half of them, from OCS, tl remaining from aviation cadets, battlefield commissior and direct commissioning from the ranks and fro warrant and flight officer grade.

TO expect from this mass, flung into command ov an army of 8,291,366, mainly draftees, absolute a herence to standards of judgment and probity evolv during years of peacetime training was impossibl Even the two per cent leaven of Regulars was not ii mune to the stress of war. So there were inequalitie there were delusions of grandeur, there was some st pidity and some ineffective leadership. The War D partment tried from the beginning to weed out tl unfit. A total of 6,700 officers passed before reclassific tion boards; 327 were demoted, 4,123 were separat from the service, and 2,250 were reassigned. In ad tion, 1,887 others were reassigned without board pr ceedings. The total of square pegs in round hol —8,587—was, one notes, approximately one per cent the peak commissioned strength.

So serious became the hue and cry that the Secreta of War in March 1946 appointed the now famo Doolittle Board to look into officer-enlisted man relatio ships. There is neither time nor space here for critic analysis of the findings and recommendations of tl board; anyone interested may easily obtain a copy. B it is this writer's opinion that the board, finding th the standards of the "old" Army were so high that tl "new" Army had not come up to them, instead recommending such indoctrination as would bring tl "new" to the higher standard, recommended *loweri* the standard to meet the situation. Without in any wa questioning the motives of this board, it does seem th it looked at the situation through reversed glasses.

Net result of the following wave of experimentatic included a complete revision of the Articles of Wa now become, by the act of 5 May 1950, the Unifor Code of Military Justice. And old AW 95, concernir conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, d teriorated to Article 134:

"Any officer, cadet or midshipman who is convicte of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman sha be punished as a court-martial may direct."

The fine edge of the officer's honor was blunted. N dismissal—cashiering—as inevitable result of convictio of dishonor, but a loophole. There were, in this ne code, degrees of dishonor. One might, so to speak, b a little bit pregnant without causing invidious commen

This, of course, is a matter of personal opinion. But the situation exists, and must be taken into account in any consideration of the changes in the Army.

VJ-Day to 25 June 1950—and after

Back to the Army again, sergeant,
Back to the Army again.
KIPLING

IT was during this war period that the Army went on the pay-as-you-go, cash-and-carry system in its commissaries and post exchanges—with which no one can cavil. And about this time, too, the saber—symbol of authority—went by the board. The Sam Browne belt, unwept monstrosity, had disappeared several years previous.

During those war years the Nation saw uniformed women in the service, expanding from the nurse's role to that of general administration. The Regular, initially shuddering at the thought, accepted the fact, albeit as reluctantly as his grandfather had accepted Clara Barton. He accepted, too, almost complete elimination of the old Army's post social life. The Army had grown entirely beyond the capacities of existing garrison posts, and a nation by now become habituated to the wanderlust of the trailer, to the uprooting of its own home life by industrial processes which sent families by the thousands gypsying from place to place for work as well as for pleasure, saw no valid reason for perpetuating the past cloistered existence of the Army. Consequently Congress was in no mood to expand Army housing.

As a result the average Regular, like his civilian colleague, became a commuter; his wife—were he married—a commuter's wife, uninterested in hubby's job, unacquainted with his superiors. Of course, on permanent posts, and in other spots where conscientious post and unit commanders and their wives were rightly jealous of the "old" Army and all that it meant, some of the garrison spirit of the past was reviving. The writer knows of one gallant lady who single-handed has for several years past kept up the distaff morale and instilled the spirit of the service, first in a division in Europe and later in an army area here. On the other hand, such things as the discouragement by 1st Infantry Division headquarters in Bad Tolz during 1950, of the time-honored custom of exchanging calls, particularly with the divisional high command, were no help to morale.

At best, both abroad, where the Army was reliving again the "days of the Empire" along a new world-wide frontier, and here in our huge cantonments, the revival of Army spirit was more nearly akin to country club gatherings than to the close-knit association of the past. The measured etiquette of military social intercourse was drooping, as it had earlier drooped in civil life.

This was unfortunate, for the biggest problem by this time was the assimilation into the officer corps once more of a large group of former emergency officers. Like their predecessors of 1920, these men could be divided roughly into two classes: those who had found a new vocation, and those to whom a life in uniform offered a better job than they could find in civil life.

But—and this is important—these newcomers were again divisible: into those who were being integrated into the Regular service and those who, retaining their Reserve status, were merely being kept on extended active service. These latter, and their families, could not help being imbued with an element of insecurity entirely incompatible with the rigid tenets of a lifetime profession.

Unfortunately, too, a generation of Americans brought up in cafeteria style found itself in our overseas stations living in luxury, surrounded by menials. Some individuals, particularly women, lost their heads. A certain degree of arrogance crept into their thinking, and there was not sufficient social intercourse with the older generation to correct this. The leaven was too thin; cracks were appearing in the moral fiber of the officer corps.

ABROAD, in strange places, an Army Exchange Service provided all the necesssities and most of the luxuries of life in the United States. All this was fine. But this Army, spick and span again physically, lacked soul; a moral inertia had gripped it. No one who has lived in our stations abroad, who has seen at close hand the little slimy, grubby tentacles of Black Market dealings wind themselves into Army lives, can deny this.

This Army traveled in reasonable comfort—by sea, by land, and in the air. Its families—officers and enlisted

men alike—shared quarters on transports equipped beyond the wildest dreams of the "old" Army. Gone were the days when one queued up on a bath roster. Gone, too, were the days when a transport voyage for a small infant was really a risky performance. Baby food, baby formulas, adequate medical and nursing personnel, well-equipped dispensaries, replaced the one harassed ship's doctor of the turn of the century, with his CC pills, castor oil and iodine. Our transportation people,

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it seemed, had learned that women and children were people!

Pay had crept up; never, of course, reaching either a comparable civilian level nor the ever-upward climb of the high cost of living. The officer, true, for a long time had been freed of the expense of providing his own personal arms and field equipment, and newcomers, except for West Point graduates and ROTC honor students—barred from participation by the very fact that they were commissioned in the Regular Army initially—received an initial $250 clothing allowance. Theoretically, the Regular, if he and his minded their pennies, could live as well as their forebears. Actually, this was not—and is not—so.

Not only had keeping up with the Joneses become a problem in this era of living in civilian communities, but the more urgent and very real additional expenses of the day—baby sitters, for instance—gouged holes in slim pocketbooks. No longer could the Regular and his wife leave the children home, confident that Private Jones, the family striker, would take charge. Now it was a case of paying seventy-five cents an hour for a sitter, when taking an evening off. Rentals in many areas ran beyond commutation; medical expenses, for those living off a post, became an urgent necessity in the family budget.

THAT was your Army, Mr. Jones, when Korea flamed in June 1950. It was an Army of cosmopolites, as familiar with the Rue de la Paix, the Ringstrasse, the Ginza and the battered façade of Unter den Linden as it was with Main Street. It had experienced the Berlin Airlift, the Mozart Express, the North Atlantic Treaty. The stresses of an ever-increasing turmoil and tempo throughout the world were testing its soul as the wind of cold war blowing from behind the Iron Curtain's cynical, godless ideology sought every cranny and crevice in its fabric.

Professionally, the Regular had rubbed shoulders with diplomacy in a big way. The American officer, in occupied areas, in UN, in NATO, in Greece, in the frenzied Pentagon rabbit warren, had become not only a student but also a practitioner of world politics. He had so become, not because of any meddling of his own, but by official dictate. And he did a magnificent job.

Professionally, too, the Regular was struggling with the atom and its effect upon the art of war. In so doing he had to combat civilian dreams of pushbutton war, as well as the civilian's incipient panic. He was on the horns of a dilemma—on the one hand, how best to utilize the genii of the atom without throwing away the essentials of heretofore "conventional" war; on the other, just what were those essentials in an atomic age? His deliberations were interrupted by the Korean explosion.

The enlisted man in 1950 had come far from his counterpart of 1904. His base pay of $75 a month and "found" compared very favorably with the $180 of the just-joined second lieutenant. The "perpetual private" was long gone; milkshakes were more popular than whiskey. The noncommisioned officer was a studious, serious-minded individual, probably married and bringing up a family. The stripes on his sleeve, unfortunately, were not necessarily tokens of ability to lead men in battle; every specialist, it seemed, wore chevrons.

The company cadre, although it included a topkick, also included something new—a unit administrator of warrant rank, who was supposed to take from the commander the onus of the ever-waxing paperwork. This was all fine and dandy in theory. But what had happened was the insertion of an unnecessary idling gear between two essential pinions of the basic military machine. Like all idling gears, it reversed the direction of energy. The company commander was put out of

touch with his men, his first sergeant—once his trusty right hand—was bypassed, his prerogatives clipped, his influence diminished. (One notes, *en passant,* that this situation has lately been corrected.)

GONE, too, in great part, were the days of individuality, when mess sergeants vied with one another for the reputation of the "best eatin'" outfit on the post. Like the post exchange, now become but one link in a great chain-store organization, the company mess was but a branch of a cafeteria system with a standardized daily diet and menu. However, this must be admitted the new system protected the soldier from the less-than mediocre efforts of a poor mess sergeant and an indifferent company commander. And it was still possible for an exceptionally conscientious commander, blessed with a good mess sergeant, to preserve some individuality in the mess.

The manpower filling this cadre consisted of young men brought up in an atmosphere of TV and comic books, juke boxes and pinball machines, hotrods and drive-in movies, organized baseball and organized crime. Some of them came from families infected with the creeping paralysis of unemployment compensation turned into a racket. The Nation itself, prosperous as never before, had become uninterested, it seemed, in anything beyond its creature comfort. Yet at that very time an element of fear was entering its consciousness: Soviet Russia had the atomic bomb!

With such background these young men, in June 1950, apparently lacking any moral incentive to stimulate their patriotism, were catapulted in Korea into the horrors of a warfare unparalleled since the days of Genghis Khan. Murder for the wounded, torture for the captive, was their lot.

Yet the record shows that when the chips were down in battle or in the hideous terror of brain-washing, this new American soldier—with twenty-three notable exceptions—showed himself to be certainly the equal of the crop of earlier days. He was fit comrade to that Lieutenant C. P. Summerall who stalked up to the gate of Pekin's Forbidden City under a hail of enemy fire to chalk there a target for the guns of his battery; to boy musician Calvin Titus scaling the walls of the outer city to spearhead the storming party of the 14th Infantry; to Sergeant Alvin York single-handedly capturing 132 armed German adversaries in the Argonne.

The difference between the old and the new, it appeared from the records of both World War II and of Korea, was that the successors of Calvin Titus and Alvin York needed an awful lot of indoctrination to convince them in the first place that the chips were down, and in the second, that they were their chips. Once convinced, they would write a golden page in our Army's books.

We did add a new word to our military vocabulary as a result of Korea—a shameful word: "bugout." But, galling though it may be to admit it, one must remember that bugouts have occurred prior to 1950. Panic is no respecter of persons. Once started, it is as hard to put out as a prairie fire in a gale. Leadership and discipline, though they will minimize its probability, cannot furnish guarantee against it.

The Shenandoah Valley, 19 October 1864, had witnessed the bugout of the entire VI Corps of Sheridan's army. Before that, Bragg's men on Missionary Ridge, 25 November, 1863, had done just that. And on 14 December 1944 the Ardennes had witnessed mad panic in VIII Corps' sector.

Only leadership will curb panic—the personal leadership of strong men, known to their subordinates. "Turn, boys, turn!" shouted Sheridan to the fleeing rabble at Cedar Creek, and turn they did, because they knew him and relied on him. Any modern Sheridan, be he corporal or general, can do the same, *provided his men know him well enough to rely on him.* It was done in the Ardennes, on the Pusan perimeter, in the reel-back from the Yalu.

And to the credit of our "new" Army, remember that S. L. A. Marshall declares he was unable to find in all his exhaustive research in Korea, a single instance of mass bugout by an entire American unit.

So we come back to Major Burns's remark of 1937:

> The officer who believes that American civilization as it is evolving will give him the same human material that fought at Gettysburg or in the Argonne is living in a fool's paradise. . . . Whether this American will make a different or better soldier no one can say. . . .

The answer is, thank God, that while indeed widely differing in manner and thought from his forebears, the American soldier of today is essentially the same fighting man. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.* (The more things change, the more they are the same.)

The Past Is Prologue

I see these things, still am I slave
When banners flaunt and bugles blow,
Content to fill a soldier's grave
For reasons I shall never know.

MAJOR GENERAL C. T. LANHAM

THE last outfit has passed our reviewing stand; the parade dismisses. There still remains unanswered the question why this fighting Army, which has nothing to fear, nothing to excuse, seems today to be steeped in a flood of self-pity, based on diminution of fringe benefits, high cost of living and dread of shrinking retirement pay. There is talk of breach of contract between the government and its Regulars, of degradation of rank.



These charges are serious, and there is much foundation for them. But the Army has known some of these things before, "pocketbook blues" in particular. In 1876 the Fifty-fourth Congress, failing to pass an appropriations bill, let the services struggle along for an entire year without pay. Again in 1912 a five-month hiatus in pay resulted from a similar failure.

Mass exoduses of Regular Army officers have occurred during periods of Army stagnation, notably all during the first fifty years of the national life, and again following the Depression of 1929.

The present exodus, however, comes from causes other than a mere stagnation in grade. The officers who are today resigning or retiring voluntarily to go into civil life do so mainly because they fear that a Regular

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commission is no longer a thing of permanence; that it is becoming a temporary and uncertain job rather than a profession. This the Department of the Army has brought about by its own action—the involuntary retirement of Regulars long before the age limit established by law when they entered the service.

At one time this age limit was sixty-four years; then it came down to sixty, except for general officers whose stars carried with them, it seems, a bonus dose of Kickapoo Indian remedy guaranteed to prevent tired blood for from two to four years.

NOW Regulars lacking stars—men of the highest efficiency—are being urged forcibly out the door while still in their middle fifties, during the most crucial period of human endeavor, when a man is too old to swap one profession for another, and while he still has heavy family responsibilities. Younger men, seeing this, feel they must swap horses, so to speak, before they too get caught irrevocably.

Others, recalling that only a few years ago the privilege of retirement at one's own request after thirty years' service was being arbitrarily denied, call it a cat-and-mouse game of sorts, a breach of contract. The curtailments and threats of further curtailment in "fringe benefits" thus become a cumulative factor in worries about the future.

Odd indeed it is that at this time such things should be permitted. One well remembers how General MacArthur's courageous stand and statements to the Congress during the drab period of 1931-35 prevented the dismemberment of the Army.

This is a far from from the "old" Army—such, for instance, as that courtly colonel of the old school, senior officer on Corregidor in 1921, who, on finding that the quarters assigned to an incoming captain—a complete stranger—were being reconstructed and therefore temporarily uninhabitable, went personally to meet the arriving transport and insist that the officer, his wife and five-year-old son, make their home in his quarters until theirs were made shipshape.

The gap between officer and enlisted man, too, originally resulting from rotation of officers prior to World War II, has been widened since then, by the replacements of casualties—the repple-depple system, and later rotation policies. Its effects have been felt more by the enlisted man, perhaps, but both officer and man have become, as it were, homeless men, with no team to tie to.

We have lost or are in danger of losing one of the finest things in the spiritual sense—the stimulation of heredity, of "belonging," so essential to teamwork on the playing field or in battle. It is strange that Americans, who give so fanatically to team spirit on gridiron and diamond—note the renaissance of the Baltimore "Orioles," for instance—would purposefully destroy such a thing. But we have.

It is too bad, for we possess the foundations for such hereditary unit pride. We have such things as Alexander Hamilton's Battery—D of the 5th Field Artillery Battalion—antedating the United States Army itself; we have the "Buffsticks" 3d Infantry, the 9th Infantry's Liscum Bowl, the 38th Infantry's "Rock of the Marne" name, the "Brave Rifles" of the 3d Cavalry, the "I'll try, Sir!" legend of the 5th Infantry, to mention but a few of the scores of existing stimuli to the pride of American fighting men. And this is true, too, of many of our old National Guard regiments.

There, it would seem, lies the weakness of the Army of today, a spiritual weakness. One can but hope that the attempt now being made to change rotation policies toward unit rather than toward individual replacement will bear fruit.

BOTH the United States and its Army are as different today from those of 1904 as the modern fire engine differs from the old galloping three-horse steamer. Nostalgic as are memories of the past, one must face the present order to be prepared for the future.

The Regular has gained much professional knowledge through the years. But somewhere along that road he has lost several things in addition to his saber—the symbol of authority and duty. Both he and his family have lost, little by little, the close comradeship, community of interest and force of tradition enjoyed in the past.

But in the spirit of that past lies the hope for the future. Let's salvage that spirit.

Poet's Creed

The great poems must be taken
Even as men take a ridge, in travail
Laboring up sunstricken with base-plate
And mortar-barrel. Great poems
Come not from books, or Base Section
Meditations back of the lines. Great poems
Are won like the war, with rifles.

Only the Combat Infantryman,
Rifleman, grenadier, weapon man
Can win from the war great poems.
Follow with me the infantryman
Into the sun-blaze where great poems
Wait unwritten up within mortar-range!

HARGIS WESTERFIELD

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WHAT IS THE ARMY'S STORY?

MAJOR JOHN H. CUSHMAN

A FEW months ago the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army urged every soldier to "Tell the Army's story clearly and loudly." I certainly agree with General Bolte that the Army's story needs to be told and we soldiers are the ones to tell it. But when I try to do it I find that I cannot speak very clearly because I do not know what the Army's mission is or how it plans to fulfill its mission. And this, I find, is true of my fellow soldiers. At a time when new weapons and new machines herald a revolution in warfare, we soldiers do not know where the Army is going and how it is going to get there.

This not only leaves us mute when we should be speaking up for the Army, but it is the basic cause, I believe, of much of the dissatisfaction that exists within the Army. Writing in the columns of this magazine a few months ago, an unnamed officer put it well:

"There is nothing wrong with our men, our officers, our units, or with our schools and training establishment. They are fine. What is lacking is a common goal and a

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MAJOR JOHN H. CUSHMAN, Infantry, now a student at the Command and General Staff College, recently completed three years of troop and staff duty in Germany. He is a 1944 graduate of the Military Academy.

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common program resolutely laid down from topside."

THE answers can only be obtained in a statement of the fundamental doctrine of the Army. The preparation of such a statement would not be a simple task. It would require a searching analysis of the Army's role in today's world by the best minds the Army can muster. But the result could well give the Army something to hold to in its work for the several years to come and it could give the American people a new point of view on national military policy. The latter need is manifest too, if I read the commentators rightly.

Such a statement of fundamental doctrine would not be something new. The Air Force, for example, has had such a statement since March 1953, when Air Force Manual 1-2 was published. The title of this unclassified manual is "United States Air Force Basic Doctrine." In it the Air Force presents persuasively and clearly its basic reason for being, along with the fundamentals of the employment of airpower. It sets the keynote for Air Force thinking. It has been distributed widely, and it provides everyone in the Air Force—top planners, development people, combat units, public information officers, ROTC instructors and all the rest—with a soundly presented doctrine on which to peg his work.

The Army can and should do the same thing. The statement need not be complex or profound. Its simplicity might even seem elementary. But the stark expression of basic truths would set a course for all of us.

The statement might begin with an outline of the fundamental conflict that divides the free world and the communistic world, and of the reasons why the United States is taking a leading role in the struggle against the communistic world.

Many weapons are used in this struggle. They include not only conventional armed force and partisan warfare, but also deceit, treason, and revolution. Our opponent is a crafty fighter who knows how to get the full use out of all these weapons.

THE statement might continue with a discussion of the role that the armed forces play in national policy, and the special position of the Army as part of the armed forces. The national security system is a coordination of various means, including military, political, diplomatic, economic, psychological, and moral forces. In order to serve the national aim, this "national weapons system" is coordinated at the highest levels of government.

The armed forces are an extension of the national power. Ideally, they are not used at all. The mere threat of their readiness should be sufficient for the attainment of national objectives. But if they have to be used, they will be most effective when they are integrated with the other elements of the national system, when they are used as a part of the overall plan.

The armed forces are composed of land, sea, and air elements. Each of these elements depends on the other two, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the operations in progress.

Both land and sea forces require integrated air elements for all operations. These elements are not ne sarily a part of the air forces. Land forces operate n effectively with the closest ties with their support aviation, and for this reason United States Army docti could logically state that command of supporting avia be assigned to the land force commander.

The objective of armed force is to impose the natic will on the enemy. There are various ways of acc plishing this, but the most decisive and lasting way i occupy the key centers of his territory and so elimi his control therein. Of all armed forces, land fo are best suited to this task.

THE statement might continue with a discussion of position of the United States in the world, and effect of this position on the employment of the Arm

In relationship to the communist world, the geogra position of the United States is insular. It is prefer that our national power be employed at a distance. this we must have control of overseas bases and sea air lanes of communication.

The ability of the nation, with its allies, to pr its armed power swiftly at long range, concentra decisive forces at selected areas, is essential to the nati security system. This ability is today more pote than real in certain areas of the globe. Converting reality should be a principal aim of national mili policy. Advances in technology can increase the mob of the armed forces and help attain this goal.

The world position of the United States and the e of modern technology on the armed forces therefore n it probable that the Army will be used at long ra from the homeland. It will be used in joint operati in decisive actions, in furtherance of the national ol tive. It follows that the land element of these joint fo must be not only of appropriate size, but also ready immediate operations.

THE statement might continue with a discussion of possible shapes of war, and the role that the A would have in each.

If armed forces should be used by the United S in the struggle with international communism, the conflict will most likely take one of two forms. It either be a major war between the centers of the opposing sides, or it will be a group of so-called peripl actions, or minor wars, not directly involving the cipals of both sides.

It is probable that a major war will begin with i continental air warfare. Both sides will use weapo mass destruction. It is also likely that the enemy launch a powerful land attack aimed at the occup or control of the entire Eurasian continent.

In this case the Army would have a dual role. It w assist our allies in defending critical areas, and it w also prepare an intercontinental striking force for dec action in the enemy heartland. The base of opera for this striking force would be either in the U States or in other areas under friendly control. The ing force would use every technological develop

ıilable to improve its mobility, shock firepower, range, d endurance. At the appropriate time it would strike the enemy heartland, eliminating enemy control and cing the national will upon him.

A peripheral, or limited, war might well be fought hout mass destruction weapons. The key to success a peripheral action is the swift application of decisive ver at a critical point. The goal is the attainment of ited objectives. A decision is obtained by the use of d-hitting, flexible, mobile formations with built-in lurance. As in a major war, the application of armed ce is made more meaningful when it is part of a co-inated plan that uses all the means available to the ion in support of the common aim. The use of local ces and political influences assumes great importance both peripheral and major wars.

IE statement could include a brief discussion of the rinciples of war and their basic application to the em-yment of the army in the light of advances in tech-ogy. This section would be a guide to those engaged the development of weapons and equipment. It ıld show how technology can enhance the combat ctiveness of the Army by improving control, mobility, l firepower.

Also appropriate would be a short section describing soldierly qualities demonstrated by outstanding units individuals, from the dawn of military history to present. It would emphasize that these qualities are e than ever in demand today, and it would discuss methods by which they can be developed and en-raged.

The basic Army doctrine that is finally produced need be identical to the suggestion above. But as long t is a clear and reasonable position that is backed by authoritative voice of the United States Army, it ıld give new meaning to our existence and lend new ency to our work. Its influence for the good would enormous.

ınd there is another dividend to be gained from such ınalysis.

One of life's most frustrating experiences is to have the re to act decisively in a situation, but to lack the ns at hand. This state of affairs can be unpleasant ıgh in the more prosaic fields of endeavor; it can be strous when it occurs in the field of national policy. even the best run nations are sometimes faced with it. One way to prevent this condition is to be ready with tools before the need develops. Figure out in advance t may be needed, then build it. This is hard to do he national level, but it is the only way to be sure we will not be caught with two pair when we need of a kind in the international poker game.

he Army must anticipate the way in which it may be five or ten years from now. A sound estimate, made ıe general staff and supported by unwavering com-d action, will provide guidance for the Army from o bottom. It will also do much to prevent future ration or defeat in another Korean bonfire or a world agration.

The Sensitive Adjustment of Men to Machines

(Continued from Cover 2)

conflicting requirements of a large standing army and a democratic society. Technological warfare has generated very formidable training requirements. These are incompatible with short terms of service. A way must be found to make the service more attractive so that men will make a career out of the military and preserve their experience.

How do we cultivate and preserve personal and group effectiveness on the battlefield? This question introduces a host of specific psychological problems. Let me cite but three:

(1) The development of more powerful weapons has progressively enforced the separation of soldiers from their fellows, until tomorrow a battlefield may well be a lonely place. How can the psychologist help man's sense of purpose and social obligation to survive this new isolation?

(2) There is much that needs to be known before we can fully understand the dynamics of fear. Such an understanding will permit us to protect our troops from its debilitating effects and to capitalize upon its effect on any enemy.

(3) Shortly after the end of World War II, much publicity was given to the Army's trend toward "democratization" within its ranks. Perhaps the most widely publicized feature was the abolition of off-base saluting. Now we have a reversal of this trend—a movement back toward the traditional "spit and polish" approach. Such shifts in policy indicate a lack of knowledge concerning the most effective structure of military organizations—concerning the type of education, organization and leadership which will cause men to fight effectively with a feeling of common purpose and mutual pride.

While these problems of morale have been pondered by military men for hundreds of years, they remain basically psychological problems. Psychologists can bring to them both their technical know-how and their abilities to obtain information which is not now available.

ANOTHER problem with which the psychologist must be concerned is the effect of technological warfare on military leaders. Officers are required to make decisions about equipment, about operations, about training. Sound decisions require a high degree of technical competence. With all due respect to our present generation of officers, they do not have the technical training to make decisions in these areas with confidence. They are uneasy; they must depend on civilian technical advice and are unhappy in their dependence. How should the next generation of officers be prepared?

THERE are over 2,000 psychologists participating in military problems: some are in uniform; some are government employees; others are with civilian organizations and universities. If the cold war become hot and global, the time scale for a military decision will be expressed in days or at the most weeks. There will be no time for research. The necessities of science will become luxuries. If the psychologist is to serve his country, it must be while the war is still cold. We can only hope that these efforts will contribute in some way to prevent it from ever getting hot.

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Antitank Weapons for the Airborne

Self-propelled Guns Can Be Dropped

Captain John C. Burney, Jr.

ASSAULT troops in an airhead are especially vulnerable to attack by enemy tanks. This is a fact recognized in our training literature. Field Manual 57-30, "Airborne Operations," states: "Defense agaist enemy armor must be given added emphasis in airborne operations."

The unfortunate fact is that our airborne divisions lack an effective antitank weapon. The airborne division has two tank battalions, but they cannot reach the airhead until ground or sea link-up.

CAPTAIN JOHN C. BURNEY, JR., Armor, now serving overseas, recently was on duty with the AAF board at Fort Bragg. He is a 1946 graduate of the Military Academy which he entered after service as an enlisted man.

The paratrooper is thus deprived of his most effective antitank weapon at the time that he is most exposed to enemy tanks, during reorganization after landing and initial development of the airhead.

What does FM 57-30 suggest to remedy this? It says: "The normal shortage or lack of friendly armor requires the airborne commander to provide other means for antitank defense and offensive power."

Other means? To be sure, the airborne division has other antitank weapons that can be delivered by parachute. It has rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, and towed antitank guns. But these weapons do not meet the requirements of modern airborne combat.

In warfare dominated by nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, dispersion is essential. The demand is for highly mobile weapons, which will allow units to concentrate rapidly for attack or defense to disperse equally rapidly to avoid senting a profitable target.

Recoilless rifles, as they are prese used, lack this mobility. Towed tank guns are unwieldy and requir much time to be placed into action. rocket launcher, on the other hand, range and accuracy. We must also in mind that our potential oppone wealthy in tanks and self-propelled He uses many of them and in mass. of this emphasizes the airborne's for strong antitank protection by hi mobile weapons.

WE should provide airborne units lightweight, full-tracked self-prop antitank guns, which would replac ponderous tanks that are useless ir borne operations.

What would be the characteristi this weapon? Its main armament w be preferably a high-velocity gun, e 76- or 90mm. The gun woul mounted on a full-tracked highly bile carriage, protected by a quart half inch of armor plate: heavy en to stop shell fragments and small fire. This light armor would also pr a shield against the primary effec atomic detonations. The vehicle w weigh between 15,000 and 18 pounds without crew or ammunitio ground pressure would be approxim three pounds per square inch.

Can such a vehicle be produ Rapid progress has been made ir development of light tracked car and high-velocity guns. It is clear t first-rate self-propelled gun weig less than 18,000 pounds can be duced.

Can such heavy equipment be p in an airhead? Yes, it can. A sel

The new YC-130 turbo-prop transport, built by Lockheed, can carry up to twenty tons, at higher speeds than other transports

lled gun could be dropped by para-
ute today, using standard equipment.
modified heavy-drop kit for 2½-ton
ick and five or six 100-foot G-11 para-
utes could be used to deliver the
apon. It would easily meet the height
d width limitations (80 by 100 inches)
heavy drop from a C-119 airplane.
tractor weighing 17,000 pounds was
opped successfully by this technique
ring Exercise TEST DROP at Fort
agg, North Carolina, in January 1953.

ELF-PROPELLED guns can be de-
livered efficiently by parachute with
lay's heavy-drop equipment. The new
-bag type delivery platforms eliminate



vances in heavy-drop techniques have given airborne forces more ground mobility and firepower. Similar techniques can be applied to solving airborne's critical need for self-propelled antitank guns weighing about 17,000 pounds.

ch of the damage that results from
gh landings. Improved disconnects
arate the parachutes from the load
en it strikes the ground, and prevent
ls from overturning during high
ids. Multiple 64-foot parachutes can
used instead of the 100-foot para-
tes now in use, in order to add sta-
ty to heavy-drop platforms during
cent. This will further reduce dam-
Automatic restraint and release
ices now under development will
itly facilitate the extraction of cargo
n aircraft in flight.

Cargo aircraft have also been im-
ved. The C-130, soon to be service
ed, will permit the parachute delivery
heavier equipment than can be
oped from the C-119, our standard
p carrier airplane. The C-123 as-
t transport, which is already in pro-
ction, will be able to land on rough,
nproved fields with loads weighing
uch as 20,000 pounds. A heavy drop
em for the C-124 Globemaster is now
g tested. It is designed to deliver by
chute 40,000 pounds of equipment,
hich any single item may weigh up
3,000 pounds.

We have not taken advantage of these improvements in equipment and techniques. As a result, the organization of the airborne division has become obsolete. When the division was given two tank battalions, a self-propelled gun could not be delivered by parachute. But today's lightweight equipment and techniques and equipment of aerial delivery make effective antitank protection available to troops in an airhead. The organization of the airborne division must be altered accordingly.

The substitution of a lighter weapon for the tanks of the airborne division would have several advantages. A light self-propelled gun could accompany infantrymen in terrain impassable to the tank. A vehicle with a ground pressure of three pounds per square inch would have far greater flotation and trafficability than a medium tank, with its eleven pounds per square inch. The use of a less complex vehicle would also ease the maintenance problems of the airborne division. Today the ordnance company of the division is usually overburdened with tank maintenance requirements. Supply problems would also be fewer, for modern tanks are hungry creatures. The proposed vehicle would have a simplified fire control system and engine train, and this would ease the G3's training problems.

THE use of self-propelled guns in place of tanks offers another important, though less apparent, advantage to the paratrooper. Airborne, with its great strategic mobility, and armor, with its firepower and tactical mobility, are a natural team. The capabilities of each balance the limitations of the other. Tanks, when provided with a flexible combat team organization, are especially well suited to strike through enemy territory and reach airborne units that have seized critical terrain.

But tanks are limited in number, largely because of their cost. Substitution of comparatively inexpensive self-propelled guns for airborne's tanks would free 140 tanks per airborne division. These could be used in armored divisions together with infantry and artillery of equal mobility, and in separate tank battalions, which could be attached to infantry and airborne units when needed. This reorganization would give tanks great flexibility and efficiency, and armor would become a stronger partner of the airborne.

This reorganization would still allow the airborne division to use tanks when it is engaged in non-airborne operations. They could be attached when required. The amount of armor attached would depend on the terrain, situation, and the needs of other divisions. Those who prefer the use of organic rather than attached armor should be appeased for two reasons: the same tanks would habitually be attached to a given airborne unit; and a good *organic* tank destroyer would be present in the airhead.

The self-propelled gun need not be used only for antitank protection. Its versatility would make up for its inferiority to the tank as an offensive weapon. This light tracked vehicle could operate in close coordination with the infantry to engage any type of target. One may prefer to have a supporting tank, but in an airhead one must accept the best substitute—a highly mobile self-propelled gun.

Today's airborne division can make no use of its primary antitank weapon at the time that it needs it most. But we *can* give the paratrooper an effective tank destroyer that can be delivered to the airhead. We must keep in step with progress, equip the paratrooper with the best tools available, and save airborne organization from obsolescence.

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EDITORIAL

What Is a Soldier Worth i 'Civilian Equivalents

THE great pay-raise hassle of 1954 ended on several sour notes. President Eisenhower vetoed the pay increase voted to the civilian employees of the government. Congress, which voted the raise, never did consider seriously the idea of an increase for the armed forces.

In his veto message, the President said:

> While this bill is limited to civilian personnel, I must observe, parenthetically, that consideration of a complete Federal personnel program must eventually meet certain imperative needs of the members of the armed forces. These patriotic men and women, whose morale, skill and dedication to service are so important to us all, now lack adequate medical care for dependents and reasonable survivorship benefits for their families. It is most important that these needs of armed forces personnel, serving their country often in remote corners of the world, engage our serious consideration.

As we read the veto message, the President is not considering a military pay raise; he is merely in favor of taking steps to correct two unfortunate aspects of military service. Also, the President did not veto the civilian employee increase because he felt the civilians did not deserve an increase, but because the type of raise voted did not fulfill the requirements of good personnel management, and the postal portion of the bill would add to the postal deficit.

This leaves the military in a rather unsatisfactory position. In October 1951, civilian employees of the government were voted a 10 per cent increase, retroactive to 1 July of that year. The military was given an *average* 5.7 per cent increase effective 1 May 1952. In 1954 Congress has voted the civilian employees an additional five per cent; the military was not even considered.

It is so easy to remember that in 1949 the Hook Commission studied thoroughly the problem of military pay, and came up with recommendations for an increase, taking into account the fringe benefits that accrued to the military. Not only were the Hook Commission's recommendations cut by Congress, but the fringe benefits received a whittling that effectively removed much of their attractiveness.

HOW much of Congress's latest neglect can be laid to the so-called McNeil Report cannot be measured accurately, but undoubtedly the charts submitted in June by the Defense Comptroller to Senator Ferguson (at the Senator's request, we must add in fairness to Mr. McNeil) had their effect. These charts, it will be remembered, purported to show that men in uniform were better paid than their civilian counterparts.

What is the civilian counterpart of a soldier? Mr. McNeil says, for instance, that a lieutenant colonel and a GS-14 are comparable. This leaves much room for argument, even for resentment. Not that there is a thing wrong with a GS-14. We know GS-14s in Pentagon and in arsenals and other installations. T are sharp, conscientious, experts in their fields. T earn every cent they get, and it probably would m good sense to pay most of them more to keep indu from wooing them away. They are probably bette their jobs than most lieutenant colonels would be in same job. But every day lieutenant colonels are ord into unfamiliar jobs, take over to the best of their abi and take the responsibility for running an office in wl the GS-14 has been working for years. The officer le the job fast—or else. The skill may be the GS-14's, the decisions and the responsibility belong to the offi

Turn the GS-14 loose with a battalion. *There* wo be a situation! Not because the officer is a better than his civilian counterpart, but because the officer had more varied experience and has survived a more orous process of selection.

If the GS-14 and the lieutenant colonel do draw ne the same pay (Mr. McNeil says they do, lower inc taxes, allowances, and "other benefits" considered), t there is definitely something wrong. The lieute colonel must have dependents to get into the s bracket as the GS-14, otherwise he is way behind. I lives in government quarters, he loses $137 per mo —and we have all seen some of those government q ters. If the lieutenant colonel gets all the pay br there are, and has two dependents, he is $6.00 ahea the GS-14 each month.

Out of this $6.00 he must pay for breakage on quent changes of station, excess baggage allowances, l cloths, green uniforms, outmoded short overcoats, moded long overcoats, outmoded field coats, BOQ messing expenses when he is separated from his fan and the myriad other expenses that are all too fam to those who wear the uniform.

In addition, the $6.00, we suppose, serves to repay officer for his 24-hour responsibility, his working h that have no relation to 8:30 to 5:30, his subjectio trial and the end of his military career for offenses would be considered mere eccentricities if indulged i a civilian, and the grave penalties that would befa he decided he didn't feel like working today.

And, of course, there is the officer's constant subjec to physical risk. We don't know of any GS-14 who his office by plane to command a battalion of ill-trai and under-armed troops in Korea in the early days of conflict, but we can name several military officers—s of whom didn't come back. There isn't enough mone pay for this facet of a soldier's life, and anything

uld be an insult, so we can ignore this from the finan-
l side—but not from the fact that the chart equates a
-14 with a civilian.

About those "other benefits," which the McNeil chart
ts at $28.00. Commissaries and PXs? We've checked
ces lately. Considering the restrictions on commis-
ies and post exchanges, in most cases you're better off
liscount houses and super-markets, where they're avail-
e. Medical care for dependents? Our readers and
sident Eisenhower seem to agree on the value of this
nefit. There is little point in pursuing this farther
erhaps we'd all be better off if we got those putative
her benefits" in cold cash.

IE Army has enlisted men, too—many of them. Will
nyone be able to convince an Army corporal that he is
ter off than a GS-6? The corporal, with two depend-
s, has a take-home pay of $289.00, according to the
le, while the GS-6 has $287.00. In the corporal's
39.00, however, is included quarters allowance of
7.00, a subsistence allowance of $33.00, and "other
nefits" of $52.00 ($5.00 of which is reenlistment
nus). These figures are based on the idea that half
corporal's time will be spent overseas, but they
ore the fact that civilians stationed overseas get extra
owances. If the corporal is single, he gets $21.00 a
nth less take-home pay than the GS-6, even consider-
that he gets $139.00 in "other benefits."

Compare the 8:30 to 5:00 hours, five days a week, of
GS-6, whose skills may include shorthand, and the
ls, devotion and time demanded of the corporal. Most
is remember those situations, especially during World
r II, when enlisted men and civilians worked in the
e office, performing the same duties. Came the time
en custodial service was scarce—and who was detailed
lust off the colonel's desk, empty the wastebaskets,
l even to scrub the floors? The civilians? We all know
answer. The enlisted men and women did the menial
res, in addition to other duties, while the civilians sat
and the more thoughtful of them forebore to snigger.
he case of the enlisted women, especially, patriotism
ned to be penalized heavily. The corporal seems
e deserving of an increase than the civilian.

E McNeil figures are probably accurate statistically.
/hat they imply is not necessarily accurate at all. We
know that when civilian employees of the government
voted pay increases while military pay stands still dur-
a period when fringe benefits have been cut and are
under attack, the soldier begins to wonder if he
se the right profession after all. His sacrifices in
dom, home life, and bodily risk can't be worth much
e people of the United States, through their elected
esentatives, place a lower value on his services than
do on those of civilian employees. When the sol-
is not even considered for a pay raise because of an
trary linking of his rank with some civilian grade that
no possible relation to his job, it is time to look again
is comparison of duties and pay, and to decide if it is
l, or useful.

We say it is neither valid nor useful, and has done incalculable harm—and should be repudiated by the Department of Defense if it is ever again dusted off by those who believe the soldier is not worthy of his hire.

We agree that no amount of money can pay for the soldier's sacrifices—but that is no argument for treating him worse than his civilian contemporaries.

We cannot help but feel that it is a grave error, one that creates injustice for those who serve in the armed forces, and danger for the country, when those who serve the government in civilian clothes are chosen for financial favor over those who serve in uniform.

CIVILIAN control of the military is in the American tradition, and no thoughtful soldier would want to see any change in the concept. The soldier's duty is to serve his country, to give it his best efforts, and his life if that is necessary. It is doubtful, however, if this concept of duty includes within it the thought that the soldier is to become, or remain, a second-class citizen. Money isn't everything, it is said, but it helps. Officers, particularly, formerly realized that their low pay was compensated by many privileges that did not accrue to the civilian, including not only the monetary rewards that we have come to call "fringe benefits," the security that came with retirement at sixty-four years of age, and the opportunity to travel every four years with his family, but also by some intangibles that included the respect of the civilian populace and the leaders of the government.

The soldier's duty is still the same, but his rewards have been cut again and again. Earlier forced retirement, loss of many fringe benefits, too many changes of station and long separations from family—the list is long and need not be repeated to readers of the JOURNAL. Add to these dollars-and-cents losses, many of them forced by commercial pressure groups, the curtailment of a decent home life caused by the times we live in, and then pile on top of these knowledge that the soldier is falling further and further behind in pay as compared to civilian employees of the government. The result is not encouraging from the viewpoint of national defense.

The rain may fall upon the just and the unjust alike, but some can afford umbrellas and some cannot. The civilians who control the armed services seem to make no effort to improve the financial lot of the soldier or his opposite numbers in the other services, while civilian employees of the government are voted larger salary increases more often. If there is logic in this, we cannot see it. If logic does not apply, there must be another reason—politics. And in that field the soldier is helpless. He must rely upon those civilians who control the military to fight his cause.

We do not gloat because the civilian employees of the government were denied their increase by Presidential veto. We do ask that when the civilian pay raise is again considered, the military be considered at the same time, and that Congress realize that prices have risen for the uniformed and the ununiformed alike, and that both serve faithfully.

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The Word from the Schools

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

School Brigade Reorganized

The Infantry School Brigade is undergoing a reorganization. Earlier this year, the Second Student Regiment was inactivated. Current plans call for inactivation of the First Student Regiment and the First Officer Candidate Regiment. The revamped School Brigade will include five battalions, a brigade headquarters, and the Infantry School Detachment.

New Assault Technique

Fort Benning's Human Research Unit No. 3 has developed a new (but not yet approved) system of eliminating "rifle bounce" caused by normal body movements of infantrymen walking in an assault. The new system employs a rhythmic thrusting forward and firing of the weapon at each step. A normal man has a natural ability to perform this movement through his experience in throwing baseballs, footballs, etc. Test firers using this system have been scoring from two to three times the number of hits that were scored previously.

New Training Films

Assembly of an Airborne Unit, TF 21-1926, 20 minutes. This film presents various assembly aids, and shows briefings, the takeoff, the jump, and final assembly.

Duties of the Jumpmaster, TF 31-1927, 40 minutes. This motion picture gives a clear-cut delineation of the responsibilities of the jumpmaster. It takes the viewer through a complete jump cycle from start of rehearsal to actual jump.

Front Line Rifle and Weapons Squad in Defense, TF 7-1867, 23 minutes. This film shows the organization of a defensive position at the basic level. Emphasis is given to proper placement of weapons to insure effective use of firepower.

Infantry Operations in Mountains, MF 7-8278, 39 minutes. A tactical film showing the mountainous areas of the world. It stresses the need for proper physical conditioning, and it includes time and space factors.

Desert Equipment Tested

Army Field Forces Board No. 3 is testing newly designed infantry equipment for combat in desert areas. Among the items being tested is a desert uniform of sateen fabric. It is worn loosely in combat, but has an adjustable belt to give it a natty appearance when desired. The Fort Benning testing agency is also experimenting with a universal carrying strap. It weighs less than a pound, and can be rolled and placed in a soldier's pocket when not needed. It is capable of carrying weapons, ammunition, and rations.

New pack arrangements are also being tested. A lightweight webbing device has been designed to replace the familiar ammunition pouches and packboards. It has a wide, padded shoulder strap and two ammunition pouches in front to counterbalance the weight of the pack on the soldier's back.

The experiments are being conducted at the Army's testing station at Yuma, Arizona. Soldiers selected from the 47th Infantry Division have been using the equipment on the Arizona desert, where the temperature often exceeds 120 degrees. The tests involve crawling and marching in conditions approximating those of combat. It is thought that if the tests are successful, this equipment will be adopted by the Army.

TIS Instructional Material

The following new instructional material suitable for r resident as well as resident instruction may be ordered from Book Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. the prices shown.

Individual Training and Patrolling, 2024N-USAR. I vidual camouflage, movement under fire, maintaining direct use of cover and concealment. Patrolling to include duties higher commander, preliminary duties of patrol leader, and patrol order. Terrain exercise which requires planning, orga ing, and conducting of daylight reconnaissance patrol. 4 ho 25¢.

The Battalion Coordinated Antitank Defense Plan, 24 USAR. Development of AT plan, influencing factors, c acteristics and tactical employment of AT weapons organi the battalion and those normally attached or in support of battalion. 1 hour. 20¢.

Front-Line Battalion in Defense, 2428-USAR. Planning organization of a front-line battalion defense and conducting defense during an attack. 3 hours. 40¢.

Battalion Reserve in Defense, 2439-USAR. Missions employment of the reserve rifle company and the tactical position of units and installations within the rear portion of battalion defense area; the reserve company in counter-att the establishment of the combat outpost. 4 hours. $1.35.

Retrograde Movements, 2485-USAR. Principles of retrog movements to include retirements, withdrawals from action delaying action; map exercise on employment of a rifle batta in a night withdrawal and in a delaying action. 4 hours. $1

Principles of Mine Warfare, 2701-USAR. Presents basic doctrine for the employment of mines; standards of train need for unit and individual training; types and characteri of fields. 1 hour. 20¢.

Command Posts, 3626-USAR. Organization, operation displacement of a command post with emphasis on dutie communications personnel. 1 hour. 15¢.

Military Government, 6429-USAR. Principles, missions organization of military government in the combat zone duties of regimental and battalion S1s in this respect. 1 h 15¢.

Operations & Training Handbook. Enumerates the more portant duties, defines responsibilities and describes staff f tions of the Operations and Training Officer. Shows the org zation of battalion and regimental staffs and the relationshi the S3 to other members of the command. $1.30.

Front Line Rifle Company in Defense, 2423A-USAR. ganization of an interior rifle company defense area, inclu location and organization of rifle platoon defense areas, emp ment of weapons platoon, and location of company installat 4 hours. 10¢.

Combat Command, Delaying Action, 2627-A4. Princ and techniques of delaying action applicable to the Co Command of the Armored Division. 4 hours. 50¢.

Radio Telephone Procedure Workbook. Practical exerci radio telephone procedure. 2 hours. 25¢.

Signal Orders, 3309-USAR. Preparation and content Paragraph 5 of the Operations Order; purpose, preparation, contents of the SOI-SSI, the Signal Annex, and the C munication SOP. 1 hour. 25¢.

Codes, 3350-USAR. Field security measures. Practical

se covering Operations Code and Modified Clear Code Words. our. 15¢.

Message Writing, Codes and Authentication, 3532A-USAR. nciples and techniques of message writing; preparation of ssage in secret form using Operations Code and Modified ar Code Words; use of Army Authentication System No. 3. our. 15¢.

Signal Orders, 3561-USAR. Paragraph 5 of an Operations ler; purpose and content of SOI and SSI. 1 hour. 15¢.

Regimental and Battalion Staffs, Infantry Regiment, 6904A-AR. Organization of regimental and battalion staffs; com-nd and staff relationship; general duties of staff officers. 1 r. 15¢.

Introduction to Company Administration, 6505. Administra- personnel in a company and their duties; important military lications; and three company records. 3 hours. 10¢.

Guide, New Operations Order Format. A complete guide for New Operations Order that became effective 1 July 54. udes Operation Planning, Operations Order, Techniques of paration, Overlay-Type Orders. 45¢.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

w Radio for Light Artillery

new radio, the AN/MRC-20, is being issued to divisional t artillery battalions for use by Forward Air Controllers to uest and direct air strikes for front-line units. The FACs Air Force officers on duty with Army units.

he AN/MRC-20 is a combination of three radio sets: /ARC-8; AN/ARC-3; and AN/ARC-27. The AN/ARC-8, gh-frequency radio, is used by Air Force ground elements exchange of information. The AN/ARC-3, a very-high-uency radio, is used to contact older model cargo and troop er planes that still use this type radio. The AN/ARC-27 ates in the ultra-high-frequency band, and is used to contact ighter and the newer heavy aircraft. It will probably be the t used of the three sets. The radio is mounted in a ¾-ton k. Two men are authorized for its operation.

w to Use 30-foot Telescope Mast

he 30-foot telescope mast, AB-348/MRC-20—used for nting the AN/ARC-27's UHF antenna—may be operated er manually or by power. In either case, care must be ex-ed.

ome users have experienced several failures in the cable re-ing and extending mechanism, with power operation. In view of this, power operation should be avoided. A hand crank is provided for easy manual operation. If unusual resistance is noticed while cranking the mast up or down (power operation does not permit such "feel") cease cranking and notify a repairman. Since neither TM 11-692 nor the equipment markings state precautions pertinent to power operation, it is further suggested that the mast motor be electrically disconnected to prevent accidental operation.

Whatever method of operation is used, precautions should be taken to avoid jerky and irregular movements and sudden directional changes. This precaution will prevent the cable system from becoming entangled with the reel case. The mast should be fully extended before retraction. First locate the vehicle on a level area to prevent binding of telescopic sections.

The AN/ARC-27, a component of the AN/MRC-20, communicates efficiently with the mast in the lowered position. In fact, antenna extension is required only in dense foliage, in heavily built up areas, or when extreme range is desired. When the AN/ARC-3 of the AN/MRC-20 is not in operation, its antenna mount may be used and the telescopic mast left in traveling position; the coaxial cable to the AN/ARC-3's antenna must, in this case, be connected to the proper place on the MRC-20 cabinet.

Telescopic mast failures should be reported expeditiously on DA Form 468 ("Unsatisfactory Equipment Report"), copies of which are packed with the equipment. Such reports may be sent directly to: Chief Signal Officer, Washington 25, D. C.

Training in Mathematics

Students expecting to enter The Artillery School are advised of a new policy in mathematics training. Henceforth, students who receive gunnery instruction will be *presumed* to have an adequate background in basic mathematics. Prospective students who feel deficient in this subject may enroll in appropriate USAFI courses, or may use the TAS booklet "Exercises in Gunnery Mathematics." The latter can be obtained from the Book Department, TAS, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, at a cost of 30 cents per copy.

Normal gunnery courses have no requirements in "higher" mathematics, but a recent survey has shown that students in any given course have varying mathematical backgrounds. In the past, all students were required to complete a review of basic mathematics. Future incoming students will be examined to determine their level of knowledge in mathematics. A review will be provided outside normal academic hours for those who are deficient.

280 Gun Skids to a Stop

It took two days, many men and bulldozers, cranes and tank retrievers to right this 280mm "atomic" gun after it skidded on a highway near Murnau, Germany, and turned on its side.

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Irons in the Fire



New Helicopter

The CH-1, an all-metal small helicopter, has been developed by the Cessna Aircraft Company. This machine differs from existing small helicopters in that the engine is mounted ahead of the main rotor drive in a manner suggestive of fixed-wing airplanes. This arrangement offers easy access for engine servicing and provides a great deal of cargo space close to the center of gravity. The CH-1 has a 35-foot diameter rotor and a gross operating weight of 3,000 pounds. It is powered by a supercharged fan-cooled engine delivering 260 net horsepower to the transmission. Performance figures have not yet been released, but the helicopter is expected to have excellent speed and altitude characteristics. The position of the power plant affords maximum cooling. It is presently undergoing CAA ground and flight certification tests.

Self-Propelled Howitzer

This new 155mm self-propelled howitzer can be put into action with greater speed than any other medium field artillery piece now in use. Developed by the Detroit Arsenal, Centerline, Michigan, and the Massey-Harris Co., Racine, Wisconsin, the M44 Howitzer can cruise on the highways at 30 miles per hour and can go anywhere a tank can go. It can climb a 60 per cent grade and fire on a 30 per cent slope. It is also one of the most rapid firing 155mm howitzers ever developed.

Artillery Camouflage Nets

The Army will soon have a fam of camouflage net drape sets for c cealing field and antiaircraft artill equipment, which can be erected in minutes and dismantled in 10 minu in daylight. They can be erected less than half an hour under black conditions. These nets, which w developed by the Corps of Engine Research and Development Labo tories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, prov effective concealment against vis and photographic observation, b ground and aerial, beyond 800 f If necessary, the sets can be drop from a plane for on-the-spot use field batteries. The sets will repl the flat-top type. Tests have sho that they are lighter and easier to h dle, cost less, and can be manu tured more rapidly.

Aluminum Skid

An aluminum skid for the handl and shipping of heavy equipment been developed by Harvey Alu num, Torrance, California. It is per cent lighter than compara wooden skids, and it can be used w any kind of handling equipme With a load concentrated in the c ter of the two runner beams, it support six tons. The capacity be increased to ten tons if the loa spread away from the center. A nu ber of these skids have been p chased by the Air Force.

Air-Drop Research

Improved shock-absorbing dev that can be used in the air-drop cargoes of various weights will be veloped and tested at the Univer of Texas, Dr. Donald K. Tress scientific director of the Quartern ter Food and Container Institute the Armed Forces, has announ This research program is being in tuted in order to reduce costs excessive losses. The project will under the supervision of the In tute's Container Laboratories, will be conducted at the Universi Balcones Research Center.

The Month's BOOKS

ır of the Future?

COMMUNIST GUERILLA WARFARE
By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1954
229 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50

iewed by
ONEL H. M. FORDE

Communist Guerilla Warfare is a care-y documented study of guerilla and -guerilla operations in Russia during dd War II. The authors have examined voluminous literature available from ı Russian and German sources and, by ful selection, have presented a vivid unt of these two aspects of partisan ations.

he book is divided into three parts ch deal successively with the Soviet illas, the German antiguerillas, and conclusions of the authors.

ı the first part a brief summary of illa operations prior to World War II ıs the basis for the statement that "Mao tung is responsible for transforming t had been more or less textbook wis—into a master-plan of campaign for illa warfare." And Mao had evolved theories from Communist literature ıg back to military writings of Karl x and Friedrich Engels on the Crimean (1853-56) and our own Civil War 51-62). Operations of the Soviet illas closely followed Mao's blueprint. tactics of stealth, surprise, and disap-ance proved sound. Likewise, integra-of guerilla operations with those of field armies, enhanced the effects of types of warfare.

n the Soviet side, the partisans were ected by the Communist Party, while soldiers fought under the direction of Red Army. Guerillas and Army were ed at top level—(and) down from, the went two distinctive 'chains of com-d'—and here the combined staff plans worked out."

eculiar to all Communist guerillas has the disregard for the Hague and eva Conventions. In ignoring the es and Usages of Land Warfare" the munist guerillas have, on the one , foresworn treatment as prisoners of while, on the other, gained a marked ntage in surprise through the carrying ncealed weapons and the wearing of an clothes. Through such activities Soviet Russia incited "the German soldier to the most thorough ruthlessness which alone could, and did, kindle the partisan flame all over occupied Soviet Russia. . . . (The) Soviets succeeded in putting across the most cunning scoop in psychological warfare ever conceived."

In the second part the authors traced the development of German efforts to stamp out the partisan menace. At the time of the invasion in June 1941, scant thought had been given to the possibility of partisan warfare. Smugly confident that the population of occupied territories would welcome the army which was liberating them from the hated Communist oppression, the Germans were utterly unprepared to cope with the initial indifference which rapidly became wide opposition. Ruthlessness in the treatment of captured partisans was directed in official orders, from Hitler's headquarters down to the lowest echelons of command. The German "Manual on Warfare against Bands for all Services of the Armed Forces" illustrates the barbarity of this warfare in the east when it says "The interrogation of prisoners is one of the best sources of information. It is, therefore, wrong to shoot captured bandits at once." Not wrong to shoot them, but wrong to deprive the antiguerilla forces of the information which might be obtained through severe interrogation!

The value to the Red Army of guerillas is strikingly pointed out by the statement that in 1943 Army Group Center had nearly 100,000 German and allied troops engaged in combatting the Soviet Partisans. A Russian claim of 1942 includes "144 Police Battalions, 27 Police regiments, 8 other regiments, 10 Security Police and SS Punitive Divisions, 2 Security Corps, 42 special units and as many as 15 Field Divisions . . . (and five) Hungarian Divisions" as being employed against the Communist guerillas. What an amazing diversion was caused by the harassing and destructive efforts of these widespread bands of partisans.

The authors' conclusions that in any war against a Communist nation, partisans will be an integral part of the Communist armed forces, re-emphasizes the need for study and preparation for antipartisan operations. The certainty that in any future actions, such as Korea, Indochina or Malaya, partisans will be engaged is a new concept to those who think only of "the classical (and out-dated) war."

In an appendix, parts of the German "Manual on Warfare against Bands for all Services of the Armed Forces" outline the "minor tactics" of antiguerilla warfare. This Manual could well serve as a model for one of our own Field Manuals. The selection and training of "guerilla hunters" and their tactics of finding, surrounding and annihilating guerillas are applicable world-wide.

Guerilla warfare in 1941-45 is shown as brutal, ruthless combat, with neither side adhering to the Hague Convention. Our own experience with North Korean and Communist China guerillas confirms the Communist guerilla as a treacherous, cunning, implacable enemy, capable of heroic self-sacrifice and almost superhuman exertion. To the American or Western European this descent into barbarism is a shocking experience. The West must learn how to combat the Communist fighter without also degenerating into savagery. And, in any war against Russia, we must remember that the "Partisans for Peace," tools of international Communism, are present in every Western nation. As guerillas, they will be active in the rear areas of the armies of the West, and in the homeland, intent on their missions of espionage, sabotage and treason.

Middle East "Muddling"

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST, Volume I
By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair with Commander G. M. S. Stitt, Brigadier C. J. C. Molony and Air Vice-Marshal S. E. Toomer.
British Information Services, 1954
506 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $8.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL JOHN MEADE

Her Majesty's Stationery Office has just published another volume of the Military series of the United Kingdom History of the Second World War, the official British history. This is the first of six volumes to deal specifically with the campaigns of the Mediterranean and Middle East. It begins with two excellent background chapters and ends with the first appearance of German forces in the theater in March 1941. The heroic antics of Il Duce while pursuing his ambition of getting an empire cheaply are well presented and the chilling effect

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of the German decision to send in the first team is a climactic note.

This is an excellent historical volume, worthy of the attention of the present-day planner as well as students of the recent past. "The account is a joint one" and is "at the level of the High Command" but the painfully small size of the land and sea and air forces initially involved tends to produce a story that at times approaches the detail of a unit history. Few Americans know of the frailty of the British military posture in the Middle East in the years just before the war. Mussolini knew enough of it to justify his effrontery of using the Suez Canal and the Red Sea as main supply route of an expedition that in no sense was intended to benefit the British Empire. The agony of British effort required to build up all military forces to meet the multiple requirements of the Mediterranean and Middle East despite the shattering effect of Dunkerque is frankly told. As the RAF saved Britain so the Royal Navy saved the Mediterranean.

In the light of the shift of power and responsibility that has occurred between the British and ourselves this volume points out to us with brutal clarity the vacuum created by a non-cooperating France. Equally strongly does it demonstrate the strategic importance to us—and the enemy—of the land areas of Greece, Turkey and Ethiopia. It is quite clear we must struggle with the same geographical facts that plagued the British high command in Egypt at the start of the war. Although it has sometimes been described as "muddling through" there is virtue in the peculiarly British capacity to achieve cooperative effort without a rigid command structure such as we are inclined to use.

The true story of how a few heroic men of the Italian navy disabled the British Mediterranean fleet in World War II, told by the man who led them and shared in their exploits.

The pioneers of today's "frogmen", whose daring successes caused Sir Winston Churchill, in a secret meeting of the Cabinet in 1943, to exclaim over their "extraordinary courage and ingenuity."

SEA DEVILS

Prince J. Valerio Borghese

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Many Will Disagree

MacARTHUR: 1941-1951
By Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954
454 Pages; Index; $5.75

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Here is a book of interest to all military men, but one with which many will disagree. It is the story of "the incomparable virtue of the MacArthur strategy," and of the alleged errors of Truman, Acheson, Bradley, and Collins, based primarily, it appears, on the records and opinions of one of the authors, a general who is by way of being a somewhat controversial figure himself. It is also an analysis of the MacArthur strategy against the background of military history and the principles of war. Of most value, probably, are the accounts of the intelligence problems and methods in the Far East during the period covered by the book.

On these last matters General Willoughby speaks with particular authority. He was MacArthur's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence during the entire period. He had also been an instructor at the Command and General Staff School (1931-35), and it was there that he first came to MacArthur's attention: "As Chief of Staff of the Army, MacArthur had emphasized the value of historical analysis in his annual reports; he liked the use which Willoughby had made of these reports for lecture purposes." (Willoughby is referred to in the third person throughout the book.)

In view of General Willoughby's close association with General MacArthur, the descriptions of events and personalities have obvious value. The quoting of a few extracts on the more controversial phases of the defense of the Philippines will give some idea of the scope and characteristics of the book, although they may, out of context, not give a completely accurate picture.

In regard to the destruction of planes on the ground at Clark Field: "Despite the fact that the Clark Field planes were caught in the face of previous orders from MacArthur to fly them south to Del Monte field on Mindanao, MacArthur has always defended Brereton who, as the air commander, was of course entirely and solely responsible for the security of his planes."

On the subject of empty trucks "rolling into Bataan," the explanation given is that the combat troops had highjacked the trucks with the result that when the MTO started the move to Bataan he had just 26 motor vehicles left out of the one thousand he had assembled at the beginning of the and many of the missing vehicles brought into Bataan empty: "There wa even more important collateral reason Bataan's supplies were short: the er preparation for defense, allocation of me equipment, and supplies, was limitec the war-plan concept to defend for a m mum period of six months only, to l the entrance to Manila Bay for the res Navy that never came. In MacArth opinion, the Navy could—and should—h come."

In a later chapter, the organization functioning of guerrilla movement in Philippines is described in some de With the many world situations in wl guerrilla activities may play an impor part, the essentials of organization as in the Philippines are of professional ir est: Establish a net for military intellige establish a chain of communications l within the islands and to Australia; es lish an escape route to accommodate eva tion of selected individuals; develop ar ganization for subversive activitites anc propaganda for use at the appropriate t locate and make contact with individ known to be loyal.

As the end of the war with Japan proached, General Willoughby took a pr inent part in the surrender negotiati "Completely familiar with the make-u the Japanese Army after four years of tensive combat observation, G-2 took the initial planning, policy developm and staff surveillance of the demobiliza of the Japanese units in the homela There is much of value to intelligenc ficers, operations officers, and military ernment specialists in the account of period between VJ-day and the start of Korean campaign.

The book becomes increasingly bitt the coverage of the Korean war. The thors cite the record of the many rep sent from Tokyo to Washington pric the outbreak of hostilities and sum up intelligence situation in this way: "T reports . . . could be termed 'gratuit MacArthur was not officially conce with Korea, which had become a jealo guarded State Department enclave. territorial boundaries of the Far East C mand pointedly eliminated Korea MacArthur's responsibilities, including telligence collection. His G-2, of co could not remain indifferent to the ger military situation in an adjacent area, quietly maintained a small surveillance in Korea. . . ."

The discussions of the controversia pects of the differences of opinion betw Washington and MacArthur do not mit condensation without possible di tion. An unfortunate element in the the occasional attribution of opinio anonymous staff officers. For exampl the discussion of the Truman-MacAr conference on Wake Island, it is stated "staff notes covering the meeting rea follows" and included is the statem

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

HITLER'S SECRET CONVERSATIONS

Introduction by H. R. TREVOR-ROPER

Taken from carefully selected, actual shorthand notes of the Fuehrer's "off the record" statements during the critical years of 1941-1944, this book reveals the twisted mind of the maniacal politician (who also regarded himself as a military genius) and his fatal flaws as a tactician. A document that should be studied scrupulously by every student of military affairs.

Retail price, $6.50



THE UNDECLARED WAR 1940-1941

by WILLIAM LANGER and S. EVERETT GLEASON

Two military experts who are also excellent historians trace the events, problems and developments of the fateful years of 1941 and 1942; the planning and execution of the lend-lease program; the success of Nazi conquests; our clash of interests and objectives with the Japanese; and all the other factors which led to our actual participation in World War II.

Retail price, $10.00



THE MILITARY GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

by BRIG. GEN. COLIN R. BALLARD

With objectivity and profound historical insight, Gen. Ballard portrays Lincoln as an excellent, if unconventional, military strategist. He presents indisputable evidence that Lincoln's grasp of military matters matched his statesmanship and dispels the legend that the 16th President "prolonged the war."

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

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

Edited by E. B. LONG

Through Grant's keen eyes, the planning of the battles, campaigns, strategy, logistics, recruiting—the whole Civil War — is brought into sharp relief. Completed only days before his death, the *Memoirs* give you the full account of this able yet simple man who rose from the masses to lead the Union armies.

Retail price, $6.00

BOLIVAR

by SALVADOR de MADARIAGA

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

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

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"To determine if the Red hordes were on the move or not, by day or night, was made impossible by Truman's own suicidal orders that kept our planes twenty miles south of the river border." Many military men may agree with this and similar statements, but will think it odd that they should be in staff notes covering a meeting.

Liddell Hart's Second Thoughts

STRATEGY, The Indirect Approach
By Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1954
420 Pages; Index; Maps; $5.95

Reviewed by
COLONEL HAROLD D. KEHM

Captain B. H. Liddell Hart needs no introduction to students of the art and science of war and international affairs. Though many of his some thirty works may be less than wholeheartedly accepted by some, they are at least known to all who read widely and carefully in these fields.

In the Preface to his new work, *Strategy,* Liddell Hart tells us that it embodies the results of further research and reflection on his original study of "the strategy of the indirect approach" which he first published in 1929 under the title, *The Decisive Wars of History.* In *Strategy* he re-examines or perhaps we should say he reconfirms, his earlier conclusions.

In the current volume he reviews military history from the Great Persian War of 490 BC through World War II (or the Arab-Israel War of 1948-49 if we include the appendices).

What is his thesis and how does he conceive its application to strategy and grand strategy? The essence of Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach is that suc is best gained by taking the line of leas sistance and least expectation and by locating the enemy physically and psy logically.

In a chapter, "The Concentrated Ess of Strategy and Tactics," he presents axioms of his conclusions in the follov maxims of strategy:

"1. Adjust your end to your means

"2. Keep your objective always in m

"3. Choose the line (or course) of l expectation.

"4. Exploit the line of least resistanc

"5. Take a line of operation which o alternative objectives.

"6. Ensure that both plan and dis tions are flexible-adaptable to circumstar

"7. Do not throw your weight in stroke whilst your opponent is on guard

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

BOHEMIAN BRIGADE. By Louis M. Starr. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1954. 387 Pages; Index; $5.00. An easy-to-read, competent story of Union newsmen in the Civil War, their editors and their newspapers.

THE BRITISH IN ASIA. By Guy Wint. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. 244 Pages; Index; $3.75. The author has been an editorial writer on Asian affairs for the *Manchester Guardian* since 1/9/49 and has had wide experience in China and the Far East. An earlier edition of this book was published in Great Britain in 1947 but did not appear in the United States.

THE CAPTAIN CALLED IT MUTINY. By Frederic F. Van de Water. Ives Washburn, Inc., 1954. 236 Pages; $3.50. A rather thorough job of research on the Navy's only mutiny—which may not have been really mutiny at all but a tragedy caused by a jittery captain.

ENGLISH, IRISH AND SCOTTISH FIREARMS MAKERS. By A. Merwyn Carey. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954. 121 Pages; Illustrated; $5.00. An indispensable tool for gun collectors and gun bugs generally.

THE FLYING SAILOR. By Rear-Admiral Andre Jubelin. The British Book Centre, Inc., 1954. 276 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50. The autobiography of France's youngest admiral, now on duty in Washington. Admiral Jubelin flew with the RAF in World War II; the book has won two literary prizes in France. The author is a literate writer as well as a sailor and airman.

GENERAL KIRBY SMITH, C.S.A. By Joseph H. Parks. Louisiana State University Press, 1954. 537 Pages; Index; $6.00. A biography of the last Confederate general to surrender. The book indicates tremendous research but is not one of the more stirringly readable biographies.

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST, Volume I. By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair with Commander G. M. S. Stitt, Brigadier C. J. C. Molony and Air Vice-Marshal S. E. Toomer. British Information Services, 1954. 506 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $8.00. The first of six volumes which are to cover the campaigns in the Mediterranean and Middle East theaters from 1939 to 1945. This first volume deals with the beginnings of the war and ends with the restoration of Haile Selassie to the throne of Ethiopia and the removal of the threat to the passage of convoys in the Red Sea. The book is well illustrated, both with maps and photographs, and compares favorably with the efforts of our own Office of Military History.

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE WAR IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1939-1940. By Major L. F. Ellis. British Information Services, 1954. 425 Pages; Maps; Index; $8.75. Another in the well written and well mapped series of British official histories.

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE WAR AT SEA, Volume I. British Information Services, 1954. 664 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $9.00. The first of three volumes on British Naval operations during World War II, covering the "Defensive Phase" from the beginning of the war until the end of 1941.

MANPOWER IN THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES. Edited by William Haber, Frederick H. Harbison, Lawrence R. Klein and Gladys L. Palmer for the Industrial Relations Research Association. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 225 Pages; $3.00. Sixteen articles by experts on industrial manpower including one on military manpower policy by Eli Ginsburg and James K. Anderson. A good sourcebook for those who work with personnel policies.

REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By George F. Kennan. Princeton University Press, 1954. 120 Pages; $2.75. One of America's most respected diplomatists attempts to relate problems of foreign affairs to the problems of the world in which we live.

STORMY BEN BUTLER. By Robert S. Holzman. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 246 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. A new attempt to analyze the personality of one of the Civil War's most controversial generals. Replete with footnotes, the book is still eminently readable. The author is a charter member of the Civil War Round Table of New York.

A STUDY OF WAR. By Quincy Wright. The University of Chicago Press, 1954. 1552 Pages; Maps; Index; $15.00 set of 2 volumes. A reissue of the famous two-volume series first published in 1942. This analysis goes into the causes of war, the effect of war on inventions and vice versa, war losses, war in primitive and civilized societies, the political effects of war, etc. Over the years there has been wide acceptance of this monumental study.

THEY CALLED HIM STONEWALL. By Burke Davis. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 470 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. A biography of the colorful Confederate general; the first major work on this subject since Henderson's.

WORSHIP RESOURCES FOR THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. Compiled and edited by Charles L. Wallis. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 483 Pages; Indexes; $4.95. A compilation from widespread sources of religious poems, prayers, short essays, etc. Of exceptional usefulness to chaplains, lay preachers and others who need spiritual source material.

3. Do not renew an attack along the e line (or in the same form) after it once failed."

Ie concludes that classic concepts of the e of strategy are inadequate. He holds a proper view of strategy recognizes it is concerned with the long-range cts or results of military actions or move- ts as well as with the actions or move- ts themselves. Therefore, he suggests following definition of strategy:

The art of distributing and applying tary means to fulfill the ends of policy."

eyond this pure or military strategy he nguishes a higher strategy which em- s more than only military means. He it "grand strategy." What he means this expression is less precisely an- nced. His ideas are perhaps best sum- zed in the following:

The role of grand strategy—higher strat- -is to coordinate and direct all the rces of a nation or band of nations, rd the attainment of the political object he war—the goal defined by funda- tal policy" and;

Grand strategy looks beyond the war he subsequent peace. It should not combine the various instruments, but gulate their use as to avoid damage to future state of peace."

he maxims and the descriptions devel- l by Capt. Liddell Hart are neither ound nor particularly novel. The ims are not even a good revision of the

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

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Pass In Review

A junior-grade CPX is one of the more interesting items to come to our attention this month. It's a tactical and strategic war game called *Tactics* ($4.95). This game is played on a 28 x 22 inch colored map board and employs two opposing armies including 37 combat divisions plus supporting elements. The idea, of course, is for one army to eliminate the other by following sound tactical maneuvers in accordance with a set of rules designed to impart maximum realism. It's fun to play and certainly is a good way to bone up on fundamental tactics. I'd certainly recommend *Tactics* as sound BOQ equipment and handy to have around the house when your guests get tired of playing charades.

Viking has published a new edition of Selig Hecht's *Explaining the Atom* ($3.75). The first edition of this book was very well received and sold more than 25,000 copies. It was a lucid, simple explanation of atomic energy. Hecht has passed away since his book first came out. This edition is brought up to date by Professor Rabinovitch and includes material on recent findings in the thermonuclear field.

We are preparing the material for our annual fall mailing to our numerous book buyers. Working with the various publishers we have been selecting what we believe to the finest titles in the military field to consolidate in one catalogue for the convenience of our members. With few exceptions, most of the titles will be or have been reviewed in the JOURNAL. Glancing over the list of selections, we are impressed with the quality and quantity of books of military interest that have appeared in recent months. Among the featured titles that have not yet been reviewed are *Power and Policy* ($4.50) by former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter; *They Called Him Stonewall* ($5.00) by Burke Davis, and, of course, the new one-volume *Abraham Lincoln* ($7.50) by Carl Sandburg. Incidentally, if you would like to get this fall book list and aren't one of our regular book buyers, drop us a line and we'll be glad to mail you one.

R.F.C.

traditional principles of war. His ideas are certainly not new to American military thinking. From West Point or ROTC to the National War College, officers are, and have long been, drilled in the concept that military action is but one instrument that may be used in the furtherance of national policy. From the very beginning of their training in tactics, they are urged to seek soft spots and to "Hit 'em where they ain't!"

They may not know the author's quotation from Stonewall Jackson: "Mystify, mislead and surprise," but they are familiar with the military precepts it enjoins. Students at Leavenworth have always expected a "U" if a solution to a map problem did not provide for the envelopment of one or both flanks.

The book is well and clearly written and easy to read. Unhappily, most of the maps are poorly drawn and so are of little help to the reader. The book contains far too much obvious praise of the author.

His review of world military history is interesting and provides a useful reference even though it suffers as to objectivity. The author is overzealous in trying to prove that the indirect approach is the key to success in all situations. One of the less glaring examples is his insistence that the heel of Italy rather than Salerno should have been the site of the main effort in the invasion of Italy. As an example of the wrong kind of thinking, he cites General Clark's statement:

"The Germans . . . could also calculate that it would have to come within the limits of air cover."

While we need not approve the choice of Salerno and must be ready to applaud ingenuity and boldness, it is by no means logical to believe that in September 1943 there was only a reasonable calculated risk in sending a major amphibious force beyond air cover to an objective so far from the final goal of the campaign.

In similar ways, the author, at times, hurts his own case in his attacks on classic military theory. For example, he condemns Clausewitz as the exponent of the thesis that battle is the goal of strategy. But, even though he quotes it, he seems to forget that Clausewitz' fame rests less on that thought than it does on his description of war as:

"Continuation of policy by other means."

Even with these deficiencies, the book is to be recommended. Its most valuable contribution is that it brings together many of those ideas which throw doubt on the validity of the thesis that the threat of "overwhelming force" is the best way of preserving the peace.

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LT. GEN. W. L. WEIBLE

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HERE'S WHY, Sergeant Bowles



SFC RAYMOND R. BOWLES

Never let it again be said that the voice of a sergeant cannot be heard in the Pentagon! When Lieutenant General W. L. Weible, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration, read in our September issue the fourteen suggestions for improvements in Army procedures made by Sergeant First Class Raymond R. Bowles, who is on duty in Austria, he circulated the questions among interested sections of the General Staff and sent the answers to THE JOURNAL. The questions and answers appear below. We can only add that if there is any better evidence than this of the fundamental soundness of the U.S. Army we don't know what it could be.

Why don't they make a second award of the American Defense Ribbon for all Regulars who were serving at the outbreak of the Korean War?

Service medals have traditionally been used to give recognition for *spec* periods of service in emergencies. Revival of a previous medal with new modified awarding criteria would violate this tradition. This revival was gi consideration at the time of adoption of the National Defense Service Me which gives tangible recognition for service since 27 June 1950.

Why don't they issue or award an Honorable Service Ribbon? There could be an award for each 10, 20, and 30 years of honorable service. Make the thing hard to get and really something to work for.

The Good Conduct Medal presently provides for tangible public reco tion of exemplary behavior, efficiency and fidelity of enlisted men for exten periods of service. A medal award based solely on honorable service wo damage the prestige and incentive value of the Good Conduct Medal.

Why don't they award a Marksmanship Ribbon instead of the Marksmanship Badges? This would encourage more people to wear such awards. Might even make for some better scores on the range.

The Department of the Army has traditionally used decorations and me and their respective service ribbons for providing recognition for indivic valor, accomplishment, achievement, and service under emergency conditi It has traditionally recognized individual skills by badges, including th indicating proficiency in arms. The use of a ribbon in lieu of a marksmans badge would result in lessening the prestige of existing decorations medals. It would certainly cause confusion in the minds of the public would tend to further expand the popular misconception that the numbe ribbons rather than the relative prestige of individual decorations or me is the important thing. This suggestion has previously been considered rejected.

Why don't they issue a Company Supply Records cabinet? This would be a good use for old trunk lockers.

The desk, field, fiber, company, which in authorized military units is signed and issued specifically for the storage of records required to be m tained by a unit.

Why don't they have a company stock card instead of the company property book form? It would be faster to post, neater, and easy to handle.

Posting to a Company Property Book is normally infrequent. The hand of numerous separate stock cards by a company or battery in the field w be difficult in comparison to the ease and safety with which the Comp Property Book in its present form may be handled.

Why don't they have a general supply form instead of the issue slips, turn-in slips, ammo requests, and so forth? The Air Force shipping document and requisition form is a good example of what I mean.

The particular supply forms mentioned are only a few which would h to be considered in design of a general supply form. Because of the v variation in information required at different echelons of supply, any gen supply form would contain numerous columns. This would result in a la cumbersome, impractical form. The Air Force unit supply system is pr cally identical with the Army unit supply system and utilizes the turn-in issue slips as separate and distinct documents.

(Continued on page 27)

Artillery Spotting

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Vol. 5, No. 4 November 1954

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The Army Combat Forces Journal is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army.

The **Journal** strives to

¶ Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

¶ Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

¶ Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

¶ Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

¶ Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

Association's *Journal*

There have been a number of changes in the composition of the Executive Council of the Association in recent months because members have left Washington for distant stations or have retired from the Army and removed from the city. While it is not necessary that an officer or member of the Council be on duty in Washington or nearby, they usually resign when they leave the city in order that there will be a quorum present at all meetings. As was mentioned once before in this column, the Council has directed that election of members of the Council by members of the Association be resumed next year. This means that early next spring the JOURNAL will publish a ballot for the election of officers to fill the seven vacancies that will occur in June 1955. We'll have more to say about who can vote and how at a later date.

THE PUBLISHER

TRENDS IN TRANSPORTATION

Men in Search of Mobility .....
Ship to Shore ..... *Harry A. Jacobs*
Assault Troop Submarine ..... *Comdr. G. W. Kittredge*
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MEN AND METHODS

Here's Why, Sergeant Bowles ..... **Cover**
It Seemed Like a Good Idea ..... *Col. Robert F. Hallock*
World-Wide Unit Rotation .....

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Huk Hunting ..... *Lt. Col. Luis A. Villa-Real*
War Without Men ..... *Col. George S. Reinhardt*

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

Radiological safety man aboard Army helicopter checks ground for radiation after atomic blasts at Yucca Flats.

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WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

THE MONTH'S MAIL

50th Anniversary Issue

● The October issue of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL has just come to my attention. I noted with pleasure that this handsome issue marked the JOURNAL's first half century. It certainly is an excellent tribute to the fifty years of service which the JOURNAL has rendered to the United States Army.

The JOURNAL, adhering to the highest professional standards, has fully accomplished the great objectives which it has set for itself. In so doing, it has also made a record in military journalism of which the Association of the United States Army can be justly proud. I wish to congratulate you and the members of the Association who are adding to the traditions which the JOURNAL has established throughout its distinguished career. As you celebrate the JOURNAL's fiftieth anniversary, may I express the hope that it will continue to thrive and enjoy outstanding success.

ROBERT T. STEVENS
Secretary of the Army
Washington, D. C.

. . . a most interesting issue . . .
Best wishes to the JOURNAL on its birthday and may it have many more.

J. LAWTON COLLINS
Gen., U.S. Army
U. S. Representative
NATO
Washington, D. C.

Your Fiftieth Anniversary issue was a fine reminiscence. It should inspire all of us in the Army to preserve and pass on to those who will follow us the unquestioned integrity and faithfulness to duty that was the hallmark of those who preceded us.

I am confident that in the next fifty years the contributions to the Army of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL will exceed the many valuable services *The Infantry Journal* and *The Field Artillery Journal* performed in the past.

M. B. RIDGWAY
General, U.S. Army
The Chief of Staff
Washington, D. C.

. . . certainly excellent . . . you have every reason to be proud of it. Colonel Dupuy's article is truly a fascinating story of the Army and a very fitting contribution . . .

F. L. PARKS
Lt. Gen., U.S. Army
Hq. Second Army
Fort George G. Meade, Md.

. . . The JOURNAL has done a fine thing to have [Colonel Dupuy] write up this half century of progress in the service. . . .

DANIEL NOCE
Lt. Gen., U.S. Army
The Inspector General
Washington, D. C.

. . . Having served 37 of these past 50 years, I say that the article presents not only the facts but the human feeling—both the history and the sentiment. It is a fine background for understanding the many actions which we are now taking to bring back the Army to which we "old-ti have been attached through our heart our minds and not because of the e upon our pocketbooks. . . .

WALTER L. W
Lt. Gen., U.S.
Dep. Chief of Staff for Operations & Administration
Washington, D. C.

I read . . . Colonel Dupuy's article great interest. [It] is very well writte accurately captures the spirit of the A past 50 years. . . . a notable achieve of which the author and all who assis its publication may well be proud.

A. R. BOLLING
Lt. Gen., U.S.
Hq. Third Army
Fort McPherson, Ga.

. . . A quick look at the illustratior made me eager . . . to read . . . C Dupuy's article. . . .

W. B. PALMER
Lt. Gen., U.S.
Dep. Chief of Staff for Logistics
Washington, D. C.

. . . I could delay no longer in t you what a wonderful task you are c

Someone recently tried to put a tag on the term "intangible," as appli the military service. Our great Chi Staff, General Ridgway, with a t burst of fervor, said, "Why the intar is the most tangible thing we deal w our service!" The Dupuy article ha

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ɔr of such depth of feeling and it is so led today . . .

W. G. WYMAN
Lt. Gen., U.S. Army

Sixth Army
idio of San Francisco, Calif.

. . We here at Fourth Army congratu- you on this occasion. . . .

I. D. WHITE
Lt. Gen., U.S. Army

Fourth Army
Sam Houston, Tex.

ɔur anniversary issue is a tribute to imagination and taste, your artist's and your printer's mastery of his craft. I think, a superb example of magazine uction.

:an't be quite as glowing in my praise ɔlonel Dupuy's article. The early and le parts of it are fine—a factual, mov- ocial history, devoid, praise be! of so- gical jargon or pretense of scientific sis. But the latter part fails to bring ıe bright promise of the earlier parts ɔecomes a lament that the "new" army as good as the army in which Colonel ıy grew up. This, I think, is subject gument, but not here. But may I say if that is true, whose fault is it but ıel Dupuy's generation? They were e saddle when this "new" army was in the 1940s.

would have been much finer if ıel Dupuy had built his ending on hing more endurable than a gripe. ending of the introductory article had ight ring and is much more mean- l today. I refer to the sentences that The Army's "problem today is not branch survival and recognition, but my survival and recognition. It is for a closing of ranks."

ause of my present position please use my name.

NOT-SO-OLD SOLDIER

staff of the JOURNAL *is grateful for onderful reception accorded the Oc- issue. We regret that lack of space t let us print all of the fine letters we received. For those who have the artist was Gil Walker whose appears here quite regularly. We limited number of reprints of the available at a cost of 25¢ each for who may want extra copies.*

ring, a Way of Life

lonel Yeuell's article, "Soldiering is of Life" [September], is to my mind the most concise, clear, and sensible that I have ever read on that sub- for one, hope that the topside reads inks about what Colonel Yeuell . . .

MRS. R. E. BELL

Corps
'9, c/o Postmaster
ork, N. Y.

• Colonel Yeuell's article is of classic brilliance and superb timeliness. It can well serve as the foundation of facts upon which to base improvements and changes to make our Army again an elite organization, where opportunity to command is a top desire of every good officer, and where to belong means being a member of a proud and honorable brotherhood of men who are in the Army because they think it is the finest and most satisfying job in the world.

CAPT. MALCOLM K. RHINE
Hq Seventh Army
APO 46, c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

Praise for "The Pros"

• "The Pros," by Colonel A. T. McAnsh [August], is the finest, most inspiring thing of its kind to come across my desk. I feel that it could be used in work with the reenlistment problem.

Let me take this opportunity to compliment you on your fine magazine. It is a real delight to a librarian to find such emphasis on good reading and such apparent appreciation for reading's worth.

(MRS.) FRANCES L. DUFRAINE
Base Librarian
Great Falls Air Force Base
Great Falls, Mont.

"Why Didn't They Shoot More"

• This article is written as a rebuttal to some features of "Why Didn't They Shoot More?" [September].

Friendly ambush patrols frequently used overhead fires in lieu of rifle fire and "this overdependence reached ridiculous extremes." There is absolutely *nothing* ridiculous about using a plotted and pre-fired concentration on an unsuspecting enemy patrol. A mortar (bursting radius 15 yards) or artillery (bursting radius 25 yards) shell or VT artillery shell can kill far more effectively than caliber .30 fired in total darkness. In addition, the disorganization and panic caused by overhead fire, if properly coupled with flares, will provide the friendly patrol with plenty of targets, whereas opening up with small arms alone will cause the enemy to melt into the ground and/or withdraw with minor casualties. In the daytime, this is less valid, but daytime patrolling is almost a thing of the past.

"Bunkeritis." Here is a malady forced upon us by the stalemate "police action." American troops frequently occupied positions as tiny as 100 by 200 yards. Not only did the Chinese know every position, but they could saturate the entire area with barrages sufficient to kill any living thing out in the open. An example was an estimated 10,000 rounds dropped on a position that had approximately the above dimensions. Only when the metal umbrella folded could the rifleman leave his bunker to fight from his firing position.

Bunkers are unthinkable when a situation exists in which pin-point shelling is almost impossible. But they become man-

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datory when a static position is dictated. Had our commanders used foxhole rather than bunker-type defenses, they would have trebled their casualties and seriously jeopardized their defensive positions.

Rarely did the Chinese inflict more damage on us than we upon them despite superiority of enemy numbers. Rarely did our men lose positions unless decimated to such an extent that no other course lay open. And rare indeed was the occasion that any position so bloodily relinquished was not retaken. Chinese dead are a mute but conclusive testimonial to these facts.

LT. PETER L. ROMANOW

Fort Dix, N. J.

"It's SOP!"

● Here, here now, Lt. O'Brien ["It's SOP!" August], are you trying to upset the applecart? Disorganize our fine military machine? Read and use Department of the Army Field Manuals, Technical Manuals, and all other pertinent publications and regulations? What would become of those neatly aligned rows of manuals and publications in our Staff and COs' offices? Why, they would become soiled and disarranged. Who's running this Army anyway, lieutenant? You are an iconoclast and suspect.

Compliments, O'Brien, you've performed an admirable service for your fellow junior officers. Why must there be ground rules, SOPs, SOPs for the ground rules, and just plain ground rules for the ground rules? Are these SOPs and ground rules really disguised excuses for lack of knowledge of perfectly reasonable rules and regulations? What happens to an officer when he departs the junior ranks and steps into the commanding ranks? Is it an official prerogative that any commander can summarily scrap the book and make his own rules? W when they step into the commanding r do they not find it necessary to open book?

Did you hear about the CO who ins that everyone would exchange salutes when driving a vehicle? How many of above first lieutenant have taken tim late to read FM 22-5 and the military tesy portion of FM 21-13?

LT. O'SI

Leadership and Training

● An editorial in an *Infantry Journ* 1942 states in timeless words the nee the combat soldier: "The fighting r confidence must rest on three things leader, his weapon and himself. His l can often do little to guide him once h is on. His weapon cannot make h smaller target to the aimed or unaime of the enemy. *Only the man by hin through knowledge of what a trained er must do to live and fight, can h himself as he must if battles are to be w*

Thus we reach the basic ingredient, has always been in the military ser leadership that is trained, dynamic, fident, mentally, morally, and physical to overcome the many handicaps w Nature and man place in the path o leader.

To consider manpower first, we realize that the drafted man starts o the service on an entirely different m basis from that of the volunteer, o member of the Reserve Corps or Nat Guard. The draftee . . . has little interest in the strange way of life which he has been thrown. He h liking for the regimentation and menial work which to a greater or degree will be his lot. Also, at this there is not the compulsion or the pat desire to serve which is present whe nation is at war.

What is the best approach? There simple answer. The leader charged training must put to use every bit of and knowledge that he possesses. B own example, by stimulation of prid most all men can be reached. By imply no relaxing of standards. I found that the best way is to demand formance and to act as if it were impo for my men to fail to deliver it. It well. Every item in the leader's ps logical armament must be used, so th fighting man will live, fight, and abo win battles when called upon to do s

In short, I submit that the des toughness of the troops is still a funct command—through good training by fied leaders. An orchid to the officer men of the Army's organization and ing division who are intent on leadin service back to ways of toughness.

MAJ. RICHARD S. SA
Retired

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

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

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

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Q *Who operates the USAA?*

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Q *Where does USAA operate?*

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Q *How are these savings returned to USAA policyholders?*

A In the form of dividends, at the end of the policy year. In 1953, for instance, some 180,000 Officers insured by USAA shared in more than $4,300,000 dividends.

Q *How much might I expect to save on my policy?*

A Last year, USAA policy-holders (other than Texas) received a 20% initial discount from manual rates and a 30% dividend at the end of policy year. A policy based in Texas received a 44% dividend on manual rates, resulting in the same net insurance cost. USAA has always returned substantial savings during all of its 32 years.

Q *How can USAA afford to pay such liberal dividends?*

A USAA confines its insurance benefits solely to Officers and Warrant Officers in the Armed Forces—a "preferred risk" group, so costs are reduced. With all selling completed by mail, we have no agents commissions to pay, or branch office overhead to meet.

Q *How about coverage outside the United States?*

A In areas of the world where USAA operates, you enjoy exactly the same insurance protection you get at home.

Q *Are claims paid quickly—especially abroad?*

A Rapid adjustments are assured wherever you are protected by a USAA policy. USAA claims facilities have been established in overseas areas to provide fast service.

Q *Who is eligible for a USAA policy?*

A Active and retired Officers, Cadets and Warrant Officers of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Foreign Service Officers of the Department of State; Reserve and National Guard Officers when ordered to extended active Federal duty; the widows of such Officers and Warrant Officers so long as they remain unmarried.

Q *What about Officers released from active duty?*

A Yes, they're eligible, once they've established membership in the USAA while on extended active Federal duty—so long as they maintain their reserve commission.

Q *Just how big is USAA?*

A USAA is the biggest in the field of Armed Services insurance with over 200,000 officers enjoying insurance at cost through membership in USAA at this time. During its 32 years of operations, USAA has paid over 60 million dollars to and for its members as savings on their policies or for their protection against loss. Over 250,000 policies are now in force. USAA is the sixth largest reciprocal insurance association in the United States.

Q *Who owns USAA?*

A Every member of USAA has a money interest in the business in direct proportion to his policy premiums. No one makes any profit from USAA, except the member policyholders themselves. USAA is not connected or affiliated with any other insurance company.

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FRONT AND CENTER

With all of the shuffling of units that is going on and scheduled to continue for some time, this may be a good time to review the Army's definitions of the various terms involved. AR 220-5 is the source:

To *constitute* means to include a new unit in the Army's troop program. It may then be activated. To *reconstitute* means to include a unit that has previously been disbanded.

To *activate* means to place on the active list a unit that has been constituted or reconstituted.

To *designate* a unit means to give it a number and/or name. To *redesignate* means to change its number and/or name.

To *organize* a unit means to bring it into physical existence by assigning personnel and perhaps equipment to it. A unit may be organized before it is actually constituted.

To *reorganize* means to change a unit from one type to another within an army or service, or to change personnel or equipment to conform to new tables.

To *convert* a unit means to change it from one arm or service to another.

To *inactivate* a unit means to place it on the inactive list. To *disband* means to withdraw it completely from the Army. To *discontinue* means to inactivate or disband a unit that has not been constituted.

✓ ✓ ✓

Your reaction to what follows will depend upon your general attitude towards ladies in uniform. At the dedication of the WAC center at Fort McClellan, Ala., General Ridgway revealed that Wacs are now assigned to 19 of the 32 career fields. When the WAC was founded in 1942 it was thought that its members would be limited to four or five minor league tasks.

✓ ✓ ✓

The next item on the docket in the revamping of Army organization is the creation of the Continental Army Command out of the present Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. Continental Army Command will have more control over the six Continental armies and clearer lines of authority over training activities of those armies. It will also reduce the number of subordinate headquarters reporting directly to the Chief of Staff.

✓ ✓ ✓

It has long been apparent that something should be done for the many non-regular officers who have been on active duty for ten or fifteen years under short term agreements. Now the Army has a plan to offer these non-regulars indefinite appointments and at the same time provide for those reaching certain ages to be retired. The age would depend upon rank. At the same time the Army hopes to be able to be more selective in choosing reserve officers who would be offered indefinite appointments. Under present law reserve officers on active duty may apply for retirement when they complete 20 years of federal service.

✓ ✓ ✓

Three psychologists announced last month what many military men have long believed—that individual combat effectiveness and high intelligence go hand in hand. Drs. Robert L. Egbert, Tor Neeland, and Victor Cline of Human Research Unit 2, Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Ord, Calif., interviewed 647 members of rifle companies in Korea before they reached this conclusion. It is just possible that they have finally destroyed the widely held fallacy (chiefly among civilians) that men with low mentalities make the best fighters. The psychologists found that good combat men also have these qualities: emotional stability; good physical health; great interest and competence in athletics; strong family ties; a high sense of social responsibility; they come from a somewhat higher economic and social group than inferior men in combat; they get along well with their companions in arms. These findings may soon affect Army recruiting and classification. Dr. Launor F. Carter, research director of Unit 2, has indicated that there is a possibility that f er high-IQ soldiers will in the fu be placed in technical jobs, and con units will begin to get their fair sh

✓ ✓ ✓

The Army has been employing tives for certain types of work at ove installations for many years. But v it was doing as a matter of course without fanfare, became a widely licized operation by the Air Force w the latter tabbed it "Operation N Son" and made a successful bid for lic approval and Congressional co ments.

✓ ✓ ✓

Army tacticians working on the p lem of re-supply of combat units b have been attracted to the Canad built DeHaviland Otter, a rugged si engined airplane that they believe be the answer to the problem of plying dispersed combat units. The doesn't require hard runways for l ings and take-offs and will carry a lb. load. Considering the relatively haul distances involved, one plane c deliver a respectable tonnage by tling back and forth. The Army h to get some Otters before long.

✓ ✓ ✓

It has been reported that Pia Helicopter will install a turbine e in the H-21 Work Horse if the T portation Corps agrees and will co for a prototype.

✓ ✓ ✓

The Army is preparing regula and forms for the use of soldiers in ing homes under the provisions o new housing law. One interesting a is that a soldier does not have to bu home in the immediate area where stationed as one of the purposes o law is to make it possible for a c soldier to buy a home to which he retire. The housing law provides fo government to insure the mortga that a serviceman may borrow as as 95 per cent of the cost of a home to exceed $17,500). The interest r 4½ per cent.

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■ "HOW CAN WE stop hostile jets that slip through our primary defenses?" Newsmen covering Army Ordnance's demonstration of the Skysweeper saw the answer to attack by high-speed aircraft at medium range—and spread the story over front pages from coast to coast. It was the story of a gun that could "see" through fog and darkness . . . pick out an enemy within a 15-mile radius . . . compute its speed, altitude and course in seconds . . . then, automatically aiming itself, shoot the plane out of the sky.

■ Actually the story began when Army Ordnance anticipated the threat of faster flying jets and started to work with Sperry on the problem. Through its pioneering in radar, Sperry engineers were able to design the "eyes" of needed performance. From Sperry's experience in electronics came the "brains" to compute precise firing information. Sperry's developments in servo mechanisms provided the "muscles" for rapid aiming and firing.

■ The Skysweeper gunfire control *system* which resulted from the cooperative efforts of Army Ordnance and Sperry is typical of the many systems which Sperry has developed working with various branches of the military to meet critical needs. Once developed, Sperry manufacturing specialists convert engineering designs into precision weapons for large scale production. Among similar projects at Sperry today are systems for bombing and navigation, missile guidance and naval gunfire control.

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MEN IN SEARCH OF MOBILITY

MILITARY mobility is more than trucks, tanks, helicopters, airplanes, Liberty ships and landing craft. It is also an amalgam of brains, ingenuity and imagination. Occasionally we are rewarded with flashes of information that emerge to reveal the potency of the latter when they are brought to bear with spirit and energy. The next four articles in this issue give such an insight. They present evidence that many men are devoting brains and know-how and imagination to the tremendous task of finding ways of moving armies and their supplies in the atomic age.

We begin with a report on how the Transportation Corps expects to get men and supplies over the beaches without their becoming fat targets for enemy bombers.

Then we have a submariner who has put his imagination and know-how together and tells us the nuclear-powered submarine may make possible over-the-water assaults on hostile shores in the atomic age.

An infantry major fresh from Korea shows us that the Army is learning more and more about the possibilities (and limitations) of the helicopter. The significance of this report is not so much what 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, did as it is the knowledge that the Army is trying to find out all it can about what the combat forces can do with the whirly-birds.

And finally the long-pondered question of whether trucks in a combat division should be parcelled out to smaller units or pooled is being re-examined in tests in the Far East, Europe and the U.S. Here again the spirit of inquiry that motivates the tests are significant.

NONE of these reports is the last word, the final answer in the Army's search for tactical and logistical mobility. That is quite obvious. But they show a trend and they show progress. But much more significantly they show a robust attitude of inquiry and search that is vastly reassuring.

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OVER THE BEACH

New techniques and equipment will revolutionize the handling of cargo from . . .

Ship to Shore

HARRY A. JACOBS

IN anticipation of the need for over-the-beach supply if war should come again and to fill the increasing demands of the combat arms, the Transportation Corps, through its Research and Development Command at Fort Eustis, Virginia, has been devising new procedures and equipment for cargo handling.

From its many amphibious assaults during World War II the Army acquired an invaluable insight into the strategic, tactical, and logistical requirements of over-the-beach supply operations. The improvement of the then existing methods and equipment for cargo handling received the greatest initial attention at Fort Eustis. But with tremendous changes being made in matériel and in the future conduct of combat operations, the emphasis has been gradually shifted to completely new methods and procedures which in many instances are radical departures from earlier established practices.

The quantity and scope of logistical support required in modern operations has increased rather than decreased, and any new equipment must have maximum load capacity, transportability, and efficiency of operation. The demand for new transportation tools has been further heightened by the need for the Army to be able to supply itself entirely over the beach.

Army planners were fully cognizant of the significant role played by over-the-beach resupply operations in support of amphibious assaults. They recalled, in planning the Transportation Corps' research program, that for 41 days after D-Day in Normandy two U. S. field armies relied almost exclusively on over-the-beach resupply for their logistical support. They also recalled that the DUKW, best known of the World War II amphibious carriers, moved ashore about 40 per cent of the supplies required by the American forces in France the first four months after D-Day.

CONSIDERING amphibious carriers as an important item of equipment in over-the-beach operations, the Transportation Corps placed a great deal of emphasis on the improvement and enlargement of the DUKW. As a result we have today, in various stages of development, a new family of amphibious carriers—the Superduck, the Drake, and the BARC.

Additional research and development now provide the Army with a conception of future port and beach operations in which new items of equipment and new procedures will be employed. Among these new items are the aerial tramway, the beach lighter, the overland conveyor, the packaged port, and the amphibious trailer train, as well as the versatile helicopter. The employment of the new equipment is portrayed in a number of artists' conceptions which are based on what actual over-the-beach operations may look like in the future.

Revolutionary changes are being planned in the overall concept of military transportation methods. These changes are based on the fact that almost 25 per cent of military cargo is wheeled or tracked and that another 50 per cent can be carried in containers weigh up to five tons each. From these fa came the Roll-On—Roll-Off and c tainerization principles.

Food, ammunition, clothing, constr tion materials, and other supplies c be moved ashore on amphibious c riers, aerial tramways, or landing cra but the vast majority of trucks, tracto tanks, self-propelled artillery, and o er mobile items of equipment can brought directly to shore aboard hea beach lighters and moved inland imr diately under their own power.

The only vessels presently availal for Roll-On—Roll-Off use are the LC 8 (60-ton capacity) and the LCU (1 ton capacity). For future use the Ar is designing a beach lighter capable carrying a load 15 times greater th that of the LCU.

To implement the containerizati principle a reusable steel container h been fabricated with a capacity of 2 cubic feet. The outside dimensions the container measure 8 feet 6 inch in length, 6 feet 3 inches in width, a 6 feet 10 inches in height. Items of th type speed up movement of cargo a provide security and protection fr the elements. Furthermore, they can handled readily by conventional mea of transportation as well as by the ne equipment.

Should the United States again ha to participate in all-out global war, ov the-beach logistical support* of o forces on foreign shores may well e ploy all of these items and many mo now in the process of development the Transportation Corps.

MR. HARRY A. JACOBS has contributed several articles on transportation developments to technical journals. A graduate of Georgetown University, he served with the 4th Armored Division during World War II. He is a civilian employee of the Office of the Chief of Transportation.

*In referring to over-the-beach operations t term LOTS (Logistics over the Shore) is oft used.

ne Aerial Tramway

J entirely new idea in over-the-beach operations that has been developed :e World War II is the aerial tram-. While the tramway has been in for some time in commercial and ustrial enterprise, its adaptation to itary use is new.

Several prototypes of aerial tramways ady are in existence; one 4500 feet ength has been erected at Fort Eus- Their availability in the future will ıtly decrease the Army's dependence fixed port facilities where geographic ditions prohibit the use of amphibi- carriers in the movement of cargo n ships to supply dumps.

'he component parts of the military nway are designed for convenient age, maximum transportability, and : of erection. With two 10-ton sky- per tramway, it will eventually be : to handle up to 80 long tons of ;o per hour, roughly equivalent to capacity of conventional small port lities. Yet the tramway will retain desired mobility.

The accompanying cut illustrates a potential use of the aerial tramway in ship-to-shore movement of military cargo. A nearby port (left background) has been destroyed and rendered useless in a pre-invasion atomic attack. The remainder of the coastline in this area is inaccessible to landing craft, save for the small undamaged pier in the foreground. Road and rail facilities in the area escaped major damage.

By using the pier alone for the discharge of cargo, the barges, lighters, and landing craft shuttling between the ships and the shore probably are processing barely enough supplies each day to support the combat action taking place farther inland. The success of these over-the-beach efforts depends largely on favorable weather conditions and an absence of enemy interdiction.

TO increase the capacity of the operation, two aerial tramways are installed within 48 hours. With 75-foot steel towers to support the traction cables, the tramways are extended from a point 400 yards inland to a pair of barges moored securely some 2,000 yards offshore. Here the outer terminals of the tramways are installed. The towers between the opposite ends of the tramways are secured either to the floor of the beach or to the ground.

The barges, or "sea islands," are each large enough to serve as floating piers for two ships. Cargo is unloaded directly into racks lowered from the skycars.

The self-propelled skycars move from ship to shore and return at speeds up to thirty miles per hour, carrying up to ten tons per trip. With two skycars in operation on each tramway, the daily capacity of this small one-pier port can easily be tripled. When no longer required here, either or both of the tramways can readily be dismantled and moved to another site. On the other hand, if the combat situation requires displacement of the supply dump to a point farther inland, either or both of the tramways can be extended.

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New Amphibious Carriers

THE World War II DUKW's principal disadvantage was its limited cargo capacity. Compared with the LCM-6, which could carry thirty tons, the DUKW's performance, with 2½ tons, was poor. On the other hand, the DUKW was capable of crossing the beachline and moving directly inland without discharging its cargo, while the LCM-6 could move only as far as the water's edge, where its cargo had to be transloaded.

Army research and development engineers have now in various stages of development three new amphibious carriers which enlarge upon the principle so successfully demonstrated in the DUKW. These new carriers are the XM-147 amphibious 6x6 truck, called the Superduck; the XM-157 amphibious 8x8 truck, called the Drake; and the barge, amphibious, resupply, cargo, known as the BARC. The Superduck and Drake are products of Ordnance research and development, while the BARC is being developed by the Transportation Corps.

The Superduck is a greatly improved version of the DUKW. Without having greater overall dimensions than the original carrier, the Superduck is designed to carry four tons of cargo, although Ordnance rates its capacity as two and a half tons. Both carriers have substantially the same roadability characteristics.

The Drake, next logical step in the development of the amphibious carrier family, is still in the developmental stage. It will be built along the lines of the Superduck, although proportionately larger, and will travel on eight wheels rather than six in order to accommodate up to ten tons of cargo. The Ordnance load rating is eight tons, however. While its roadability may be restricted somewhat because of its 10-foot width (compared with the Superduck's 8 feet 7 inches), its size will not be great to preclude satisfactory perf ance on land.

The original DUKW, the Superd and the Drake may be describe trucks fitted with hulls, designed marily to operate efficiently on d ship-to-supply dump hauls. Amphib carriers larger than the Drake ma described as barges fitted with wh Into this category falls the BARC, t and largest member of the new fa

The BARC has the advantage of mendous cargo capacity (sixty to approximately twice that of the L 6; but its huge size (27 feet in wi makes it impractical for operation standard roads. The BARC can n cross-country, however, and is expe to operate several hundred yards in from the beach.

Consideration is also being give Fort Eustis to the design of amphib trailers of up to 20-ton capacity. conception is to use the loaded tra with Superduck and Drakes, while other is to form trains by having or more trailers towed afloat and as by specially designed amphibious t tors. In the latter conception a con uous ferrying service would be feasi

The Army is also designing a be lighter with a capacity of 2,000 t Preliminary sketches indicate that lighter will be approximately 300 in length and will have about 15, square feet of deck space. It is prima intended to carry cumbersome mo equipment such as heavy tanks, he artillery, and engineer construct equipment.

AT another beach (*see cut*) some tance from the aerial tramway stallation there exists only a wide stre of gently sloping sandy shoreline. Th is no port in the immediate vicinity hence no fixed port facilities. The f sand on the beach, however, prese an ideal opportunity for the full ployment of modern amphibious carri

Near the center of the beach are 2,000-ton lighter has touched shore a is discharging the last of its mobile ca of tanks and heavy engineer constr tion equipment. To the right of t lighter, heavy landing craft are discha ing mobile and self-propelled equ ment. Meanwhile, the majority of t bulk cargo is being moved ashore 4-ton Superducks and 10-ton Drak as BARCs carry the bulldozers, medi tanks, and medium artillery.



)ne half of a Superduck transporta- ı company is moving 50 per cent of load across this beach. Although ited in capacity to four tons per ve- le, the Superducks are capable of ying the main burden because of ir excellent roadability characteris- . A good two-lane highway within ile of the beach enables the Super- ks to operate under optimum condi- ıs in moving supplies to the inland nps.

The Drakes, carrying substantially heavier loads, are used to move cargo to a transfer point where the Army's new rough-terrain forklifts (rough terrain forklifts of 3- and 5-ton lift capacities are being service tested in Korea by the Transportation Corps) transfer the loads to waiting trucks. At the same time an amphibious tractor-trailer train moves up across the beach toward its destination.

As a result of the use of amphibious carriers, heavy landing craft, and lighters, the beach is not cluttered with supplies or with service personnel and equipment required formerly for the transfer of cargo from landing craft to trucks. Bulk cargo, vehicles, and mobile equipment are moved directly across the beach to initial inland destinations. Maximum dispersion of personnel, equipment, and supplies is thereby easily achieved. It is important to note that on short notice the entire operation can withdraw from this beach and move to another similar site if the situation so requires.

ıe Packaged Port

J the basis of its experience with the Mulberries, the prefabricated piers d in the Normandy invasion, the ıy sought in the post-war years an ly transportable unit that would pro- e basic pier facilities wherever needed nout additional large-scale, on-site struction. Attention was focused ul- ıtely on the DeLong pier, used fre- ntly by commercial firms for offshore drilling and temporary terminal fa- ies.

'he DeLong pier is an oversized steel ge which can be towed readily to a red site. When it is ready for in- ation, steel caissons six feet in diame- are dropped through wells in the ge. The barge is then elevated by nious pneumatic grippers, which se the barge literally to climb the sons until the desired pier elevation ttained. Two or more such piers, ing in length from 300 to 400 feet, form the basic components of the ıy's so-called packaged port.

'ne additional item used in the pack- l port, as well as elsewhere, is the able overland conveyor, which is g developed rapidly with the basic of providing a continuous transpor- n system from the waterline or pier ıitial inland supply dumps. At dis- ıtion points, smaller sectionalized veyors also may be set up to keep plies and equipment moving forward ırd the front. The conveyor systems, e or small, will be readily transporta- by land, sea, or air.

another coastal area nearby (*see t*), in a small natural harbor, a al minor port has been gutted in of a series of pre-invasion atomic ks. So complete was the destruc- that none of the port facilities can sed by our forces.

evertheless, because of its strategic location the Army has decided to use this port area. Within 30 hours after the arrival of engineer and port terminal units the port is in operation. The Transportation Corps solved this problem by towing in one of its packaged ports to replace the wrecked port facilities.

After installing a DeLong-type pier, terminal unit personnel complete the laying of an overland conveyor system which extends from the outer end of the pier through the destroyed port to the initial distribution point farther inland. Extension of the conveyor along the length of the pier permits direct discharge of cargo onto the belt system from the landing craft and lighters tied up on both sides of the pier.

At the other end of the conveyor system the cargo, packed mainly in prefabricated steel containers, is moved directly onto trucks or rail cars or is removed and stacked by mechanized cargo handling equipment. The basic conveyor system probably will be able to handle up to 150 tons per hour, despite the fact that some of its sections move the cargo over 36-degree grades.

The packaged port involves maximum use of prefabricated port equipment in order to install in the minimum time facilities of strength and stability rivaling deliberately constructed ports. Addition of the conveyor system to the packaged port also provides for great speed in cargo movement with a minimum of interim handling.

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Cargoes by Helicopter



THE versatile helicopter can be ployed effectively in over-the-beac supply, especially in temporary sus ing operations designed to bridge in the logistics chain. The larger copters now being built can ha heavier loads of equipment over gr ranges with increasing efficiency speed.

Cargo can be loaded directly int day's medium helicopters, while b equipment can be carried in nets s beneath the fuselage. A helicopter pany equipped with twenty-one med helicopters is capable of handling 9 ton-miles of cargo per day, or over ton-miles per helicopter per day.

Logistics for the Future

THE emphasis being placed by the Army on the development of new and improved over-the-beach operational procedures and equipment is predicated on a simple evaluation of the characteristics of modern warfare. In view of the wide radius of destructive power possessed by nuclear weapons, future combat operations will stress maximum dispersion in both forward and rear areas. In turn, this means that military forces will be required to operate in smaller groups spread over large land areas.

Even if it were possible to protect major fixed port facilities from mass destruction attacks, it is doubtful that the supplies required by the many widely scattered units could be handled successfully through a few large ports. On the other hand, ability to establish over-the-beach resupply operations at sites dictated by the disposition and strength of the front-line units would reinforce further the combat potential of these forces. It would provide them with a freedom of movement which would reaffirm the element of surprise as a tactical weapon.

Accordingly, the Army must be ready in the future to provide terminal facilities along any given coastline, regardless of the availability of fixed port installations. Further, with a minimum of warning it must be prepared to transfer operations from conventional harbors and ports to rugged, undeveloped beaches. Transportation Corps terminal units must be trained and equipped to land with the assault elements and establish over-the-beach supply lines in the least possible time.

But what do these developments mean to combat troops? Stated simply, they assure them of continued movement of vital supplies and equipment under virtually all conceivable conditions. In addition to guaranteeing the combat troops adequate logistical support, the ability to establish terminal facilities along practically any shoreline will vide assault units with greater flex ty, mobility, and versatility.

With an entirely new family of phibious carriers in the making, new and readily transportable beach port equipment in the process of d opment and refinement, and with and more efficient cargo and equipr handling procedures in test stage new and stronger transportation lin the logistics chain is being forged.



ASSAULT Troop Submarine

e coming of nuclear-powered submarines capable of carrying sizeable numbers of troops (or large quantities of cargo) for long distances gives the soldier a new medium of approach to the enemy's vitals. The prospects are intriguing.

COMMANDER G. W. KITTREDGE

E sea was calm and still. The officer the periscope gazed steadily at a l island. Every now and then, he ›ed back and made a motion to the ·termaster. It was a downward ges- with his thumb. The Quartermas- ɔn seeing the motion, would run ı the periscope and then raise it al- at once. Ducking the periscope washed away the salt from the upper lens. As soon as the periscope was up again, the officer resumed his ceaseless vigil—watching the small, green tropical island. The name of the island was Makin.

All day long on the 16th of August, 1942, two submarines, the USS *Nautilus* and the USS *Argonaut*, circled Makin Island submerged, and reconnoitered. Tomorrow was to be the day when the 211 marines the two submarines carried would hit the beach. But today while the two of them cruised around the island at periscope depth with forty feet of water over their fat hulls, the 198 men and 13 officers of Companies A and B, 2d Raider Battalion, slept or played acey-deucey or drank coffee.

If the raid on Makin Island was only the story of another successful operation of American armed forces, it would still be worth telling. The Makin Island raid had everything to capture the public's imagination. It was colorful. The marines were commanded by Colonel Evans F. Carlson of "Gung Ho" fame and included one of the sons of the late President Roosevelt. It was novel. The raid involved a new type of operation —the landing of combat infantry, from submarines deep within the enemy's territory, without air support or the support of other forces. It was necessary. The raid wasn't a gimmick or a grandstand play because it took place at a time when the Marine force on Guadalcanal was hard pressed and something had to be done to disrupt Japanese plans for reinforcing Guadalcanal from the Gilberts.

MANDER G. W. KITTREDGE, U.S.N., ı submariner who graduated from the val Academy in 1940. During the ·ond World War he served on several ›marines and commanded the *Grouper*. ıce the war he has participated in rations into the Arctic and Antarctic, ·ed as an assistant naval attaché in lia, and commanded two different marines. He is now on duty in the ıce of the Secretary of Defense.

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The raid on Makin Island was successful. After dark on the 16th of August, 1942, the two submarines, *Nautilus* and *Argonaut,* surfaced and rendezvoused. Shortly after midnight on the 17th the marines began to disembark. By 0421 all marines had left the submarines and were on their way to the beach in rubber assault boats. At 0513, communications were established. The raider group was on the beach. Once there, they wiped out the enemy garrison almost to a man. They destroyed two airplanes, a radio station and a supply dump with 900 barrels of gasoline. The two submarines, supporting the raiders with their guns, disabled a 3,500-ton transport and smashed a small patrol vessel. The action took two days. On both days, the supporting submarines were forced to dive by Japanese air attack. In the evening of the second day, the last of the marines were taken off the beach and the submarines headed back to Pearl Harbor. Yes, the operation was a success, but how much of a success? Aside from the cold, hard statistics of enemy losses, what did it accomplish? First, it accomplished its mission. It made the Japanese high command believe that an invasion of the Gilbert Islands was impending and the guns, troops, and aircraft which were badly needed by Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, remained in the Gilberts. Secondly, two companies of combat infantry accomplished through surprise what it later took 6,500 troops to do by prepared assault.

But the raid on Makin Island during 16-18 August 1942, did more than these two things. It was the first time submarines, entirely on their own, had ever been used as assault troop transports and it may very well have laid the foundation for landing operations in another war.

ON 1 March 1954, a hydrogen bomb was exploded at the Eniwetok proving ground. The power of this bomb was reported by a member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy as twelve to fourteen megatons (a megaton is equal to 1,000,000 tons of TNT). This represents an explosive force of 600 to 700 times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Almost a month later, on 26 March 1954, an additional thermonuclear test took place. After the second explosion, Admiral Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated, ". . . the results of these tests have brought us very much nearer to the day of the satisfaction of our military requirements, put us within sight of them. . . ." *The New York Times* on 1 April took this statement to mean that the United States can now make hydrogen bombs of sizes that can be carried by small- and medium-size fighter planes and guided missiles, since the armed forces would never be satisfied with bombs that could only be carried by a B-36 or similar large bomber. In the same issue, *The Times* gave a table of destruction which would result from the explosion of a hydrogen bomb. The table was based on a bomb of ten megatons explosive force, bursting in the air at an altitude of 2,000 feet. According to the table, total destruction would result over a diameter of eight miles; severe damage over a diameter of sixteen miles; moderate damage over a diameter of twenty-eight miles; partial damage over a diameter of thirty-two miles; however, destruction by fire would be much greater than destruction by blast and the limit of incendiary action would stretch over a diameter of fifty miles, or a total area of almost two thousand square miles. All of which boils down to the single question:

Are prepared landings of the Normandy beachhead type still possible in view of the hydrogen bomb and the apparent ability of even small tactical aircraft to deliver it?

DURING the last war, a successful landing usually required three definite steps. Step one was the preparation for the landing—the assault by naval and air forces so as to soften up the enemy beachheads. This preparation by air and gunfire usually took two days. Step two consisted of the landings themselves with the assault troops embarking in small boats and carving out a beachhead. The time spent in this phase varied in accordance with the resistance met. It could have been a couple of hours or it could have been a couple of days. The third step was invariably the longest. This was the build-up of the reserves and supplies necessary to capture the position (as required by Pacific operations) or to pave the way (as in Europe) for step four, the breakout. In any event, this transfer of logistical support from ship to shore took time, and during that time the ships had to remain in the area where they were particularly vulnerable to air attack because of limited space to maneuver and their unloading activities. During the last war, this was a calculated risk. The hazards of enemy air attack were known and the damage they could do had been learned by experience. task force commander did what he c in the way of providing combat ai trols day and night, but some er planes got in and at Anzio and Gu canal and Normandy the support ve stayed and took their losses because troops ashore were doomed unless got supplies.

But when we have one bomb that result in incendiary action over a c fifty miles in diameter, can any of t troops or supplies get ashore from a g of transports milling around ten 1 off the beach in standard landing neuvers? When we have one b which can bring about total destru over an area of fifty square miles incendiary action over an area of al 2,000 square miles, is the assault landing as we knew it in the last any longer a calculated risk? Is any force commander going to be prep to say that his fighter defenses a absolute that not one enemy plane be able to break through? He has t able to say that; otherwise his e landing force is liable to be wiped ou order to achieve maximum superi on the beachhead, he must concen his force. But with this new and ter destructive power—the hydrogen b —one enemy plane breaking through either annihilate his concentrated or so badly disrupt it as to make i longer effective. It is hard to believe any task force commander would u take such a responsibility. He ha course, an alternative. He can dis his landing force in order to mini the effects of the bomb. But if he this, he dissipates the effectivenes both his own defensive abilities and offensive capabilities of the lan force. It would be like committin serves to a battle piecemeal—a little and a little there, to be swallowed u the enemy who is fighting on his terrain.

THERE have been many approach this problem but none so popul late as the one that starts with: "T won't use atomic weapons in the war. They'll be outlawed by com consent like gas in the first World Too horrible, everybody will be a of retaliation." In answering this have only to ask ourselves the ques "If an enemy invasion force were sig 300 miles off Sandy Hook, steamin the Jersey coast, would we who dro atomic bombs on Hiroshima and N saki drop a hydrogen bomb on an en

ce which was going to invade the ıited States?" Now then, let us put selves in the place of the enemy and the same question, "Would he drop ın one of our task forces?" For the art ımphibious warfare will, of necessity, dergo a change.

Such a change may take numerous di- tions. It may result in increased em- ısis on airborne assault and airborne ply. But with our present stage of ınological advancement and the dis- ces which would be involved in any ding we might have to make, it is dif- lt to see how logistical support could achieved by aircraft in any but ex- nely limited operations. Therefore, most logical pattern of future opera- ıs for the landing and supply of U.S. ıps on foreign shores, lies in the direc- already forecast by the Makin Island of 1942—by submarine troop trans- s and submarine supply vessels. The of submarines for such operations ıld result in two distinct advantages. first would be relative safety from monuclear weapons at all times (ex- the actual few minutes it would for the submarine to surface and ırk the landing personnel). This ty, of course, would result from the that to bomb the group of assault p submarines, it would be necessary etect them. The best means of de- on in warfare is still the human eye. des being unable to see a submerged narine, it is extremely difficult to de- one by other means. Contrary to ılar conception, radar will not work er water.

E second advantage obtained by us- g submarines as assault troop trans- , would be *surprise*. Surprise is a lament of successful warfare, and rise and detection are inversely pro- onal to each other. It is axiomatic if your enemy cannot detect you, ıre in a position to surprise him. The y to effect a surprise landing along astline gives the submarine troop port a tremendous advantage. Let us a hypothetical situation. The Ger- during World War II built almost housand submarines. Let us suppose had constructed one thousand sub- ıes as troop transports with each ıarine carrying, say, fifty combat in- ymen since the German submarines smaller and could not have carried ıny men as the *Nautilus* and *Argo-* did on the Makin Island raid. And er, let us suppose that we had had lvance intelligence that this force was at sea, heading for the east coast of the United States. What could have happened? If everything had gone along like the Makin Island raid, more than three German divisions could have been landed along our coast. Remember, we are only concerned with the immediate landing! It is extremely doubtful that we would have had any more success in opposing such a landing than the Japanese had at Makin Island, because the German submarines would have effected complete surprise and their landing force would have achieved local superiority.

YOU ask: How does this prevent that one aircraft from dropping a hydrogen bomb as the troops are discovered in the act of landing? If the same sort of reasoning is applied to the hypothetical case, we need only to look at the time it took the raiders to get ashore at Makin Island. It took the marines almost an hour to get ashore at Makin. The hypothetical case becomes more than a calculated risk when there is an hour's warning to get a plane with a hydrogen bomb to the beachhead. Even after the troops hit the beach they can't disperse fast enough to get out of the blast area and that's assuming they had complete surprise and no opposition.

All of this is true and proves that we have to change our concept of amphibious landings. Why do we take a beachhead? Why don't we go right into a port like the Germans did at Oslo or the Canadians did at Dieppe and disembark our troops directly onto the docks? We don't do that because we could not effect complete surprise that way. The enemy would have time to prepare his defenses and therefore, since it is a very old precept of warfare that ships can not attack land fortresses with any measure of success, the landings would be beaten off. That is the reason we have developed the beachhead landing so that we can choose some isolated spot where the enemy's defenses are weak because he can't be strong everywhere. But even the strongest of defenses can be breached momentarily by surprise as they were at Dieppe and Oslo and therein lies the defense against the hydrogen bomb. A surprise landing by assault troop submarines should be made as close to a large enemy port as possible in order that the use of nuclear weapons would include the port in the blast effect. The objective of such a landing should be to seize the port and its dock facilities at the earliest opportunity. Let us turn to our hypothetical case.

Suppose our enemy landed his three divisions from his submarine transports and seized Rockland, Maine, What would our immediate reaction be? To drop a hydrogen bomb on Rockland, Maine? That would eliminate the three divisions but it would also eliminate Rockland. After that the people up and down the East Coast would not be very eager to prosecute the war if they knew their own air force would drop a hydrogen bomb on them should they happen to be the next port assaulted. No government could perform such a preposterous act against its own people and expect to remain in power. Therein lies the defense of the landing force against the hydrogen bomb—the hostage value of the port. The ships that transported the landing force are another matter. If they are surface ships, once they have cleared the area where the blast effect of the hydrogen bomb will not injure the port, the ships are fair game. But submarine transports, once they have unloaded their troops and submerged again, where are they? I recognize that there are flaws in the above reasoning but I still believe there are many great advantages to submarine troop transport. It is relatively immune to aerial attack for the simple reason that it cannot be seen by the attacking aircraft.

THE question will naturally arise: Is it possible to build an efficient troop transport submarine? Or a cargo type submarine, because the troops will need support after they have landed? The answer is, never has it been more possible! Both types have been constructed in the past but recent developments open awesome possibilities. The first nuclear-powered submarine (named for the old *Nautilus*) is now a fact instead of a theory. As a result of this new source of power and the air revitalization device which was developed during Operation HIDEOUT at New London last year, submarines will be able to transit whole oceans without coming to the surface. The new reactor development program of the Atomic Energy Commission should greatly reduce the size of nuclear power plants but the effect of eliminating the electric batteries in submarines should alone increase the living space by an additional third.

We are entering a new era—an era of nuclear power. Let us hope we use this new power wisely and apply it to all our modes of warfare, for when the whole sea is available to us, to be used to our advantage, why should we use just the surface of it?

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THROUGH THE AIR

Want to move an entire infantry battalion by helicopter? Can do. But there are drawbacks that you ought to know about. Here's how it was done in . . .

Exercise Lift

MAJOR JAMES S. DOUGLAS

A five-man group boards a helicopter

LAST May the 3d Battalion of the 27th Infantry ("Wolfhounds") demonstrated, at a cost of nearly $24,000, that an entire battalion could be moved by helicopter to defensive positions ready to fight. But it also showed that this mode of transportation has limitations.

In a period of less than a week, the Battalion S3, Capt. Harry Floyd, developed definitions, procedures, and training techniques that made possible a successful move. As there were no field manuals on the subject, Captain Floyd made use of his experience as an airborne officer and wrote a complete SOP for both embarkation and debarkation. He also drew out of the thin air a time schedule and control system for the flow of both the helicopters and personnel.

We understood, from talking to the pilots of the helicopters, that when most unit commanders thought of helicopter transport, they visualized entire fleets of the big cargo ships alighting at one point, loading up with men, and then taking off in a mass flight. This battalion elected not to try that system for two reasons. First, there was no single place in the regimental sector where 20 helicopters could safely mass at one time. Secondly, we believed the control system would become so involved that the choppers could not be used effectively. The method actually used bore a deliberately marked resemblance to the airborne technique of marshalling. This will be discussed later in the article.

There was very little background information to study. The 45th Transportation Battalion (Helicopter) supplied some general characteristics and load data, but these served for little else t to focus attention on what we coul pect from the machines. For exan we knew that with a full gasoline each helicopter could carry only a 1,000 pounds of cargo or personnel, this only during the times when th was dense. In the afternoons, wher air was normally warmer and less d either the cargo load or the gas supply had to be reduced. We fo by aerial reconnaissance and trial, there were severe limitations to choice of embarkation and landing Helicopter pilots, like pilots of f wing aircraft, require two approa We contemplated sites at the bas hills, but downdrafts made contr the ships almost impossible.

These matters may appear of consequence, but our mission wa move the battalion to its prepared b positions, which were in the hills. problem here was to determine wh we would save time by landing t at a point well back from the hills then walking them to the position

WE were trying to test the feasil of moving the entire battalion, bat loaded and under combat condit into pre-selected defensive positions proved before we ever started tha could not, because the terrain w not permit. We therefore had to e lish an artificial tactical situation w would permit landings, and we h locate a defense sector where the chines could come close enough to rant the use of helicopter travel. only suitable ground was an area more than likely would never have selected for defense by any force.

The most fallacious assumptior made was the existence of abs friendly air superiority. It was falla because in the problem we were req to make all possible haste because enemy threat, yet *we* completely

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MAJOR JAMES S. DOUGLAS was serving as S3 of the 27th Infantry Regiment at the time of the operation described in this article. He has since become Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion of the 27th. He is a 1944 graduate of the Military Academy.

ıted the air. In other words, we were ven an ideal situation—one which we ıuld never guarantee ourselves in the ent of hostilities. And even with this eal situation, we still needed over two ɔurs to complete our move after our ersonnel were ready. If trucks had en available under these same luxuri- ıs tactical conditions, we could have oved faster over a poor road net five nes as long as the air route.

HAT was proved then? First, that a fully combat-loaded battalion could moved by helicopter; and secondly, at the H-19 helicopter is merely an- ıer mode of transportation, which, e other modes, has severe limitations. does not replace the work horse of the my, our 2½-ton truck.

One of the more interesting facets of e planning was the loading system veloped by Captain Floyd together th the S4, Captain Jemison. In or- r to get all men into position in a ndition to sustain a fire fight, we moved th almost every man carrying about pounds of weapons, ammunition, ɔd, and personal gear. Our initial es- ıate had been in the neighborhood 50 pounds each. We planned for, d accomplished, an aerial resupply of ımunition during the exercise. This ıld not be done simultaneously with op movement, and the nature of our ssion indicated the need for rapid oc- pation and for preparedness. The only apon we did not take was the 105mm oilless rifle. We have yet to figure : how to fly one of those.

One of the primary tactical considera- ns was to secure the airhead, and the lk of K Company was selected for t mission. It will be noted in Sketch hat we selected at the bivouac area ır airports, each with its own integral embly area and loading station. By iding K Company among the four ts and putting the security force per- nel into the loading stations first, were able to insure that the first ndred men to leave the field were t of that security element. Each ne could carry only five men with ir equipment, so we could not send ull tactical group in any one single icopter.

The danger that one or more ships ght be lost to enemy action made it dvisable to group key personnel, or re than one crew-served weapon, in one ship. Except in one case, where combined one light and one heavy chine gun from M Company, we ered to this concept. It meant, in ence, that for a period of time tactical



As the landed men move out, the ship turns back for another load

and unit integrity had to be sacrificed. No commander relishes such an action in the face of the enemy, but here we had no choice.

THE plan was to divide the other rifle companies into two groups, after integrating their weapons platoons, and to place the two groups in different assembly areas. We had to know, of course, exactly how many men we would be required to transport. Each rifle company was limited to 135 men and had attached to it four medical personnel. Attached for purposes of movement only were five men from Headquarters Company and the six members of the control group for one port. Similarly, the Heavy Weapons Company was limited to 100 men, plus attachment of three medical personnel, six men from Headquarters Company, and the six control group personnel. The Headquarters group was left with 50 men, and the fighting strength of the battalion as moved was 600.

With these data and plans, the company commanders could start their work. They had to fill in names and distribute the weight loads by name. M Com-

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

Sketch 1. The tactical situation. The 3d Battalion's mission was to screen the 25th Division's move into a defensive sector. The battalion moved from a position 7½ miles south of the area.

pany faced the most difficult problem, since it had some 2½ tons of ammunition for its crew-served weapons as well as the weapons themselves. The S4 had calculated the weights and, to ease the burden on M Company, had distributed some of its ammunition to the rifle companies. The latter, which preceded M Company in flight, were to stack the ammunition in piles where crews could gather it after they arrived. The weight of some weapons still could not be equitably distributed, and some men from Mike carried up to 90 pounds. The entire company had to be placed late in the movement in order that the helicopters' gasoline load would be partially lightened from expenditure.

THE marshalling area contained four heliports, and for each there was an assembly area and loading station. There was an officer, designated as Embarkation Control Officer (ECO), who from a vantage point was connected by telephone to each assembly area. This provided him with the flexibility and certainty of control he required to manage the operation. If (and this happened) the flow was disrupted at any one port, or if one assembly area cleared before the others, the ECO could direct troops to move from a lagging area to the clearer one in order to maintain even distribution and flow.

In each assembly area the senior officer present was in charge, regardless of the troop disposition within the area. He had phone connections to the loading station, where there were a noncommissioned officer and two guides. Each loading station was required to keep a load of personnel in it at all times, and the NCO merely telephoned his requirements to the assembly area. The noise of helicopters made shouting useless. The officer in the assembly area knew in what order personnel were to depart, and by proper stacking he simplified his task and could readily dispatch the next load on call. The guides were on hand to lead loads out to the ships via safe lanes that avoided the dangerous stabilizing propellers.

When all the troops had been cleared from an asssembly area, and upon word from the ECO, the control group reeled in its wire *toward* the station and boarded the last helicopter to come into that particular port. This was an unusual procedure, since units do not normally marshal themselves from an area. It proved very satisfactory in this case, however, and it was repeated for the return trip in an equally efficient manner.

The chart below shows how the troops were distributed in the four assembly areas. It should be noted that the plane numbers indicated merely show sequence. There were no chalk numbers fixed on the planes, because so many things could have happened to interrupt the flight of any given ship.

Area A — Planes	1– 5:	K Company
	6–29:	L "
	30	: Control Group
Area B — Planes	1– 5:	K Company
	6–10:	L "
	11–29:	M "
	30	: Control Group
Area C — Planes	1– 5:	K Company
	6–29:	I "
	30	: Control Group
Area D — Planes	1– 5:	K Company
	6–10:	I "
	11–19:	Hq "
	20–29:	K "
	30	: Control Group

As can be seen, this system wo work properly only if the feeder p for the ships themselves were success We required that four ships land sin taneously, load, and take off at the sa time. Each of the 20 ships would m 30 trips. To regulate the flow of h copters into the ports, the Transpo tion Battalion supplied a ground-con unit that was in radio contact with e ship. It was the controller's job to that no one port got farther behind its out-loading than the others. So of the breakdowns in this system be discussed later.

The final link in the loading and ing plan having been completed, had but to train and make a dry-r We were provided with five helicop on the day before the exercise so that could teach the troops the seating p and the safety factors to be followed

THE day of the exercise was clear dry, and the exercise was an inter ing spectacle. What could be seen it, that is. We had anticipated so dust in our dried-up rice-paddy fi but we made extensive use of the vision's watering truck both before during the lift. Despite these pred tions, dust was a problem. For the f time in two weeks the wind tool notion not to blow, and dust clo would not dissipate. One port was clared temporarily unsafe until we re-watered it, an operation that requi about ten minutes of precious time. T was one of the unforeseen "bugs" in control system, even though in itsel did not invalidate the system. Dust stop about six trips from the one p but fortunately not until we had patched the entire security elements K Company. But there were other lays.

At one port, one of the men from Company fell while moving to his sl He was so heavily laden that he co



Sketch 2. The layout of assembly area, loading stations, and heliports. Note t the helicopter did not have to fly over the heads of the troops.

recover by himself, and the men ady in the ship had to unload and) him in. This delay of some thirty nds beyond normal loading time enough to allow the other three s to clear the area, and the pattern n was disrupted. Still later, one developed engine trouble and was ed out of action, knocking out one he groups of four. The only other dent worth mentioning was the fail- of the radio of one of the ships. The then had to guess where he was posed to land. Suffice it to say that lid not always guess correctly.

espite these intrusions on our plans, flexibility of the system itself pro- d the cushion needed for recovery all temporary disruptions. It was e than apparent that every phase of operation had been carefully learned every man in the battalion. The light of the entire exercise, in my ion, was the high state of enthusiasm vn by all of the men and officers. one man balked at the idea of flying ese contrivances, and some of those ssarily left behind wished that some e principals would break their legs need replacements. Fortunately, ever, there was not a single injury ng the double move of 600 men— bute to the planning and execution e exercise by both the Infantry and Transportation Battalions. It was very well done.

MMARIES are oftentimes anti-cli- actic, but there are times when ation of salient points is effective. I stated at the outset, too many cial assumptions and conditions had made to allow a workable exercise. limitations imposed by approaches downdrafts prevented our testing r prepared defense sector, and our were far from the worst in Korea. test was unrealistic, and I do not ve that helicopters could have been satisfactorily in the mission under l combat conditions.

e learned, during development of lans, that the optimum flying dis- for these machines, when they make several trips each, was about minutes. But we still needed wo hours to move an understrength ion in less than a twenty-minute round. Trucks could have done ob more satisfactorily and, above ould have given us the use of the which we sacrificed so completely g the move.

ally, if the enemy has air superiori- even if he has only the capability ew successful sorties, a mass move by helicopter may well be doomed to failure. The noise of these ships cannot be kept secret, and if coupled with a dust cloud such as we had there would be no doubt about what was happening. It is true that vehicles make noise and stir up dust, but vehicles and personnel can stop and disperse. A helicopter, once airborne, is a slow vehicle with no place to go but down. The hunters of war are not so sportsmanlike that they wouldn't shoot down choppers like so many sitting ducks. During the exercise it was evident even to a novice that one high- or low-speed aircraft could have seriously crippled the entire battalion.

None of what I have written is intended to deny that there are great and perhaps unexplored uses for helicopter movement, but not in the small segment of the field we tried. I have, therefore, two recommendations. An extensive manual should be prepared and published for guidance in the operational planning of helicopter movements. Using that manual as a basis, all infantry units should be given the opportunity to participate in the planning and execution of such a move so that they can determine for themselves the difficulties and intricacies involved in this form of transportation.



A 57mm recoilless rifle is swiftly unloaded at the airhead

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OVER THE ROAD

To Pool Or Not to Pool

. . . Organic Vehicle

CAPTAIN AVERY E. KOLB

THEY'RE feudin', fightin' and fussin' again over the merits of taking some organic vehicles away from combat units and pooling them on the division level.

It's an old and always lively feud between the proponents of mobility and economy. They've fussed over it many times in the past, but they never seem to reach an agreeable compromise.

The latest encounter began last year when General Maxwell D. Taylor ordered a series of transportation tests to be conducted by the Eighth Army. Preliminary results were so impressive that Eighth Army continued the tests. ACofS, G3 is in on it and so is OCAFF and the service schools. It's coming up in scheduled maneuvers and in Europe the 43d Division tested it.

General Taylor's tests grew out of earlier combat actions in Korea. From the time in July 1950 when the 24th Division got itself "road blocked" at Taejon, and subsequently as reports of "vehicle ambushes" and "road-bound columns" were received almost daily from the fronts, planning staffs posed a serious question on troop bility: *were our forces being immobili by their own transport vehicles?*

Faced with the bewildering para of having an abundance of vehicles little transportation capability, the c bat commanders resorted to their c devices. At first many vehicles w abandoned and troops took to foot. L some vehicles were pooled and forr into provisional truck units. The Eig Army continued the practice on a l ited scale throughout most of the c paign. Then, in early 1953, Gen Taylor sought to formalize this exp ence in two carefully developed tra portation tests.

As a civilian employee in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, CAPTAIN AVERY E. KOLB, Transportation Corps, USAR, is in a position to keep our readers posted on developments in motor transportation. He does this very well, not only because of his proximity to his subject matter but because he has a nose for news and can scent out a story hidden in reams of official reportage.

In the 2d Division test a large num- r of organic vehicles were withdrawn d a Transportation Truck Battalion ıs added to the division. In the 45th vision test, organic vehicles were or- nized into regimental pools and placed der the operational control of the Divi- n Transportation Officer. Results of th tests were striking—indicating that ıfth to a third of organic vehicles could eliminated from the division without lucing over-all mobility and effective- ss. Combat commanders at all levels :eed that substantial economies had ɜn achieved; but many of their com- ·nts reflected the sentiment: "For d's sake don't let this happen."

With rare objectivity and fairness, the ;hth Army forwarded its complete dings and comments of commanders and down the line. General Taylor t that his original contention had been ne out. But he conceded that the rean situation was not one on which base a final conclusion, and recom- nded that similar tests be undertaken ɔther theaters.

ORE than a decade ago the War De- partment was concerned with econ- y and greater utilization of motor ısport in the infantry division. Dur- field exercises for the reorganization he division from 1937 to 1939 motor ısport was one of the items given :ial attention.

As a result of the lessons of these rcises the late General Lesley J. Mc- ir recommended streamlined combat ts which would be limited to trans- t equipment required for quick, de- ve action. Vehicles needed only oc- onally by the units would be pooled ıigher headquarters and kept under stant commitment to the most urgent sions.

ut McNair found he was up against ething as big as custom. And with a on, economy took a back seat to the ıand of commanders for command grity and organizational self-suffi- cy. In 1942 General George C. shall wrote that he felt division sportation was extravagant and "rep- nted what the commanders asked for er than over-all requirements." Mc- r agreed and attributed the excesses chiefs of arms and services seeking ily and thinking narrowly, to field manders who seek to make their s too self-contained, and to an over- ılgent War Department."

oposed revisions in the infantry divi- in 1943 would have reduced organic cles to approximately 450. But when news reached active theaters, commanders set up a howl. Even General Eisenhower objected to a major shuffle in division transport at such a critical time. The proposed reductions were not made.

ARGUMENTS pro and con in the matter of transportation pooling have parallels in all arguments involving "the pooling principle." Pooling is something almost anyone will agree is good—for the other fellow.

There is nothing which pleases the higher commander so much, nor galls the subordinate commander more, than the mere mention of pooling. Whether it involves typewriters, special weapons, or trucks, the higher commander sees in pooling the answer to his wish for finger-tip control, coordination of effort, and economy of means. The subordinate commander, on the other hand, sees pooling as an evil designed to take away his most valued possessions—his command prerogative and the integrity of his unit. And it is not unusual that the commander who fights hardest against pooling at a higher level is the first to force it on subordinate units within his own command.

Whether you agree or disagree with the pooling idea depends, to a great extent, on where you happen to be sitting and the direction you happen to be facing, at the time.

Perhaps in this as in most things the answer lies somewhere between the two extremes. It is a tribute to their objectivity that neither McNair, Marshall, nor Taylor advocated *complete* transportation pooling. Nor has anyone sought to deny the tactical commander what he requires to achieve his mission. Differences of opinion have been entirely over the *degree* to which pooling should be applied and the *manner* in which transportation service could be best furnished.

THE first "Truck Battalion Test, Korea" was conducted by the 2d Infantry Division between 18 May and 16 August 1953. The 69th Transportation Truck Battalion, consisting of three truck companies with a total of 180 cargo trucks, was attached to the 2d Division for the test. At that time a compensating number of organic vehicles (192) were withdrawn. Additional vehicles were withdrawn from the division as the test progressed and the ability of the truck battalion was demonstrated. The maximum number withdrawn reached 425 before the battalion began to feel the pinch.

The 90-day period covered phases during which the division was in reserve (56 days); in combat on a defensive position (15 days); and withdrawing to new defense line (19 days). Division artillery and the tank battalion were engaged during the entire 90 days. One regiment was committed to combat 27 days. Throughout the test the majority of all cargo transport was furnished by the truck battalion. Even so, there remained some unused truck capability except when the division was called upon to furnish ammo transport to army during limited periods of heavy fighting. Generally, truck requirements were less during combat than when the division was in reserve.

The division reported that when a truck battalion of 180 task vehicles was attached, 334 trucks could be safely withdrawn. This is a net saving of 154. Based on the price of an M211 truck with one year's supply of spare parts ($9,975.00) this saving in dollars amounted to $1,536,150. Were this extended to existing Army divisions worldwide, savings in vehicle costs alone might be more than twenty million dollars.

Manpower savings were not fully evaluated. The division stated that when 334 vehicles were removed only 447 men were withdrawn. But this ratio of personnel to vehicles withdrawn (1.3 to 1) did not take into consideration other man-hour savings in vehicle repair and service, nor the additional man-hours provided units by relieving men of what had been dual MOS functions.

The fact that there was an excess mobility during the test led to the belief that even further savings might be possible, and Eighth Army recommendation for further tests was partly based on the belief that it might be possible to determine the minimum rather than an optimum number of cargo vehicles for divisions.

By and large, division staff was pleased with the results of the test. Regimental commanders, understandably, preferred to keep control of their vehicles. Corps commanders were of mixed opinions and felt some compromise or alternate solution might be worked out.

THE second test was conducted by the 45th Division. It got off on a different footing from the 2d Division's test because X Corps proposed and got approved an alternate plan.

Truck platoons were organized below division level—three per service company in regiment, two in the tank battalion, and four in the Quartermaster company. These platoons were "housed" in their home units but were under the operational control of the Division Trans-

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The Pros and Cons Exchange Views

In adjoining columns below, statements extracted from comments of various commanders engaged in the tests are arranged to indicate the general tenor of arguments on both sides of the question.

The number of vehicles presently authorized in the infantry division may be considerably reduced if the cargo trucks are pooled and centrally controlled.

The centralization of transport reduces the ability of the battalion commanders and the regimental commanders to carry out their tactical mission with the speed and assurance that is provided by organic transportation.

There are too many organic vehicles in the present infantry regiment. This places demands on the time of the tactical commander for administrative action which could be better devoted to training and operations.

The units of a division have already been squeezed dry of all equipment and personnel which do not contribute to over-all killing power of the division.

A vehicle, like a gun, is not contributing to the destruction of the enemy when it is in reserve. It has been a well-established fact for many years that the most effective use of transportation is through pooling.

The present allocation of vehicles and personnel has been determined as a minimum allotment necessary to support and operate the division in general combat operations.

As a result of combat operations in Korea it is apparent that the infantry division has many more cargo vehicles than are required and that the control of such vehicles is dissipated throughout the division.

Combat operations in Korea have emphasized again the great importance of tactical flexibility at battalion and regimental levels.

The flexibility of the division is increased by centralized control since all cargo transportation can be readily utilized to accomplish the predominant mission existing at the time.

The pooling principle could deprive other units of transportation, while the main effort is being supported.

However, there are compensations and improvisations which experience and training could provide. For example, restoration of the lost art of shuttling.

But this imposes a serious maintenance threat, as the vehicles present are forced to remain on the road continually without benefit of rotation and proper maintenance.

The elimination of excess cargo vehicles will reduce the personnel and matériel required to support these vehicles, thus implementing practical economy measures.

Command control of transportation (as well as other military means) and resultant operational efficiency is worth much more than the incidental economy resulting from a centralized transportation system in the division.

Firepower in the division is effectively and centrally controlled by the division commander through his artillery commander. Engineer support is effectively controlled for the commander by the division engineer. It follows that there is a possibility of improving logistical support and mobility by centralizing some of the organic vehicles of the division in a battalion organization under a division transportation officer.

The present system of pooling of motor vehicles at all levels under the existing T/O&E provides an effective and efficient means to centralize transportation when so required.

A T/O&E Transportation Truck Battalion is a logistical type unit to perform the mission of supplying the general cargo transport for a division.

The introduction of a division transportation truck battalion would require a change in the fundamental concept for the operation and support of the infantry division.

The economies which are possible Army-wide are of such magnitude as to make desirable a re-examination of the basic doctrines of the infantry division in the field of mobility.

The tests were inconclusive.

portation Officer. Division artillery not participate in the test.

Upon the completion of reorgan tion, vehicles determined to be exc were administratively parked and tal out of use. Although only 99 vehi were taken out of use, this really r resented some 106 vehicles because division was short about seven vehic

The test covered a 90-day period ginning in late August and ending November. During this time the vision was in a static, non-combat uation. However, winter supply a construction requirements caused an usually heavy transportation load.

Reports submitted at 30-day interv indicate that "all division transportat requirements were successfully m Regimental commanders without exc tion were pleased with the success of exercise, but the artillery comman looking on as an observer, decided would not have worked for him. At end of the last period the division c cluded that "this test has proved t centralized control and pooling of tra portation has provided greater flexibi . . . increased mobility of subordin units . . . and more efficient utilizat of general purpose vehicles." Howev the test was not conclusive because the nature of the division mission the time, and because artillery was included.

WHEN any proposition is so clea split down the middle as this, chances of compromise become less li ly. Prejudice swings the pendulum fr one side to the other, seldom pausing the halfway mark. And having swu so far to the side of total organic r bility in the past, it will not be surp ing to see it cling there. Or go other direction all the way.

The tactical unit commander, up whom the ultimate benefits or grief fall, might buy the pooling idea if could be sure he would get the tra portation he needs at the place and ti he needs it. After all, his main conc is with what's in front of him. there is little by way of past experie upon which he can base such faith others to provide his essential mobili

The Transportation Corps, last of technical services to secure troop r resentation in combat divisions, a stood to gain or lose by the ultimate cision. Silently, and with fingers cross the Corps stood by to await results, c fident that were it given the opportun it had the know-how, the people, a the organization to give the tactical co mander the kind of service he expec

Here's Why, Sergeant Bowles

(Continued from Cover 2)

Vhy don't they issue OVM books with ks and other vehicles that have a ge number of OVM items? This way could tell what you received with vehicle, and what was turned in. hould always be with the vehicle.

The Ordnance Corps ships with each vehicle a Type 7 SNL catalog listing items of OVM applicable to that vehicle, a packing list showing the Ordnance 7 items shipped and a technical manual showing the application of each item. Property accounting regulations require maintenance of records of vehicles and OVM, by item, in the Company Property Book; thus, this book affords a suitable record of property turned in.

Vhy don't they have a special stock ord card for unserviceable property ounts, one that would have columns show the accountable officer what is he shop, what is in the laundry, and at is on hand at all times?

The Department of the Army system for ready identification as to location of unserviceable items is as follows: "When supplies are determined to be repairable by a classification officer or repair shop at the station the supplies will be recorded on the accountable station supply officer's unserviceable property record and the supplies forwarded on a hand receipt to the shop for repair and return. When repaired and returned, the supplies will be transferred from the unserviceable property record to the regular stock record account by the use of turn-in slips." This method shows where unserviceable items are located with a minimum of record-keeping.

Vhy don't they drop all mess person- and equipment from line company &Es and form such personnel and ipment as a Mess Platoon in the dquarters and Service Company?

This proposal was included in a recent study by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces Committee to determine areas in which personnel savings could be made in the active Army. The proposal was rejected for the following reasons: (1) Implementing this area of savings would have a serious effect upon units during combat operations and would not be feasible in many units which are normally widely dispersed. (2) The mess facilities of most installations would require modification to adequately provide for battalion size messes. This question is being reconsidered. The feasibility of using consolidated messes during combat operations will be field tested during the division exercises that are to be conducted next spring.

Vhy don't they have a pin-on type insignia for enlisted men? Think he sore thumbs and cussing this ld save.

The matter of the use of detachable enlisted insignia is presently under study. This study is primarily concerned with the need for insignia suited to direct exchange of garments in the combat zone and the use of organizational garments such as medical whites, cooks' whites, etc. The use of the traditional sew-on chevrons is considered particularly appropriate for those garments that will remain permanently with the individual. The comment relative to sore thumbs is not considered valid.

hy don't they have a system where nizational clothing and equipment ld be set up in sets and marked with company letter and set number in- of the individual laundry marks? type equipment passes hands sev- times during its service. And it's to re-mark some of it.

Those items affected by this suggestion, if adopted, are the very ones that should be returned to the individual after cleaning (for example the coat, field). The use of company numbers would not result in any significant change in markings required nor contribute to the lessening of administrative workload in the units.

hy don't they issue a Table of Al- nces to show the number of tools orized for so many vehicles instead suing tool sets? This would make etter accounting of tools.

The components of Ordnance tool sets are listed in J series SNLs. Inclusion of line items comprising tool sets in T/As would result in such a voluminous publication that the intent of a T/A would be defeated. However, where complete tool sets are not required, individual tools are shown in lieu thereof of the respective T/A.

ny don't they do away with the marks and overseas bars? A guy gets all that stuff sewed on looks walking mass of stripes.

One of the approved principles governing the Army uniform is: "Ornamentation of the Army uniform should be carefully reviewed and those trimmings that detract from the concept of a distinctive and dignified uniform should be eliminated." This review is currently in progress and will specifically encompass the above suggestion.

ny don't they let enlisted men use D card as identification while on in place of the Class "A" pass? of the typing, signatures, and r this would save.

ID cards are issued for the sole purpose of identification of the individual. Possession of this card in no way indicates that the bearer has authority to be absent from his place of duty. The ID card is issued to all individuals whereas only a select group are authorized class A passes. The commander responsible for issuing passes would lose all control if such a suggestion were adopted.

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THE MONTH'S READING

Mobility

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ROBERT T. STEVENS
Address at St. Louis, Mo.

If our Army forces are to achieve maximum mobility it is essential that we have the capability of quickly transporting them and their equipment long distances by air. Extensive planning and intensive training have carried us far along the road toward that goal. Our airborne troops have reached a high degree of effectiveness. Progress has also been made in developing techniques and procedures for aerial delivery of military loads far beyond that believed possible in World War II. In addition, assault type aircraft have been developed which are capable of air-landing our combat troops without the benefit of prepared air strips or runways. This progress has placed our Army on the threshold of a degree of strategic and battlefield mobility unparalleled in military history. I use the word "threshold" advisedly because these great advances have given us a tremendous potential rather than great actual capability today. In some cases we are barred from crossing the threshold because the necessary amounts and types of aircraft are not presently available. Of course, this is an inter-Service problem on which we are constructively working with the Air Force.

Germs of a War

SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY
The Origins of the World War
The Macmillan Company, 1937

No less important would be the analysis of that complex force which first began to be a powerful, disruptive agency during the French Revolution, and which steadily gathered strength for a century and a quarter, which we call "nationalism." This in turn is closely bound up with psychological and political questions of race, religion, democracy, education, and popular prejudice. Still more important, in many minds, as underlying causes of [World War I] are the intricate political and economic problems which have arisen from the transformation of society during the past hundred years by the modern industrial system which began in England and subsequently penetrated more or less all the great countries of the world—problems of excess population, food supply, foreign markets and raw materials, colonial possessions, and the accumulation of capital seeking investment abroad. Finally, the influence of the newspaper press is a factor much greater than commonly supposed in causi [World War I]. For decades it fed the constant und currents of irritation of one country against another, and its clamor and misrepresentations often made difficult or possible the peaceful settlement of sources of conflict. H far government officials controlled newspaper opinion, a how far they themselves were hampered in their freedom action by it, is a subject which greatly needs further care historical investigation. Obviously, no single volume hope to deal thoroughly with all these complex and in related factors which constitute the underlying causes [World War I]. They may be conveniently grouped un five heads: (a) the system of secret alliances; (b) militari (c) nationalism; (d) economic imperialism; and (e) ne paper press.

Atomic Survival

Bulletin of the Atomic Scien
September 1954

The admonition "When you strike at a king, you st to kill," has obviously been adopted by our nation's c defense planners. It bears out the conclusions reached Project East River.

It is the knock-out nature of a nuclear attack which ma the A-bomb such a revolutionary weapon. Any doubt wh anyone had about the striking power of the A-bomb solves into thin air when one considers the awesome portions of thermonuclear weapons effects.

While Federal Civil Defense Administration assumes possibility of an initial devastating blitz, other governm agencies have been slow to wake up to its terrifying nificance. A lightning blow coming out of the blue c pletely invalidates all of America's mobilization concept applied in the past two world wars. The Military Est lishment is faced with the prospect of fighting out of in tory.

Should the United States be subjected to the smash impact of a nuclear blitz upon its heartland, it would itself face to face with the problem of sheer survival. S denly everything might become reduced to personal mentals—food, shelter, and medical attention. All would be secondary and almost irrelevant. Our Strat Air Command, if its bases were operable, might pound Soviet homeland with hundreds and even thousands of

r weapons but the sorest need would focus upon the cal condition of the home base. There is some indication, it rather indirect, that some government officials are nning to be aware of the huge liability present in the nerability of our home base. More and more, high policy have to consider this weakest link in our national urity.

uerrillas and Communism

IRWIN R. BLACKER (Editor)
Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas
Simon & Schuster, 1954

'he contemporary implications of guerrilla warfare are nendous. The Communists have long recognized its ie. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin all studied and te about it. The clandestine mind, the small cell struc-, the absolute discipline, and Russia as a base for sup-s and haven in the event of defeat have made the Com-nist guerrilla a dangerous force in the world. Ruthless is disregard of reprisals against civilian populations and ing nothing in the way of property to lose, he has not tated to take the field when assured of a sympathetic, tral, or vacillating civilian population. By the close of rld War II arms in great quantity had been dropped Europe. Less than twenty percent of these have been ied in to the governments where Communist partisans rated. Thus an armed and organized guerrilla force of e size is prepared to fight in any European war.

n the Far East the Chinese have emigrated in great nbers into almost every country of Asia, taking with them r own secret societies, of which the Communist is the est and best organized. And no group in history has zed guerrilla warfare as effectively as Mao Tse-tung's nese Communists.

However, in the past, guerrilla warfare has been an instru-it in the fight for freedom against tyranny and occupa-. The people of the satellite countries of Europe and , if given intelligent guidance and adequate arms, may in guerrilla action against the Communists.

arch in the Jungle

COL. R. W. VOLCKMANN
We Remained
W. W. Norton & Co., 1954

ixth Army Headquarters turned out to be on the exact where I had started the war with the 11th Infantry three years before. I reported to Colonel Frank alee, and after turning my reports over to him I asked if ght clean up a bit. After a shower and shave I put on shly-starched uniform I had brought along for the occa-. The uniform was handmade by a Chinese tailor, some Australian cloth that had been sent in to us by narine. Frank's mouth dropped open; "First damned hed uniform I've seen in the Southwest Pacific for ths!" he exclaimed. I explained that I had served under eral Krueger before and remembered what a stickler he was for appearance, so I had come prepared. "Yeah," Frank replied, "but what an example to set, and after being stranded on this island for over three years to boot!"

After meeting General Eddleman (G-3), Colonel White (G-2), and General Decker, Deputy Commander, I was taken to General Krueger's office. I turned out my smartest salute and shook hands with the General, wondering all the time whether he remembered me as the lieutenant who had served under him years before. I didn't have long to wonder, for the first thing he said was: "Well, Volckmann, did your two years in the 2nd Division do you any good?" I was taken quite by surprise, but managed to get out a very emphatic, "Yes, sir!"

Soldiers and Scientists

THEODORE H. WHITE
The Reporter
23 September 1954

Science and war have been partners since the beginning of history—or at least since Archimedes was chief consultant at the siege of Syracuse. But the partnership of U.S. science and defense since the war has created peculiar problems.

In a large sense, our military tradition has been blessed in having known no Clausewitzes, no Napoleons, no Douhets. Long on riflemen, artillery, and logistics, it has been short on theorists of war. With the exception of a few oddities such as Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and General George Patton (an intellectual of combat in spite of his pistol-packing flamboyance), the senior soldiers and sailors of America have been stolidly unfascinated by the fancies of master military intellects. They have been pragmatists, craftsmen at combat, rarely absorbed as scholars by the higher relations of strategy, policy, and society. Ours has been a sound but unintellectual defense tradition.

Like American scientists of an earlier age, the American soldier reflected an American system of education whose chief concern was with technique, how to make things work. Down to a much later period than the scientists, the soldiers were unprepared to ask the fundamental questions of their craft.

Into this vacuum at the end of the war moved the scientists, dangling weapons and models of weapons yet to come that would revolutionize combat, and promising further sweeping changes. But they came not like the previous purveyors of ordnance, with merely a better gun, a better ship, or a better plane. They came with ideas about how to use the weapons. Some were naïve, some were arrogant; collectively, however, they carried with them the ferment of new strategies, even new philosophies, of combat.

The military, scarcely understanding some of the instruments but vaguely aware that in this new magnitude of weapons new instruction should be sought, set up about themselves diffuse constellations of panels, consultant committees, and advisory boards staffed with as many brilliant scientists as they could find. "Some of the guys at the Pentagon," said one observer, "went around collecting scientists like butterflies—they all wanted the flashiest collection of brains for their branch."

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Two branches with two missions, Field and Antiaircraft Artillery, were integrated. The result: lower standards of training, wasted time, effort, money, real estate, ammunition, and personnel.

It Seemed Like A Good Idea

COLONEL ROBERT F. HALLOCK

THE attempt to integrate field and antiaircraft artillery was an illogical and unnecessary step, but there is no need to worry now about the single arm with one collar insignia. At the same time, we must avoid the great waste involved in trying to train all artillery officers for all artillery specialties. Before the mists of antiquity close in, let's see how they became integrated, how it has worked, and what we ought to do now.

In World War II it became SOP to attach to each division one AAA automatic weapons battalion for air and ground defense and support of ground offense. This battalion needed a supervisory headquarters, and so, for want of a better solution, it was assigned to the division artillery headquarters.

This setup caused no particular trouble. Meanwhile, corps artillery headquarters came into existence. They found that they had divisional AAA units under their supervision and then began using AAA gun units effectively in the field artillery role. This led to the concept of corps antiaircraft artillery, and such units appeared in OCAFF's post-war document, "Type Field Army."

Since it had now been established, at least to the satisfaction of some, that division artillery and corps artillery headquarters must command both field and antiaircraft artillery units, a comparable army artillery headquarters seemed to be required. This organization also appeared in the "Type Field Army."

About this time guided missile work began to show great promise. If a missile could be made to hit an aircraft in flight, it looked as if it should be simple to make it hit a fixed target or even a moving terrestrial or waterborne target. Maybe this would be the all-purpose artillery weapon!

Shortly after World War II there was great pressure to save personnel and funds and to release unnecessary real estate. The artillery part of the solution appeared obvious. Since these two artillery arms were inextricably intertwined anyway, why not make them into one? Combine the two schools and save great quantities of time, people, effort, and money.

And the clincher was the specious question, "They both shoot cannon, don't they?"

DEPLOYMENT of automatic weapons for air defense requires judgment and both tactical and technical skill; but the real key to their effectiveness lies in the practiced hands, eyes, and nerves of the members of the gun squads. In the surface role, these weapons are in the same category as machine gu recoilless rifles, and mortars. We l machine gun battalions in World V I. It is time that AAA automatic we ons follow the path of these early chine guns and be issued as individ weapons to units that need them fire against air or surface targets.

There is no need for corps antiaircr units. Enemy aircraft crews are un pressed by our corps boundaries. defense must be organized to prot targets in areas of great depth and wid and the job is best done at army or hi er echelons.

Nor is there any need for an ar field-and-antiaircraft artillery headqu ters or an army field artillery headqu ters. Army antiaircraft units work un brigade command. When used in surface role, they are either attach to an appropriate headquarters or, m likely, are assigned a mission of su port or reinforcement. The best exc for an army field artillery headquart is the existence of the Corporal bat ion. But the Corporal's great range built in to permit it to reach the enem rear areas, not to permit it to be plac in *our* rear areas. The corps has t necessary survey, communication, a command structure to handle t Corporal; and in the face of t threat of guerrilla warfare, a po tion in the corps zone may well the most secure. Determination targets for the Corporal is comp rable to determination of targ for tactical air forces and shou be done at JOC. A good soluti is to attach the battalion to co and to retain any necessary e ments of control at army hea quarters. Similar comments app to the 280mm gun battalio

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COLONEL ROBERT F. HALLOCK, Artillery, has been intimately concerned with both artillery arms since 1946. He writes: "I haven't met a working artilleryman for the past four years who disagreed with these opinions." He is a 1923 graduate of the Military Academy.

ıer field artillery units, including nest John, remain directly under army ımand only briefly, in transit to or n corps or while re-training or re-ıipping. They get necessary super-on from the army field artillery staff ion.

Guided missiles fall into two distinct es: the surface-to-surface missile and surface-to-air missile. There are or differences in their structures, heads, guidance systems, and many er features. Of course the SAM can used against terrestrial targets, but problem of control is not as simple t appears. Such use generally is in-ient and wasteful, and should be sidered an emergency measure only.

VE we saved time, effort, person-ıel, troops, matériel, ammunition, estate, or money? In general the vers are negative. Dual training has osed heavy extra costs. The schools ort Sill and Fort Bliss still exist and ı are having a hard time expanding dly enough to keep up with their l. Both need more acreage, person-buildings, and ammunition. Finding aircraft units for Fort Sill and field lery units for Fort Bliss as school ps has been a continual problem. axiomatic that no officer is ever as ert in his duties as he would like to and that the more subjects he must w the less complete his knowledge be in any one. The recent Army d Forces study on "The Enlisted S Structure of the Army" stressed need to define narrowly and precise-ıe area of training required of each er to avoid the waste of over-train-Yet now we require officers to at-ot to cope with two lifetime profes-.

ave we increased battlefield effec-ıess? Again, on the record to date, ınswer is no. In spite of great t by many agencies at all lev-or some eight years to accom-field artillery training of ircraft officers and vice versa, to give dual training to new ers, we still have few officers are trained to an acceptable ee in both subjects. It is self-nt that officers who have only attering of knowledge of the ıess of an artillery battalion, or antiaircraft, should not be ıed important duties therein ıg a tough fight; yet such of-were assigned to units repeat-during the Korean war. Ob-ns were met with comments 'They're all artillerymen now. They're supposed to know their jobs." It is not melodramatic to state that use of such officers cost lives—sometimes their own, often others'.

THE Army is organized by branches. Each branch is established to perform a necessary basic function. Obviously there are many techniques and equipments which are common to several or all branches. For example, cannon are used by various branches as well as other services. The question is: what are the basic missions to be performed and what does it take to get them done?

The antiaircraftsman must keep his attention focused overhead. He must know the enemy air force, its strength, location, composition, characteristics, identification, techniques, and capabilities, both present and future. He must work intimately with the friendly air force and know it in even more detail, to include its plans and operations. Except for his own local protection, his only interest in other nearby friendly forces is their priority for commitment of his air defense means.

The field artilleryman must concentrate his attention on the infantry and armor he supports and what's in front of them. He must immerse himself in their problems. He must know them and their situation and plans intimately, in the greatest detail and up to the minute. He must foresee what they are going to be up against in the future. He must know the enemy in his front and adjacent areas, and must be unrelenting in his search for surface targets.

What is our mission? Here is the meat of the whole matter. How often we have heard the old rule, "You may forget your best friend, your name, or anything else, but never forget your mission." And it was never "missions." To train people to turn handwheels and angles, to set dials and frequencies, to make mathematical computations, to issue proper orders, and to maintain and operate all the other complex machinery of an artillery unit requires time and attention, but it does not constitute fulfillment of an artillery mission. These things are mechanical, or at best a science. There remain the arts of artillery warfare, which can be learned only by long experience and which can be summarized only in statements of the artillery missions. Try to prepare a single statement of the mission of the field-and-antiaircraft artillery! If the artilleryman has not forgotten his mission, certainly his attention to it has been diluted by the assignment of a second, incompatible one.

ONE other situation is worth examination. As the air battle in World War II swung in our favor, certain antiaircraft artillery and other units were converted and retrained as effective field artillery units. This experience may seem to support the need for cross-training of field and antiaircraft artillery officers. It would be nice if everybody knew everything, but where shall we draw the line? Antiaircraft artillery units were also converted to units of various other branches. Infantrymen too were urgently needed. Who can say that in the next war we may not face an urgent and sudden need for more armor, helicopter, truck, engineer or signal units and fewer of something else than we had planned? We must plan for the future as accurately as is humanly possible and as resources permit, and meet unforeseen contingencies as they arise. Fortunately there is always a reservoir of branch-trained officers in branch-immaterial assignmnets, and surplus branch-trained officers can likewise be used to fill such jobs.

FIELD ARTILLERY officers must be thoroughly and completely trained for their duties, and antiaircraft officers for theirs. All officers should be familiar with both specialties, as they are with other branches. "This is "nice-to-know" training, and should be done as opportunity permits. As individual officers now attend schools of other branches and are detailed for duty in branches other than their own, so selected artillery officers should be cross-trained for special future assignments. Individual records must continue to show specific qualifications, and assignments must be based thereon.

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. . . Only a well trained leader could keep a patrol on its toes every second. The penalty for inattention to details of training was likely to be death in a guerrilla ambush . . .

Huk Hunting

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LUIS A. VILLA-REAL

LIBERATION from the Japanese and the establishment of the Republic were glorious events that made the year 1946 one of bright promise for Filipinos. While some of that promise has been realized in the eight years that have passed, it was long delayed and obstructed by an armed Communist conspiracy that terrorized and divided the people, and threatened the stability of the young republic.

Early in the Japanese occupation the Socialists and Communists formed a coalition to lead guerrilla resistance against the invader. Jap-sniping became a patriotic duty and almost every Filipino was or wanted to be a guerrilla. A rifle and ammunition were treasures hidden carefully until an opportunity arose to use them against the Japanese.

Led by Luis Taruc, the Communists soon wrested the coalition leadership from the Socialists, following which they sought to gain control of all anti-Japanese guerrilla groups. By the middle of 1 the Hukbalahaps (People's Army Fi ing the Japanese), or Huks as they ca themselves, actually were fighting op against guerrilla groups not under C munist control. This internal war seriously weakened the overall guer effort against the Japanese on Luzon

After the liberation, the Commu began to exploit post-war poverty economic troubles, especially in the fa ing areas. For purposes of agitation propaganda, the Communists pointe the serious shortages of seed, draft mals, and farm implements.

Before long the Hukbong Magp laya ng Bayan (People's Liberat Army), or the HMBs, as they now named their military organization, making increasing use of terroristic tivities to undermine the people's fidence in the strength and stabilit their new government.

By 1951 about 10,000 well armed g rillas, supported and led by well ganized local Communists, had con trated mostly in an area north and of Manila. When local police and stabulary could cope no longer with expanding guerrilla movement the P ippine Army was called in.

Each of the battalion combat te (BCTs) formed for the anti-guer operations had a full T/O strength 1,047 officers and enlisted men. Nor

Part of the worldwide communist conspiracy. Luis M. Taruc, head of the People's Liberation Army (HUK), surrounded by his guerrilla followers.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LUIS A. VI REAL, Philippine Army, is the Ar Forces attaché of the Philippine Re lic to Madrid. An artilleryman, he fo the Huks for several years as a batta and regimental commander. Sev years ago he was a student at Fort

these BCTs operated at about 70 per nt of that strength. The BCTs were ganized into a headquarters and head-arters company, a service company, a onnaissance company, three rifle com-nies, a heavy weapons company, and ield artillery battery, the members of ich could be used also as riflemen. so included were an intelligence sec-n, a psychological warfare section, and nedical and dental detachment.

Attached to the BCTs, under the erational control of the S2, were mili-y intelligence service teams, each com-ed of one officer and seven to twelve isted men. These teams, with order battle records, terrain data, and re-ed intelligence, were assigned perma-ntly to designated areas, and were ached to the BCTs in or nearest to h area.

IE Army began its task by dividing ne known areas of HMB sympathy sector commands, each having a ll tactical headquarters. Depending the situation, two or more battalion nbat teams were assigned or attached each sector command throughout the on.

n organizing logical combat sectors provinces of Pampanga and Bulacan e formed into the PAMBUL Sector. acan Province borders in the south Rizal Province, in which lies Manila. h Pampanga and Bulacan Provinces der also in the south on Manila Bay form an area the approximate center which lies some thirty miles generally h of Manila (*see map*).

AMBUL Sector can be divided geo-hically into three distinct areas: two ntainous and one flat and swampy. eastern area, in Bulacan Province, ominated by the Sierra Madre Moun-s, a series of rugged, wooded ranges ning generally north and south and nding eastward through Tayabas vince to the Pacific Ocean. In the lie the Zambales Mountains, an lly rugged north-south chain which along the west central coast of the d. Between the two ranges are situ-the fertile plains of Luzon, the hern portion of which form the cen-f the PAMBUL Sector.

the north center of the sector the daba Swamp spreads some ten miles orth-south length along the eastern of the Pampanga River. To the west of the swamp, immediately of the Chico River, Mount Arayat, e volcanic cone, rises approximately feet above sea level. East of the p, rice paddies extend to the foot-of the Sierra Madres.

The Candaba Swamp area, considered strategically the most important part of the sector, provided the HMBs with excellent cover and concealment as well as excellent sources of food. It was recognized that if the government forces attacked the swamp area the guerrillas could move westward into the Zambales area where supplies and crops were fairly plentiful. To the east, the Sierra Madres also would provide the guerrillas with excellent hiding places, with the added advantage that contact could be maintained through the mountains with HMB organizations in the north and south. If, however, the guerrilla forces were driven deep into the Sierra Madres they would encounter serious troubles, since there is considerable unexplored territory in that area.

HAVING evaluated strategically the three main areas within his jurisdiction, the PAMBUL Sector commander determined that had sufficient troops been available it would have been preferable to launch a series of simultaneous attacks in all three areas. However, with only three BCTs in his sector it was considered more practical to concentrate efforts on single areas in turn. Any other course of action would have required deployment of all three BCTs into a given area and would have left the other two areas open to guerrilla foraging attacks and probably to purely terroristic killing, burning, and looting.

At the peak of their strength the HMBs were known to have operated small ordnance shops deep in the Zambales Mountains where they repaired weapons and converted carbines into serviceable automatic weapons. In order therefore to destroy these ordnance shops and bases or to render them untenable, it was decided to attack the Zambales area first. Committing two of his three BCTs to this mission, the sector commander assigned the 3d the task of providing security in the remainder of the sector.

Operations were initiated in the Zambales area in August, 1952, with one BCT moving into the rugged mountain interior where it was resupplied completely by air throughout the period. The 2d BCT took up positions covering all possible escape routes along the perimeter of the operational area. Other escape routes to the west and south outside the limits of the PAMBUL Sector were covered by troops of adjacent sector commands.

Up to October 1952, when the Zambales operations were terminated, seventy enemy were killed or captured of an estimated 200. All known ordnance shops and dumps within the sector were destroyed. Having accomplished his purpose in the area, the sector commander turned his attention elsewhere.

Following a phased withdrawal from the Zambales area, BCT elements in the PAMBUL Sector were redeployed around Candaba Swamp where squad-size patrol activity was initiated. As the troop

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strength increased, the perimeter was extended to encompass the swamp. Operations were then restricted to the southern portion, with light security forces covering the remainder of the circle.

Shortly before Christmas, just prior to the launching of a coordinated attack by the government forces, Communist commanders began to realize that the Philippine Army buildup in the past two months had resulted in their being surrounded and cut off from their supply sources. HMB emissaries therefore requested a truce, presumably for the purpose of discussing peace terms. Accepting the proposals in good faith, the Sector commander ordered his troops withdrawn to a larger and more lightly held line around the swamp while the peace negotiations were being held.

It is significant to note that the HMB peace proposals were timed to coincide with the rice harvest and that the area from which the government troops were withdrawn was dotted with rice paddies. Immediately available to the nearly starved guerrillas, therefore, were these rich, ready-to-harvest rice fields. The Communists had gained an advantage.

They gained an additional advantage since the enlarged perimeter created unfavorable gaps between troop units, permitting ultimately most of the guerrilla forces to escape from the swamp area. By the time negotiations were broken off by the HMBs (after New Year's Day, 1953) most of the guerrillas had vanished, as had the Communist leaders and much of the local rice crop.

WHILE the HMBs at first appeared to have won in this clear example of Communist trickery, it soon became evident that the Army and the government really had gained the psychological advantage. The local population, especially those favorable to the Communist element, observed the contrast between the sincerity of the government forces and the obvious bad faith demonstrated by the HMBs.

During the negotiations it was believed that the Communist leaders were in the immediate vicinity, but all contact with them was lost after the negotiations were broken off. When subsequent intelligence reports developed that most of the guerrilla troops were located in the area between the swamp, Mount Arayat, and the foothills of the Zambales, preparations were undertaken for the next stage in the campaign.

The 1st Cavalry Squadron (Horse), which had been assigned to the PAMBUL Sector late in December, remained in the Candaba Swamp area, along with the 22d BCT, in order to secure this area. The 6th and 20th BCTs, with the bulk of the 17th BCT, deployed in stages into the Zambales Mountains-Mount Arayat-Candaba Swamp triangle and gradually intensified patrol actions designed to discover the location of the top HMB leaders.

Loudspeakers were frequently used to induce HUK guerrillas to surrender.

On 15 January 1953 the sector commander received word that new peace negotiations were to take place at Baliti, west of Mount Arayat. Consequently, the areas immediately west and southwest of this *barrio* were placed off limits to government forces.

Once again, top rebel leaders failed to take part personally in the negotiations, choosing instead to send representatives. The Communist demands proved to be as preposterous as they were transparent, and as the talks continued, bands of HMB guerrillas roamed unmolested through the off-limits area, gathering supplies within sight of government troops.

The negotiations, if they deserve to be termed as such, broke down completely and were discontinued on 3 Febru Although the whereabouts of the C munist leaders were not known defin ly, intelligence reports indicated t they had remained within the trian during the talks.

Because it was the home of one of HMB commanders and a known ce of HMB sympathy, the town of San L on the southwestern edge of the swa was thought to be the hiding place the Communist leaders. Also con ered as logical hiding places because favorable terrain and local sympa with the HMB cause were the area w of Angeles, in the Zambales foothi and Mount Arayat, at the north cor of the triangle.

WHEN PAMBUL Sector headquar was informed that a guerrilla he quarters courier had been trailed to *barrio* of Santa Cruz, near Mexico, t area was taken under surveillar Meanwhile, troops attacked a numbe possible hiding places within a f mile radius. By a process of eliminati the most likely location of the H headquarters was narrowed to Mount Arayat area.

On 2 April 1953 a guerrilla ni patrol was contacted under circu stances indicating that it had been touch with the Santa Cruz cour The direction in which the patrol mo supported the earlier deduction that HMB leaders were hiding in the de jungles of Mount Arayat.

Early on 4 April the 17th BCT oc pied positions blocking Communist cape routes along the trail connect Gatiawin and Pinagkasalan, south of hill, while elements of the 6th B moved in on the left flank of the 17 At 0500 hours on the same day the BCT attacked and searched thoroug the objective area.

Meanwhile, at Arenas an officer the 6th BCT's civil affairs unit learr that five HMBs were hiding in the fie between Arenas and the 6th's assa forces. Reserves searched the area a captured two men, one an HMB co mander and the other an organizer.

The captives disclosed the locati of the HMB headquarters on Mou Arayat. In addition, they revealed t a woman courier had brought fo clothing, and newspapers to Santa C from Manila on 2 April and that other courier and seven armed HM left the *barrio* that same day to carry items to their headquarters. This gro proved to be the patrol contacted elements of the 17th BCT that nig Following their interrogation, the pris

led government troops to the Com-
nist headquarters, only to find that
position had been abandoned a few
rs earlier.

: became necessary now to prevent
HMB leaders from escaping to the
lands, apparently since they had
ned of the capture of the two men.
: 6th and 17th BCTs, both rein-
ed, quickly established a 30,000-
l perimeter, blocking the area with
ries of strong points, from which
ols moved up the slopes of Mount
yat in daylight.

LLOWING a patrol clash east of
atiawin on the morning of 9 April,
rilla groups ranging in size from
e to forty men made several attempts
nfiltrate the perimeter, particularly
he western and southwestern slopes
Mount Arayat. Because all known
er points in the area were under
rnment control, it was assumed
the HMBs soon would be forced to
e a major breakthrough attempt in
r to alleviate a shortage of food
water.

n 10 April three companies of the
BCT occupied a line along the
hern and eastern slopes of Mount
at, where they were reinforced later
n additional rifle company. On 13
l six companies from the BATZAM
PAGAN Sectors were attached to
BUL Sector headquarters. On the
another battalion plus two com-
es were added to the sector's strength.
n 24 April elements of the 6th
and 1st Cavalry Squadron attacked
all enemy force near the *barrio* of
ia Vista, west of the mountain.
n guerrillas were killed and four
ired. Acting on information ob-
d from the captives, among whom
members of the HMB headquar-
security force, elements of the 6th
attacked a guerrilla camp where it
was thought the ranking leaders were bivouacked. Strong rear guard action, however, held off the government forces until the camp was evacuated.

On 29 April a guerrilla surrendered to the 22d BCT, and revealed that his group, comparable to a Philippine Army battalion cadre, was bivouacked on the northeast slope of Mount Arayat. Plans were made to attack this concentration, but this was abandoned subsequently in favor of a plan to reinforce the perimeter at the point where it was thought the guerrillas might attempt a breakthrough.

Before the line could be reinforced, a strong HMB force struck at the expected point. After inflicting heavy casualties on government units, the guerrillas succeeded in breaking through the line. No estimate of HMB casualties was made, since those killed or wounded evidently were carried on by their comrades.

It was impossible to determine whether the HMB leaders, whose capture was long the main objective of these operations, had escaped. Because troops patrolling behind the lines in the breakthrough area made no further contact, it was assumed that the entire Communist force had made its way safely across the Chico River, east of the hill. This would place the force in Nueva Ecija Province, which lay in another sector, ending for all intents and purposes the major anti-guerrilla operations in the PAMBUL Sector.

TO support the anti-guerrilla combat operations a series of specific efforts were made behind the lines to isolate the guerrillas from external sources of supply and from HMB sympathizers and other civilians within the sector. These efforts may be classified as intelligence and psychological.

In the intelligence field, screening points were set up periodically in each community and all persons within a specified area were required to report for screening against the order of battle and personality files maintained by the military intelligence service teams. Prisoners in temporary custody of the teams helped to locate suspected HMB members, supporters, or sympathizers who, when so identified, were held for further interrogation.

Those cleared through the screening points were marked on the hand with a rubber stamp, the character of which was changed for each operation. The marks assisted local roving patrols in their efforts to insure that none evaded the screenings.

After each screening operation in a given area the civil affairs unit held a rally, consisting of short educational talks on citizenship, democracy, communism, and the role of the Army in the anti-guerrilla operations. Among the speakers were government officials, Army officers, prominent loyal citizens, and Communist prisoners. These psychological efforts did much to counteract HMB efforts along similar lines.

When it was recognized that the HMB forces on Mount Arayat were cut off from outside sources of supply and information, the Army initiated a brief propaganda or psychological warfare campaign designed to entice Communists into surrendering. Light liaison planes dropped two sets of leaflets over the area. One set informed the rebel leaders that the Army was aware of the HMB situation on the mountainous slopes and pointed out that they could choose now either to remain in position and die of starvation or thirst, fight their way out, or surrender. In the second communication the HMB soldiers were promised justice if they surrendered, and were told that if their superiors were seriously concerned for the welfare of their followers they would not force them to continue the hopeless fight.

Subsequent investigation showed that the guerrillas had been out of food for at least a week prior to the breakout attack. On the basis of this situation, fear of the effect of the leaflets on their followers forced the HMB leaders to attempt the breakthrough immediately.

HMB operations showed excellent planning and execution, with emphasis on deception and surprise, standard specialties of all capable guerrilla forces. In attacks or raids groups as large as 300 men and women were used, but more often the groups were considerably smaller. Their withdrawals almost always demonstrated good order and dis-

entant HUK receives friendly treatment from Philippine government troops.

cipline and they exhibited special skill at establishing strategically located road blocks to delay the advance of Army forces.

The guerrillas relied principally on a system of couriers for communication, and further subdivided this system into "legal" and "illegal" systems. In the legal system the couriers, usually very young and innocent looking men and women, avoided roads and highways and moved cross-country on foot, while in the illegal system the couriers used the highways and public conveyances. As is familiar in conspiratorial activities, the couriers generally knew only the location of two posts, their own and one other. The route between Communist headquarters in mountain hideaways and the nearest courier post in the lowlands usually was maintained by HMB forces.

Because in their tactics the guerrillas specialized in elusiveness, it usually was necessary to move extraordinarily close to these forces before opening fire. This therefore required skillful and diversified patrol action on the part of all government units, and, accordingly, required the utmost in training and leadership at all levels of command.

Since the collection of essential elements of information depended largely on the success of the patrols, the ability of small-unit leaders was of particular importance in effective anti-guerrilla operations. Only a well trained leader could keep a well trained patrol on its toes every second under the sometimes demoralizing circumstances encountered in the Sector. The penalty for inattention to details of training often was likely to be death in a guerrilla ambush.

THERE were several occasions where Army units lacked the degree of mobility that might have meant success. This is predicated on the recognized fact that guerrilla forces were most successful in terrain which hampered movements of conventional units. Since HMB elements generally sought to avoid contact with government forces, they found that the jungles, swamps, and mountains worked for them as it worked against Philippine Army forces attempting to find, fix, and fight them.

The fruitless assault on the Communist headquarters hideout on Mount Arayat might have been successful had even a few troop-carrying helicopters been available to support a surprise encircling raid on the objective. Mobility of this type would have enabled the government forces to maintain contact with the HMBs until there remained no alternatives but to stand and fight or to surrender.

LIKE the anti-Japanese guerrillas of the World War II years, the HMB forces were not self-supporting. They relied on the local population for sympathy and for financial and material support. Prior to 1951 the Communists employed a quota system to collect large sums of money from their followers, augmenting this by "taxing" other civilians and civilian-sympathizers in the areas under their influence. Farmers in these areas were pressured into paying tributes of food, especially rice, which was stored subsequently in mountain hideouts and in warehouses in the larger HMB-dominated towns.

The effects of long periods of open sympathy toward the Communist cause made it difficult to effect an immediate and complete separation of the guerrillas from their civilian supporters. Despite the fact that government forces generally were able to isolate the bulk of the HMB troops, supplies and information usually continued to reach the Communists.

The operations described here were difficult and delicate. Military action against dissident factions within a country can create more trouble than can be solved unless the government forces have or can win and maintain the friendship and loyalty of the local population.

A complex legal problem arises out of the fact that a government founded on genuinely democratic principles always hesitates to bring military forces to bear against a segment of its people except for the gravest reasons of national safety and security.

Because the success of any guerrilla movement depends in large measure on sympathetic support from the civilian population, it is essential that the people understand clearly that the armed forces of the government are their friends and protectors. Every civilian who is given reason to resent and fear the government forces is a potential supporter of the guerrilla movement, even though reluctantly.

Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the people than are the regular armed forces of their own government. Local populations will shelter their own people against operations of foreign troops, even though those they shelter may be outlaws. For this reason, native troops would be more effective than foreign forces in operations against native Communist conspirators. It would be rare, indeed, if the use of foreign



Part of the Philippines security gram: buses are stopped at checkp and male passengers are friske

troops would not in itself doom to ure an anti-guerrilla campaign.

While this has been primarily cussion of the anti-guerrilla opera in the PAMBUL Sector, the fact the HMBs are part of a world Communist conspiracy is evidenced remarkable clarity in the paralle tween the two HMB armistice ne tions and the Communist peace ta various parts of the world.

WHEN Communist guerrilla le made armistice overtures the ta situation had turned sharply a them. They needed a respite to g new supplies and to either regro slip from a trap. When, as a dire sult of the time spent on negotia the situation again became more able to the Communists, they brol negotiations and resumed fighting.

The lessons here seems to be when operating against Communi Communist guerrillas, regardless circumstances, a good working k edge of Communist world strate imperative in assessing the inte and probable tactics of the sn elements of the movement. The actions have reflected generally trends and shifts in the master pl the Communist conspiracy.

Gyroscope is the code name, but you call it

World-Wide Unit Rotation

How will division rotation work? What will it do to me? Will it make the Army more or less combat ready?

The answers to these and other questions will be found in this authoritative report

OPERATION GYROSCOPE is the Army's answer to the imperfections and disadvantages of the individual replacement system. GYROSCOPE provides for the rotation of oversea combat units, ranging from battalion to division in size, with similar Stateside outfits. Its principal advantages are that it will stabilize individual assignments and increase the combat capability of the Army.

GYROSCOPE was not hurriedly conceived and approved. It is an outgrowth of many plans and studies advanced during the past decade. Unfortunately, manpower procurement problems, logistical roadblocks, and a warring world prevented putting earlier plans into effect.

GYROSCOPE overcomes these limitations so far as it is possible to do so. Indeed, unit rotation may increase the Army's ability constantly to be ready and able to replace entire units destroyed in a nuclear-age holocaust. GYROSCOPE is designed to improve the T/O&E of the active Army by producing more effective combat units. The principal ingredient of the plan is the stabilization of the assignments of career soldiers and selectees.

When GYROSCOPE begins to turn, it will be possible for a career soldier to put in twenty or thirty years in the same outfit, serve in all oversea theaters, have an equal amount of time in the States, and probably at the same post.

TO see how GYROSCOPE will work, let's take two hypothetical infantry divisions, locate them at two fictitious posts. We will put the 301st Division at Fort Ducrot, Kansas, and the 302d Division at Zweigenburger, Germany, and schedule them to exchange stations, beginning 1 January 1955.

Before the first soldier walks up the gangplank, the commanders of the two divisions will have worked out all details of the movement through direct correspondence. It will take careful planning and close coordination by the staffs and commanders.

PROVAL of the division rotation system described here came from the highest levels of the Govern- it. The JOURNAL has been informed that when retary of Defense Wilson was briefed on the plan Secretary of the Army Stevens and General Ridg-, he told them that his final approval depended only n their getting the personal approval of the Presi- t. A few days later Mr. Stevens and General gway flew to Denver to interview the President. nouncement of the plan came almost immediately eafter. The plan had long been under considera- and study. Major General Robert N. Young gave igh priority when he became Assistant Chief of F, G1, in 1953. The actual working out of the ny details was the task of many staff officers in the tagon. Two of them have been singled out by neral Young for special mention. They are Colonel . Dubbelde, Jr., Infantry, who was Chief of the ns Division of G1, and Lieutenant Colonel Charles vert, Armor, also in the Plans Division of G1. It Colonel Dubbelde's last important task for the ny as he retired on 30 September, within a matter nours of the time public announcement was made unit rotation had been approved by the President.

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.The divisions will move in three increments, at two-month intervals, and will use a regimental combat team for each increment. The same transportation facilities used to deliver the RCT to Europe will be used to bring the returning RCT home. As nearly as possible the exchanging RCTs will be the same composition and strength in order to maintain the oversea division at full strength and to equalize the burden on the transportation agencies.

Upon arrival in Zweigenburger of RCT 1 of the 301st, the commander of the 302d will have two of his own RCTs and a third belonging to his counterpart division. Thus, he is prepared to carry out the division's mission.

The second increment will include the division commanders and their staffs. Upon arrival in Europe, the commanding general of the 301st will have two of his three organic RCTs and a third RCT of the 302d. By rotating in this manner, the division commander will be with, and will command, the greater part of his division, except for the period he is actually in transit. Further, by rotating an RCT at a time, local ground rules and peculiarities may be passed on from one unit to the other and thus prevent a loss of continuity.

The entire movement will have been completed upon the exchange of the third RCTs. The 301st Infantry Division can look forward to 33 months in Germany, and then the return to the States. The 302d can plan on spending 31 months at Fort Ducrot before moving overseas to a different theater.

IN planning GYROSCOPE much consideration was given to the length of the oversea and Stateside tours. The periods of 33 and 31 months were dictated by the two-year term of selectees who make up approximately fifty per cent of the Army's enlisted strength.

In general, Selectees will get six months of training before going overseas. They will then serve 17 months overseas. This totals 23 months. The remaining month is to get him back to the States and discharged.

The way it will work is this. Beginning six months before the 1st RCT of the 301st Division is scheduled

to replace an RCT of the 302d in Germany, it will ceive an increment of brand-new Selectees. These be trained and integrated before the outfit sails. T will then serve 17 months overseas and be rotated b after an increment of trained Selectees are receive replace them. This second increment of Selectees been trained for six months by the 302d. In other wo 10 months after the 302d arrived back in the State received an increment of Selectees designed to be trai as replacements for the 301st. This second increm will also serve overseas for 17 months, which period coincide with the date the 301st Division is sched to be rotated back to the States.

In training the Selectees for the 301st Division, 302d will fully indoctrinate the men in the 301st D sion's history, traditions and battle accomplishme Patches of the 301st, as well as appropriate regime or battalion insignia, will be issued, in order to make men conscious of the spirit of the outfit they are go to be members of. Shipment overseas will be made "packet" replacement group.

FOR the career soldier GYROSCOPE offers something has long wanted: Men joining combat units will ceive their training in, and become a part of the u They will change stations at home or abroad when unit moves. The stabilization of men in units serves eral needs. It will produce a more effective and c petent combat soldier, with a greatly increased mo and create a higher standard of unit performance *esprit de corps.*

We all know that soldiers remaining in a unit ov period of time develop extraordinary loyalties to t outfit, to their leaders, and to their comrades in a These intense loyalties are a means of developing t fighters who will fight and even die for the reputa and prestige of their unit.

THE advantages of stability of assignment to individ and to the service are well known, but worth repeat briefly. Stability of assignment creates more highly qu fied noncommissioned officers and skilled technici Incoming recruits will be trained by the unit to wh they will be assigned, and with less time loss and more efficiency. Thus, a high order of unit teamwo possible. The prestige of the noncommissioned offi is raised and the respect for authority and disciplin strengthend. The net result will be better trained, b led, units with firm attachments and loyalties.

GYROSCOPE also will help to stabilize officer ass ments, especially in the company grades. At pres newly commissioned officers in the combat arms gene serve the greater portion of their first five or six yea troop units. Under the present system, this servic divided among several units. However, GYROSCOPE make it possible for many company-grade officer remain assigned to the same division or regiment du all or a major part of their junior service. All of grades will have a greater degree of stabilizatio career planning becomes longer-ranged.

TH target dates presently established for coordinated ravel of dependents to several of the oversea areas, and lies being pushed for the remainder, the movement dependents overseas may well be coordinated with ROSCOPE's rotation of units. This is obviously a most ortant point in a peacetime army.

n addition to its rotation and stability, GYROSCOPE contains certain features which will produce material ngs to the Army in men, money and time. With sta- y, the reenlistment rates may reasonably be expected ncrease, thereby reducing the requirements for the c training of new men along with the related costs osing trained privates and noncommissioned officers. e direct movement of officers and enlisted men from t stations to the transports for oversea movements reduce the number of military and civilian employ- required for the operation of processing stations. The ilization and lengthening of the tours of duty in the ited States will decrease the frequency of individual gnments, and savings in the costs of packing, crating movement of household good and in travel will fol- . For example, to move an infantry division from Fort y, Kansas (the geographic center of the U.S.), by p train to the New York Port of Embarkation costs roximately $122,000 less than moving the same num- of officers and men individually.

There will be greater supply economy, too. GYROSCOPE vides that all possible unit equipment will be transferred in place each time a unit rotates. Such transfers will require careful planning and coordination, but the long-term effects should result in improved maintenance and supply accountability. The realization by a commander that he must turn over and account for all of his property in proper condition, at a given time, will provide a strong incentive to stay abreast of the supply and maintenance situation in his command.

THE relief of oversea units by incoming units from the U.S. will provide training in relief techniques that are required constantly in combat. Though these reliefs will not be conducted under combat conditions, the same planning and coordination will be required, thus providing valuable experience for such an operation in the event that it be made during combat. In addition, worldwide training and experience factors will be obtained by the railroads, Military Sea Transport Service, Transportation Corps, and all of the technical and supply services.

The immediate rotation of all units simultaneously is obviously unworkable. Therefore, it will be necessary to put GYROSCOPE into operation gradually. Approximately two years will elapse before the last division is rotated. By the use of planned arrangements, the initial rotating divisions will serve as test units and will be able to furnish valuable experience factors for later rotating units. As GYROSCOPE progresses, necessary adjustments may be made efficiently.

ON'T TINKER WITH THE GYROSCOPE

R more than a decade soldiers have been nomadic, oving from place to place so fast that they had no oppor- ty to feel they belonged to anything more substantial the Army. This was one of the real sources of service atisfaction and was acknowledged as such. When unit tion was first advocated its justification was that it would vide for stability of assignment.

he additional element of combat readiness was added to OSCOPE as it developed. Combat readiness is a necessary ent without doubt and also a quite essential element of rotation system. Certainly no system of unit rotation ld have been adopted that would clearly lessen the bat readiness of the Army.

s finally presented (and as described in the above ar-) unit rotation will provide for stability of assignment increase the combat readiness of the Army. GYROSCOPE do that—if it is permitted to work.

YROSCOPE won't work if too much is loaded on it. It 't work if the Army is required to maintain more com- units with fewer men. It won't work if the ground s that are basic to it are changed. A gyroscope is a sensi- instrument and amateurs shouldn't tinker with them.

here are hints that the Army will emerge in a year or so 24 combat divisions—and at a time when its total gth is being reduced. This is possible, of course, but it ardly possible that those 24 divisions will be at full bat strength and ready to fight. The Army learned long that if you don't have at least a minimum number of "housekeeping" troops your combat units will be performing the housekeeping chores at a cost to the unit's combat efficiency. The days when a first sergeant and a company commander had more men on special details than they had out for drill are quite distant, but they could return. And so could the days when officers were assigned so many extra tasks that they were rarely present for duty. And with those kind of conditions you almost inevitably find that your regiments are understrength two-battalion outfits. Not a very combat ready picture.

GYROSCOPE won't work if the basic premises on which it was built are changed. For example, if Congress should change the period of service for Selectees from the present 24 months to 21 months (as has been advocated) GYROSCOPE would be out of kilter. Adjustments might be made but only if there was assurance that other arbitrary changes wouldn't be made.

Here again the increase in number of divisions comes into the picture. Congress isn't likely to cut the strength of the forces overseas, but when it finds that there are nine or more "combat divisions" in the ZI, it may be tempted to wield an axe that would fell the whole concept of unit rotation.

Only time will tell. The fears expressed here are based on what has gone before. And if there is a lesson it is the old one that soldiers are better qualified to prepare military plans and tables of organizations and equipment, and such, than civilians.

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WAR WITHOUT MEN . . . . . .





Let's not be hypnotized by push buttons. Whether it's cold or hot, war requires strong, mobile ground forces. We don't have them today, nor do our allies.

COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT

IERICAN diplomacy suffered a setback at Geneva as catastrophic as the French military defeat at Dien Bien ı. Both reverses sprang from the same cause: the com-nists control the thermostat in the Cold War. They because Malenkov & Company has the army it needs, ere it needs it.

Our truce negotiators in Korea learned that communists pect only armed power, available on the spot and pre-ed to back up high-sounding phrases. In Korea, and in in Indochina, that meant not only air power and al strength but ground combat forces, numerous and l armed.

n contrast, the United States and the rest of the free ld have consistently underemphasized their armies e the end of World War II. The West has refused to ize that the vast technological advances in warfare did eliminate, but actually increased, the need for trained iers. It has been trying to hold the communist bloc at with huckster phrases about miracle weapons, flaunted never used. The free world has supported its diplomats ı press releases about atomic and hydrogen bombs, led missiles, push-button forces, and strategic bombers. ıas tried everything except having enough trained, ipped, fighting men.

'here has been an awakening in some places. Chair-Alexander Wiley of the Senate Foreign Relations ımittee, for one, recently warned against continuing lace our major reliance on air power. He doubted ther "we can be smug concerning our Air Force e Russia disclosed the equivalent of our B-52 inter-inental jet bomber." Referring to the war in Indo-ıa, the Senator prophesied: "Air and naval forces not be able to prove the exclusively decisive factor."

MMUNIST China created its army in accord with ıe Soviet concept that modern war above all requires men. Our own airborne expert, Major General James M. Gavin, bears witness that this is no antiquated "human sea" notion. He asserts: "The requirements of atomic conflict inevitably include more, not less, ground soldiers and tactical air strength."

America's postwar strategy has been based upon the assumption that small, élite formations can, with superior weapons, defeat almost any number of poorly armed troops. It's the old knight-in-armor-versus-peasant concept in new dress.

Unfortunately, we did not put superior weapons into the field in Korea, whether or not we had them stockpiled. Chinese "volunteers" were a long way from being undisciplined peasants. Our all too small Army was unable to wholly match them. Consequently, our theories failed miserably in Korea. Absolute command of the sea and nearly absolute air supremacy failed to produce victories, for lack of men on the ground. Nevertheless, today, as in the post-VJ period, we delude ourselves with talk of maintaining our security with machines and bombs—in short, a war without men.

Such escapism has led to the ruin of nation after nation. One reason why Imperial Rome fell was that it could not buy mercenary armies able to defeat barbarian invasion, once its self-reliant citizens had become too soft to fight.

The American experience suggests that we should pursue a sane middle course between extremes. Our record of technological achievements explains and justifies our insistence upon scientific support for brute strength in combat. American respect for human life makes the casualties of mass-attrition warfare abhorrent. For generations we have produced more coal per miner, more steel per worker, more food per farm hand, than any rival. Our most expensive and scarcest form of power has been *manpower*. Extending our industrial experience to military fields makes sense. Whenever and wherever possible, we substituted weapons for men. Yet a preponderance of manpower, ours or our allies', has favored the United States in the decisive phases of all its wars.

Now, for the first time confronted with a threat that

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> To fail to exploit our newest weapons would be as un-American as it would be disastrous . . .

is backed by human resources exceeding our own, we must, of course, emphasize technological superiority in weapons and equipment. But there is neither excuse nor reason for resorting to the fantastic and avoiding the facts. It is also extremely dangerous.

THE unpleasant fact is that the armies of the United States and its allies must approach in size those of the armed hordes of communism if the free world is to survive. Fortunately, despite fears of military escapists who would substitute atomic bombs for divisions, the manpower problem can be solved. Communist masses can be countered, even arithmetically, if we exploit the mutual manpower potential of our Atlantic and Pacific allies along with our own.

France alone had an army of two million in 1940; surely one-third of that is practicable today. Sixty million Germans and as many Japanese live within areas the United States has pledged to defend. They could easily maintain half a million troops each. Italy, whose fighting men have been grossly maligned for the faults of incompetent leaders, would not be taxed unduly by 20 divisions. Turkey now has more than 20, and Spain has another 20 that we can rally if we will. The far-flung British Commonwealth has always responded to emergency, when it finally recognized one, with 30 to 50 divisions. The total is startling but factual. And American and western European industry can arm its divisions better than the divisions of the Iron Curtain countries can be armed.

Only one factor is missing from this rosy picture: the role of the United States. Our present rearmament program is immense—in terms of everything but combat divisions. To stop the communist hordes, the United States must have more than token armies. Not even a full-scale resumption of the "Arsenal of Democracy" role is enough. U. S. divisions must take their places in appreciable numbers wherever we expect our allies to resist armed aggression.

After soul-searching and debate, we successfully built up a worthy army of South Koreans behind the screen of UN divisions. Our six divisions in Europe comprise a valiant advance guard rather than a screen, especially since our so-called "mobile reserve" is almost nonexistent and strategically immobile.

IN World War II, Soviet Russia not only raised the largest army of any combatant, but put the highest *percentage* of its population into its armed forces. The ples of the USSR suffered not only the greatest nu of casualties in that war, but, with the exception o land, the greatest percentage loss of population. Even those sacrifices, ultimate victory required the aid o Western allies.

Today Russia is again exerting the greatest e If the NATO nations, *including the USA*, had the proportion of military forces to population as Russia there would be no communist menace.

The vastness of Russia's manpower is not the gre danger to an adequate defense of the free world. The ger lies in the American and allied unwillingness to mit their own men in sufficient, not necessarily e numbers.

Manpower statistics have been used and misused they can be twisted to support any contention. In e ating military strength, the imponderables of the " tive" manpower of known total populations tend to fuse the facts. A few points are clear, however. Ame 160 million swing the balance in Europe, even aft the populations of the European "satellites" have added to the communist ranks.

Red China's armed millions, while a threat on Cl borders, cannot reinforce the Kremlin's armies in Eu And even these could be held in check in the Far by Japan, Pakistan, and other nations on our side defeatism, generated by the Soviet armies that exist t can make communist superiority in trained manpo permanent fact the day after tomorrow.

THE United States cannot buy a mercenary army t vent aggression. All our Marshall Plans and milita programs are logically capped by our commitments to the United Nations or under the North At pact. The spirit and the determined efforts of our cannot be expected to exceed our own.

New divisions are expensive to create and mai New divisions demand many more men than air g or trick weapons. Both of these considerations ar pleasant to face.

That is why we nationally chase the will-o'-the-w phantom battalions; that is why the public acclaim disastrous concept of defense. Opportunism and the nial national characteristics of the American peopl combine to endanger the security of the United

The people of America have never lost their av to "large standing armies." Perhaps it was the bad left by British Redcoats in our Colonial struggles; c haps it was immigrants' memories of government pression, enforced by arrogant soldiery in "the old try." Whatever its origin, the prejudice remains a influence. For example, the original Constitutiona hibition against army appropriations for a period in of two years still hamstrings the Army's efficient co ing for equipment but does not apply to the Navy Force.

This once understandable state of mind has bee forced through American history by our ability t

torious ("They always won the war, didn't they?") ıies after the start of every conflict. Our histories lay at stress upon the manly virtues of our people, which ıbled Minute Men to defeat British regulars and newly med National Army divisions to knock out Prussian ards.

Those books fail to record two more revealing reasons our unbroken martial success. First, American man-ver, aided by that of our allies (French at Yorktown, tish in the Ardennes), has always been numerically ater than that of our foes. Secondly, we have always l time—purchased by geographic isolation or a friend-British navy—to mobilize a sufficient quantity of that npower before the enemy had to be met on the battle-d.

IR unjustified we-can-always-do-it-again-if-we-have-to attitude has been subconsciously fostered during the t decade by our reliance at first on atomic monopoly later on atomic superiority. It was only recently that mlin disclosures of hydrogen-bomb tests and an ex-ding communist strategic air force shook the compla-t U.S. belief that nuclear superiority is all that we need urvive.

The strengthening of continental defenses and the d-up of the Strategic Air Command with weapons and ıes are good as far as they go. But they fall far short ıaking us militarily too strong for our potential enemy. have begun to face up to the cost of defending Amer-ı cities from air attack; we still object to putting enough ı into Army uniforms to prevent such an attack from ıg launched. It is clear that our diplomacy will suffer ong as the U.S. fails to command the respect of the munist bloc. At Geneva, both Russia's Molotov and China's Chou En-lai openly derided our concept of sive retaliation. Massive retaliation is a deterrent to l war, but the threat of communist retaliation on our vulnerable cities makes it ineffective against piece-l world conquest. The Kremlin is already convinced country will not order a strategic bombing offensive op communist creeping aggression.

LY a strong, highly mobile force, composed mostly f Army divisions, can contain local creeping aggres-and keep U.S. global diplomacy from falling com-ly on its face. No serious military expert, whatever the of his uniform, believes that aggression on the ground be stopped anywhere else but on the ground. Korea an ideal test for the application of air and naval su-ırity. U.S. supremacy on the sea and in the air was pensable to the GI in his foxhole; but if it had not for U.S. divisions, Korea would have been overrun dless of how many planes or ships we brought to

early it is high time for a new New Look at our mili-defense policies, with due regard for the importance ıclear and thermonuclear weapons. To fail to exploit potential of our newest weapons would be as un-rican as it would be disastrous. To neglect continental ıse or a "deterrent" Strategic Air Command would

> . . . but to stop the communist hordes, the United States must have more than token armies.

invite communist blackmail whenever the Cold War grows hotter. But to ignore the lessons of history, to repeat our error of maintaining inadequate ground forces until we are attacked, could be fatal.

The world power of the United States can be gradually whittled down by Korean and Indo-China incidents, staged at slight cost by aggressors, until we have lost our allies one by one without ever having used our deterrent air strength or tested our continental defense. That way is dangerous.

German schemes for world conquest twice counted erroneously upon American decadence and inability to place fighting armies in the field. Will our military policies lead the Kremlin into making the same mistake?

THEY will unless the American people realize that in a world situation so unfavorable we must prepare large numbers of men to fight *before* the need arises. America must take to heart the lesson of General Emory Upton that preparedness not only reduces the cost of war but in many instances prevents war from breaking out. In essence, we must recognize the priority of freedom over a high standard of living. We must realize that, whatever the cost, we *can* afford the price of survival.

The moral for mid-twentieth century USA is easy to read, though perhaps unpalatable to swallow. We cannot go it alone in a world that contains the sharp cleavage between the free and the totalitarian-slave nations. We cannot and do not desire to conquer the world in a series of "preventive wars."

The only other alternative is to invest our resources, manhood, and wealth in the four pillars of truly national defense, which today has world-wide frontiers. We must have (1) a mighty air force; (2) an effective defense of our heartland's cities; (3) a navy superior to any possible combination of foes; and (4) a strong, highly mobile army, ready, equipped, trained . . . now. All must employ new weapons to the utmost.

There are no "priorities" among those four. Each one and every one is essential. Belatedly we seem to have accepted the first three. There is barely time for the nation to realize that its security cannot totter on a three-legged defense stool. We cannot win a war without men. Providing an adequate ground army will erase the risk of losing a war. And it may do more. *With an adequate army we may check communist aggression without having to resort to total war.*

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CEREBRATIONS

Co-ops for PXs?

EVERY soldier knows that the Post Exchange has become a problem. It is common knowledge that the PX is included in the soldier's pay as a symbol of economic advantage justifying lower compensation for military service. But civilian opposition and Congressional restrictions on Exchange operations have acquired a symbolic meaning that obscures the simple fact that the Post Exchange is an expensive and inefficient service for which the soldier pays more than he receives.

Why not abolish the PXs and substitute post cooperative stores? Whenever people have lived together on limited incomes, sharing the problems of a common way of life, they have sought to reduce their expenses by group buying and selling. Co-ops have the approval of popular and legislative opinion. Their merchandising practices are based on the needs of a group of people with mutual interests and problems. And they pay for themselves. A moderate annual membership fee (about $5) constitutes the working capital of the store, and entitles each member to a proportionate share of the savings made by the operation of the co-op. So the co-operative store is a type of "private enterprise" that can be adapted to the military post.

This is our proposal. Now the argument.

What is wrong with the Post Exchange?

First, it is old-fashioned. The PX was the Army's answer to the need for a country store on isolated posts. It was designed for a small, homogeneous station, providing a limited number of "essentials" which were in recurrent demand. And this was enough for many years: Military consumers demanded less, large "Special Order" items were provided by the Post Quartermaster, and there were fewer families depending on it for children's clothing and household furnishings. But consider the Army post today! In population alone, it frequently exceeds neighboring urban centers. Furthermore, the post population is more heterogeneous. More people are demanding a greater variety of items.

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Secondly, the PX is expensive and inefficient. Its managers may be hard-headed businessmen, but today they have to compete with new developments in wholesale merchandising. Nationwide buying and redistribution no longer result in great savings because of the need for large and expensive administrative structure.

Thirdly, you *pay more* for the Post Exchange than you save. Members of the military service can never expect a wage scale equivalent to civilian scales when part of their cost of living is borne by the government. Add up the salaries of the military personnel *alone,* assigned to Post Exchange duties, from Washington through your local post. That's money out of *your* pocket. It may not be tacked onto a price tag, but it is added to your wage scale. The PX fosters an illusion of advantage which justifies comparatively lower compensation for military service.

One other argument should be mentioned. The retention of the Post Exchange is frequently justified on the ground that it contributes funds for "morale" and "welfare" activities. Such an argument enables the government to evade its own responsibility for providing such funds. Is it fair to tax the soldier to pay for his own "morale" activities?

The post cooperative store would be a legally incorporated group of persons in a military community (as many as want to join), who hold "stock" (membership) in an enterprise which sells merchandise at prevailing market prices to all customers. Every member back his share of the savings on year. When anyone makes a purc in his name, the number of his r bership card and the amount of the chase would be recorded. At the of the year, his share of the sa would be determined by the amou has purchased from the store. In tion, he would get back a share o savings on purchases made by non-r bers.

This is "free enterprise" except only soldiers and their eligible d dents could be members. Since soldier's savings would be only a r on his investment in the co-op, it not be charged against "Pay of Army." And because the co-op v be self-supporting, it could not be trolled by appropriations riders.

The "moocher" problem would be solved. It's easier to control mer ship than sales. There would be n vantage for non-members becaus price will be the same as off the Competition with local retail would thus be eliminated.

The post co-op would be limit the range of its merchandise on the selling capacity of the stor could provide an outlet for the st increasing demands of all consu while concentrating on the needs members. There is no reason wh a secondary stage, the co-op coul be able to take over the functio the Sales Commissary, which is no der more vigorous attack than th Nor is there any reason why the could not take "special orders" f customers.

The post co-op would be gov by a board of directors, elected b members. They would employ a ci manager paid from the profits store. Although the co-op would o under such general policies as mi stipulated by the post commander policies would be the same as thos vided for a concessionaire. The should avoid every aspect of bei "official agency." In this way it remain independent of restrictive lation initiated by local pressure and passed down from Congress t commanders. An adequate deg

ɔl could be exercised by official litions of operation," and by the ɜ power of the stockholders.

re is a challenge for those who can the co-op possible to prove that ırmy can still take care of its own.

CAPT. ROGER W. LITTLE

›ting Messages

ΞN radio fails or is jammed by the emy, combat commanders are too without any method of communi- ı. Telephone lines are vulnerable illery fire. Runners are compara- slow, and they often don't get gh. The various types of visual ound communication are unsatis- y as a full substitute for radio and ıone in an emergency. Such meth- s carrier pigeons and plane drop ickup are too often impractical.

ere is, however, one other method hooting messages. We ought to le to shoot messages out of a mor- howitzer, or a recoilless rifle. This ɔd is not entirely without prece- for our artillery has often fired ganda leaflets at the enemy.

that is required is a projectile de- l to hold a written message, which urst over a "message reception cen- nd drop the message in the man- a parachute flare. If we can make rogen bomb, we ought to be able ign a simple hollow shell for this ted use.

ɜ distance that a message would o travel would determine the type uncher" used. Perhaps a 60mm would fire messages from 350 00 yards, an 81mm mortar from › 3,000, a 105mm howitzer from to 12,000, a 57mm recoilless rifle 4,800, and a 75mm recoilless rifle 7,300.

s take the case of a company in ranced position that has been cut ım the rest of the battalion. Its have been jammed and its tele- lines cut. The company com- r wants to request artillery fire specific targets, as well as am- on and other supplies. His only e method of communication is a message.

, he must know where to fire the e. He could fire a pyrotechnic signated type and color that would y identify the company but would y in effect, "Where is 1st Battal- essage Reception Area?" Battalion respond with a designated flare ɔwn, or a series of flares, which be fired *vertically* from its own ɜ reception area.

A company then prepares its message (in code if the situation seems to require it), estimates the distance to the battalion message area, and fires the message. The message could be prepared in duplicate or triplicate and sent a second or third time if battalion does not acknowledge receipt of the message (also by prearranged signal). Acknowledgment signals could be fired by colored smoke shells in front of the company or even into the enemy position.

What are some of the objections to this method?

(1) Messages shot forward from battalion could fall into enemy hands if not fired accurately. True. Therefore, accuracy would have to be achieved in practice firing—as is the case of regular artillery and mortar firing on the range.

(2) Messages shot inaccurately from front-line units back to battalion would be lost. An SOP could be established whereby any message seen to land outside the message reception area would be opened and promptly delivered to the battalion command post.

(3) The firing of pyrotechnic signals to identify the message reception area would enable the enemy also to spot the area and lay in concentrations of artillery or mortar. Such counter-action would be costly to the enemy and would not likely be effective, as the message reception area would be large, and we could not reasonably expect that it could be "knocked out."

(4) This method simply loads more equipment on the infantryman. Naturally some soldier or several of them would have a little more weight to carry. But this is no valid objection if we consider emergency communication important. The number of shells carried by a company would not have to exceed half a dozen or a dozen.

(5) The enemy might capture some of these shells and use them against us by firing false messages into the battalion message area. To prevent this, a system of authentication—the positive identification of the sender by a frequently changed code name—could be employed.

If tests should prove that it is not possible to fire these time-shell messages accurately enough to make the proposed method practical, another type of message shell could be designed, which instead of bursting in the air would continue its flight to the ground. Any danger to our own troops from firing this type of shell could be avoided by incorporating a device that would give the shell in flight its own characteristic sound—some distinctive whine or whistle similar to the Germans' "screaming meemies" of World War II. Our troops would thus be warned of the approach of the shell and at the same time be notified that a message is on the way.

CAPT. JOSEPH H. EWING

Orientation from the Air

THE next time the chips are down, the light plane (or helicopter) will be our three-dimensional jeep. It's much easier to get lost in a plane than in a ground vehicle. Staff officers would do well to develop their proficiency in map reading and orientation.

Modern aeronautical charts are designed for use at higher speeds and greater elevations than those of the light plane. Air charts usually eliminate detail that would clutter up the chart and make it impractical for high-speed navigation. For reconnaissance in a light plane, a ground map that gives this detail is needed—1:250,000 for large areas, and 1:50,000 or 1:25,000 when the area is small. If you do use an air chart, remember that the edition printed with UTM ties in directly with the ground maps at all scales, while the GEOREF edition is used in major aerial strategy, air defense, and air-sea rescue.

When making a reconnaissance in a primitive area, it is important to remember three points:

(1) Rapid weather changes increase the problems of orientation.

(2) It's possible to get lost in a surprisingly small area.

(3) "Reconnaissance type" maps are not too much help once you're lost.

Experience flying light planes and helicopters over the Seward Peninsula in Alaska showed that the best terrain features for orientation were the coastline, settlements, roads, and prominent terrain features. The coastline was well depicted on the old maps, while the representation of interior areas was often merely the result of imagination.

The situation is far different in developed areas, such as the eastern part of the United States. Here, there is so much detail that the problem is rather one of selection. There are so many surfaced roads that only the parkways and turnpikes stand out. Major rivers, lakes, and estuaries are helpful; minor streams and ponds are not. Railroads are useful only if the local system has been studied before the flight. Power lines cut a distinctive and conspicuous swath across the land. A few hill-forms, such as Indiantown Gap, are clearcut enough to establish position.

COL. WILLIAM C. HALL

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THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

New Helicopter Board

A five-man board has been appointed by the Commandant of TIS, to review and coordinate helicopter instructional material used at The School. The mission of the board is to supervise the preparation of special texts and other training literature. In addition, it will make recommendations to Army Field Forces headquarters at Fort Monroe, Va., for helicopter training tests.

Airborne Department Reorganized

Because of a cutback in students, the Airborne Department has been reorganized. It now consists of a Basic Training Committee and an Advanced Training Committee. The Basic Training Committee instructs in the five basic jump techniques, conducts the five qualifying jumps, and determines whether students are in physical condition to jump without injury. The Advanced Training Committee is responsible for instruction in the techniques of air transportation of Army units and aerial delivery of supplies and equipment. It also conducts the jumpmaster course for officers and first-three-graders.

TIS Instructional Material

The following new instructional material suitable for nonresident as well as resident instruction may be ordered from the Book Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., at the prices shown.

Front Line Battalion in Coordinated Fire Plan, 2408A-USAR. A description of long-range fires, close defensive fires, final protective fires, and fires within the battle position; roles of machine guns, 81mm mortars, heavy mortars, and field artillery. 1 hour. 30¢.

Lessons From Korea. A compilation of lessons learned by the infantry from its military operations in Korea. Included are lessons learned in tactics, use of weapons, functioning of staffs, use of communications, and automotive maintenance. 10¢

Wire Communication, 3292-USAR. Characteristics of wire equipment of the infantry regiment; the capabilities and limitations of wire communication. 1 hour. 15¢.

Training, Selection and Duties of Communication Personnel, 3560-USAR. Procedures used in selection of personnel for communication duties; requirements for all phase training of communication personnel. Practical exercise in preparing MTP training schedules for communication personnel of an infantry battalion. 2 hours. 15¢.

Company and Battalion Radio Sets, 3563-USAR. The characteristics and employment of radio sets organic to elements of the infantry battalion, heavy mortar company, and tank company. Field expedients to extend the operating range and capabilities; responsibilities for maintenance and supply functions on radio equipment. 2 hours. 15¢.

Command Posts, 3627–USAR. A practical exercise on selection, interior arrangement, operation, and displacement of a command post. 1 hour. 10¢.

Communication Systems of the Infantry Regiment, USAR. Radio and wire systems of the infantry regiment tical exercise covering company communication systems. 1 15¢.

Communication During Approach March and Attack, USAR. The duties and organization of communication per in the infantry regiment and communication in the ap march and attack. 3 hours. 30¢.

Preparation of a Field Exercise Rifle Squad in Attack, Procedures used in planning, preparing, and conducting a unit exercise. Includes a practical exercise in the actual p tion of a field exercise for a rifle squad in attack, inc ground reconnaissance and critique. 6 hours. 15¢.

Handbook for Instructor Training. A resident publ which is designed to assist an officer or noncommissioned confronted with the task of training instructors. Everythin a training memorandum to detailed lesson plans is inclu this handbook. The field manuals have been worked c detail and the important points extracted and compressed logical, streamlined course of instruction. 45¢.

A special text on rifle marksmanship, designed especia instructors, has been published for residential use at The In School. The text, entitled "Hits Count," uses a variety o trations and an informal style of writing to teach instructo to train riflemen to get hits that count on the range and i bat. Although the text is intended primarily for instructo Infantry School considers it *must* reading for all infantry and NCO's. 50¢.

T-10 Parachute Assembly

TIS has cancelled instruction on the T-7 parachute ass In view of the availability of the T-10 and its favored u the earlier T-7, instruction is being confined to the T-10

TIS "Sells 'em Hard"

Last March an editorial entitled "Catch 'em Young, S Hard" appeared in The Army Combat Forces Journ urged the Army to attract youngsters by inviting them to i and letting them see for themselves some of the more "g ous" features of Army life and Army equipment.

TIS does this on a year-round basis. Here is a run-do the major visits of young people to Fort Benning whic occurred since the Journal editorial appeared:

(1) Birmingham (Alabama) Boy Scouts—5 adults a boys.
(2) Herring (Georgia) School—5 adults and 63 chil
(3) Woodland (Georgia) School—3 adults and 25 ch
(4) Youth Rally Day—250 school children.
(5) Demolay Group—150 high school boys.

What do these young people see? The Youth Rally had lunch in the field, prepared by the Third Army Foo ice School, saw an hour-long demonstration of paratroop ing, and toured the Main Post. Itineraries of other vary, since there are many interesting things to see on th

ew Fire Planning Terms

TAS has adopted several changes in fire planning terminology order to clarify these terms for instructional purposes and effect coordination with The Infantry School. The following now in effect:

Preparation. A preparation is that portion of fires delivered ediately before and/or during an attack. It is intense fire gned to disrupt communications and to disorganize the ene- s defenses. Preparations are delivered in accordance with a schedule. A preparation may include the fire of ground, al, and air means.

Commander's Concept of Fire Support. This term replaces neral Plan of Fire Support." However, until such time as ges can be made to appropriate manuals, the definition of term in any instructional matter will be followed by the rseded term in parentheses, *e.g.*, "Commander's Concept of Support (General Plan of Fire Support)."

iaison Officer's Fire Plan. This term replaces "Close Support Plan." Usage of this term is governed by the same provision at for the preceding term, *e.g.*, "Liaison Officer's Fire Plan se Support Fire Plan)."

rtillery Direct Support Plan. The direct support artillery bat- n commander's plan of fire support is a consolidation of the mander's Concept of Fire Support (general plan of fire sup-) and the Liaison Officer's Fire Plans (close support fire).

pporting Fires. In offensive operations, supporting fires may elivered prior to or at any time during the attack. In de- ve operations, supporting fires must be planned to support nases of the defensive action. Supporting fires may be pre- ged both as to time and place (scheduled fires), or they be prearranged as to location only and fired on request (on ires). The terms "preparatory fires" and "protective fires" been eliminated from instruction at The Infantry School. term "supporting fires," as defined, has replaced the two r terms.

id Ranging Equipment Test

est of the relative ability of the infantry *counterfire* sound g system and the artillery sound ranging system to locate mortars was recently conducted by TAS.

artillery sound ranging system employs several micro- s, regularly spaced along a straight base. For these tests two ases were employed: a one-second (microphones spaced a e equal to the distance sound travels in one second), crophone base and a two-second, five-microphone base.

infantry sound ranging system employs a series of three- hone arrays. In these tests three of these arrays were used. istance between arrays was approximately 750 meters.

rage accuracies in locating the mortar obtained during ests were as follows:

	Range Error	*Direction Error*
Infantry System	44 meters	9 meters
Artillery System	10 meters	1 meter

mortar was fired at distances of from 2,000 to 3,000 from the sound bases.

these tests were conducted under favorable weather and conditions, no final conclusions can be drawn at this time relative effectiveness of the two systems in locating mor- owever, the test did establish that locations of the 81mm t ranges up to 3,000 meters can be made by both systems fficient accuracy to warrant attack by unobserved fire.

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense PID, will report on the new films available to the services.

With the return of the off-post salute, officers and men will want to reacquaint themselves with the whys and wherefores of this time-honored tradition. This subject, usually difficult to present through lectures, is well handled in **Military Courtesy, TF 21-1965** (approximately 20 minutes). A tough master sergeant uses an interesting story to instill in two recruits the meaning and importance of the salute.

The **Infantry Weapons and Their Effects** series is highly recommended either as an indoctrination for new troops or as a review. These films are distributed as Film Bulletins (FBs) and run between 8 and 10 minutes. They outline the nomenclature, ammmunition, range or ranges, and tactical employment of each weapon.

One of the best films I have seen on leadership is **Principles of Leadership, TF 21-1840** (43 minutes). FM 22-10 comes to life on the screen as "Captain Jackson" explains what leadership is and what it embraces. While "Captain Jackson" tells his story, the film flashes back to his induction and follows him through the various NCO ranks, OCS, and combat, to his present assignment as a company commander. This picture would be especially useful at an officers' or NCOs' call or in a leadership school.

Any information troops learn about their own and sister services is additional equipment for use in the accomplishment of their mission. **Armor Organization, Weapons and Tactics, TF 17-1903** (27 minutes), gives the soldier a brief picture of Armor. He gets a look at the various tanks, personnel carriers, and other vehicles organic to Armor, together with their basic armament and tactical employment.

A color sound film strip (SFS) **U. S. Anti-Personnel Mine M-14, SFS 5-118** (14 minutes), should be available in film libraries this month. It outlines the proper methods for arming, planting, and disarming the plastic, non-detectable M-14. The strip emphasizes safety factors that must be observed in handling the mine, as well as methods to determine damages incurred in shipment.

Infantry Operations in Mountains, MF 7-8278 (38 minutes), explains why certain decisions are made in mountainous areas and why certain weapons can or cannot be used. It shows the effects of this type of terrain on time estimates, transportation, and weather; and it gives many other basic facts about mountain operations.

Swimming for Survival, MN 9198 (17 minutes), a Navy film, shows how to stay alive in water. Various swimming strokes, expedients, and methods of breathing are explained and demonstrated. It can be obtained through the information officer at Naval District Headquarters.

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IRONS IN THE FIRE

Airborne Radar



Sperry Gyroscope Company has produced a compact airborne radar that promises to increase safety in troop-carrying and cargo planes. The drawing above shows what the radar's "turtle-shell" antenna would pick up over the area around Cape Cod, Mass. The five-inch radar screen can be used for search and surveillance, accurate navigation over uncharted airlanes, detection of distant storms, or anti-collision warning of mountains, tall structures, and other aircraft. The complete set weighs only 150 pounds. Its 18-inch antenna is gyro-stabilized for steadiness against the pitch and roll of the plane. The radar set is effective at altitudes up to 50,000 feet, and it has unprecedented power for its size and weight. It has potential military value for Army light aircraft, and many tactical uses for the set suggest themselves. The radar set operates in the 10,000-megacycle band of the spectrum with sharpness and clarity.

Jet Assist for C-82

This C-82 Flying Boxcar is equipped with the new J-44 jet powe serve package. A development of Fairchild Aircraft, the jet provide extra 1,000 pounds of thrust. It is expected to reduce required tak distances and permit increases of as much as two to three tons in maxi take-off weights. The added power plant may also provide an addit safety factor in case of engine failure on take-off. The J-44 packa attached to the top of the fuselage by means of a fixed pylon. Th intake can be closed by remote control when the jet is not in use, to re drag. The assembly can also be installed so that it may be retracted w the airplane. The J-44 operates on regular aviation gasoline, and quires no structural modification of the airplane. Seventy-two inches and 22 inches in diameter, it is easily accessible for service, and it ca installed or removed in a matter of minutes.

Handy Presser

This new electric presser is a handy to have around the barracks or BOQ, transit. The mar turer claims that i quickly remove kles and renew creases in trou sleeves, lapels, an lars. It weighs eight ounces an be used on AC o current. The ma turer is Weylum, Hollywood Blvd. Angeles 27, Cali



Amphibious Vehicle

This new amphibious vehicle, whic been developed by the Marmon-Herri Company, Indianapolis, can negotiate sw soft mud, or sand, climb 65-per-cent cruise in deep water or travel down a way at 45 miles per hour. Its large alum hemispheroidal wheels have the effect ing the vehicle greater traction the de sinks into mud or sand. It is powere 110-horsepower Ford engine, but in deep it is propelled and steered by hydrojet. the "Rhino," the vehicle can turn in i length when in water. Its chief pr uses are in agricultural, logging, and pet operations, but it could have military

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Power View

POWER AND POLICY: U. S. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age
By Thomas K. Finletter
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954
408 Pages; Index; $5.00

iewed by
.. H. D. Kehm

Ir. Finletter has written a book which its the attention of all U. S. citizens thoughtful study by politicians, states-, military men and economists.

he thesis of the book is that we should cipate that by 1956 Russia will be in sition to launch a sneak atomic attack ch can destroy our major cities and industry and, if we are not properly ared, our ability to strike back as well. best chance of forestalling such an it is to build and position forces, par-arly atomic-air, so that Russia will not e the attack because she will know we can absorb it and retaliate with stating force.

Ir. Finletter contends that we could eve this and spend no more than we now paying for a defense that does not ide the indicated protection. He states ier that unless we change our present ary policies, planning procedures, and of thinking, we will not have them ie future and hence will invite our destruction.

the author's view, being properly ared means establishing "indispensa-forces in the following priorities; first, NATO Atomic-Air to carry out the ic counterattack; second, air defense orth America and the NATO areas; hird, the U. S. contribution to NATO my, sea and non-atomic air forces. He ibes any forces beyond these as "dis-ible" no matter how desirable they appear.

his view the greatest danger currently n what he terms "the Gray Areas," nations which border (or nearly so) ussia or Communist China. Here, be-of our massive retaliation policy and se the interests of our strongest part-are often nearly in conflict, he fears ay blunder into atomic war.

e description of how U. S. force levels been decided in recent years is par-rly useful reading for military and nmental planners.

e writer's proposals as to what needs done to ensure the proper defense eculiarly timely now that the policies new Administration are just becom-fective. He contends that the basic defects in our military planning are, first, that the size of the defenses is governed too much by fiscal considerations and the international mood of the moment, and, second, that the division of funds is determined by compromise among the Chiefs of Staff rather than by objective decisions by impartial officials.

The reader will be surprised by the discussion of the relative influence of the Secretaries of the defense agencies and the chiefs of staff even under the New Look.

Mr. Finletter's analysis is not without vulnerabilities. It appears to give too little weight to the reasons behind the force level decisions of other specialists. It does not see even an important potential in the procedural and organizational changes recently made. It reflects some of the common tendency of air power advocates to consider that only airmen appreciate the potential of the air weapon. Finally, it leans to the thought that organizational and procedural changes will make the Secretaries exert greater direction and control where they have not done so in the past, even when they had the power to do it. The proposal that a permanent civilian Under Secretary in the Department of Defense might do much to accomplish this is peculiarly weak.

Guerrillas in the Philippines —and Elsewhere

WE REMAINED
By Col. R. W. Volckmann
W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954
244 Pages; Index; Maps; Photographs; $3.75

IRREGULARS, PARTISANS, GUERRILLAS
Edited by Irwin R. Blacker
Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1954
487 Pages; $5.00

Reviewed by
Jonathan Carmen

On a recent Tuesday night I idly picked up Colonel Volckmann's *We Remained,* with the intention of killing a bit of time until Buick-Berle had departed from television and I could go about my customary chores of bedding down the brood. I must confess I grossly neglected my parental duty that night and didn't put down *We Remained* until the small hours of morning. If that be high praise, the publisher and Colonel Volckmann are welcome to it. The next morning some small doubts nagged my mind. Not only had I failed in my parental obligations, but I couldn't escape feeling that *We Remained* wasn't that good a book. But what had held me to it for three hours? I finally concluded that it could only have been the promise of more exciting things to come. But they never did. This is a difficult conclusion to come to and it certainly was not intended by the author whose prose style is completely unpretentious and almost pedestrian. That is what makes the grip of the book uncanny indeed. There was always the feeling that on the next page or in the next chapter Colonel Volckmann would cut loose and describe some of the truly difficult feats of his guerrilla units. They made the Japanese look like monkeys more than once, but beyond the bare outlines of plans and results Colonel Volckmann is mute.

For example, there was the rescue of Mrs. Osmeña, the wife of the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and her family of six. He tells us that constabulary on duty at checkpoints on the Baguio-Manila road were induced to record falsely the passing of the Osmeña party. But other details of what must have been a quite exciting incident aren't described, even though it was so well planned, rehearsed, and executed that the Japanese didn't know what had happened until the Osmeñas were gone. And so too with other incidents that the author mentions but doesn't develop.

But *We Remained* isn't a failure. Far from it. First it is an excellent unit history of the outfits that made up the "United States Armed Forces, Northern Luzon," and secondly it is a fairly comprehensive case history of how to organize guerrilla units behind the lines of an occupation army.

Colonel Volckmann's final chapter has to be mentioned separately. In it he discussed the prospects of guerrilla activities in an atomic war. He believes that the greater dispersion of forces that will be practiced will create fluid battle situations and isolated actions that will be "a setting ideal for guerrilla warfare."

In contrast to *We Remained* is *Irregulars, Partisans and Guerrillas,* an anthology of guerrilla warfare, edited by Irwin R. Blacker. What Mr. Blacker has done is to assemble accounts of guerrillas that are bloody and meaty with the details Colonel Volckmann shunned. There are guerrillas here who fought against Napoleon in Russia and against Morgan in Panama; with Robert Rogers' Rangers in the French and Indian Wars and with Mosby at Harper's Ferry; with Smuts in South Africa and with Lawrence in Arabia; with the French Maquis and the Polish Underground; with Mihailovic's Chetniks and Tito's Croats; with Popski's Private Army in North Africa and Wingate's Chindits

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in Burma.

This is only a partial listing but these stories have what Colonel Volckmann's story doesn't have: details of what happened and how. The stories Mr. Blacker selected are of uneven quality. But there are many other terribly dramatic and revealing stories in this book.

I rather think that this anthology will be must reading for future students of guerrilla warfare tactics and expect to find it on the supplementary reading lists of the service schools. And therefore there is one blemish that should be mentioned. Mr. Blacker's comments that introduce each of the stories are too often fragmentary and sometimes misleading.

It should be added that Mr. Blacker acknowledges his indebtedness to the late Colonel Joseph I. Greene, long the editor of this magazine, thus attesting again the widespread influence Joe Greene had on the military literature of the past 15 years.

Freeman's Last Volume

GEORGE WASHINGTON: A BIOGRAPHY
Volume Six, Patriot and President
By Douglas Southall Freeman
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954
502 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50

Reviewed by
LYNN MONTROSS

Toward the end of a June day in 1953, Douglas Southall Freeman wrote three sentences with his usual care for the niceties of expression. They were destined to be not only the last paragraph of the sixth volume of his unfinished biography of George Washington, but also the last words of a career devoted to American history. For Dr. Freeman died suddenly that evening at the age of sixty-seven, and historical scholarship in this country has been the poorer ever since.

So rich was his contribution that this is one of the rare instances when a book reviewer finds the author of a biography hardly secondary in interest to his subject. The project itself was famous. Here, for once, historical scholarship rode in a carriage instead of plodding along on foot. Financial support had been provided generously by the Guggenheim Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Dr. Freeman, like a general in the field, commanded his own trained staff of loyal, devoted assistants—researchers, editors and librarians as well as competent clerical helpers.

Surely, it seemed, the product must be a completely satisfactory life of a subject who had eluded other biographers just as he balked portrait painters in his own day. Yet there is something lacking in Freeman's *Washington,* too. As a well documented reference work, the six volumes merit superlatives. But they can only be disappointing on the whole to the reader expecting that nobility of phrase and conception which so often distinguished *R. E. Lee* and *Lee's Lieutenants.*

Freeman's *Washington* is pedestrian in comparison. It is factual historical writing at its best. But it is not Freeman at his best.

Volume Five, it may be recalled, dealt with Washington the general during the last years of the Revolution. The present volume sees him through a period of postwar retirement at Mount Vernon, followed by a first term as president. Thus the seventh and final volume of the unfinished work would have covered Washington's second term and last years, and the author planned to end with his own summaries and conclusions.

Since this could not be, Volume Six includes an introduction by Dumas Malone and a prefatory note by Dr. Freeman's historical associate, Mary Wells Ashworth. Here the reader will find a detailed description of the methods and working habits of the Richmond newspaper editor who turned historian.

Few facts have been overlooked in Dr. Freeman's meticulously documented pages, bristling with footnotes in three digits. The first chapter of Volume Six presents Washington as the returned warrior of 1784, savoring contentment as a country gentleman at Mount Vernon. This was the life he loved best, but it was soon to be interrupted again when his countrymen made him their first chief executive.

Even during this four-year interlude as private citizen, his fame attracted a horde of visitors who almost literally ate him out of house and home. While providing food and wine for these guests, Washington became so pinched for cash in the summer of 1788 that he was three months late in paying the rector his pew rent of £5. He was further humiliated by having to put off the sheriff of Fairfax County when that official called to collect money due on Mount Vernon.

Added to the embarrassment of debts were Washington's attacks of "ague and fever," followed by rheumatic pains. He dosed himself so prodigiously with red bark on one occasion that he cured the fever but incurred a violent skin eruption and could not shave for a fortnight.

It was a tired and aging man of fifty-seven, in short, who responded none too eagerly to the call of his country by taking the oath as President at New York in 1789. Always a realist, he was not sanguine about the Constitution he had helped to frame. But enthusiasm was not the great man's outstanding trait, and nobody did more to make the Constitution "work" in practice.

The phrase "Washington slept here" loses a good deal of its hackneyed humor after the reader has jogged along with the father of his country on horseback or in coaches from New Hampshire to Georgia and westward to the forests of present-day Ohio. He wanted to see for himself the state of America, and in the boneshaking process he must have rested his weary head in enough inns to fill the pages of a thick guidebook.

During his travels he revisited, without much show of emotion, nearly all of his former battlefields. At Valley Forge, years after the crisis of the Revolution, was chiefly interested in a field of bu wheat which reminded him of his exp ments at Mount Vernon. And at Tren the scene of his most brilliant generals he left not a single reminiscent wor a diary entry recording that he went ing for perch in the Delaware.

Washington's problems, vexations triumphs as President are covered in tail. His social life while in office is given the full treatment in Volume For that matter, the biography as a wl is muscular with fact, and it could sel be accused of lacking objectivity—a ch which has been leveled with some c at Freeman's books about the Confeder On the other hand, it is hard to bel that the Richmond editor's heart wa his latest work as it was when he w about Lee and his lieutenants.

Only a carping reviewer, however, w fail to recognize that the achievement Freeman's busy lifetime rose above criticisms. Until the last few years, l be remembered, military history was quently considered a poor relation of the professors were pleased to call "s history." The two historians who done most to erase such distinctions Samuel Eliot Morison and the late D las Southall Freeman, both of them wo successors to a tradition of American torical writing which once gloried Parkman, a Motley and a Prescott.

After Math

THE COMPLEAT STRATEGYST
By J. D. Williams
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 19
234 Pages; Illustrated; Index;

Reviewed by
COL. WM. C. FOOTE

The title page and the front blurb state this book is "a primer on the t of games of strategy." If so, it's quite primer to this reviewer. Another ir series of RAND Corporation research ies, Mr. Williams' book develops "theory of game strategy" step by fortunately for the average or below age reader.

According to the Preface, know of the Game Theory is mostly held b tight (close-brained, not inebriated) fessional group which has been devel the subject, and by another and group that has been exposed to it. this knowledge is being offered gloomy minded would say inflicte those lay persons who can obtain this and peruse it. Perusal alone won't results, except for the humor and th of it. To get the meat requires caref tention, analytical thinking, and a and paper; and, lest we forget it, a and active recollection of "higher" metic to include negative numbers sonal check book balances excepted spots you'll find recourse to some of algebra a help, particularly probab

eterminants, and even permutations and ombinations.

The author and Charles Satterfield, the lustrator, have collaborated well to blend y phrases and clever cartoon illustrations. robably Chapter 1 presents more proof f this than do the other chapters, but ere are other samples of both scattered rough this book to ease the mental efrts of the reader.

Naturally this "primer" ("primer" to e artillerist) introduces us to a new and ief vocabulary: "oddment," "dominance," addle-points," "game matrix," "maxmin" d "minmax" and lastly, "value of the me." All these aren't strangers to us, t they are newly defined as applied to e Game Theory. Be it noted that "stratgy" here differs from the common contation of that term, "A strategy is a an so complete that it cannot be upset enemy action or by Nature," but "it ust be utterly complete and it may be terly bad."

We find that the Game Theory is edited with the successful "accounting the distribution of deaths in Prussian my Corps due to kicks from horses," d "with the assertion that the method just as applicable to the distribution of rses kicked to death by Prussians."

This is not an easy book to go through, ce to work out all the problems in it d to check the illustrative problems reire concentration and perseverance, two alities equally applicable to courtship d to war.

dvocate or Historian?

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II:
THE ORGANIZATION AND ROLE OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES
By John D. Millett, Ph.D., LL.D.
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954
494 Pages; Index; $4.25

viewed by
L. George J. B. Fisher

The author, now president of Miami iversity, served on the staff of Lt. Gen. hon B. Somervell and during the war official historian of the Army Service ces. In discussing the controversies that ed color to the history of ASF he apaches them, as is probably inevitable, n the viewpoint of the inner office of grand architect of the Pentagon build-

It is obvious from this account why nany controversies should have arisen ing the stormy existence of ASF. Many hem started as reactions to actions ini-d by General Somervell; and the iniaction is not always easy to justify, by so skillful a writer as Dr. Millett. his volume brings out the essential that it is impossible to understand without understanding the personaliof its commander. General Somervell a good deal of thought to the idea of *mand*. He was selected to head one he three operating—or "command"—groups which the War Department established in 1942, yet the congeries represented by ASF was the least receptive to the kind of command procedure that Somervell typified. The only real command, in the full military meaning of that word, within this triangular setup was the Army Air Forces. It was given to neither AGF nor ASF to command in the course of military operations. Within ASF, actually the command role was administrative rather than military. Had General Somervell been more considerate of this distinction, had he exercised his command functions more in the pattern of General Marshall, there would have been better response to his leadership and less of contention to cloud the solid accomplishments of ASF.

A possible fault in this volume lies in the fact that the commanding general's views are necessarily relevant to an understanding of the Army Service Forces. Yet the author serves as an advocate of those views to an extent that weakens his role as a historian.

The principal mission of General Somervell, as head of the Army Service Forces, was to relieve the Chief of Staff of the burden of directly supervising the business affairs and much of the administrative routine of the War Department. This Somervell accomplished to a degree that was undoubtedly satisfactory to General Marshall. Had he invariably hewed closer to this objective, he could have served his chief even better.

One basic issue of continuing importance which the author presents well from the service viewpoint, is that of the proper relationship between military and civilian authority in the mobilization of industry for war. In the histories published by the civilian wartime agencies the position is steadily taken that the uniformed services were driving toward control of the industrial economy of the nation. It is time that the position of the Army in this matter should be clearly stated, and this Professor Millett has done. He states that Somervell's aim was not to encroach upon civilian prerogatives, but rather to prevent the War Production Board from assuming direct control of military procurement. This aim reflected the studied and long-standing policy of the War Department, rather than General Somervell's own concept, yet the vigor with which Somervell maintained it may have contributed to the fear by Mr. Donald Nelson and his associates that the military had dark designs upon the whole industrial structure.

In the Industrial Mobilization Plan there was a provision that, in case war broke before needed civilian agencies were set up, the Army-Navy Munitions Board would serve temporarily in the capacity of a production control authority; this, however, was merely a contingent and at best an interim measure which never had to be put into effect. Neither the Army nor the Navy had any desire to become involved in the wartime controls of industry, while both were strongly opposed to surrending their responsibilities in procuring what was needed in order to meet military and naval objectives. In a democracy at war the matter of proper relationships on the procurement front is of transcendent importance. In presenting the Army's position during World War II, a position supported by the Director of War Mobilization (Hon. James F. Byrnes), this volume makes an important contribution to the historical record.

How Not to do It

THE REASON WHY
By Cecil Woodham-Smith
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954
287 Pages; Illustrated; $4.00

Reviewed by
Lt. Col. Donovan Yeuell, Jr.

Just one hundred years ago the charge of the Light Brigade took place near the resort seaport of Balaclava. This famous cavalry action into the Valley of Death has been branded as one of the greatest military blunders. Blame for ordering the charge was never clearly fixed, and for generations a violent controversy raged among the principals.

The book offers valuable thought-stimulation for officers who aspire to high command and staff positions, because the specific errors of leadership, tactics, administration, organization, and training are so glaring that they should stand in one's memory as almost perfect examples of how not to do it.

The key British generals at Balaclava sadly lacked the quality to make and seize opportunities for victory. They were setpiece, garrison generals. Balaclava hinged on Lord Raglan, the army commander; Lord Lucan, the cavalry division commander; and Lord Cardigan, the Light Cavalry Brigade commander. Their lives make fascinating reading and paint a vivid picture of Britain a century or so ago.

The army commander, Lord Raglan, was sixty-five when he entered the Black Sea and hadn't seen action since Waterloo. (He confused his staff by referring to the French allies as "the enemy.") Raglan lacked both ability and vigor, and by favoring his friend, Cardigan, brought about circumstances wherein the Light Brigade commander could and did bypass his long-time foe and superior, Lord Lucan of the cavalry division. The Crimea was ideal cavalry country, and the proper use of horse soldiers was critical to the campaign. Yet, partly because of the unhealthy relationship among Raglan, Lucan, and Cardigan, and partly as a result of their shortcomings and the flaws in the system, the cream of British cavalry never played its part. In reconnaissance, pursuit, and foraging, the cavalry was poorly handled. Often it was withheld when the time was ripe to commit it; at other times it was thrown frontally against infantry and artillery when it should have flanked.

The first half of the book dwells on the

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN: The Prairie Years and The War Years. By Carl Sandburg. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954. 762 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50. Carl Sandburg has condensed his six-volume study of Lincoln into a one-volume life which will undoubtedly become the standard in its field.

THE ADMIRAL AND THE EMPRESS. By Lincoln Lorenz. Bookman Associates, 1954. 194 Pages; Index; $3.50. John Paul Jones fights, and beats, the Russian conspiracy against him while he was in the service of Catherine the Great. The parallel of Russia in the early 1800s and Russia today is brought out rather forcefully.

AMBASSADORS IN ARMS: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion. By Thomas D. Murphy. University of Hawaii Press, 1954. 315 Pages; Illustrated; $6.00. The story of one of World War II's finest fighting outfits, written in a sympathic vein.

AMERICA'S RESOURCES OF SPECIALIZED TALENT: The Report of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training, Prepared by Dael Wolfle, Director. Harper & Brothers, 1942. 332 Pages; Index; $4.00. "An impressive body of information" of the highest importance to military personnel experts and future commanders.

THE BUFFALO HUNTERS. By Mari Sandoz. Hastings House, 1954. 372 Pages; Illustrated; $4.50. 1867 and the thundering herd written with color and historical accuracy by the author of *Old Jules*.

THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION 1763-1775. By Lawrence Henry Gipson. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 287 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. A re-examination of the causes of the War for Independence.

THE CONCISE USAGE AND ABUSAGE: A Modern Guide to Good English. By Eric Partridge. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1954. 219 Pages; $3.50. How not to make the common mistakes. The word "concise" in the title is well chosen.

EXPLAINING THE ATOM. By Selig Hecht. The Viking Press, Inc., 1954. 237 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. Revised to include material on the H-bomb. One of the better explanations for laymen.

FIFTY YEARS IN CHINA: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador. Random House, 1954. 346 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. Our Ambassador in China at the time of the Communist victory tells of his long service in that country. The author does not minimize the Communist threat and is against compromise. Preface by General George C. Marshall.

GEORGE WASHINGTON, Volume VI, "Patriot and President." By Douglas Southall Freeman. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. 529 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50. The latest in the important series which Dr. Freeman could not finish before his death.

THE GUN DIGEST, 9th Edition, 1955. Edited by John T. Amber. The Gun Digest Company. 224 Pages; Illustrated; $2.00. The latest edition of what is now a standard annual work. Any gun bug worthy of the name will have a copy.

INDONESIA: LAND OF CHALLENGE. By Margueritte Harmon Bro. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 263 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. The wife of a United States Embassy attaché records her impressions of 18½ months in Indonesia.

IRREGULARS, PARTISANS, GUERRILLAS. Edited by Irwin R. Blacker. Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1954. 487 Pages; $5.00. A stirring collection of exciting short stories and fragments illustrating actual incidents.

JAPAN'S DECISION TO SURRENDER. By Robert J. C. Butow. Stanford University Press, 1954. 259 Pages; Index; $4.00. Dr. Butow, on the basis of hitherto untapped information, decides that neither the atomic bomb nor Russia's entry into the war was the decisive element that led to VJ-day.

THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN. By Stefan Lorant. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1954. 256 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. A very short book for the subject but well done within the limits embodied by its length. The illustrations are profuse and pertinent.

THE MAGNIFICENT MITSCHER. By Theodore Taylor. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954. 364 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. A biography of the air admiral whose carriers helped to blast the Japanese from the Pacific.

THE MARSHALLS: INCREASING THE TEMPO. By Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr. and Lt. Col. John A. Crown. Historical Branch, G3 Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954. 188 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.25. Another in the well-illustrated series of monographs covering Marine actions in World War II.

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. Funk and Wagnalls, 1954. 602 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.00. This book examines the influence of war on civilizations in the western world from Meggido in 1479 B.C. to Lepanto in 1571 A.D.

THE NEW WARFARE. By Brigadier C. N. Barclay. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1954. 65 Pages; $2.75 The editor of the *Army Quarterly,* the famous British magazine, develops the idea that existing conditions are "the new warfare" and will last for many years.

THE PASSPORT. By Saul Steinberg. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 224 Pages; $5.00. Another Steinberg collection; Steinberg fans will appreciate it and others, as usual, will be thoroughly puzzled.

POWER AND POLICY: U. S. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age. By Thomas K. Finletter. Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954. 402 Pages; $4.50. A former Secretary of the Air Force and State Department official reappraises America's military and foreign policy as integrated and inseparable parts of the same problem.

THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT. By Peter F. Drucker. Harper & Brothers, 1954, 404 Pages; Index; $5.00. The author of *Concept of the Corporation* and *The New Society* surveys the field of business management—a subject which has become of increasing interest to the Army.

THE RENO COURT OF INQUIRY. By Col. Wm. A. Graham. The Stackpole Company, 1954. 305 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. A condensed version of the substance of the evidence given before the Military Committee of the House of Representatives in 1879. A vital record for those interested in the Custer legend.

REUNION. By Merle Miller. The Viking Press, 1954. 345 Pages; $3.95. Fiction. Eight men who shared a desperate hour on the battlefield have a reunion complete with a killer and an intended victim.

SPIES FOR THE BLUE AND GRAY. By Harnett T. Kane. Hanover House, 1954. 311 Pages; Index; $3.50. A famous novelist lends his touch to the "cloak and dagger" portion of a war that made spying and penetration into the enemy's country less difficult than normal.

THE STORY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Text by Dumas Malone, pictures by Hirst Milhollen and Milton Kaplan. Oxford University Press, 1954. 282 Pages; Index; $10.00. A beautifully illustrated volume along with an inspired text that should help any American to appreciate one of the basic documents of his government's existence.

THE UNTOLD STORY OF DOUGLAS MacARTHUR. By Frazier Hunt. Devin-Adair Company, 1954. 533 Pages; Maps; $5.00. A sympathetic biography by a long-time friend and disciple and noted radio commentator.

THE VIET-MINH REGIME: Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. By Bernard B. Fall. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. 146 Pages; Maps and Charts; $1.75. Solid, scholarly and dull; chock-full of data for those who need it, but hardly the volume for a pleasant evening's reading.

ves of Lucan and Cardigan. The second alf is devoted to the campaign and its ternnath. The campaign, begun as a lark, a tale of poor supply, cholera and death, upid command decisions, frightful staff ork, disregard for the welfare of troops. ideed, there can hardly be a military fun- imental that was not repeatedly violated. The account of the battle of Balaclava is e highlight of the book, painting such ghts as the handsome, stupid, 57-year-old ord Cardigan coolly leading his decimated ght Cavalry Brigade in full-dress, parade- ound formation, down a mile-wide valley o and a half miles long, the sides and d of which were held by greatly superior ces of Russian artillery and infantry. nder withering fire the whole way, the valry had the mission of charging with er and lance, the strong artillery battery the far end of the Valley of Death. To a dier, Mrs. Woodham-Smith's description the battle is quite a bit more useful than nnyson's poem. While exciting and artbreaking, the book is also informative. Hardly a complete account of the Cri- an campaign, *The Reason Why* strikes the root of the evils that destroyed a tish army that should have won. The ps could be better. Military history is served strictly because military op- tions are not treated comprehensively ugh. Still, it is a work generally well tten and easy to read, and more useful a soldier than its blurbs would suggest.

ef and Positive

GUIDEPOSTS TO THE FUTURE:
A New American Foreign Policy
By General William H. Wilbur
Henry Regnery Company, 1954
176 Pages; Index; $2.50

iewed by
J. Gen. H. W. Blakeley

When the Allied forces landed in North ca in 1942, General Wilbur, then a nel, was one of the first winners of the lal of Honor. In the more intellectual s of international affairs, he is almost illy distinguished with an extensive rd of study and personal observation ussia, the Balkans, Japan, Korea, West- Europe and Central America. His is, of course, not primarily military, t is of particular value to military men use it presents with brevity and clarity nmary of our foreign policy during the World War II period, his concept of eaction of other nations to our policies, an outline of what he believes our gn policy should be.

ie combination of brevity (which pre- s consideration of many angles, ifs, uts) and of positive opinion ("It is l-clear that our post-war foreign policy een a dismal failure") results in a versial book, but one that is well- ied and easy to read.

he position in which we find our- ," says General Wilbur, "is a direct of the deliberate, conscious acts of government during the past eight years." He cites our actions in regard to China, Poland, and the Arab world in support of this contention. On the other hand, he gives full credit to our government for its successes in Greece and Turkey, and in the origination and implementation of the Berlin Airlift and the Marshall Plan.

He also discusses the Iranian oil problem and has a particularly interesting chapter on the evaluation of our potential allies. In the case of England he believes that strong conflicting forces within the country have seriously weakened it, and that we have erred in providing "funds to finance socialist adventures." France, he thinks, cannot be counted on as a primary source for effective action for world peace, but Germany has a great potential in the fight against communism either in the cold war or in another world war if that cannot be avoided. Japan, he believes, can be counted on as an ally.

In regard to Russia, he is in complete agreement with the statement of Secretary of State Dulles: "Power is the key to success in dealing with the Soviet leadership. . . . The Soviet communist leaders themselves possess and exercise great power; they recognize and respect power in others; but they have only contempt for pleading that stems from weakness or fear."

"Mystify, mislead and surprise"

THEY CALLED HIM STONEWALL:
A Life of Lieutenant General T. J. Jackson, C.S.A.
By Burke Davis
Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954
470 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong

American soldiers today generally have too little acquaintance with military history. Nearly all, however, recall Stonewall Jackson's prescription for victory: "always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy if possible." How he accomplished this is less well known. Nor are we today sufficiently familiar with the traits of character, the mind and the methods that made Thomas J. Jackson, C.S.A., the Southern leader most feared in the north. If any general in our military past can serve as a useful model to this generation, it is certainly Stonewall Jackson. Mr. Burke Davis has written the kind of biography of the renowned Confederate leader which will appeal to the layman as well as aid the professional soldier to understand how a ragged and starving army can be transformed into an invincible fighting force.

The great value of this biography is the revelation of the mind and character and fighting methods of its protagonist. It does not pretend to be the profound professional study of tactics and strategy which Henderson gave us over a half century ago (1898). But Henderson made mistakes, some of considerable moment, and he encircled Jackson's brow with a tight-fitting halo.

It is comforting to the ordinary soldier to discover that even Stonewall Jackson erred. He learned about war the hard way. In telling us about the errors of Jackson's acts and the shortcomings of his character, Mr. Davis by no means engages in a muckraking spree, but he does succeed in showing us a human being and not a bronze statue. The anecdotes and characterizations quoted from contemporary letters, diaries and memoirs do not deflate Jackson's reputation. They give fascinating glimpses of Jackson's eccentricities and idiosyncracies which even led some who knew him to question his sanity.

The author notes the problems arising from his excessive zeal for secrecy that left his immediate subordinates in ignorance of his plans and purposes. We are astonished by the constant friction with many of his top officers. But in spite of a few military errors and failures, too often neglected by earlier biographers, we observe, with pride in the achievements of this American soldier, his contributions to the military art in tactics, strategy and even logistics.

Two aspects of Jackson's practice of the art of war are particularly important today. How did he so frequently succeed in mystifying and surprising the enemy? Mr. Davis makes it perfectly clear: because of the incredible mobility of his little army, which in the Valley campaign did not exceed 17,000 men. What gave his army marching ability was not only discipline, training and high morale. It was above all his ability to march light, for, as his lieutenant, Dick Ewell, put it: "The road to glory cannot be followed with much baggage."

We may profitably consider Mr. Davis's book a case history in military leadership. Jackson's will power and robustness in the face of obstacles and disaster were worth thousands of men in action. The friction and shock of war had no terror for him. His boldness and decisive action at high speed snatched victory from defeat. His driving power won battles. Even when he violated some of the basic principles of war, his daring and coolness misled the enemy and gave him victory. His men believed in him and followed him. Mr. Burke Davis deserves the thanks of the American soldier today in so well explaining why.

Colorful and Controversial

STORMY BEN BUTLER
By Robert S. Holzman
The Macmillan Company, 1954
246 Pages; Notes; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
Col. Robert F. Cocklin

Considering the millions of words that have been written about the Civil War and its participants, it is really remarkable that so little attention has been given to Benjamin F. Butler. Certainly, he was one of the most colorful and controversial charac-

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ters of that era, and his varied careers as lawyer, politician, major general, and office holder brought him more publicity than almost any other figure of his day. It could very well be that the utter complexity of the man has overawed prospective biographers.

Picking Ben Butler as a subject opens wide vistas to the biographer. A dynamic and picturesque man, before the Civil War Butler was highly regarded as a most able and skillful lawyer with a penchant for making enemies and money. He was a political power in his own state of Massachusetts although in those years he was never successful in gaining public office.

Since he was active in the militia, Butler managed to maneuver himself a commission as a brigadier general at the outset of the rebellion. Not too long thereafter, President Lincoln found it politic to make him a major general, and he subsequently became the senior major general of the Union Army, to the frequent embarrassment of the Administration. His war years were fraught with controversy. He gained the distinction of causing Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, to issue orders to his army to hang him immediately upon capture as "an outlaw and common enemy of mankind." When Butler took military command of New Orleans, his stern efforts to bring the citizenry to heel earned him the sobriquet, "Butler the Beast," throughout the South. His tenure in New Orleans finally caused so much embarrassment to the Administration, particularly with foreign countries, that he had to be replaced.

Throughout his whole career Butler's associates and relatives always seemed to be able to use his various positions for personal gain, although there never was any definite evidence that Butler took any money for himself from these suspect ventures. Nevertheless, they added more fuel to the fire of discussion that always surrounded him.

This brief sketch of some of the high points of Butler's career can only serve to point up the difficulties of capturing the man on paper. Professor Holzman has done an admirable job within limitations, and certainly his work makes a considerable contribution to the information on the period.

Iroquois and French

THE WHITE AND THE GOLD: The French Regime in Canada
By Thomas B. Costain
Doubleday & Company, 1954
482 Pages; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
COL. C. A. H. THOMSON

Put down the gaudy paper-covered whodunit. Switch off the TV. Give away the tickets to the show. Pick up Costain, and you will know no loss. Here is history so well and imaginatively presented, so skillfully told, that fictional movie or mystery cannot substitute for its rich tapestry.

Warfare? Here are expeditions, ambushes, sieges, sallies; strategy and tactics in the wars of the wilderness. Here is bravery and cowardice, the fantastic story of Adam Dollard who carved himself a place beside Leonidas of Thermopylae, the treachery of Etienne Brulé. Here is psychological warfare, as the indomitable Charles Le Moyne, captured by the Iroquois and on his way to torture and death, talked in native tongue of the disasters that would befall the Long House if anything happened to him—talked so persuasively that the warriors stopped, held a council of war, and paddled him furiously back to the point of his capture and turned him over to friendly Indians. Here are weapons, weapons systems, weapons developments, as gunpowder overwhelms arrow and hatchet, and is adapted to forest warfare.

Politics? Here is the opening of Canada drawn against the intrigues, the ignorance, the competition for prestige and place, the administrative rigidities and stupidities, and the cupidity of the monarchs of England, France and Spain. The interplay between the ambitions and avarice of courts and courtiers in Europe, and the work of founding an Empire in the New World, is told in a hundred ways.

This first in a series of volumes, under Costain's editorship, designed to present Canadian history vividly and completely, brings the story up to the end of the 17th century, to the commencement of the wars with the English.

Australian Air History

AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR OF 1939-1945
Vol. III, AIR WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY 1939-1943

By John Herington
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1954
748 Pages; Maps; Illustrated; Index.

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

"The Austrialian contribution to air fighting against Germany and Italy," says the author of this volume of the series *Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, "consisted in the allocation of a large number of individuals for virtual incorporation within the Royal Air Force rather than the provision of self-sufficient units to work in cooperation with the major forces . . . The spreading, in both time and space, of a comparatively small force among so many major and minor combatant units presents a problems of narration which has, perhaps, never before been attempted on this scale."

This appraisal is certainly an understatement of the type usually considered to be British rather than Australian.

The military historian will find it a valuable reference work. There are occasional interesting comments on matters not strictly within the scope of the volume. For example: "There was some speculation both at the time and later as to the reason why Field Marshal Rommel mained doggedly in siege of the Alam line while the situation became increasi ly adverse for him. . . . Rommel was the position of the greedy monkey w its paw around fruit in a narrow-nec jar—he was unwilling to relinquish prize so nearly within his possession. . He still hoped that, if he could only e his critical supply difficulties, Gern pugnacity and his own sense of tim would yet throw the British off balance give him final victory."

Patch and Float

EPICS OF SALVAGE
By David Masters
Little Brown & Company, 1
234 Pages; $3.50

Reviewed by
RICHARD GORDON MCCLOSKEY

Admiral Cunningham's victory at M pan on 24 March 1941 seemed to have fectively immobilized the Italian Navy. the night of 18 December 1941, six Itali riding on torpedoes, slipped into Alexan harbor behind a British destroyer, eva the elaborate defenses. Early next m ing the battleships *Valiant* and *Q Elizabeth* exploded and sank. All the lians were captured (two, in fact, had imprisoned in the lower reaches of *Va* and sweated out their own explosion out squealing). The two battleships down quietly and sat on the bottom. aerial reconnaissance showed them a ently afloat. Intelligence swung int tion to keep the sinkings secret, and salvage crews toiled to refloat and re The Axis never knew the Mediterra was wide open.

From yarns like this to the great for 590 ingots of gold worth some million dollars, sunk off New Zealand, Masters hops around the world recou choice stories of World War II sa operations. A typical day's work in the of London during the Blitz, the cleari the Suez Canal, how a salvage job o of the Mulberry units was one of the to D-day, how to raise a non-floating ing dock; these are some of the epics with in this book.

Without getting too technical, Mr. ters makes clear some of the techn used in the ever complicated work of r a ship or its cargo. The chapter on e mental diving and salvage work is pa larly interesting. Altogether, this is cinating and exciting book.

Little-Known Confederate

GENERAL EDMUND KIRBY SMITH, C.S.A
By Joseph Howard Parks
Louisiana State University Press, 195
537 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index;

Reviewed by
N. J. ANTHONY

Edmund Kirby Smith was the se ranking full general of the Confe Army, but the service of his peers, a

ne of his subordinates, was so much more lorful as to push him into relative ob- ırity. Indeed, so little has been the in- est in General Smith that some writers n't sure whether his surname was Smith, by Smith, or Kirby-Smith. You'll find erences in indexes under all three.

Smith grew up an "Army brat." Gradu- d from West Point in 1845, he served h distinction as an infantryman in the xican War. He was professor of mathe- tics at West Point, and as a captain ıed the new 2d Cavalry, in company h A. S. Johnston, R. E. Lee, Thomas, rdee, Hood, Van Dorn, Stoneman, and hugh Lee. A native of Florida, he owed his state into the Confederacy.

mith got into action early. When he wounded at First Bull Run he was a adier general. Made major general a months later, he was given command the Cumberland Gap area. During gg's invasion of Kentucky in 1862 he cted the severe defeat on the Union es at Richmond, Kentucky. Promotion owed, and he took over the new Trans- sissippi Department on 7 March 1863. held that command until after the fall ıe Confederacy. By February 1864 he a full general, just under forty years ge.

Vith the Mississippi in Union hands the Confederacy thus cut in half, h's theater was isolated. His job was ake it self-supporting. It was "no bed ses," he lamented, but he succeeded in of local politicians. In this autonomous nand Smith exercised more power than ther general officer in the war. He ap- ed his own civil and military officers. al generals held rank only by his au- y, without confirmation by Richmond. ıstituted a regular system of blockade ng, controlled the cotton market, and had a treasury department of his own. of manpower was his greatest prob- There were too few Confederate teers, and he had to depend on state who were none too ardent.

e greatest triumph of Smith's theater he defeat of Banks's Red River am- us campaign. Historians generally to belittle this campaign, and some it, probably because the Union ander was Banks.

th's command held out after Lee's der. He signed capitulation papers June 1865, the last commander of derate ground forces to throw in the

is the first real biography of the gen- no commanded the largest theater of r, and who held the same important nd longer than any officer on either Like any mortal, Smith made mis- ınd the author makes no attempt to ver them. He has done a fine job, mith's own papers. The only fault hargeable to the author—is the in- cy of the maps. Only two general e provided, and they are useless for itary reader.

Pass In Review

One of the handsomest books to come to our attention in recent months is the new *Soldiers of the American Army 1775-1954* ($12.50) which will be published later this month. With text by Colonel Frederick P. Todd and drawings by Fritz Kredel, the historical background and development of the American soldier are recorded. Twenty-five of the beautiful full-page drawings are reproduced in full color and the uniforms are authentic in detail. This oversize (11 x 14) volume is bound in handsome buckram.

We've just seen an advance copy of Paul I. Wellman's new book, *Glory, God and Gold* ($4.50) sub-titled "An Informal History of the Southwest." This is the second in Doubleday's Mainstream of America series, the first of which was Stewart Holbrook's *The Age of the Moguls.* Wellman's book is a splendid job of writing and his warm picture of the development of our turbulent Southwest is exciting and enjoyable American history.

If you are diplomatic enough to handle the situation, you might be interested in getting your wife a copy of *What Every Woman Should Know About Finance* ($3.50). Seriously, this book should be very useful to service wives who are frequently called upon to run the family's affairs during the absence of their husbands. This book is an introduction to money management, savings, life insurance and investments. You needn't admit it publicly, but there is a lot in this book that husbands could use too.

Colonels Reinhardt and Kintner (who need no introduction to our readers) have revised and up-dated *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat* ($3.95) in a second edition. Portions of this new edition have appeared as articles in this magazine during the past year and we are informed by the publisher that he believes the authors are "closely in step with the constructive suggestions of H. A. DeWeerd in the July issue of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL." The first edition was selected by our editorial board as one of the 12 books to make a distinguished contribution to military literature in 1953. Whether this second edition will merit an oak leaf cluster in 1954 we can't say, but it remains the one book solely devoted to the impact of nuclear weapons on the ground battlefield.

Major General J. F. C. Fuller, the widely-known British military analyst, has a new work called *A Military History of the Western World* ($6.00). We'll be running a full-fledged review in the next issue.

Really good war novels are a rarity. A recent addition that rates membership in this select circle is one about a Confederate soldier in our Civil War—*The Gray Captain* ($3.50) by Jere Wheelwright. You don't have to be a Civil War addict to enjoy this fine book that really brings the smell of combat to your nostrils. Wheelwright paints a poignant picture of a Confederate soldier and the Confederacy itself as it was in a tragic and desperate time.

It's good to see that venerable sea-dog Marc Mitscher getting some recognition. Theodore Taylor has just written a heart-warming biography, *The Magnificent Mitscher* ($4.50) that will help to preserve the tremendous contributions which Mitscher made to the Navy and to his country. "Pete" Mitscher was a sailor's sailor, wore the wings of a flyer and ended up commanding all of the naval aviation in the major invasions in the Pacific during World War II. Mitscher turned down Forrestal's offer to succeed Admiral King as CNO so that he could stay in the fighting war. Shortly after the war was over Mitscher died. Taylor has done a factual but sympathetic job on this biography.

The parade of books about General MacArthur marches on and on. General Blakeley reviewed the Willoughby and Chamberlain book in the last issue of the JOURNAL so for this month we'll just mention Frazier Hunt's *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur* ($5.00). Frankly, I didn't find anything new or untold in the book and can only observe that a man with the brilliant military stature of Douglas MacArthur deserves better treatment than his admirers are giving him.

R.F.C.

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



Army aviators can set world speed records, too. Warrant Officer Billy I. We *(left)* flew the Army's SC-39 Sikorsky helicopter *(above)* 156.005 miles an h a speed that exceeded the previous record of 146.735 miles per hour set by Air Force in 1953. Wester, who is now on duty at the Sikorsky plant in Conn cut, served in Korea with a helicopter transportation company and wears the I with an oak leaf cluster.

THE MONTH'S PICTURES

Knothole in the iron (?) curtain and Sergeant First Class Bushan Boreta and a West German border guard take turns peep

HE ARMY
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The Limits of Free Speech in the Military Service

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U. S. Court of Military Appeals

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"This Is Your Army"

Widely acclaimed documentary film to be shown in 13,000 commercial theaters in U. S.

Major T. P. Furey

"This Is Your Army"—the documentary film that depicts the vast range and scope of Army activities—will soon be seen by civilian moviegoers in the U.S.A. and perhaps later in other countries. Produced originally for the purpose of informing our own troops of the world-wide missions of the Army and how they are being accomplished, "This Is Your Army" was such a whopping success within the Army and won such critical acclaim from professional movie-makers that it was prepared for release as a public service to the 13,000 commercial theaters in the U.S.A. It may well turn out to be one of the finest public information projects the Army has ever launched. To fit it to commercial schedules the movie had to be shortened to 55 minutes from its original 78, but those who have seen both versions say that the shorter version is superior to the original in sustained interest and impact.

The problems involved in producing "This Is Your Army" were monumental by normal motion picture production standards. The selection of material to be photographed, the scheduling of shooting dates, the coordination required for men and equipment to be at the right place at the right time, involved the efforts of thousands of soldiers and Wacs at installations scattered around the world. The cooperation of foreign governments, through U. S. Army Military Missions, was also required. Probably no other motion picture ever entailed the participation of more people.

In preparing scenario and script, it was wisely decided to concentrate upon the people who make up the Army —on their training, duties, and combat capabilities.

In August 1952 the writer assigned to the project made a tour of sixteen major installations to familiarize himself with the Army. The script itself was written at Fort Monroe, Virginia, with the technical advice and assistance of the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces. In September 1952, the Chief of Information and the Secretary of the Army approved the script, and shooti began.



Movietone News, which had the contract, assembl two complete camera crews. One shot scenes in t Continental United States, Alaska, and Panama; t other toured the Far East, Europe, and the Middle Ea Approximately 200,000 feet (40 miles!) of 35mm co film were exposed. In Korea, Signal Corps cameram shot 38,000 feet of color combat scenes, which beca a vital part of the final film.

Every commander was extremely cooperative. (Formosa, for example, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-sh put on a review of 90,000 troops for the cameras.

Climatic conditions sometimes made it difficult secure uniform exposure of the color film. In one we the Continental crew was at Fort Ord filming scenes sea level, at Camp Hale 10,000 feet up in the Colora Rockies, and in the steaming jungles of Panama.

The story behind the public showing is one of g erous cooperation on the part of the motion picture dustry and of enthusiastic support from the high echelons of the Army.

In May 1954, General Ridgway invited top memb of the motion picture industry to the Pentagon to the film. As a result of that conference, the Council Motion Picture Organizations, Inc., arranged for distribution of the film on a non-profit basis.

The film is to have public premieres early in Dec ber in New York City, Washington, D. C., Chicago, Francisco, Los Angeles, Atlanta, and possibly Dal Two hundred and fifty technicolor prints will be av able for widespread distribution.

The reaction of those outside the Army who h seen the film so far has been very favorable. One viewer said, ". . . a topnotch film, a great credit to associated with its production, a picture that every blooded American will appreciate."

A reviewer in *The Hollywood Reporter* wrote: "I good morale-building stuff. To produce it, the A spent funds economically and wisely. They got a of picture."

Parents Magazine will present a Gold Medal Aw of Special Merit to the producers of the film. "(magnificent scene follows another," the magazine's view said, "as if a whole series of prize-winning can shots have been assembled for a masterful display of military strength. Yet the men we see appear so int gent and human that one is never oppressed with a se of impersonal might."

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

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(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

Association's *Journal*

After most of the JOURNAL went to press, the judges in our Association seal contest met to make their selection. Rather than spoil the effect of a full-page announcement in the next issue, we won't announce the winner right now or display the winning design.

There were ninety-nine entries, ranging from mere written descriptions to beautiful paintings on expensive board stock. Many of the entrants forgot, or ignored, that the design was to be the basis of the Association's ROTC medals; their entries, while very worthwhile, were too elaborate for suitable reproduction.

By the time you read this the winner will have received his check for $100. The Executive Council of the Association will decide at the December meeting whether the winning design will be accepted as the official seal of the Association of the United States Army.

THE PUBLISHER.

MEN AND METHODS

. . . Worthy of His Hire. . . . . *Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens*
Faithful to Our Trust. . . . . *Anonymous*
It's Still a Good Idea. . . . . *Lt. Col. J. B. B. Trussell, Jr.*
This Is for You. . . . . *Maj. Gen. James C. Fry*
How to Be a Noncom. . . . . *M/Sgt. Frank J. Clifford*

THE CURRENT SCENE

"This Is Your Army." . . . . . *Maj. T. P. Furey,* **Inside front c**
TRUST: Mission Accomplished. . . . . .
The Limits of Free Speech in the Military Service.
Judge George W. Latimer

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

An Army On Its Toes. . . . . *Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway*
Let's Put Sense in CBR Training. . . . . *Col. John L. Miles*
Night Ambush Patrol. . . . . *Lt. Col. George Juskalian*
Atomic Weapons for the Battalion Commander. . *Col. Frank J. Sackton*

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

Last "Bird Dog" joins the Army

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

Leadership is the Answer

● Colonel Yeuell's ["Soldiering is a Way of Life," September], is one of the best articles I have read about our present-day Army. What we need is more articles like this, and more good leaders to put these things into effect, to make a better army.

I may be stepping on someone's toes, and may get mine stepped on for writing this, but the military leadership of our noncoms is not good.

I'll start at home: As a quick guess I would say that seventy-five per cent of the NCO corps here in Germany are combat veterans of World War II and Korea. The percentage of World War II veterans is small in comparison to Korea veterans because of the large number of World War II veterans lost in Korea. These NCOs must have displayed leadership somewhere, to be promoted to NCO grades. But they don't know their jobs.

One reason is the Korean conflict. When it started, units all over the world were stripped of their top noncoms, who were shipped to Korea. For example, my own unit, the 35th Infantry, was stripped of its noncoms who were shipped to the 24th Division the same day the 35th left its station for Korea. From the history of the gallant 24th Division and other divisions in Korea, it is known what happened to these good soldiers. We were trying to do too much with too little. Unit commanders had to have NCOs, so they made noncoms of what they had at hand. Some unit commanders used sound judgment. Others failed to use good judgment. Result: the Army today is loaded with 1700-hour and payday noncoms.

But our unit commanders won't weed them out. They feel that they did not promote them and should not have to reduce them. That is poor leadership. It is better to have a few good noncoms than a company full of incompetent ones.

The private soldier in Germany is a 24-month draftee. Many of them fail to recognize the commitments of an army that is stationed all over the world to keep Communist aggression away from American soil. They spend two-thirds of their time in the field. This puts a great strain on the noncom, because many times he must work without officers. If there are officers with the platoons, the NCO has double work, because he has to train these officers as well as the privates. This is not a blast at the officer corps. Most of our officers of platoon level are from the ROTC; a good thing in itself, but they need more training before being assigned to troop duty. Leaders are inspired by leaders, and the leadership displayed by these graduates is not of the standard to inspire the leadership of NCOs.

Let's not fool ourselves. We must have a NCO corps of the highest standards if we are to survive as the best army in the world. Let us start by doing the following:

(1) Establish a noncommissioned officer academy, patterned after West Point.

(2) Establish a system of selection for NCOs that can be justified in peace and in war, and not deviate from it by one letter.

(3) So long as we have to meet w commitments, let's have rotation at ba ion level.

(4) So long as we must have a dra army, give the taxpayer something fo money and make the draft for three or more.

(5) Give us back the old first serg

(6) Issue the dress blues to all N of the first three grades.

(7) Demand leadership of the hig standards, and we will have discipline

(8) Give us back some of the old rison life, with spit and polish.

(9) Give us good officers who set example and who know their jobs.

If we have leadership, we will discipline. The two together give us best army in the world. Today we it more than ever.

SFC Walter Joh

Co F, 10th Inf
APO 112, c/o PM, New York, N. Y.

Training Service Troops

● The technical training received by service troops is the best in the world the same standard, the training (after training) in basic military subjects is about the worst.

The average service unit devotes a day a week to training. Here is an e ple of a training schedule:

TI&E	1 hour
Chaplain's talk	1 hour
Lectures or films	2 hours

That's four hours of good time wa The average NCO in these units

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ı out of combat-type units so long he o longer really qualified to teach the ned subjects. Or he may have never ɜd in a combat-type unit. Nor has he time to keep up with the latest in tac- skills. Therefore, most of the time training consists of the lecture being from a book or training films that ten or more years old. If these are ıvailable, the training period is given to care and cleaning of clothing and ɔment or the good old art of pressing ɜets.

ıe results of this became all too clear orea when service units had to fight. ıe best thing would be to do away the weekly training periods and set vo or three thirty-day training cycles year.

ıe thirty-day periods should be solidly ed to training—night and day. There d be thirty days of living in the field : combat conditions; no passes or ɜnds off. The instructors should be ɜs and NCOs who really know their ess.

having two or three cycles a year ɜould be rotated for this training and no serious drain on the operations of nit.

d why not bring back the old weekly school for all NCOs? This was where s members of the staff and special ıs gave talks on the organization and ions of their activity. This was a help in knowing what the other fel- ɜas doing. And it creates mutual re- ımong all members of the team.

is a well-known fact that a well- l soldier lives a hell of a lot longer. ɜtart learning how to live.

SFC Raymond R. Bowles
Sub-Area QM
174, c/o PM, New York, N. Y.

ry Trappings & Tradition

ɜ "New Army" as advocated by Gen- avin calls for a highly mobile, small- sterner type of combat team. This ıas the advantage over the older con- f divisions in that it will be more ıstaining and will not require the pport services to back it up. It will ıighly mobile combat force of elite and men augmented by the tre- us firepower it will possess in new ɔnventional and atomic weapons.

staff this highly effective striking ve must have the finest soldier in ɔrld. To get him we must restore ɜstige, discipline, education and tra- l aspects of the Old Army that Colo- ıell advocates [September]. No one be blind to the value of military n. Everything should be done to d keep alive in the New Army the that were inspiring and glorious of l Army. The spit and polish and rious heritage of military tradition be taught the young recruit. Pride ıizations, of uniform, of service, and flag and country should be his ıdments.

It is folly to suppose that a military man does not want a uniform that is eloquent and apart. Satisfy the craving for uniforms and emblems of distinction, for that military glamour and display which breeds pride and inspiration, for military formations with banners and bands, for the prestige, honor and recognition that go with these things. Thus with "quality not quantity" as our guidon, we can proceed to organize an army of leaders. . . .

As Colonel Yeuell puts it, "Soldiering Is A Way Of Life."

Capt. Frank D. Yturria
USAF (VC)
APO 928,
c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

Letters from England

● I did not realize that Major Paget's article on the British regimental system [June] would create such interest among your readers.

We, in Britain, see many U. S. service men but the visit of British soldiers to your shores must be a very rare event.

Surely in these days of Anglo-American cooperation, visits could be arranged from both sides in order to foster relations and create greater understanding between the armies of both countries.

The cost of such visits would be very small compared with the good will that would certainly ensue. I am a member of the Territorial Army but I know very little about the National Guard, and I feel sure that many members of the Nationl Guard know very little of the Territorial Army. Yet both are serving the same purpose and the same cause.

Sgt. E. Tampin
16th Airborne Div. Sig. Rgmt. (T.A.)
(Middlesex Yeomanry)
London, England

● From various articles in your Journal



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
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and more particularly "Cerebrations" and letters from your readers, I am reminded of a conclusion I drew in Korea—that our armies are very similar in outlook. We both suffer from those who moan "It's a married man's Army" and those who insist on "doing it their way." I am convinced that if the common soldiers of our armies could get together there would be an awful lot of surprised and delighted men on both sides. When I was in Korea, my battery commander became very friendly with the O. C. of Battery C, 936th Field Artillery and we frequently interchanged men among gun detachments for a week at a time. The spirit of comradeship between our two units was remarkable after a few such interchanges.

BTRY. SGT. I. V. HOGG
School of Artillery
Larkhill
Wiltshire, England

Marine on Helicopters

● Having participated in several battalion-size helicopter-borne movements while a member of the 2d Marine Division, I read with particular interest "Exercise Lift" by Major James Douglas [November]. . . . there are a few points mentioned that stir me to comment.

Major Douglas mentions that difficulties were encountered in the planning phase of the operation his battalion conducted because "there was very little background information to study." Now I'm not honking the Marine Corps' horn (we don't have to usually), but why didn't the major draw a jeep from the Wolfhounds' motor pool and bounce over to the CP of the 1st Marine Division where he would have found many officers versed in the intricacies of planning and conducting a helicopter operation and who would have been glad to display a little interservice cooperation? No sense in fumbling around in the dark when there is someone available to help light the way.

The major poured cold water on some helicopter enthusiasts by mentioning, "We . . . needed two hours to move an understrength battalion." With the type choppers illustrated that is understandable, but bigger and better whirlybirds are on the way, some of them capable of lifting a platoon and transporting it at much higher speeds than at present. [As for] the helicopter being a sitting duck for enemy aircraft, the chopper is still the only mode of transport I know of that can go up, down, sideways, and backward, and if necessary, pause to take cover behind a hill. Try hitting that from a jet.

One vitally important point Major Douglas did not cover [is that] in a helicopter move a copter may not be a duck in the air but once on the ground and unloading it makes a target for ground troops impossible to miss. Security of the area *before* the unit lands is imperative. Because of this I would suggest that the manual the major calls for include a chapter or two on the subject of a pathfinder-s platoon to be parachuted into the prop landing area minutes before the main b arrives to secure the area and to guide aircraft in.

CAPT. JOHN L. L
USMC
Co B, 1st Recruit Training Bn
Parris Island, S. C.

50th Anniversary Issue (Cont'd.)

● . . . the Fiftieth Anniversary Issu THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a very fine edition [of] which you every reason to be proud.

I read Colonel Dupuy's article with greatest interest. He has captured flavor as well as the history of the A during the past fifty years in a very curate and interesting manner. Ha been a part of the Army for thirty-s of these years, I can vouch for botl flavor and accuracy. It is exceptio well done.

With best wishes to the Associatio the United States Army and its Jou for another fifty years of constructive e

J. E. HULL
General, U.S. A
Hq. Far East Command
& United Nations Command
c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

● . . . Colonel Dupuy's article and introduction thereto are most excellent bring back to me many memories o service through the past forty years. I not say that I can trace back a close ciation over the full period covered my first acquaintance with the Army b in 1904 and I think throughout this od Colonel Dupuy's article covers vividly those times and conditions.

W. M. HOGE
General, U.S.
Hq. U.S. Army, Europe
c/o PM, New York, N. Y.

● I read with great interest and sat tion Colonel Dupuy's article and th troduction to it. I thought the arti splendid one and very fitting for you niversary number. . . .

A. C. MCAULIFFE
Lieutenant General, U.S.
Hq. Seventh Army
c/o PM, New York, N. Y.

● I . . . thoroughly enjoyed Colone puy's article which brought back memories.

I also wish to express my congratul to the JOURNAL for the fine service performed, not only for the personn the combat arms, but for all memb the Army in keeping them abreast o rent military thinking. It is my hop this mission will be continued in the outstanding manner for many yea come.

W. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.
Hq. U.S. Forces, Austria
c/o PM, New York, N. Y.

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

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r loading tough, heavy materials as on this airport con-uction job, the HD-20G is in a class by itself. Large ılders fit easily into the 9-ft, 2¾-in. wide bucket. Con-lled tilt enables operator to ease heavy boulders into ck.

Breaking up and loading old asphalt is a punishing job that demands the strength of the world's largest Tractor Shovel. Here the Allis-Chalmers HD-20G rips up an old air strip and loads the rubble into hauling units.



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An Army On Its Toes

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY

Condensed from an address before the National Guard Association

IN its military meaning, mobility can be defined as the ability to shift striking power. In a sense, the effective strength of a military force—the strength which can be applied against the enemy—is multiplied many times by mobility. Combined with proper use of the principles of the objective, of deception, security, surprise, offense, and economy of force, it can give local numerical superiority over an enemy whose over-all strength is greater than our own. Its importance, therefore, in any conflict between us and enemy masses which we might have to face, is strikingly obvious, as would be our peril, should our mobility not exceed that of an enemy of that kind.

Mobility exists in a number of forms. There is tactical mobility—the ability to shift striking power on the battlefield. And there is strategic mobility, which in its simplest form, might be described as the ability to shift striking force *to* the battlefield, or from one battlefield to another battlefield. This phase of mobility in particular has numerous ramifications, some of which I shall touch upon later.

In the tactical sense, the most obvious form of mobility is the *capability* of moving military units. But, since military mobility is essentially the movement of striking power, the transportability of troops is not its only criterion. Another important aspect is to be found in the flexibility of firepower—the ability to place concentrations of the proper kind of fire upon the right type of targets, and to do it with the necessary number of weapons in minimum time. At the moment, I am thinking principally of the fires of modern artillery, including guided missiles and free ones, or rockets.

UNTIL the development of the range capabilities of modern artillery, the weight of artillery firepower could be brought to bear only at a comparatively short distance from the location of the guns. If a crisis developed at some area of the battlefield beyond the limits of their range, their firepower could be applied only by moving the guns near enough to the new target to engage it.

Today, thanks to the ranges of modern artillery and the efficiency of modern communications, such dramatic physical movement is not so often necessary. The same result is achieved—much more rapidly and just as effectively—merely by traversing or elevating the guns to fire on a new target. Thus, the cannoneers who the handwheels to move their fire to another target in fact, shifting striking power, and hence are hel to achieve mobility on the battlefield.

In both these senses—the physical movement of tr and the flexibility of firepower—the Army's tactical bility is being steadily increased.

WE are working painstakingly to develop and r available to our forces improved transportation on the ground and in the air. One of the more stri changes in the Army's mobility is in our increasing of aircraft. The light aircraft which made its debi an artillery spotter in World War II has taken on a of new missions, making possible more effective mand supervision, closer liaison, and more rapid re naissance. There is, too, the vitally significant us the helicopter, which proved its value again and a in Korea. We are working toward helicopters or vertiplanes of greatly increased cargo capacity to en us to transport tactically significant numbers of men quantities of equipment and supplies into nearly sort of terrain. I may say that a great deal more prog in this field especially, is eminently to be desired is unceasingly being sought.

Mobility on the ground has been improved by new armored personnel carriers for the rapid mover of infantrymen on the battlefield. The entire fami Army vehicles is under constant scrutiny with an to desirable substitution, or augmentation, by new de in the interest of bettering our mobility. Also, our gr mobility has been helped by increased availabilit armored units.

In a very fundamental sense, we are looking to important changes in the Army, among which creased mobility will certainly figure prominently. U the supervision of General Dahlquist, of the Cont tal Army Command, a far-reaching study is taking to determine the changes in organization, tactics, equipment which changes in weapons and tran capabilities are making advisable. Some indicatio the shape of the future Army have already been ceived. It appears that our units must be smaller, f and more self-sufficient than those of today. They be characterized by the use of swift communicat

vy firepower, and—needless to say—great mobility. ›ve all, *mental* mobility will be a prerequisite for :essful military operations. Static thinking, geared ›ast dependence on long, fixed lines of communica- s and great depot systems, cannot be tolerated. New ics will reflect the necessity for forces in the field to :ate with a minimum of impedimenta. The direc- of our effort is expressed in the words of the Con- :rate General Ewell: "The road to glory cannot be ›wed with much baggage." Excess baggage can be ıtal just as well as physical. In the tests to be con- ted in two divisions this fall, the Army hopes to :e further progress in establishing the outline of the ting unit of the future—a unit that can live and win ıny battlefield, atomic or otherwise.

'oncerning the other aspect of tactical mobility which entioned—the flexibility of firepower—great strides ɜ also been made and others can be anticipated. Both ange and in destructiveness, the 280mm gun, the poral guided missile, and the Honest John free et constitute significant increases in our potential the delivery of striking power. These weapons are he hands of troops, but they are also undergoing inual testing which will lead to improvement and attainment of still further capabilities. In addition, r weapons of novel capability, some of them for ialized uses and all of them adding to the over-all bility and volume of our firepower, are under de- pment.

s for improving our strategic mobility, the Army's bility in this respect is not within our control to as t a degree as it is in the case of our tactical mobility.

E importance of the strategic mobility of the Army :mphasized by the fact that it is our *strategic* mobility h will largely determine the promptness with which nd troops can exploit the effects of strategic air ks upon the enemy. Strategic mobility also is an ›rtant element in determining the speed with which 'orces could develop the strength to launch a coun- :ensive to defeat an attacking enemy in a strategic

ıe aspect of Army capability for strategic mobility h we can influence is deployment. A number of rs have influenced the decision to withdraw some ır ground combat units from some of their over- ıded positions. One of these has been that by group- ›ur forces at more centrally located areas we have ased our strategic mobility, since we are thus able ift these troops more readily to any one of several ons.

ith respect to expeditious long distance movements :ces, however—a field which is essentially outside Army's control—the picture is less bright. The y to move forces rapidly to or between theaters of tions is dependent on the troop and cargo capacities ɜ Air Force and the Navy. Of equal significance ir capacity to transport the required logistical sup- and to do so on a continuing basis.

consider the air-transport problem alone, the Army is concerned with low-cost cargo-carrying capacity, not with supersonic speed. We are interested in the ability to land on unimproved terrain, where huge, hard-surfaced runways might not be available. And we are vitally interested in adequate numbers of aircraft—in terms of capacity—to meet our essential requirements for troop and cargo movement.

Unfortunately, the many serious problems faced by the Navy and Air Force in meeting these and their many other important responsibilities do not presently present a bright picture for the near future.

THERE is another matter bearing on our total mobility which I should like to discuss briefly. That is capability for rapid mobilization. While the capacity for speed in mobilization is not a form of mobility itself, it is an essential prerequisite for initial strategic mobility. In this area, too, we confront disturbing deficiencies.

By constituting a force available for mobilization, the National Guard has served the Nation nobly in the past. I know that it will serve the Nation with equal gallantry in any future emergency. The Army Reserve also performed invaluable service during the mobilization for World War II and in Korea, and would do so again.

The situation today, however, is much more critical than any we have faced in the previous history of our Nation. If war came, we could expect no extended period of grace during which to mobilize, train, and transport our Reserve forces to where they will be vitally needed. An attack could come almost instantaneously, with little or no warning, and could be delivered simultaneously against widely separated points. Accordingly, we must prepare ourselves *now*.

In order to meet the necessities of such a situation if it should occur, we need not merely large numbers of trained men in the reserve components, but units, with their members accustomed to working with each other and with their equipment, ready for service with minimum training and orientation. This is a need of which the Army is acutely aware and which it is intensively working to fulfill, a need which the members of the National Guard fully appreciate.

THE dangers we live with today are great. The potential of the threat which faces us is massive in weight and uncompromising in objective. If we should have to meet it on the battlefield, we must expect to be outnumbered. Therefore, we must multiply our *effective* strength to the maximum.

One successful way of doing so is through ever increasing mobility which, combined with the constantly increasing firepower of our Army and the quality which derives from the skill, the stamina, and the determination of our fighting men, can help to offset the numerical superiority of our potential enemy. However, military capacity is still effective in large measure in proportion to the number of fighting men who can bring that military capacity to bear directly upon the enemy. There always exists the need for a strong reserve of highly trained, highly organized, and readily available fighting men.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

New Deputy CG

Brigadier General Ernest A. Barlow is the new Deputy Commandant of The Infantry Center, succeeding Colonel Wolcott K. Dudley, who has retired. General Barlow was formerly Chief of Staff of the Third Army. In another shift, Colonel Thomas Mifflin, Director of the TIS Weapons Department, has replaced Colonel John M. Hightower as Deputy Assistant Commandant of TIS.

Marksman Leaves TIS

Lt. Col. Ellis Lea, U. S. Army pistol team captain since 1952, is now Assistant Executive Officer of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice in Washington. Col. Lea had served with the Small Arms Group of TIS's Weapons Department since 1952. He has won 417 shooting awards and is regarded as one of the nation's finest marksmen. Under his leadership the Army took 694 team and individual prizes in sectional, regional and national pistol competition.

Rifle Firing Data Card

A new firing data card has been approved after several months of experiment by classes at TIS. The new data card looks like the old one, but there are several differences. The record squares for sustained fire are now the same size as those for slow fire. The "remarks" column and individual "call bulls" have been removed from the record squares. So that the firer can determine more easily the relationship between "calls" and "hits," a "call target" of the same size as the "hit target" has been placed next to the "hit target." The firer plots each shot in the call target by number, just as he does on the hit target. The transition table remains the same.

New Reference Data Available

The July 1954 edition of "Reference Data, Infantry Regiment," based on current T/O&Es, is now available from the Book Department, TIS, for 65¢. It contains organizational charts for all units in the infantry regiment. Accompanying each chart is information on the mission, capabilities, personnel, and equipment of the unit. In addition, there are 32 tables covering such subjects as movement data, hours of daylight and darkness, engineer bridging data, and casualties in combat.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Instruction in Germany

An electronics instruction team from TES recently completed a 90-day tour of Army units in Germany. The team, consisting of one officer and six enlisted men, provided special instruction to units receiving the Army's newest mine detector, the AN/PRS-4 "Uncle Henry." Instruction was also provided on the AN/PRS-3 mine detector "Polly Smith" and the Sniperscope "Bob Jones." This training was conducted on both op tor and depot maintenance levels.

The team also gave instruction on the latest mine dete repair techniques to Seventh Army field maintenance c panies. Major infantry and armored units of the Seventh A received indoctrination courses on mine detectors and sn scopes. Stress was placed on operator techniques and first-ech maintenance. In addition, the team gave engineer unit Germany training in the latest mine detection equipment. tour ended with a visit to the USAREUR Engineer Scho Murnau, Germany.

Movement by Air

Students at TES are being taught that the majority of heaviest engineer equipment can be moved by air. With the of the latest assault-type cargo aircraft, combat engineers ca employed with maximum effectiveness in vertical-envelopn type operations without having to be trained as paratroo

Engineers are learning how to support infantry in an airl to carry airfield construction equipment into an airhead, how to drop or land engineer supplies and equipment to for or isolated units. Officer and enlisted students at TES are ta the capabilities and limitations of cargo aircraft, procedur loading engineer equipment into those aircraft, and techni of aerial delivery. These lessons are then applied in rea tactical exercises.

Military Orientation Program

The 12-week Officer's Basic Course at TES is now prec by a two-week period of basic military orientation. The pu of this Basic Officer's Military Orientation Program is to t leadership and provide a review of basic military subject officers with less than one year of commissioned service. program includes dismounted drill, bayonet training, ph training, and inspections. A student-officer chain of com is used to conduct these subjects. Emphasis is placed on and command, bearing, precision, knowledge, and endur

Classes are also conducted in weapons familiarization, in guard, military courtesy and customs, officer responsibility, field sanitation. There are also three seminars, in which stu discuss troop leading problems with senior NCOs and com and field-grade officers. The program also includes a le reaction test, which consists of a daylight patrol problem a night combat patrol problem. Students are closely obs to determine their reactions when faced with typical co situations. The climax of the program is a two-day biv At this time students fire the M1 rifle for familiarization, complete the daylight and night infiltration courses and close combat course.

The program has so far completed ten cycles, with app mately 110 officers in each cycle. Student critiques inc the program is proving valuable in fitting the officer for h itial command assignment after completing the academic of the course.

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Air Force

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FRONT AND CENTER

An article in the Soviet newspaper *Red Star* of 3 July 1954 tells Soviet soldiers how to act under atomic attack.

"In the offensive," the article says, "headlong contact with the enemy is the best mode of action on hearing the atomic alert signal because the closer the battle array of the advancing unit is to him, the smaller is the probability of the use of the atomic weapon by the enemy."

If "during encounter with the enemy," the article continues, the atomic weapon is used, "the soldier must correctly and opportunely utilize the protective properties of various local objects, shell-holes, ditches, embankments. Immediately after the explosion, the soldier gets his weapons ready for shooting and resumes the careful observation of the enemy. If the enemy undertakes the attack, the main task of the soldier is to destroy the attackers."

Red Star says that "to the brave and able soldier the atomic weapon is not terrifying."

✓ ✓ ✓

Army, Navy and Air Force assistance to Latin American countries during Hurricane Hazel was extensive. Billed as a "typical joint operation" by the Public Information Office of the Caribbean Command was one in which Army Sergeant First Class Kenneth Ramsey, flying in a Navy helicopter, discovered 500 persons stranded on a hilltop in Honduras. He radioed the Joint Rescue Operations Center to recommend that food and fresh water be flown in and that plans be made to evacuate the people to a safer area. This was done. The Navy flew in the food and water by helicopter, landed in a clearing cut out and m by natives under Sergeant Ramsey rection. The Corps of Engineers moved in by boats to evacuate the gees to the nearest railhead.

✓ ✓ ✓

Comment on career opportuniti Army Aviators by Colonel Robe Neely, Assistant Chief of Trans tion (Army Aviation):

"Today [the Army Aviator] mus be an officer of one of the branch the service and secondly an aviator. must attempt to remain proficient, fied and experienced in their bran the service while at the same tim ficient, qualified and experience aviation. . . . Upon being rotat ground duty the aviator is in fa competition for good efficiency r with his contemporaries who have their full time on 'ground duty.' O other hand the increase in the siz complexity of the aircraft and th responding increase in time th aviator must spend on aviation m even to meet the minimum safe quirements, has tended further t vent rotation to ground duty. Yet he is rotated to ground duty his ch for promotion are lessened becau his lack of experience . . . in his arm of the service.

"The difficulty seems to be th perience and efficiency in aviatio ters are not recognized as qualific for increases in responsibilities and and that the opportunity to com aviation units of appropriate size i erally lacking."

✓ ✓ ✓

The belief that specialization hamper an officer's career opportu is not confined to Army Aviation other field of concern is in researc development. Officers who have a k edge of science believe that if they too much time in research and de ment they lose ground in their bas or service. But scientists who wo military problems say that rotati officers on R&D comes too ofte that the officer is just learning hi around the laboratory when he tated. This problem is recogniz the Army and is under study b

Base Pay: 1908-1952

An informal study of the base pay of all grades from private to general between 1908 and 1952 was recently made available to us. It shows that while the pay of lieutenant generals has increased only five per cent in the 44 years, the pay of privates has increased about 450 per cent.

The following table prepared from the facts furnished is somewhat simplified. For reasons of space the pay acts of 1916, 1940, 1946 and 1949 have been eliminated and all sums are stated in even dollars.

	1908	1917	1920	1922	1942	1952	% of increase
Gen.	. . .	833	833	666	666	963	15
Lt. Gen.	916	750	750	666	666	963	5
Maj. Gen.	666	666	666	666	666	963	45
Brig. Gen.	500	500	500	500	500	800	60
Colonel	333	333	383	333	333	592	78
Lt. Col.	291	291	341	291	291	474	63
Maj.	250	250	320	250	250	400	60
Capt.	200	200	260	200	200	326	63
1st. Lt.	166	166	216	166	166	259	56
2d Lt.	141	141	176	125	150	222	58
E-7	. . .	. . .	74	126	138	206	180
E-6	45	51	53	84	114	175	290
E-5	40	48	45	72	96	145	260
E-4	30	38	45	54	78	122	310
E-3	21	36	37	42	66	99	375
E-2	18	33	35	30	54	85	375
E-1	15	30	30	21	50	83	450

Enlisted grades of 1908 and 1952 are not exactly comparable. In this study 1908 grade titles were more or less arbitrarily divided as follows: E-7 none; E-6 First Sergeant; E-5 Junior Sergeant Major; E-4 Sergeant of Infantry; E-3 Corporal of Infantry; E-2 1st Class Private of Engineers; E-1 Private of Infantry.

These figures are base-pay figures and do not reflect allowances or longevity pay. Nor do they reflect income tax payments; there was no income tax for anyone in 1908.

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

. WORTHY OF HIS HIRE

AMONG our junior officers are many capable leaders. The Marshalls, MacArthurs and Eisenhowers of tomorrow are there—playing their parts inconspicuously, out of the glare of the spotlight—but doing the jobs that you expect them to do in the superior manner which has been traditional among military men in this country. Our past good fortune may lead us to expect that this fine crop of potential leaders will mature naturally to take their places at the head of our military establishment. However, it would be a tragic mistake to believe complacently that leaders of merit can be nurtured in an atmosphere of neglect, abuse, and misunderstanding.

To insure that the leaders of tomorrow will meet the standards of their predecessors, we need to restore a full measure of dignity to the honored profession of arms. The career service should be made attractive to the highest type of young American. In no other way can we make certain of having the quality of leadership so necessary to our future security.

Money isn't the only answer but it is part of the problem. I feel that we can never pay a man enough to compensate him for combat duty. But I am equally certain that the sacrifices he makes for the Nation should not be at his own expense. We count on him, night and day, to defend us, and we ought to treat him fairly.

I HAVE never met a man who selected an Army career as a means of improving his financial position—and I doubt if I ever will. But recently I have met some, and heard of others, who express real fear that financial insecurity may cause them to leave the Army. It is a sad commentary on the value this Nation places on military protection that between 1949, when military pay scales were given their last general overhauling, and the present day, the United States Consumer Price Index registered a 13.5 per cent gain in the cost of living, but military pay has increased only 5.7 per cent.

At the same time military emoluments such as savings through purchasing at commissaries and post exchanges, medical care for dependents, all of which have long been considered as part of military compensation, have been reduced by both legislative enactment and executive policy until there is very little benefit remaining to the career soldier from these privileges. In short, this whittling has materially reduced the soldier's take-home pay.

As Secretary of the Army, it is my firm purpose to make certain that the young man who elects the Army as a career has the opportunity of living a well-rounded life, that it is possible for him to marry and raise a family like other Americans, to support his family properly, and to provide reasonably for their security in later years. I intend to continue doing everything in my power to see that he is able to obtain advancement commensurate with his ability and his experience—and that he enjoys the prestige within the community to which he is justly entitled.

* * *

At the present time we are preparing a legislative program for submission to the incoming Congress which is designed to eliminate some of the inequities which plague the career soldier. One item provides for a pay raise. . . . A second provides for a comprehensive revision of benefits for survivors. A third provides for more reliable medical care for dependents. Another item provides permanent change of station allowances for service families.

tary of the Army Robert T. Stevens

(From an address at Richmond, Va.)

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An officer who prefers to remain anonymous writes that we are in danger of corrupting the soul of our Army and that salvation lies within ourselves, but we must be

FAITHFUL TO OUR TRUST

IN the next war, police-type or otherwise, I plan to be an infantry unit commander—I haven't missed a fight yet. If at that time we are operating under present conditions, I will not be surprised if I am summarily relieved by a senior Korea veteran during my first week in command because of one or more of the following:

- I won't certify *in advance* that nothing will go wrong in my unit.
- I defend on an extended front by means of strongpoints and refuse to string my men out one deep.
- Through enemy action I have some MIAs in my unit.
- I have only one decoration policy—give the man the award(s) he deserves.
- I take my subordinates' word, oral or written, and give them responsibility and privileges commensurate with their jobs.
- I administrate only on prescribed levels.
- I will not guess at enemy casualties or other effects of my efforts.
- I use tanks in other ways than as pillboxes.
- I believe I am in an honorable profession, a member of a brotherhood of officers, and I therefore act by a code of ethics.

FANTASTIC? Not at all. I can adduce examples of trouble, if not actually being relieved, experienced by commanders in Korea, illustrating each point.

Do we desire the respect of others? Let us then respect each other. A first step would be to restore the respect, yea, reverence, for an officer's certificate, for his official statement. Of late, it has been used as a noose around a subordinate's neck—if something goes wrong in a unit of any size, the lowest commander who cannot produce a certificate from his subordinates to the effect that the sin will not be committed, is hanged for the crime, regardless of the actual location of the responsibility. This "keeps the record straight." Early one Korean winter all commanders in a certain corps, down through battalion, were forced to sign certificates (
tificates, mind you!) that no bunkers in their se
would collapse. The ostensible purpose was to in
that all commanders took action to make their bun
reliable. The actual application merely adjusted
aforesaid noose. Relief of a commander who had a bu
collapse could then be based on false official statem
instead of, or as well as, on the actual collapse of
bunker and any resulting injury to persons or prop

Trust in one's associates is closely allied to tru
one's subordinates, officer and enlisted. If you
them, you must give them responsibilities and pre
tives to fit the jobs you trust them to do. To c
horrible example, one unit in Korea attempted to bo
the morale of its drivers and to build up the presti
its noncoms by prescribing that an officer ride *ever*
hicle moving after dark.

Such examples of "Put an officer on it," and "
manders will give this their personal attention"
heard more and more frequently. If a man is ca
of carrying the title of motor officer, or even moto
geant, he is entitled to the rank, pay, privileges
prerogatives of the job, and he must be given th
thority, responsibility, and freedom of action nece
to perform his duties.

A FEW illustrations on tactics should suffice. D
protests from numbers of intermediate comman
some senior officers insisted on one hundred per
coverage of the front of a unit. If a regiment had se
thousand yards of front, there was a *manned* fo
every few yards, rather than strongpoints on the
terrain features, with cross fire and patrols in betw
The danger and error were recognized by many.
know more than one young lieutenant colonel, f
battalion commanders in Korea, who feel that al
tactics books should be rewritten to conform to
experience there. What of them? What if they,
cesses" so far, are wearing two and three stars i

t war? What of the even less experienced officers
) know of no tactics but Korean? They will be our
l-grade officers a few years from now. What of the
ntry and armor officers who have never seen a tank
ombat except dug in on the MLR for use as a direct-
anti-emplacement gun? Is anyone telling the in-
ry that the engineers cannot always build super-
ıways up to the front-line foxholes? I remember the
ı-priority, highly touted documents bearing "Lessons
rned in Korea" which circulated in 1950 and early
1. Loaded, they were, with the same lessons pointed
in this magazine and its predecessors long ago—some
re and some during World War II, and surely some
re World War I. Pity the man who spends his
er in a service school, who suddenly finds himself
combat command and who has to discover there
ything he should have been taught!

anyone making it clear that "outposts," misused
gh the term was in Korea, are used to deceive the
ıy, to force him to deploy and delay, and to alert
MLR? Outpost Harry, to name one, was defended
vigorously than many parts of the MLR itself.
are we to inform the men who died in the last-ditch
ıse of Harry that they really weren't supposed to
at all? Not true? Then let us make sure the survi-
know that Harry was *not* an outpost.

ıe restrictions placed upon infantry commanders in
employment of their units served to *stifle* tactics.
sion had to approve the movement forward of the
of units larger than a squad or two. Division (and
corps at times) had to approve all patrols, even
which one would expect a company commander to
le on his own. While no one disputes the need for
ination, over-supervision is most galling, most dan-
ıs, and most deleterious when applied to actual
at operations.

) what of casualties? I have seen commanders give
ore thought to finding the bodies of known dead
handling them properly than they gave to the care
living. But the cardinal sin was a man missing
ion. Company, battalion, and regimental command-
eads were likely to roll if a patrol was overwhelmed.
ve the CO" began to make as much sense as "Off
his head" in *Alice in Wonderland.* The concept
alty downward was thus distorted into harassing
dinates in the name of taking care of people long
d any help. I watched a brilliant unit commander
pieces under this and similar forms of constant
ing from above. Normally a kind and considerate
he would hang up the phone after a call from the
higher headquarters and all but scream, "Why
hey leave me alone?" then begin to lay about him
ıis staff ran for cover. Normally one to fight for
en, he became, after a few months, a nasty fault-
who believed what higher headquarters said about
ff and unit more than he believed his own eyes
is own people. A vicious system was responsible
degeneration. On the other hand, I hold no brief
ose officers who display a callous attitude toward

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their men and their hardships. They cling to the be
long ago shattered at The Infantry School by R
Whiting and his colleagues, that "it's good for the
The answer is, of course, that you don't have to prac
being uncomfortable.

THE increased pressure from above shows up mark
in administration, even if we take no special n
here of the much bewailed and completely unchec
Army-wide flood of paper. During certain period
Korea, a company commander could clear his prop
records by certifying to the combat destruction of n
ing property, without being required to show the f
ments. A fine idea, but pressure on battalion and c
pany became so great that a commander scarcely
a choice but to falsify reports. If a company was s
ten armored vests, and regiment or division had a l
on the amount of certifiable losses in a given pe
(how ridiculous can you get?), then some other c
pany in the battalion that hadn't lost its quota w
be directed to certify to the loss. Why this shuffle
tween companies? Because battalion had become an
ministrative headquarters. Combat-loss certificates
reviewed there. More and more papers were signe
person by the battalion commander. Attempts by
staff to lighten his load were useless—he *had* to
things himself. One infantry battalion was actually
mended on inspection because clerks had been pu
in from each company and an S1 section establish
two more squad tents in battalion headquarters to
ceal, displace, and maintain. They probably had t
stolen in the first place. I cannot indict the battalio
was the misplaced emphasis on administration that fo
it to such an improper measure. The inspectors
commended it were among the most guilty in forcin
battalion into the administrative picture.

And decorations! A unit specified (though n
writing—it's not that bad yet) that all field-grade of
and all commanders should get a valor award du
their tours, but was then slow in giving these offic
second such award if they happened to *earn* it. All
ommendations leaving battalion had to be signed b
commander, and battalion had to type up all certifi
and affidavits supporting valor awards. "Quality
citations decreased (with certain notable exception
the rank of the recipient went up, especially durin
latter days of the war. You could almost tell the
of the recipient just by reading the citation; there
some standard feats, for which a field-grade officer w
normally get a decoration, but which would me
hanging for a company-grade officer if he failed t
them.

Consider, also, the dilemma of the honest comma
He wants to give everyone exactly what he deserves
owing to over-all cheapening of the medals is
pressure from within himself, if not from other
"keep up with the Joneses." If his G3 is a come
does no great deed of valor, shouldn't he get a
Star to match the equally or more undeserved o
the G3 in the next unit? If the commander uphold

It is the inner man and not the outer trappings of uniform that makes the soldier the strong right arm of Democracy

grity of the decorations, he hurts a man he wants oost.

IIT S4s would have been in sad shape indeed with-ut the free coolie labor of the Korean Service Corps. v else to move vast quantities of supplies when con-tly subjected to vehicle levies from above? But why nuch to move—why, for example, so much artillery nunition? There was no shortage of ammunition *ngressional Record,* please copy). There was only ligality in its expenditure. We fired these huge unts of artillery because we were trying to keep the hen Chinee off balance by hitting him every time tuck his head up, even if we saw only one enemy er at a time. Scrutiny of enemy casualty statistics s me to believe that part of this artillery effort was result of competition between commanders. This t for prestige, as measured by the number of enemy ed," led to the practice of forcing artillery forward rvers to report results of each concentration, whether ot they could observe it. An FO told me he had to t enemy casualties for one concentration before lion would fire another for him. The results: an-case of enforced false official statements, inaccurate ates of enemy casualties, and a lieutenant with a en sense of honor.

e artillery was not the only branch forced to esti-enemy casualties. I hold dear the memory of the e created by an infantry S3 who, in protest against constantly forced to guess at and report enemy lties, one night after a small patrol action turned report of "estimated three enemy MIA" in addition usual KIA and WIA figures. The first two echelons owed it whole, before someone woke up and de-ed the basis for estimating MIA. The S3 merely ted the sad truth—the same thing he said before, g, and after this event—that he had as sound a for estimating the one as the others, namely, his nation. He assured them he would continue to hem any report they desired, but only because it equired of him. But why did they insist on these es? Because somewhere unspectacular reports were l upon with disfavor.

key to the situation is the inner man, officers who w themselves and have enough integrity and cour-practice their beliefs. Nowadays it takes a lot to gether a group of prima donnas and say: "You've ed a lot; now I'm telling you we'll do it this way e I want it done this way. Maybe some day you'll up enough to be entitled to know why I want it, until then, do it because I say so. Dismissed!" A oldier said this in my hearing, and I honor him vith the equally sound man who said, on arriving at and in reply to a query from a subordinate com-r: "My policy? I have only one policy—loyalty to subordinates." Both of these officers practiced what they preached. Long may they preach, until a few more of us get guts enough to practice.

Another damaging attitude is "Preserve the record; never mind the war effort." A unit lacked a vital piece of communications equipment, required by the situation and by the SOI for an essential signal. Screams to higher headquarters produced only, "Don't worry—you don't have it, but you're covered—your request is a matter of official record now." Someone was more concerned with "the record" than with the inability of a unit to meet the SOI in a dangerous combat situation.

One last example, and one that has shaken me deeply. Not long ago I prepared a memo for use and transmission by my staff supervisor, in which the entire argument hinged upon a point of honor, national and military. He struck out all reference to honor, leaving a hollow, bloodless paper, which was approved without a hitch all the way up the line.

THE inner man—we must reach the inner man. Fourth-of-July orations are old hat. Worse, "pointing with pride," "viewing with alarm," *"noblesse oblige,"* "honor," "glory," "patriotism," "loyalty" are now sissy or, at best, maudlin words. "Loyalty" has been so abused in security investigations that now it is hardly even a polite word. Though we've progressed a bit from the days when Doolittlism made it a disgrace to be commissioned, I still note that, while officers used to have their framed commissions hung in their quarters, I haven't seen one in years. A new uniform with or without gold trim will not create morale or *esprit* when the wearers do not trust and respect one another; it will not make a soldier of an undisciplined man; it will not make reliable a man without integrity; it will not make patriotic or loyal a man who has neither pride nor principle, a man with nothing to cling to in the way of ideals or hope for the future of the Nation and of mankind.

What, then, is to be done? Rigorously eliminate any procedure or policy at any level which deviates from established doctrine and which does not "repose special trust and confidence in the valor, fidelity, and abilities" of an officer. Eliminate with equal vigor any officer who gives evidence that he does not merit such trust or will not extend it to others. Insist with equal firmness that noncommissioned officers have equally high standards.

Honorable men who give value received for their pay, men who know they are trusted to carry out sound and honorable policies will make our army the right arm of Democracy, a fit and glorious force.

When "honor," "patriotism" and "glory" are no longer sissy or dirty words; when subordinates are given maximum trust and minimum supervision; when all our efforts are directed toward doing the right thing and doing it right rather than keeping "covered," the rest will fall into place. Until that day, we've a hard row to hoe.

The integration of the two artilleries was a sound idea that can in time increase the fighting efficiency of the Army and provide greater opportunities for all artillerymen

It's Still a Good Idea

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. B. B. TRUSSELL, JR.

I would be less than honest if I argued that the integration of field and antiaircraft artillery has been carried out with unqualified success. But it is unfair to argue, as was done in the November issue of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, that the idea of integration has been proved unsound. If failure has occurred it has been in execution rather than conception.

The charges levelled at the integration of the artillery appear to fall into three categories: the combination was an unplanned, impromptu shotgun wedding that stemmed from a haphazard series of organizational expedients; full integration, with all artillerymen qualified for both antiaircraft and field artillery duty, is not feasible; and even if integration could be accomplished it would still be of little benefit.

The answer to the first of these arguments can be found in a brief look at the record.

Until 1907, there existed by law only one artillery arm, although for some years there had been a *de facto* separation of the arm into field and seacoast branches. The basis for this separation, both before and after it was formalized, was dual. Tactically, the coast artillery operated in conjunction with the Navy, while the field artillery was an integral part of the field army. Technically, the difference in tasks led to differences in weapons and in gunnery concepts. The coast artilleryman used computing and predicting devices to permit successful engagement of moving targets, and the field artilleryman solved his gunnery problems in his head. For field and coast artillery, therefore, the separation made sense.

When antiaircraft came into the picture during the First World War, it could with equal logic have been assigned to either of the existing branches. It was allocated to the Coast Artillery Corps partly because there seemed to be a relation between the gunnery used for engaging a moving battleship and that for engaging a moving airplane, but also because field artillery was in such demand in France that it more than had its hands full.

During the inter-war years antiaircraft lost virtually all the technical affinity —never more than tenuous at best—that it may initially have had with seacoast artillery. Tactically, the two never had anything in common, for by its very nature antiaircraft had a role as an integral part of the field army. Thus, there was little logical basis for an organizational association between seacoast and antiaircraft.

THE Second World War brought a new development. Our possession of air superiority restricted the occasions when antiaircraft provided support to the other combat arms in what was then considered to be its primary function, but antiaircraft did show that it could engage ground targets effectively. More recently in Korea, this capability was fully used, and antiaircraft normally helped provide fire support for the infantry.

Surely, it is not sound tactical or ization to have two independent sou of control over artillery fire support in a single division. For ground-sup fire, then, antiaircraft should be org to the division or higher unit exe ing tactical control over field arti Whether or not it resulted from adv planning, the union between field antiaircraft artillery within the field was the result of a realistic adjust to the necessities of existing cir stances.

The charge that integration is feasible because the complexities of type of artillery are too great for one officer to master cannot stand the face of the facts. The coast art officer mastered techniques runnin gamut from submarine mines thr railway guns to antiaircraft weapon searchlights. Today's infantryman that matter, must employ tanks mortars and recoilless cannon as w his basic weapon, the rifle. Wa grows constantly more complex, an soldiers must meet the challenge greater complexities.

Antiaircraft artillerymen have al demonstrated that competency in types of artillery can be attained b dividual officers. Through force c cumstances, he has mastered the nery and tactics of both types of True, he has done so with antiai weapons, which cannot achieve th finements in ground fire of which artillery weapons are capable. How the difference between firing at gr targets with antiaircraft weapons with field artillery weapons can b duced essentially to comparatively variations in technique, which ca learned with relative ease. The gr tendency of field artillery to take from antiaircraft's book and empl

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Trained as an antiaircraft artilleryman, LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. B. B. TRUSSELL, JR., Artillery, entered the Army in 1942 as a second lieutenant after graduating from the University of Minnesota. After the Second World War he was integrated into the Regular Army and was later sent to Columbia University where he earned a Master's degree in International Relations. Now on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel Trussell is looking forward to a possible assignment in the field artillery branch of his arm.

tors and computers in its gunnery uld simplify transition still further. Since it surely is easier to fire at a und target with a weapon designed ground fire than to do so with a ıpon designed primarily for antiair- t fire, and since the antiaircraft ar- ryman has proved his ability to en- e ground targets successfully with own weapons in both direct and irect fire, there is little rational sup- for an argument that antiaircraft lerymen cannot became competent l artillerymen. There are, in fact, few working artillerymen in the aircraft who oppose complete inte- ion of the artilleries, or who lack slightest confidence in their own ity to handle either kind of artillery. ong them, moreover, the most en- iastic advocates of integration are e who have had cross-assignments field artillery units and therefore speak with the authority of personal rience.

field artillerymen have misgivings ncerning the feasibility of integra- perhaps it is because they underesti- their own abilities. My pride, as an ircraft artilleryman, in the abilities ıe members of my branch does not ıd to the conceited belief that field erymen are any less versatile or d. Surely the antiaircraft has no opoly on the ability to master both of gunnery, tactics and techniques. ıring World War II, both field and ircraft OCSs turned out reasonably grounded battery officers with only ıteen weeks of training. Before the of the war, many of these became ınding artillerymen of not only bat- out field grade. I can't believe that eer officer, with years rather than s or months in which to learn his ssion, is unable to develop com- ce in two closely related special- And with the amount of time which officers today spend away from being what it is, it is equally hard ieve that they have become so in- ıbly wedded to one speciality that ıave lost all their mental flexibili- their ability to apply the same principles to the solution of similar identical problems.

ourse, antiaircraft is unique among ombat arms in that it not only as part of the field army but also t of the Air Defense Command the operational control of the Air but this fact poses no special lties. Except for guided missiles, weapons are now used in both ies. There is no noteworthy difference in tactics and techniques. Thus, at the tactical level at least, there are no antiaircraft problems peculiar to this one exclusively air defense function which would be so serious as to make integration impractical.

As for guided missiles, there surely is more similarity between surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles than there is, for example, between surface-to-surface missiles and field artillery guns. What all artillerymen of whatever persuasion have to face up to is that guided missiles of all types constitute an entirely new field. The dimensions of the problem are measured much less by the type of target against which the missile is used than by the technical characteristics of the missiles themselves. Certainly, an officer trained to serve with a Corporal battalion is better qualified thereby for duty with a Nike battalion than with a battalion of 105s—and better qualified for a Nike unit, also, than an antiaircraft officer trained exclusively on 90mm and 120mm antiaircraft guns. For that matter, there seems to be no reason why half the members of Corporal battalions could not be drawn from antiaircraft, and half the members of Nike units from field artillery. Granting that only the surface of the guided missile field has been scratched, the further development of missile doctrine can be expected to reveal a substantial body of principles common both to surface-to-surface and surface-to-air tasks and matériel, just as conventional field and antiaircraft artillery have much in common.

INTERCHANGEABILITY among artillerymen being feasible, there remains the question of whether it is desirable. No one can predict with absolute certainty the relative need for the various arms if war should come. It is conceivable but most unlikely that the capability of transferring large numbers of men between the artilleries as the requirements of the situation change could be of only slight advantage. Now and for the foreseeable future, we must provide units of both types of artillery. The attainment of true integration would permit substantial manpower and training economies, for the interchangeability could be incorporated into mobilization planning. Obviously, it would be more efficient to convert an individual trained in one kind of artillery which had become surplus to another kind.

Furthermore, unless we again enjoy air superiority, future combat may well require that the quantity of antiaircraft be significantly increased or that artillery units and weapons of both types be able to function effectively in both roles. In such an event interchangeable artillerymen would be essential.

One of the major responsibilities of the active Army is to provide a nucleus around which wartime expansion can be carried out. If past experience provides a valid basis of judgment, the professional soldier must be able to function in wartime in any number of different specialties. Hence, maximum versatility among career soldiers is essential. It is not possible for everyone to know everything; but it is surely possible and desirable, when there are two closely related specialties, for career officers initially trained in one to gain a thorough working knowledge of the other. By so doing they double their potential usefulness.

THE greatest strides in integration have been made in the unification of the schools at Sill and Bliss and in the incorporation of antiaircraft units into the existing artillery organization of the field army. These are solid and positive accomplishments, especially for the short period which has elapsed since artillery unification's formal inception. There has also been considerable progress in cross-assignment. However, integration can only become fully effective when the members of the artillery arm are assigned without discrimination to all types of artillery. The only way to achieve integration is to integrate—and that means to establish cross-assignment as such a commonplace policy that it will be impossible to identify the average artillery officer's experience with a single type of artillery. So far, during the short time since integration was initiated, such large-scale cross-assignment has not been possible.

CERTAINLY, many problems must be solved and many difficulties overcome before artillery is truly unified. There are bound to be honest differences of opinion concerning the solutions which should be adopted. But honest differences can generally be resolved by discussion and compromise. Intransigence, passive resistance, and foot-dragging do not stem from honest conviction but often from less praiseworthy motives. Objections to an idea may be registered up to the time a decision is reached—but it is a fundamental military precept that from that point on, it is everyone's duty to support the decision fully. Any other type of behavior is not in the best interests of the service, and certainly is not in the tradition of U. S. artillery.

Beginning, a new series by CMD

This Is For You

MAJ. GEN. JAMES C. FRY
Chief, Career Management Division, AGO

IN a new series beginning next month in THE ARMY JOURNAL, Career Management Division will endeavor to answer many of the questions officers bring to CMD. These questions concern schools, promotions, stabilization, category renewal transfers, concurrent travel, and many other personnel problems. In this first article I shall touch lightly on some of the subjects that will be written about in more detail later in the series.

Many officers ask CMD about chances of attending military schools. An officer will attend only one of the five senior schools. The National War College, The Army War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Naval War College, and the Air Force War College are all on the same educational level. Graduates of these schools all receive equal consideration for promotion and assignment.

Selection for military schools beyond the advanced branch course is competitive, CM making the selections based on an evaluation of each officer's record in the zone of consideration. An officer's efficiency, combat record, troop duty, command duty, staff duty (all types) and instructor duty are all weighed and totaled to get a final qualification score that determines relative standings.

There is too much emphasis on attendance at top schools. Less than 45% of regular officers and only a token percentage of reserve officers can attend the Command and General Staff College. Only a fraction of that number will go on to attend the five senior schools. Eligibility does not qualify a man for attendance, nor does graduation insure promotion. There are many general officers who have never attended any school except their branch school.

Representatives of the CMD visit each army area on the average of once every three months. They can answer practically every personnel question and welcome the opportunity to do so.

Many officers seem to think that influence will get them preferential treatment. This rarely results in other than routine action. If officers will tell their Career Branches what assignment they desire they will get the same treatment as officers who try to use influential friends. A current and carefully prepared Preference Statement is the best way to get your case on your records in CMD. This statement is always considered before orders are issued. Don't be afraid to write out the exact reasons why you want the assignment you ask for.

The term, "Career Management" has a strange appeal and many officers believe CM is at fault if they aren't promoted or don't get the assignment they seek. The primary mission of CMD is to insure the smooth and efficient operation of the Army through the wise assignment of qualified officers.

World-wide assignments cannot be run from a duty roster as a first sergeant supplies kitchen police. The qualifications needed for each job are different and money has a great influence on every move that is made. The moving of officers' dependents and household goods must be justified on the basis of Army requirements.

I CANNOT overstress the importance of command experience. There is always room for the officer who seeks responsibility and who is anxious to demonstrate possession of command qualifications. A military commander has a high degree of authority which extends into matters normally considered individual and personal. A soldier's existence, ability, potentiality, professional knowledge, as well as matters which affect him personally depend upon his commander's knowledge and appreciation of the importance of all phases of his work. The ability to command is always weighed heavily in every personnel action—particularly promotions.

I must emphasize the need for accurate and detailed descriptive comments when efficiency reports are prepared. The implication of the absence of a clear word picture in the space reserved for descriptive comments is that the reporting officer didn't consider the officer rated of any special importance. Descriptive comments on efficiency reports are generally the determining fact selecting officers for promotion an extremely helpful in making a ments. Unfortunately many officer to take the time to write a clea concise description of the qualific and potential of officers who have s them loyally and efficiently.

EVERY officer should clearly u stand that CMD can only infl his career when he is changing st This is very little in comparison wi opportunities available to comma in the field. Department of the Arm icy (see TM 20-605) specifically commanders responsible for devel officers by rotating them through staffs and through command a ments. The chief of every staff s in every headquarters has an oppo ty to assist and urge compliance appreciation of such policies. Some manders are reluctant to give oppo ties to officers who have not a qualified for a new duty assign This hurt the Army at the begi of World War II because subst numbers of officers were qualifi perform only one assignment and not meet the broad organizationa administrative demands of war. grow and develop with added res bilities and if selected for an assig on the basis of indicated potentia mistakes will ever be made.

In closing I want to say again th partment of the Army requireme main paramount, and able office needed to supply the needs of M Missions, and troop assignments different nations. A man's career erally in his own hands. He seek good assignments, avoid pro pleasant tasks at the expense of tunities to demonstrate comman organizational ability, and turn in tern of performance of duty on ev signment that will insure a good regardless of what or where t may be.

How to Be a Noncom

MASTER SERGEANT

FRANK J. CLIFFORD

No mumbo-jumbo or laying on of hands is called for. Just a simple code of conduct that requires you to respect yourself, your uniform, your superiors, equals and subordinates

X a group of "old" noncommissioned officers with a generous quantity of , allow to sit around for a few hours you get this:

'rouble is they've taken away all our ority." A general shaking of heads greement.

Ve don't have no dignity no more." e head shaking.

'he junior officers are doing us non- ' work." More agreement.

ıen·someone will blow the head off glass and get down to the real brew. v did we get this way?" he will ask. d Congress trim us down a bit? To extent. Did the Army go too far ı the primrose path of "democracy"? e a distance. Have modernization nechanization with all their techni- adgets forced a change? To some e. Have the continuing draft, d War II, and the Korean war contributed to the decline and fall of the noncom? More than likely. Have diminishing service benefits driven too many good noncommissioned officers out of the services? In too many cases this is true.

But most of all the noncom himself is to blame. If a noncommissioned officer fails to get the respect his rank entitles him to he had better start looking more closely at the guy he shaves every morning.

By definition, a noncommissioned officer is the link connecting the planning side of the business with the doing side. Generally he is older, both in years of service and in "birthday cake" years than the men under him. Indeed, he is frequently older in both categories than his immediate superiors.

We can say he is about thirty years old, married, has a high degree of skill in his MOS, has participated in at least one war and, more often than not, is a high school graduate. Commonly, he directs and participates in a craft or trade in which he is a recognized journeyman.

THIS description is so riddled with barrel-house generalities as to be almost useless. It is useless because it presumes that noncoms are of uniform quality. By way of emphasis, and by virtue of long association with this breed of men, I can say that this is not so. The chevrons are only the obvious symbol of the thing they represent.

We have our "bad" noncoms and our "good" noncoms. Bad noncoms get a free ride on the coattails of the good noncoms—and the whole Army goes on the ride. In a not so far-fetched adaptation of Gresham's Law, the "bad" noncom directly affects the overall value, in every dimension, of all noncommissioned officers.

Since it is obviously impossible to go up and down the length and breadth of the land, unfrocking the "bad" noncoms, a handier and more practical solution must be found.

The solution lies in the noncom himself. If a man is to aspire to noncommissioned officer status he must embark on a program of self-improvement. And when I say self-improvement I don't mean he should confine his efforts at

MASTER SERGEANT FRANK J. CLIFFORD, USAF, is on ROTC duty at the University of Pennsylvania. He began his military career as a rifleman in the 109th Infantry, Pennsylvania National Guard, in 1936 while still in high school. His unit went on active duty in 1941 and in the fall of that year he transferred to the Army Air Forces. During the Second World War he served in Europe as a crew chief and since then as a First Sergeant. Sergeant Clifford boasts that he has a wonderful wife and five little Cliffords. He writes us that his wife "long ago saw the prudence of saving whatever money I was able to earn and it was mainly through her efforts that we have a home of our own and it is entirely through her efforts that my life to date has been a happy and full one."

uplift to reading good books and thinking pure thoughts.

What I mean specifically might be called the "Big Three"—Personal Appearance, Conduct, Ethics. I list these in this order for good reason, for the first two, in combination, result in a code of ethics of the highest sort.

Without being a bit droll, I say that a sergeant should habitually appear with a clean face and clean hands, as well as clean clothing. But I have known NCOs, from duty sergeant to master, who paid only hit-and-run attention to these elementary functions.

In the matter of the bath I can add nothing not already said, in detail, by those suave and dedicated hucksters who enliven the airwaves and brighten the TV screen with their messages.

Closely related is the haircut. I don't think it would fracture anyone's financial structure to break down and get a haircut every ten days. And I mean a haircut, not a "ducktail" cut which is more suited to the bandstand than to the hardstand. I do not recommend shaved heads, nor am I suggesting that everyone parade around under a crew cut thatch. Perish the thought! All I suggest to our would-be professional noncom is that he get a "sensible" haircut—the kind his doctor, his insurance man or the Old Man prefers.

CLOTHES don't make the man but they help. As a minimum I recommend the following: ten complete sets of underwear, preferably white in color. Pajamas, while not absolutely necessary, add a very civilized note to the wardrobe. A washable bathrobe is a must—dignity demands it. No man over 30 should prance about the barracks in his skivvies, like a stud between assignments. Before anyone guffaws and says, "Haw, I'd like to see a guy in pajamas and bathrobe in Korea!", let me say that I'm not talking about the field, but barracks living.

A noncom should provide himself with a minimum of three trousers, two blouses, two pairs of dress oxfords, two pairs of field shoes, at least four neckties, two belts, a half-dozen shirts, a dozen pairs of sox, two garrison caps, one cap, service, and a dress raincoat.

In addition to these, a noncom who wants to be recognized as a professional would do well to equip himself with a first-quality dress outfit. At this point I expect comment ranging from silent breast-beating to loud, vituperative demands for my head or fragments of it. "Don't this joker know clothes cost money?" Certainly, I know clothes cost money, but let's not be childish. In any first-class business, men in supervisory positions are expected to dress the part —and they do! The Army is no different. You can't expect to be a member of the first team if you look like the guy who carries out the trash.

Care and maintenance of the uniform is lesson three. Frequent cleaning, pressing and correct fit is necessary to get full value from a uniform.

Included in this lesson is the matter of chevrons, service bars and ribbons. These ornaments should be of the best quality and your sales store is the place to go. They have fine quality stripes, Hershey bars and hash-marks. The nickel-nursing practice of snipping stripes from a worn-out garment and sewing them onto a new outfit is silliness in action and the mark of a tinhorn. Why slander a new garment with tattered and torn stripes when you can go first-class for a few cents?

IN regard to "fruit salad," no professional noncom would be caught dead, under any circumstances, wearing the individual, as issued, bars. If you have an assortment and want to display them, have them sewed directly onto the uniform, taking care that they appear in the correct order of precedence. AR 600-45 and 600-65 have all the dope on which comes first. When the uniform goes to the cleaners, the ribbons are cleaned free of charge.

The juvenile but widespread practice of covering ribbons with Plexiglas or celluloid shields should be banished. It is the mark of an amateur and is denounced in regulations.

Summer uniforms are the despair of many. Few men can look like the bandbox soldiers they'd like to be when wearing khaki. The only solution is to brace yourself and prepare to spend more money. Ten sets of "issue" khakis are required. Since shades of khaki and texture of cloth vary, it is well worth the time and effort to select matching outfits. Once the sets are paired they can be



kept matched by a small mark, in ink, or a knot of colored thread, ap to an inconspicuous place such pocket flap or shirttail.

A professional noncom requires a one set of summer gabardines or tr worsted. These can be bought f little as $20 or as much as $50. A b while very smart, is not necessary well uniformed. The issue shi almost every case, must be tailored. can be done for not more than a b shirt and the finished product look a million. Alterations generally con taking in the body and reducing so the fullness of the sleeves.

The summer uniform is an espe sensitive outfit because clothing actly the same, or closely similar, cu material is sold as work clothing worn by scores of different categor tradesmen. Since this practice appa cannot be stopped (until the new g come out), it is up to the nonc make his uniform look like a unifo

The items listed above represe impressive pile of clothing. How man, especially a bachelor, going to all of these things when he is ferred? The single noncom has a ping weight allowance, just like hi ried brother. He merely takes hi to the Transportation Officer, ord hand, and ships the surplus stuff Transportation Officer at his new st No fuss, no muss, no charge—ar forced selling or giving away of su books, clothing or other things acc over the years.

To digress a bit, a noncom o move should travel light—unless part of a troop movement—con himself to only as much baggage himself can easily carry. A B-4 ba a piece or two of "airline" luggag sufficient to carry all he needs, ev an extended trip, and this is n awkward a load to carry. The ba bag or the duffel bag should never l ried when the NCO is traveling s in a very small group. Ship it st through. A million bucks wor dignity is involved.

NOW let's talk about wearing th form. It is part of the nor badge of office and one of his stocks-in-trade. The NCO should the uniform with dignity and ap like a man who rightfully belong is proud to belong.

Elementary precautions includ rect fit, style, color, cleaning and Needless to say, the uniform s never be worn while engaged in

:h might soil or tear it. Should the orm become soiled or torn, it is the of the wearer to remove himself the public view until repairs can ıade.

hate to mention it, but someone :, so I will. Nothing bulky should arried in the pockets. I have seen :oms with pockets loaded with gh junk to build a road block.

ɔstume jewelry presents a tempta- especially to the younger NCO. down the impulse to "dress up" key chains, tie clips and fancy r pins. Pocket watch chains and h fobs (there are still such things!), dless of their intrinsic value, are out less they are fully covered by a coat. n in doubt, don't wear it!

oes are a part of the uniform, al- gh not commonly regarded as such. down heels, holes in the soles and bsence of a high-gloss shine consti- slovenly appearance. Shoe shine ods are as varied as shoe shiners. ı your other extremity we find your There is only one way to wear the ılthough creative spirits never seem :e of trying tricky arrangements. plete, easy-to-follow instructions the interested in Army regs.

is ends discussion of the first of ıajor topics. We now move in on :cond, Conduct.

way of making a proposition, let : say that a noncommissioned offi- :onduct must be above reproach at ıes. He shouldn't be a little plaster -if he tried and succeeded to any :, he'd be more actor than noncom ve have too many of these as it is. pping rapidly through the obvious houldn't get drunk, especially not ublic place. He shouldn't employ :al force or resort to base language relations with his subordinates. He l tell the truth, be factual, candid, dable, aggressive and interested. ıould not grumble, complain or e a martyred air every time he is alt a pat hand.

:e most of these points have al- been thoroughly discussed in the :out manual we will pass them by. efinition of proper conduct goes a arther and grapples with facts of yond the imagination of even the recocious Boy Scout.

this is lesson five. A noncom pates in no "deals," black-market :rwise, regardless of how lucrative ɔfit, either in money or other con- ions, and regardless of how fool- the scheme may be. With our :cattered all over the world and in

the areas where the fast buck is readily available, this rule of conduct tops all the others. As clever as it might sound in the re-telling, black market dealings are expensive cupidity. They are corrosive to the character of the man involved, slanderous to his uniform and his associates, whether they participate or not. Moreover, they are, in a very direct cash-on-the-barrelhead way, expensive to Uncle Sam.

Next in seriousness in the conduct region are "easy credit" traps. While a certain amount of credit buying is necessary, especially for a married NCO, not every merchant is a genuine good samaritan. Moreover, credit buying is habit-forming and it is easy to slide into a situation where pay is committed before it is earned. Debt is a heavy and galling saddle. Unredeemed debts bring no credit to the uniform.

Borrowing is the first cousin of debt and it is one of the surest ways of undermining personal integrity and the integrity of the entire NCO corps. This is doubly true if the borrowing is done from subordinates. This might be called lesson six.

IN his relations with his men, a noncommissioned officer must try to be as just and impartial as his wisdom and experience will allow. Impartiality is a fine word, but it is an even finer action. Let this be the text of lesson seven.

Because of the physical fact that the noncom is intimately associated with his subordinates—he works with them, eats

with them and is quartered with them—it is not easy for him to maintain the fine line of deference necessary for effective control. Uppermost in his mind should be the proven principle that he should not be "one of the boys." He's not paid to be, he's not expected to be (especially by the boys), and it is entirely inappropriate that he be. He can only lose if he tries, the force of gravity being what it is.

This little trick is especially difficult to pull off in our modern Army, but it can be done, and it must be done. Here's a tip: watch how the Old Man does it.

In lesson eight we find a rule that might be a little hard to digest at first swallow. The NCO should cultivate the company of other NCOs and this includes especially his dining and social companions. If the mess hall provides no special, separate facilities for NCOs, no great amount of pressure is required to set up a restricted corner. Current directives, regulations and the general subject of NCO prestige are sufficient grounds.

THIS brings us to the last of our big topics—Ethics. Webster makes short work of this fine, upstanding word but his brief condensation sums up the total output of civilized men and he spells it out in easy-to-take words. He says, "ETHICS 1. The branch of philosophy which deals with moral duty of man, as in his obligations to others or in the perfection of himself. 2. Moral principles or action; standards of conduct."

The key words in the definition are "moral duty" and "obligations." This is the fine print in the contract and it is often overlooked in the search for directions on how to be ethical. It is not enough to point to a fine assortment of high ideals—it is everyday actions that are the bone and muscle of a healthy code of ethics.

How does the NCO discover a code of ethics worthy of his trade? By simply following the rules outlined in the other two big areas—Personal Appearance, which can also be called Personal Respect, and Conduct, which might be called respect for his uniform, his outfit and others. No mumbo-jumbo or laying on of hands is necessary. This may sound like oversimplification of a knotty problem but close examination of the dictionary definition makes it plain that no greater amplification is needed.

But there must be diligent, everyday practice of the rules of the first two of "The Big Three" or the third will never appear. It is as simple as that. And all three are necessary to develop a truly professional noncommissioned officer corps.

A Yugoslav soldier and an American captain glare across barbed wire during a Trieste crisis of 1947.

TRUST: *Mission Accomplished*

THE nine-year American and British occupation of Trieste came to an end in October with the signing of an agreement returning Zone A, which includes the city of Trieste, to Italy, and ceding Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste to Yugoslavia. To the world at large, the settlement meant the disarming of a dangerous land mine of international tension. To the 351st Infantry and supporting units it meant a mission accomplished, and, incidentally, the loss of one of the Army's most popular overseas stations.

The beautiful and busy port of Trieste has seen its share of trouble in the last 1,200 years. It has at various times been ruled by Romans, Venetians, Austrians, French and Yugoslavs. The end of World War II meant o renewal of Trieste's troubles. In May 1945, Marshal troops moved into the city, in defiance of an Allied ment. A month later the Yugoslavs withdrew to the gan Line," which is roughly the same as the present b ary between Italy and Yugoslavia. In September 194 battle-wise 88th "Blue Devil" Division, at the time manded by Major General James C. Fry, moved into T Although the 88th was later inactivated, one of its ments, the 351st, stayed in Trieste on occupation dut

Seven U. S. soldiers were injured in a 1946 riot before the MPs dispersed the pro-Yugoslav demonstrators.



l the Italian army took over Zone A st October. Other units that remained ntil the end of the occupation were ıe 88th Armored Reconnaissance Comıny, 508th Signal Company, 23d Ordıance Company, 281st Military Police ompany, 12th Field Artillery Battalion, 17th Engineer Combat Company, and eadquarters TRUST.

The first years of the occupation were ɔrmy. While the predominantly Italn population of Trieste was generally iendly, a determined minority of proıgoslav Communists tried to stir up ɔuble with the aim of annexing Trieste Yugoslavia. In September 1946, seven . S. MPs were injured by the explon of a hand grenade thrown during Communist demonstration. A year lat- after the signing of an Italian peace eaty, the borders of the Free Territory Trieste were adjusted and the Yugovs seized on this opportunity to proke other incidents. Coolness and firmss on the part of everyone from the Allied Military ɔvernor to the noncommissioned officers at the outposts evented the mutual hostility from flaring up into open stilities. At one outpost, manned by five enlisted men d one lieutenant, a Yugoslav colonel demanded the right march 2,000 men through the U. S.-British zone. The onel threatened to use force, but the American officer ked to him patiently, delaying him until higher authority ıld be brought to bear on the fiery Yugoslav, who finally thdrew. A smart junior officer who knew his job had preıted what might easily have become a very unpleasant d perhaps world-shaking incident.

But the main job of the 351st during its long tour of ıupation duty was to live up to its motto: "Toujours Pret" lways Ready. A year-round training cycle was continuly in progress in the hills around Trieste and on the beaches of Venezia Giulia. Recreational facilities were of the best, and the Blue Devils have left Trieste regretfully.

Pulling out of TRUST, the medical detachment of the 351st loads into a boxcar.

If the occupation of Trieste has proved that opposing powers can get along with each other at close quarters even if there is little mutual affection, it has also shown that allies can cooperate without friction in peace as well as in war.

The troubles of Trieste may not be over. This city of 300,000 still has its unfriendly minority of Communists who are not averse to causing strife. Vitally important as a strategic and economic outlet from central and eastern Europe to the Mediterranean Sea, Trieste must still be regarded as a rich plum by the lords of the Kremlin. But a popular and sensible solution has been found, at least for the time being, for one of the world's most ticklish problems. Much of the credit for this must go to the officers and men who served at TRUST.

The 351st stood tall for General J. Lawton Collins, then Chief of Staff, when he visited TRUST in June 1951.

"When you put on a uniform there are certain inhibitions you accept," President Eisenhower once remarked—while he was General Eisenhower, if our remembrance is clear. One of those inhibitions is the uniformed man's right to free speech, one of man's most precious rights and recognized as such in the Bill of Rights.

Why is this? Why, if there is no inhibition on the uniformed man's Constitutional right to worship as he pleases, should there an inhibition on his right to speak or write as he pleases? The clearest explanation we have seen is imbedded in the judicial opinion of JUDGE GEORGE W. LATIMER *of the Military Court of Appeals in the case of* United States versus Voorhees. *In a portion of his opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in part from the majority opinion of Chief Judge R. E. Quinn),* JUDGE LATIMER *departed from the dry citing of legal findings and precedents to take a philosophic view of the problem, and the resulting essay, extracted here from the body of Judge Latimer's decision, may well be a historic benchmark for the guidance of military men.*

A few words about the case may be of interest. Lieutenant Colonel Melvin B. Voorhees was convicted by a general court-martial at Fort George G. Meade, Md., of five violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in a case growing out of articles and stories he had written on the conflict in Korea. He was charged with having violated "policy" and "propriety" standards of Army Regulations and had failed to submit his manuscripts for clearance before offering them to a publisher. A board of review disapproved four of the five findings of guilty by the court-martial but approved the sentence of dismissal and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. The Court of Military Appeals in a 2 to 1 decision affirmed the action of the board of review except that it directed a rehearing on the one remaining charge because it believed the sentence of dismissal was too severe. The Army later decided not to press this remaining charge and announced that it was dismissing the case.

The Limits of Free Speech in the Military Services

JUDGE GEORGE W. LATIMER

I BELIEVE it ill-advised and unwise to apply the civilian concepts of freedom of speech and press to the military service unless they are compressed within limits so narrow they become almost unrecognizable. Undoubtedly, we should not deny to servicemen any right that can be given reasonably. But in measuring reasonableness, we should bear in mind that military units have one major purpose justifying their existence: to prepare themselves for war and to wage it successfully. That purpose must never be overlooked in weighing the conflicting interest between the right of the serviceman to express his views on any subject at any time and the right of the Government to prepare for and pursue a war to a successful conclusion. Embraced in success is sacrifice of life and personal liberties; secrecy of plans and movement of personnel; security; discipline and morale; and the faith of the public in the officers and men and the cause they represent. . . .

So far as I have been able to discover, the United States Supreme Court has never passed on the precise question which now confronts us. It has, however, pointed out one rule which seems to be the golden thread running through all of its pronouncements. That rule, paraphrased from a number of opinions, is that while freedom to think is absolute of its own nature, the right to express thoughts, orally or in writing, at any time or place, is not. I need not take sides in the great debate as to whether the right of free speech occupies a preferred position which must be jealously safeguarded by the judiciary. Some opinions say it does, others are to the contrary. Either view can be taken without detracting from the principle that in the armed services it must be subject to those restrictions which are necessary to successful operations.

Time after time the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the right to speak freely must be considered in the light of attending facts and circumstances. That principle to me seems implicit in the "clear and present danger" concept. If such is the case, then the rights of the man in the service must proportioned by a more refined measu ing rod than are those belonging to t man in the street. What may be qu tionable behavior in civilian life, and y not present any danger to our form Government, may be fatal if carried in the military community.

THE substantial interest of society wi which we deal must be weighed scales adjusted to the necessities of t military service, and I believe they alwa have been. Unless the concepts unc which this nation has waged war succe fully are erroneous, then the exigenc of the military service demand circu scription of the right of free speech a suppression of publications which co tain information detrimental to the m rale, discipline, and security of the se ices. No officer or man in the arm forces has a right, be it constitution statutory, or otherwise, to publish a information which will imperil his u or its cause. Neither does he have t right to make public confidential inf

ation he receives by virtue of his mili-
ry assignment which might impair
riously the efficiency of the military
achine.

It should require little imagination to
sualize the havoc that would result if
ilitary authorities were denied the right
censor written communications or dis-
tches for national security purposes.
ne versed in the difficulties of maintain-
g secrecy in the armed forces can well
agine the holocaust if security had to
abandoned. Members of the press
no have been foremost in pleading the
use of freedom to speak and write
ould hardly insist that the principles
eighing in favor of freedom of expres-
n outweigh those favoring national
curity. Their willingness to accept
nsorship on matters involving national
curity is proof of that statement.

While the factors which must be con-
ered in permitting military disclosures
y appear to vary in peacetime and
rtime, they are substantially the same.
all persons who are presently working
sensitive military or civilian plants
ld, without restriction, publish their
owledge, their thoughts, and the in-
mation they obtain by virtue of their
ployment, the probabilities that this
ntry would survive as a nation would
be considerably lessened, if not rendered nonexistent.

I HAVE purposely approached the problem largely from the standpoint of security as that furnishes the firmest support in favor of control. But policy and propriety interests of the military likewise support regulation of public utterances. Briefly I will dwell on the reasons why I believe that to be necessary.

At the heart of every successful military force are morale, discipline, and public support of the cause. An army which lacks those cannot hope to succeed. What I have previously stated in regard to security, applies in part to policy and propriety. A wise policy, a fair sense of propriety, underlie morale and discipline. No man willingly lays down his life for a national cause which he is led to believe is unsound or unjust. Yet implicit in military life is the concept that he who so serves must be prepared to do so. If morale and discipline are destroyed, our forces cannot be trained adequately, and the nation must necessarily fail in battle.

A few dissident writers, occupying positions of importance in the military, could undermine the leadership of the armed forces; and if every member of the service was, during a time of conflict, or preparation therefor, permitted to ridicule, deride, deprecate, and destroy the character of those chosen to lead the armed forces, and the cause for which this country was fighting, then the war effort would most assuredly fail.

By way of illustration, in this particular instance, General MacArthur had been in command of the United Nations Forces in Korea. For the purpose of testing the principle, I can assume he was still in command at the time the manuscript was placed in circulation. One of the chapters of the book was devoted to his utter disregard of the fundamentals of military secrecy. It is not difficult to comprehend that an officer assigned to the position occupied by this accused could, by virtue of his assignment, and through false and misleading statements, destroy the faith and confidence of the people of the free world not only in the leadership of General MacArthur, but also in all other American officers. It matters little whether the published comments were true or false because the effect on the public would be the same and the cause would be weakened.

It seems to me to be doubtful reasoning to suggest that, if false, the General might institute court-martial proceedings

GEORGE W. LATIMER, Judge, United States Court of Military Appeals, and Colonel, Artillery-NGUS, has been a soldier and a lawyer since 1925. He first entered the military service by enrolling in the University of Utah ROTC. He was commissioned in the Utah National Guard in 1925 and served in all commissioned ranks between second lieutenant and colonel. He is a graduate of the Battery Officers' course at Fort Sill, and a wartime special course of the C&GS School, Fort Leavenworth. He entered Federal service with the 40th Infantry Division in 1941 and served as chief of staff of that division in combat in New Britain and the Philippines in 1944-45. A graduate of the law school of the University of Utah, Judge Latimer practiced law in Salt Lake City between 1925 and 1940 and in 1946 he was elected to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah for a ten-year term. In June 1951 he resigned to accept a Presidential appointment to the newly formed United States Court of Military Appeals. Judge Latimer is a member of the American and Utah State Bar Associations, the National Guard Association, Sigma Pi, and Delta Theta Phi legal fraternity, and the Kiwanis Club. As Colonel Latimer he is presently legal officer on the staff of the Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard.

to punish the offender. His major task is to fight a war, not a lawsuit. Criminal sanctions may be adequate in civilian circles, but preventive measures must be taken in the military. It is too late to apply criminal sanctions after the battle is lost.

A concept that a commander is not entitled to have the faith and confidence of his men and the support of the American people uninfluenced by false and unjustified accusations is fundamentally false. Hypothetical cases of every type could be developed to prove that, unless Army policy and standards of propriety were respected by members of a command, chaotic conditions would result. It might well be that, under certain peacetime conditions, all officers could be held up to ridicule and contempt by members of their commands; but if they were, I have good reasons to assert that such unbridled accusations would have a measurable impact on the discipline and morale of the unit in particular and the service as a whole.

Stated hypothetically, I can well imagine what might happen in Korea if, at the present time, an American officer there on duty were to publish an article in a national publication that the commanding general of the American troops in that area was collaborating with the communists. It is to be remembered that military personnel are not without recourse if they have cause for complaint or suspicion as other channels have been provided through which any member of the armed forces may, in confidence, air allegations of any nature.

CONGRESS must have realized the potential harm in permitting unbridled expressions of opinions by service personnel as Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice proscribes the use of contemptuous words against certain enumerated public officials. If an attack on those officials can be made the basis for criminal prosecution, and I assume it can, then a scurrilous publication about a commander should not be considered less serious. Certainly, the latter clashes head-on with other Articles of the Code and the customs of the service, and has a greater tendency to bring discredit on the military service and to interfere more with its assigned mission. Furthermore, Congress has prohibited the publication of articles which interfere with the proper waging of war, and the Supreme Court has upheld the statutes.

In the oft-cited case of Schenck v. United States, . . . the defendants were convicted of publishing articles which had a tendency to obstruct recruiting. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated:

> "But it is said, suppose that that was the tendency of this circular, it is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. Two of the strongest expressions are said to be quoted respectively from well-known public men. It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose . . . We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."

IF it is necessary for survival that this country maintain a sizeable military establishment, and under present conditions that must be conceded, then I have a great deal of difficulty in following an argument that those who serve should be entitled to express their views, even though by so doing they may destroy the spirit and morale of others which are vital to military preparedness and success. I have no disposition to deny the validity of the argument that the benefits derived from free expression by civilians may be worth the risk of endangering the future of the Republic. That concept, however, fits civilian society where conditions permit full debate and full development of both sides of the controversy. Full and complete information is essential to the proper solution of problems which face a democracy during periods of tranquility. Ideas for combatting false ideals and misguided ideologies can germinate in that climate, and informed discussion is desirable. That method of meeting false charges is characteristic of a democratic form of Government, but it presupposes time in which the public can be fully informed on the merits and demerits of each con-

tention and a delay in the solution is r
of grave importance.

However, a military organization ca
not be governed by those processes.
training a civilian army, time is of t
essence. A war cannot be won in t
halls of debate, and conditions do r
permit meeting lies with the truth.
syndic preaching syndicalism to servi
men can hardly be neutralized by
patriot teaching patriotism. But even
suming he could, that process place
burden on the service which, duri
times of stress, it should not be requi
to carry. In a time of peace, those w
voluntarily or involuntarily work to p
tect our nation should not be required
toil in contention and strife engende
from within. It is enough that they mi
be required to labor while being critica
assailed from without. A citizen, wit
certain limits, may circularize his cau
be it noble or ignoble, as there is li
danger to a constitutional form of G
ernment in an ordinary crusade. I
one false rumor, timed properly, n
destroy an army.

Assuming arguendo that the privil
of free speech is a preferred right,
should not prefer it to such an ext
that we lose all other benefits of
form of government. A demoralized a
undisciplined military service could
us all those we possess, and hosti
to prior restraints on communicati
should not be permitted to endan
our nation.

IN summation of this portion of
opinion, I conclude that the arm
services have the power to limit
right of free speech of their person
but the power must be considered
two ways: First, for the power to re
late the flow of information and, secc
for the authority to suppress or proh
its publication. They, in one sense, bl
as there is no absolute free speech
free press if permission must be obtai
from an official in the service before p
lication. His arbitrary refusal to c
may be tantamount to prohibition
officials can be tyrants, but that al
does not justify uncontrolled disclos

While the principles which gov
the right to regulate communicati
and the right to prohibit them may di
I believe the armed services could
quire submission of any and all writi
That is not to say they could prol
the publication of those which have
reasonable relationship to security, a
policy, or military propriety; but t
could require an inspection to m
certain those matters were not viola

Let's Put Sense in CBR Training

Could your outfit survive a nerve-gas attack? Start assessing casualties and you'll soon know. Realistic training that uses imagination will teach your soldiers how to protect themselves.

OLONEL JOHN L. MILES

HE prevailing state of mind about CBR agents is vividly illustrated by exchange between a captain and a ivate in a training unit.

"What can nerve gases do to you?" ked the captain.

"Well, sir, . . . they makes me nervs."

"I know. They scare the hell out of e, too!" answered the captain.

Units, like individuals, are also someies confused. During a recent field ercise in Germany, a ponton bridge npany, bivouacked in a woods the ght before a river crossing, was warned expect a CBR attack.

The supply sergeant checked his uipment and submitted an emergency uisition for missing items, including e field impregnating set for clothing l one hundred pounds of bleach. At st he knew what he needed and how get it.

The simulated attack with blister nts covered the woods, men, supplies, l equipment. As there was no other er available in the vicinity, the comy commander decided to stay in place l decontaminate the area. There are e practical difficulties in cleaning the top of a 50-foot tree with apparathat has only three feet of hose. It ad enough to try to clean up inverted tons. But they can be left in place later dumped into the river.

The umpire ruled that the company's on was "satisfactory." The company had means to make protective clothing, decontaminating agent—one hundred pounds of it—and three-gallon decontaminating apparatuses. The umpire charged the company neither with casualties nor delay. He did not know that it takes at least 24 hours to impregnate clothing, and that nearly 14 tons of material—four tons of which is bleach—are needed to cover a path four feet wide and a hundred yards long.

WITH gases one hundred times as toxic as any that have been used before—and the Russians have them—training that produces such results is not only ridiculous but downright dangerous. It is an insult to a soldier's intelligence, if he thinks about it; or it gives him a completely phony picture, if he does not.

He is not likely to think about it, except when he carries that extra five pounds of gas mask under his left arm or around his leg all day. He remembers, or has been told, that in World War II gas masks were scattered from Utah Beach to Czechoslovakia. They were No. 1 on the throw-away list. That's the easy solution. Do not think about it, and perhaps it will not happen.

CBR agents cannot be seen, heard, smelled or tasted. This is not entirely true, but it is close enough. To retire the side, CBR agents need only the help of an ignorant soldier and a few favors from the weather.

To be effective, the soldier should compare his CBR training program with his fire and police departments at home. How many times has his house burned down or been broken into? It hasn't. Do you then get rid of both departments? If the house burns down, or if

ONEL JOHN L. MILES is assigned to the hemical Corps Board, Army Chemical enter, Maryland. His suggestions for provement of CBR training are based observations he made while Chemical fficer, VII Corps, in Europe.

your money is stolen, you are delayed or prevented from attaining your mission —a long, reasonably secure, and happy life! You are willing to pay for this extra protection. The CBR protective equipment issued to you, and your ability to use it, are the equivalent of your fire department and police protection. They are insurance policies.

AS an infantryman, your mission is to destroy the enemy; as an artilleryman, to fire your piece; as a tanker, to fight your tank; or as a truck driver, to move your truck from here to there at the right time with the right load. If you become needlessly disabled or fail to keep your equipment operating, you make your mission and your unit's mission more difficult. You may even cause your unit to abandon its mission altogether.

CBR training must be oriented to the mission of your unit so that, under CBR attack, it may continue its mission with a minimum of delay or loss. To continue your mission requires prompt and correct individual, group, and command action.

Training must start, but cannot end, with the individual soldier. He has four fundamental questions. How do I care for my mask? When do I put it on? How do I put it on? When do I take it off? The knowledge that nerve gases cause an irreversible inactivation of cholines-terase is no substitute for the correct answers. So stick to the four fundamentals and forget most of the chemistry.

THE first hurdle in the training program is to present the answers to these questions sensibly. A good way to begin is by making an equipment and training inspection of the company. Instead of scoring points, assume that a G-gas attack is on and assess casualties. On the M9 type of mask, the canister is not screwed tightly to the facepiece; on another it is cross-threaded. On the next mask, there is enough dirt under the outlet valve to hold it open. These three masks will not protect. Three KIAs.



The bulge in the back of this man's neck shows that his mask is too tight. If he decides to relieve the pressure he may become a CBR casualty.

"Soldier, in combat, when do you put on your mask?"

"When I hear a gas alarm or smell a strong distinctive odor."

Wrong! Get rid of that idea right now! Nerve gases, BW agents, and radiological dust do not give themselves away by odor. The answer is: "When I get suspicious that something may be wrong. Then I give an alarm and put on my mask."

One more KIA.

"Mask!"

About 40 men—20 per cent—took one more breath after the command was given. Nerve gas was present, remember? That one breath was enough. Forty more KIAs.

Here is a soldier who must think is putting on a catcher's mask—from back, forward. If he is holding breath he may get away with it.

Look how tight the head straps on this mask. The soldier would be n comfortable if he stuck the facep on with thumb tacks. If he has to v the mask an hour, he will pull it and take the gas—it could not be wo he may think, than the discomfort. other casualty.

Twenty men failed to clear the m Probably only half of them had eno gas in the mask to knock them Pick out every other one—ten casual Another 20 did not fasten the r strap. A little rough cross-country go and their masks will leak. Some will wise to the situation before it is too l Add another ten casualties.

That makes 65 casualties—unless s have been missed!

NOT all the toxic chemicals rele were in the form of vapor. S were liquids. They landed on skin, cl ing, and weapons. There is no time to call on the aid man or company ply. Each man must get the grea possible use from each item of pro tive equipment he has on his per Flush with water, blot away any maining liquid, and use protective ment. Nerve gas symptoms come qu ly, and it is all over quickly. Bl agents take a little longer.

Clothing and individual weapons r be taken care of. If the men have thought these situations through al of time and decided what to do and to do it, it is already too late.

"Soldier, when may you take off mask?"

"When I am told to do so by ar ficer, who has determined that no is present."

Correct, and by the book! What p have been made to pass the word al Who will have the vapor detector and where will he be? Do not ans that one right now. Think it over.

Looking back over what has happe so far, it seems as though more th third of the company has been through avoidable errors and no tho has been given to accomplishing mission.

After all those hours spent in classroom teaching individual protec and self-aid, this has been a dishea ing and a sad spectacle. The so never accepted the necessity of defense nor made it a part of his experience. The instruction just did stick.

RY a different approach. Conduct your training to force the soldier to make s mistakes now, when no one gets irt. Give him a chance to benefit from s mistakes. In combat, he will not ve that chance.

Explain to your unit the fundamen- s of several CBR situations as they ect each soldier. If possible, use an istant to demonstrate what you are king about. Then call one of your en, Jones, forward. You can start on n by telling him something similar to s:

"First of all, Jones, check the CBR otective equipment you have on your rson. You have a mask, protective itment, BAL, atropine injector, water your canteen and bladder, first-aid ck, handkerchief, knife or bayonet, d you can make some mud. Check! u are to be subjected to a CBR at- k. Do what you should do, so that u may become combat-ready again as ickly as possible. I will time you with top watch. Stop at my command. Af- that, others of the unit will comment your performance."

You stand on Jones's left. Your as- ant is on his right. Suddenly you yell AS!" in Jones's ear. As he involun- ly turns toward you, your assistant irts some water—simulated nerve gas om a medicine dropper on Jones's n.

After a few seconds, while Jones is ng his stuff, you begin to speak again owly to use about 60 seconds before command *"Stop!"*): "Your nose be- s to run. There is a tightness in your st and you begin to have difficulty athing. Your sight dims or blurs. The pils of your eyes have contracted to point size. Your eyeballs ache, par- larly when you try to focus on some ect. Twitching of the muscles may in, starting with your eyelids. Breath- becomes increasingly difficult, with ible wheezing. You drool—gasp for ith. Feelings of panic grip you. You covered with sweat—nauseated. Ab- inal cramps seize you. You vomit. o! You have great difficulty working r fingers, arms, and legs. You urinate defecate involuntarily. You fall ex- sted and unconscious. In about five e minutes you will be dead.

This situation was a lethal exposure nerve gases, in which some liquid e gas got on Jones's chin. If the osure had been less severe, the symp- would have occurred in about same order, but not as rapidly. Are e any comments?"

He didn't stop breathing!"

He just wiped off his chin."

"He didn't wash off the gas!"

"He was slow in getting his mask on!"

"He didn't clear his mask!"

"He fumbled for his atropine!"

"He tried to push the needle into a rigid thigh, instead of relaxing the muscle and jabbing it in!"

There are dozens of variations to this routine. Splash crankcase oil, doctored with oil of garlic, on skin or weapons. Tell the soldier that his nose burns and he is just about to vomit; that there is a burning particle of WP on him somewhere; that there is blister agent in his eye—and check the time he takes to irrigate it.

You are restricted only by your own imagination. But keep the situations limited to one or two soldiers. Have each use only what he has on his person and limit the examples to those that he might conceivably meet. Always ask, "What do you do?"

Nerve gases strike fast. This soldier may die because he has not been trained in the speedy and effective use of his first-aid kit.

THE next phase of instruction is aimed at building the team. Before a commander can operate his company effectively and continue his mission, his specialists—his mess sergeant, motor sergeant, supply sergeant, and medic—must be able to work under CBR conditions. Men must be trained to use the vapor detector kits and mechanical protective equipment.

Even though the company commander has the responsibility, it is obviously impossible for him to train completely each one of his specialists. It is also a waste of time for one officer to prepare a program of instruction, lesson plans, and presentation in order to train one man. The most effective way would be for one officer in a battalion to train all the detector kit operators in the battalion; one officer in the regiment, the supply sergeants in the regiment; and one officer in the division, the radiological monitors in the division. Instruction should take place at the highest level, and should be given to the largest group consistent with effective instruction.

Under this plan, the CO of Company A is given the job of training vapor detector kit operators. He soon learns that the kit is a complicated apparatus. Tests have to be made and interpreted correctly. It is no job for an 8-ball. The soldiers he trains have the intelligence

of high school graduates or better. He will have to spend some time in the classroom, explaining the effects of heat and cold, the physical characteristics of specific agents, and methods of analysis —information above and beyond what the average soldier needs to know. From the chemical supply point, he can procure field detonation sets, containing live agents. The men will make tests in the field at night, as well as in daylight, and they will wear masks.

Even though other specialists of Company A are being trained by regiment, the responsibility for their training still remains with the company commander. He must personally check their newly acquired knowledge.

The supply sergeant has been taught the purpose of each item of protective equipment. Suggestions have been given him for their use and storage in garrison, in the field, and in combat. He has been given methods for estimating requirements. He has helped build a nonventilated shelter to store all his supplies. He has made a check list showing which items require special protection and which do not.

The motor sergeant has received training in decontamination of vehicles, not only with standard agents, but with field expedients, soap powders, washing soda and the like, which might be picked up through supply channels or procured locally.

The mess sergeant and the medic have also received information and training which bear directly on their daily responsibilities. Each has had to solve problems in the field. Each error was rated with "That cost the lives of so many men!" or "That delayed the mission so many hours!"

IT does not take too long to get the men up to their required standard of proficiency, if you tell them what they need to know and have them practice it. You should not require them to jab themselves with atropine just to prove that the needle does not hurt once it gets through the skin. They can take out the injector, remove the plastic covers, and go through the motions. A trained man can mask, get out his atropine, and stick himself with the needle in eighteen seconds. He must be good, but he can do it. But he does not learn how just by attending lectures and reading books.

While putting the finishing touches on the individual training, plan for concurrent training in the field.

The first time, the problem can be a straight dry run. Assume any logical field activity, with full unit and individual equipment—bivouac, road march, defense of a position—it does not matter, provided you have everyone take the precautions normal to a CBR alert. Borrow people who know something about CBR defense to act as umpires. Check the precautions that have been taken.

How much longer did it take the unit to set up than normally? This is an important factor to know. Correct what is wrong. Simulate an attack on the whole outfit with persistent agents, blister or nerve gases. Observe. Criticize. Point up each lesson to the men. Let them get their mistakes out of their systems when it does not matter much.

The next time you can have a surprise attack. But make it logical. Do attack troops on the top of a high ri with non-persistent agents on a wi day, or with mustard in freezing wea er. Chemicals are not used that in combat. Keep the tactical situat sound. If you plan a simulated att have the method of attack understo If you use smoke pots to simulate be certain each soldier knows that smoke is supposed to be gas.

CBR agents, if they are used, louse up the battlefield. They will t frightful tolls among the unwary, ignorant, and the foolish. They can lay by destroying unprotected men by making whole sections of the bat field untenable for friend or foe. T can, if you let them, completely vit your mission.

Realistic training, which places C defense in its proper perspective as of the hazards of combat, will ins prompt and correct individual, gro and command action, aimed at the fillment of the mission. Such train must be practical, concurrent, and i grated with all other activities.

One airplane loads sufficient n gas to destroy every unprotected liv thing in an area of one hundred squ miles. It is odorless, colorless and ta less. When it has dissipated, the térial, supplies, resources, manufac ing establishments and loot in the a will remain virtually undamaged. some people that could be an attrac possibility.

"What can nerve gases do to y soldier?"

"Well—sir—they still makes me n ous!"

For Yogi Berra, this method of putt on a mask may be OK, but for a dier in action it may mean "KIA."

While a trained noncom uses a detection kit to test for evidence of CBR agents, combat infantrymen take up defensive positions nearby.



It didn't matter from what direction the Communist attack came . . . it walked into the jaws of the . . .

Night Ambush Patrol

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE JUSKALIAN

)RE than half the Korean war was fought along a fixed front, where raids and patrol actions were the order of day. A large number of the patrol actions were of the ıt ambush type, and they varied in size, formation, and ctiveness.

ın ambush patrol formation was developed by the 1st :alion, 32d Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, in the spring 953, which turned out to be relatively successful in the ted patrol contacts which the battalion had with the ny. We called it simply the Y formation. (*See Figure 1.*) ıally, the angle between any two spokes of the Y was ıl to each of the other two angles.

or control purposes, each of the spokes was designated team with its own team leader. We called the teams :y were identical) Able, Baker, and Charlie. There : nine men in a team. At the hub were the command p (patrol leader, radio man and sniperscope operator) a two-man light-machine-gun team, making a total of ıen in the patrol. The size of the patrol could, of course, ecreased or increased as the situation required.

he horizontal clock system was used to gain even more rol. Able team was always aligned along the line to clock regardless of compass direction. Baker and Charlie s always pointed toward 4 and 8, respectively. Each in the patrol then knew that if he was warned the ıy was approaching from "2," it meant the enemy was oaching midway between Able and Baker teams.

ıe formation of the patrol automatically set a trap for :nemy in every direction. If he made contact, no mat- rom where he came, the enemy was fairly certain to his neck into one of the jaws of the patrol.

mament within the patrol consisted mainly of carbines, natic rifles, hand grenades, grenade launchers, and a machine gun.

:n within each team were placed from two to five yards (depending upon visibility) and in a straight line. might think this interval too close and advocate a stag- rather than a straight line in order to reduce the :es of casualties. But this is fallacious reasoning, for ght control is paramount. When control is loose or xistent, casualties mount.

placing each man in each team so that he faced in the opposite direction from the man next to him, a maximum of cross observation and fire in all directions was provided. (The arrows in *Figure 1* show the principal direction of fire and observation.) Two exceptions to this arrangement were the end man in each team, who faced outward to protect that sensitive spot, and the team leader, who faced in the same direction as one of the two AR men who flanked him. The latter exception allowed the two AR men in each team to be facing in opposite directions and still gave the leader maximum control of both AR men.

The light machine gun at the hub of the Y was initially laid along the most likely avenue of enemy approach—let us say between 12 and 4 o'clock. It could be easily shifted, however, to fire in any direction—that is, between 4 and 8, and between 8 and 12.

Alternate means of communication were available between the patrol and the MLR through sound-powered phone, radio (PRC-6), and flares. Within the patrol, each team leader had a sound-powered phone which tied in with the patrol leader at the hub. Passing signals from man to man

Figure 1: the **Y** formation.



'ENANT COLONEL GEORGE JUSKALIAN, who has contributed ore to THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, served as ımanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, in 'ea. He is presently on duty with G3 in the Pentagon.



Figure 2: attack at 2 o'clock.

either by tapping or in subdued voice was an additional means of communication within the patrol. Prearranged signals, by the use of WP hand grenades, or bursts of fire, could be devised at the discretion of the patrol leader.

THREE men in each team were picked up as a screening group to move out on order of the patrol leader, mop up the immediate area, and capture enemy. To avoid the confusion and possible disaster which would result from two screening groups mopping up in the same area, each screening group was responsible for the area between its team and the next adjacent team in a clockwise direction.

So much for a picture of the patrol as it lay in wait to ambush the enemy.

Moving out from the MLR, the patrol generally proceeded much as any other patrol on a similar mission. One rule we lived by religiously was to start the patrol out precisely at dark. The patrol leader understood that he was to move out *not* on an exact, preplanned minute, but when he personally saw that the enemy across the way would not be able to see his patrol as it moved out.

Another rule in moving out was to travel rapidly, so that the patrol could reach its objective area and set up before the enemy arrived on the scene. We felt we could favor speed over caution because we invariably employed certain safeguards. We physically screened (patrolled) "no man's land" daily, giving particular but not obvious attention to the general objective area to be occupied by the night ambush patrol. These screenings were made just before dark. In this way we eliminated the possibility of the enemy setting up an ambush of his own on the previous night, then holing up all day and jumping our patrol after dark. As a further safeguard, the objective area selected was always nearer our own lines than the enemy's.

In short, we were determined by every means at our disposal to get our patrol on the scene before the enemy got his, for it was clear the odds vastly favored the patrol that arrived there first.

The patrol occupied the objective area in this manner. It approached the area in a close single column with Able team in the lead, followed in order by the command gro and the light-machine-gun team, Baker team, and Cha team. As Able team reached the center of the object area, its leader moved it in the preplanned direction a halted it. Each man then automatically assumed the pr position facing his proper direction. The command gro and the light-machine-gun team set up as soon as th reached the center (or hub) of the objective area. Ba and Charlie teams both passed through the hub and mov to their prearranged positions. The patrol leader was ri there at the hub to see to it that the teams went to th proper places.

Once the patrol was on position, it stayed until it v time to return to the MLR. We did not shift the patrol a second or third objective area during the night. T would have flouted our own rule of "getting to the sce first" and would have been an open invitation to the ene to turn the tables on us.

UNLESS the weather made it impossible to do so, or u less the patrol was ordered back to the MLR becau of action, the patrol remained on position until shor before daylight, leaving in just enough time to reach lines by daybreak. It left the objective area in the sa order in which it arrived; that is, Able team; command gro and light-machine-gun team; Baker team; Charlie team. leaving, each team turned in on itself so that the man w led the team out also led it back in. Each team pas through the hub just as it had when it first reached position. This control measure provided a simple me for the patrol leader or his assistant to check each man his patrol as the man passed by him.

On the return to the MLR, caution was more import than speed, for we were far less certain about the ene at this point than we were when the patrol started out. T patrol left the objective area shortly before daylight rat than in the middle of the night, because we banked on belief—borne out by experience—that by that time an ene patrol would also be on its way home and would be likely to intercept our patrol somewhere between the obj tive area and our MLR.

We have observed the patrol in position and as it w in and out of position. Now let us watch it fight.

IN *Figure* 2 we have assumed that the enemy is approa ing from 2 o'clock. As soon as the patrol leader has det mined the direction of the enemy's approach, he faces Able and Baker teams toward the enemy. The turnab by the men who were facing in the opposite direction done instantaneously by the terse warning: "Enemy at The men merely "swivel on their belly buttons," so to spe For security, two men in each of the two teams keep lookout in other directions. The end man observes outwa while the man next to him faces to the rear.

If the light machine gun is not already laid on 2 o'clo it is shifted to that direction.

No change is made in the disposition of Charlie team.

The patrol opens fire on the enemy on the patrol lead signal. The closer the enemy can be sucked in, the bett The cross fire of the combined Able and Baker teams, coup with the light machine gun, provides a potent, close punch. At the same time, prearranged mortar and artill fires are brought down to punish the enemy further and hinder him if he tries to reinforce or pull out.

After the enemy has been hurt, but before he can pol

battlefield, the patrol leader dispatches Able team's ening group to capture any enemy left in the imme- e area.

harlie team did not take an active part in this encoun- It didn't have to. But it was ready to deliver flanking on any enemy that might have overrun and passed ugh Able and Baker teams. It was also ready for any ny that might have come from any direction between d 12 o'clock. This brings us to our next example.

he enemy in Korea rarely struck from one direction e. His normal tactic was to hit in two or more places.

Figure 3 we have assumed the enemy approaching m 2 and 6. As soon as the patrol leader has determined direction of the enemy's approach, he faces Able and rlie teams toward the enemy by giving the brief warn- "Enemy at 2 and 6."

ble team faces toward 2 o'clock and Baker toward 6 ck. As in the first situation (*Figure* 2), two men in of the two teams keep a lookout in other directions. se are the end man and the man next to him, who ob- outward and to the rear, respectively.

nce the enemy is coming from both sides of it, Baker stays put except for the center man in the screening p, who turns about so that he faces in the same direction e other two members of the screening group. He does to familiarize himself with the situation in the area h he is going to screen.

e light machine gun is laid at either 2 or 6, depending here the patrol leader thinks its fire will be most effec-

in the first situation, the patrol opens fire on the enemy e patrol leader's signal. At the appropriate time, the l leader sends out the screening groups from Able and r teams to capture any enemy left in the immediate area. this situation all three teams joined battle. Figure 3 s almost every man is in a favorable position to take part e fire fight and inflict heavy punishment upon the y.



Figure 3: attack at 2 & 6 o'clock.



Figure 4: attack at 2, 6, & 10 o'clock.

Figure 4 shows the enemy coming from three directions: 2, 6 and 10. In this situation, only the center man of each screening group moves initially. He faces about so that he is looking in the same direction as the other two men in his screening group. The end man in each team continues to observe outward to cover that approach.

Again, the light machine gun is laid in the direction in which the patrol leader believes its fire will be most deadly.

The subsequent action closely follows the pattern already established in the previous examples. The patrol leader signals the patrol to fire on the enemy, and then at the right time he dispatches each screening group to mop up its assigned area.

Here, as in the previous example, all teams took part in the fire fight. *Figure 4* shows that in this particular action the patrol delivered the maximum amount of fire power against the enemy and at the same time made the least possible rearrangement of the men within the patrol.

LET us now consider the likelihood of the enemy attacking against the tip of one of the spokes. (*See Figure* 5.)

This situation calls for a departure from the pattern set in the previous examples. The patrol leader, as soon as he determines that the enemy is coming from 4, orders the leader of Baker team to take prompt action. The Baker team leader, using his end man as a base, moves the man next to the end man and the two automatic riflemen so that they face toward 4 o'clock. He also swings his screening group around so that it is in position, prepared to move out and mop up the close-in scene of action. The assistant team leader faces toward 4 o'clock to keep abreast of the action and to help as needed.

The light machine gun is laid in the most profitable direction—either toward 3 o'clock or 5 o'clock.

The remainder of the patrol remains intact, ready to support Baker team or engage any enemy that might move in from other points.

The Baker team leader controls the local action at 4 o'clock, giving the fire order and the screening order at the right times.

In this situation the patrol is more limited in the amount

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

A new series of films on military justice will be of interest to officers and enlisted men of all arms. **Non-Judicial Punishment, TF 15-1967** (28 minutes), tells what cases may be disposed of under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. **The Summary Court-Martial, TF 15-1961** (45 minutes), and **The General Court-Martial, TF 15-1950** (73 minutes), pay special attention to the duties of the members of the courts.

Parts II and XI of the **Land Mine Warfare** series can be very useful in training programs. Part II, **Booby Trapping Mines, TF 20-1984** (30 minutes), shows how the enemy can be harassed and delayed by the effective use of the M15 antitank and M16 antipersonnel mines when used as booby traps. Part XI, **Conduct in a Minefield, TF 20-1989** (10 minutes), describes how a soldier who has stumbled into a minefield is rescued by an enterprising buddy who makes use of field expedients.

Armed Forces Screen Magazines (AFSM) are entertaining and informative films, each of which runs about 20 minutes. They cover such items as new equipment, inter-service competitions, and the history of military customs.

Front Line Rifle and Weapons Squads in the Defense, TF 7-1867 (24 minutes), stresses the importance of preparation and planning. It begins with a platoon leader's defense order to his squad leaders 48 hours before an expected enemy attack. The film covers the squads' preparations, coordination among the squad leaders, the platoon leader's final order, and the eventual defeat of the attackers.

Air Force Instructional Methods, TF 1-4986, presents and explains the components of successful teaching. This series consists of three parts, each running approximately 20 minutes: Part I is **The Pattern for Air Force Instruction;** Part II is **Ways and Means of Teaching;** and Part III is **The Developmental Lesson.** These films may soon be obtained from Air Force film exchanges.

Adjustment to Military Life, MF 45-8288 (18 minutes), can be used for both in-service indoctrination and public information. It shows the similarities between civilian and military life. SFC Maxwell, a training platoon sergeant, compares, by means of flashbacks, his present Army life with his former way of living.

of fire power it can bring to bear on the enemy. Eleme of the patrol have to move—although not far—out of tl original positions while the enemy is arriving on the sce But an alert, aggressive, well-trained patrol should be a to perform this variation successfully. The strength herent in the Y formation is still present, though redu in some respects.

WE have seen the patrol engage the enemy in four ferent situations. A score of additional situations coulc visualized, but the pattern of action in any case would essentially the same.

The following fundamentals should be remembered.

(1) *Organization.* The three teams within the pa are organized, equipped, and disposed exactly alike. T size of the patrol can be increased or decreased simply increasing or decreasing the size of the teams. Change the size of the patrol should, however, be done in multi of three to maintain uniformity in the teams.

(2) *Control.* The patrol leader is at the hub, where can best control the entire patrol. He has several me of communication with the MLR and within his pa Team leaders are placed where they can best control bulk of their teams' fire power. Assistant patrol and t leaders are designated beforehand. The use of the horizo clock system facilitates control.

(3) *Fire power and observation.* Maximum cross power and observation are achieved, providing all-aro offensive and defensive strength. There are no blind sp and the danger of patrol members firing into one ano is small.

(4) *Simplicity.* The Y formation is easy to learn remember. Certain devices, such as the horizontal c system and the identical organization and disposition of e team, help to increase simplicity.

(5) *Flexibility.* Like a well-organized, well-trained f ball team, the Y formation patrol has certain signals that it in motion against enemy contacts. The ability of th formation to meet all enemy contacts with essentially same pattern of action gives it flexibility.

Because the Y ambush formation and the technique o employment were developed late in the Korean war, they only limited tests on the battlefield. But it worked on occasions when it was used. It worked so well that we in 1st Battalion were convinced we were on the right tr

Figure 5: attack at 4 o'clock.



IRONS IN THE FIRE

6mm Recoilless Rifle

The infantryman will soon have a potent new AT weapon. The Army released some facts about the Battalion Antitank (BAT) 106mm Reless Rifle System, which has the capability of penetrating the armor ny known tank at twice the range heretofore possible with individual pons. The BAT weighs less than 500 pounds and can be fired either n a jeep or from a mobile tripod mount. The new weapons system con- of the recoilless rifle, ammunition, fire-control equipment, and a cali- .50 machine gun that is fixed to the recoilless rifle and is used to spot target with tracer bullets. This device eliminates the need for a fragile, plex optical range finder. Special caliber .50 ammunition emits a flash a puff of smoke on impact. The firer pulls trigger to fire the machine gun and pushes fire the recoilless rifle. The BAT can be ersed through 360 degrees, and it can be ressed to 20 degrees or elevated to 60 de- s. This weapon will enable the infantry- to be a long-range sniper against tanks. an also be used against enemy troops, lacements, pillboxes, and other installa- s. It is operated by a three-man crew, and n be hand-carried for short distances.

New Sniperscope

More effective night firing will be possible with this improved sniperscope, which has been developed at Fort Belvoir, Va. The new sniperscope operates on the same principle—of picking up objects at night with infrared light —as the old model. It has a longer range, more rugged construction, and a more accurate aiming device than the model used in World War II and Korea. The increased range is due to increase in voltage from 4,000 to 20,000 volts. Shown here being used with an M1 rifle, the sniperscope weighs 31½ pounds.

Gas Turbine Vehicle

The British Army has revealed the world's first gas turbine tracked vehicle. Shown recently at a special demonstration in England, it is propelled by a gas turbine unit capable of developing up to 1,000 horsepower. This unit is composed of a compressor turbine unit, a power turbine unit with built-in reduction gearing, four combustion chambers, and a synchro-coupling unit that enables the turbine to be mechanically connected to the compressor.

eliport" to Open

ne Army Transportation Corps will open st helicopter airport at Fort Eustis, Va., on cember. The "heliport" will consist of a lar taxiway, which will be crossed by two oot runways. Additional space for land- and takeoffs will be provided by eight lar "pads," placed around the outer rim e taxiway. A large helicopter hangar is nder construction at Fort Eustis. It will space for several large helicopters and or five maintenance shops.

Atomic Weapons for the Battalion Commander

COLONEL FRANK J. SACKTON

F the British victory at Crecy in 1346, the Italian historian, Villani, writes: he guns shot forth iron bullets by ans of fire . . . they made a sound e thunder . . . the whole plain was ered with men struck down by arrows l cannon balls." The British had used otal of three cannon in the battle. Although cannon of a sort had pre-usly been used in military operations, Battle of Crecy provided the first ificant military application of gun-vder to discharge projectiles. But it not until sixty-eight years later that powder was first used in small arms: the handgun which was the fore-ner of the arquebus and the musket. Ve can surely expect that atomic rgy will be harnessed and geared to needs of the battalion commander ar less time than that! It can be done and it should be done in concert the current program to place mili-emphasis on more effective destruc-power rather than on masses of men. should not be deterred by the that large atomic bombs and mis-are "cheaper" per kiloton of explo-power. True economy can be meas-only in battlefield effectiveness achievement of victory.

he thought has been expressed fre-itly that tactical "baby" atomic weap-can have only a limited use on the efield. But when we think of the s of battlefield targets that would itable for "baby" bombs it becomes clear that the Army needs a family of tactical weapons expressly designed for use on the battlefield. For most purposes, these weapons need have only from five to ten times the explosive power of our present tactical weapons. For some of the "hard" or "area" targets discussed below, atomic explosives in the range of three to five kilotons would be useful.

Appropriate targets for these larger atomic weapons would be concentrations of troops, transport, and supplies; bridges, railroad trestles, and marshaling yards; and canalized avenues of approach to the battle area. These weapons would provide a means with which to isolate the battlefield, to crush the enemy's flank, or to create gaps in the enemy's lines. They would permit attainment of surprise through the employment of massed fire power at critical points without the necessity of troop maneuver, which tends always to warn the enemy of the impending blow. Above all, these weapons would prevent a stalemate in the battle area and make possible battlefield fluidity and an early decision.

FOR as long as the art of war has been studied in the modern world, there has been a vain search for a sure method of isolating the battlefield. An army will win if it can prevent the enemy from reinforcing and supplying front-line units. It will then chew up the enemy in detail, repeating the process of isolating the battle area as it moves forward to attack other enemy units. Tactical atomic weapons provide a commander with the means to accomplish this.

World War II and the Korean conflict are replete with instances in which a critical target, such as a bridge or railroad trestle, was repeatedly destroyed, only to be repaired or rebuilt by the enemy—under cover of darkness if necessary. Some critical bridges in the Korean war were alternately destroyed and repaired and destroyed and repaired, for a period of two years. Even the best bombing efforts could not isolate the battlefield for more than relatively short periods.

Tactical atomic weapons would accomplish the complete destruction of bridge targets without the necessity of a direct hit. In addition, radioactive contamination of the surrounding area may deny the repair crews access to the target area. Destruction is complete because of the tremendous effects of blast and heat on the target. Conventional bombings, even with direct hits, seldom destroy bridges or trestles completely. The foundation uprights as well as a portion of the structure itself usually remain intact. But the heat generated by an atomic bomb will burn up everything inflammable and will even vaporize steel within the area of the ball of fire. The bomb crater resulting from the blast action will destroy all of the foundation and supports. As for radioactive contamination, when point detonation or delayed-fuze setting is employed, the crater will be quite "hot," and the area will be effectively denied to the repair crews until the radioactivity dissipates, or until specially trained and equipped decontamination personnel remove or plow under the hot radioactive top soil and debris. Even then, repair crews will be able to work in the crater area only for short periods of time until the radioactivity is reduced to working levels. A time-consuming alternative would be to relocate the structure at a new site.

Thus we see that effective and total destruction of a critical target, plus effective neutralization of the surrounding

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area, gives a tactical advantage with the use of limited effort. We now appear to have an effective means of isolating the battlefield for longer periods of time than has been possible heretofore.

THE ability of the scientists to diminish the "critical" mass in atomic explosions has made possible tactical nuclear weapons, or "baby bombs." Also, the successful development of atomic artillery spells a new era in battlefield destructive capability. But this should be only the beginning. What would be very useful indeed would be a family of nuclear weapons at the divisional, regimental, and battalion levels—nuclear devices that can be fired from mortars, hand-operated rocket launchers, and recoilless weapons. Also needed are atomic heads on mines, ground-to-ground rockets, and guided missiles. There is a critical need for the latter to supplement tactical aircraft in the close support of ground forces. Obscure, indefinite, and intrenched enemy locations would be easy prey for atomic warheads with a wide radius of destruction. Such missiles would be useful against targets beyond the range of atomic artillery, and they could be guided to target by Army aircraft.

Such tactical atomic weapons would offer many benefits to ground forces. The greatest single difficulty of troops today is the need for pinpoint accuracy to destroy or neutralize a target. The difficult task of locating the enemy is, in itself, a real problem, yet it is only preliminary to the problem of getting accurate fire after the target has been located. Quite frequently a direct hit on an enemy tank or bunker will fail to knock it out. But the devastating effect of an atomic explosion insures destruction of the target even with a near miss. Area destruction becomes a reality without the need for pinpointing enemy locations. Nuclear weapons also allow ground troops to neutralize an area temporarily by radioactive contamination, thus making it unnecessary to occupy all critical points during an attack.

Tactical atomic weapons will inevitably require changes in tactical formations and maneuver. The most prominent of these changes will be a trend tow dispersed and well-ventilated formati Concentrations of troops and equipm would be the most promising tar for an atomic attack. The quest naturally arises: How does an a move in the face of atomic weapo If it is concentrated for control shock action, it is vulnerable to se punishment by the enemy's ato bombs. But if it is widely dispersed, trol becomes difficult and the army la the punch which comes only from centrated mass attack. This dilemm solved by using dispersed formati when in movement or at rest, but centrating promptly for an attack. T is more difficult of accomplishment t it sounds, and it will require maste and well-timed command action. It for emphasis on movement under c of darkness and during periods of creased visibility. Electronic comm cation equipment becomes more im tant than ever in facilitating con when conditions are bad and formati are dispersed. In addition, Army avia must be employed to maintain sur lance over the gaps in the formati and to ride herd on the fluid sur forces.

TROOP maneuver can be used to f the enemy into limited or canali areas. The enemy becomes a pr target for nuclear weapons after he been compelled to concentrate his fo and has lost his mobility. Conditi of stalemate are to be avoided at costs because the immobility that res from holding a line leads to concen tion of forces and matériel and t provides choice targets for atomic w ons. But stalemate conditions will be frequent and brief, since atomic w ons have the capability of crushing enemy's flanks. Maneuver around flanks and against the enemy's rea thus made easier. If the enemy's fla are fixed on terrain that is unfavor for maneuver, atomic weapons can cr wide gaps in the enemy's line. Air bu create the greatest effects of blast heat against the enemy, but do not taminate the ground. Friendly fo can move immediately over such terr

The introduction of atomic weap to the battlefield down to the batta level will have the same revolutior and devastating effect that accompar the initial use of the longbow and repeating rifle. In the current ato race, the rewards are rich indeed the army that first emerges with a c plete line of tactical nuclear weap

CEREBRATIONS

TC's Future

E uncertainties and upheavals which my ROTC has experienced in recent s are matters of concern to the De- ment of the Army, the Department Defense, and our civilian colleges. crux of the problem involves man- er policy on a national level. It ap- s, to me, that we have been so con- ed about the current short-range lems that we have lost sight of the ose and mission of the ROTC pro- n.

OTC trains students for positions adership in the Armed Forces in a of national emergency. The mission e senior division, Army ROTC, as d in Army Regulations, is to train ge students as junior officers who the qualities and attributes essential eir progressive and continued de- ment as officers in a component of Jnited States Army, particularly in eserve components, i.e., the Orga- l Reserve Corps (now Army Re-) and the National Guard. In ad- n, the senior division will provide jor source of procurement of junior rs for the Regular Army through ecurring selection of a number of guished military gradutes from sen- nits for direct Regular Army ap- ment.

ause Selective Service is in effect, Department of Defense has ruled OTC production must be geared to e duty" requirements on the basis would be unfair to defer a student gh four years of college ROTC en not require an immediate tour ive duty, while his non-college con- rary has already served on active This argument had some validity there was shooting in Korea and the manpower cut in the armed Even then, it was questionable. with a reduced manpower require- under which Selective Service will duct all eligible males, it would that there is no valid basis for policy.

obvious that so long as this situa- ntinues, the ROTC is not ful- its historic role of providing an

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officer reserve for emergency mobilization. Our only officer reserve pool will contain those who have already served on active duty. This would be all right in the event of total mobilization when everyone will have to serve, but it would not be all right in the event of another Korea in some other part of the world which would require something less than a total manpower mobilization. Are we going to have the same unsatisfactory situation that existed when we mobilized for Korea and had to recall veterans while we still had an untapped but untrained manpower pool? In our efforts to prevent individual injustices today are we not setting up a situation which may result in greater injustice tomorrow, to the detriment of the common good and future morale of our Army?

Officers are badly needed in our Army Reserve units. Not long ago I inspected all of the Army Reserve units in the Green Bay, Manitowoc, and Waupaca areas of the state of Wisconsin. They are all basically good units, but they are almost without exception teetering on the verge of inactivation because of insufficient strength. Commissioned ROTC graduates not required for active duty could alleviate this situation in respect to officers. They could be assigned to Reserve units and required to participate actively. Failure on their part to participate should be grounds for revocation of commission and immediate induction as enlisted men. In our efforts to appease Selective Service officials are we not missing an excellent opportunity to strengthen our Army Reserve? Is this in the national interest?

True, we have a law requiring an eight-year service obligation; theoretically, discharged veterans with two years' active duty have a six-year reserve obligation remaining. But it is a law without a sanction, and it is not working. Under the law, our reserve units should be filled to capacity, but instead they are seriously short of men.

As a result of the "active duty" policy, PMSTs were required to inform graduates of 1955 that the Army could not guarantee that all of them would be commissioned upon graduation. This announcement undoubtedly accounted for a drop in last year's ROTC enrollment despite an increased male enrollment in our colleges.

The uncertainty of getting a commission, the termination of hostilities in Korea, the GI Bill, and the tendency of Selective Service boards to "lay off" college students have combined to create a serious ROTC enrollment problem which may soon result in the loss of excellent ROTC units in many of the smaller colleges.

Between semesters this year an unprecedented number of students left college for the Armed Forces, hoping to complete their service obligation while there is no shooting and to take advantage of the GI Bill, which will help pay for their education when they get out.

Deferments are no longer sufficient incentive for enrollment in ROTC. Experience has shown that few college students who maintain a minimum satisfactory scholastic average are inducted. Last fall, two of my junior-year students who had signed deferment agreements as freshmen violated those agreements by refusing to enroll in the advanced course. I cancelled their deferments with a recommendation to their Selective Service boards that they be inducted immediately. Seven months later they are still in college and I expect they will still be there to graduate next year. Last year at this time 71 sophomore students in my ROTC unit were deferred so that

they would be eligible for selection for the Advanced Course ROTC. This year only half of that number were deferred.

All of which adds up to a picture of famine in the midst of plenty. Our efforts to limit ROTC commissions to meet only active-duty needs, along with other factors that tend to diminish ROTC enrollment, may well result in a few years in an insufficient output of ROTC officers to meet even our "active duty" requirements. We stockpile materials. Why not stockpile leadership for possible future emergencies?

This nation cannot compete with its potential enemies strictly on a basis of manpower. Our lack in numbers must be compensated by the quality of our capacities and abilities. A key ability in this respect is that of leadership. We should not limit leadership training in our civilian colleges because of pressure from Selective Service officials. Such a policy is penny wise and pound foolish. We should permit ROTC units to produce as many officers as their facilities permit. Modern warfare requires educated leadership. We cannot have too much of it. Further incentives should be provided to help the ROTC program and to induce its enrollees to "Learn Today to Lead Tomorrow" and "Be Better Prepared to Better Serve."

LT. COL. BERNARD C. TEETERS

Assignments For Retired Officers

NOT long ago I had occasion to see a letter dated April 7, 1917—the day after the United States entered World War I. Addressed to The Adjutant General, it was from Brigadier General James N. Allison, USA, Retired. At the time, he was approaching his sixty-ninth birthday, having retired five years previously after a career which had begun with his enlistment as a drummer boy in 1863 and included the Civil War, the Indian campaigns, the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection. Undaunted by his years or his battles, the doughty old gentleman came directly to the point: "In the conviction that under existing circumstances there should be no able bodied idlers in Government service," he wrote, "I report myself . . . available for any work to which I may be considered qualified. . . ."

No doubt the archives are full of comparable letters from retired officers tendering their services on the outbreak of every war in our nation's history. And if war should come again, there is no doubt about the eagerness of every retired officer to get back into harness. Like Job's steed, he smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains, and the shouting, and he saith among the trumpets, Ha, ha!

Any objection that age or physical condition of retired personnel would negate the advantage which could be taken of the services of these officers in wartime is not based on a clear view of the facts. Now that the "thirty-and-five" provision of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947—which states that any officer with thirty years' service and five years in grade as a permanent full colonel must be retired unless promoted to brigadier general in the Regular Army —is beginning to take effect, the average age of retiring officers has gone down. When the integrated officers begin to be affected, the average annual number can be expected to rise. At the present time, the average age of colonels being retired after thirty years' service is only 54 and a fraction. During the next five years, the number of thirty-year retirements is expected to average between 150 and 200 colonels a year. After that, while the number should increase, the average retirement age will remain about the same.

The record of past wars provides convincing examples of useful service by such officers in wartime. The number of possible assignments, entirely apart from operational command and staff positions, is countless. We all recognize that, to be effective, large-scale mobilization today would have to be much more rapid than ever before. Mobilization requires a host of personnel widely experienced in administrative, training, supervisory, and day-to-day planning jobs. The active Army simply does not have enough of such officers to meet these and the other vital requirements which would face it at the same time.

Also, it is not in the best interests of the service to commit too large a proportion of the Active List officers to these duties. The experience that officers gain in battle is too important to their professional development, and their professional development is too important to the leadership and direction of the postwar Army. For at least a decade following a war, the Army must select its top leaders to a large extent on the basis of wartime reputations. To achieve the broadest base of selection, battle experience must be as widespread as possible among Active List officers.

It is clearly both practicable and desirable to use retired officers on active duty in time of war. But if they are to be used to full advantage, the beginning of mobilization is too late to start finding assignments for them. For many Reserve officers, this problem has been met by designating specific mobiliz assignments to individuals. At the ent time, almost 9,000 Reserve of —more than 17 per cent of all Re officers on "pay status"—have suc signments. The administrative bu of a similar mobilization assignmen tem for retired officers would not b heavy. On the contrary, it would possibly be scarcely greater than th ministrative burden of processing a applications for duty which can b pected to pour in from retired of on the outbreak of war.

We need a plan for the wartim of retired officers. Shortly before a ficer's retirement, it could be de whether his services would be req in case of war and, if so, in what ca ty he would serve. If he were w to accept the assignment offered his name could be placed on an a bility list, which would not only be ful for detailed personnel plannin would also furnish the basis for dis tion to him of all future publica pertaining to his special field of int In this way he could keep abrea professional developments, be ab take over a wartime assignment minimum delay for orientation, and a definite reminder that his abiliti still valuable.

Naturally, the rosters would ha be kept up to date to reflect chang physical condition and to elimina ficers on attainment of whateve ceiling might be adopted. The r would be worth little unless th ficers listed were actually available needed. But considering the fact so many retirements today are c by length of service rather tha physical disability, and considerin comparative youth of officers now ing, the period of their potential u ness would still be more than enough to make such a system em ly worthwhile.

LT. COL. JOHN B. B. TRUSS

Marksmanship Training

PROFICIENCY in marksmanshi cherished American heritage. Fre from time immemorial have provec thousand battlefields the superior individually aimed shots over the ra volley firing of hireling mercenar

No army in history ever attaine high marksmanship standards th had in 1940. But since that time has been a steady decline in mark ship, until today our standards are ically low. In 1940 mean scores of firing were approximately 85 p of the maximum possible score. P

dies have shown that this figure has :lined to 45 percent.

The evidence of our very low stand- 's can be observed everywhere—in ular units, at training centers, and ·ing civilian component summer field ning. Training schedules are inade- ıte and ineffective. Preliminary marks- nship training is either completely ored or poorly conducted. The limited e allotted to position and trigger- eeze exercises is dissipated by the mpt to teach five different positions. itions are generally poor and slings itually loose. Coaches are not trained nake corrections, and errors are re- ted until they become bad habits. ere is a general failure to teach un- scious trigger squeeze, relaxation of body, and concentration of the mind eye. The sequence and timing tech- ıes taught are incorrect and promote hing. Instruction in score books, t setting, and sight changing is in- ctive. It is not considered important ıuse few men are capable of firing ıps small enough to warrant intel- ıt sight changes.

ur failure to teach basic principles narksmanship and to inspire men confidence in their weapons had c consequences in Korea. Men were ı extremely reluctant to use their vidual weapons. They preferred to for artillery fire even against small le patrols. It was discovered that great majority were so deficient in smanship that they were unable to n accurate "zeros."

ıe first step in the revival of marks- hip must be the realization of its importance in increasing combat iveness. We have been so intrigued e atomic bomb, atomic artillery, and new weapons that we appear to forgotten that the rifleman and nan still have the all-important role osing with the enemy and taking ıolding ground.

r basic manuals on marksmanship enerally sound, but they contain a rrors that must be corrected if we aterially to improve our standards. errors include insufficient time d to preliminary marksmanship ıg and range firing, improper ıce as taught by the BASS meth- reathe, aim, slack, squeeze), the ot to teach too many positions, the ous concept of trigger squeeze, and ect sustained-fire techniques.

chief fault is that we have made h of trigger squeeze. We have so rated what should be taught as a mechanical operation that it has become a bugaboo to the average recruit. Field Manual 23-5 correctly states: "Your attention must be divorced from the trigger finger. This finger works automatically when you are well trained. Then you can concentrate all your attention on the correct sight picture." But throughout preliminary marksmanship we exhort men to "squeeze, squeeze," and the firer becomes as tense as a sprinter waiting for the starter's gun and he flinches involuntarily.

Field Manual 23-5 allots only 24 hours to preparatory marksmanship out of a total of 78 hours of rifle instruction. The time spent in preparatory marksmanship should be increased. The results obtained on the range have a direct relationship to the time devoted to effective position and trigger-squeeze exercises in preparatory marksmanship. A breakdown of this phase of training shows that only 3½ hours are devoted to position exercises and 2 hours to trigger squeeze. Since 5 positions are taught, the time available for each position is inadequate to achieve satisfactory results.

At least 30 hours should be allotted for preparatory marksmanship. Instruction firing at 1,000 inches, if conducted at all, should be devoted entirely to the prone position. Liberal use should be made of dummy rounds to insure that proper sequence, timing, sight concentration, and unconscious trigger-squeeze are sufficiently emphasized.

During position exercises, only the prone, sitting, kneeling, and standing positions should be taught. Other positions can be taught later as concurrent training during transition firing. The proper sequence and timing of sighting, taking up the slack, and holding the breath should be taught during position exercises and not left until trigger-squeeze instruction begins. They are important in slow fire, so that men learn to perform the simple mechanical operations in the proper sequence.

The BASS sequence is not conducive to a high standard of marksmanship. If we accept the fact that "attention must be divorced from your trigger finger," it should not be hard to understand why this is so. After the pupil takes up the slack, his mind must be instantly diverted from the trigger and directed entirely to the sight picture. This is very difficult for the recruit to master, and it is no wonder that he flinches so often.

Taking up the slack logically belongs in the sequence of "slack, breathe, aim, squeeze." The rifleman must be taught to take a comfortable position, relax and adjust his body until his sights are resting under the bull's-eye. Then, when he is set, he takes up the slack in one firm motion, takes a breath of air, and expels half of it while his eye and mind are completely absorbed by the sight picture. When the picture is correct, or when the center of any wobble is at the lower edge of the bull's-eye, the trigger is squeezed by an unconscious reflex action of the finger. The interval of time between taking up the slack and squeezing the trigger enables the soldier to forget the trigger and concentrate on the sight picture, follow through, and call the shot.

The weakness of the BASS sequence in trigger squeeze exercises is even more pronounced during sustained-fire exercises. For the firer is required to take up the slack and immediately begin the squeeze. As a further temptation to flinch, the coach is required to strike the operating handle and cock the piece every four seconds, when the command BOLT is given. The average soldier will often jerk the trigger before the handle is struck even though he is not ready. This rigid rule induces flinching, since he jerks through the slack and squeeze in order to be in time with the instructor.

Each time the hammer falls, the coach should strike the operating rod handle quickly and smartly. The pupil should be taught to take up the slack immediately, keep his head down and pillowed on the stock, note the sight picture, adjust his body so that his sights are correct, and hold his breath. Then, concentrating his whole attention on the sight picture, he should automatically apply a steady and unconscious pressure on the trigger until the hammer falls. Then, and only then, should the coach strike the operating rod handle for the next shot.

The instructor can indoctrinate men in the four-second time element by calling "first shot," "second shot," etc., in a drawl, not a command.

There is nothing that contributes more to developing the soldier's pride and confidence than the attainment of a high standard of proficiency with his individual weapons. This helps him attain the same standard of proficiency with all other weapons. Firepower contributes most to halting a hostile maneuver and furnishing an effective base for our own maneuvers. But it must be accurate, devastating in volume, and responsive to the will of the commander. The revival of the American tradition of marksmanship is essential to the realization of this objective.

LT. COL. EDWARD E. CRUISE

THE MONTH'S READING

Synonym for Confusion

REAR ADMIRAL LEWIS L. STRAUSS
Remarks at Washington Conference of Governors
April 1954

I am reminded . . . of a story for which I am indebted to a veteran Washington correspondent whom most of you know—Arthur Krock. He is a collector of esoteric and unprinted Americana, and he told me a number of weeks ago that back in 1861 there had been a committee of Virginians, including General Lee, who were very anxious that Virginia should not secede from the Union. They had arranged an appointment with President Lincoln to find out whether he intended to use force against the States which had seceded, and, if so, to try to dissuade him. They wanted to get their information back to Richmond as promptly as possible and so they devised a telegraphic code. In modern parlance I think we would say, that they undertook proper security provisions. The code was a simple one: If the conference with Mr. Lincoln was successful, the word "Blessings" was to be tapped out over the wire. And if the conference was unsuccessful, the word was "Calamity." But they also envisaged the possibility that they couldn't get any decision and in the case, the code was "Washington."

Limited Warfare

BRIGADIER C. N. BARCLAY
The New Warfare
The Philosophical Library, 1954

It can be said, however, that up to comparatively recent times wars could be kept under control. A conflict might assume somewhat larger proportions than was anticipated; but it was unlikely that one started as a small incident would become a world-wide struggle. This is not the case today. Nations are organized in large groups, each member of which is bound by treaty, or alliance, to assist any other member who is in trouble. Travel by sea and land has been speeded up and a new element, the air, has been introduced which makes the movement of personnel, stores and equipment an immensely faster process than was the case 50 years ago. Consequently the practical difficulties of assembling, and maintaining, large forces have been reduced.

As a result the great powers take pains to cloak any like incident which they may start, or sponsor, in a which they hope will confine it to the limits which their purpose. Modern history is full of examples de strating that this is no easy matter and that miscalcula are very apt to occur. Herr Hitler, when he invaded P in 1939, hoped that the powers would stand aside, as had done in the cases of Austria and Czechoslovakia hardly expected to provoke a world war of nearly six duration, which would end with his own death an ruin of Nazi Germany. When, in the summer of 195 United Nations under the initial lead of America, de to support the South Koreans against the North Ko the extent of the conflict was obviously not foreseen. Si ly the French in Indochina could not have anticipate immense drain of this campaign in men, money and ma

Nevertheless, it can be said that Korea and Indochi the 1950s have not led to disaster on the scale that P did in 1939. Why is this, and how is it that we have able to check the play of forces in a manner whic failed to do in 1939? There are several reasons; bu doubtedly the most important is that neither group of p can afford a large-scale shooting war: they will do a anything to prevent one. Subsidiary reasons are tha theatres of war are remote from the home lands o leading powers, and that the areas in dispute are not to any great power. Korea is of little economic impor to anybody, except the Koreans. Indochina, whilst o siderable importance economically, is not *vital* to the ence of France.

Victory in Virginia

JEROME BONAPARTE STILLS
The New York World, 14 Apri
From *Bohemian Brigade b*
Louis M. Starr
Alfred A. Knopf, 1954

On that morning of Monday which beheld the occu of Petersburg and Richmond by Union troops, the grand armies of the Potomac and the James began a p which will be remembered as the swiftest, the mos relenting, and the most successful in history.

ifted and thrown, by the tremendous onsets of Saturday Sunday, from the earthworks he had occupied for s, Lee, uniting his forces near Chesterfield Court House, ward and midway between the two cities he had de- d, pushed straight on for the Appomattox. Crossing river at Devil's Bend, he struck the Richmond and Dan- Railroad at Amelia Court House on Wednesday, and n to strain every sinew of his command to escape down road via Burke's station to Danville, before Grant d head him off.

rant was too quick for him. The flight of the Army of hern Virginia had not begun before the hounds—swift ns with steel fangs and baying cannon—were on its . . . .

ree days and nights, hurrying, hurrying, the two great es, scarcely fifteen miles apart, thundered in through ges and valleys, over hills and streams, toward a common That goal—the Richmond and Danville Railroad—which ld strike it first? Should we come upon it to find that rey had passed; . . . to sit ourselves down forthwith, king God and Grant that at least we had got Petersburg Richmond? Or should we, *could* we, have the gladness eeting the hunted thing face to face out of its dens, g it a shot between its scared eyes, worrying it, torturing o giving up its fearful ghost at last?

e last vindictive thought inspired the men not only to rance, but to a kind of frenzy. They marched as victors d; they sang and cheered along the roads like demons. ark divisions that sank to slumber in some forest in the ng at ten, awoke with the drum at two, to eat a meal sty as a bird's, and then to start, with bands playing, waving, and shouts that might have roused the tardy upon the roads again. All the hardships and incon- nces of other marches were turned to joys in these. ng rivers became a joyous *divertissement*. The soldiers into the water up to their waists, joking, laughing, and ed shaking themselves and rolling upon the banks like py drove of Newfoundlands. Villagers, astonished and is, asked what "you all" were going so fast for?

e're the devil after Lee!" cried a soldier.

"O, we're after Lee
infantree and cavalree,
e're bound to smash him up before the morning."

tience Is Needed

REINHOLD NIEBUHR
The New Leader
4 October 1954

right solution of these *political* problems in both nd Europe, upon which the health and the unity free world depend, is more basic to our security he frantic defense of any important strategic point, we cannot afford to be complacent about the loss such points. In short, the problem which confronts hether we have the patience and the resourcefulness long-range goals for a very broad alliance. That is mportant than to seek to prove in every instance the resoluteness of our anti-Communism, though that resoluteness is necessary. Every illusion in regard to our foe is as dangerous to our survival as heedlessness.

There is no reason to suppose that the malignancy of Communism will become less. But for that very reason we can hope that the health of the Communist world will not remain robust. If it does, all our theories about the illegitimacy of a tyranny and the legitimacy of a free government would be refuted. Tyranny has short-range advantages over democracy. But in the long run it must perish, at least as a monolithic imperial structure, even though it has been proved that a single nation cannot extricate itself from totalitarianism unaided.

Our problem, in short, is to avoid catastrophe by bearing heavy burdens, by remaining cool and prudent, by resoluteness in crises and by living together with a loathsome system in a narrow world. Perhaps that is not a problem which semantics can illumine after all. Our chief difficulty as a nation is that we have not been accustomed to such narrow and unattractive alternatives. We hope against hope that there are some hidden alternatives. But there are none.

Expert Witness

DR. O. G. HAYWOOD, JR.
Former Calanel, Corps of Engineers; U. S. Military Academy, Class of 1936; Manager, Missiles Systems Laboratary, Sylvania Electric Praducts, Inc.
Testimony before Subcommittee, House of Representatives
25 June 1954

Dr. Haywood. Mr. Talbott recently released some statistics. I think it was for the last 15 years, since 1929, the cost of living has gone up 200 per cent; wages have gone up 315; and enlisted men's salaries have gone up 110 per cent; officers' 60 per cent. . . .

. . . There seems to be a hesitancy among the military people, since the generals make the presentations [to Congress], to talk about themselves. The 60 per cent for officers is average, and it is mainly junior officers. . . . I would say the percentage pay of all generals may have gone up in the order of 10 per cent since 1929 as compared with the cost-of-living increase of 200 per cent. . . .

. . . there is a great deal of restriction on authority, partly Congress, partly internal to the Defense Establishment. There is no question that I have considerably more authority and freedom of action in Sylvania than I had in the service. We don't have the multitude of regulations. It is a vicious circle. Some restrictive regulation is written and someone abuses it. Instead of the man being court-martialed or criticized or being relieved from command, another more restrictive regulation is added, and pretty soon you have so many things prescribed in the book, the only way to get something done is to throw the book away, go ahead and do it and take your reprimand . . . you get something done.

. . . The centralized control of top promotions means it is based on the paper record and so, the man with a nice, clear record, with no mistakes, is at an advantage over the one who has mistakes and accomplishments. The tendency is to look to see if there is anything against him, rather than what has he actually done. . . .

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Cold War and Coexistence

THE NEW WARFARE
By Brigadier C. N. Barclay
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1954
65 Pages; $2.75

Reviewed by
NORMAN POSER

During the past few months there have been many books and magazine articles speculating on how the "next war" will be fought. Despite its title, *The New Warfare* is not one of them. Brigadier Barclay, editor of the British *Army Quarterly*, believes that the "next war" has already arrived. It is of course that now-familiar nightmare, the Cold War, which includes not only the veto and atomic espionage, but Korea and Indochina, and such calculated annoyances as the retention in the Soviet Union of Russian wives of Americans and Englishmen.

So far we are on familiar ground. It has become a truism to say that we are now engaged in a struggle with the Communist world on all fronts—political, economic, psychological, and at times military. It is here that this slim volume leaves the commonplace and begins to challenge widely accepted ideas. For it is the author's contention that with the Cold War the world has reached its practical limit of military effort.

Brigadier Barclay's approach is historical and economic rather than military. Until the nineteenth century, wars had little lasting effect on populations at large or the economic resources of nations. From Napoleon's time until 1914, warfare was national in scope, but it could generally be kept localized. Modern credit finance made it possible to pay for these wars. But since 1914 warring nations have been living beyond their means. Today the Democracies and the Communist nations will go to extreme lengths to find compromises avoiding total war not only because they are faced with the threat of total destruction, but also because they realize that they are already fighting as much of a war as they can economically afford.

Having made this interesting thesis, Brigadier Barclay analyzes the "new warfare," paying particular attention to local wars, to propaganda, subversion, and nuisance tactics, and to the use of armed might as a threat to back up diplomacy. He then offers a sanguine but not especially original program for obtaining a gradual easing of international tension.

What are the chances of avoiding total war? Good, says the author. He concedes that there is no available historical example of two nations or groups of nations arming furiously and not eventually going to war. But the scale of modern armaments has made today's situation altogether different from the past. On the other hand, he recognizes the danger that total war could break out at any time during the next few years. And he admits that the West must stand on certain principles and establish certain limits beyond which the Soviets or their allies cannot be allowed to venture.

The reader gets the idea of a man playing a game of chess with himself. The author has strong opinions, but he constantly leaps around and qualifies them. He praises democracy but objects to its "unedifying vote-catching." What, one might ask, is democracy without election campaigns? He condemns communism but makes the doubtful assertion that it has "an apparent absence of corruption." It is evident that *The New Warfare*, though only 65 pages in length and maddeningly general in nature, will make many readers angry. But it is hard to argue with Brigadier Barclay's opinion that a full-blooded World War III would bring economic ruin to both camps of today's divided world. And his argument that we must "fight" the Cold War with determination, be prepared to win a total war if it cannot be avoided, and at the same time leave the way open for negotiations, is one to which most thinking persons will subscribe.

Spying for the Wehrmacht

GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
By Dr. Paul Leverkuehn
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1954
209 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50

Reviewed by
COL. H. M. FORDE

This book is that rarity, a report on a nation's intelligence activities. It details the methods, procedures, and techniques of the German Military Intelligence Service, and recites some of its successes and failures. It also acknowledges weaknesses of organization and employment, and errors in national policies. Such a detailed confession could be possible only from a nation totally defeated in war, w secret files have been captured by the torious enemy.

The author was a reserve officer the German *Abwehr* throughout the Writing of his own personal experie he also reports the experiences of o who served in that widespread orga tion. His explanations of the organiz and functions of the *Abwehr* furni good background for the later underst ing of his reports of its operations. frequently told story of competition ar the German hierarchy for power prestige is repeated here when he of Himmler's efforts to control all i ligence in foreign areas, military as as intelligence of a political nature.

In addition to describing the orga tion and functions of the Military I ligence Service, the author offers ge observations on espionage, sabotage, counter measures, and discusses its a ities in Poland, Denmark and Nor the West, Balkans, U.S.S.R., the East. He concludes with a personal mate of Admiral Canaris.

It seems odd that the *Abwehr*, res sible for the collection of informatio the use of all three services, made evaluation of that information. The information was passed to the three a services, for their own evaluation interpretation. An example of the f ity of such an operational techniq illustrated in a report the *Abwehr* in July 1944 to Army General H quarters about Allied plans for a brea in Normandy. The staff officer wh ceived the report refused to acce and stated the report was "valueless cause the number of divisions to be in the operation had not been incl in the report! As the author points the operation which followed within next few weeks followed exactly the as reported by the *Abwehr*. Dr. L kuehn also repeats reports published where, that Hitler refused to accept able reports which were contrary t preconceived opinions.

Belief in the excellence and effici of the German Military Intelligence ices is weakened by the disclosure information of military intelligence on Denmark or Norway was not gat until just before the launching of operation. Long-range plans for colle detailed information concerning

routes of communication, locations combat efficiency of foreign military s had been neglected, even for such accessible neighbor as Denmark. It compliment to the ability of the Ger- Intelligence officers that such in- ation could be gathered in the short e of four weeks instead of over a span years.

recommend this book to all officers rested in intelligence. For the exper- ed officer it affords an opportunity to pare German methods with his own; e to the inexperienced it affords an ht into little-known techniques and edures.

ei Fighters

ASSADORS IN ARMS
Thomas D. Murphy
iversity of Hawaii Press, 1954
6 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Bibliography; $6.00

ewed by
ILLE C. SHIREY

nbassadors in Arms is both a military a sociological history of the 100th itry Battalion, the first unit in the ed States Army whose men were mericans of Japanese ancestry.

ie author, an associate professor of y at the University of Hawaii, has rtaken to show the status of persons panese ancestry in the Hawaiian community in the years before World War II, the shock of the attack on Pearl Harbor on both Japanese-Americans and other racial strains in Hawaii, the military record of the 100th Battalion, and the part the 100th played in securing an improved post-war status for Japanese-Americans in Hawaii.

The 100th Battalion was formed in May, 1942 from Nisei soldiers who had been inducted in 1941 and assigned to the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments. General Delos C. Emmons, who had relieved General Short, first felt that about 100,000 AJAs (Americans of Japanese ancestry) and Japanese aliens would have to be evacuated to the United States. He had, however, on the advice of his intelligence staff and the FBI agent in charge, radically revised his first opinion. But he still felt, with invasion more than a dim possibility, that the Nisei soldiers already in uniform, partly for their own protection, should be trained in the United States. The 100th accordingly took most of its training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.

The 100th moved on the Salerno, to Cassino, to Anzio, gaining the respect of Fifth Army troops all along the line, winning honors in large quantities, and taking severe casualties. After Rome fell, the 100th became the 1st Battalion of the 442d CT, although it kept its famed numerical designation.

Here there were problems at all levels. The battle-tested 100th, not without a certain amount of condescension, offered to advise the officers and men of the 442d on the facts of infantry combat. The 442d, naturally enough, resented the advice, however good it may have been, and went on to learn the hard way. As matters turned out, there was glory and pain enough for everyone, and some to spare.

Professor Murphy has done a splendid job of integrating his military history with his sociological material. The reader is able to see in the battle record of these men the compulsion they had to justify themselves and all AJAs as loyal Americans, as well as the effect their training and combat record had on other Americans in Hawaii and, to a lesser degree, in California. Eventually the West Coast racists were silenced if not convinced, but there is plenty of room to speculate on the needless pain that could have been avoided had General DeWitt not made evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast a matter of "military necessity."

One point that deserves more emphasis than Professor Murphy has given it is the relationship between the very high educational level of these men and their combat efficiency. No amount of zeal and esprit would have permitted them to complete successfully some of their

SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY 1775-1954

DRAWINGS BY FRITZ KREDEL

TEXT BY FREDERICK P. TODD



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A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ASSIGNMENT TO CATASTROPHE, Vol. I: PRELUDE TO DUNKIRK. By Major-General Sir Edward Spears. A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1954. 332 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5.00. Churchill's personal representative to the French Government in 1940 writes his memoirs of those critical days when the Maginot Line crumbled and France fell because of the corruption of its own government. Historians will find this an important though not necessarily objective source.

THE BLUE CONTINENT. By Folco Quilici. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954. 246 Pages; Illustrated; $5.00. Another of the spate of books about the undersea world. This one is a beauty, to grace any library, of exceptionally fine design and containing many photos in full color. The action in this epic of skin diving takes place under the Red Sea.

CRIME AND THE SERVICES. By John Spencer. Grove Press, 1954. 322 Pages; Index; $6.00. A British analysis of the influence of service life on criminal behavior—do the Services make criminals, or do they make good citizens out of criminals? An interesting blend of military and sociological analysis which might not be wholly applicable to conditions in our own Services but which might be worthwhile as a point of departure for those who wish to study the problem.

DANGER IN KASHMIR. By Josef Korbel. Princeton University Press, 1954. 351 Pages; Maps; Index; $5.00. An account of the struggle in the state that is torn between India's and Pakistan's fields of influence. This book could become important for an understanding of the problem if the Kashmir troubles flare again.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1953. Edited by Peter V. Curl. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 458 Pages; Index; $5.00. A reference work bringing together the important documentary materials relating to America's world relations in 1953. Useful for editors, government officials, students and interested laymen.

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN AMERICAN HUMOR. Edited by Bennett Cerf. Hanover House, 1954. 688 Pages; $3.95. A collection of stories, poems, scenes from plays, parodies, etc., collected by the famed punster of "What's My Line?" A collection like this can't go wrong and there are 688 pages for $3.95.

THE FIRST AND THE LAST: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945. By Adolf Galland. Henry Holt & Co., 1954. 368 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.95. A professional military airman, dismissed as the Commander of the Fighter Arm of the Luftwaffe in 1944, gives his version of what happened to the German fighter forces. It proves once more that intuition is a poor substitute for solid military virtues.

GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. By Paul Leverkuehn. Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. 209 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. A senior member of the Abwehr offers some hair-raising and other interesting super-spy tales from German archives.

GLORY, GOD AND GOLD. By Paul I. Wellman; edited by Lewis Gannett. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 402 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.00. A history of the Southwest covering four centuries of almost incredible strife and adventure. Mr. Wellman's literary abilities (*Indian Wars of the West, Broncho Apache, The Walls of Jericho,* etc.) guarantee readability and interest.

GRIERSON'S RAID. By D. Alexander Brown. University of Illinois Press, 1954. 261 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. A stirring account, beautifully illustrated with line drawings at the chapter headings, of a little-known incident in the Civil War. Grierson's brigade of Union Cavalrymen in April of 1863 rode the length of the state of Mississippi down to Baton Rouge in Louisiana in a bold cavalry thrust that gives the lie to those who say that the Federal Cavalry could not perform as did the more famed horsemen of the South.

A GUIDE TO THE PLANETS. By Patrick Moore. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1954. 254 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.95. Here is a portion of the field of astronomy written in language that the layman should understand easily and should find of great interest because Mr. Moore's writing stresses the fascination inherent in the planets.

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume IX: Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January 1943-June 1944. By Samuel Eliot Morison. Atlantic-Little, Brown & Co., 1954. 413 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. Volume IX of the series that seems to go on and on—and adds much to the knowledge of World War II as it progresses. This volume stresses the fine cooperation between Army and Navy; it is a bit less enthusiastic about cooperation with the Air Force.

THE HYDROGEN BOMB: The Men, the Menace, the Mechanism. By James Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr. David McKay Company, 1954. 244 Pages; Index; $3.00. Yellow journalism on a terribly important subject. Roundly damned from Los Alamos to Hiroshima and way points by scientists, government officials and others who presumably are better informed than the authors, who are Washington correspondents of the *Time-Life-Fortune* organization. Recommended only for readers who have both feet firmly on the ground and tongue securely imbedded in cheek.

LANGUAGE, MEANING AND MATURITY. Edited by S. I. Hayakawa. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 364 Pages; Index; $4.00. This group of selections from *ETC: A Review of General Semantics* is primarily a sales approach to those who are slightly interested in the subject.

MARGINS OF THE SEA. By Maurice Burton. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 212 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.00. Evolution as studied from the common forms of marine life found between the high- and low-tide marks of the seas. An outstandingly good example of the latest turn toward popularization of science.

MARXISM: The Unity of Theory and Practice. By Alfred G. Meyer. Harvard University Press, 1954. 181 Pages; Index; $3.50. The author "indicates how far removed [Marxism] is from the real world." Not necessarily easy reading but rather important for the student or officer who hopes to understand our present enemy.

THE MOUNTAIN WORLD. Editor-in-chief: Marcel Kurz. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 224 Pages; Illustrated; $6.00. This is the English-language edition of the long-established series published by the Swiss Foundation for Alpine Research. This issue covers mostly the Himalayan adventures but also includes some accounts of mountaineering in the Arctic and Africa. Beautifully illustrated both with maps and photographs.

POLTROONS AND PATRIOTS: A Popular Account of the War of 1812. By Glenn Tucker. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1954. 812 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00 for 2 volumes. Newspaperman, advertising man, soldier and farmer, Glenn Tucker has used his varied experiences to give this book a popular and almost homey touch. An intensely readable account of one of our less publicized wars.

RITUAL OF LIQUIDATION. By Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut. The Free Press, 1954. 515 Pages; Index; $6.50. A systematic and exhaustive research study by social scientists into the available documentary materials on the famous Moscow trials of the mid 1930s. There is some material on the Beria case in 1953.

STONEWALL JACKSON AND THE OLD STONEWALL BRIGADE. By John Esten Cooke, edited by Richard Barksdale Harwell. The University of Virginia Press, 1954. 76 Pages; Index; $3.50. An Ordnance officer under Stonewall and famed Southern novelist writes of his commander in the redundant literary style of the last century. Stonewall's stature loses nothing in the telling.

STRANGE CONQUEST. By Alfred Neumann. Ballantine Books, 1954. 184 Pages; $.35 paperbound; $2.00 hardbound. A biography of that strange American, William Walker, whose name still brings varied reactions in the Central American republics. Walker's life was no less exciting than this only slightly over-written and only slightly fictionalized account of his incredible feats.

WAR OF WITS: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence. By Ladislas Farago. Funk and Wagnalls, 1954. 379 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. Intelligence for the layman, probably more exciting than solid. Good reading, several cuts above the average spy thriller and probably even informative in spots.

: spectacular actions if they had not the intelligence to cope with shift- situations and to take the initiative n the need arose.

hope that there will never again be :ed for another 100th Battalion or l CT in the United States Army, but does not mean that we cannot learn this book some of the factors that : great fighting units.

ders of the Sitzkrieg

NMENT TO CATASTROPHE
: PRELUDE TO DUNKIRK, July 1939-May 1940
Maj.-Gen Sir Edward L. Spears
A. Wyn, Inc., 1954
Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5.00

wed by

Gen. H. W. Blakeley

th the exception of Sir Winston :hill, no person had more oppor- es to observe, and the ability to re- the events leading up to the defeat : Anglo-French armies in 1940 than al Spears did. In addition he had dvantage of being completely fluent : French language, and of having ong and in many cases intimate intance with both the civilian and ry leaders of France and Great n. And his knowledge of the terrain he kind that comes from traveling t many times on foot or horseback. principal assignment during the s leading up to Dunkirk was as officer from Mr. Churchill to Reynaud, the French Prime Minister Minister of Defense. Functioning at gh level, he did not of course cov- kind of military detail that made :ount of his 1914 (*Liaison, 1914*) :nces and of his later World War I ures (*Prelude to Victory*) such le reading for military men.

rly, however, he establishes that ad been taught in all service schools basic causes of the 1914 reverses— suitable reserves and of communica- between the high command and commanders—was repeated in 1940, ack of the will to fight and poor ne turning reverses into complete . In contrast, the Allied armies the Battle of the Bulge had flexibil- strengthen limited reserves, control, l to fight, and excellent discipline. inions of French leaders extend lmiration to the deepest disgust, and ls no punches. Of the command- e B. E. F., General Lord Gort, he s that he would not be likely to ribed "as intelligent above the aver- But of this quality he says: "Look- k now on a long career in which I et many of the great men of my am inclined to place mere intel- below many of the other qualities ke for greatness. Intelligence is to what over-bright headlights are : they lead to faster driving than prudence dictates, and give no information as to the sharpness of the curves ahead or what obstacles lie beyond. By dazzling other people and thereby inviting accidents, far from making for speedy progress in the long run, they only tend to obstruct and confuse. Gort dazzled no one, but inspired confidence because he was completely trustworthy."

It might be interesting to list the senior American army, navy, and air force commanders of the last forty years in two columns, one headed "Highly intelligent" and the other "not so intelligent" (or perhaps even "dumb"), and then evaluate their comparative successes when in high command positions. Interesting but probably not advisable.

This story is of course a tragic one—in fact, it is the first volume of a two-volume work to be called "Assignment to Catastrophe"—but he makes history come alive and draws notable portraits of the men who made history: Churchill, of course; Franchet d'Esperey, that strong man of 1914 in the uniform of a Marshal of France in 1939, confined to a wheel chair as the result of a motor accident but still roaring; Pétain, Gamelin, Georges, Darlan, and Weygand, all presumably competent professionals, but unable to give the French the military leadership necessary to stave off defeat; and the "statesmen," some not deserving that name. And always the reader will be conscious that the events of 1914 and 1940 are background for the situation in Europe today—and tomorrow.

Analysis of Defeat

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE WAR IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1939-1940
By Major L. F. Ellis
British Information Services, 1953
425 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Appendixes; Index; $8.75

Reviewed by

Orville C. Shirey

This volume of the official British history of her forces in World War II deserves as much attention from the military student as any volume published by either the United States or British historical offices. We have seen a great deal of the problems of World War II high command in the victorious invasion of Europe and elsewhere. But in *The War in France and Flanders* we see a multi-national command beset by disaster and defeat, by communications breakdowns, by suspicion and recrimination, and by incomparably superior forces. The account is likely to be a good deal more instructive, from the military viewpoint, than any study of a campaign in which everything went according to plan, and our side won.

Principally, of course, Major Ellis is concerned with the actions of the British Expeditionary Force, but he must necessarily have a great deal to say also about the orders and actions of the French command under whom the BEF fought—though with reservations.

Matters began badly when Intelligence, which had correctly appraised German intentions through the end of 1939, failed to appreciate correctly the final version of the German battle plan, which Hitler had approved on 24 February 1940. German security measures were so successful that the shift in weight of the main attack to the German left wing went unnoticed. When the Germans struck through the Ardennes, the French command was caught off balance, and never recovered.

Major Ellis shows very clearly that the Dunkirk evacuation was not, as many thought at the time, a miracle of improvisation. It was a well-planned operation, based on the timely decision by the BEF commander, Lord Gort, that the gap the Germans had made could not be closed and that the only thing that could be salvaged from the debacle was the BEF and as much of French First Army as could be taken off the beaches and from the port of Dunkirk. The inevitable confusion of an evacuation under heavy pressure and the motley collection of ships that were used made the operation appear haphazard, but it was under close control and is worth a good deal of study as detailed here.

The author is critical of the part the RAF was forced to play in the Battle of

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

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France, though not of the RAF itself. The RAF had been built up on the theory that the Germans would be held as in 1914 while the Allies were gathering strength. As a result neither planes nor organization were suited to close cooperation with ground troops in a fast-moving situation, nor was strategic bombing heavy enough to be effective in a short campaign. British air strength was, of course, not fully committed, since it was recognized that it must be husbanded for the inevitable assault against England, but it is doubtful if the result would have been much different had every aircraft been thrown into the battle. The needed techniques for support of ground troops—techniques which were badly needed—did not exist.

Aside from the mechanics of the campaign itself, there are many major points worth noting. Beginning with faulty intelligence, the situation deteriorated quickly. The French command, dependent on inadequate communications, seemed incapable of appreciating correctly the strength of the enemy penetration, of taking strong action to close the gap, or of exerting real leadership. The Belgians, defending an untenable position, could not be moved to withdraw from it. The British, though they honored their commitments to the French, were still a semi-autonomous force with the right to appeal French decisions to the government at home, and there is some evidence that this had an unhealthy effect on the French command no matter how correctly Lord Gort carried out the orders of his French superiors. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to say what else the British government could have done, but such a situation in any multi-national army is unhealthy, especially when decisions must be made quickly and carried out promptly.

In short, *The War in France and Flanders* might well be adopted as a textbook on how not to conduct the defense of Western Europe.

Our Forgotten War

POLTROONS AND PATRIOTS:
A POPULAR ACCOUNT OF THE WAR OF 1812
By Glenn Tucker
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1954
Two volumes boxed; 760 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00

Reviewed by
LYNN MONTROSS

There has long been a need for a compact new history of a conflict which can perhaps teach more painful object lessons than any other military adventure in the American past. And even though these two volumes do not quite fill the bill, they stimulate interest in a most instructive stage of our national development.

Above all, the reader is struck by the progress made in honor, decency, and good taste by both English-speaking peoples during the 140 years since the War of 1812. American lapses have been bewailed by the masochistic school of historians, but a candid reckoning is not more to the credit of the parent nation. It was an appallingly hateful little war, with each side blackguarding the other in propaganda as a prelude to cruel burning and looting expenditions at the expense of civilians along the Canadian frontier.

One force of New York militiamen refused to cross the Niagara River to aid comrades beset by superior enemy numbers on Queenston Heights. In sad contrast, another militia outfit burned the Canadian village of Newark, thus depriving 400 old men, women, and children of shelter in the dead of winter. The inevitable retaliation took place a few weeks later when regulars and Indians crossed on the ice to burn Buffalo and near-by American villages after hideous massacres.

The cowardly flights of American militiamen are an old story, but the British refused to be outdone even in this department of disgrace. As one instance, 600 unbroken regulars of the 41st Regiment surrendered in a body to mounted Kentucky riflemen at the battle of the Thames while other redcoats fled. General Henry A. Proctor, the British commander, who saved his life by good footwork, had recently been told to his face by Tecumseh that he was fit only for petticoats. The great Indian leader died fighting on this field, and the good taste of the day is illustrated by the boast of the Kentuckians that they flayed his corpse to make razor strops. It seems, however, that they found the wrong body.

In the field of propaganda the *London Times* vied with provincial American newspapers in the base arts of braggadocio and invective. Statesmen of both nations endorsed a policy of seizing hostages until scores of British and American military prisoners were held in close confinement as potential victims of the firing squad. But good sense and decency prevailed before either side carried reprisals to such extremes.

At one time the adjective "popular" in a subtitle would have wrung a fastidious shudder from trade-union academic historians. But of late there have been some top-flight historical works of popular interest, based on long and painstaking research. Unfortunately, *Poltroons and Patriots* is not one of them. It might have qualified if more time had been devoted to bringing the research and writing to maturity. The book is uneven in performance, however, with chapters excelling in both respects being found alongside others rewritten from standard published works. The maps are inadequate but the volumes have an attractive format and illustrations consisting of battle painting reproductions.

There are stirring descriptions of the sea fights as well as the two actions with a claim to being history's most decisive fresh-water battles—Perry's victory on Lake Erie, which made possible the winning of the West; and Macdonough's tri on Lake Champlain, which frustrate most threatening British invasion o war.

The land battles, generally spea are slighted. Yet it would be hard t more desperately fought engagements Sackets Harbor, Lundy's Lane, an other fights on the northern front. sides took casualties as high as 4 cent while standing firm and swa bone-crushing volleys of musketry.

Nor has enough space been given development in combat of such m leaders as Winfield Scott, Jacob B and Andrew Jackson after the co weathered the humiliations resulting the failures of elderly politicians in form. For it would hardly be goin far to say that the United States had its birth on the bloody battle of the War of 1812.

It has long been customary to to it as an unnecessary and indecisive Nothing could be farther from the as Mr. Tucker ably points out in hi clusions. A former Washington news and advertising man, the author e sizes that it took Perry's and Har victories to win the West perman that a second war was needed to antagonisms which had been smol since the Revolution; that in trut young American nation did not a unity until it went through this ordeal.

Even the battle of New Orleans entirely to be deplored because it place before sailing ships could the Atlantic with the news of an ing peace. For it was this thun postscript that restored the national after the burning of the capitol at ington by an army of Peninsular vet In twenty flaming minutes Andrew son's outweighed force brought A from the mud to the stars by inflicti those same redcoats one of the mos sided defeats ever suffered by arms since Bannockburn.

Getting the Army There

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERA IN WORLD WAR II
Vol. IX: Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January June 1944
By Samuel Eliot Morison
Atlantic—Little, Brown & Co., 1954
413 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Appe Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL ROBERT F. COCKLIN

If the proud record of the United Navy in World War II doesn't sh resplendent glory for future generati will not be the fault of Samuel Eliot son. In eight previous volumes h ranged the Atlantic and the Pacific r ing the tremendous accomplishmer our Navy. This ninth volume must been much more difficult to prepare s covers a period and an area where our

:d a subordinate role. However, never restimate Morison! He convinces you our Eighth Fleet under Vice Admiral itt did a whale of a job (it did) and st makes you believe the whole thing d have been done better if our Navy ıad the con.

tensibly, this volume covers the Amer- ıaval role in three major amphibious tions—the invasion of Sicily, the cap- of the Salerno beachhead, and the ıus landing at Anzio. Since the Medi- ıean theater was under British control nd, in the air, and on the sea, Ameri- naval commanders had little to do the over-all strategy. Further, the operations described were exclusively of transporting and supporting the troops engaged in the operations. ıad no carriers, so our naval air arm :onfined to the scout planes of the cruisers. We had no battleships or cruisers there and no major naval 'e battles were fought. Thus it would r that Morison had little to work with, ıe result could scarcely be more than f summary of the elements involved, ıtes and territory covered—but don't elieve it! Here's how the publisher up this volume: "In all three [opera- the United States Navy distinguished both for impeccable performance in g the Army where it wanted to go ı supporting with Naval gunfire the fighting ashore."

te logically Morison does stray from iginal objective to get enough ma- for this volume. He torpedoes the strategy and over-all British policy Mediterranean. He felt that the ı operation was ill conceived; that ıcuation of the German troops from could and should have been pre- ; that the Italian Armistice was woe- ıungled and that the whole Anzio on was a mistake. Some of these ions are at least debatable and have earing on the history of U. S. naval ons in World War II.

ison proves, too, that he is much t home on the tossing briny than he ssessing ground operations. He de- great deal of space to discussing the fighting in these operations but lead from strength. Without be- the heaven-sent blessing of naval support in an amphibious landing, never take the place of the dough- :h his rifle in hand. Morison has over-emphasized what was an im- but not wholly conclusive con- ı.

ıel Morison, who teaches American ıt Harvard University, is a historian rst rank and a fine writer. In gen- is series is an outstanding work. ticular volume is, in our judgment, kest of the lot. One of the chief for the book's weakness is that the ıas attempted to construct a battle- ıut of materials sufficient only for ıat.

Pass In Review

Alben W. Barkley's recent popularity at the Kentucky polls is apt to be repeated in the best-seller lists during the coming months with the publication of his autobiography, *That Reminds Me* ($4.50). These interesting sidelights on a long and fabulous political career are both highly interesting and superbly entertaining. Barkley's writing, like his speech, is replete with humorous stories that are usually used to emphasize a point he's trying to make. In any event, it's a difficult book to lay aside once you've cracked the covers. It seems most unusual, though, to have a candidate so well versed in gaining political advantage allowing the publishers to get away with a publication date for this volume some days after the polls were closed on November 2. It seems certain that if the Veep could have known for sure what the reviewers were going to say about his literary efforts the pub date would have been moved up at least a month.

Have you ever wondered what literate people do to while away the hours in the frozen North? Well, among other things they write books. At least that's what Ernest Gruening, the former governor of Alaska (1939-1959) did—and made a fine job of it too. His new book, *The State of Alaska* ($7.50), is, innuendos notwithstanding, an excellent and detailed history of our northernmost frontier. It is almost ninety years ago now that Secretary Seward spent some $7,200,000.00 for a piece of real estate that was jestingly referred to as "Seward's Folly," but which in later years has proved to be one of the greatest real estate acquisitions the American taxpayers have enjoyed since the $24.00 deal by which the Indians were euchred out of Manhattan. Gruening's history goes back almost two centuries to the discovery of Alaska by Vitus Bering and carries on down to the present day and in a final chapter sums up the continuing effort of these citizens of the Far North to acquire American statehood. Complete with a bibliography, voluminous footnotes and an index, Governor Gruening's history is an important and welcome addition to every American bookshelf.

After watching a televised interview with William O. Douglas, that inveterate hiker, mountain climber, and Supreme Court Justice, I took time to look over his latest book, *An Almanac of Liberty* ($5.50), which has just been published. In it Douglas has written 366 essays examining landmarks in America's continuing struggle for freedom. There's one for every day of the year starting with the 4th of July. Douglas says in his foreword that there could be as many of these almanacs as there are philosophies and points of view. He sums up the objective of this book very well when he says, "I have written for the common man, hoping I could help him see the main contours, and, seeing them, better understand the high vantage point we have reached with our form of government." It is indeed a stimulating volume to peruse.

Our readers who feel that we have dealt too harshly with the recent books on MacArthur (Chamberlain and Willoughby's *MacArthur 1941-1951* and Hunt's *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur*) are referred to the devastating, documentary review of the Chamberlain-Willoughby book in the current issue of *The Reporter*. The author is Dr. Louis Morton, who wrote *The Fall of the Philippines* in the Office of Military History's "The U. S. Army in World War II." After reading Morton's review I couldn't help wish that I could see about a two-hour program of "Author Meets Critic" with Willoughby and Morton in the leading roles!

It's not a day too soon to remind you that the Christmas season is well upon us. Your Association's book service can give you a hand in selecting some mighty fine books to give to your military friends as gifts. We'll be glad to send you our illustrated catalogue of current selections and our up-to-date military book list. What's more, we can mail the books almost anywhere in the world for you and will give you a discount in the form of book dividend coupons in the bargain. There are plenty of fine titles to choose from and you can be sure your order will be handled promptly, so just write to the Combat Forces Book Service, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. You can whittle down your Christmas list in a hurry without shopping worries.

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'MANY PARTS WELDED INTO ONE'

Major General Julius Ochs Adler

From his Farewell Address to the 77th Infantry Division

The Service is not a mosaic of parts; it is a unity of many parts welded into one. It is far more than an organized force of material power. The Service, embracing within its strength the Infantry, the Artillery, and all the varied branches that contribute to (the efficiency of) the whole, is an institution with its glorious traditions reflected and embodied in the present.

I will not venture an opinion as to how many men nor the quantity and types of weapons constitute adequate strength for this nation. But there are certain principles that I am convinced must be observed if our safety is to be assured.

We must have military planning at the very top that insures our resources and manpower will be fused into a condition of greatest strength without reference to individual service interests. The speed, destructiveness and complexities of modern war have taught us we can successfully defend ourselves only if our various weapons and services respond in unison and harmony. This means a high degree of coordination and demands the banishment of all narrow-visioned service rivalries; moreover it requires complete mutual understanding and agreement on the effective employment of each of our fighting organizations and weapons.

I do not for a minute deprecate the individuality, the pride, the tradition and spirit of the separate services. These qualities are irreplaceable assets both in training and in battle and must always be stimulated and encouraged. Beyond this, however, we require among all elements of our entire military establishment the same wholehearted teamwork that has been developed within the 77th Division.

Members of the Association of the U. S. Army agree with General Adler that the Army "is a unity of many parts welded into one"; that loyalty to an arm or service is an "irreplaceable asset"; and that there can be no place for "narrow-visioned service rivalries."

Soldiers of all branches and components join the Association of the U. S. Army because they believe that the "unity of many parts" can be "welded into one" only when full support is given to the one as well as to the parts of which it is composed.

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

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

The crew chief directs the firing from his position behind the gun

In position and ready for firing orders from battery headquarters, Skysweeper gun crew moves fast when the word comes

SKYSWEEPER

Targets are checked on the position indicator scope of the radar setup



A corporal technician adjusts sensitive parts of the Skysweeper's radar set

Information received from operations center is converted and plotted by battery technicians and sent to the crew chief of the gun. These Signal Corps photographs, released in December 1954, were posed by the 531st AA Battalion



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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

Association's Journal

ON page 60 of this issue you'll find of ten books which the staff of magazine believe to be the most signif contributions to military literature d the past year. The list includes titl varying degrees of literary value tha dividually and collectively have ma considerable contribution to military tory and thinking.

We began these annual awards last because we felt some public recogr was due the authors who labor in field of military writing to the advar education and enjoyment of those who are interested in the military

Soldier

Lieutenant General Raymond S. Lain, USA-retired, was the second ident of the Association of the U Army, serving in 1951 and 1952. was long an active advocate of a s association and magazine represe the Army and his many contribu to the Association were especially able because of his business experi

A citizen-soldier most of his life, eral McLain continued to work act in the interests of national defense his retirement, particularly as a me of the National Security Training mission which was a natural assign in view of his long advocacy of univ military training.

His death on 14 December 1954 a heavy loss to the whole nation.

The reaction to the announceme the awards last year was most encour and convinced us that we were esta ing a useful custom. We were deli to find our selections approved in learned circles, too. One of our ch Bruce Catton's *A Stillness at Appom* went on to win the National Book A and the Pulitzer Prize.

The ten selections this year repr not only long hours of careful readin rather extensive periods of free and discussion among members of the staf others who read widely in the field all, about twenty books were consi serious contenders this year. The ten were reached by the democ process of majority vote. As a resu have a list which doesn't completely s any one individual judge—and it i doubtedly a better list because of this. all agree, however, that every soldie benefit greatly by reading any or the titles selected—that's the only u mous vote we could get.

THE PUBLI

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

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EDITORIAL POLICY

e ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a profes-
l military magazine devoted to the dissemination
formation and ideas relating to the military art
science representing the interests of the entire
.

ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—
lvance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields
of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, adminis-
tration, weapons and weapons systems.
lvance man's knowledge and understanding of
the soldier as an individual, as a member of a
trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army;
emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a
high sense of duty.
iseminate knowledge of military history, especially
articles that have application to current problems
or foster tradition and create esprit.
plain the important and vital role of the United
States Army in the Nation's defense and show that
the Army is alert to the challenges of new weap-
ons, machines, and methods.
vance the status of the soldier's profession.
pted by the Executive Council of the Association
of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

January 1955 Vol. 5, No. 6

ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

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ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

My dear General Lemnitzer:

I am proud and happy to extend the warm hand of fellowship of the members of the Association of the U. S. Army to the members of the U. S. Antiaircraft Association.

The four and one-half years that have passed since the U. S. Infantry Association and the U. S. Field Artillery Association joined together to form the Association of the U. S. Army have demonstrated that the idea of one strong and common association of all the arms of the U. S. Army is practical as well as desirable. We have made a good start and now that the members of the U. S. Antiaircraft Association have joined us, we shall go on to become the stalwart champion and effective spokesman for the whole Army.

Sincerely yours,

G. H. DECKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
President

Lieutenant General L. L. Lemnitzer, President
United States Antiaircraft Association

THE U. S. ANTIAIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION

My dear General Decker:

Thank you for your kind letter of welcome to the members of the U. S. Antiaircraft Association.

For sixty-three years the U. S. Antiaircraft Association and its Coast Artillery predecessor served its members well. Now we are happy indeed to join in the common effort of the other arms to create a single, strong and effective Association.

The overwhelming vote of our members in favor of joining the Association of the U. S. Army is convincing proof of our firm belief in the ideals and program of the Association of the U. S. Army and gives evidence that we shall do all that is within our power to make the combined Association a powerful, effective and resourceful spokesman for the United States Army.

In behalf of the Executive Council of the United States Antiaircraft Association and our entire membership, I would like to express to you, your Council and your membership, our appreciation and gratification at having so harmoniously and successfully worked out all terms and details pertaining to the union of our Associations and respective Journals. I feel confident that this merger will promote a better understanding among the members of all elements, not only of our respective Associations, but of the entire Army as well, and that it will serve to give us much greater unity and strength.

Sincerely,

L. L. LEMNITZER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
President

Lieutenant General G. H. Decker, President
Association of the United States Army

UNITED STATES ARMY

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Dear General Decker:

I am greatly encouraged to learn that the U. S. Antiaircraft Artillery Association has joined the Association of the United States Army. Both associations have my heartiest congratulations on their decision to take this step.

The Army's branches and components are bound together by the traditions and purposes of the Army as a whole. The Association of the United States Army can play a unique and important role in strengthening the ties among us and thereby contribute greatly to the performance of duty by every soldier and ultimately to the accomplishment of the Army's missions.

I should like to say to every member of the larger and stronger Association of the United States Army that you have my wholehearted support in our common endeavor to make the United States Army a single instrument of unsurpassed military effectiveness, that it may at all times be ready to shoulder any responsibilities which may be placed upon it.

Sincerely,

M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Lieutenant General G. H. Decker
President, Association of the United States Army

MESSAGE FOR MEMBERS

YOUR Association of the U.S. Army has reached another milestone on the road to becomi an institution representing the entire United States Army. This is the first issue of the Jou NAL to go to the former members of the United States Antiaircraft Association, who join with us officially on the first day of 1955.

We used the words "joined with us" because they best describe the spirit of our enlarged A sociation. The members of the Executive Council of the Antiaircraft Association take th places as members of an enlarged Executive Council of the Association of the United Sta Army. Antiaircraft's President becomes a Vice President of the new Association. The *Antia craft Journal's* Editor becomes a member of the staff of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURN The *AA Journal's* subscribers become members of the Association of the United States Arm

Your staff looks forward to the additional support from our augmented membership, and the new ideas and forward thinking that will come from the members of a branch that works w the latest concepts of electronics, missile propulsion and guidance, and other new scientific velopments.

The former members of Antiaircraft will receive this magazine (a monthly, as opposed to t bi-monthly *Antiaircraft Journal*) for the period of their subscriptions. Thus they will rece twice as many issues for the remaining membership period. Those members who belong to b Associations will have their membership extended by the length of their unexpired AA memb ships. And AA's life subscribers automatically become life members of the Association of t United States Army.

Your Publisher is particularly happy about this new development, since he was Associate E tor of the *Coast Artillery Journal* (the *Antiaircraft Journal's* predecessor) from October, 1940 February, 1946. For him, it will be a case of welcoming old friends and associates. At the ti the United States Field Artillery Association joined with the United States Infantry Associati to form the Association of the United States Army, he felt that something important was m ing from the new organization. That missing "something" is now very much present.

Your staff, both of the JOURNAL and of the Association, welcomes the new members of the A sociation and looks forward with delighted anticipation to the opportunity to serve the wi membership. We hope you will write us often, both with praise and criticism. The first impro our morale; the second keeps us on our toes. For members in remote corners of the globe, we w be happy to perform those little military services that can best be done by a friend in Washi ton. Our Joseph I. Greene Memorial Library is small but useful, particularly to the historical minded; all members are welcome to use it.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is our principal contact with the vast majority of members. Your Publisher, your Editor, and the other members of the staff are never satisf with the magazine; we continue to try new things and to improve the old. We are guided to important extent by your wishes; if you don't tell us what you think we'll never know. We co on the former AA members to offer us some new and refreshing viewpoints—and some publi able articles.

In many fewer words—Welcome!

THE PUBLISHER

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TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
UNITED AIR LINES
WEST COAST AIRLINES
WESTERN AIR LINES
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

THE MONTH'S MAIL

"Faithful to Our Trust"

● The author of "Faithful to Our Trust" [December issue] should raise his chest and look proud. Many of us would have liked to have said this. . . .

Like the author I'm an infantry commander and will be one when a "brush fire" starts. I couldn't agree more with the author's comments. All of the malpractices may not have existed in every outfit in Korea but I'm certain they were there in some degree in some outfits under some commanders.

When the Army stops worrying about what the newspapers and "mamas" say and start building an army based on discipline we'll be on our way back to the pre-Doolittle days when an officer's word was sufficient, loyalty went both ways and a soldier was a soldier.

LT. COL. ROBERT W. GARRETT
Arlington, Va.

● I have read "Faithful to Our Trust" three times and I infer the author subscribes to the rewriting of our tactics books to conform to his Korean experiences. As a veteran of the indignities of two wars' annual physical examinations, I have this brief but proven bit of sagaciousness to offer: deviation from tested and proven tactical principles results in disaster. This applies to squad-sized and larger units alike. Terrain may well be the principal modifying factor in applied tactics but never an excuse for the abandonment of tactical doctrine.

MAJ. H. W. RICHARDSON, JR.
New Albany, Ind.

● *The Editors have read the article more than three times and cannot read into it the meaning inferred by Maj. Richardson. On page 19 of the article the author asked: "What of the even less experienced officers who know of no tactics but Korean?" The whole tenor of the article suggests that deviation from sound principles often led to near disaster.*

Light Weight Otter

● "Front and Center" [November] gives the capacity of the new DeHaviland Otter as 500 pounds. That is about 2,000 pounds less than its rated ton-and-a-quarter pay load.

Though we haven't received any Otters yet we look forward to getting them early in 1955.

LT. JOHN W. GRANICHER
30th Engr Grp
Fort Winfield Scott, Calif.

● *Our faces are real red from embarrassment and mystification over how that figure ever appeared as "500 pounds." Some natural enemy of the Otter must have been on the loose in the print shop.*

Equal Recognition

● I read with interest the questions of Sergeant Bowles and the answers of General Weible [November 1954] regarding the award of additional service ribbons to our soldiers. The multitude of service ribbons that we now award have cheapened our decorations to the point where Bill Mauldin's garritroopers are even gaudier than our *bona fide* heroes.

Civilians, unfamiliar with the meaning of our various ribbons, are more impressed by the blue badge of the combat infantryman than by any assortment of important decorations. But what of the combat-tested veterans of the other arms? The Yalu-traveled artilleryman has the same collection of ribbons and stars as the Pusan clerk. I'd be the last one to take a thing away from a front-line infantryman—there's no job more rugged or deserving of recognition—but how about some recognition for the artillery FOs who were with him on Old Baldy or the combat engineers who went up on Baldy to dig out men trapped in bunkers when the Chinese took over?

Members of regimental tank companies were awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge for performing the same mission as divisional tank battalions who were ineligible. Infantry unit administrators won the Combat Infantryman Badge at battalion headquarters behind artillery batteries whose men were ineligible. At one time, in 7th Division Artillery, there was no promotion from second to first lieutenant unless an officer had sixty days "hill time" and at least one patrol. Some infantrymen win recognition for one day of action.

Surely the Army hasn't so many genuine combat veterans (men who've shot and been shot at and spent a few miserable weeks in a hole) that it can't afford them suitable recognition.

Let's quit giving so many ribbons to *everyone* and give something to those people who do the dirty work.

LT. ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR.
58 Hamilton Road
Chapel Hill, N. C.

Service Stripes

● After reading "Here's Why, Sergeant Bowles," [November] my buddies and I believe that the service stripe and overseas bars—the service stripe in particular—are a mark that definitely should not be removed from the uniform. To most of us who prefer to stay in service and who more or less feel we are professional soldi service stripes are a mark of pride.

SFC AUSTIN R. KE
Co L, 5th Cav
APO 201, San Francisco

Tac Air in Navy Blue

● The ideas presented in Colonel R hardt's article, "Put Tac Air in Navy Bl [September issue] have often been discu among Navy aviators as well as infan men, both Marine and Army alike. H ever, this is the first time, to my knowle that these thoughts have appeared i widely read publication. It is encouragin see this done. Let's hope that the prop to place all tactical air commitments the hands of Navy and Marine C aviation receives the most careful consid tion.

Although it seems to be a sound ide cannot believe that it will be as easy Colonel Reinhardt seems to indicate. Tl are certain obstacles to be surmounted fore our military establishment could sibly operate under such an improved tem. Some of these are briefly discu below.

First, we must be able to supply new force with pilots and aircraft (a mendous number compared with the p ent naval air arm). This would poss suggest the transfer of Air Force men equipment to the Navy. But here we m consider that there are differences betw Navy and Marine Corps aviators and th of the Air Force Tactical Air Comma differences which would most certainly hibit any switch, at least for some ti For one thing, the naval aviator (and plane) must be able to operate from an craft carrier. This is the principle of na aviation which gives it its mobility and f ibility and so must remain. Besides t it is also noteworthy that one of the f most missions of the Navy aviator has l been close air support of ground troo which is untrue of his Air Force contem rary. Extensive indoctrination and train would be necessary.

It should be remembered that while Navy and Marine Corps provided excell support for the ground forces in Korea (p ticularly in the operations around Pusan perimeter and near Chosin Re voir, where they operated independen under their own control system), this tem is designed primarily for support amphibious operations. The Navy mi well be reluctant to send its air arm inl on extensive overland campaigns out reach of its seagoing forces.

The advantages of such a move se

ious to anyone who thoroughly under-
ıds the two concepts of close air support
very. Tactical air would become a far
e capable infantry weapon, being availa-
to the unit commander (down to and
uding the battalion commander) when
where he needed it. The time lapse
ween request and delivery of a close air
port mission would be reduced from
s—or, in some cases, hours—to minutes;
that mission would be both flown and
trolled by pilots primarily trained in
ınd support. The superiority of this
hod is indisputable.

Colonel Reinhardt is to be congratulated
ı fine article which brings into the open
of the vital problems facing our mili-
establishment today.

Lt. Thomas M. Martin
USMC
ıg Schools, 1st MAW, FMF
), San Francisco

er from Britain

have always read your magazine for
fine articles and general contribution
ilitary studies, but in the October 1954
ıber I find a passage most offensive
untrue.

refer to the last paragraph of the letter
Mr. Frederic L. Wells on page 12.
paragraph can only mean that Britain
been stripped of her "prizes" because
has lost her manhood, since she is no
er hardy and self-denying. . . . I trust
readers have more intelligence than
ccept his complacent and completely
ıeous statements.

editor you should, in my opinion,
excluded this letter. Great Britain
tremendously in the 1914-18 war—
itely more than the United States.
during the last war, with the U. S.
than three times the size of Britain
ıst more men dead than you did.

we lost our manhood it is because
lie dead on battlefields for liberty all
the world. . . .

T. H. McGuffie
rosbie Road
orne, Birmingham 17, Eng.

*he Editors are aware of the immense
butions and great sacrifices of the
h peoples to the cause of freedom
where, and we hold them in highest
t and deepest affection. The last*
The Journal *would do, wittingly
wittingly, is insult the peoples of
ı gallant ally and close friend of the
d States. We cannot believe Mr.
intended any insult to the British
s. We sent him a copy of Mr.
ffie's letter and he replied as follows:*

egret that my remarks should have
such an impression on any patriotic
hman. That Britain has suffered
ısly "we know, indeed"; but the
was that these tragic events occurred
because certain things were not
hat incited men like Conan Doyle
or Rudyard Kipling (note such verses as "The Lesson," "The Islanders," "The Dykes," and "Lord Roberts") warned ought to be done.

I offered my two cents' worth that my own country might learn from Britain's experience; as it is surely to Britain's advantage that this country should so learn.

Frederic L. Wells
Newton Highlands, Mass.

Anniversary Issue (Cont'd.)

• I have read and re-read Colonel Dupuy's article. It is simply magnificent, by far the best article of its type that I have ever been privileged to read. I do hope that it can be published in some large civilian magazine . . . where the civilian public will have a chance to read it.

Lt. Gen. Hobart R. Gay
Hq. Fifth Army
Chicago, Ill.

• I have just finished reading Colonel Dupuy's "Pass in Review" and I am so moved that I must write you at once. It is the finest picture of Army life over the years . . . I have ever seen. [It] has great historical merit but it teaches a real lesson. . . . If all our new soldiers read this, I am sure they would be better soldiers and better Americans.

Col. Gilbert Baldwin Lamb
Scarsdale, N. Y.

• I am a retired AUS Infantry officer [and] have been a subscriber to your magazine and *Infantry Journal* for way back perhaps as far as 1914. . . .

I want to tell you what a great kick I got out of "The Journal's First Half Century." Maybe I'm wrong, but I sense a certain tone of sadness, a certain wish that some of the old customs of the service, the old spirit that caused a man to be proud of "the Dirty Third," the "Dandy First," or "the Fighting Devils". . . .

I suppose you would call me an old fossil; but old or young, fossil or otherwise, I certainly do not approve of any lowering of the standards. Clothes may not make, but "the apparel oft proclaims" the man. An officer, I was taught, must always be on parade. How disappointing the dress of Army officers here in Philadelphia. . . . Please don't misunderstand me. Maybe it's not their fault. Maybe they must wear the clothes they do. When I was in the Army, an officer prided himself in being well dressed at all times and he usually was. . . .

And almost as bad, you see majors walking on the left-hand side of captains, a captain saying to a colonel, "Bill, that was a good game we saw last night," and a lot of other things that an old fogy like me just can't stomach.

There is no substitute for discipline. Military bearing breeds discipline; discipline begets unit spirit. When you have

(Continued on page 57)

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

MACKAY TROPHY
1951–1954

HARMON TROPHY
1951



1954
U.S.A.F.
OUTSTANDING UNIT CITATION

GUNNERY TROPHY
1954

ALLISON TROPHY
1951–1953

BENDIX TROPHY
1949



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N AIR DEFENSE

Geography Is On Our Side

BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS R. PHILLIPS



GADIER GENERAL THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, .S.A.-retired, has been a contributor to the ilitary press for many years. During the e-World War II years he wrote a number of netrating articles on the changing face of ar in both the *Coast Artillery Journal* and *fantry Journal*. Among these were "The New ice of War" (1938), and "Traditionalism d Military Defeat" (1941). He entered the my in 1917 and retired in 1950. Since then has been writing on military subjects for *e St. Louis Post-Dispatch*—which means at the good burghers of St. Louis are the st informed people in the country on mili- y matters.

THE United States has a built-in geographical advantage over the Soviet Union for defense against air attack as well as for aerial operations it might conduct against the Soviet heartland. The importance of this advantage will increase as the two opposing forces approach a stalemate in air-atomic weapons—atomic and hydrogen bombs and the means to deliver them.

When stalemate comes, the ability to foil the air-atomic offensive will be the great deterrent to an air-atomic blitz. When there is comparative equality in air-atomic power, defensive superiority will become decisive. If the would-be first attacker knows that his



THE U.S.S.R. LIES OPEN TO AIR ATTACK FROM ALL DIRECTIONS



attack will be heavily blunted by the other's defenses, while his own defenses are unable to do the same against retaliatory bombers, an effective defense becomes the real deterrent. In effect it adds up to an increase in offensive power.

Thus, as the Soviet air-atomic power increases to the point where it effectively stalemates our air-atomic combination, it will become more and more imperative for us to seize the advantage geography has bestowed on us and build an effective air and antiaircraft defense.

THE superiority that geography gives the U.S. over central Eurasia offers us two great offensive advantages. First, our aircraft can enter the Soviet Union's Eurasian heartland at any point on its 14,000-mile perimeter. This perimeter is so vast that it is impossible to set up either a complete defensive screen or a warning screen at or near the rim. This requires the Soviets to defend from regions inside the country. Thus they lose the advantage of distant warning and successive lines of defense. It has been reported that the Moscow region is surrounded by seventeen airdromes.

The second offensive advantage comes from the much shorter distances the United States Air Force has to fly from our peripheral bases to enter a central Eurasian territory. Moscow is only 1,100 miles from Turkey, 1,600 miles from England, and 2,700 miles from Thule. There is actually no target that is more than 3,000 miles distant from some one of our peripheral bases. All can be reached by our medium bombers and, with refueling, present bombers can return to their bases.

The picture with reference to a Soviet attack on the United States is just the opposite. With the exception of Uelen—across Bering Strait from Alaska—all Soviet bases are more than 3,000 miles from targets in the United States. It is doubtful that Uelen would be usable as a base since any operations there would be picked up instantly by Alaskan radar stations and the base could be taken out at once from Fairbanks, only 675 miles away.

In addition, geography forces the Eurasian power to make its flights over thousands of miles of territory controlled by the U.S. or its allies. The approaches are channelized over natural defensive and warning areas unless long dog-legs are flown, which would increase the already great distances.

Distance is an important factor in limiting offensive capacity, simply as a function of time. A 10,000-mile flight would require from twenty-four to forty-eight hours, depending upon the type of plane. Flights of half or less than half that distance, such as from our peripheral bases to Eurasia, could be made much more often. The distance factor has the practical effect of doubling the capacity of our air force or of halving that of a Eurasian air force.

The geographical advantage to the U.S. in air defense is equally pronounced. The direct routes from eastern Siberia, North Cape (Mys Schmidt), and Kamchatka pass over Alaska or the Aleutian Islands. As previously indicated, the eastern tip of Siberia is not usable as a base. The direct line from Kamchatka is more than 3,500 miles, while a long dog-leg to the Pacific Northwest over the Pacific to avoid the Aleutian Islands is about 4,300 miles. A long dog-leg from North Cape to avoid Alaska and to come down through central Canada to Chicago is about 4,500 miles.

OTHER North Pole approaches are no more favorable. It is about 4,000 miles from Franz Josef Land to Chicago. And no one has suggested that the Soviets might have air bases on Franz Josef Land.

The shortest air route to the United States from the east is from Murmansk. The distances are about 4,000 miles to New York and 4,400 miles to Chicago.

The routes from Murmansk cross over Greenland, Baffin Island, Labrador and Canada, and then for several hundred miles over the United States. It should be possible, from radar stations on Greenland and on Baffin Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland, to obtain warning of enemy approach 2,000 miles out

FRIENDLY LAND AREAS FLANK THE U. S. AT STRATEGIC POINTS



of New York City. Substantial progress has been made in establishing these stations.

Routes from eastern Europe which would cross the Atlantic south of Greenland are longer. It is about 4,500 miles from Lithuania or Czechoslovakia to New York. The northern route would cross Sweden and Norway and give warning, while a more southerly one would cross Germany and Scotland. It is impossible to select a route in this area that will not cross territory of our European allies, no matter how far off the direct course the flight is made.

The chart on page 13 shows that the direct air routes to the United States from either the east or west cover a width of only about 1,000 miles on the east and about 800 miles on the west in the vicinity of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. This simplifies the American defensive problem enormously. It means that distant advanced warning can be provided against direct routes of attack from the east and west by covering a space of only 1,800 miles. This compares with the Soviet problem of covering 14,000 miles to gain warning.

To evade these distant warning installations a hostile power could fly a dog-leg course. This would, of course, greatly increase the distances. This is the justification for patrolling the Pacific between the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutians, for patrolling off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts with airborne radar planes. It also is the justification for radar patrols between Greenland and Iceland, between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, and between the Faroes and the Shetlands.

For some reason the U.S. public has given more attention to filling the gap in the warning system from the North Pole down through Canada than in getting effective warning and defense over the direct routes. The North Pole routes to the United States are the longest of all and the most difficult to navigate because of the proximity of the route to the magnetic North Pole.

A more reasonable program would be to build interceptor bases to back up the distant warning systems we have now toward the northwest and northeast.

There is a widespread misconception that warning is simple, easy, and dependable. The opposite is true. Radar is perpetually giving ghost images that have to be investigated by interceptors. A distant warning line, with present radar equipment, across northern Canada would send so many ghost images that the entire air defense system would be in a state of constant alert. Such a system is no better than none.

It is not feasible to build interceptor bases in the far north of Canada. And they are terribly expensive. Thule air base, on Greenland, has cost us about $300 million so far. It is open to navigation about two months a year and this has been extended to three months by the use of ice-breakers. In northern Canada the sea may be open for two weeks in one year and not at all in another. The problem of building an effective warning system there, with a minimum of interceptors to back up the radar, is insuperable.

We can hope that new developments in radar m improve performance to the point where a warni line that is not backed by interceptors will have so value.

Some U.S. scientists, supported by energetic ne paper columnists, have insisted that the United Sta should construct the distant warning line at once. the Department of Defense, where there was m awareness of the logistical difficulties and also a bet understanding of the usefulness of such a line w present equipment, it was felt that the defense shou be expanded northward from the border.

ALONG the Canada-U.S. border is the Pine T Line, reinforced to the north by Canadian regio defense installations around the principal populat areas. The farthest feasible advance to the north one which could be supplied by road and rail. T is the so-called McGill fence which runs genera from southern Alaska, north of the Canadian Natic al Railway and to Hudson's Bay north of Church

Such a warning line can be supplied and can backed up with enough interceptors to investig radar images. At the present time it is the most i portant distant warning project, next to the syste covering the direct routes from the northeast a northwest.

The Soviet Union does not have an importa capability to attack the United States from the air the present time. The Soviet long-range air fo consists of about 700 copies of the U.S. B-29 with range of about 3,350 miles. A small number, fr 10 to 20, of the Type 31 turbojet, similar in char teristics to the U.S. B-36, have been built. This pla is said to have a range of 6,500 miles and a top spe of 460 miles an hour.

At the last show in Moscow the TU-37 and T 39 jet bombers were displayed in flight. These are heavy and a medium bomber with performance es mated to be near that of the U.S. B-52 and B-4 These should be coming into numbers in from thr to five years. When the Soviets do have a long-ran air force equipped with these aircraft, then the a defense problem of the United States will becor deadly serious.

The range of the Soviet's B-29 type of bomb alone is enough to indicate the impracticability attacking the United States with it. It obviously w designed to reach all of Europe and the United Stat peripheral bases.

Our own Air Force would not dream of sending B-29 over Soviet territory, nor is there any reason believe the Russians would send one over the Unit States. There has been a great deal of irrational ta of one-way flights to the United States. Public i agination pictures a lone Soviet bomber with million- or five-million-dollar bomb reaching a billio dollar target here at the sacrifice of not returning.

This approaches fantasy. A lone bomber would n

stand one chance in a hundred of reaching its target. When high Air Force officers talk about intercepting only 40 per cent or only 70 per cent (it varies from time to time) of the attacking bombers, they are talking about what they call a serious, well-organized attack, and not one lone bomber.

A TYPICAL bomber-attack plan would call for 15 aircraft to participate. One or two bombs might be carried. Part of the aircraft would be loaded with radar-deception equipment; others would go along to divert enemy interceptors from the bombers with lethal loads. The whole scheme of deception and diversion would be most carefully worked out. When an Air general says that 60 or 30 per cent of the attacking bombers would get through, he means the atomic carriers in this sort of attack.

It seems obvious that attacks against the United

Enormous problems of air defense loom on the horizon. In a few years the Soviet Union will possess a large fleet of high-speed intercontinental bombers. We must be ready for that day with improved radar detection and guided missiles. While the Communist fastnesses can be attacked from relatively nearby bases around the perimeter of Eurasia, the Soviets must fly long distances over unfriendly territory in order to attack the U. S. This favor that geography has given us, backed up by a sound defensive system, may provide the deterrent to total war.

tates by the B-29 type of bomber constitute no great anger. There are too few of the Type 31 to be condered a serious threat, for the entire stock would ave to be used in a single attack. We appear to have, herefore, from three to five years to perfect our efenses before the Soviet Union will have a bombing hreat to match our own. And when that time comes, s indicated earlier, the United States has a built-in eographical advantage.

Air and antiaircraft defenses are wholly dependent pon radar, and radar is going backward compared ith the advance of weapons. The radar guidance nd command systems in ground-to-air, air-to-air and r-to-ground rockets and pilotless aircraft can be interfered with if the frequencies are determined and e airborne equipment provided.

An antiaircraft rocket which explodes by command dio could be exploded by the enemy radio if the enemy bombers had the proper equipment. On the other hand, radar bomb sights can also be jammed and made ineffective. To top these complications, it is perfectly possible to make a rocket with guidance that will home on any radar transmitting equipment. Equipment can be made that will detect radar as quickly as the radar detects the equipment.

The struggle in the electronics laboratories to build a jam-proof radar and to devise equipment to recognize and jam radar is as critical and arduous as that devoted to designing faster and faster aircraft and better and better antiaircraft rockets.

This battle is being fought in secrecy in scientific laboratories and at military testing grounds. Its outcome will determine whether or not many miraculous accomplishments in the guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft will ultimately be effective in war.

AS aircraft speeds continue to increase, the problem of interception becomes almost insoluble. Radar warning does not reach out far enough to give sufficient time for interception when combined speeds of the two planes reach 1,500 to 2,000 miles an hour —2,200 to about 3,000 feet a second, equal to the speed of a rifle bullet. To expect two planes to meet when the combined speeds reach such a figure would be the same as expecting the bullets fired by two duellers to hit each other.

Nevertheless the British are preparing to defend their island entirely by antiaircraft rockets. This is a more practicable solution for Great Britain than for the United States. The areas which must be defended there are not numerous and are relatively small.

When speeds do become so great that interceptor defense becomes impracticable, the United States will face an exceedingly difficult defense problem. Continuing improvement in range of rockets and in radar is of the utmost importance to meet the defense problem in the not distant future. And looking farther ahead, it may become necessary to find a way to intercept the ballistical missile.

At the present time, however, interceptor speeds have advanced faster than bomber speeds, and the use of air-to-air homing rockets has greatly increased the power of the interceptor to kill. On the other hand, the bomber cannot use the air-to-air rocket for defense. The bomber is attacked from the rear and must fire backward. The initial speed of the rocket is decreased by the forward speed of the bomber so that it drops and loses its course.

Some time in the not distant future our survival may depend upon solving defense problems which do not yet press upon us but which do loom on the dark horizon. If we can discern the problems today we should strive now for the solutions. The two most critical ones in air defense are improvement of guided missiles and radar. A few years hence, when the offensive power of the air-atomic combination is stalemated, an effective defense may become the great deterrent to war.

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

From its launching site at Lorton, Va., a Nike battery guards Washington, D. C.

A Nike platform under construction. The well holds the shaft that raises the missile into firing position

NIKE'S NEST

Here's how bases for the Army's supersonic guid missile are being built outside America's greatest ci

Nike is one of the chief elements of the fist that guards the na from air attack. Launching platforms for this potent guided mis have been built near Washington, D. C., and are in the process of c struction around other vital and heavily populated areas.

Nike's nest consists of two areas: the launching site itself and control area. More than ninety-six tons of steel and a vastly gre amount of concrete go into the building of one of these "platforms" a battery of four Nikes. A mile or so away from the launching are the controls, where are located the three radar units that find enemy aircraft and "lock" the missile to it, so that their paths will evitably meet. Two officers and thirty-six men are regularly assig to the launching area, and five officers and forty-four men to the con area.

Used in conjunction with air interceptors and conventional anti craft artillery, Nike will present enemy bombers with an impenetra screen of fire. It has a range of approximately 50 miles and can re altitudes of 60,000 feet. Its speed is approximately 1,500 miles an h Once the ground radar units have found the path of the approach bomber, automatic controls in the Nike take care of the rest and gu the missile without fail to its target.



The plan of a Nike nest. When the radar "finds" an enemy bomber, a tracer beam locks on it, and the paths of Nike and bomber have to cross (Courtesy "Steelways")

An Army technician inspects a Nike missile before it is raised to the launching platform

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The more things change the more they are the same

A Medal for Horatius

COLONEL W. C. HALL

Rome
II Calends, April, CCCLX

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Senate Medal of Honor
To: Department of War, Republic of Rome

I. Recommend Gaius Horatius, Captain of Foot, O-MCMXIV, for the Senate Medal of Honor.

II. Captain Horatius has served XVI years, all honorably.

III. On the III day of March, during the attack on the city by Lars Porsena of Clusium and his Tuscan army of CXM men, Captain Horatius voluntarily, with Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius, held the entire Tuscan army at the far end of the bridge, until the structure could be destroyed, thereby saving the city.

IV. Captain Horatius did valiantly fight and kill one Major Picus of Clusium in individual combat.

V. The exemplary courage and the outstanding leadership of Captain Horatius are in the highest tradition of the Roman Army.

JULIUS LUCULLUS
Commander, II Foot Legion

Ist Ind. AG. IV Calends, April, CCCLX
To: G-III
For comment.

G. C.

IId Ind. G-III. IX Calends, May, CCCLX.
To: G-II.

I. For comment and forwarding.

II. Change paragraph III, line VI, from "saving the city" to "lessened the effectiveness of the enemy attack." The Roman Army was well dispersed tactically; the reserve had not been committed. The phrase as written might be construed to cast aspersions on our fine army.

III. Change paragraph V, line I, from "outstanding leadership" to read "commendable initiative". Captain Hor command was II men—only I/IV of a squad.

J. C.

IIId. Ind. G-II. II Ides, June, CCCLX.
To: G-I.

I. Omit strength of Tuscan forces in paragraph This information is classified.

II. A report evaluated as B-II states that the officer a Captain Pincus of Tifernum. Recommend change "M Picus of Clusium" to "an officer of the enemy forces".

T. J.

IVth Ind. G-I. IX Ides, January, CCCLXI
To: JAG

I. Full name is Gaius Caius Horatius.

II. Change service from XVI to XV years. One ye Romulus Chapter, Cub Scouts, has been given credi military service in error.

E. J.

Vth Ind. JAG. IId of February, CCCLXI.
To: AG

I. The Porsena raid was not during wartime; the ple of Janus was closed.

II. The action against the Porsena raid, ipso facto, a police action.

III. The Senate Medal of Honor cannot be awarde peacetime. (AR CVIII-XXV, paragraph XII, c.)

IV. Suggest consideration for Soldier's Medal.

P. B.

VIth Ind. AG, IV Calends, April CCCLXI
To: G-I
Concur in paragraph IV, Vth Ind.

L. J.

VIIth Ind. G-I, I day of May, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. Soldier's Medal is given for saving lives; suggest of Bronze as appropriate.

E. J.

VIIIth Ind. AG III day of June, CCCLXI
To: JAG
For opinion.

G. C.

(Continued on page 47)

COLONEL W. C. HALL, Corps of Engineers, an occasional contributor, is presently stationed at Fort George G. Meade, Md.

EDITORIALS

nmarkable Objectivity

E have been impressed in recent months by the firm objectivity displayed by those engaged in seeking the t possible tactical organization for the ground arms. nyone is engaged in honing a pet axe—or in goring neone else's pet ox—we would be very much surred. Everywhere we go we encounter a spirit of open uiry, best typified perhaps by an informal memoran- n written by a G3 Indian that came to our attention e by accident and in a totally different connection. one yet knows," the memo said, "what the future nization will be and until we do, one cannot say are discarding anything."

een of Battle

OTHER officer wrote to us in a letter: "The probems that face the infantry are tremendous but we'll e them if we get support and understanding." He te that in a plea for this magazine to give every bit of ort it could to the infantrymen who are at work on ntry's modern problems. We pledge all the support can muster. We reaffirm our belief that the infantry e arm that all the rest of the members of the Army labor and fight to advance. Infantry will change has changed mightily in the lifetime of our senior ers—but it is still the arm of decision, still the Queen attle.

y in Being

learned long ago that we don't have to smite our aders with a broadside to make them get a point, so we are well content to simply label "The Gun Might Have Won," on page 24, as "a lesson for ." But we cannot resist the temptation to observe it is becoming more and more clear that a modern has to be an army in being on the day the emes burn their secret papers and not an M plus 30 or 180 day force. Viscount Montgomery makes point, as you'll note when you read pages 20 to 23. lentally, Colonel George B. Sloan hit hard at this for an army in being in an article in the June 1954 of this magazine. If you don't remember it, you d be rewarded by digging up a copy of that June to read what Colonel Sloan had to say about the ign for an Atomic Army."

ty and SHAPE

I'LL not be surprised to find that Viscount Montnery's piece is pure Montyese: honest convictions ed boldly and without rancor. He is undeniably t remarkable man and an able soldier. He begins his piece by saying he is an international soldier representing the NATO countries, but is speaking his own personal views. We read that with considerable interest because we have been aware for some time that the high command at SHAPE—General Gruenther, Field Marshal Montgomery, General Norstad and others—have been deeply involved in the task of applying atomic weapons to the defense of Western Europe. General Gruenther himself has said that he believes atomic weapons would be used if war broke out in western Europe. Qualified and reliable newspapersmen who have visited at SHAPE have reported on the healthy attitude of inquiry and willingness to investigate new ideas that exist there. For example, Dr. Vannevar Bush told a subcommittee of the House of Representatives that he had worked at SHAPE with Field Marshal Montgomery "in planning an important command post exercise [where] there were scientific teams, the subject being modern weapons." All this gives added interest to the "personal views" of this international soldier who represents 14 NATO countries.

Tac "Strike Forces"

HERE'S something that's really not so new but you can mull over it profitably nevertheless. The aviation industry press has reported that the Tactical Air Command wants to create something called "strike forces." This idea seems based partly on TAC's desire to share in "strategic" missions with nuclear or thermonuclear bombs and partly a way to carry the ball in small periphery wars. The latter concept would have a TAC "strike force" of atomic light bombers and fighter-bombers that could strike a target—after ground forces had maneuvered the enemy into profitable concentrations. A further refinement is for the air forces of the smaller allies to be confined to close support missions. For example, the air arms of Turkey and Korea would be armed with simple, hardy close-support aircraft such as the Mighty Midget made by Martin.

Good Shooting

YOU can be proud that the U. S. Army (with a mighty assist by U. S. science and industry) is the only military service in the world to have conceived, developed and produced workable, effective guided missiles and rockets for both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface operations. We can't say what the limitations of these weapons are, but we understand their full capabilities have not yet been field-tested.

And we note that General Gavin recently said that the Army will have rockets with longer range and carrying more explosive power than the Honest John.

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED FORCES, EUROPE

THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR

Speaking before the Royal United Services Institution in London some months ago Viscount Montgomery discussed the changing face of war in the clearest and most forceful terms any postwar soldier has used. We publish here a condensed version of that talk because we think every soldier will find it stimulating and informative. We ought to add that the Field Marshal during his recent American visit made almost the same talk before a California audience.

I SPEAK as an international soldier who is the servant of the fourteen governments of NATO. What I have to say represents my own personal views.

As we advance further along the road of development of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, guided missiles, and ballistic rockets, it will become increasingly clear that a *hot* war will be mutual suicide for the contestants. Therefore, the great problem regarding the cold war now in progress is how to win it without precipitating a hot war.

Local wars, *e.g.,* Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, will no doubt continue to form part of the cold war, but there is a vast difference between them and a hot war. Both are global, the cold war *and* the hot war.

In trying to win the cold war one side or the other may miscalculate and bring on a hot war, though neither side wanted it.

I consider that the present state of world affairs, and the present tension, will continue for a long period. Therefore, the true objective of all military thinking today must be how to combine most economically the military measures needed for success in the cold war, with the development of the military strength needed to convince our enemies that a world hot war would result in their own destruction: no matter how great the surprise they achieved at the outset, nor how ruthlessly they conducted the contest.

The cold war calls for the use of conventional weapons; success in the hot war calls for new weapons.

It is obvious that the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons will have a profound effect on the conduct of war, on weapon systems, on strategical and tactical conceptions, and therefore on the organization of forces.

In our reorganization, we may often find a clash occurring between conventional weapons which we know about, and new weapons which we do not know about. Whenever that clash occurs, the solution should be on the side of the long-term new weapons. New weapons must be "phased in" gradually to our existing weapons systems so as to reduce, eliminate progressively, equipment and weapons which w become out of date as the years pass.

I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE a basing all our operational planning on using atomic a thermonuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is longer: "They may possibly be used."

It is very definitely: "They will be used, if we are attacke

The reason for this action is that we cannot match t strength that could be brought against us unless we u nuclear weapons; and our political chiefs have never sho any great enthusiasm in giving us the numbers to be able do without using such weapons.

It all calls for a certain reorganization of our forces, a in our strategy. A special group at SHAPE has had th matters under very close examination for the past year a we have reached certain conclusions. We now need t cooperation of national authorities to get those conclusi translated into practical action.

In fact, we have reached the point of no return as rega the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot w

If we visualize an atomic war, the importance of civil d fenses is apparent. That subject is grossly neglected tod Indeed, there is no sound civil defense organization in t national territory of any NATO nation so far as I kno

Let us then consider the future.

If ever war should come again to this distracted world, whi God forbid, weapons of power unprecedented in the ann of war are available for employment. There are some w say that if war is joined, nuclear weapons will not be use I would disagree with that. My opinion is that the fear atomic and thermonuclear weapons is a powerful deterre to war; but once a world hot war has started *both* sides a likely to use them. We would certainly use them oursel if we are attacked, as I have said.

So far as we can see today we are not justified in dependi on air bombardment alone, even with nuclear weapons, bring a world war to a successful conclusion; still less a lo war or disturbance. Wars today can be won only by fightin and, in a hot world war, fighting will continue in the air, sea, and on land until one side loses the will to fight on. W would be wise to accept these facts and to prepare oursel accordingly.

On the other hand, the skillful employment and accura application of superior nuclear firepower in combination *wi the operations of streamlined land forces, can be a decisi factor in the land/air battle. The problem will be, how force the enemy to concentrate his armed forces sufficiently offer a worthwhile nuclear target, without exposing our ou forces to destruction by the enemy's nuclear attack.*

our forward thinking we must put the emphasis on ıization, on tactical conceptions, and on the weapons equipment that are necessary to enable us to fight in vay we want.

l our future depends on getting the right answers to the ems we now have to face.

a hot war is precipitated by miscalculation, which is /s possible, there will not have been the build-up of rn land and air forces, nor the strategical deployment ıbmarines, which are generally taken for granted. In a case, we, the Western nations, might be temporarily ised.

t if we can react quickly, we would win such a war. would take a long time for the East to build up the ; necessary to do us serious harm, and by that time our rces will have done a great deal of damage to the East- ountries.

is type of hot war, the war by miscalculation, may come y time. We must fight it with the weapons we have got, ı the way our forces are trained when it begins. We must, t, do the best we can with what we have got, and not be o plans designed to meet an entirely different situation.

gest that such a war will have three phases.

irst Phase: a world-wide struggle for mastery in the air f the oceans. It will be vital during this phase to pre- nemy land forces overrunning and neutralizing Western and territories.

ond Phase: the destruction of the remaining enemy orces.

lrd Phase: the bargaining phase, when the enemy's and and all it contains is at the mercy of the Western

NTY MAKES THESE POINTS:

omic and thermonuclear weapons will be ed if we are attacked.

e dominant factor in future war will be rpower.

r support must be provided land forces, ing highly trained forces.

fight successfully on land we must have:
First-class peacetime forces in being
Well organized reserve forces
Sound logistic and movement organization
Sound civil defense organization

nd Forces must emphasize strategical and tical mobility and simplicity of weapons stems.

itable aircraft must be developed for mov- ; divisions rapidly by air.

mies need a simple line of supply based an airlift.

services must develop livelier and more portunistic battle leaders.

airpower. We will then carry the air attack to the point where the enemy accepts our terms.

The second and third phases may be concurrent.

Against the background of this over-all strategy, let us consider the war under three headings: the war in the air; the war at sea; and the war on land.

IT is clear from the strategy I have outlined that the dominant factor in future war will be airpower. And that is my very firm belief. But like so many things we do, we too often pay only lip service to this great truth.

The greatest asset of airpower is its flexibility. The main factors in determining the degree of flexibility are the methods of command and control, the range of aircraft, and the mobility of supporting equipment.

Flexibility and centralized control of all the air forces in a theater of war, are vital to success.

But the West has sacrificed flexibility by basing the air command organization on the requirements of "direct support" of the land forces, whereas it should be based on the organization necessary to gain the greatest measure of control in the air.

Airpower is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset—its flexibility.

If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it quickly. The methods we adopted in the later stages of World War II are not *necessarily* those we should adopt in the next war. In World War II we had almost complete air superiority from 1943 onwards; it will not be the same in World War III, and we cannot afford to sacrifice flexibility in our air command organization.

We must be careful that we do not draw false lessons for the future from the last two years of the late war; by which time we had won the war in the air.

The land-based air forces must always provide whatever offensive air support is needed in the war on land, using air forces that are highly trained in that particular work. But they must carry out this task without sacrificing their own flexibility. On occasions the whole of the available airpower may have to be used to help to save the armies from destruction, and the air organization must provide for such a contingency arising at short notice.

Now let us examine the war in the air.

If we can maintain the ability to start a tremendous nuclear bombardment of the East the moment we are attacked, they cannot afford to do nothing about it.

It must affect the employment of their air forces.

It must force them to devote a considerable effort of their long-range air forces and nuclear weapons to attempt to hit our strategical air forces and the installations on which they depend.

It must force them to expend effort on air defense, no easy problem for them.

AGAINST this background, I suggest there are three successive stages to consider in the war in the air.

In the first stage as I see it, both sides will rely principally on piloted aircraft in both the strategical and tactical fields. In this period also we stand to gain from the balance in favor of the offensive in the air if we can react immediately.

I see no sign, within this period, of either side being able to create an air defense system which could greatly affect the present balance in favor of the offensive in the air.

But we cannot afford to rely on air resources which depend on mobilization. The air forces we need, together with all

the means necessary to keep them operational, must exist in peacetime. And we must restore to the air forces the flexibility they have largely lost, by centralizing Air Command on the highest possible level.

The second stage [is] the not too-far distant future, [when] the East may create a sufficient stock of atomic weapons, and may develop the long-range means of delivering them effectively enough for them to strike at the outbreak of war a devastating blow at our means of delivering offensive airpower.

We would not then be able to apply our greater stock of nuclear weapons, and we might therefore lose the initiative in the air war at the start.

At this stage, as far as I can see, both sides will still be relying principally on piloted aircraft.

Before this period arrives, it will be of tremendous importance that we should have developed, and have in being, a highly effective global early warning system, together with the best air defense that the scientists can give us.

The third stage: further ahead in my opinion than five years from now, the East may have developed means of delivering their weapons with accuracy, both short-range and long-range, which do not rely on piloted aircraft. Our ability to counter that threat by both offensive and defensive measures will be much reduced, because the targets will be far less vulnerable—whether they are launching sites, or the weapons themselves actually in the air.

We must ask ourselves seriously what, at that stage, are to be the targets of our offensive airpower.

Will it then be true that offensive operations by our aircraft or missiles will directly affect the enemy's ability to deliver his weapons against us?

I do not see the airplane disappearing altogether.

In the tactical field I am sure that there will always be tasks for piloted aircraft in support of land and naval forces. The enemy's aircraft used for these purposes, and their bases, will remain an important target for our aircraft and missiles.

What we must do now is to organize the command and control of our air forces so as to retain the greatest degree of flexibility, centralizing command in the highest commander who can effectively exercise that command; so that he can wield the available air forces in a theater of war as one mighty weapon.

IF we are attacked, we must set in motion an immediate air offensive on the largest possible scale, directed at the enemy's air forces and at his homeland. The means of delivering an immediate air offensive must exist in peace. We must develop an effective, and global, early warning system in order to have some chance of being able to take the offensive in the air should we be attacked. And we must study air defense urgently; I will say something on this subject later on.

It is vital that our air forces should be able to absorb nuclear attack, and survive to strike back. The principle of dispersion must be explored from every angle. We must get away from the enormous concrete runways of today.

Naval forces require air support in the same way as do land forces. It is vital, in the conditions of today, that navies called on to operate in the great oceans should have their own air forces.

The navies of those nations whose work lies entirely in narrow seas such as the Mediterranean, or in European waters, are in a different situation; in my view, such navies do not need their own air forces.

The question to be faced, and decided, is, "In the future will the seas be controlled from the sea or from the air?"

When one considers the range and power of aircraft of the future, and the progress that is likely in radar and electro I am personally forced to the conclusion that the time come when the major factor in the control of the seas be airpower.

TO fight successfully on land we need the following essentials, as a minimum:

First: We must have first-class, "active," peacetime fo up to strength and ready at all times to act as our shield w out any mobilization procedure. These forces must be tra and equipped to the highest pitch: mobile, hard-hitting fensive troops of magnificent morale, very highly discipli under young and active commanders. These are the tr and the commanders who have got to stand firm in the of the horrors and terrors of the opening clashes of an atc war, and they will stand firm only if they are highly trai and highly disciplined. These are the M-Day forces.

Second: We need reserve forces, well organized, cap of being mobilized in echelons, and each echelon recei sufficient training in peace to ensure it is fit to fight at time it is needed. These are the post M-Day forces.

Third: Our forces, active and reserve, must be backe a sound logistic and movement [transportation] organizat which should exist in peace to the degree necessary to en success in the opening weeks of war.

Fourth: We must have a sound civil defense organiza in each national territory.

The whole philosophy underlying these needs in l forces is that the active forces "in being" in peace will m it impossible for the East to launch an attack successf without a preparatory build-up of their forces, which we w know about; it would be difficult for the enemy to surprise

Our active forces will prevent the Eastern forces f reaching our vital areas, while we are assembling and mo forward our *reserve* forces.

It is clear to me, and I hope to you, that adequate strength, multiplied by the ability to use nuclear weapon quantity, increases our chances of successfully defending West if we are attacked.

A further point is the great effect that the progress of scie may have on the time factor in war. There is a stronger quirement now than ever before for M-Day forces to ready, in place, and fully effective against a surprise att

Reserve forces must be organized with relation to the t when they must be available for use. This will affect state of readiness in which they are maintained, and, to s extent, their organization and equipment.

IT seems to me that the early phases of a third World W will shape very rapidly the course of such a war. It wo be wishful thinking to say at this time that a decision wo be reached in a matter of weeks or of a few months. Bu suggest to you that a policy of the fullest exploitation of nuc weapons early in a war, raises serious questions as to military worth in peace time of contributions to the war ef which will have a delayed effect.

Let us have a last look at the war in the air, at sea, on land.

We have got to win the war in the air.

We will not win it unless the air forces are allowed regain their flexibility and unity, and unless air comma is organized accordingly. It is vital that this matter be tack at once on the highest political level.

We must maintain in peace the ability to launch an imm diate offensive against anyone who attacks us.

The West is vulnerable to nuclear attack. Great offens

wer is wasted unless it is married to defensive power and ı be launched from a secure base. As time passes and the ensive capability between East and West levels out, the vantage will go to that side which can protect itself against ack, and can survive to strike back.

There is at the present time no sure defense against the plane or ballistic rocket. Indeed, so far as we can see to-, trying to get a secure defense against air attack is rather e trying to keep the tide back on the sea shore with a ket fence. This situation must not be allowed to continue.

The best scientific brains we possess should be gathered to help in the task, working in close cooperation with air ces. I say "air forces" because I hold the view that air de-se should be organized and handled by air forces, and that iaircraft commands should be handed over to that service.

f the armies can hold the land flanks, they help to keep the eat to proportions that will prove manageable.

Today, the navies must handle this war. They must be en the minimum means to ensure control of the seas and he approaches to essential ports, and no more. It is essen- that they should not dissipate those means on tasks which not affect the war at sea.

But we must not be hide-bound by past traditions. I give s my opinion that the time will come when the seas will controlled from the air.

all the fighting services the armies have the most difficult task as regards organization for the future.

Ve must make a serious study of the shape of future war land. It is of little use to superimpose new weapons on rld War II organizations, and then to try and work out tactical changes involved; we have got to examine the blem against a new background.

Ve must examine our armies, and their equipment, to see it changes are needed in an atomic age. A complete re-mization is needed of the reserve armies of all the West-nations; the present systems for producing reserve armies mostly out-of-date.

ı the organization of land forces the emphasis must be trategical and tactical mobility, and on simplicity of weap-systems.

Ve need divisions that can be moved rapidly by air; this necessitate suitable aircraft for the purpose.

o gain full advantage of the immense firepower that ear weapons have provided, and to avoid destruction by ny nuclear attack, armies must develop a more lively and rtunist type of battle leader than exists at present, in junior and senior ranks. Such a leader must have the ination, the daring, and the resources to seize fleeting opportunities; he must be trained to act independently immediately within the framework of a general plan, r than on precise and detailed orders or only after refer- to a superior.

ınd forces must become *less* dependent on roads and *more* ble of cross-country movement.

ıe supply system of land armies must be streamlined. must become much less dependent on fixed lines of ly such as roads and railways.

mies need a simple line of supply based on an airlift. ıy, when supply lines are cut by enemy action, armies to operate efficiently. The system of the future should de air supply to forward maintenance areas from base ts many miles to the rear, and well dispersed. Divisions d draw their requirements from the forward maintenance with vehicles having a cross-country capacity.

The airlift from base depots to forward maintenance areas must be by some type of "vertical lift" aircraft, which can take off and land vertically, and which fly at a fast speed like an ordinary aircraft in level flight. The air supply must be capable of being maintained in *all* weathers, and by day and night. Obviously the distance for this forward air supply should be kept as short as possible; therefore base depots should be moved forward from time to time.

I see base depots being replenished by large freight-carrying aircraft which can land and take off from PSP [pierced-steel planking] airstrips.

THERE is clearly a tremendous future for "vertical lift" aircraft, and it must be exploited for the benefit of land forces.

Whether this supply organization should be owned and operated by armies or by air forces is a matter for immediate examination on the highest inter-service level.

Finance will affect the solution.

No nation could afford to give the one service the amount of airlift that service would need at any particular peak moment in war. In the Berlin Airlift, and in Korea, it was necessary to draw on the air transport resources of all the services.

If the airlift organization is to be an organic part of an army, it will cost more than if it was under the air forces; and the army will never have enough.

In war time great flexibility will be needed, and the ability to effect rapidly a large concentration of airlift within a theater of war will be necessary. Great skill will be needed if the lift is to be maintained in all weathers. Air cover and protection will be necessary. An airlift organization must be dovetailed into air operations.

A political decision will probably be necessary as to who will man, own, and operate the airlift for land forces. That decision should be given soon, and before an inter-service argument develops which could lead to ill-feeling. It is my opinion that this vast air organization for the land armies will be best handled by the air forces.

Such a supply organization would do away with the vast array of units and headquarters which today constitute the enormous "tail" of a modern army. It would be the first step in restoring to armies the "freedom of the countryside," and the tactical mobility that have so largely disappeared. By simplifying the tail we shall get more bite in the teeth.

The armies of today have to a large extent lost their mobility; they are becoming road-bound and are weighed down by a gigantic administrative set-up in and around them. Staffs are far too big; the amount of paper that is required to produce even quite small action is terrific. We seem to have lost the art of command, other than by paper. No ordinary man can read half the paper that is in circulation; I doubt if the other half is worth reading.

IN the scientific age into which we are moving, which is also an age of ever-increasing costs, governments have got to insure that their armed forces and security measures are built up within a framework of economic realities and against a background of sound inter-service responsibilities.

If what I say has validity, then the future will call for:

- Bigger air forces.
- Smaller and more immediately ready regular armies with great strategical and tactical mobility. Better organized and more efficient reserve armies.
- Smaller navies.
- The organization of the three fighting services based on more atomic and thermonuclear power, and less manpower.

The Gun That Might Have Won

THE Austro-Prussian War of 1866 was the first (and no doubt only) war in which the soldiers of one side were armed primarily with muzzle-loaders and those on the other with the comparatively new breech-loaders. Opinion is practically unanimous that this factor, as much as any other, brought victory to the Prussians.

In July 1866, when the armies converged at Königgrätz (or Sadowa), where the Elbe meets the Orlice in what is now Czechoslovakia, the Austrians fought with all their traditional bravery, and at times with greater skill than usual. The forces were fairly even—about 200,000 to a side.

But the fire power was on the Prussian side. Its troops had their breech-loaders, the famous needle guns. Only a few Austrian units were equipped with breech-loaders, mainly Früwirth guns. The Austrian muzzle-loaders were good weapons in one respect: they were sighted to 1,000 yards as against 400 yards for the Prussian breech-loaders. But the Prussian soldier could load from the prone position; the Austrian could not. This gave the Prussians a rate of fire more than three times faster than that of the Austrians.

After-battle studies revealed a most significant fact. Austrian losses in their muzzle-loader units were greater than Prussian losses by about the same ratio as the Prussian rate of fire was greater. In the few Austrian units equipped with breech-loaders, losses were about equal to the enemy's.

WHY were the Austrians sent into battle with their outdated muzzle-loaders? Certainly not because the breech-loader was a brand-new invention. Eighteen years before, Prussia had completed its re-equipment program to become the first European power to have an army of breech-loaders. The Austrian muzzle-loader lingered on wholly for reasons of national economy. Members of the Austrian Diet, in their periodic attacks upon the already small military budgets, habitually rationalized their parsimony into bombast masquerading as military policy. "Austria's military policy must be a defensive one," a member said. "If we are to choose between an Army of poor striking power and a ruined economy, let us be sure to choose the first." Another member exclaimed: "A sound military policy may replace unnecessary military strength." So spoke Austria's policy makers, at a time when not far away Prussia's armament program went steadily forward.

ARMY leaders had for several years been pressing for adoption of a more modern infantry weapon. Several types of breech-loaders had been developed in Austria, any of which might have served the purpose if funds had been granted for general production. Of these, the Früwirth gun seems to have been the best or at least enjoyed the highest favor in military circles.

By 1862, at a time when the Prussian Army had long been fully equipped with their needle guns, Austrian Army leaders managed only to equip several companies with Früwirths. Early in 1866, as the crisis mounted, Emperor Franz Josef ordered the issuance of Früwirths to the dragoons, hussars, and four infantry battalions. Perhaps if time had allowed, Austria might have caught up with the

Bettmann Archive

Count Benedek, commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces in 1866, paid with his professional reputation for the blunders of others.

changing times. Too late it learned wars do not wait for armies to get r While the brief campaign was act being fought, the government a priated 1,500,000 florins for 5(Früwirth guns. But florins could not the needle guns.

In the peace arrangements A lost its Italian province of Venezia was charged an indemnity of 30,00(florins to Prussia—a sum that would kept the army in breech-loaders many years. A fraction of that am spent in time, might possibly have g the Austrians victory instead of de

ONE aftermath of Königgrätz was ly a unique event. The age-old, always unedifying, sport of scap hunting was indulged to the full. Austrian commander-in-chief, C Benedek, was summoned to ex things to the Emperor. "The troo Your Majesty fought valiantly," the eral began, "but the Prussian n gun . . ." Here ended one of the sh royal audiences of record, when the peror turned his back on the d guished national hero, veteran of el campaigns and three battle wound

Shortly thereafter Benedek and of his chief lieutenants faced a c martial whose procedure was d rigged to assure the foregone conclu Since the defendants had for years publicly pleading for better wea and warning of the fate that Austria now suffered, the court thought ruled out all testimony antedating war itself. Only the defendants' con of the campaign could be discu Some reference to the Prussian su ority in weapons crept in, of course, the court did not encourage it. For sons that have been debated at g length, the Emperor eventually ord the trial stopped. The results of action were largely academic; the tary careers of the principals could h ly have suffered more by an official dict.

If there is in this tale some kin parable for our own times, it should be hard to detect it.

They Ride To Work

Armored infantry moves fast on personnel carriers and fights hard—from the ground. Its tactical concept and attitude are more closely related to armor than conventional infantry

CAPTAIN BOYD T. BASHORE

ledicated infantry lieutenant of my ıcquaintance was assigned to an ored division a few years ago. To it mildly, he regarded the assign- t with misgivings. It seemed to him his professional throat was about e cut. Why, he knew *armor* officers had never been assigned to an ar- ed division! What would they do to ager young infantry lieutenant? His previous knowledge of armor was t hours' training in armored infan- techniques at The Infantry School. it turned out, the lieutenant learned about fire power, mobility, and k action than he had learned in ıis previous training.

/hen the lieutenant got his orders he ded he had better study the organiza- of the armored division. He dis- red that it contains plenty of infan- Of the fifteen combat battalions, are armored infantry, four are tank, are artillery, one is combat engineer, one is reconnaissance.

time went on our lieutenant learned more about armor.

he armored division has a flexibility ically unknown in infantry units. armored infantry battalion seldom s as a tactical unit. Instead, it is led up into companies, and some- s platoons, which are coupled with artillery, and engineer units to task forces. The mission at hand mines the proportions of tanks and ıfantry in the combat team. The hing of units can be accomplished in minutes, merely by some terse s given over the radio.

ır lieutenant liked the mobility of armor when he became accustomed to it. His tactics were formerly planned on 1:25,000 maps, movement was made at two and a half miles an hour, and organic supporting fires were not normally of much help at ranges of over a thousand yards.

But for the armored infantryman, even 1:50,000 maps are sometimes too small in scale because he can move at speeds up to thirty miles an hour. The 90mm guns of the tanks can support him at ranges of five thousand yards. Enemy machine guns and indirect artillery and mortar fire, while still held in healthy respect, are no longer heavy factors in tactical planning for the infantryman who rides to battle in an armored carrier. On the other hand, the infantryman's old friends—woods, ditches, streams, marshy ground, and bridges—become extremely menacing. Enemy tanks and antitank mines are his deadly foes. The armored infantry officer must stress physical fitness in his troops, because they live relatively plush and gypsy-like lives, and are likely to become unused to doing much walking.

THE armored infantry rifle squad is equipped, organized, and trained essentially the same as an infantry rifle squad. It consists of a two-man automatic-rifle team, five riflemen, a squad leader, his assistant, and a driver. The squad is transported in its own full-tracked armored personnel carrier (APC), which offers protection from artillery and small-arms fire, goes forty miles an hour, has a hundred-mile operating radius, and can cover the same terrain as a tank.

In addition to usual infantry weapons, the armored infantry squad has an organic caliber .30 A6 machine gun, and a caliber .50 machine gun which is mounted on the carrier. These weapons can make the squad's fire power almost equivalent to that of a standard rifle platoon. Whether the carrier is the M75 used in Korea or the new M59, it is a mobile machine-gun pillbox which can support the squad with devastating fire from hull defilade.

An armored infantry platoon is composed of three of these squads, plus a machine-gun squad, which has two five-man machine-gun sections, a driver, a squad leader, and his assistant.

The armored infantry company consists of three of these platoons, plus a mortar platoon, which has three 81mm mortar squads, each transported by its own APC. In addition to having the normal supply, mess and administrative sections, it has two large maintenance sections—one for the company's vehicles and one for its radios.

The vehicles include seventeen full-tracked armored personnel carriers, two 2-½-ton trucks, one halftrack, four half-ton trucks, and several trailers. The mounted radios are fourteen VRC-7s, five GRC-4s, and three GRC-3s; while seventeen PRC-6s and one PRC-8 are used for dismounted work.

To the average infantry officer, the armored infantry battalion is a strange unit. Tactically, it is composed of four line armored infantry companies, a 4.2-inch mortar platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon. Administratively, the battalion is entirely separate. It has its own personnel section, vehicular maintenance section, medical detachment, and supply platoon.

The armor headquarters on the regimental level is the combat command—a tactical headquarters which may be changed from day to day. The battalion is authorized its own insignia and its own battalion colors, and it writes its own unit history.

ARMORED infantry is generally used in either of two ways: the infantry

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AIN BOYD T. BASHORE, Infantry, en- ed in 1943 and in 1946 entered the litary Academy, from which he grad- ed in 1950. His most recent assign- nt was in Europe with the 42d Ar- red Infantry Battalion.

Tanks and infantry move into an attack during a training maneuver

supports the tanks, or the tanks support the infantry.

The tank, with its greater fire power, heavier armor, and greater shock action, obviously has the advantage over thin-skinned armored infantry vehicles under the right conditions of terrain. When armor can be used in its primary role, the armored infantry usually supports the tanks.

But when the terrain is unfavorable to tanks, armored infantry assumes the primary role. Such conditions occur when buildings, woods, or close terrain render the tank's cannon virtually useless and make the tank vulnerable to close-in antitank measures by enemy infantry. Dismounted armored infantry is used in the leading role when streams, gullies, or minefields deny mobility to the tanks. Then the tanks provide direct-fire support and furnish antitank protection to the front, flanks, and rear of the infantry, at ranges up to 5,000 yards.

Mobile defense is another new wrinkle for the infantryman suddenly exposed to armor tactics. Armor defends an area by maneuver and counterattack, and defense is seldom attempted on any level below combat command. The defense is organized into two echelons: a somewhat standard line of strongpoints, and a reserve. The reinforced infantry units are placed where they command the key terrain features and block, or at le control, the most likely avenues of proach. These strongpoints are me neither to stop the enemy completely to disperse him. Their primary miss is to canalize the advancing enemy i corridors that lead to pre-chosen ta country where armor can get in its de ly licks. In this mobile defense, most the armored infantry is usually pla in the strongpoints, while most of tanks are held in reserve.

The latest armored personnel carrier, the M59, carries twelve infantrymen, weapons and ammunition. The armor provides protection against small-arms fire and shell fragments. Tactical use is still under development.

The armored infantryman must ne become too attached to his person carrier. Unlike the tank, it is not a fig ing compartment. The armored infant man is a member of a standard but fa moving infantry squad, and he must prepared to fight hand to hand just l his walking cousin. The carrier is mer transportation, a means of moving fast as the tank. The APC, like the a craft and parachute of the paratroop merely gets him to the objective.

The M59, the latest APC, is ligh than the M75. It has the added capal ity of crossing bodies of water. An mored infantry outfit in M59s can up a beachhead in an attack, crossing river without stopping its advance.

Armored infantry tactics are still ing developed. Although almost eve one pays lip service to the field manua few agree exactly how the new AP should be employed, primarily becau the one-inch armor on the M75 mea different things to different peop There have been armored infantry co manders who stopped when they we

ed with machine-gun fire, and others o attacked into recoilless 75mm and 5mm fire. No one has put out a firm swer to the question: "Where should carriers be?"

There have been commanders who dis-unted three thousand yards away m the objective, requiring their "ar-red" infantry to attack on foot across ire-swept hill, rather than endanger carriers. There have been command-who believed that the APCs should all times follow only ten or fifteen ds behind the tanks, on the theory t the tanks "cover" the carrier. But st commanders have followed the re acceptable tactics of having the Cs trail four or five hundred yards ind until the tanks hit the objective, l then close the gap at top speed, dis-unting riflemen right on the objec-, practically jumping down the fox-es of the enemy.

) prepare himself adequately for an rmored *infantry* command, the infan-officer, in addition to his own branch ning, needs exactly the same back-und as an armor officer, with the sible exception of tank gunnery. Un-unately, he usually has not received quate armor training before he is ped into the race and told: "Do it!" ne sound infantry officers may be t professionally by their inexperience en they are suddenly required to take r an armored infantry command.

Many armor officers don't fully appreciate the infantryman's dilemma. This sink-or-swim attitude is a serious deficiency in our present methods.

There is a definite need for specialized *armored infantry* training taught by an armored infantry department at The Infantry School or The Armored School. This training should have somewhat similar objectives, and perhaps be of similar length, as jump school, and should be conducted on an Army-wide level for all infantry officers and some noncommissioned officers, before they are assigned to an armored division.

Such a course could develop tactical policies for the armored infantryman. As it is now armored infantry doctrine is two-headed; some comes from Benning and some from Knox. This is not good.

This armored infantry indoctrination course should emphasize practical class participation, including armored infantry tactical problems with tanks. Equal importance should be given to two weeks of driver and maintenance training for every student, including officers. This should be combined with a somewhat shorter course striving for the same goals from the radio maintenance and communications standpoint. The indoctrination course should end with a brief class in the history and traditions of armor in general, and armored infantry in particular.

Infantrymen should be encouraged to volunteer for such schooling and subsequent assignment to an armored infantry unit, contingent upon graduation. And also some distinguishing insignia should be authorized for the armored infantryman, possibly a shoulder arc which says "Armored," patterned after "Ranger" and "Airborne" tabs. At the very least, official recognition should be given to a blue-braided high-peaked armor cap by awarding it free, the same as any qualification badge, to the graduate of the school.

It has been agreed that every regular infantry officer, if physically fit, should be airborne qualified. The requirements should go one step farther: every infantry officer ought to be armored infantry qualified too. Sometime during his early infantry career, every infantry officer should rotate at least one cycle through straight, airborne, and armored infantry.

Only in that way will the infantry officer realize that armor is not the private monopoly of the yellow-scarved officers and men who used to ride horses and now ride tanks; but that it is rather a state of mind, an aggressive, flexible manner of thinking by the officers and men of *any* combat branch, who believe in mobility, fire power, and shock action.

RED PARALLEL

The Tactics of Ho and Mao

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg

THE parallel between tactical patterns and growth of the Viet Minh and of the Red Chinese in the Chinese civil war is so precise that even the circumstance of today's truce predicts tomorrow's trouble.

Mao Tse-tung's ten military principles have been consistently applied by Red warlord Ho Chi-minh. The Viet Minh began war on a guerrilla basis and has emerged to its brigade- and division-level period. Before long it will enter its army-level era of organization and operation.

Viet Minh foot mobility has been of the highest order, and on a parallel with that of the Chinese Reds. It is the Asiatic rebuttal to machine-age war. Ho Chi-minh's guerrillas have followed Mao Tse-tung's axiom: "We march more than we fight, but every march is for the sake of a fight." This tactic multiplied Viet Minh numbers and confused opposing intelligence officers and commanders. A formal army, like that of the French and the Chinese Nationalists, arrives at a point of justified desperation when it cannot find, much s oppose, the enemy opposite it. The c bility and the elusiveness of the 'e Minh greatly prolonged the Indoch war. It was so designed by the C munists for two purposes: to allow Viet Minh forces time to grow to military stature, and to bring war wei ness to the people of Indochina. T followed the Mao Tse-tung philosoj of "not fearing long wars" but want decisive campaigns within long wars

It was the ninth of Mao Tse-tur Ten Military Principles that accelerac his rise to power from 1946 to 19 This principle said, in simple ter "capture from the enemy so as to a yourself." As the Chinese Reds gair new weapons and material in the C

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG, Armor, was a member of the Marshall Mission to China in 1946. He was captured by the Communists at that time and spent two months in a Red prison. Out of that experience and much study he wrote *Red China's Fighting Hordes*. He has also written a book on training aids and expedients, which will be published this year. We count him as one of our regular contributors. He is presently assigned to G3 at the Pentagon.

The deadly parallel betwe the tactics of the Red Chine and the Viet Minh is n where more precise than the adherence to Mao's di tum to be cautious and p

e civil war, the number of offensive ves increased and they became more ressive. While the source of supply ; different for the Viet Minh, its ressiveness and concerted military ac- ı was in direct ratio to the armament ained, and it gained the majority of arms from the Chinese Reds. Or- ıizationally the Viet Minh grew larg- and more formal as Red China sup- d advisers, technicians, and weapons. Red China's Ten Principles are sim- rules designed for beginners in fare. They are tailored for the pa- ıt, and they fit the ultra-patient atic. Palace revolutionists or daring olutionists would be contemptuous of ir cautious and conservative advice. they are sure and certain rules for ı who have the patience and en- ance to apply them. Ho Chi-minh uch a man.

irst among the ten principles of the inese Reds is: ". . . strike at scattered isolated enemies, and later strike at . . . powerful enemies." Foremost in sistency and chronology was the Viet ıh's application of this axiom, which ht be called the tactics of digestion ıout indigestion, a principle which proportionate to the means at hand. Viet Minh attacked the outposts ategic and tactical) of the French ıy in this succession, and scored some important gains in 1950-51, espe- ly in Tonkin. Over the years the t Minh adhered well to the first ıciple but did err now and then in ging the next degree of target to ck. For example, the Red attack on Sam (November-December 1952) was apparently preceded by faulty intelligence, or overconfidence, or a combination of both. This bloody Viet Minh attack had much of the character of the 1947 attack the Chinese Communists made on the Shantung city (a formidably walled one) of Tsining which, like Na-Sam, was an attack eventually abandoned after heavy Red casualties. Neither place had any real (local) strategic importance, yet in both instances there is now reason to believe that the Reds attacked in the hope of establishing military prestige.

VIET MINH adherence to the second principle ("first take the small towns; later the large") was leading to the application of the third: "We take the annihilation of the enemy's fighting strength, and not the holding of cities . . . as the major objective. . . ."

Ho's regular forces always tried to apply the fourth principle: "In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior forces. . . ." This they did at Dien Bien Phu.

Consistently choosing its own conditions of battle, the Viet Minh adhered to the fifth principle: "Fight no unprepared engagements. Fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory. . . ."

Throughout all of their campaigns with regular and irregular forces, Ho's warriors were subjected to the sixth principle, which is "fear no sacrifice, fatigue," and train to fight successive engagements within a short time.

Ambushing French columns with regularity, Viet Minh forces regularly applied the seventh principle successfully: "Strive to destroy the enemy while he is in movement. . . ."

Hanoi and Haiphong stood in 1954 as Mukden and the port city of Yingkow did in 1947. The Chinese Reds eventually took Yingkow, and Mukden became an air-supported island that was later submerged into the Communist sea. Like the Chinese Reds, the Viet Minh was patient and abided by the eighth principle: "With regard to the question of assaults on cities [take] . . . those which are weakly defended. At favorable opportunities wrest all of those which are defended to medium degree. Wait until conditions mature to wrest [those] . . . strongly defended." As the 1954 negotiations in Geneva reached their crisis the Viet Minh began militarily to choke Hanoi and Haiphong. Conditions had matured with the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Obviously, Ho Chi-minh had wanted these cities for a long time, but he abided by the eighth axiom that Mao had demonstrated to be so successful. There is no doubt that Ho's forces would have attacked and tried to divide, so as later to devour, the delta region, had the truce not been established at Geneva. Another Viet Minh aping of the Chinese Reds—and an old Communist military-political combination—was their backing with military victories of their representatives at the diplomatic table. Asiatic Reds regard it as axiomatic and necessary to arrive at the conference table with victories current enough to force favorable diplomatic arguments. The Chinese Reds set their pattern when General George C.

ıt in assaulting cities. kden *(at left)* fell to the l Chinese in 1947 and t Minh forces walked vic- ously into Hanoi in 1954.

Marshall tried to settle the civil war, and they applied it in Korea. It must always be expected that when a Red regime is ready to negotiate it is also ready with some soon-to-be-applied war plans.

EXAMINE the tenth principle (which the Viet Minh used) and you find yourself reading between the lines or paraphrasing its real lines:

"Be skilled at using the intervals between two campaigns for the resting, regrouping and training of troops. (Do not rest too long.) . . . Do not let the enemy have breathing space." This principle concedes that the Communists at this particular military stage of development do not always have the logistical capability of "carrying through" and that their drives will often spend themselves, yet they must always seek to resume their pressure on the enemy. Logistically the Viet Minh was not up to prolonged attacks as was demonstrated in several instances when they hit the hard core of French defenses.

The French military problem over the years was much like that of the Chinese Nationalists. Unfortunately, the French technique was parallel. Pillboxes, islands of resistance, and bristling defenses were created to ward off the Red mosquito attacks, but as Communist aggressiveness increased, the French came to rely more on these fixed defenses. In the fury of the tasks and troubles at hand the French were often blind to the potential and power of mobility. In the jungles aerial reconnaissance and intelligence were useless. What was most needed was more effective ground intelligence or information from natives made ultra-friendly by political means. British General Sir Gerald Templer proved this point in Malaya. The French wanted to engage the foe in open battle; the Viet Minh forces avoided brutal contests until they were ready, and the French lacked timely enough information upon which to launch forces to catch the Communists. Thus the French were unable to concentrate on worthwhile Red concentrations.

IN the sober application of these ten principles it must be conceded that Red Chinese advisers to the Viet Minh had their influence, and Ho Chi-minh and his officers can be credited with endurance and patience, but not with originality. The Chinese Reds spent many war years perfecting these principles, which will in the future provide the basic guide to all other Red revolutionary moves in Asia.

Dien Bien Phu, the target of much opportunity, was enveloped vertically, just as Chanchun was in 1946 when the Chinese Nationalists airlifted twelve thousand troops into the Manchurian capital, air supplied them, and lost them to Red concentric envelopments on the ground. Like the heroic defenders of Dien Bien Phu, the soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek fought at Changchun until their perimeter was only a few hundred yards in diameter—and even then resisted until they were physically overrun and captured at point-blank range.

After seeing this battle in Manchuria I could only conclude that to survive at all, such an airhead must move and keep moving on the ground, so as to force the enemy to realign his forces and prevent him from concentrating them. To stand still (and Nationalist heroism was equal to that demonstrated at Dien Bien Phu, although the skill was somewhat less) is to invite disaster.

Dien Bien Phu was a blocking effort and an attempt to engage Viet Minh forces in open battle so as to destroy their numbers. But the key to Viet Minh acceptance of battle here lay in the Red consideration of the odds and the "favorable conditions" which Red China's great tactician and strategist, General Lin Piao, summarizes several times in his written texts and in one place says: "Calculated risk engagements . . . should not be undertaken at random . . . and only if there is a 70 per cent prospect of victory."

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu goes deeper than the French decision to establish a blocking airhead there. Whose initiative really caused the conflict? Ho Chi-minh moved certain of his troops into Laos in a maneuver that was used by Chinese generals. The "One-Eyed Dragon," Chinese General Liu Po-cheng, executed such a move in 1947 when he moved his army group from a long-established battleground in Shantung and "fled" hundreds of miles southwest to the Taipeh Mountains, where he could fight in a new area and force the Nationalists to realign their strategy. In short, Liu diverted the enemy and forced him to fight in an area favorable to his own forces.

AT the time of the Laos invasion the French were reported to have explained the disappearance of the Viet Minh 316th Division by saying that it had been "wiped off the battlefield." The Chinese civil war proved to Army observers that one must b of the Red division that "disapp because it always turns up again very embarrassing place. The 316t vision did just that.

The Viet Minh organization of sions on a regional rather than o tional basis is taken from Mao tung's concepts of consolidation in rilla war, which he wrote many ago. As Colonel Samuel B. Gri USMC, translated it: "Without solidation, one will have no strengt further expansion. In guerrilla wa if only one thinks about expansion forgets consolidation, he will not be to stand up against the enemy. . . . correct policy is to expand on *bas* consolidation." Logistically the regi organization provided the Viet N with bases of food, manpower an telligence because the Reds forced allegiance of the people within the ticular countryside. Politically it allo them to dominate the people and doctrinate them.

In viewing Red regional organiz on a local or tactical basis, it is impo to look at the Viet Minh regional base, organization on a strategic l Here we find the real logistical bas the Viet Minh in South China ju the Red Chinese base for their o tions in Korea was in Manchuria more realistically, in the Soviet Un Yet in both cases the bases were out the war zone and relatively safe bec to bomb or invade them was to in a bigger third power into the war.

The Viet Minh was a "twilight ar whose strength at night could ex the numbers usually manifest in light. This army, like that of the nese Reds up until 1949, had two p —the guerrilla and the formal—w acted in combination and coordina with each other. In most cases ei portion could avoid battle by hidin arms and merging into the country as peasants. This feature of momen obscurity in one's own land was direct contrast to the necessary form ty of the French forces which had mission of preserving the governm and vital territories. However, the Nam force possessed, and still posses the capability of operating portions its body on this basis.

LIKE the Chinese Reds until 1949, Viet Minh force has lacked an force. Ho Chi-minh's forces have a like their Chinese predecessors, opera

ı a fair minimum of motor transport, have utilized motor vehicles for ply rather than for tactical mobility. Oriental tactics of encirclement are those of the half-moon diagrams we prone to draw on maps. Instead, are more subtle, and often part of circle is a permanent guerrilla base ch only needs the regular or more nal army to close with it. The Viet ıh's approach was often based upon concept, long ago projected by Mao -tung: ". . . if we analyze our various ular army] bases and their inter-ion, plus the relation of multiple rilla bases to the regular army's front s, then we are encircling portions he enemy. This is [a] second form ncirclement."

o Chi-minh's forces must now be sured in light of the progress of the Army of China since 1949. The light army" of today will not re-ple that army of the future. The Minh forces are going to take on ern and formal aspect with Chinese tance, especially now that it is not ing.

June 1946, a truce was superim-d on the Chinese civil war fighting Manchuria. At that time General Piao, the Communist commander Manchuria, had an irregular to half-lar collection of well-disciplined, ened troops. He had failed, how-in the Battle of Ssupingkai (1946) tand up successfully against the formal and formidable fire power ıe Nationalist armies. The truce, all of its well intended purpose, Lin Piao a period of many months. utilized this interval to recruit, re-, re-cadre, and reorganize his motley . Logistically, he strengthened his and made many technical im-ements. It was this army, rebuilt ıg a truce period, that eventually ked the Nationalists and swung the ıce in favor of the Communists. Piao's army was the avalanche that ed the Red sweep of China.

ıe truce in Indochina now offers Chi-minh the same opportunity and d of grace. He can now rebuild rmy along more formal lines, cadre units from among his veterans, without having to fight at the same and strengthen his forces logis-y and technically. The Viet Minh not neglect to capitalize on the period.

ould the war be renewed, it could be with an entirely new type of Minh army.

Red armies on the march. The Viet Minh *(above)* were taught by the Chinese Communists *(below)* how to travel light and move fast.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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. . . trouble wit

cavalry is . .

COLONEL SHILLELAGH

The cavalry General Walker was depend upon on 26 November 1950 had long since departed the Army

IT always wants to do what it can do. Jeb Stuart had the only element of Lee's army which could range and raid far from the main body—so he did. To possess a capability of damaging the enemy places on any military man or force a strong compulsion to do the damage. To possess great mobility imposes a strong compulsion to use that mobility. Stuart understood the importance of his screening mission too, but he thought he could screen Lee, and ride hard and far, strewing destruction under his hooves.

Lee understood the proper use of cavalry. He knew his entire force depended on the information Stuart could collect and deliver to Army headquarters. He knew also that you cannot tie down good cavalry to the sole task of scouting ahead of the infantry. There are times when this screening job is of vital importance and there are times when such use would be a waste of good cavalry. There are times when the most vital mission is to serve the main body and other times when the independent missions are appropriate. Stuart's critical absence at Gettysburg was a matter of timing—timing influenced by the compulsion to do what he could do.

THE air age introduced cavalry with greater mobility, greater striking power and an inability to dismount and fight on foot. As the range of aircraft increased, the preoccupation of airmen with the independent mission also increased. This new capability for inflicting damage deep behind the enemy lines was much more fascinating than attacking enemy ground forces or even than jousting with other airplane opened up new possibilities. That compulsion to do men can do still existed—and always will. Other men, fe of it, worried about what would happen to the Army this new cavalry was off on its hard and far-ranging mis

The compulsion to exercise the independent air capa included the compulsion to justify it; so that a whole literature was created around the possibilities which la exploiting this new power. This new literature picture Army as a backward and reactionary service which not understand the potentialities of the new weapon which sought to limit its development. The efforts of se minds to arrive at a realistic balance of missions and e ment were labeled reactionary by the exponents of vi through air power. If the Army sought to develop it quirements for close support and for reconnaissance, it a cool reception from air soldiers with visions of indepen air warfare.

WORLD WAR II provided a good test of air weapon veloped in the Thirties. The bombers developed by Army Air Corps compared very favorably with those of independent Royal Air Force in Britain. The compa does not support the charge that development of the i pendent mission had been retarded by Army control o power in the United States. On the other hand, the parison with the Royal Air Force in the fighter category less favorable to the United States. It reflects the kn preoccupation of American airmen with bomber develop and their lesser concern with defensive warfare.

COLONEL SHILLELAGH, a regular contributor to this magazine, was recently detailed to an extremely important assignment, and by the time you read this he may be wearing a star.

he real failure of the Army in this period was not in the lopment of air power but in the failure to integrate this er into the Army mission and structure. A contrasting l was followed in the Navy and the Marine Corps. reas the Army leaders in large measure looked upon Air Corps as another branch to support the infantry, the y and Marine leadership accepted aircraft as a primary at weapon which their ground combat leaders had to to use as they used other weapons. The development r power was not the exclusive concern of an air corps in Navy and Marine Corps, but was a primary concern of op leadership.

course, the Army faced the more difficult problem. The cal limitations of carriers effectively limited the Navy ort-range planes which fitted into fleet missions. The size of the Marine Corps itself tended to limit aircraft opment to the ground support and reconnaissance mis- Only in the Army did the possibility of extended air- range give a new lustre to the independent mission and the airman's interest away from the ground battlefield. Air Corps was the logical inheritor of the cavalry tradi-

e Army did not produce a Lee who could understand the importance of service to the main body and the tance of the independent mission, a man big enough k to sound principles, while recognizing that human will sometimes spoil the best of plans. In consequence, rmy structure was badly fractured, and the Army suf- the total loss of the new cavalry potential. We may sk, as General Gavin has, "Where was Walker's cavalry vember 26, 1950?" Was he depending upon a Stuart ad long since departed the Army?

ND these effects on the Army structure and power, the npaign of the air power enthusiasts to justify doing what ould do has had critical adverse effects on American ts of warfare. The "New Look" of recent history was ant primarily in the official endorsement of a theory which had long been advanced by air power en- ts and had been accepted as a practical basis for force ments before Korea, but had not received earlier public ement by our military leadership. In a sense, the an- ment of the New Look was the ultimate triumph of npaign to justify the independent air mission.

air-power triumph is more astonishing in coming so ter the Korean demonstration of the incapacity of air to control ground action. True, the Army criticism Air Force claims has been muted by unification into note which sometimes resembles harmony. And some- e Army's theory of modern war has only reiterated to mothers that their sons must still fight on the ground of planes and atoms. Unfortunately, we have pro- o acceptable theory of war for our time.

is seriously affects our military thinking in three ways: We have accepted civil destruction as an object of l a means of war where formerly it was an incident The question raised is not of humanity but of reality er we have forgotten that war is still a political in- t which must have political objectives and methods. lusion may prove to be the ultimate irrationality.

(2) We have rejected the precept that indecisive brutality and destruction which advantages neither side will be outlawed by mutual consent or forbearance. We expect war to take the form of tremendous destruction on both sides, though we find no purpose in it. We have surrendered to the idea that a capability will be exercised merely because we possess it.

(3) We have lost sight of our objective of defeating the enemy armed forces as a means to victory and have substituted for it the intangible will of the enemy to resist. This is an objective which defies definition and invites untried methods. This error leads to the brutalization of war without purpose, to a preoccupation with mass destruction, to the neglect of the political realities.

COULD the Army have retained an Army Air Force which would serve both close and distant missions? Or did the new capability of long-range aircraft truly embrace a sphere of action which was properly outside the scope of the Army mission? Or finally, if the long-range mission warranted the creation of a separate force, should this force have been entrusted with the missions of reconnaissance and close support for the Army?

The Army readily conceded that the long-range mission bore only an indirect and general relationship to the operations of the Army commander. It was not considered essential that the Army control and direct these missions.

On the other hand, tactical air was strictly an auxiliary of the Army. Splitting it from the Army could only jeopardize the effectiveness of the air-ground team. Nevertheless, the thesis that the air was a different medium and not properly subject to Army command gained remarkable currency and acceptance among Army officers whose training and experience had not stressed the requirement for command knowledge of air warfare. An Army command which had classed air support as something to be supplied by an Air Corps or an Army Air Force was too ready to conclude that it could accept this support from a separate Air Force. Unified control of the air-ground team, representing the most critical coordination required in modern warfare, was sacrificed. The all-important ground battle was split down the middle.

All the waste and inefficiency of joint operations was introduced into the ground battlefield. There is no such split of command on the naval battlefield nor on the air battlefield. The true function of joint command—coordination of the three battlefields—was not recognized. The most serious question of military organization which confronts us today is this: have we imposed on the ground battlefield a requirement of coordination which men cannot meet? The corollary question is this: will our failure to integrate our capabilities in the land battle lose that battle?

THE Army did not propose that the national interest would have been better served by keeping the independent mission in the Army than by taking reconnaissance and close-support missions out of the Army. For in truth, the strategic air force is still very much like the cavalry. It has the capability of striking far in the enemy rear; but it also has the capability of striking the enemy army, with devastating and possibly decisive effects on the ground battle. This may yet be the most important contribution of a strategic air force to

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

Guided Missiles, MF 45-8354 (28 minutes), is now ready for showings to the troops and for loan to civilian organizations. This film, which gives an overall view of our guided missile program, is an adaptation of the "Big Picture" series, the only change being the substitution of a "Miscellaneous Film" leader for the "Big Picture" leader.

The Concept of the Attack and the Triangular Infantry Organization, TF 7-1902 (21 minutes), outlines the Army's fundamentals of offensive warfare and shows how they are applied to the triangular infantry organization. Every attack poses its own problems, but the basic concepts are the same—find 'em, fix 'em, fight 'em, and finish 'em.

Exercise Ski Jump, MF 31-8290 (27 minutes), briefly covers many of the problems that occur when operating in extreme cold. The film covers such things as the selection of a camp site, pitching a hexagonal tent, making a lean-to or snow house, handling the injured, making a sled from materials at hand, the use of ski poles as tow lines, care and use of personal weapons, and the need for proper personal health habits.

The driving hazards in Germany and other sections of Europe are extremely different from those in this country. **Safe Driving Practices in Germany, SFS 20-209** (15 minutes) will prove to be a valuable film for troops stationed or expecting to be stationed in Europe.

Tankers will be interested in the two-part film, **Fundamentals of Tank Turrets. Part I, Introduction and Controls, TF 17-1974** (17 minutes), opens with a brief history of the tank and then explains the various controls in American tanks, emphasizing that though they may be located in different places and have physical differences, they are basically the same. The film outlines their operation and their safety provisions. **Part II, Vision Devices—Direct Fire Sights, Fire Control Equipment, TF 17-1975** (17 minutes), explains the function, location, and capabilities of the periscopes, telescope, direct-fire telescope, range finders, elevation quadrant, gunner's quadrant, and azimuth indicator.

Action of the Individual Tank, TF 17-1990 (20 minutes), covers the responsibilities of tank crew members and the areas of responsibility of the individual tank on the march, in the assembly position, during the attack, and during reorganization. The theme of the film is "teamwork means success," whether among tank crewmen or among the tanks themselves.

victory; but the separation of organizations and missions to prevent its realization.

The argument for assigning reconnaissance and clos port missions to the separate Air Force is primarily econ There can be no doubt that these missions would be formed with greater enthusiasm and success by an air ele within the Army. However, the argument is made tha planes required for the long-range mission will also pe the Army support mission, and that economy is achiev pooling these weapons in a single force.

The P-51 of World War II was good for escort, for ception, and for ground support. Today, however, th no such plane. The high-performance interceptor wil five or six times as much as an attack aircraft and be less efficient for the attack mission. It would be sheer to plan to use the high-priced interceptors for the attac So economy now requires special attack aircraft for the mission. Equipment development and new tactics are m clear distinctions between the air battlefield and the g battlefield which were less apparent ten years ago.

IN the perspective of this short reach of history, we car see what unification did to our defense organizatio took the air element, our modern cavalry, out of the to give emphasis to its long-range mission. It divorce long-range air weapons from the ground battle where have a major—perhaps a primary—role to play. It too tactical air force off the Army team and put it on the S team where coordination is difficult or impracticable. certainly has the appearance of creating a critical brea organization in order to correct a small point of friction.

The Army has indeed been grievously hurt in the u tion act. It has lost control of the ground battle, has be dependent for vital support upon an independent c which is concerned primarily with its own separate obje But most grievous of all has been the effect upon thinking. The Army has come to accept the ground as bounded by the use of its own weapons systems. Th tical air force operations of reconnaissance and ground port, which are as integral to the fight as division art have been lost to Army thinking and Army planning.

The separate Air Force can be a tolerable arrangement if the Army maintains a capacity for vigorous and indepe thinking on the air power requirements of the ground b The Army can best define these requirements. It must a the responsibility for doing so and must keep them in ba with other planning for the ground battle. It must thi the tactical air force as a part of the Army and must be pared, if necessary, to sacrifice divisions in order to mai a balance of tactical air force. It must define and est the Army requirements for support from the strategi force. It must think and plan in terms of the whole battle. For these purposes, its leaders must be thoro trained in the application of air power in the land b These tasks may be extremely difficult under our prese ganization, but they are absolutely essential to the fu ploitation of our national defense potential.

It is not enough to reproach the cavalry of the air ag wanting to go off and do what it can do. We must mak tain that it is present and accounted for in the land b

SKI SCHOOL

Tough tactical exercises and winter sports are joined at the Mountain Training Center deep in the Austrian Alps

Skilled Austrian Skilehrers bring the students along fast; this first-week student shows good downhill form

ıustria when it's too cold to fish, you learn to ski. At ;t that's what 600 U. S. officers and men did last winter ıks to the USFA's Mountain Training Center at Saal-ı, deep in the Austrian Alps.

ɜ MTC is in operation the year around. But when r crawls down from the perpetually snow-covered peaks :e and snow cover the cliffs and ridges used for "mili-ssault climbing" exercises during the summer months, :ain climbing gear is stowed away and skis and snow-are broken out.

dents are officers and soldiers selected for the training it commanders of U.S. Forces in Austria. The courses e weeks and selected students, earmarked as instructors, ·ee weeks of additional training. At the end of the five-ɔeriod students can perform such conventional maneu-· the snow plow, stem turns, the stem christiania, the ;bone climb and a few variations in cross country ski g. The twenty professional instructors are Austrian *Skilehrers* (ski teachers) and *hilf skilehrers* (assistant ski teachers)—accredited by the Austrian government, which prescribes rigid standards.

When a man reports at the school he is issued skis, ski poles, ski boots, parka, sun glasses, snowshoes, two-man tent, small cookstove, and a rucksack. From then on he learns to live on and in the snow.

He spends most of his time on the "slope"—always on skis and always carrying his rucksack. When he isn't on the slope he is probably out on a "cross country," which means toiling uphill and trekking down either on skis or snowshoes.

It's hard work during the first couple of weeks but incessant drilling and practice bring proficiency, and slopes that were dizzy, impossible inclines when the student first reported become simple challenges to his skill.

And when it is all over and graduation day comes, the student skier knows why the MTC is the most popular school among officers and men on duty in Austria.

No comfortable chair lift as at Sun Valley, but a precarious handhold on a cold, frost-covered cable that som times slips out of the skier's mittened hand as he nears the top of the slope, sending him slitheringly downwa

Soldiers from Alabama, Arizona and points north learn to bivouac for the night by scooping out a trench the snow and covering it with a shelter half held up by a pair of skis laid across the top of the trer

arade ground is the "slope" where, except for cross-country jaunts, the soldier spends all his working hours

Vhen the student becomes reasonably proficient on skis he joins in small-unit tactics under a full rucksack

How guided missiles and rockets are giving surface-to-air and surface-to-ground artilleries more punch, and more range, which means more mobility

EXTENDING THE RANGE



Captain Josiah A. Wallace, Jr.

THE new guided missiles and free rockets now coming into use are designed to serve a multitude of combat functions. We have surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground missile weapons in various stages of development and refinement as well as production. It seems probable that the period of "atomic plenty" will also see these new weapons become plentiful.

The new antiaircraft artillery weapon, Nike, is presently in production. New tactical units are being formed and trained to use this surface-to-air weapon and a major share of the antiaircraft defenses of our big cities will fall to Nike outfits.

Field artillery is moving forward too. New surface-to-surface weapons are being designed and tested to increase the potential of the field artillery arm. Now in the process of testing and refinement are such weapons as the Corporal, a guided missile, and Honest John, a free-flight rocket.

Employed as a field artillery weapon, the surface-to-surface guided missiles and free rockets provide the Army with practical, dependable, all-weather weapons suitable for use in—

- Extending materially the effective range and warhead capabilities of field artillery.
- Delivering tactical atomic explosives accurately.
- Giving artillery much greater mobility.
- Reinforcing heavy fire support of ground forces in conjunction with tactical air elements or when such elements are unable to provide the desired support.
- Attacking highly critical targets that cannot be attacked by tactical air elements.

These surface-to-surface missiles appear to bear up well in analysis against an actual combat situation. An example from Korea illustrates this.

Near Kunu-ri in late November 1950 an aerial observer, operating deep behind enemy lines, detected a growing concentration of Communist infantry in what would appear to be an extension of his division's sector. Continuing his surveillance, he saw that the force, in its movement south, was confined in a narrow valley.

In answer to his request for artillery fire, he was informed that the target was beyond maximum range of all available battalions. Subsequently, tactical air was called in but failed to locate and attack the concentration.

Early the following morning, the observer, again airborne over enemy lines, picked up his target once more and discovered that the force, estimated now at nearly ten thousand men, had moved farther south during the night and had dug countless foxholes in an area five hundred yards wide and some three miles deep. Eventually, he was able to get the fire of a 155mm howitzer battalion on the target, but despite excellent initial effect on the concentration, the battalion soon was forced to displace to another position. Later the same day, this massive enemy force attacked southward against our forces, forcing the withdrawal of two of our divisions.

Surface-to-surface missiles could been used in this situation, and fectively. Guided missiles would been an ideal weapon against the centration in the narrow valley, an such an attack it seems certain tha bulk of this force would have been k or wounded. Thus pressure on the lines in this area would have bee duced materially.

This example shows how surfa surface missiles can extend the range destructive capacity of conventional artillery weapons. Furthermore, h single missile been fitted with an at warhead it could have destroyed enemy force in the open.

It follows that surface-launched gu missiles will provide the army in field with another means of delive atomic weapons. No longer will we to rely entirely on air or 280mm delivery. Using both the 280mm and guided missiles, senior comma will have the capability of firing a weapons with great accuracy rega of weather conditions that might pr use of aircraft.

IN the Korean example, surface-t face missiles could have been us destroy the combat potential of the munist force even though that forc dug in before its attack. Such an a would have been in the nature of fire support for the American forc fending near Kunu-ri. And if it been decided to launch an attack o force, the missile fire could have followed with conventional field art and tactical air attack to pave the for the ground advance. If we as for the purpose of discussion, tha Communists had air superiority Kunu-ri, or at least behind their

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CAPTAIN JOSIAH A. WALLACE, JR., Artillery, is on duty at the Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile School at Fort Bliss. His last appearance in these columns was in the issue of May 1953.

:s in that general area, tactical air ıld have been exposed to considerable in attacking such a concentration. s of course questionable in such an nt if the aerial observer would have ıted the force. Given the location of center of this concentration, guided-sile units could have pierced the tile air defense with ease and ac-ıcy.

'his is but one example of how sur-:-to-surface missiles could be used in ıbat. Surely there are many others. would tend to prove that in modern the ability to strike ever deeper and r more effectively into the enemy's is of great importance. All would l to show that the depth of a given ıbat sector will, in the future, be ermined by the effective range of pons at the combat army's disposal.

OM the point of view of weight, ıided missiles offer considerable ad-tages over conventional artillery pro-iles. These advantages stem from r different design requirements.

'he walls of a conventional projectile :t be strong enough to withstand the ıendous external pressure exerted by the propelling charge when the shell is fired from the tube and boosted to maximum speed within a fraction of a second. In flight, the projectile must be able to bear up under the strong centrifugal force resulting from its high rate of rotation. The external portion of the projectile must be designed to produce a minimum of air friction so that it will move along a stable, predictable trajectory.

Having designed a projectile that meets these three requirements, the ordnance engineer can then, and only then, compute the weight of the explosive charge to be carried by the shell. Fragmentation factors follow as a fifth and minor consideration.

In designing surface-to-surface guided missiles, the ordnance engineer can dispense with most of these considerations and design a missile to carry a prescribed explosive charge.

Propelled by its own power, the missile is subjected to substantially less shock of initial acceleration than an artillery projectile. Since it is guided in the air by airfoils of various shapes, there is no need to consider centrifugal force. Of prime importance, however, is the aerodynamic design.

The outer skin of the missile must be designed to attain maximum airspeed for any given amount of power. The skin and casing must be strong enough to withstand extremely high speeds and the resulting high outer-skin temperatures. But these considerations do not necessarily require material increases in the weight and thickness of the missile's casing.

Lighter casing construction permits heavier warhead charges and produces a highly favorable charge-to-case weight ratio that will probably allow an advance determination of fragmentation effects.

SURFACE-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles and rockets are not intended to replace any of the weapons now in use. They provide a logical supplement to these weapons, extending the range and combat potential of the field artillery. Because of their greater expense, these weapons may be used somewhat sparingly in any future conflict, but they would be available as a potent rapier with which the Army could thrust telling blows swiftly and effectively behind hostile lines. Guided missiles are coming of age.



New Incentive to Re-up?

Army pollsters bring to light some revea attitudes towards the new unit rotation p

THIRTY-FIVE years ago the question was, "How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm after they've seen Paree?" But today it is, "How you gonna keep 'em in the Army after they have seen all too much of the world (except maybe Paree)?"

Some hints were obtained recently by OCAFF's Human Research Unit No. 2 which went into action with a questionnaire right after the Army's unit rotation plan—Operation GYROSCOPE—was announced. HRU No. 2 asked a lot of questions of 1,200 officers and men of three different outfits in the U.S. These were the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Infantry Division, and the 508th Airborne RCT—all scheduled to go overseas.

Answers made to some questions by first-three-graders of the Regular Army are of interest. The questions and the results appear in the adjoining box.

Why did fewer Regular Army noncoms answer questions 2 and 3 affirmatively than answered question 1 affirmatively? The researchers say this was because the men were told just before being asked questions 2 and 3 that signing up in a unit rotation outfit would mean 33 months of service overseas. Many men probably figured that under the old system their chances of staying in the States were better than reenlisting in an outfit scheduled for shipment overseas for 33 months.

But the big tipoff seems to be in responses to question 6, and to a slightly lesser extent, to questions 7 and 8. Availability of dependent housing seems to be the controlling factor, followe "spending most of the tour witl same fellows" and having a "perm home base to return to."

Officers were favorably incline ward the plan. Of the officers viewed from the 10th Infantry Div 94 per cent said they believed rotation would be "some" or a "big provement. In the 3d Armored Ca Regiment, 100 per cent of the o tested were for the plan.

More than 60 per cent of the Re Army first-three-graders said they "v be more proud to be a soldier" the unit rotation plan. They als pressed the belief that GYROSCOPE v mean more adequate dependent ing both overseas and in the U.S., authority for noncoms, and more tainty for the future.

The report lists 37 responses of three-graders to the question, "W your most important reason fo wanting to reenlist in a unit ro outfit?" Of these, 19 said they didn't like the Army or preferred ci life, and so wouldn't reenlist; 5 like the outfit they were then sc in; 4 had family reasons (wife's h for instance); 3 said they had ha much overseas service already; 2 s preferred Stateside duty; 2 were s bious about the merits of the plan didn't want to be involved in it; he didn't want to go to the Far and another said, "I would not re in any unit without an increase i scale."

Pertinent and typical objectio officers who planned to stay in the ice were reflected in such com as these:

—"Opportunities for promotion in an outfit might be less.

—"My career may follow too n a field of experience which may on my promotions later."

—"Possibility of getting stuck w dull oufit and job."

Officers emphasized the possibil improvement in combat readiness, er morale and greater *esprit* even than they did stability or "famil sons."

	Per cent who will reenlist		
	10th Inf Division	3d Armd Cavalry	508th Abn RCT
(1) Will you reenlist when your present tour of duty is over? (This question was asked before the unit rotation plan was mentioned or explained.)	62	58	62
(2) Would you reenlist for a 3-year tour with your present oufit under unit rotation? (This question was asked after all the facts about unit rotation had been presented.)	50	52	53
(3) Would you reenlist for a 4-year tour of duty with your present outfit under unit rotation?	42	49	43
(4) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years, spending 33 months in Europe?	70	62	65
(5) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years, spending 33 months in the Far East?	45	47	55
(6) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit for 3 years if dependent housing were available overseas for officers and first-three-graders?	74	72	68
(7) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation oufit for 3 years if you would be spending most of the time with the same fellows?	71	75	66
(8) Would you reenlist in a unit rotation outfit if it had a permanent home base at which to train and return to after an overseas tour?	68	73	61

. . . It Will Take a Whole New Generation

BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE W. PARKER

E integration of the field artillery d antiaircraft artillery into one ar- ry, has led to the hottest controversy he combat arms since we debated merits and demerits of horseflesh the internal combustion engine. Like horse argument, which still persists, artillery integration argument is y to last for a considerable time. he British Army has had an inte- ed artillery arm for many years, in- ing the period of World War II. ve often thought that perhaps their nization may have had a contribut- nfluence on our decision to organize arly. It is interesting to relate, there- a chance conversation I had with artillery commander of the British monwealth Division on the occasion is leaving Korea to return to Eng- . When I asked him of his plans ientioned that he had first to attend eeting—a meeting of senior British erymen to consider whether or not field and antiaircraft artillery ld be continued in one arm! His opinion, he volunteered, was that should not be. So a single arm of types of artillery is not a fixed usion on the part of our British ery comrades.

far we have had only a four-year period of single branch artillery. can assume that the decision to rate was a result of considered, de- study, and with a long-term solu- n mind. Thorough, open discussion problem should be welcomed, but continue to argue the pros and we should base our arguments on ature possibilities of integration as is on the present degree of success- nplementation of the change. The Combat Forces Journal could le a very useful service, it would by printing for the information of its readers the facts upon which the official decision to integrate was based, if such facts are available and releasable.

A distinguished antiaircraft artilleryman, recently retired, has said that it will take a whole new generation of artillerymen to make integration complete. Many an artillery officer of either breed, field or antiaircraft, having spent a significant portion of his career developing the know-how of his branch, may understandably resent being placed in a position where his experience doesn't fit him for the job at hand and where he must rely on the views and experience of others for the solution of problems he feels he should comprehend by virtue of his training. Understandably, he's against integration. So we shall probably have to write off all those who were field or antiaircraft artillerymen, and concentrate our efforts on those who have never been anything but just "artillerymen." If integration is to succeed over the long run, integrated schooling, assignments in both fields, and a one-branch loyalty must be vigorously pursued. The merger of our branch associations and their professional journals is a step in this direction. The young artillery officers of today must grow up with the conviction that integration is here to stay, or that any future changes will be effected in such a manner that the skills they have mastered will not become useless to them.

THE most important basic difference in the background and experience of the two types of artillerymen is that of tactical concept. The field artilleryman thinks, tactically, like the infantryman or tanker he supports. He thinks in terms of seeking and destroying the enemy. He thinks in terms of movement, mobility and offensive action. The bulk of his training is along these lines, and properly so. The antiaircraft artilleryman, on the other hand, thinks, tactically, in terms of static deployment, with little or no tactical mobility, for he must wait until the enemy comes within range of his weapons before he can engage. His training, and again

WHEN the question of artillery integration came in for renewed discussion recently, it seemed only logical for the editors to ask Brigadier General Theodore W. Parker to set down his thoughts on the subject. Having an intimacy with both kinds of artillery, General Parker is peculiarly suited to know what he is talking about. After graduating from the Military Academy in 1935, he served in several field artillery assignments before and during World War II. In Korea he was commander of X Corps Artillery and last April he returned to the U.S. to take command of the 45th AAA Brigade at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.



properly so, exclusively emphasizes defensive action. Isn't it reasonable to assume that it was similarity of mission and tactics that led to the now obsolete coast artillery branch taking over the functions of antiaircraft artillery as the need for the latter arose? There is an inherent, fundamental, and vitally important difference in the tactical training and thinking of the two types of artillerymen and in the employment of their weapons.

From this point of view a better argument might be made for the integration of field artillery with the infantry or with armor, or an integration of all three, than for the integration of field and antiaircraft artillery. Similar weapons are found frequently throughout our combat arms, often with identical or closely related techniques of employment. It is not a difference in weapons, or techniques, which basically requires the existence of separate arms. It is far more a question of difference in tactics. If integration of the two artillery branches should finally prove less effective than their separation, I am convinced that such a conclusion will result from the incompatibility of the tactics of the two.

The differences in the equipment of the antiaircraft artillery and the field artillery are not particularly important as far as integration is concerned. Each type of artillery has long included in its armament a number of calibers: light, medium, and heavy. Each has had a variety of auxiliary equipment and prime movers. An antiaircraft officer might be assigned to an automatic-weapons unit (caliber .50 machine guns and 40mm guns), then to a 120mm gun unit. A field artillery officer might serve with a 105mm howitzer unit, then a 240mm howitzer unit. Sound-and-flash units, operations detachments, and searchlight batteries were also possible assignments for one or the other, and now the field is broadened by guided missiles, both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface. The variety of assignments is certainly expanded by integration, and this expansion generates a need for increased knowledge on the part of the individual. In itself this is not a strong argument against integration, for seldom did any one officer serve with every different type of equipment even when the two artilleries were separate.

IT also seems apparent that the use of antiaircraft weapons in a ground role has little bearing on the question. Antiaircraft weapons, so used, have never played a significant part in any campaign, nor, to the best of my knowledge, in any major battle. They have contributed to successful actions on many occasions, and their use is definitely warranted whenever they happen to be on hand and not more needed in their normal role. Such use, however, has nothing to do with artillery integration.

Since the two artillery branches were integrated we have had only one period of hostilities, in which to observe the results. The Korean action should certainly not be taken as typical. On the other hand, the experience gained in it should not be discarded. The conclusion I would draw, based on my own observations, is that we did not practice artillery integration in Korea. When an artillery officer arrived in Korea he was categorized as having an antiaircraft or a field artillery background. As a first possibility, an antiaircraft officer might be assigned to the AAA brigade which was deployed in defense of the fighter bases and ports of Korea. A field artillery officer ra if ever, received such an assignm There was certainly no integration th The majority of artillery officers assigned to divisions. Upon arriv division the antiaircraft officer was sidered for assignment to the autom weapons battalion of the division lery. If there was a place for him t (taking into account the relative cer shortages and specific MOS requ ments of all the artillery battalions) antiaircraft officer would be assigne the automatic-weapons battalion. F ly, if ever, was a field artillery of assigned to an automatic-weapons talion. So there was no integra there, either.

Percentage-wise, comparing officer signed to those authorized in the ta of organization, there was alway preponderance of antiaircraftmen field artillerymen. Consequently, a n ber of antiaircraft officers were assig to field artillery battalions, and in manner a degree of integration achieved. However, even when assig to a field artillery battalion, the an craft officer was a better-than-even to fill an S1 or S4 position, or to up in a headquarters or a service bat rather than in an S2, S3, or lia officer position or in a howitzer bat Integration was thus partially achi in the division field artillery battal but it was marginal.

Corps artillery, having no active, gral AAA units, were assigned a n smaller percentage of antiaircraftme their artillery officer allocations. general pattern of the assignmen antiaircraft officers to corps units similar to that of divisions. The battalions, corps artillery headqua and the Eighth Army artillery se all had antiaircraft officers assigned seldom did these officers occupy tions requiring field artillery knowl and experience.

AS a part of the directed MOS sys in which certain selected senio ficers were ordered to specific as ments, corps and division artillery manders and executives were officers of antiaircraft background. this system worked successfully partly because of the unusually ability of most of the officers so assig and partly because, as a general the concurrent assignment of an craftmen as both commanders and ex tives of any single division or corp tillery unit was avoided. The same applied generally to field artillery b ions and batteries: if either the

ler or executive was an antiaircraft r the other had to be a field artil- ıan.

ıis description of artillery integra- in Korea applies to the stabilized, phase of the conflict. It indicates integration was only partial and ıe-way: antiaircraft officers in field ery assignments. The stabilized con- ı in Korea probably made the tion of integration more successful would have been possible in a le situation, since there was more in stabilized combat conditions for he-job" training and since the new ledge required of the individual nore limited. A general conclusion ıt integration of antiaircraft officers field artillery units worked satis- ily in the top and bottom grades eral officers and colonels, and junior nants—but that it was not prac- e in most instances in the middle s, where branch experience was ılly important in order to perform ıctorily in combat such duties as ıion commander, S3, liaison officer, ıowitzer battery commander.

e advent of missiles, guided and is hailed by some as a development ı makes the integration of the ar- more logical and desirable. It ɔe so. Surely, if one missile or one y of missiles should be developed equal capabilities against both air round targets, the argument would engthened. However such a uni- missile has not yet been devel- just as a universal air-ground gun never developed by the d States Army. At any rate, me tactical differences ex- between use of surface-to- ıd surface-to-surface mis- s exist between the antiair- ınd field artillery weapons.

ar I have said nothing ɔut the effect of artillery ation on the officers of our n components, although were certainly a majority persons involved in the ɔtion of Korean experi- If the artillery has now e too all-encompassing for er officer to cope with, ıly it will have to be ı down into specialties or nent patterns for Nation- ard and Army Reserve ; who have much less o devote to its mastery. ıajority of our antiaircraft y units are now commit- static defense roles for the protection of vital areas of the Continental United States. Both missile and gun units are so employed. Future planning is taking into consideration the fact that such static defense missions are particularly appropriate ones for civilian component units, utilizing a small caretaker detachment on-site and providing the emergency operating personnel from a unit recruited in the neighborhood of the gun or missile position. We shall probably hear more of this development as time goes on, and it may have its greatest impact on the artillery arm, specifically on the antiaircraft component.

There are a number of other factors which affect the ultimate success of the integration of the two artilleries. We are always faced with a need for a large number of officers for branch-immaterial duties such as service on high-level staffs, military attachés, military missions, and branch immaterial service school instructors. The time so spent is lost to troop duty and experience with artillery organization, tactics, and equipment. The average officer must spend a considerable portion of his career at schools, both his branch and higher schools. This requirement is increasing with the increasing complexity of our equipment. Again troop experience time is lost. As an officer progresses through his career, if he loses the opportunity for troop experience he also loses his confidence in troop leading in his arm, and he tends to seek and settle into staff or branch immaterial positions at every level. An expanded artillery career field would seem to aggravate this condition.

For the past several years we have had the bulk of our field artillery overseas, the bulk of our antiaircraft artillery in the Continental United States. As long as rotation of personnel is effected on an individual basis the proper rotation of artillery officers is certainly more easily accomplished with an integrated artillery. Mark up a point for integration.

THIS short review of integration, with its limited number of cross assignments, indicates that each of the two arms has contributed certain of its characteristics to the new offspring. Of these I would name two as particularly beneficial. The field artilleryman has contributed the sense of urgency and flexibility of thinking that are characteristic of a mobile arm and which are needed to keep our static defenses out of the doldrums; the antiaircraftman has contributed an appreciation of the advantages of mechanical computing and automatic transmission of firing data, characteristic of his three-dimensional gunnery problem, and of fundamental importance in the development and improvement of artillery technique in general, both for aerial and terrestrial targets.

FOR the next fifteen to twenty years, while all the once-upon-a-time field artillerymen and antiaircraftmen serve out their careers, generally alternating, it is to be hoped, between assignments in both fields, we should continue to debate the issues of artillery integration with an open mind. We should practice integration to the hilt, departing from this policy only when obvious damage to operations would result (as I believe it would have resulted in Korea). We should rear a new generation of artillerymen whose allegiance is only to artillery, not to field artillery or to antiaircraft artillery. Then we should let this new generation decide, in light of their experience and the requirements of artillery at that time, whether the artillery mission or missions at that time can best be accomplished by two arms or by a single one. Artillerymen have always prided themselves on their versatility. We can prove our claim to that heritage by making integration work now, while we continue to analyze its strengths and weaknesses.

THE MONTH'S READING

The Past Triumphant

PHILIP GUEDALLA
The Second Empire
Hodder and Stoughton, 1932

When Napoleon took the field [Napoleon III against Austria in 1859], it would be as well for him to be Napoleonic; and the Emperor, who had consulted the Oracles of military orthodoxy in Paris, brought with him an authentic plan by an old master. Almost past eighty, living in the suburban peace of Passy was a Swiss soldier of the First Empire named Jomini, who had ridden with Ney's staff at Ulm and Iena and left his master as the clouds gathered after Moscow. The old man had made a plan for his master's nephew, and he made it in the full tradition of Soult and Berthier. The plan was palpable to connoisseurs as a perfect Empire piece; one could almost see the gleam of the brass gryphons on its dark rectangular joinery. It ignored completely the unauthorised innovation of railways, and it depended for its success upon the obliging courtesy of an enemy who would keep reasonably still. But since it was for use against the Austrians, it was entirely successful; and the French enjoyed in 1859 the pleasing experience of defeating with the methods of 1809 an adversary whose military thought was that of 1759. Jomini's plan, in the mode of the First Empire, was victorious over generalship which had advanced no further than the Seven Years' War; but if the Austrians had been Prussians or if General von Moltke had ridden to Pavia with the Feldzeugmeister Giulay, the French would have been swept against the Alps.

The Meaning of Korea

THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Power and Policy
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954

The argument for extended bombing [of China] was not military in nature. It was based on a fundamental political objection to the course the US government was following in the Korean War. The US government intended to limit the war to Korea if it possibly could; it saw Korea as a war to stop aggression and to restore the *status quo ante,* as all wars to enforce collective security are supposed to be. The proponents of extended bombing wanted total victory over the Chinese; they wanted to use the opportunity to roll back the Communist power.

On the other hand they wanted to make the rollback at small cost and risk to the United States. The proposals for a tough line with Red China promised an easy victory, with little cost to the victors. The idea of using United States ground troops to support Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland of China was repudiated by the most ardent supporters of a tough policy in China. It was not even proposed tha United States Air be used to support a landing by Ch on the mainland; and the Air is the favorite for those want a tough policy without much cost.

The argument for extending the Korean War beyon limits of Korea was that a limited war was inherently w and that the purpose of the Korean War, like all should be victory, by which was meant a clear defe China and, as a minimum, the rollback of Comm power out of North Korea.

Two points about this are important. First, the idea we were after "victory" in Korea is incorrect, if by "vic we mean the total defeat of the Chinese and their u ditional surrender. We were in Korea to stop the aggre where it started, at the 38th Parallel, which is what we d

Next, all the suggestions that we should be tough the Korean War, were, as we have said, based on th sumption that the war could be extended and the Ch thoroughly defeated with little additional effort by United States. The 1950 drive by the UN Forces ove 38th Parallel was on the assumption that the Chinese w not intervene and that there would be no opposition e from the almost totally destroyed army of North Korea. later suggestions for "victory" over the Chinese assumed this victory could be had with only a very limited inc in the military effort of the United States.

Too Powerful to Survive?

FRANK MUNK
Professor, Political Science, Reed C
The New Leader
8 Nov. 1954

It would be difficult enough to tame the tiger of p had we to cope with domestic and internal causes a Yet it is evident that the real impetus in this country is to the shift from a primarily domestic to a predomin external state, from a state dedicated to due process o to a state dedicated to maximization of external power. world of power politics, America must supplant argu with armaments. The question is to what extent.

In the present world situation, a high degree of mi power would be required even had there been no ch in the technology of war. Unfortunately, science—the p over matter—has been brought in to increase man's p over man. Science itself being blind, directionless directiveless, socialized science easily and inevitably bec an arm of government. Government and science tog are a formidable thing, formidable enough if one h contend with one such government alone. The fac course, is that we are in the presence of a compe struggle—three governments have already exploded nu

pons and more are on the way—and that no secretiveness prevent other nations from acquiring and developing total weapons now coming off the assembly line. Total pons create their own total states. How much power, ı, *must* the U.S. possess? Are there any built-in limita- s on national power? At what point does it become destructive? There is no absolute level of military power which a country would be "secure." Too little power invite aggression, too much power invite overarmament, tarization, the hybris of expansionism. The important g is not only the level of power, but the relative rate ncrease. In the long run, the most advantageous is that l at which aggression is more risky than nonaggression. ut let us remember also that power tends to create ıter-power. Our chief worry in the months to come be not our potential enemies but our present friends. er attracts, but it also repels. You can become so power- that everybody fears you—especially if you succumb to temptation of throwing your weight around.

he U.S. faces the problem of combining a government great external power with its traditional limitations at e. Can there be a democracy permanently armed to teeth? Furthermore, does not impairment of the demo- c process also reduce our military power? Ideology, is part of a nation's strength. . . .

he ultimate question, therefore, is whether attempted imization of power truly leads to its optimum, whether pursuit of more power may not in reality tend to reduce The real challenge to America is to establish firm foun- ons of national power in which the military, political, omic and ideological components are so balanced as to titute a mixture blended for stability, maneuverability overall effectiveness. . . .

ectronics and the Army

GENERAL CHARLES L. BOLTE
Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Address before the Armed Forces Communications Association
December 1954

would like to draw your attention to a recent action h exemplifies the Army's deep interest in electronic ers. Early this year the Army established the Electronic ing Ground at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. At this in- tion the Army Signal Corps will perform technical and ıtional field-type tests on advanced communications and onic systems which help to determine experimentally equirements we must place on research and develop- . Improved doctrine and techniques will be developed is post, and specialized individual and unit training will ovided to the personnel who will operate our electronic ment.

r the first time, the Army will have facilities to lay out ll scale the communication and electronic operations of ıtire field army for study and evaluation. The Army ronic Proving Ground will serve as the crucible into ı we pour many operational problems, and through ı, by the application of experimental methods under conditions, we expect to crystallize procedures, organi- ıs, and systems fulfilling the demands of the future .

A Medal for Horatius

(Continued from page 18)

IXth Ind. JAG. II Calends, September, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. XVII months have elapsed since event described in basic letter. Star of Bronze cannot be awarded after XV months have elapsed.

II. Officer is eligible for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

P. B.

Xth Ind. AG. I Ide of October, CCCLXI
To: G-I

For draft of citation for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

G. C.

XIth Ind. G-I. III Calends, October, CCCLXI
To: G-II

I. Do not concur.

II. Our currently fine relations with Tuscany would suffer and current delicate negotiations might be jeopardized if publicity were given to Captain Horatius' actions at the present time.

T. J.

XIIth Ind. G-II. VI day of November, CCCLXI
To: G-I.

A report (rated D-IV), partially verified, states that Lars Porsena is very sensitive about the Horatius affair.

E. T.

XIIIth Ind. G-I. X day of November, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. In view of information contained in preceding XIth and XIIth Indorsements, you will prepare immediate orders for Captain G. C. Horatius to one of our overseas stations.

II. His attention will be directed to paragraph XII, POM, which prohibits interviews or conversations with newsmen prior to arrival at final destination.

L. T.

Rome
II Calends, April I, CCCLXII
SUBJECT: Survey, Report of DEPARTMENT OF WAR
To: Captain Gaius Caius Horatius, III Legion, V Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Postmaster, Rome

I. Your statements concerning the loss of your shield and sword in the Tiber River on III March, CCCLX, have been carefully considered.

II. It is admitted that you were briefly in action against certain unfriendly elements on that day. However, Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius were in the same action and did not lose any government property.

III. The Finance Officer has been directed to reduce your next pay by II I/II talents (I III/IV talents cost of one, each, sword, officers; III/IV talent cost of one, each, shield, M-II).

IV. You are enjoined and admonished to pay strict attention to conservation of government funds and property. The budget must be balanced next year.

H. Hocus Pocus
Lieutenant of Horse, Survey Officer

Short Course for Military Managers

The new Army Management School aims to help commanders conduct the Army's business

ONE of a number of steps being taken to strengthen what might be called the business side of the Army, the Command Management School has been opened at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Here students get an intensive orientation in the concepts and principles governing the management of major segments of the Army. The school offers a three-week short course to senior officers and key civilian employees of the Army.

The opening of the school is evidence that the Army recognizes that every installation commander must, in effect, be a businessman if the Army's business is to be well managed. The job of the school is to help the officer who attends it become a good business manager.

The Chief of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway made the formal welcoming speech that opened the School. Later Assistant Secretary of the Army Charles C. Finucane spoke at a luncheon. Then the opening class, which consisted of two major generals, a brigadier general, twenty-two colonels, eight lieutenant colonels, and eight civilian employees, got down to business.

THE school is an unusual one in many ways. Take the physical plant. The students sleep, eat and study in one large brick building. Near the sleeping quarters are five lounges, each accommodating about a dozen men, where informal discussions and study sessions are held. This is particularly convenient, since the day's classes begin at 0830 and end at 2200.

Dogmatic teaching, as such, is held to a minimum. The Army assumes that the students have picked up a great deal of management knowledge in their years of Army experience. The program, as well as the actual layout of the school building, is designed to promote the free interchange of ideas.

Classes are presented by the "case method." Small groups of students, faculty members, and civilians discuss actual management situations that illustrate important problems. This teaching method is used today by the leading civilian schools of business management.

THE opening of the Command Management School marks an important step in the development of understanding among both civilians and military men that the Army's nontactical methods as well as its fighting equipment must be kept up to date. Today's post commander is a business manager as well as a military leader. He is being given increasing authority to shift resources when necessary; he has to make up many detailed estimates and reports of his operations; he uses many highly trained civilians on the post; and the value of the funds he manages runs into millions of dollars.

With the increase in the size and complexity of the Army there came the realization that new techniques of management were needed. In 1948 the Office of the Comptroller was established to improve these techniques. Four years later, one of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Karl Bendetsen, directed that command management classes be included in the Army's school system. Since the results of adding this instruction would be slow to be felt, and since a cadre of senior officers who understood the fundamentals of management techniques was needed, it was decided to set up a short, concentrated course in command management.

The Comptroller of the Army retained a management consultant firm to study the problem and submit recommendations. By June 1953 it produced a plan that won Pentagon approval.

The big task was to determine the approach and scope of the school. Then a faculty had to be recruited and a physical plant obtained.

MANY suggestions were worked into the course of instruction. The program, as it was finally drawn up, consists of four phases.

General management. This covers the relation between the installation higher commands; the skills and to management; the military-civilian sonnel management team; and th portunities of building healthy co nity and public relations through management.

Planning and programming. He students take up specific problems the aim of reaching a better under ing of the relationship between the program system, the management stallations, the Army budget, an attendant missions and schedules ing to the allotments of funding.

Manpower management. Com ers are shown how manpower re ment policies and control techn affect their operations.

Financial management. This co trates on the concepts and objecti the Army's controls and accou techniques, and on ways in whicl trol techniques can strengthen com

THE staff of the school is especiall suited for its assignment. The cor dant, Colonel Frank Kowalski, Jr had much practical experience i ing being chief of staff and CO of a installation. The deputy comma and director of instruction is Gilb Jacobus, a retired Air Force colone has taught graduate classes in m ment at George Washington Univ He has also served in the Exe Office of the President and as a m of the Senior Staff of the Na Security Council. The other me of the faculty have special trainin experience in management.

The Command Management S promises to bring increased efficie the handling of the Army's vast bu and to help assure that every spent on defense buys a dollar's of value. It will help develop fiel manders who will be familiar wi conventional signs and symbols o ness management as well as wi signs and symbols on military ma

Bang! You're Dead

MAJOR THOMAS S. ARMS, JR.

ealistic umpiring system eeded for assessing ualties and destruction itomic maneuvers. e's a suggested system neither gives away secrets, nor requires to be a physicist.

WE'VE come a long way from the broomstick and stovepipe maneuvers of 1941. Modern exercises and maneuvers come complete with an "enemy" who has his own uniforms, equipment, and doctrine, and who can usually be relied upon to follow the tactical situation and refrain from engaging in fist fights for possession of the objective. But in one sense we're right back to broomsticks and stovepipes. Our introduction of atomic warfare to maneuvers has not been a crushing success.

This is partly understandable. It is true that we have made progress in developing doctrine and staff procedures for tactical employment of atomic weapons. It is also true that the service schools are teaching the doctrine and procedures. But it is not safely possible to simulate an atomic blast—even a small one—to the extent necessary to impress troops with the enormous destructive power of the weapon. Some devices that produce explosions and small, mushroom-shaped clouds have been tried out, but there is still plenty of room for ingenuity in the physical simulation of an A-blast.

There is also another—and more important—part of the same problem. Doctrine and instruction are fine, but neither does the slightest good unless it is applied systematically. Our atomic doctrine has *not* been applied systematically to maneuvers, and it cannot be until a uniform system for umpiring is adopted and umpires trained to use it intelligently. Not until then will commanders and troops be able to get an accurate idea of the destructive and disorganizing capabilities of atomic weapons. Figures on effects of atomic weapons are available to authorized personnel, but there is a big difference between seeing these figures on paper and trying to plug a gap on the ground where a couple of your companies or battalions were a few minutes before.

WHAT are the requirements for an umpiring system? First, it has to be accurate without violating security.

MAJOR THOMAS S. ARMS, JR. is a 1942 graduate of the Military Academy. He completed the course at the Command & General Staff College in 1950. He is presently on duty at Fort George G. Meade, Md.

There is little point to using atomic weapons in exercises if commanders and troops are going to get either an exaggerated or reduced picture of casualties and damage wrought by the blast.

Secondly, it has to be forcefully and uniformly applied by umpires who, having been trained in the system, can assess casualties and destruction without a lot of jawing back and forth with the commanders whose units are being chewed up.

Setting up a workable system with these characteristics is a large order. The planning has to begin at the top, at the same time that the exercise itself is laid out. A senior officer who is a graduate of a special-weapons course should sit in on all of the planning for the exercise, so that its atomic phases can be integrated realistically. Then, when an umpire planning group is formed, a special-weapons sub-section should be formed at the same time.

This sub-section has several jobs. First, at least until Department of the Army publishes uniform instructions for umpiring atomic maneuvers, it will have to prepare a set of instructions, duplicate them, and distribute them to unit umpires.



SCALE: 1:25,000

Figure 1: Template

WHEN the directives and plans for the exercise have been written, the sub-section will have to prepare in overlay form a set of templates for each atomic weapon or group of yields that will be available for the exercise. *(See Figure 1.)* The sub-section will also have to prepare yield tables for each weapon for a ground-contaminating burst and for as many heights of burst as seem to have any point for the exercise.

These tables serve two purposes. First, used with the map template, they tell the umpire the percentage of casualties to assess against troops in different zones, beginning with ground zero and working outward *(see Figure 2)*, and they show how much equipment in the different zones would be damaged and how badly it would be damaged. *(See Figure 3.)* Secondly, they eliminate the classification bugaboo. The man who actually prepares the templates and tables must be a trained special-weapons officer who is authorized to use classified material for his computations. Enough information about the burst is omitted from the table that unauthorized persons, even slipstick specialists, cannot work backward from the tables and come up with information they shouldn't have. This in no way affects the realism for the participating troops.

THREE more forms are also required. One is a table for the umpire to use for tagging casualties from residual radiation, if it exists. *(See Figure 4.)* The second is a table showing radiation dosage, which the umpire can consult if monitors with appropriate instruments *ask* him for the information. *(See F*
5.) The third is a report form whic
show the casualties and damage as
from a given burst in the umpire's
location of the unit and ground z
the burst, what the unit was doing
time, and additional informatio
maneuver directors may want. Of c
there may be many variations of
templates and tables, depending o
much atomic play will be used i
exercise.

When the special-weapons sub-s
finishes doing the preliminary
work, the next step is to explain
the umpires who have to use it.
instruction in the umpire school s
be given by special-weapons-traine
cers who are qualified to answer th
zard of questions the student u
will ask about such things as the

Figure 2: Casualties to troops (per cent)

ZONE	Troops in Open						Troops in Woods		Troops in Foxholes		Troops in Tanks	
	Good Visibility		Fair Visibility		Poor Visibility							
	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	W
A												
B												
C												
D												
E												
F												

ONE	Tanks		Artillery		Vehicles		Signal		Aircraft	
	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe	Dest.	Severe
A										
B										
C										
D										
E										
F										

Figure 3: Damage to equipment (per cent)

:he burst, types of casualties it will se, damage to equipment, radiation ct, and interpretation of the tables.

'TH all this done, the rest is fairly imple unless the umpire starts trying utguess the tables. His main problem be to convince the irate commander :he 17th Balloon Regiment that he ninety per cent of his command e just disappeared in a puff of smoke ıuse they were too close to ground when Aggressor let fly with a ıb.

'he umpires of units likely to be clob-ed will be told through umpire chan-the date and time of the burst, the ınd zero, and the map template and pons-effects tables they are supposed ıse.

'he umpires then count the equip-ıt and personnel in the area and :k on the positions, actions, and lo-ons of the troops. Just before the set for the burst, each umpire plots his unit's location on his map, orients the proper template over ground zero, and notes the zone his unit is occupying. After the blast, he checks his tables to see how many men and pieces of equipment have been wiped out or damaged, and tags the casualties and damaged or destroyed equipment. Within four hours after the burst he tags as radiation casualties not more than ten per cent of all wounded.

IF the burst leaves residual radiation, the procedure is somewhat different. If his unit is in the area at the time of burst, the umpire takes the steps that have just been outlined. In addition, he uses his table for residual radiation and tags additional casualties at the end of each hour the unit stays in the contaminated area. If the unit was out of danger at the time of the blast but moves into the area later, the umpire must also be prepared to assess residual-radiation casualties.

Whether this system is the "school solution" or not remains to be seen. It was used in Exercise FLASH BURN, and it worked. More detailed reports on it have been sent forward through channels as a recommended appendix to FM 105-5 *(Maneuver Control)*.

The important thing is not that this system or another be adopted in detail, but that atomic play be included in every tactical exercise where it is appropriate, that its effects be accurately and uniformly calculated, and that umpires be given a uniform system such as the one outlined here—a system so authoritative that unit commanders will have no choice but to accept the casualties they are assessed. If this is done, and if planning for atomic play becomes an *integral* part of the exercise rather than a hasty afterthought, commanders and troops will get a realistic idea of the effects of atomic weapons on every aspect of planning and operation in modern warfare.

Figure 4: Casualties from residual nuclear radiation (per cent)

'imes of Entry Hours After Burst)		0				1				3				5			
ne of Stay (Hours)		1	3	5	8	1	3	5	8	1	3	5	8	1	3	5	8
ZONE	A																
	B																
	C																
	D																T
	E																
	F																

Figure 5: Ground contamination from nuclear radiation. Dose rate levels (Roentgens per hour).

urs 'er rst	ZONES					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
½						
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						

MAJOR W. M. CHAPMAN

SEAL DESIGNED BY INFANTRY COMBAT VETERAN CHO
BY JUDGES IN ASSOCIATION OF U. S. ARMY'S CONT

Major William M. Chapman, Infantry-USAR, was awarded the $100 for the design of a seal for the Association of the U. S. Army. A total of 99 entries w ceived. The judges were quite impressed with the general high quality of the missions and a final decision was not easy to make. The Association is d appreciative of the efforts of every person who entered the contest.

Major and Mrs. Chapman and a young son live at New Castle, Del., when commutes to Wilmington where he is a professional advertising designer. He en the Army as an enlisted man in 1942 and served in the Southwest Pacific wit 32d Infantry Division.

He returned to civilian life in 1946 but kept his reserve commission and is pres enrolled in the USAR School of the Delaware Military District, Wilmington.

The final decision as to whether Major Chapman's design will become the ciation's official seal rests with the Executive Council of the Association, which not met to consider it at the time this issue went to press.

THE JUDGES

Mr. H. STAHLEY THOMPSON
Vice President,
Rinehart & Company
Publishers

Brig. Gen.
DONALD ARMSTRONG
U. S. A.-Retired

Lt. Col.
WILLARD WEB
Armor-USAR
Chief, Stack and R
Division
Library of Congr

CEREBRATIONS

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Convoys

IEROUS recent articles in THE MY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and ere have discussed the tactical zation necessary for ground com- a time of atomic plenty. While have been numerous differences nion on the details, one salient ands out: There will be and can continuous, fully manned MLR sense of either World Wars or We are much more likely to very fluid front with mobile and obile strongpoints and task forces her reinforced-battalion or regi- l size. If we accept this our entire l supply setup must be radically l.

h a fluid front will provide many unities for infiltrators and partisan rs on relatively unprotected sup- cilities and columns. The day of gimental service company and di- camps sitting alone only a few o the rear of the front is over. So, probably the day of the MASH her close-to-front evacuation facili- Safety from ground attack will e forward within the strongpoint ters or way back in well policed otected areas.

air-minded friends will say the s answer is air transport and air tion. They are right, but only so. Both will be needed for high- cargo, support of our own in- g groups, and evacuation of the eriously wounded. But they can- expected to supply the front with mendous daily requirements of mmunition, POL, and replace- These will continue to be sup- verland as in the past—but with ence.

lies must be convoyed—in the sense of the term—and the con- ust be prepared to fight their rough and back again. Such sup- umns would bring up the bulk and the replacements. Indeed, uld plan to put packets of replace- on such columns for their added l fighting power.

not advocating that armed truck ies should fight their way up alone. There are two possible solutions. One is to change the TC truck unit by assigning to it platoons or sections of armored cavalry, armored engineers, and mobile AAA. This, I imagine, will prove uneconomical, since truck units would not often need that much protection. The second, and to me preferable, solution is to make up convoys as needed, composed of TC truck units, armored cavalry, engineers, and mobile AAA. Such convoys must be under the command of a single commander whose mission would be to get the cargo through to its destination and bring them back. While this calls to mind naval tactics, it cannot be forgotten that it also was an old and respected cavalry mission during our Indian-fighting days.

On the route back, the convoy would carry salvage, prisoners, rotating personnel, wounded, and—if we can still afford that luxury—the dead. Both en route to and from destination, the convoy commander must have final responsibility for the destruction or attempted salvage of damaged vehicles and their cargoes. The job will be neither an easy nor a pleasant assignment, but it will be a vital one, requiring high skills and fortitude.

MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT

Paging Sam

THE Navy has brought back the sword. Off-post saluting is back. There are moves afoot to make the NCO something more than a private with a fatter pay envelope. It appears that the pendulum is swinging back to the theory of spit, polish, discipline, and tradition.

Enlisted uniforms are becoming almost indistinguishable from officers' garb. If we're going to go back to the days when there was a difference between Os and EMs, there was, for many years, one distinguishing mark of an officer—the Sam Browne. Let's have it back.

I know many officers observed the departure of Sam Browne without even the suspicion of a tear. But who were they? They were the ones who let themselves get thick around the middle, so the belt rode like a brassiere instead of covering the web belt, like it should. They were the ones who couldn't find time to give the belt the loving care that was required to keep it looking its best. They were the ones who bought a cheap belt at Gus's Army and Navy Store and wondered why the belt never looked as good as the ones the sharply dressed officers wore so proudly.

A real officer, the hard, lean leader of men, the man who couldn't understand anything less than perfection, wore his Sam Browne proudly. This type of officer didn't gripe when the CO ordered that all Sam Brownes would match his own—he bought another like the CO's or went into his trunk and brought out another one that would fill the bill. He felt that the CO had certain privileges—and when he got to be a CO, as he fully expected, he could be as hard and demanding, assured in his knowledge that he had conformed when he was a junior.

But now that the pendulum is swinging back to making soldiering a way of life—hurrah!—or a profession, instead of an escape from Selective Service, let's go all the way. Let's impress everyone with the idea that officers are different, and that there are no poor officers. The Sam Browne can be the first blow in the campaign.

MAJOR SHOOT'N SALUTE

A Break for the Good Draftee

IN these days of determined and somewhat desperate effort to improve the reenlistment rate, it seems to me that we are missing a bet in not being able to

make sufficiently definite commitments to a good man who is about to be discharged and who might reenlist if the prospects were a bit more attractive. I am thinking particularly of the draftee nearing the end of his first hitch.

I know a young man who illustrates the point. He is a corporal, high school graduate, basic training infantry, upright and intelligent and a good physical specimen. He is a military chauffeur in Europe. Very shortly he will go back to a small Kansas town, to drive a laundry truck.

If I were his combat-unit commander I would take this man tomorrow as a tank gunner or assistant squad leader and would be confident of a first-class performance of duty, in either capacity, after a 30-day break-in period. In six months I would accept him as a tank commander or squad leader, and be happy to have him. But as things stand I can't offer him a thing. He wants to go back to the States, but if he should reenlist there he may be given *no* firm promises of where he may be assigned, nor any indication that he will be promoted. He must build his reputation as a worthy soldier all over again, at a place he may not want to go, with a strange company commander. So he says to hell with it.

My proposal, therefore, is this: that the Army set up a system whereby unusually good men of grade lower than E5 may after a certain period of service be put in a separate "especially desirable" category and as members of that category be given preferential treatment upon reenlistment.

I would expect no more than fifteen to twenty per cent of all men to qualify. The definition of what constitutes an "especially desirable" man can easily be drawn up. Based on these specifications, original recommendation by a company commander and approving action by a battalion commander would be enough to place a man in the select bracket. Officers recommending too many men *not* especially desirable would be subject to censure for poor judgment. In any case, the percentage could be kept at a proper level through normal administrative action.

Either the commanding officer of a soldier leaving a unit or a recruiting officer at a separation point would be privileged to commit the Army firmly as to the man's assignment and promotion, both within reasonable limits. He should be given practically unlimited choice as to geographic assignment, as much latitude as possible in choice of branch, and a one-grade promotion on the spot. He should also be presented with a letter to his new CO acquainting him with the fact that he is the lucky recipient of a good man.

Why not? Such a system commits the new company commander no more than sending him any other NCO. The administration of the system would not be difficult. And the end result, I am confident, would be a higher rate of reenlistment of the better men—desirable for many reasons, including economic.

I don't think giving one man preferential treatment over the next has any undesirable aspects. The crying need of the Army is for good men, and the good man wants a clear differentiation made between himself and the run-of-the-mill.

BRIG. GEN. HAMILTON H. HOWZE

The Question of Status

COLONEL Dupuy's warm and absorbing "Pass in Review" [October] hit the bull's-eye in many places, especially when it observed that "the sight of a group of other officers, including colonels of thirty years' service, bent low under the burden of their own bedding roll and baggage, bobbing like a line of weary stevedores past crowds of staring, much amused enlisted men, *was helpful neither to the self-esteem of the one nor the discipline of the other.*"

The spectacle of senior field-grade officers making like replacements with twelve weeks' service may be in keeping with the times, but I don't see it that way. If it was part of the Army's effort to appear democratic, it boomeranged, for the Army drew more brickbats than its more autocratic sister service for being *un*democratic. Moreover, the Army's penchant for treating its officers and senior noncoms like recruits helped bring on our current troubles.

My journey to the Korean front via the replacement pipeline demonstrated to me the Army's knack for making and keeping bad habits. The sight of bird colonels dragging their own B-bags and making their own cots in the Port of Embarkation barracks was only the foretaste of a trip that seemed deliberately designed to deflate the self-confidence and prestige of officers on their way to assume troop command. Contact with all ranks at the various stops in the replacement pipeline brought some solace—we discovered that we were all treated like recruits. Only when most of us finally arrived in a division did we feel that we had a place in the Army. Later as a battalion commander I found it commonplace to have experienced noncoms come to the outfit indiscriminately packaged with the rawest reinforcements.

The Army has borrowed muc business, but the way it treats i missioned and noncommissioned is consistent neither with good b practice nor with military wisdo corporation would ever think of t its medium-level executives (Arm grade officers) or its factory f (the Army noncoms) in a way t become all too customary.

Before World War II an offic first-three-grader was somebody— in the Army. Inside the Army it possible to restore the pride and of those who serve. If we don't, w come, to borrow a British phra army of generals, colonels, and ranks.

LT. CC

Shooting Can Be Fun

KOREA taught us the value of a marksmanship. Spraying the scape with unaimed fire did not s enemy. All it did was cause our to run out of ammunition. Increa tention has been given to marksm training in the last few years, an has been an improvement, but the ard of shooting still leaves m be desired.

From hours spent on rifle ra have determined that the most c fault is the way young and inexpe officers and noncoms introduce the rifle and shooting. It is con merely a chore which must be plished. No effort is exerted to r enjoyable or interesting. The un mander should tell his men tha are going to engage in a form o ing that will be fun. He shou them that almost anyone can be shot, and that many of them can experts. He should also tell them noncommissioned officer should to shoot well.

Expert riflemen should be p their skill. Why not reduce the all recruits $20 a month, and the the pay by that amount for thos qualify as experts? In addition, t commander should award prizes dividuals who shoot well on the ranges. Rifle marksmanship m made a genuine sport and recrea we are to succeed in raising it standards desired and instilling t dier with confidence in his weap

The next serious fault whic crept into our rifle marksmanship ing is the universal practice of the soldier through his course of i tion. Eighty hours are allotted t marksmanship in our basic trainin grams. This should be ample f

ıge intelligent soldier, but the results ld indicate otherwise.

) the average young training officer y, accustomed to the eight-hour day, ty hours of training time represents ten days of rifle instruction. Conse- ıtly, when he makes out his train- chedules, he schedules ten consecu- days of rifle marksmanship. If he in the training program that sixteen s are allotted to preliminary firing eight hours to record practice, he lules three days of range firing. His e company of 200 men must go out fire preliminary and record in three Consequently, he hurries to the e, he hurries to get each order on and hurries to get them off. The ridual firer consumes only a small ion of the day in firing, and he is ied through that. Each man does not ighty hours, but only a portion of e has little or no time to think about rrors, much less correct them.

is well known that if a subject is d over many days, instead of being entrated in a short period, the pupil ıs more of what he is taught. So not spread this instruction of eighty s over twenty days, with four hours aining a day, or have a two-hour d each day for forty days? There t be difficulties in scheduling the ing and securing the range, but they ıe overcome. If we spend five thou- dollars to give a soldier basic train- ınd he fails to stop the enemy be- of poor marksmanship, we have l.

ıother glaring mistake is the manner ıich firing positions are taught. The er is told to take a prescribed posi- as shown in the manual. Although is technically correct, it should be ined to the soldier that the best ons are comfortable positions. Ex- to him that the prescribed positions been found best for the majority en, but that he may require a slight tion. Any position may be used if n hit the target. Tell him that the is useful to give him support, but ot put him in too tight a sling. Let ling be loose at first, and let him en it up as his muscles become ac- med to it.

tructors who possess patience and ıess are required for good rifle smanship training. They must insist each step in this training be mas- The man must be taught how to ıis rifle, even if it takes three times ıny rounds as the nine now pre- d. Zeroing of the rifle with a sand- est is helpful to the new soldier. It s to him that his rifle fires accurately, but it is up to him to hold, aim, and squeeze in order to be a good shot.

A final point: Our rifle marksmanship training manual is too long. Few soldiers read it completely. Let's return to our short manual of pre-World War II. More people will read it, and some of it will stick. Ten or fifteen pages would be the ideal length, for this much could be absorbed, retained and used.

If these simple factors are applied to our marksmanship training, it is felt that the vast majority of our soldiers can be made into good or superior rifle marksmen. As many old soldiers know, these techniques are not new; we have just forgotten them.

COL. ROBERT L. COOK

Driver Badges

A RECENT check at a large post revealed that no unit on that post had awarded badges to drivers or mechanics in recent years. Few members of the administrative staffs knew that the driver badge was an item of issue. A quartermaster clerk had checked his stock records and reported that he had the badges in stock, but "nobody uses them any more." What has happened to our unit pride? Where is the soldier who once proudly turned out for inspection on Saturday morning with his badges brightly shined and prominently displayed on his chest? Are we too busy today to recognize a job well done?

The driver and mechanic badges, described in detail in AR 600-70, have been standard awards for many years and are awarded in recognition of a soldier's special qualification, just as marksmanship badges are awarded.

Driver and mechanic badges should form part of every unit's safety program. They are a goal toward which all drivers and mechanics can work; they are a mark of distinction that any commanding officer of the grade of lieutenant colonel or higher can award to deserving drivers. The timely awarding of driver badges helps build unit pride which in turn produces good safety records. It is a means of setting the man apart and giving him individual attention.

The manner of presenting awards has much to do with the pride (or lack of pride) with which they are worn. Unit commanders should remember that the driver badge is a coveted honor to a soldier *only* if his officers consider and treat it as such. If the awarding ceremony is a haphazard toss across the first sergeant's desk, the driver will probably not wear the badge. But if the battalion or regimental commander personally presents the badge at a unit parade and invites the badge winner to take the review alongside him, the badge's prestige will be established.

We all know how costly vehicle accidents are in money and lives. The driver badge is another weapon we can use in attacking this menace. Properly used, these awards might save the reputation of a unit commander and his outfit as as well as lives and money. Let's get them out of the warehouse and onto the chests of deserving soldiers.

COL. JAMES W. MILNER

Twin Firing Charts

ARTILLERYMEN can increase their batteries' firing speed, accuracy, and safety by using two firing charts instead of one in the battery fire direction center. Ignoring charges that it was not practical, we tried this system, and found that we liked it.

Here is the way it is done. When we go into a new position, we have the computer set up a firing chart on a normal grid sheet. We also have one of the radio-telephone operators set up a duplicate chart on a battle map.

When a fire mission comes in, the computer acts as a horizontal control operator and determines the firing data by the use of a Rizza Fan. The other chart operator acts as a vertical control operator. He computes the site and then checks to see if the firing data of the horizontal control operator are correct. He sounds off, of course, if he catches a mistake. The recorder relays commands to the guns and does his recording in the normal way.

The only extra equipment needed is the two Rizza Fans. No additional men are required. The computer, recorder, and two radio-telephone operators that are authorized are sufficient to make the system work. For replacements there are the two artillery mechanics, a driver, and the chief of the firing battery, just to mention those in firing battery headquarters.

There are several advantages to this system. First, you get a double check on firing data. It should give the Exec such a sense of security that he can more easily get away from the FDC to check on the rest of the firing battery.

In addition, the system makes it possible to engage two targets simultaneously. It enables two persons to receive training in the plotting of live firing data. It can give a new chart operator training in determining real fire data—putting him under the gun, so to speak—without taking a chance of having a round land on the battalion commander.

LT. JOHN H. VANSTON

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Graphical Firing Table Fans

Production of one thousand plastic commercial models of the GFT fan for the 105mm and 155mm howitzers was completed during November 1954. These fans are being issued through normal Ordnance supply channels to all active army 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalions stationed in the United States. Units of the U.S. Seventh Army will also receive a limited number of these fans.

These GFT fans are on sale at the Book Department, TAS. They sell for $16 prepaid. Orders for the GFT Fan should specify the caliber of the weapon with which the equipment is to be used.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Signal Instruction

By installing six "vehicular mounted" AN/GRC-9 radios in a room, TES's Communications Section has been able to overcome many of the problems relative to teaching signal communications. Power is supplied by regular storage batteries that are located outside the building. Power cords leading from the floor boards connect the batteries to the PE 237 power supply units. A battery charger housed in the building keeps the lead-acid storage batteries on a continuous floating charge while the sets are in operation.

This arrangement has several advantages: Instructional facilities are available at all times; it is no longer necessary to mount the equipment in a fleet of vehicles; and there are fewer distractions in a classroom than there would be in the case of outdoor instruction.

For Bridge Builders

TES has recently made available to qualified persons Special Text 5-261-1, "Introduction to Nonstandard Fixed Highway Bridges." It can be bought from the Book Department for $.41 (including mailing costs). The buyer must state his name, rank, and serial number, and must present a certificate from his unit commander stating that the text is to be used in pursuit of military duties.

Special Text 5-261-1 covers bridge and vehicle classification and design, construction procedures, planning, and organization. It also contains data on vehicle classification and beam characteristics.

The following special texts are also available at TES:

ST 5-7-1	Engineers in Atomic Warfare	$ .13
ST 5-32-2	Land Mines	.39
ST 5-260-1A	Nonstandard Military Fixed Bridges	1.00

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Experimental Films

A number of experimental training films, each containing one teaching point, has been produced at TIS. They are primarily designed to instruct newly inducted soldiers in fundamentals, or other personnel in "hard to teach" subjects. The films range from five to ten minutes in length.

Training films of this type are inexpensive and easy to produce and may prove extremely valuable as a training medium. The films are currently being previewed and analyzed at TIS to determine their teaching effectiveness.

Subjects include: Driver's Maintenance of Battery; Calibrating and Tuning, Radio Set, AN/PRC 10; Reciprocal Laying, 81mm Mortar; Wearing Individual Parachute Equipment; Position and Grip, Machine Gun M1916A6 on M2 Tripod; Bolt Locking Adjustment, Machine Gun M1919A1 and A6, and Machine Gun Clinometer M1917.

New Training Films

Dismounted Drill, TF 7-1947, 33 minutes. Drill fundamentals for the squad and platoon, replacing an older film on the subject.

Observation of Mortar Fire by the Combat Soldier, TF 7-1729, 41 minutes. The first training film to be produced on mortar observation by the front-line soldier.

Distribution of these films is anticipated the early part of this year. For the exact date, check your local film library.

Ranger Course Revamped

The Ranger Course (objective development of small-unit combat ers) has undergone some change

Ranger training now consists seven-week course which is divide three phases. The first, or Fort Be phase, is concerned with laying th demic and physical groundwork f rigorous practical training in the su ing phases. Emphasis is placed or reading and demolitions, as w physical development subjects su hand-to-hand combat, bayonet, and ical training.

The Ranger Camp in Florida site of the second phase, which in swamp, jungle, and amphibious ing. The final phase is conducted mountains of North Georgia. At two camps the students are subjec the most realistic combat training sible. The patrol is the principal v of instruction and it is while actin patrol leader that the student's l ship abilities are tested.

Basic Infantry Officer and C Candidate graduates may skip the Benning phase of instruction if graduated from those courses no than six weeks before the start Ranger class.

New Unit Designations

After four years of service in F the 3rd Infantry Division return Fort Benning on 3 December. Marne Division colors have rep those of the 47th Infantry Div which reverted to state control as tional Guard unit.

Men assigned to the 47th Di at the time of transfer have bee tegrated into the 3rd Division. General Haydon L. Boatner, who manded the 47th Division at the ti the change, now commands the 3r vision.

In another "transfer" that inv only the designation of units, not t the 30th Infantry Regiment becam 29th. This regiment is used as a onstration and experimental outf TIS. The 29th Infantry was stat at Fort Benning from 1919 to 194

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL W. RUTLEDGE
Commanding General,
The AA & GM Center

Hinman Hall Dedicated

THE home of the Antiaircraft Artillery arm at Fort Bliss, Texas—"where the tactics and techniques of the weapons of the future are being developed today"—a beautiful and useful new academic and administrative building, capable of handling more than 2,000 students, was dedicated on 23 November. General John E. Dahlquist, Chief of Army Field Forces, was the principal speaker.

The building, named Hinman Hall in honor of the late Brigadier General Dale Durkee Hinman, has 59 classrooms of 50-man capacity, some of which can be converted into 100-man classrooms; a library and reading room; two communications laboratories; twelve basic electronics laboratories; an auditorium; snack bars; and administrative offices.

The building was begun during the time that Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen was Commandant. The present Commandant is Maj. Gen. Paul W. Rutledge. Brig. Gen. R. R. Hendrix is Assistant Commandant and Brig. Gen. Earl W. Heathcote is Deputy Commander of the AA & GM Center.

E MONTH'S MAIL

(*Continued from page 9*)

ɔirit, you have a fighting group; and g groups win wars.

MAJ. RALPH S. CROSKEY
elphia, Pa.

ır October issue was superb. Colonel ' writes a classic story. In connection is theme, it makes me wonder if the ıtion could not convince the Army ere is still time to rebuild an *esprit.* er we ever have a regimental *esprit* on British lines is immaterial, but need more . . .

PAUL IASIGI
Ninth St.
:k, Tex.

r Fiftieth Anniversary issue provided f us here with an enjoyable and inve period of reading.

nel Dupuy . . . places the Army in ect historical and social perspective within the larger history of the United States in the past fifty years. The spirit of simplicity and honesty of the "Cloistered Army: 1904-16" was brilliantly recaptured, and the confusions and triumphs of the "Semi-cloistered Army: 1920-40" brought back many memories. Certainly, the message that the modern army needs to discover and *recapture* the spirit of the past army, that spirit which provided the motivation and drive for the successes of World War II, should be carried to the soldier and to the civilian of today; an outstanding work like this of Colonel Dupuy's can well serve that need.

LT. GEN. H. I. HODES
Hq. VII Corps
APO 107, New York, N. Y.

• I should like to offer my very heartiest congratulations on the anniversary issue. . . . Colonel Dupuy's contribution was a masterly condensation of a fine record, and an admirable piece of writing. The thing that was particularly notable was the many points of contact between the experience of your Army and our own, in both a service and a domestic sense.

I am old enough to have done my first soldiering back in the early days of the century, when small "native" wars were all we had to worry about. And it is amazing how our little problems of those days were paralleled by those with which your Forces had to contend.

Colonialism is now out of date, if we are to believe the "humanists," but while it existed it proved a wonderful school for soldiering!

Colonel Dupuy's illuminating story is one I shall put by and often con over again.

MAJ. REGINALD HARGREAVES
British Army, Retired
Wotton St. Lawrence
Nr. Basingstocke, Hants,
England

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

The Past in Color

SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY: 1775-1954
Drawings by Fritz Kredel; Text by Frederick P. Todd
Henry Regnery Company, 1954
144 Pages; $12.50

Reviewed by
N. J. ANTHONY

Many Americans whose forebears saw military service in "the old country" can remember hours spent in admiring the color drawings in the "soldier picture books" those men treasured. But who can recall a similar collection depicting American soldiers? Not until 1886 did one Army agency get around to publishing a limited edition of such a work. This unhandy volume of handsome drawings that traced the evolution of the Regular's uniform was supplemented by loose sheets in 1908. Copies are extremely rare. There were no books extant on the subject until Messrs. Kredel and Todd published the first edition of their work in 1940. That edition too is a rarity.

Now they come up with a new work, having examined each plate and made necessary alterations and additions. The authors don't pretend to record the evolution of our military uniform. Each of their thirty-two plates shows two or more typical soldiers at selected periods of our history. None is repeated from the old official volumes, and none has been sketched before. These soldiers look alive, and Colonel Todd's commentary leaves no detail of dress or equipment unexplained.

Kredel and Todd concentrate on the combat soldier. Except for a plate on the WAC, one on bands, and another on the USMA cadet, we have representations of doughboys, gunners, and troopers, with some special-purpose people mixed in. They come from regulars, "common" militia, organized state forces, Volunteer units, and the Confederacy. The Civil War period provided the greatest variety in design, for colonels of Volunteer and state units vied with one another in striving for originality, a great many favoring the gaudy, baggy-pants Zouave outfits which, as Todd remarks, had by 1860 become a "widespread craze." But the demands of field service soon forced conversion to regulation blues. Adoption of the current, more practical khaki for combat came with the Spanish-American War.

Here are a few points of interest from the great many detailed in drawings and text. The only articles of uniform that have been preserved are the grays, crossbelts and tarbuckets (the uniform of the Regular infantry of 1814) worn by cadets at West Point and other military academies. What appear to have been at one time noncoms' inverted chevrons are not insignia of rank, but hash marks. The saber as part of the uniform has passed on, as well as epaulettes as insignia of rank. The plate reproducing U.S. infantry of 1862 shows the first use of unit (patch) insignia. The soldier with the solid sphere patch on his hat, were his unit today "owne I Corps, would wear the same insig his left sleeve, but its color would be instead of red. The use of ornate cos declined between the Civil War and although a few local units still main traditional and stately dress for cerem Hirsute adornment seems to have go of fashion after the adoption of khal

Let's hope that as times require will be succeeding editions. Messrs. and Todd rate the thanks of all m students for their superb work.

The American citizen soldier: common militia of 1830 at drill. From *Soldiers of the American Army: 1775-1954*.



The Malayan Unpleasantnes

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN M
By Harry Miller
Frederick A. Praeger, 1954
248 Pages; Index; $3.50

Reviewed by
MAJOR PAUL M. A. LINEB

At last the recent sto Malaya is told compreher and well. The cruel, dishe ing war in Malaya has go for seven years without ever called officially "a war." Th ish public authorities have i on terming the fighting "an gency," chiefly—I was tol years ago in Kuala Lump avoid the changes that wo into effect in British ins policies if the legal conc "war" were invoked.

Harry Miller presents a standing accomplishment in length journalism without d ing, as do so many newspap when tempted by hard into pretentious history o tentious editorializing. The has a good index and a s glossary, but no other ac machinery. There are no fo and it is up to the reader cept or to reject the bool whole, since it is impossi recheck his statements one b

The book should be acc Most of the sources can checked, anyhow, since th viously stem from first-han versations with participants servers of the struggle f peninsula.

The author starts his boo the background of Malayan munism, including a desc

role played by a sinister character Yuan Ai-Kuo in Mandarin Chinese, ı Ai Quoc in Vietnamese. This man form the Chinese-dominated Com- movement of the South Seas in Today he plays a bigger role on the scene under the name of Ho Chi-

ile the author's sympathies are Brit- ey are not at all provincial or chau- . He has a humane and civilized for the Chinese who make up one his story. It is a tribute to official secretiveness, which sometimes sur- our own official talents for burying y and political blunders, along with ıssorted dead cats deleterious to offi- putation, in the bottomless abysses ssified files, that even Mr. Miller could not get the true story of the joint British-and-Communist destruction of the Malayan Kuomintang. First the Kuomintang did not exist; then they were pro-Japanese; then they were bandits; then they did not exist. Mr. Miller follows Spencer Chapman in writing of the KMT guerrillas of wartime Malaya, and crediting only the Communists for success.

The lesson to be learned from wartime Malaya is that victory is *not* the justification of *any* means whatever. While the Allies in Europe were throwing away lives by refusing anything but "unconditional surrender," the British (with respect to Malaya) and the Americans (with respect to Manchuria) purchased Communist help at a fearful price. Miller points out the military rules which the Chinese Communists in Malaya have adopted from China for the good welfare of their infantrymen; he does not point out that in tactics and operational doctrine the Sino-Malayan Communists have remained much more the heirs of the British secret "Force 136" than of the Chinese mainland "Eighth Route Army." The enemy of Britain and of peace —for Malaya—is British-trained.

I visited Malaya in July and August of 1950, in September of 1951, and in February and April of 1954. I interviewed many of the persons whom Miller describes, all the way from that last of the British proconsuls, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, over to the brilliant ex-Communist and anti-Communist agitator, Lam Swee. I can testify that the eulogy given Sir Henry Gurney, who was murdered by a Com-

Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

RCRAFT RECOGNITION MANUAL, ised edition. By C. H. Gibbs-Smith. hn de Graff, Inc., 1954. 239 Pages; Il- strated; Index; $2.50. A standard work Britain brought up to date and now to distributed in this country through an nerican publisher.

NT'S FORT. By David Lavender. Dou- day & Company, 1954. 450 Pages; In- x; $5.50. A well documented, readable tory to join the flood of historical ac- ınts of the Southwest which are coming the presses in fairly great numbers.

HE COMMUNIST MENACE IN MA- YA. By Harry Miller. Frederick A. ıeger, 1954. 248 Pages; Illustrated; In- x; $3.50. A Singapore-born newspaper- n offers some superior reporting on the le known (in America) but bloody and structive war that the Communists brought the Malay peninsula.

SENTIALS OF MILITARY TRAIN- G. The Military Service Publishing Co., 54. 905 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. e sixth edition of what appears to be the eal descendant of the prewar ROTC man- s. Contains much basic information for recruit or officer aspirant, but would of most value for use in classes which e a competent instructor.

RST COMMONWEALTH DIVISION. Brigadier C. N. Barclay. Gale & Polden, l., 1954. 236 Pages; Illustrated; Index. unofficial history of the famous British mation that earned undying fame in rea. The author is the editor of *The ny Quarterly*. Typically British in its roughness and understatement; a fair essment of a great division's contribu- ı in Korea.

E FLOATING WORLD: The Story of anese Prints. By James A. Michener. ıdom House, 1954. 403 Pages; Illus- ed; Index; $8.75. This history and background of Japanese prints by a perceptive and sensitive writer should be of value to military families who have become interested in or have collected this form of art. Contains many illustrations, some in color.

GENERAL JO SHELBY: Undefeated Rebel. By Daniel O'Flaherty. University of North Carolina Press, 1954. 437 Pages; Index; $6.00. A biography of the Southern cavalry general, highly respected by his Union opponents.

KOREAN IN A HURRY. By Samuel E. Martin. Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 137 Pages; $1.50. "Hurry" is of course a relative term when dealing with a language as much different from our own as Korean. Well organized but written for those who have a fair formal grounding in English.

A LONG LINE OF SHIPS: Mare Island's Century of Naval Activity in California. By Arnold S. Lott, Lt. Comdr., USN. U. S. Naval Institute, 1954. 268 Pages; Illustrated; Appendix; $4.95. Mare Island's hundred-year history. The photographs are particularly attention-compelling, especially those that go back to Civil War days.

THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION. By Wilbur Schramm. University of Illinois Press, 1954. 586 Pages; Index; $6.00. A text for those interested in reaching great numbers of people with a sales message, whether the sale be one of products, political ideas, psychological warfare, etc. Useful for those whose fields of interest lie in propaganda, psychological warfare, politics and advertising.

REBEL PRIVATE FRONT AND REAR. By William Andrew Fletcher; Edited by Bell I. Wiley. University of Texas Press, 1954. 162 Pages; Index; $3.75. The personal story of a Confederate enlisted man in the Civil War. Honest, humorous and readable.

THE RED CARPET. By Marshall McDuffie. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1955. 330 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50. A travelogue with photographs of Soviet Russia, 1953. The writer, no lover of Communism and no Communist, tries to be objective but that is rather difficult. He emphasizes the difference between the people and their rulers.

SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY, 1775-1954. By Fritz Kredel and Frederick P. Todd. Henry Regnery Company, 1954. $12.50. The long-awaited pictorial history of American uniforms, done in full color. An excellent gift volume for the soldier (even for your favorite soldier, yourself).

THERE IS NO ASIA. By Dwight Cooke. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 320 Pages; $4.00. A former *Time* writer and editor and present CBS commentator writes of life in the territory which we are prone to lump together as Asia.

THIS IS OKINAWA. By Willard J. Howland and "Blackie" Bradford. Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 71 Pages; Illustrated; $1.50. A picture book in *Life* style including 180 photographs. A must for those who contemplate duty at that outpost.

TOKYO AND POINTS EAST. By Keyes Beech. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 255 Pages; $3.50. A Pulitzer Prize winning Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago *Daily News* and co-author of *Uncommon Valor* offers some impressions of an overseas correspondent's life and thoughts while covering several Far Eastern wars. The book includes some stirring material from the Korean war as well as personal reminiscences that never got into the newspapers.

THE NATION'S NATIONAL GUARD. National Guard Association of the United States, 1954. 119 Pages; Illustrated; $2.50. A series of addresses by National Guard leaders tracing the history and development of the National Guard through the present day.

munist ambush on 7 October 1951, is (if anything), not strong enough. The description of the ambush itself is an admirable lesson in Communist tactics and military ethics; Miller gives the best report on that to be seen in print.

Miller concludes by demonstrating that no antiguerrilla operation can succeed without an appropriate mixture of sustained intimidation combined with reasonable openings for reconciliation of the majority. He gives due credit to Sir Gerald Templer for the magnificent progress made in pacifying Malaya and he brings the story down to date by describing the British and Communist sides right down to recent months. On the British side Sir Donald MacGillivray has taken over from Templer. The country is now safe enough for vacationists to go on motor tours; on the Communist side there is real attrition.

This particular emergency is ending. Miller concludes by warning that Malaya is endemically ridden with problems. The long future of the unhappy country is still by no means settled. Malays and Chinese must still coexist, with or without Communism. They must, but can they?

Impressions and Memories

TOKYO AND POINTS EAST
By Keyes Beech
Doubleday & Company, 1954
255 Pages; $3.75

Reviewed by
MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY

This is the kind of book a man with a bad case of insomnia can often write in his mind between the hours of midnight and 0600—particularly if he has had an eventful life.

Keyes Beech's life has been eventful. He was a Marine Corps combat correspondent and made the landings at Tarawa and Iwo Jima, was a Far East correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News* when the Korean conflict broke out, won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of it, came back to the States and was invited to write a book. He was, he says, flattered until "I discovered that all editors want everyone to write a book on the theory that someone might write one that will sell."

Within a general chronological framework of his coverage of the MacArthur occupation of Japan and of the Korean episode, Beech has written some twenty vaguely connected or vaguely disconnected stories, impressions, memories and introspective pieces. Most of them are about the Korean conflict and its practitioners.

There are also some really fine stories on MacArthur and the occupation. In a very few pages, Beech manages to give a better-balanced picture of the General and what he accomplished than the reader is likely to get from a good many recent books on the subject. While viewing SCAP and some of its activities with a notable lack of enthusiasm, he concludes that MacArthur, though only mortal, is a great man. It is, in fact, possible to sum up Beech on MacArthur with a phrase by Max Ways, *Time* editor, quoted in the book: "Never underestimate a man just because he overestimates himself."

There is some fine material here from the Korean fighting. Beech and two other correspondents, for example, were on the Han River bridge when it was blown in the first evacuation of Seoul. His description of the evacuation of the city, the blowing of the bridge and their eventual escape on a Korean-powered raft bring alive for the reader the reports of the early days of the war.

Beech was also with the 5th Marines on their withdrawal from Hagaru to the sea, and his account of the dogged courage and suffering of the men who fought their way out is great reporting.

But most moving—and perhaps most important for the future—is an essay titled "The Pavlov Technique," on the men who "confessed" to bacteriological warfare. Most of the space is a transcript of the account of Colonel Walker M. Mahurin, a great fighter pilot with 22 World War II kills to his credit, one of those who confessed. Reading it, one can get the full impact of the tragedy of these people. Men like Mahurin are neither weaklings nor cowards. Many of them are skilled professionals whose services we can ill afford to lose. The question is: how do we go about preparing others for the ordeal they may have to undergo in any future conflict? Beech gives no answer. We wonder, in fact, whether there is an answer.

Taken all together, this is a thoroughly fascinating book. Keyes Beech has spent a good part of his professional career among soldiers, and they can profitably read what he has to say.

War—The Dominant Factor

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD:
From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto
By Maj. Gen. J. F. C. Fuller
Funk & Wagnalls, 1954
$6.00; 602 Pages; Maps; Index

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

In 1940 the publication of Major General J. F. C. Fuller's *Decisive Battles* provided a much needed corrective to the neglect of war in histories written by Americans. In this country our historians were inclined to crowd war off their pages and to belittle our military past.

Today there is greater awareness of the value of military history and the need for studying it. Few will quarrel with General Fuller's comment in his preface that "we live in a state of 'wardom'—a condition in which war dominates all other human activities. How long this tension will last, whether there is a definite answer to it, or whether it is destined blindly to work out its own end, no man can say; yet one thing is certain, and it is that the more we study the history of war, the more we shall be able to understand war itself, and, seeing that it is now the dominant fact
we do understand it, how can we
regulate human affairs?" General F
a guide who writes with authority a
derstanding.

This is the first of a three-volume
which will be the most compre
study in English of warfare in the W
world. Judging from this volume, an
the many earlier works on military
written by General Fuller, this encyc
study will be essential for even th
meager military library. It is a sc
work, based on the best authorities
and, as was to be expected, it is well
and readable. Furthermore, it is an
tive history, letting facts speak for
selves and not marshalling them to
thesis. Unfortunately the outline ma
were included in his 1940 book are o
and this necessitates having at hand
torical atlas to understand the s
situations. The tactical sketches ar
narily adequate for the purpose.

In comparing this volume with th
book, it is evident that General Ful
not merely revised *Decisive Battles.*
a carefully rewritten and greatly ex
study. For example, the present v
beginning with Megiddo in 1479 B.
ending with the Battle of Lepanto i
1571, has 578 pages of text wh
earlier book has only 316 pages dev
the same period.

Battles on land and sea that alte
course of history are the points at
General Fuller arrests his narrative
scribe in appropriate detail the ho
why of victory and defeat, and the s
and tactics involved. The importa
tribution of this book, however, is th
ground of a succinct account of
history, showing the political, soci
economic forces which created the e
ment and brought about the wars.
is a welcome awareness of the inte
of culture with the weapons, tacti
organization of military establish
Grand strategy is not neglected, an
General Fuller clearly understands
fluence on history of the Great Man,
much to say about the military lead

Undoubtedly one of the most use
products of reading this book is a
understanding of the psychology of
leadership. Brief biographical sketch
character analyses of the masters of s
and tactics, too frequently overloo
military histories, add materially
value of General Fuller's study. T
ample evidence, in consequence,
truth of Carlyle's belief that "histor
essence of innumerable biographies.

General Fuller shows conclusive
single battles have frequently decic
outcome of a war, but sometimes
in doubt whether luck or skill b
about a victory. That being the ca
lessons of this book support those c
to deterministic thinking—to historic
such as those defined by Spengler.
hope that in our own country it wi

Ten Distinguished Military Books of 1954

The Editors of *The Army Combat Forces Journal* cite these ten books for their distinguished contribution to military literature

Cavalry of the Sky — ***By Lynn Montross***

The story of the development of the helicopter, with emphasis on the contribution of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Combat Actions in Korea — ***By Major Russell A. Gugeler***

An authentic picture of men at war that shows courage and cowardice, skill and error, with equal force and honesty.

Command Missions — ***By Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.***

A memoir by a World War II commander in North Africa and Europe, unusual for its vigor and frankness.

Communist Guerilla Warfare — ***By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn***

A closely documented study of guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare in Russia during World War II.

General Dean's Story — ***As told to William L. Worden by Major General William F. Dean***

A moving account of the life of a man who fought for his country both on the battlefield and in a Communist prison.

A Military History of the Western World — ***By Major General J. F. C. Fuller***

A definitive work covering warfare from earliest times to the late sixteenth century.

Nemesis of Power — ***By John W. Wheeler-Bennett***

The story of how the German General Staff dabbled in politics between 1918 and 1945, told in vivid detail.

They Called Him Stonewall — ***By Burke Davis***

The first modern biography of Thomas J. Jackson, the magnificent Confederate battle leader.

U. S. Army in World War II: *Logistical Support of the Armies, ETO, Volume I* — ***By Roland G. Ruppenthal***

An extremely valuable study of logistics that candidly weighs both successes and mistakes.

U. S. Army in World War II: *The Supreme Command* — ***By Forrest C. Pogue***

A thorough and coldly objective account of the command direction of the largest and by far the most complex military organization ever created.

convincing argument for adequate military force and the highest intellectual effort on the part of professional men as well as laymen to help solve the problems of war and peace.

Anatomy of Espionage

WAR OF WITS
By Ladislas Farago
Funk & Wagnalls, 1954
388 Pages; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL C. A. H. THOMSON

Ladislas Farago, in this short work, attempts to give the general reader a complete panorama of the subject of intelligence and its allied activities. Breezily and popularly written, it is not intended to do more than give a tempting glimpse of the various operations which come within the field. The bulk of attention is given to intelligence and to espionage, and relatively cursory treatment to sabotage, counterespionage, and propaganda.

Intelligence is conceived on the broadest possible scale; so much so that the cold war is defined as nothing more than an intelligence operation. There is a tendency in much of the work to idealize the intelligence operator, and to praise his many coups; this is offset in part by accounts of incidents in which vital intelligence was procured and sent to the proper authority, but overlooked or deliberately ignored. Stalin's disbelief of Churchill's reports—and those of his own agents—that Hitler would attack him in June 1941, is possibly the most striking case in point.

Many topics are treated cavalierly, with little indication of the controversy they excite in theory and practice. The book is replete with incidents, woven and interwoven into the exposition, but rarely if ever told in satisfying detail. The author has been satisfied with the most superficial conclusions, and has allowed many conflicting interpretations and implications to lie quietly side by side in his pages, with the reader all unwarned.

Farago plumps for the small good staff, rather than the full-blown organization, largely on the basis of his own wartime experience. The question immediately arises whether these paragons could be applied to agencies with global responsibilities and a full range of functions.

The Army psywarrior will not discover that G3 has anything to do with his specialty; the field of psywar is treated simply as an outgrowth of intelligence, because it uses intelligence in its output. The definitions of several key psywar functions are bizarre, and not reflected in the official Army dictionary or in practice. It does not appear, however, that the treatment of intelligence, espionage, or sabotage is as ill-adjusted to current doctrine and practice.

The most suggestive and challenging statements come in the concluding remarks, where the author examines the possibility that intelligence operations can somehow be substituted for violence in the modern struggle between peoples and states. The main point which remains uncovered is the extent to which the threat of military strength is indispensable to psychological warfare or to diplomacy. So long as that threat remains important, it is difficult to foresee a situation in which intelligence—the war of minds—can wholly dispense with the struggle of weapons.

The most valuable part of the book is its bibliography. If the reader takes any advantage at all of the rich fare there listed, he can quickly discover for himself the full range of controversy of belief and practice which is hardly suggested by the author. And he can pursue further the intriguing cases which the author has sketched in tempting form.

Missionary's Story

FIFTY YEARS IN CHINA: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador
Random House, 1954
366 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Dr. Stuart, born in China in 1876, has written a book which starts in the relaxed, leisurely style of a Victorian biography and gradually takes on a tenseness climaxed by the author's imprisonment by the Japanese and by the various crises he faced as American ambassador to China during the period when the Communists swept across the country.

From the purely military viewpoint, the book has two main values: a considerable insight into the Chinese mind and way of life; and commentaries on American military leaders.

China, with over 450,000,000 people—a fourth of the world's population—and with its central location in eastern Asia, is certainly a country about which the military man ought to know more than he usually does. Dr. Stuart has not, of course, written from this viewpoint, but in the course of telling his life story he makes many illuminating comments which are probably not only applicable to the Chinese people, but also to their armed forces. As a young missionary, for example, he was surprised to discover that Chinese athletic teams would rather quit a game than risk being defeated, and that a boy who was elected captain of a team had to expect that his defeated rival for the position would invariably try to ruin the team's chances of victory.

Students in the universities of China, even more than elsewhere in Dr. Stuart's opinion, are excellent barometers of popular trends—"the most highly sensitized element." The "age-long failings" of Chinese officialdom, both civilian and military, are profiteering from public funds, primary concern over welfare of family or friends or faction rather than that of the country, the pressure to maintain appearances, bureaucratic red tape, and incompetence. These deficiencies the basic reasons for the downfall o National government and armed f "It would almost seem at times," says author sadly, "that the Chinese hav abstract morality but are honest, t ful, kindly, and so on, only as a du the individuals concerned . . . their virtue is perhaps that of personal loya

The writer pays repeated tribute American military leaders, particu Generals Marshall, Wedemeyer, and D Barr. Of American military personne general he says: "Even a layman c recognize their professional attainm and their high standards of duty."

Last and Best

GENERAL JO SHELBY: UNDEFEATED
By Daniel O'Flaherty
University of North Carolina Press,
437 Pages; Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

Joseph Orville Shelby of Kentucky longs among the folklore heroes of dark and bloody ground." Self-taught er of light horse, Jo Shelby was bo Southern aristocrat and a friend—bu an associate, mark you—of outlaws. quixotic career ranged from partisan erings of the Kansas-Missouri border through the Civil War where he ro the rank of major general, CSA, acros Rio Grande in one of the most fantas *gringo* invasions, to end back in Mis as a fighting U. S. marshal.

It was an odd quirk of fate that Jo by, who refused to surrender when Confederacy collapsed, should cap career upholding law and order in name of the Federal government an posing States Rights.

Yet that is just what he did durin great Pullman strike in 1894. Gov Stone of Missouri protested Shelby's to use Federal deputies to protect t running through his state. "If the G nor," said Shelby curtly, "had been thr what we have, he would have known the question he thinks is still open long ago settled in blood."

Shelby's war service was in a r theater—the backwash of the Confede the broad area of trans-Mississippi Missouri southward. No major deci were settled there, and, as it turned nothing that happened there after Na iel Lyon's initiative and iron hand saved Missouri for the Union in the s of 1861 could affect the fortunes o Confederacy one whit. There were ba raids, skirmishes, but all were side-s

So, although Jo Shelby was to mak with fiery enthusiasm, he never ro comparison, for instance, with Stua Forrest as a cavalry leader. His opera are buried in the musty files of the *Of Records*. Shelby's one contemporary rapher was his adjutant, Major John man Edwards, whose two books—*S*

His Men and *Expedition to Mexico*—
according to the author of this book,
ılsome and stilted as to cast an all too
glow upon their hero.
lr. O'Flaherty, with but this flimsy
ground of source material on Shelby's
ary activities, has nevertheless done a
umental job of collation and docu-
tation of material for his story. The
would have been much improved,
ever, had even one sketch map of Shel-
epic trail been added.
; a result, from a military viewpoint
tory is disappointing, for, as the author
rks, he is "neither a military expert
a scholar"—we doubt the last—"and
been content simply to trace the thread
helby's life through the kaleidoscopic
rn of American history."
ıis book, then, is more a revelation of
nanners and *mores* of individuals and
little-understood segment of our pop-
on during the monumental struggle of
Civil War than a military commentary.
ne the depiction of the anabasis of
by's command cutting loose from the
Cause to ride into Mexico is the best
of the book.
ere was a body of light horse, a thou-
strong, well armed and mounted, vet-
all, plunging into Maximilian's war-
Mexico, prepared to take service as
enaries pure and simple—a nineteenth
ıry White Company. Their sabers
to be at the service either of Maxi-
n and his alien government, or Juarez
ıis *revolucionarios*: whoever should be
igher bidder.
ow they were turned down by both
s, their later adventures as colonists
short-lived Utopia, and the return of
urvivors to the United States, is a
narrative.
ıring the Civil War, Quantrill and his
vhackers, including Dick Yager, Cole
ger, and the two James boys, rode
Shelby's command from time to time.
ı later—in 1883—Shelby, loyal to one
old command, would be a character
ss for Frank James when he stood
or murder.
ere is no evidence, however, that
y himself ever countenanced Quan-
red trail of arson, robbery and murder.
elby had standards of his own, and
were high.
ıen, at the end of the Civil War
Shelby and his men—marching for
exican border, rode into Austin, Tex-
ey found a mob about to loot the sub-
ry, containing the last $300,000 of
ınd silver in the Confederacy. The
; sabered down, Governor Murrah
ted that the best disposition of the
government's funds would be to di-
among Shelby's men, who had not
d a penny of pay for months past.
amé into the war with clean hands,"
Shelby. "With God's help I will go
it with clean hands . . . We shall
ke the money.
e are the last of our race. Let us be
st as well."

Pass In Review

In the August issue I mentioned how much I had enjoyed reading a biography of Chinese Gordon. Now I find a new book, *Gordon of Khartoum* ($5.00), which in many respects surpasses the earlier one. This one is written by Lord Elton and is a more thoroughly researched and more scholarly work than the one by Lawrence and Elizabeth Hanson. Lord Elton's writing reminded me a good deal of that of Cecil Woodham-Smith in *The Reason Why*.

Hundreds of escape stories have been written by American and British soldiers who were prisoners of war in World War II. Here, for a change, is a story from the other side of the fence. *Prisoner's Bluff* ($3.75) is the account of a group of Germans who broke out of a British internee camp. Posing as British officers or Swiss business men as the occasion demanded, they made their way some 1,500 miles in thirty days to reach the Japanese in Burma. For sheer excitement, it's as interesting a tale as we've seen since *The Wooden Horse*.

Major General Ellard A. Walsh, the fiery president of the National Guard Association, is well known to almost every National Guard and Reserve officer. Since the end of World War II he has been a tireless worker and a staunch defender of our National Guard system and has taken on all comers. It would be safe to estimate that he has written and delivered in ringing rhetoric several millions of words on his favorite subject to audiences large and small. There are those who often disagree with him, but he is highly respected for his intimate knowledge of his subject, and the tremendous amount of energy and time which he has spent researching and developing his arguments. A full-scale history of the National Guard has had a high priority on his list for a long time, and we are told that the actual writing is now in the mill. In the interim, the National Guard Association has published a handsome small edition of selected addresses by General Walsh and one speech by Major General Edgar C. Erickson, present Chief of the National Guard Bureau, which trace the development of the Guard down through our history and its status as of today. *The Nation's National Guard* ($2.50) is particularly worthwhile because it provides material not otherwise readily available.

This seems to be Stonewall Jackson's year. We mentioned the fine new volume, *They Called Him Stonewall* ($5.00) by Burke Davis sometime back, and now we have a newly edited version of John Esten Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson and the Stonewall Brigade* ($3.50). This is a faithful reprinting of the old edition with only a few typographical errors corrected. John Esten Cooke, whom the publisher cleverly describes as the Ernie Pyle of the Confederacy, certainly captures the atmosphere of Civil War soldiering, and his book is highly enjoyable.

In the past eight years we've examined a goodly number of unusual books, games, globes and sundry other items intended to educate, entertain or amuse our military forces. This month, for the first time in our recollection, we received for review a road map! However, it's not as out of place as it sounds. This happens to be a bilingual road map of Japan, and it looks like a darned good job. It lists for 50¢ in the Far East, so I suppose anyone Stateside wanting us to get one would have to spend 75¢ or a dollar. I think I'll put this one in the old hope chest, although it will surely be out of date before I'll get to use it.

The recent spate of books about General Douglas MacArthur has stimulated discussion about the war against Japan. Russia's entry into the Pacific war and the decision to use the atomic bomb will probably remain hot subjects for debate for years to come. There is, however, a new book published by Stanford University Press that adds considerably to our knowledge as to the necessity of either of these controversial moves. *Japan's Decision to Surrender* ($4.00) is written by Robert J. C. Butow, presently a faculty member in Princeton's history department. Butow spent several years, starting in 1945, in both a military and civilian capacity working as an intelligence officer in GHQ and SCAP. Since he was well versed in the Japanese language he devoted his time exclusively to historical research. From the welter of material through which he sifted, Butow is convinced that neither the atomic bomb nor Russia's entry into the war brought about Japan's decision to surrender—although they may have hastened the culmination. His well documented history adds a material postscript to the military studies of that war.—R.F.C.

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

In this issue—

ARMY POWER—the decisive force

Our Organization for Logistics

SOLIDARITY—the key to morale

Counter-Mortar Radar — Battle-Tested in Korea

A mobile radar set for counter-mortar use has long been needed. One developed jointly by the Army Signal Corps and the Sperry Gyroscope Company was battle-tested with highly successful results in Korea. It is know as counter-mortar radar AN/-MPQ-10.

The radar has three uses: it acts as a sentry: warns of enemy movements; and it pinpoints ene mortar locations. Front-line troops use the set to tect the path of enemy mortar shells, to track th trajectory automatically, and to obtain compu range data that reveals the enemy position.



Operating the "Flying Boom" of a B29 aerial refueling tanker

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WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

NEW SERVICE STARTS—Hostesses of five airlines—United, Western, Pan American, American and TWA—cut a ribbon to open Los Angeles Airways' first helicopter passenger route after eight years of scheduled mail operations. First passenger service is between Long Beach and Los Angeles International Airport, with Sikorsky S-55s.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS

RCAF SIKORSKYS—First all-helicopter squadron in the Royal Canadian Air Force is now in operation with rugged Sikorsky S-55s. These wilderness-proved transport helicopters are now based at Bagotville, Quebec. Here are four of ten S-55s in the initial Canadian order. All were flown to Canada from Sikorsky's plant.

BRITISH USE S-55s—Helicopter passenger service between London Airport and Waterloo is scheduled to begin this spring. British European Airways will use S-55s for the flights, which take 18 minutes each way compared to more than an hour by surface travel. BEA pioneered helicopter passenger flights in 1950 with S-51s.

SERVICE EXPANDS—New York Airways has expanded scheduled helicopter passenger service both north and south from its New York City inter-airport routes. Cities added were Trenton and New Brunswick, New Jersey, on the south, and suburban White Plains, New York, and Stamford, Conn., on the north. Above, passengers board a Sikorsky S-55 at the heliport in Stamford.

America's First Truly Successful Helicopter —Sikorsky VS-300



MAY 20, 1940—First public view of Sikorsky's historic VS-300—America's first truly successful helicopter—came May 20, 1940 as Igor Sikorsky was awarded Helicopter Pilot License No. 1. The VS-300 was only the first of many Sikorsky achievements in advancing helicopter development and industry-leading production efficiency.

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

Association's Journal

Since your Publisher had his s month in welcoming the members Antiaircraft Association, it seemed priate to ask our new Associate formerly the Secretary of the AA tion and the editor of its Journal, ment on the significance of the mer the reactions of AA members.—TH LISHER.

THE merger worked out so smooth the Antiaircraft membership wa comed so warmly into the Associa the U. S. Army, that it is really a pr for me to express my own appre (and I am sure the appreciation Antiaircraft members).

The best feature of the first mee the merged Council was that the wasn't any sign of distinction b the members of the branches. Al *Army* members, and happily so. A here shows me that the same atmo prevails among the staff.

Antiaircraft members were reluc give up the *Antiaircraft Journal* for good reasons; however, that feelin outweighed by the realization of a b need for the promotion of mutual standing, teamwork and unity amo branches of the Army. Most of ou troops are stationed away from clos tact with the rest of the mobile troops and that in itself gives par reason why we need to keep abreast developments in the infantry, arm tillery, as well as the technical s and administrative branches. In tu need to tell the rest of the Army abo problems and aspirations.

AN even greater influence in favor merger, however, was the com need for a strong association devo the interests of the Army as a wh promote unity, teamwork, *esprit*, p and strength in the Army. Too of the past the Army has failed to p a united front. We need a stronger and to get it we need to speak wit voice.

Thus far in our country's histo Army has borne the brunt of battle i fare. Recent developments in Kore Indochina fail to give any evider indicate any great change in the f However, there are others who rea signs differently and who would re the Army to a secondary position. W ognize this as an extremely dan proposal. Therefore, Antiaircraft o see the need for unified and deter efforts to maintain the Army with effi and strength to meet the responsib which may be placed upon it.

Going back to the merger of the ciations, the beginnings have been cious and I am greatly encouraged lieve that we are already a happy f

BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRIS
Associate Editor

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dvance the status of the soldier's profession.

opted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

TRUST Troopers

● It was with pride and honor that I read "TRUST: Mission Accomplished" [December]. I served in this command in TRUST Headquarters, and then with Company A, 351st Infantry.

I've always contended that an American, or any man for that matter, will do his best when his back is against the wall. We in Trieste had our backs to the sea at all times. This tended to unite all units and give the command a oneness of purpose. Training was the toughest and the longest, but it was entered into with that spirit which made the units the envy of other commands.

If anyone is interested, the 351st Infantry has been transferred to Camp Rucker, Ala. I am greatly interested in hearing from former TRUST troopers who have any ideas regarding the formation of an association.

SFC. Albert J. Bérubé, Jr.
227 Clermont Ave
Brooklyn 5, NY

Income Tax Exemption

● Now that a pay raise for service personnel is up for consideration again, how about income tax exemption on *all* service pay and allowances?

The exemption of all service pay and allowances would be a pay raise that would be worthwhile. In my viewpoint, the requirement that service men pay income tax on their service pay and allowances has been nothing more than a reduction in pay, and it would be to the best interests of the Government if income tax were not collected on service pay and allowances. After all, it is hardly fair to service men and women that they should be expected to devote all their time to their country and at the same time pay income tax on the compensation received from the federal government for that service.

The dent in collected taxes made by this exemption will not mean a great loss in tax revenue, and would mean a sizable increase for service personnel, who are in need of a pay raise at this time.

PFC. John M. Kilgus
5th Gen Hosp
APO 154, NYC

Artillery Integration

● In the November and December issues conflicting thoughts were presented on the validity of the merging of the field artillery and the antiaircraft artillery. As an officer who has been cross-assigned, I cannot help but agree that it was a good idea, but that it does not work. With less than three years of active commissioned service, I was transferred to the AA. I can learn and am learning the equipment and duties to the best of my ability. However, the concepts of employment, mission, and matériel are all quite different from those of the FA. Result to date: jack of two trades, master of neither. If such is the desired result, why not merge the infantry and field artillery? Both have cannon, rifles, and machine guns. Or with armor. Again the armament is cannon and machine guns. . . .

Lt. R. Tillery

Support and Supply by Submarine

● After having read "Assault Troop Submarine" [November] it appears to us that the author has neglected to give serious consideration to the problems of support and supply of the troops he proposes landing from his troop-carrying submarines.

A careful study of the problem of landing a large force (Commander Kittredge wrote in terms of divisions) from submarines in amphibious assault reveals some mighty big problems. Would surfaced submarines carrying the supplies and heavy lifts (heavy ordnance such as artillery and tanks) be any less vulnerable to attack than any other type of ship? We think not. Would it be practicable to build a submarine so large that it could even carry such heavy items? According to FM 101-10, it takes 513 short tons per day per division in an amphibious assault. That's quite a load.

There is a lot more to amphibious assault than just putting the troops on the beach and then submerging and going home. Considering the follow-up phases of the invading force the "hydrogen bomb-hostage" concept is not valid. Our Navy would be working over the enemy submarines when they attempted resupply. Coming by submarines, the enemy could not have air power, which leaves our troops free to maneuver at will and, in our opinion, our troops could eliminate the enemy with no great damage to Rockland.

To sum up, troops landed on a hostile shore without the necessary support and supplies would be at best a nuisance value to the home troops, and Rockland would never be in danger of being a hostage.

The three steps mentioned in the article for a successful landing are: (1) the softening of the enemy, (2) the landing of troops, and (3) the logistical build-up. Step 1 may be eliminated by the s feature mentioned, *but* steps 2 and not be avoided if the landing is to plish any given mission. It is step will bring the headaches to this t operation. Unless the new type subr can unload guns and tanks and under water, they will be as vulner air attack as any transport group.

It appears that until the submarin carriers whip the supply problem will be carrying relatively small u amphibious raids such as the one Makin.

Lt. Col. R. J. Mi
Artillery

Lt. Col. R. S. Jo
USMC

Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

Power and Policy

● Colonel Reinhardt in "War W Men" [November] raises many inte points. His proposition, however, order for the free world to survive armies of the United States and it must approach in size those of the hordes of communism," is debatable size of our army is predicated pretty on how and by what means our en going to wage the next war.

In their quest for world dominati Soviets have two alternate means o coming the United States: gradua tion or quick destruction in war. it that an effective opposition to the can come only from the U. S., a allies.) Which of these two lines of the Soviets will eventually resort hidden in the crystal ball. In the l postwar events, their minds are pr set on the first. Also, gradual a would be better for the Russian and perhaps just as effective in th run.

The underlying thought of the munists in the case of gradual a may very well be that the constantly tained strain on the nerves of our will exhaust us and finally induce give up in disgust, and let the USS her own way. (In the meantime, is no strain on the nerves of the inside the Iron Curtain; they just know what is going on.) If this line of action they shall pursue, th all means an army equal or nearly to their "hordes" is the answer. W armed force of this size we shall b

with Communist pressure at any nt on the Soviet periphery.

e accept the proposition that the leaders have determined upon a ı of creating conditions favorable triumph of communism in the war capitalism, which they consider to itable . . . an army equal to theirs t do us much good. We must have y, yes—an army of small, well-led, ıipped, well-trained and highly elements, ready to be thrown in re along the periphery as the need se.

strength must lie principally in air defensively, to prevent a sneak at- ınd when it comes, and offensively, :h a retaliatory counterattack.

ainly agree with Colonel Reinhardt : diplomacy must be consistent with itary strength. . . . This is just an- 'ay of saying that our foreign ob- must be consistent with our mili- ;ngth.

Lt. Col. Frank Novak
42, NYC

ul to Our Trust" (Cont'd)

thful to Our Trust" [December] ; bell in more ways than one. The name should have appeared in :ters.

'e been a regular subscriber to The L for fifteen years and find some- orth clipping or quoting in almost sue—and that's my criterion of a litary magazine. Keep up the good

Lt. Col. J. A. Donovan, Jr.
USMC
Ed Center
o, Va

a word of appreciation to The Combat Forces Journal for the ng high quality of its articles and In particular I refer to "Faithful Trust." Its tenor was sound and ıasis correctly placed—the necessity ilitating those qualities of the spirit basic to the military as well as to r honorable professions: loyalty, ntegrity, and devotion to duty. I ike to have seen the author's name so that he might have shared per- he honor which his article rightly . . .

Lt. Noel H. Merrihew
ıcisco 2, Calif

ıful to Our Trust" expresses, in ges, what I think has caused more ınd noncommissioned officers to ; service than any other thing: ıing lack of confidence in the t and ability of junior officers. The 'epancies and the taking away of led fringe benefits surely had their But there is nothing quite so ex- g to a man as to be placed in ı of responsibility and not be given ority to carry out that responsi-

The solution is to give the authority back to the company commander, who is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of any mission, no matter what the size.

At one time I considered making the Army, and in particular, the infantry, my career. I did not stick to this intention very long because I didn't like to take responsibility without authority. I know I gave little consideration to the pay. But if and when the authority is returned to the lower levels of command, then the Army will begin again to hold the men it has spent so much in training.

I feel that The Journal is the best sounding board for new ideas and for the revival of old ideas that I have seen. I am sure you will continue to publish interesting and provocative articles.

Lt. Charles J. Muldoon
Medford 55, Mass

• "Faithful to Our Trust" will no doubt stir up a fuss here and there. . . . No doubt quite a few of the combat people will have something to add to the technical points and on the intangibles, such as honor and other invisible but interesting conceptions.

We learned many things in Korea which eager beavers will try to apply in other places and at other times to fit different conditions. My Korea service was performed at no danger except that of indigestion, but I fear that the next time I will find it different and will have company galore. Behind the 8-ball, that is.

Let's assume we get into a war in which we swap positions fifteen to fifty miles a day. The combat boys will have troubles. But how about the QM and Ordnance, and the various small, detached units of CIC, MAAG, and what have you? Everyone will have fun from General Doakes of Base Section to Pvt. Joe Blow of the 9999th Ordnance Ammo Company.

General Doakes will have lots of fun keeping in touch, owing to people cutting wire and plugging couriers. His depot commanders will have troubles with sharper saboteurs than they met in Korea. Their labor force will not be as cheap either and some will be interested in smuggling Composition C in instead of C rations out. The people who take pot shots at lighted windows come evening will perhaps be more accurate and much more diligent. Small detachments will have more fun than somewhat. They will have to get used to living in groups with other people so they can ward off unwelcome visitors.

Poor old Private Blow and his compatriots of the supply forces will have to do a lot of things they were not accustomed to in Chosen, such as working ammo themselves instead of yelling *"Bahli! Bahli!"* at KSCs. Also, the supply of houseboys will be more *sukoshi* than usual. . . .

We learned many things in Korea—not always the right ones.

WO John P. Conlon
Newark, Ohio

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THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

COLONEL Anthony Standish (a pseudonym) wrote a three-part article in this magazine a few years ago in which he indicted the young American male as poor material out of which to produce a fighting soldier. He aimed his meat axe at his fellow citizens for producing a generation of Americans who were spineless and lacking in physical and moral fortitude and conviction.

Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Retired, for one, is on record with the conviction that the young American male makes the best fighting man in the world, if he is properly trained and led.

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In the final analysis Colonel Standish's philosophy is an admission of failure and offers only defeat, while General Truscott's is a challenge that offers hope. The problem becomes one of learning all we can about what makes our young American tick and how to transform that tick into a meaningful soldier and fighting man.

The way to spark the soldier, Lieutenant Colonel Donovan Yeuell, Jr., wrote in our September 1954 issue, is to recognize that "soldiering is a way of life" quite separate and distinct from American civilian life. He maintained that many of the Army's troubles of the last few years came about because the Army was imitating civilian life and had forgotten that the real heart of the Army is imbedded in a mass of fundamentals and frills. We "owe no apology" for these, Colonel Yeuell wrote. "They are effective and they give the soldier pride of service and self-confidence . . . qualities the Army must have in these days of tension and crisis. . . ."

NO, says *Captain Roger W. Little* (page 26) in this issue. "Soldiering is no longer a way of life [and] the techniques of the 'old soldier' will not bring back the 'old Army'." He reasons that the "modern Army is an image of the society in which it lives" and that it is a delusion to think an army can exist apart from the larger society from which it springs.

Captain Little is a sociologist, and sociology holds that standards and ideals are developed and maintained by men of comparable position, power and risk. To make this clear quickly, let's use decorations. Colonel Yeuell says that the little ribbons are "frills that attract men to the colors." Captain Little says that the little ribbons have value only as they are recognized as worthwhile by members of a group. If the group decides that they are meaningless they are no longer a symbol of "group solidarity" and the soldier won't wear them.

Captain Little is a soldier as well as a sociologist. During World War II he served as battalion communications officer in the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) after entering the Army as an enlisted man and graduating from the Fort Benning OCS. After the war he went to Harvard and later to the University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration. He then reentered the Army as a sociologist in the Medical Service Corps. He saw service in Korea and more recently has been engaged in postgraduate work at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. At last reports he was again en route to the Far East.

The fighting soldier who may not be much interested in theory would bly say that we had better make th choice of theories (if a choice is nece because from all he can learn, the ne is going to demand a hell of a lot o tude and conviction from the soldier. is quite apparent in "The Survivor" 34). In it *Captain George Tanha* tillery, USAR, says that we had be making plans to use the soldier survive an atomic attack. Captain Ta a graduate of Princeton University, with the 7th Armored Division in I during 1944-45. After the war he s at Stanford, earning his Master's de



CAPTAIN ROGER W. LITTLE

1947 and his Ph.D. in 1951. He i Associate Professor of History at C where he teaches courses in modern pean and military history. In 19 served on Project Vista for the Depar of Defense and is now a consulta RAND Corporation. During 1952- studied military history at Oxford Ford fellowship.

MEN without weapons are militaril potent, and weapons without me completely so. So there has to be a de balance involving thousands of mer millions of dollars' worth of weapon equipment. We call this "logistics," the tremendously complex task of g the right amount of stuff bought, and delivered is the job of thousan technicians and specialists laboring the overall direction of the Deputy of Staff for Logistics. On page 21

FLYING HIGH AT 40° BELOW

In those frozen outposts of the free world—outlying areas of everlasting ice and snow—rugged Fairchild *Flying Boxcars* deliver personnel and bulky equipment when they are needed—where they are needed.

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Stratos Division, Bay Shore, N. Y.

tenant General W. B. Palmer, the Army's first Deputy Chief for Logistics, describes the evolution of the Army's organization for logistics and shows why the new office was necessary. He concludes by saying that we must learn how to produce logistical managers who are as capable as the tactical commanders we produce so magnificently well. This article is drawn from a lecture given at the National War College early this year.

General Palmer knows whereof he speaks. A couple of small manuals he wrote while commandant of the Army Information School right after the war displayed a mastery of American military history. Without checking our memory we will say that we believe he is one of a few (and perhaps the only) American soldiers who have commanded both an armored and an airborne division. In World War II he was artillery commander of "Lightning Joe" Collins's VII Corps and in Korea he commanded I Corps.

OUR other authors this month are an interestingly varied bag. *Bill Mauldin* (page 25) and his family live in a semi-rural area outside of New York City. Mauldin has often been regarded with something less than sympathy by some professional soldiers, who viewed him as a disruptive force rather than as a candid critic of *all pretense.* We think his contribution in this issue helps to show what this man really stands for. Mauldin has never been one to discount the need for a disciplined, trained Army, and he has been a sharp critic of those who would make the military services an adult version of the Brownies. In fact, he seems to have had an almost fond regard for the "Old Army." Remember his wartime of an old cavalry sergeant, now nized, hiding his eyes in pain and as he uses his .45 to deliver the c *grace* to a faithful jeep with a broke

SOLDIERS, of course, don't ai political preferences publicly, aren't interested in that phase of the of our uniformed authors. The in specialties and experience of the mer here are indicative of the wide var knowledge that exists in our Army The provincialism and sameness of that was supposed to be the hallm professional soldiers in the old d longer exists. There is a common p created by wearing the same unifor sharing the same general experience ice overseas, attendance at service s and such. But we have noted th manuscripts offered to this magazi publication today come from all ov Army. Never before have we ha a variety of rich material from wh choose. The result is a magazine citing bite and flavor.

Major Mark M. Boatner, III, I (page 32), is another student at I worth. He has served as a platoon company commander, regimental S commandant of a division NCO sc

Colonel Waller P. Booth, Jr., I (page 38), served in OSS during War II. He is now Deputy G2 of S Army.

Robert Berkowitz, who wrote the in this issue (page 40), served Army in World War II. He is journalist in Boston.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Har Jr., Infantry (page 41), makes his appearance in these columns this He is now on duty in the Ryuky commanded the 1st Battalion, 23d try, in Korea before going there.

Lieutenant Colonel Francis S. Ke fantry (page 44), was a member Arms Advisory Group of OCAFF he wrote "Targets that Talk."

Colonel Anson D. Marston, Co Engineers (page 46), is a graduate Air War College and the Commar General Staff College. He is preser duty with the Eighth Army in t East.

Colonel David P. Gibbs, Signal (page 48), is Chief, Communic Branch, J3 Division, Hq. FECOM.

Our cerebrators (pages 49-51 month are, as usual, a varied group tary idea men. *Lieutenant James D dleton,* Infantry-USAR, lives in Br He was on duty at Benning until months ago. *Sergeant First Class Kleinman* is on duty in the office of General William F. Dean, deputy mander of Sixth Army. *Captain M Roueche,* Medical Corps, is with th Medical Group at Fort George G. M Md. *Lieutenant Colonel Edward M agan, Jr., Artillery,* commands a fi tillery battalion in FECOM.





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

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

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Rated capacity	1¼ cu yd
Belt horsepower	50
Weight, complete	16,200 lb
Dumping height	9 ft, 2 in.

From the time of its introduction seven years ago, the Allis-Chalmers HD-5G Tractor Shovel has been tops in popularity. Many thousands are daily proving their ability and versatility on all kinds of material handling and excavating jobs.

Now, design refinements make the HD-5G a three-way better value than ever before:

1. Has Bigger Rated Capacity

New bucket handles a big 1¼-yd load — streamlined design now helps roll in large loads with less tractor effort. The back of the bucket has been brought forward and the sides extended to cut spillage, put more payload where it's wanted.

2. Helps the Operator Do More

Cleaner dumping with the new bucket saves the operator time and effort shaking out loads.



For added versatility, there is a two-position bucket available with both standard automatic return to digging position and operator-controlled tip-back. If the operator chooses to use the controlled tip-back, he can load the bucket, then tip it back approximately 25° before raising, assuring maximum output under special conditions such as downhill loading or loading loose materials.

The HD-5G helps the operator do more in other ways, too — giving him full vision, fast and easy control, cleaner platform and more comfortable seat from which to work, and more working time with truc wheels, support rollers and idlers that need greasir only once every 1,000 hours.

3. Works at Lower Cost

The HD-5G now gives bigger output than ever b fore — not just because it *does more*, but because it ha features that mean *less maintenance, longer life.* F instance, new type tubular bracing on the bucket booms provides added strength and support, keeps the bucket in line. The floor at the rear of the new bucket has been raised seven degrees to reduce wear on the bottom sheet. Heavy-duty truck wheels and idlers are available for particularly tough working conditions. On piece, full-length main frame permits unit constructio so that major assemblies can be removed without di turbing adjacent units, putting tractor back on the jc in hours rather than days.



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There Is an Army Story

THE heart of the Press Branch of the Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, is an immense, clattering "city room." The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are represented by sections, or "desks" in newspaperese. The Army "desk" is deep in the center of the room. Not far away is the Air Force "desk." There seem to be more Air Force "desks" than Army "desks," but in addition to the desks the Air Force has a rack on which unclassified manuals and other Air Force literature are neatly stacked.

Penetration to this part of the room is necessary for a person engaged in the search for "background" or "the record." For it is hard by the "morgue" where clerks, given time, can pull out biographies of the Pentagon's great and near-great, the public addresses of same, and even, perhaps, announcements of the dollar value of all paper clips purchased since 1945. So while you wait for the record you want from the morgue you stroll over to take a look at what the Air Force offers.

You browse just like you do in a bookstore. And just as in a good bookstore pretty soon there is a pleasant voice inquiring if there is anything it can do for you. Please help yourself, the voice says, and if you don't see what you want the voice will get it for you, if it possibly can.

One of the most popular give-aways is AF Manual 1-2, *United States Air Force Basic Doctrine,* a small, thin pamphlet with a blue paper cover. If you pass it by the voice is likely to call your attention to it and insist that you should have a copy. If you have one, take it along and give it to a friend."

AFM 1-2 is hardly a document to fight a hot war by, but as a homily on the virtues of air power and specifically, USAF air power, it is one more arrow in the Air Force's quiver of weapons designed to win public acceptance and support.

ONE day in the first week of the New Year, *The New York Times* published a front-page story by one of its Washington correspondents under the head: "Army Manual Holds Service Merits Rating as Top Force."

The story that followed quoted extensively from the first five pages of a new edition of Army Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations.* This new FM 100-5 consists of 230 pages. But it was the first chapter of five pages that attracted the attention of the *Times* reporter. And they could well have been marked "For Public Attention—All Papers Please Copy."

In those five pages the Army tells its story: tells why it is "the decisive component of the military structure."

WE are told that cadets, ROTC students and young officers have questions and doubts about the Army's future—their future. We don't have to be told that many citizens jump to the conclusion that armies are outmoded in the Atomic Age.

Given the first five pages of FM 100-5, any reasonably alert soldier could fashion a convincing five- or fifty-minute talk on the Army's story—a story that has a future. Some months ago the Vice Chief of Staff urged soldiers to "Tell the Army's Story." Well, here it is—from 100-5.

ARMY FORCES . . .
the decisive component

ARMY forces, as land forces, are the decisive component of the military structure by virtue of their unique ability to close with and destroy the organized and irregular forces of an enemy power or coalition of powers; to seize and control critical land areas and enemy lines of communications and bases of production and supply; and to defend those areas essential to the prosecution of a war by the United States and its allies. In addition, Army forces have the unique capability to accomplish any or all of the following tasks under all conditions of terrain and weather.

¶ Insure a positive defense against enemy land forces.

¶ Apply pressure of a sustained nature on the enemy land forces.

¶ Combat guerilla forces on the ground and suppress revolutions.

¶ Force enemy land forces to mass in numbers so that his vulnerability to all types of assault is increased.

¶ Prevent enemy land forces from large-scale infiltrations into friendly rear areas.

¶ Provide positive and continuous control of the enemy's land areas and the populations therein, and enforce surrender terms, once victory has been achieved.

Supporting Forces

During the course of military operations Army forces, because of their decisive capabilities, are supported from time to time by other military components as the nature of the situation may require. Thus, sea forces may convey field units to the theater of operations or to tactical objectives within the theater, support land operations by combat aircraft and gun fire, and furnish logistical support during operations on land, a role which includes keeping open the lines of communication by engaging hostile sea forces. In like manner, air forces may provide transportation for field units in strategic or tactical operations, afford logistical support in certain circumstances, provide defensive cover over the combat zone, and serve as mid-range fire support elements against hostile field units or a very long-range weapons delivery system against rear area installations supporting hostile field forces. In any case, the efforts of all components are directed toward insuring the success of the land force operation.

Doctrine

The *basic doctrine* of Army operations is *the defeat of an enemy by application of military power directly or indirectly against the armed forces which support his political structure.* Though Army forces do not deliberately make or invite war upon civilian populations, damage to civilian economies and enemy centers of population is an incident to military operations that may be unavoidable. *In general, indiscriminate destruction is unjustifiable in a military sense, since the Army destroys the instruments of enemy political force but does not destroy the bases on which a peace can be built when the conflict is over.*

Overall Mission of Army Forces

The broad mission of Army forces in war is to *bring to bear upon an enemy's military capacity sufficient power at decisive points and times to render it ineffective.* During time of peace, the mission of Army forces is the preparation, by organization, training, equipment, and indoctrination, of field units capable of performing their wartime missions. In the accomplishment of this objective *all military, economic, and psychological means are used except those banned by international agreement or those whose employment would defeat the aims of national policy.* The possibility that an enemy may initiate the use of means banned by international agreement necessitates equipment, training, and plans to insure *prompt application of countermeasures.* During periods of peace and war, Army forces, in conjunction with Air and Naval forces, have the overall mission of supporting national policies and objectives. *Their maintenance in proper balance is essential* if the objectives of national policy are to be attained. Forces in proper balance are those allocated from land, naval, and air forces or from the elements of any one or more of these, *to meet the requirements of a given mission* and trained to operate in concert for a single purpose. A mobilization base to support these forces and to serve as a reservoir during periods of wartime expansion is fundamental to the effectiveness of the forces, especially the Army forces.

Employment

The nature of the political situation at any time may require employment of armed forces in *wars of limited objective.* In such cases, the objective ordinarily will be the *destruction* of the aggressor forces and the *restoration* of the political and territorial integrity of the friendly nation. Hostile forces in such limited wars are likely to be drawn from the populations of satellite countries, and be provided with minimum equipment by a major power. Generally, such forces will be composed of field units inured to hardship and *rarely susceptible to interdiction* by air or sea forces. Additionally, the nature of a war to halt aggression will dictate, at least initially, operations in friendly territory. And, finally, political considerations may prevent application of air measures against powers affording material support to the ostensible aggressor. *The continuing possibility of such limited wars requires the maintenance in being of Army forces capable of immediate commitment and fully organized, trained, and equipped for combat, and at the same time possessing a capability of strategic mobility.* Ordinarily, Army forces committed in such wars will be supported by sea and air forces at great distances from the continental United States. Army units organized, trained, and held available for commitment in wars of limited objective are equally available for commitment in a general war. Of land forces in being, only those of the Army are organ-

ized, equipped, and staffed to sustain themselves over extended periods under all foreseeable conditions of combat.

Command

Once military operations have begun, they cannot be conducted as two or three coordinated, but separate efforts. The efforts of all components of the military forces must be directed toward attainment of the same general objective and under one commander. In each strategic or tactical fraction of the whole effort joint forces may be employed. In the latter instances, all other components will be operating in support of the Army component. Overall command normally is vested in the Army commander; technical details of the operations of supporting elements will be the responsibility of supporting element commanders. *Coordination of effort, especially in tactical operations, cannot be substituted for command.*

Limitations

Military forces are justifiable only as instruments of national policy in the attainment of national objectives. Since war is a political act, its broad and final objectives are political; therefore, its conduct must conform to policy and its outcome realize the objectives of policy. Victory alone as an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the realization of national objectives. If the policy objectives are to be realized, policy and not interim expediency must govern the application of military power. Except in the prosecution of war in furtherance of a policy of ruthless annihilation, *Army forces most nearly conform to the requirements of national policy, since Army forces are designed to apply power directly against military power, with minimum damage to civilian populations and economies.*

General Considerations for Operations

While the doctrines of combat operations are neither numerous nor complex, their application may be difficult. Knowledge of doctrine and experience in its application provide a sound basis for action in combat. These also enable the commander to utilize the capabilities of his force in the manner best suited to the accomplishment of his specific mission.

Set rules and methods must be avoided. In its exposition of the principles which govern the application of military power, this manual does not establish inflexible rules, conformity with which guarantees success. Individuals using it should consider it the foundation upon which experience and imagination may contribute to the development of successful military concepts. The manual will be used to provide guidelines to govern the actions of individuals serving in positions of combat leadership, in positions interrelated with the other Military Services, and to serve as a firm basis for the utilization of Army doctrine in the Army's military educational system.

The principles governing the conduct of military operations, the Principles of War, are immutable, but doctrines, tactics, and techniques must be modified with advances in weapons and weapons systems, transportation, and other means applicable to war. The tactics and technique of employment of a new development must be kept abreast of the progress of the development itself. Flexibility of thought, as well as of action, is essential.

The projection of the tactical effect of a new development must be based upon a realistic consideration of its characteristics and progress in development in related fields. Thus a weapon whose deadliness dictates increased dispersion to reduce casualties may be offset by developments in signal communications and transportation, which permit the desired dispersion without reduction in cohesion and control.

Sound conclusions concerning the tactical effect of a new development form the basis for consideration of new tactical doctrine. Usually, a new development merely extends the capabilities of existing agencies without necessitating radical revision of existing doctrine. Thus, within the broad scope of existing tactics and doctrine, as an example, ground-launched guided missiles extend the range and power of artillery. In exceptional cases a development may possess potentialities which dictate radical revision of the conduct of tactical operations. History has provided the examples of the crossbow, firearms, automatic weapons, and other developments. The full import and extent of changes resulting from the employment of the latest developments, the nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and the guided missiles, is not clear at this time. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that all officers carefully evaluate every situation, both static and fluid, considering the enhanced capabilities of each opponent at a result of employment of the weapons and the limitations imposed on the use of the forces as a result of the availability of the weapons.

The analysis of the impact of new developments upon the doctrine and tactics of the combined arms must be accurate, constant, and detailed. Military thought must be alert to modify the doctrine set forth in these regulations as appropriate.

Mission for the Army: the Winning of World War III

This article is the product of discussion and study by a number of soldiers whose interest in their profession goes far beyond their daily duty. Its purpose is to suggest a program of action that the government of the U. S. can profitably delegate to the U. S. Army in the interests of national security. It is also designed to reassure those few soldiers who have expressed concern about the future of their profession. We believe this article shows them that the Army is and must continue to be a dominant military force.

WE must recognize the creeping aggression that we call the Cold War for what it is: World War III. If World War IV—the nuclear and thermonuclear war—comes it will be because of our failure to meet and defeat the present Soviet challenge.

We believe it demonstrable that U. S. concentration on preparing for thermonuclear war has weakened our power to resist creeping aggression. Our reluctance to face up to the fact that we can be destroyed piecemeal as well as in one overpowering assault threatens us with defeat in World War III.

In the next few paragraphs we "brief" some evidence that shows how our preoccupation with war with a "big bang" has limited the execution of plans and operations that will protect us from defeat in World War III.

- Our reliance on nuclear weapons and strategic air-delivery systems has been a clear signal to the Communists that our real preparations are for a final showdown and that we are largely unprepared to stop limited aggression.
- Our success in building military strength in Europe has given the Communists the opportunity to move in Asia. Communist success in Asia may mean the eventual encirclement of Europe via the Middle East and the isolation of Europe from the U. S. "The road to London lies through Peiping," Lenin said many years ago. That road may also lead to Washington.
- The inhibitions and frustrations of the Korean war should not paralyze us into inaction. Asia is the active theater of World War III, and such phrases as "the wrong war in the wrong place" and "we should never let our armies become bogged down on the mainland of Asia" will not change this situation. We do not necessarily have to let the enemy choose the battlefield, but we do have to counter his moves directly or indirectly, and up to now our only indirect counter has been the threat of "massive retaliation"—which he considers a massive bluff on our part.
- We must face up to the fact that creeping aggression is *military aggression* as well as internal subversion and propaganda. Greece, Korea, and Indochina that clear. The ultimate aims of subversion and prop da are to pave the way for armed aggression. Indee have that from the mouth of a key Communist sp man who, at a policy conference in Peiping in said: "Armed struggle can, and must, be the main in the people's liberation struggles in many colonia semi-colonial countries. But this does not mean armed struggle does not need the coordination of forms of the struggle."
- In a brilliant analysis in this magazine last n Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg demonstrated the "parallel between tactical patterns and grow the Viet Minh and of the Red Chinese in the Ch civil war is so precise that even the circumstances day's truce predict tomorrow's trouble."

Today's truce predicts tomorrow's trouble—that p is a clear warning that we must take steps to stop a sion in Asia—or lose World War III.

The Army: Decisive arm in war

UNLIKE the Air Force, the Army cannot concei on one kind of warfare. National security rec the Army to prepare to fight in all kinds: genera limited, conventional and thermonuclear.

It is not a downgrading or belittling of the A vital roles in Europe or in an atomic war to say th Communist bid for Asia is an important and signi challenge to the Army. In the words of the latest ec of FM 100-5, "The continued possibility of such li wars requires the maintenance in being of army fully organized, trained and equipped for combat at the same time possessing a capacity for strategic r ity."

Thus the Army must build an alternate military capable of checking creeping aggression in the e nuclear parity. If such an army is not created and tained we will be postponing the ultimate decisi times and places and means of the Soviet's own cho If we do create such forces and win World Wa World War IV may never happen. The stakes are

To win World War II we must overcome inhib that now chain us. It has generally been conclude a military deployment capable of coping with nib aggression would result in an undesirable dispersi US forces in a thin line around the Soviet perip The task is frequently presented as impossible. specter of unlimited Communist manpower is a raised whenever the recurrent issue of confronting munist aggression in Asia arises. The "fact" tha monolithic Soviet bloc can exploit the advantages

erior lines" position is also advanced to explain why hing can be done to check the Red tide.

t would be the height of military folly, of course, to to contain the Soviet orbit by dispersing a thin line nen around the Red periphery. Even the original tainment policy recognized this fallacy in recom- nding the creation of selected positions of strength. wever, in the implementation of the containment cy few such positions were created.

'he geographic realities of Asia belie the "interior s" advantage which the Communists reputedly pos- . Asia is a whole series of vast terrain compartments, munication between which is far more difficult by l than it is by sea. By exploiting sea and air power Free World, particularly the U.S., has a great capa- y to concentrate at a particular point on the rim of . In terms of effective manpower, the Communist les do not enjoy the overwhelming numerical superi- commonly attributed to them. Even "unlimited" power must be trained and must be supervised by ed noncoms and officers. These requirements set a real limit on the amount of men the Communists place on the field. Difficulties of supply and of com- nications further reduce the effective forces which Communists can support in any one area. Neither Russian nor the Chinese Communists have demon- ed a capacity or a desire to conduct two military paigns simultaneously.

'he cards are not completely stacked against us. We ld not avoid fighting a limited war just because it pens to be in Asia, particularly if it could be advan- ous to us. The decision to fight in Korea was an im- se gain for the Free World. A limited victory in a, one that resulted in a peace involving a with- val of Chinese Communist support from the Viet h, would have been even more useful.

E Communist challenge in Asia can be met and strated if the U.S., in concert with its Asiatic allies, ses a method and creates forces for defeating overt ession. Taking into regard the strategic situation in , land forces of moderate size, of high tactical mobil- nd capable of using air and naval support, could tively block Communist aggression.

his aspect of the problem is receiving recognition out- the Government. In a study, *The Requirements of rrence,* prepared at Princeton University's Center nternational Studies, William W. Kaufmann con- es: ". . . if we are to reduce our dangerous depend- on massive retaliation and the instrumentality of , we must strengthen the other arms of the services. most obvious need is in the ground forces. . . . The al air forces probably suffer from undernourishment ell."

o check Communist expansion in Asia we must have ary forces and a strategy for their employment. Si- aneously we must help these countries counter Com- ist subversion and internal insurrection. These ef- must be designed to march in harness or both may

Territorial conquest by Communism has never occurred without the application of force despite the illusion that the military goal of conquest can be attained by propaganda and other nonviolent pressures. This illusion has led us to give more consideration to economic and technical assistance than to creating and maintaining the military shield which will alone insure the success of our assistance programs. Communist strategic planners have never believed that they can win their aims without ultimate resort to military action. If the Communist strategy of the future is consistent with that of the past, subversion will be only a prelude to the ultimate use of force.

We must therefore be prepared to check overt aggression as well as subversive infiltration. If it can be demonstrated that it is possible to stop limited aggression by limited wars without an extraordinary drain on our resources, the security position of the entire Free World will be enhanced.

SHORTLY after the outbreak of the Korean war we began in earnest to train free Asians to defend themselves. The most striking illustration of this program was in Korea, where some twenty divisions were organized and trained. The cost of maintaining these forces into the indefinite future runs into hundreds of millions of dollars a year. The strain of keeping so many men under arms is too much for Korea itself. Thus, considerable additional economic assistance is necessary. An effort to create equivalent forces in all the threatened countries of Southeast Asia would be stupendous and expensive. This has been recognized and the trend now is toward placing limitations on the size of indigenous forces that are supported by us. "Massive retaliation" is supposed to take up the slack. It has been advocated that we should build up constabulary type forces designed primarily to maintain border security and assure internal control against Communist agents. Such a counter swing of the pendulum, however, would not solve the problem. Security forces, comparable to those maintained in Korea prior to 1950, would not be able to take the shock of overt aggression.

A compromise provides the solution. If, in each threatened country, a few suitably organized divisions are formed, the nucleus of resistance to external attack would be on hand. These divisions could also serve to train an indigenous reserve force to be called up in the event of hostilities.

Two or three indigenous divisions by themselves would not be able to check the Communist forces that could be pitted against any country of Southeast Asia. But if they could be rapidly reinforced by mobile U.S. task forces situated within the general area, they should be adequate to withstand the early Communist concentration. The necessity for providing such reinforcement was stated by President Eisenhower in a published letter to Secretary Wilson on 5 January 1955:

"To provide for meeting lesser hostile action—such as local aggression not broadened by the intervention of a major aggressor's forces—growing reliance can be placed

upon the forces now being built and strengthened in many areas of the free world. But because this reliance cannot be complete, and because our own vital interests, collective security and pledged faith might well be involved, there remain certain contigencies *for which the United Nations should be ready with mobile forces to help indigenous troops deter local aggression, direct or indirect.*" [Italics added.]

MOBILE forces organized and located regionally can provide a demonstrable capability to defend the threatened areas. U.S. and allied forces already exist in the Korea-Japan area. Elements of similar task forces are already on hand in various parts of Southeast Asia. Additional U.S. Army divisions, located perhaps in the Philippines, could provide the deterrent force needed for Southeast Asia. Subsequently, a comparable force could be organized for the Middle East to assure protection to that exposed region.

These task forces could be designed to use atomic weapons, even though under certain circumstances the weapons themselves might not be used. Whether or not atomic weapons were used, we should devise a concept for meeting aggression on a limited basis without invoking general war, but without precluding limited retaliation against the source of the aggression. In general, we should seek to limit the area of the conflict without necessarily limiting the means we use to check aggression. Some will object that any employment of atomic weapons in a limited war will necessarily bring about a general nuclear war. According to this view, an aggressor will widen the conflict if defeat seems inevitable. The logic of this argument does not stand up in the thermonuclear age. It implies that a loss of face resulting from a setback to limited aggression would be less acceptable to Communist leaders than the nuclear destruction of their own countries. Communist rulers probably have just as much interest in preventing a general nuclear war as do the leaders of the West. Whatever limitations may be imposed, we must be able to defeat the aggressor and every effort must be made to save the victim country from utter ruin. If these general principles are adopted, this concept would be given support by the free peoples of Asia. A few of the countries located along the arc stretching from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan might be able to develop forces in excess of their immediate needs and also make a contribution to the mobile UN task forces established to deter aggression in the various threatened regions.

The Army's Paramount Role

ALTHOUGH these task forces will comprise elements of all the services, the Army's contribution would be paramount. This confirms the axiom suggested by Raymond Aron that "regular armies have no substitute as instruments of the cold war." When the Army adopts the blocking of creeping expansion as a basic mission, it can take the many practical steps. Many of the problems we ran into in Korea resulted from our efforts to remake Korea into a western European or American type of theater of combat. The engineer effort required in was prodigious, but was it all necessary? It is possi fight and fight well in Asia without all the impedir and logistical detail to which we have become tomed. This squares with the growing conviction atomic weapons will demand an army able to li austerity.

Certain of Field Marshal Montgomery's recomm tions for an army required to fight a general nuclea are quite in line with what we need to fight limited in Asia. Let's check off some of them.

". . . Armies must develop a more lively and o tunity type of battle leader than exists at present, in junior and senior ranks. Such a leader must hav imagination, the daring, and the resources to seize ing local opportunities; he must be trained to act pendently and immediately within the framework general plan, rather than on precise and detailed or only after reference to a superior.

"Land forces must become less dependent on and more capable of cross-country movement.

"The supply system of land armies must be str lined. They must become much less dependent on lines of supply such as roads and railways.

"Armies need a simple line of supply based o airlift. Today, when supply lines are cut by enem tion, armies cease to operate efficiently. The syste the future should provide air supply to forward r tenance areas from base depots many miles to the and well dispersed.

". . . The airlift from base depots to forward r tenance areas must be by some type of 'vertical lift craft, which can take off and land vertically, and w fly at a fast speed like an ordinary aircraft in level fl

". . . There is clearly a tremendous future for 've lift' aircraft, and it must be exploited for the benef land forces. . . ."

The Army must have the new, light weapons are easy to handle and effective in Asian combat setting requirements for equipment, transport, ordn and supply, the Army must continue to stress simpl and lightness. Every item of equipment should be signed to make it easier to train indigenous troops to it. Services and facilities which are desirable but necessary for fighting effectiveness must be elimin

In training we must stress the adverse terrain weather conditions which are encountered in most A areas. Only an army with the highest standards of p ciency, discipline and general military effectiveness stop creeping aggression.

There is no room in this discussion for commen tactics. It is well to observe, however, that many valu objective lessons can be gleaned from our experie in Greece, Korea, the Burma campaign of World II, British operations against the Communists in Mal and the long conflict in Indochina.

A highly important part of this total concept for ping creeping aggression—and winning World III—is the example, guidance and leadership the U.S.

HOW THE COMMUNISTS PLAN TO "CREEP" TO WORLD DOMINATION IN 20 YEARS

This map-report is based on a plan purportedly outlined by Red China's Mao Tse-tung at a meeting of Communist leaders. The plan was published in the Congressional Record of 29 April 1954.

1. **JAPAN. Make a show of force and create a "peaceful revolution"**
2. **KOREA. Continue armistice until showdown favors the Communists**
3. **INDOCHINA. Take over not later than 1956**
4. **FORMOSA. Work for UN trusteeship as interim measure**
5. **MALAYA. Encircle and force British to withdraw**
6. **MIDDLE EAST-INDIA-BURMA. Penetrate by economic and cooperative measures**
7. **AFRICA. Revolution**
8. **WESTERN EUROPE. Economic collapse after encirclement**
9. **SOUTH AMERICA. Penetrate after economic collapse**
10. **NORTH AMERICA. Isolate.**

the free nations with whom it is working. It is im-
ant that soldiers assigned to MAAG missions always
carefully selected and trained for their task. Profi-
cy in the language of the country is necessary and
intellectual ability to acquire an insight into the real
ivations of the people of the country is desirable.
hly trained, knowledgeable men assigned to MAAG
ions do much more than merely give advice on mili-
matters. They can contribute to activities that will stabilize the internal affairs of the country and thus make it less susceptible to Communist subversion and propaganda. But the most important task of these cadres will be in training military leaders.

The Communists have made headway in Asia because they long ago recognized the importance of selecting and training men capable of organizing revolutionary armies. As Lenin once expressed it, "We see innumerable examples of how the better organized, more class-

conscious, and better armed minority forces its will upon the majority and vanquishes it." Because Communist warfare cannot be treated in isolated pockets, a new approach to the problem of leadership training in the threatened countries of Asia is essential. The U.S. Army will have vast numbers of potential indigenous leaders passing through its training establishments, and thus it can play an important role in developing men capable of coping with a wide array of Communist maneuvers. This training must not be satisfied solely with technical proficiency (how many Chinese fighting against us in Korea were trained in U.S.-operated schools?); it must also be designed to build a mental bridge between America and Asia.

Our experience in Korea is most revealing here. We had little success in building effective Korean military units until we were able to concentrate on creating a strong corps of Korean officers and noncommissioned officers. Success in this activity can in time overcome failures in other activities for intelligent, knowledgeable indigenous leadership will support our objectives not only within their own military forces but within the whole government. For the best of these U.S. trained leaders will almost invariably become important governmental officials.

In short, the infinitely complex and difficult task of our MAAG missions cannot be understressed. It is an important task that demands the best efforts of our Army leadership. The Army has the competence to perform it —providing it receives the full support of our entire government leadership.

The Summing Up

THE power vacuum in Asia can be filled only by the U. S. Army. If it is given the task, military strategy will truly serve diplomacy. Once we demonstrate that we have a powerful and effective alternate to nuclear war, Communism will be thrown on the defensive and many of the fears and tensions which now fret the Free World alliance will disappear.

The problem is both a political and a military one. The absence of effective, flexible Free World military forces in Asia makes Communist subversion easier. The Communist threat has military, social, and economic facets. The closest coordination will have to be effected between civilian agencies coping with the social and economic challenge of Communism and the military men assigned to develop means, including indigenous forces, to close the door against "local wars."

Our Korean experience has demonstrated that Asian nations will welcome U.S. participation in the defense of their independence. Collective security for Asia is possible when it becomes evident that we are prepared to put appropriate military flesh on the bare bones of any political commitments we may make.

The designation of the Department of the Army as the Executive Agency for the government for developing the military answer to local aggresion would be a forward step. Responsibility for planning and action in the Cold War must be clearly fixed. Of all the services, only the Army is capable of combating creeping ag sion. Occupation duty in Japan and Germany, ex ence of its Constabulary in Germany, anti-Comm campaigns in Greece, the war in Korea, and far- MAAG missions have given the Army a large rese of experienced men who are able to develop a pro against creeping expansion.

Such a military program demands a more vigo defense effort than is currently planned. We also face the reality of the conflict which is now b fought to our disadvantage and make military pre tions that will not only stop creeping aggression but also be an insurance policy against the holocaus thermonuclear war. The Army's immediate duty i furnish information which will be a basis for public derstanding of the issues involved. When our citi understand why creeping aggression must be stop they will make provision for an army adequate to charge this mission.

The point of view represented in this article has s differences from that expressed in the "State of Union" message: "The forthcoming military budget emphasizes modern air power in the Air Force, N and Marine Corps. . . . It provides for reductio forces in certain categories and their expansion in ot to fit them into the military realities of our time."

Closely related to the Army's ability to check cree expansion is the proposed plan to enlarge and invig the Ready Reserve forces. This desirable objective be attained in part by means of funds made availabl a big reduction in the Army's standing forces. Pres ably the forces to be cut are "in excess of the nati immediate needs." If we are to maintain the bala and flexible armed forces required to block creeping gression, the decision to cut down active forces in o to build up the reserves merits the closest scrutiny. reserve program should be designed to fulfill mili needs beyond those of meeting creeping aggression and the initial tasks of a possible general war. For first purpose the U.S. presently lacks adequate mean terms of ready Army divisions, and the cuts will enlarge this critical deficiency. As for the second p most expert military opinion agrees that more is t gained by having an adequate regular force ready w hostilities begin than to depend on "trained" rese

A policy which does not recognize the dange limited aggression or will force the Army hastily to provise combat formations if called upon to fight (K June 1950) is not sound policy. It does not fit into military realities of our time. Creeping aggression n be checkmated as rapidly as nuclear attack if it is t checked at all.

Finally, this is not an argument for cutting down strategic air force. On the contrary, it is a plea for S *plus* the forces we need to stop creeping aggression. is it an argument for lessening the Army's vital inter in Europe and elsewhere. It is a challenge and a for meeting Communism wherever it threatens. It assure victory in World War III and very possibly m World War IV unnecessary.

The Evolution of MANAGEMENT FOR LOGISTICS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL W. B. PALMER

From a Lecture at the Army War College on 4 January

8 September 1954, the Army created a Deputy hief of Staff for Logistics. This officer was assigned principal functions: to be the Chief of Staff's advisor ll logistical matters and to direct and control the Technical Services. These had been also the func- of the predecessor office, that of Assistant Chief of for Logistics, usually known as G4, but the new ity was granted, in specific terms, authority over nissions, organization, procedures, personnel, train- and fiscal and business management of the Tech- Services. It was the absence of these specific grants h, more than anything else, had frustrated his pred- or.

ese changes resulted directly from a report by the tary of the Army which was approved by Secretary efense Wilson on 17 June 1954. The Secretary's t, in turn, followed a period of intense study and e upon the report of the (Davies) Advisory Com- e on Army Organization. Both of these reports l strongly for change, but change by evolution; warned against the danger of disruptive revolu- ry changes. And accordingly, we have taken some ive evolutionary steps.

e United States Army has a long history. Its or- ation at any moment of Time is something evolved

pressures of all its yesterdays. So let us take a look at the past of logistical organization, and then bring it into focus at this moment of Time.

ears of Chaos

en President Washington's first Secretary of War, al Henry Knox, first organized the War Depart- in 1789, he did so by establishing four bureaus— fices of the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster al, the Paymaster General, and the Judge Advo- As the years rolled on, new bureaus were created: the Chief of Engineers, the Surgeon General, the Chief of Ordnance, and so on.

For more than a hundred years, the Chiefs of what we now call the Administrative and Technical Services were not really part of the Army and some of them were not even Army officers. What they were, in fact and in law, was heads of bureaus in an Executive Department which numbered the Army among its numerous responsibilities. They reported to the Secretary of War personally and took orders from nobody else. This departmental bureaucracy was something quite apart from the Army.



The official head of the Army was the senior line general, and he had the title of "Commanding General of the Army" or sometimes "General-in-Chief." He was the most frustrated man in the Army as well as the highest-ranking. He had no authority over the bureau chiefs; and whenever he tried to butt in they told him the Army had nothing to say about it. That may sound absurd and impossible, but it is absolutely true.

From the soldier's point of view, this strictly bureaucratic approach to military affairs had a thousand grave defects, but the gravest of them all was this: *the War Department possessed no means whatever to relate its actions to the conduct of war.* There was no agency to collect and evaluate intelligence; to prepare strategic plans guided by that information; to prepare a mobilization plan based on that strategic plan; to compute matériel requirements based on the mobilization plan; to plan an industrial mobilization based on the matériel requirements; or to plan a budgetary program by which the appropriations might be related to the probable strategic needs.

Birth of the General Staff

It was to fill this void that the General Staff was created in 1903, and the Chief of Staff was interposed

OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS

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E. F. Hart
Technical L'aison

G. O. Pehrson
Business & Industrial Manageme

Col. Arthur H. Black
Inspection Office

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Legal Office

between the Secretary of War and the bureau chiefs.

The bureau chiefs very naturally resented this interposition of the Chief of Staff. Nothing arouses resistance so certainly as being shoved from the source of power. However, it was not the Technical Services (as we now call them) that made the biggest fuss about it. The Adjutant General of that day defied the Chief of Staff so obstreperously that in 1912 he had to retire to avoid a court-martial; and even after his retirement he got a

rider into the Army Appropriation Bill to remove General Wood as Chief of Staff. President Taft vetoed the bill and the Army went unpaid for seven months.

Then in 1916 the Judge Advocate General swung a haymaker at the Chief of Staff, attacking his power in a long legal opinion. That round ended when Secretary Baker overruled the Judge Advocate General in a masterly legal opinion of his own. So as we entered World War I, the General Staff idea was still fighting for life —but not particularly with the Technical Services.

What interested the Technical Services was *money*. At that time, and for long after, Congress made the appropriations directly to the bureau chiefs—so much money to the Quartermaster General, so much to the Chief of Ordnance, and so on. Then the law would go into details about what the bureau chiefs would do with the money.

The bureau chiefs accepted the need for a General Staff to collect and evaluate intelligence and to prepare plans for possible wars; but they held onto their direct appropriations until after World War II (1950). The change even then was gradual. First, Congress gave the Secretary of Defense a broad authority over the money of all three services. Then Congress created the office of Comptroller for each of the services, and stopped making direct appropriations to the Technical Serv and the Comptroller took over the money.

This was probably the most important change made in the administration of the Army with the exception of the General Staff law itself, but don't me give you the impression that it was a victory for General Staff. It was a victory for the Defense Co troller.

How to Manage Logistics?

But we have gotten ahead of our story. Clearly sc thing of tremendous significance happened to the A about fifty years ago. It had been getting along (h ever awkwardly) for more than a hundred years, it come through the terrible strains of the Civil War; now all this commotion began with the little one-h Spanish-American War! Why?

What had happened was indeed significant: we undertaken an overseas war. That was what tore it. War Department collapsed when we took our first mo step into what has become a whole series of over wars; wars which have continually grown like the panding universe—bigger forces with more complex in more theaters on more continents at greater distai with more allies to assist, so that, try as we may to c them, our problems seem to rush constantly outw beyond our reach. It was the little one-horse Span American War that pulled the trigger. Patterns that been fairly stable for a hundred years have been sl ing ever since.

In World War I and on a greatly increased scale World War II, the stuffy little Departmental bure grew into huge industrial organizations, with arsen factories, depots, proving grounds, purchasing agenc schools, laboratories, ports, fleets, and a vast array technical troops with the field armies.

Since all these enormous enterprises were inten solely for the support of the combat arms, some age inevitably *had* to appear with the mission of coordi

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MAJ. GEN. R. W. COLGLAZIER, JR.
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Mil. Per. & Manpower Control

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Organization



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ıeir huge efforts with each other and with the mis- ı and plans of the Army. For fifty years, more or he Army has been seeking how to conform to the f life that these huge logistical enterprises have to ected and controlled by somebody.

World War I, after a lot of thrashing around, they y combined under one strong man the command rity and the General Staff planning over logistics. olution of 1918 was to organize the Purchase, Stor- hd Traffic Division, under General Goethals.

World War II the same thing happened. They the strong man in General Somervell. He moved the position of G4 to that of Commanding Gen- Army Service Forces. The technical services came his command, and the logistics planning was done staff.

r World War II effort in Europe likewise followed attern. General John C. H. Lee was made com- er of the Services of Supply in the European er. Time after time, a G4 division was established ETOUSA staff. One after another, General Lee wed them up and took back the G4 functions to lf. Finally he swallowed up the whole theater head- rs in his combination SOS-ETOUSA headquar- 1944.

these rare but very expensive experiments in war- ogistics all seem to yield the same answer. The on of executive authority over logistical operations ıe function of principal staff advisor for logistics ways given to one man when the pressure gets enough to squeeze out the theorists.

d Command Powers for G4

946, when the wartime organizations shrank down, decided to abolish Headquarters, Army Service , and to combine both the staff function and the ive authority in G4 of the General Staff. The command" is a good one to avoid unless you mean he complete sense. The authority G4 received was to "direct and control" the Technical Services. Under this formula, we went through the war emergency which began in June 1950.

This was no trivial test of the logistical organization. At the same time we were supporting the Korean campaigning, we were also undertaking the creation of Seventh Army in Germany, the creation of the Communications Zone in France, the far-flung MDAP programs and the farther-flung base construction programs. The logistical effort was certainly as great as in World

War I. The management combination of G4 and the seven technical services had a pretty fair test. It made mistakes but it was never in the slightest danger of collapse. *It was the first modern test in which we did* not *abandon our logistical organization and create a new one.*

As we emerged from the Korean conflict, there was good justification for these two conclusions:

- First, that the two functions of general manager of the seven Technical Services and principal staff advisor for logistics should be combined in one man; and
- Secondly, that G4 could handle the two jobs in a war emergency.

Defects in G4's Powers

From the day I returned from Korea to become G4, it was made crystal clear to me that I was completely responsible, both to the Chief of Staff and to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, for the logistical operations of the Army. That was what they meant by "direct and control."

But the one hundred per cent responsibility was not matched by corresponding authority. The effect of the so-called "General Staff concept" that had prevailed

since 1921 was to give four or five other General Staff agencies authority to intervene in Technical Services affairs. Since there was no one boss with full responsibility *and* authority for integrating and giving pattern to the system of seven Technical Services, they were left to seek their own salvation, each a separate little

world of its own. What they desperately needed was leadership provided by one boss who was not subject to the partial veto of four or five other authorities, each of whom claimed partial jurisdiction.

The recent changes in logistical organization are intended to furnish them precisely that leadership.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

The first step was to change G4 into a Deputy Chief of Staff.

The second and concurrent step was to spell out the grant of command authority, not only in all logistical matters but also in a number of things which G1, G3, the Comptroller, and others, had handled direct with Technical Services. What I hope we have accomplished, by adding all those words to my charter, is a real clarification of authority and responsibility.

That was all that was needed. There are no jealousies or feuds between me and the other gentlemen concerned. They are my lifelong friends. They have demonstrated so conclusively their right to my respect and their fitness for their high positions that I am always inclined to place their judgment ahead of my own.

It is a nice thing to be able to say that, in complete sincerity, about your associates—and it is that mutual trust and confidence above all else which makes our Army great. I hope and believe that the same feeling exists between me and the chiefs of the Technical Services.

And I want to make very clear—and this is important in order to be fair—that I have found the seven Technical Services entirely willing to play ball with me one



hundred per cent. It was no fault of theirs that there were defects in our teamwork.

Mr. Lovett's Buzz Saw

When Secretary of Defense Lovett left office two years ago, he said in his final report (18 November 1952): "A reorganization of the technical services would be no more painful than backing into a buzz saw, but I believe that it is long overdue."

I have great respect for Mr. Lovett, but after looking at the problems for two years, I am sure that we can isolate and define them and deal with them reason and I am sure I will have no scars afterward.

The seven technical services have reasonably di functions: a construction service, a communica service, a medical service, and a transportation se and then a supplier of consumer goods, a suppli munitions, and a supplier of toxic agents.

Each was born of the stern reality of war. The nothing which prevents their being changed whe new conditions make changes desirable. The Secr of the Army can transfer responsibilities among the a simple directive; there have been several such cha since 1940.

The difficulty heretofore has been that nobody full responsibility and authority to weld them i single, integrated system.

We have now taken that decisive, but not re tionary, step; and now I think we will quickly number of fuzzy areas along the fences between Technical Services. We will get busy clearing out underbrush. And then, I suspect, we will uncover a considerable number of problems, which have hampering us seriously all this time, undetected be they have been obscured by the brush.

We are already far advanced in creating uni supply and accounting procedures which will soon us a homogeneous supply system instead of seven similar systems.

We are already far advanced in gaining control o $24 billion inventory, buying only what we really and getting rid of what we no longer need and cl expensive depots which we can do without.

We are already far advanced in an attack on strangling problems of maintenance and repair par

Major Tasks Ahead

We must improve the whole system of develo logistical managers. For fifty years, we have h magnificent process for developing tactical comma to higher and higher responsibilities. Nobody can tend that these officers come to the higher commands a comparable readiness to deal with their logistica sponsibilities.

By the same process, highly trained G3s are now able in very sizable numbers, while highly trained are the scarcest article in the world. Yet the G4 j far more difficult. I speak from considerable experi in both fields.

We have the best-supplied, best-cared-for Army world has ever seen; but we can furnish the same se far more effectively. And we have got to do so, i United States is to survive into the twenty-first cen That is the real meaning of the recent change in logistical organization of the Army. That is where have arrived at this moment in Time.

Tough Preparation for a Tough Profession

BILL MAULDIN

EAD in a couple of news magazines ories about a young lieutenant, a ea veteran, who was court-martialed ntly for roughing up some trainees— ing one in dirt, hanging another by heels, and suchlike. Both articles, le agreeing that these tactics were of ious disciplinary value, seemed to ly that the lieutenant had a lot in his r. He was a recent combat veteran felt that present-day training meth- turn out softies who must be tough- l to battle the hard way, after arrival ie front. The idea seems to be that he young officer was guilty of was xcess of zeal.

his is a funny country. We take of an idea and go hog wild with ight after the Second World War, was a wave of revulsion against military, a fairly common postwar nomenon, only this time there was nly talk about throwing the Army he window but also of "reforming" ever fragment was left. Committees gh officers were appointed to study for a new, "attractive" Army, and bers of former soldiers with sugges- , including several like myself who'd some griping publicly, were invited stify.

bbody asked me what I thought t "tough" officers. Nobody needed they had the thought I was dumb gh to want a scoutmaster for a pla- leader, I doubt that they'd have d paper on my invitation. I don't very many of us who testified ved officers should wear enlisted uniforms, or drink in soldiers' , or abolish saluting in garrison.

ad only two crusades in mind. One that officers should eat the same as enlisted men. Not in the same though. It's nice for a fellow who nade the grade to have a tablecloth rivate dining room, away from the ng crockery of the big hall; he's d to eat like a gentleman, and he to eat like a gentleman, even if s to be taught how. But I meant

MAULDIN IN WORLD WAR II

"Wisht I could stand up and git some sleep."

The Infantry has to be tough

Copyright by Bill Mauldin

the chow should come from the same pots in the same kitchen, the simple theory being that it's the only sure-fire way to bring mismanagement in the culinary department to the attention of the proper authorities. I guess General Eisenhower himself must have felt strongly about this, because he said he'd be happy if he was remembered only as the man who reformed military cooking.

MY other thought, in which I was far from alone, was that soldiers exposed to combat should enjoy certain distinctions and pay scales which set them apart from others, not because the infantry's soul is any purer, but because it's more painful to get shot than merely bored in a war, regardless of any learned arguments to the contrary. Talking with other witnesses later, I don't recall any of them saying they were against discipline or hard training, or in favor of anarchy in the service.

Well, the ball of reform got rolling, and there was no stopping it. Public opinion said if the Army's wrong, let's remake it entirely. Sergeants couldn't cuss privates, even if a mulish character made it plain he understood only mule-skinner language. The result was that noncoms got nervous breakdowns from frustration and the privates did all the swearing. Saluting was dropped off post. Now, the salute is really a courteous acknowlegment from one warrior to another—or it's supposed to be, anyway—and obviously somebody has got to make the first move, so it's logical for it to be the lower-ranking one. I have nothing against throwing a highball on the street. If a soldier feels humbled by it he ought to wear civvies to town.

FOR a while before Korea, Army officers and noncoms were the most subdued characters imaginable, in constant dread that some offended subordinate would turn them in for being nasty to him. And I don't doubt that this produced some awfully innocent combat replacements, who, upon arrival in Korea, learned too late that it does no good to complain to the Inspector General about a Chinese stepping in your face. The pendulum swung too far. Probably there ought to be more realistic maneuvers, with trainees learning to function calmly under fire and to follow closely behind artillery, and surely the occasional accidents would be a worthwhile investment for a big return. There's nothing wrong with tough preparation for a tough profession.

But I hate to think of the pendulum starting a big swing back, because just as we seem to have confused treating a man fairly with spoiling him, we are likely to confuse toughness with sadism. The young lieutenant in the news stories would have been happier in the old Army, where it was a fairly popular notion that the way to inspire a man for battle was to make him want to kill his own officers.

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"An image of the society from which it springs"

SOLIDARITY

IS THE KEY TO THE MASS ARMY

CAPTAIN ROGER W. LITTLE

SOLDIERING is no longer a way of life. The techniques of the "old soldier" will not bring back "the old Army." For the modern Army is an image of the society in which it lives. From that society its members come, its valued images are formed, and its life is determined. To separate the Army from the larger society is to delude ourselves that an army can live by itself. And to understand the forces at work in the life of the soldier today, broad changes in the relationship between the civilian and the soldier must be examined.

The symptoms of a changed military life are well known. Old soldiers are "fading" from the Army—fading much faster than ever before. Some perceptive persons have said that the Army has lost its "soul"; others have located the missing element in the "heart." Wherever it is, the Army appears to many observers to have changed in such a way that men no longer stick with it as a "way of life," as they did when it was smaller, horse-drawn, poorly paid, and "hidebound" by tradition.

But we also hear those we trust say that the modern Army is a more "efficient" army. It has become larger, more mechanized, better paid, a "smarter" army (as measured by intelligence tests). In these respects the soldier has become more like the civilian, and the garrison more like the city.

Army of individuals or groups?

The conflict is between two theories that have been used to explain the life of the soldier: one psychological, the other sociological. But only the psychological theory has been considered a "scientific" theory. This is a

striking paradox of military thought: that a science of individuals should dominate in a social structure that depends so basically on groups. The failure to rise above an individualistic conception of military life has long obscured the progressive changes from a vocational army to a mass army.

For example, the psychological theory of emulation has long been a favorite prop of those who write and speak of military life. This theory explains human behavior in terms of "imitation." It is claimed that a person with high prestige will be imitated or "emulated" by a person with low prestige. Then, the entire social structure is explained as a hierarchy of positions, with men in the lower positions "imitating" those in higher positions. The structure can be changed only by the man at the top.

The sociological theory would contend that men in comparable positions of risk, status, or power develop standards that guide and regulate their behavior toward ideals. The standards and the ideals exist only in the sentiments of men who live and work together. They cannot be entirely determined by observation and experiment. But when they are expressed, they can be fitted together in a "big picture" which can be called a "social system." Now this is the frame of reference that a soldier uses when he refers to "my outfit," or a commander when he mentions "my men." A social system can conform with the standards of a larger organization or deviate from them.

The difference between the theories can be seen by the various explanations of the significance of such symbols as the uniform, the badge, or the ribbon. Colonel Yeuell [Army Combat Forces Journal, September 1954] has referred to these as "frills." Others describe them as "prestige symbols," and assume that they do something to the individual to make him a better soldier. Because they satisfy a "need," the soldier feels rewarded, or better motivated, or has higher "morale." These are individualistic explanations.

The sociological explanation would consider the effect of such symbols on the man's solidarity with a group. A fine uniform is not desired for the color of the cloth. The *right* to wear it is sought because it will mark the man as a member of a group. The man who wears it can belong to something, can *become* something more than his personality. Watch isolated soldiers in uniform come together among a crowd of civilians. The uniform assures them that they are not alone, that they share sentiments developed in common experiences. Or remember the rifleman away from his outfit at a rear echelon. With whom did he start a conversation? With the spit-and-polish headquarters clerk, or the parka rifleman from another regiment? Thus, clothes mar man, as one of your kind or not.

The same thing is true of badges and ribbons. mean something to the individual soldier only be *other people* around him respond to such symbols, because they enable the wearer to anticipate that an man who wears the same symbols has shared his ex ences or has done as much. They are symbols of sol ty. If badges and ribbons are no longer worn, it i cause they no longer mean as much as symbols of g solidarity, rather than because the soldier has los "need" for them.

Solidarity begets esprit

Consider, then, the problem of solidarity in the ern Army. Clear away the old catchwords like *e discipline* and *morale*. For it is out of solidarity esprit, discipline and morale arise. Solidarity is the ency of the members of a group to act together, to their own ideals. In doing so, they may reinforce orders of their leader or modify them. Where it not exist, there can be no discipline. It cannot b stilled or manufactured; it can only be nurtured preserved.

The problem of the modern Army is one of solida For, like the mass society in which we live, military have become more like crowds than neighborhoo regiments. Membership is constantly changing, persons moving in and out, up and down, and to w different stations. Under such conditions, the solid of the soldier with his group—some group—must be m tained. It can't be done by bringing back "the old Ar For large numbers, mobility, and closer contact betw the civilian and the soldier are creating a different A —the "mass army."

The Mass Army: The soldier finally stands alone

The mass army is an organization so vast that m bers can "place" one another only in terms of superficial external characteristics as insignia. T don't really "know" one another. The regiments are crowds, anonymous collections of people, consta changing before their members develop common st ards, and sharing few if any memories of the battl the bivouac. The mass soldier thinks of his role in Army as a temporary job, rather than a "calling" vocation, and compares it with other civilian jobs ra than other military jobs. Like the mass man of con porary society, he takes nothing for granted; what l to believe must first be demonstrated.

Thus, mass soldiers become increasingly dependent symbols, separated from the personal experience that h symbols represent. Insignia of rank or branch means re than personal knowledge of performance. Accomhments and experience are reflected by rows of ribs, instead of mutual recollections of service together distant time or place. There are so many specialized s in existence that a random contact between two liers rarely involves an opportunity to exchange tual experiences. As the circle of persons with com- experiences is progressively reduced, the number persons who can be depended upon as lasting friends ncreasingly limited. The mass soldier finally stands ne.

Industrial Image: The MOS is crucial

The replacement of the career soldier with the mass lier occurred in the guise of "efficiency." Military nization was consciously adapted to the image of the ustrial plant. Each step toward the attainment of ustrial management principles was described as "prog-." Personal agencies developed supermarket services the greatly increased number of men. As they did rituals and traditions were correspondingly discarded. Under industrial management principles, all activity st yield to criteria of "efficiency" and "utility," rather "good" or "right." Habits and customs must be le "systematic." But when the retreat parade is rened as a training device it loses its symbolic sigance as a demonstration of the unity of the regiment. "calls" are not the same when the bugler is pressed a microgroove and regulated by the night clerk at headquarters. Nor does the recruit develop the e attitudes toward a commander whom he meets on first page of the camp newspaper, as he did toward commander whom he met on the quad or the parade. The rise of the industrial image can be seen in two ds. First, the proportion of men "on the line" is dly decreasing, while the proportion of those reed to support them with indirect fire by long-range pons, to supply and to manage their activities, and ain and classify them for their assignments is rapidly easing. Secondly, modern communications devices so altered the spatial characteristics of control that y more activities can be centralized at relatively ote positions.

The military unit thus becomes more like the city the farm. There are fewer workers and more mans. The wide diversity of activities that must be coned requires a proliferation of staff agencies and ialists in administration. Even the commander ultimately becomes a "manager," approving policies formulated by his specialized staff, while the execution of decisions and the management of his men become mechanical rather than personal. Meanwhile, technological developments in communications increase the space between the commander and the men he is responsible for leading, even on the battlefield.

"Supermarket" services have been substituted for the "country store" relationship between the soldier and his commander. With masses of men personnel functions can be performed by category rather than by individuals. The replacement center is substituted for the recruit squad, and the separation center replaces retirement day. The recruit's destiny in his Army career is largely determined by the "job title" or military occupational specialty assigned to him in the initial classification. Because the MOS has such crucial significance in the soldier's fate, it acquires personal significance in behavior. A trade-union philosophy develops: the truck driver refuses to unload the truck, and the cook refuses to touch an unpeeled potato.

From one point of view, the military adaptation to the industrial image has worked well. For the career soldier was an "expensive" person to handle, and even more difficult to care for. He usually arrived in the outfit with only three or four other recruits and had to be trained by the company before he could "pull duty." He could not be exposed to the carefully organized and precisely scheduled program of the training center. No one knew what he could do until he had been tried on the job. There were no test scores to guide the personnel officer in selecting "the best man" as a clerk, a cook, or a truck driver. And his reenlistment crisis was met by an expensive ceremony involving the personal attention of the regimental commander. Now the separation center, with a battery of civilian clerks, ushers the old soldier out of "the home" he has made in the Army.

In contrast, the mass soldier handles easily, as easily as a packaged product from the assembly line. He is a personnel officer's dream. At each stage in his service career he can be "processed." He comes "ready made" from the training center and fits into regularly sized holes. From induction until discharge on the "belt line," his career can be planned, a procedure formulated, a policy applied, and the mass soldier conforms. So in many ways, he appears to be a "better" soldier.

At the same time, however, the size of the group with which the mass soldier can express solidarity becomes smaller. The number of things which he contacts, manipulates, or is expected to understand increases, while his own place in the total scheme becomes increasingly

vague. The "big picture" of specialized weapons, intricate systems of combat coordination, and personnel decisions from distant echelons, makes the "little picture" even smaller. The variety of contrasting impressions which are reacted to in even a single day, are interpreted against this background as inconsistency and confusion.

The Urban Image: The Army becomes a city

While the military unit has become more like the industrial plant, the Army as a whole has become more like the city. Three trends may be specified that have led to the dominance of the urban image in military life.

As the primary source of manpower shifts from rural to urban regions, the Army has more men from the city, fewer from the farm. Fewer men know that moss grows on the north side of trees, can follow the stars, or know how to shoot and care for weapons. Changes in the training program reflect the difference. It has been extended to teach subjects that recruits once brought with them. But the urban recruit also has more specialized skills than his rural father was likely to have had. It is now easier to find a clerk, a teacher, or a truck driver when one is needed.

The transition from a rural society to the mass army is most evident in the changes in the mode of life on the Army post. Particularly since the 1930s, the post has moved from a small, isolated "island" of military life, socially self-sufficient, to a heterogeneous community which functions more as a "servicing center" than a home of families living a common "way of life."

The post was always considered the "home" of a unit: a regiment or a battalion. The life of the post was related to the coordinated actions of this unit: the marksmanship contests in the spring, small tactical problems in the summer, and maneuvers in the fall. The limited number of specialized agencies were staffed by men from the regiment, on "special" duty. The unity of the regiment was symbolized by the retreat parade where old-timers were retired and newcomers were introduced. The ceremony was an impressive spectacle for all the participants and their families.

The class structure there, as in the civilian community, was clearly marked by the distinctive "way of life" of officers and enlisted men. The population of the post was stable; adequate housing was available for all officers and for most enlisted men in the positions of highest prestige. Standards of behavior, life goals, and social origins were more likely to correspond among the members of each status group (officers and enlisted men) than they are today.

The relationship between the commander and his men was an intimate one. Although seldom "frien it was continuous and predictable, strengthened b number and variety of occasions when they met toge Seniority was the primary criterion for promotion, it was accepted as "the right way" of getting al Transfers were rare, and usually restricted to ree ments at new stations. Task assignments were b general ones, such as "duty soldier" or "duty serge Members of the company were either "on duty" o special duty," a term which described the except specialist. The soldier—officer and enlisted man- esteemed by persons who had known him, in good t and bad. His "points" were in the outfit. If he lef outfit, he lost them.

The Army post, like the city, is no longer a h geneous community. According to a recent report, about forty per cent of permanent military perso actually live there. Even the most recent housing l lation fosters living off post over provision for hou on the post. Family contacts with the posts are lin to periodic visits to the post exchange, the commis or the medical facility. Such neighboring as may among soldiers and their families is increasingly lin to chance acquaintances rather than being determ by membership in a common unit.

The Army family is compelled to live in a commu where it lacks essential neighborhood ties. Housin the post has increased only ten per cent while the n ber of families has increased sixty per cent. The sca of rental housing, combined with the narrowed between the pay of officers and enlisted men has e nated differences in their ways of life. Both officers enlisted men take what they can find for living quar rather than selecting a type appropriate for their st

Persistent Congressional pressure has required replacement of soldiers on desk and other garrison t by civilian employees. Once a source of prestige the special-duty soldier, the exceptional specialist, rison jobs are now symbols of conflicting standard duty. Civilians must quit at 1700. Soldiers may, frequently do, work through the night without a tional pay. Beyond the economic significance of change, is the fact that soldiers think of themselve understanding one another. Personnel agencies, sta predominantly by a civilian force, must operate in te of objective criteria which may not reflect military siderations. The soldier's destiny is less frequently termined by "one of his own" at all echelons and off

The activity of the post is now highly routini providing few opportunities for coordinated social periences, except in the generality of daily existence.

sion is now the basic unit of the post, rather than regiment. Even the division is frequently augmented its equivalent in special units. The regiment is con-red a "shell" or cadre of permanent personnel and nees. Every four months a company receives a new of trainees to be "taken through the cycle" and dis-:hed to functioning units throughout the world, or o on to more specialized training. But the training f is carried on by a specialized group of instructors, er than "the old sergeants" of the outfit, who now er in small groups in the rear of the lecture hall to ll the glorious days of "the old Army."

Future of the Mass Army

he modern Army is thus the image of the modern ety. It has changed in response to broad changes in society itself. The Army and its members cannot is different so long as they live in close and constant tact with the civilian community. As the Army be-es more like the city, it fails to provide the same -term social rewards in itself. There is less contrast veen the civilian and the soldier. They both seek same rewards, they share the same standards. There longer a distinctive "way of life."

ince soldiers are basically civilians, they are not ivated to serve for periods sufficiently long to maintain le, functioning units. Indeed, when replaceable skills valued more highly than the stability which emerges living and working together over a long period of , there is less need for the career soldier. Civilian soldier can exchange places quickly and with little rbance to the whole organization when an emer-y demands more men.

he mass army is still in the process of development, ever. There remains much of "the old" in the mod-Army. Urban values are still in conflict with tradi-l rural values. But the dominance of the city in emporary life, the consequent urban values and at-les of future members of the Army, and the break-n in the isolation of the Army post, indicate that the es of the industrial plant and the city will ultimately inate military organization.

hen the day of the mass army finally arrives, it is able that military service, as a career, will be greatly ged and will involve a much smaller number of . Even combat will consist primarily of the coordi-n of diverse technical skills, and the managers er than "commanders") and technicians required be drawn from comparable roles in the mass society. ldiering as a "way of life" cannot be restored by ing more symbols or revising the old ones, by bringing out the swords and bands again, or by making discipline more severe. *The loss of the symbols and the discipline is a portent of the mass army.* The sword, the band, and the splendid uniform belong to an era when pageantry was as much a part of the society as of the army. If these symbols no longer induce an attitude of respect and deference on the city street, how can they be expected to do so on the quadrangle?

Similarly, increasing the severity of punishment for disciplinary problems will not *restore* discipline. For discipline is a product of solidarity, not the raw material. The mass soldier responds best to rules that he helps make. The standards to which the mass soldier will conform are those of the small group in which he feels at home. The problem of solidarity is to unite that small group with the larger components of military organization.

To dream of the old Army is only to conceal further a problem that must be faced and dealt with. The problem of solidarity does not necessarily destroy the potential effectiveness of an army in combat. Just as industrial organization has been able to cope with the problem and continue to maintain a high degree of efficiency, so can the mass army do the job for which it is designed: fighting wars.

What must be done, however, is to recognize that the solidarity of the mass army will be a constant problem. The maintenance of a career army will be increasingly difficult. Mobility between the army and civil life will become more rapid as jobs become more comparable, warfare more industrialized, and separate retirement systems eliminated. The pageantry and symbolism of the career soldier have been sacrificed for the easy handling of the mass soldier. Combat activity will become increasingly dependent on the solidarity of small units, the squad and the platoon, within which face-to-face relationships can be maintained. Commanders beyond the company will take on more of the characteristics of the manager, influencing the conduct of subordinate commanders by impersonal managerial techniques. Commanders at higher levels may continue to use the symbolic techniques of the historic commander but they will not be effective because the mass soldier does not understand them, nor do other members of the society from which he is recruited.

Still, the mass army will win wars or perform the tasks assigned to it. Mass soldiers will accept their jobs, the need to perform them and, if necessary, to sacrifice their lives in doing the task. But they will expect it to be done in a businesslike way, without fanfare and trumpets, and then go home.

The Proof of the Pudding

MAJOR MARK M. BOATNER III

Good training produces good soldiers. Our training suffers when it depends on formulas and rules rather than results

THE truth about our training programs is that they are good in theory and poor in practice.

I do not belittle our accomplishments in developing a fine program for training large masses of men. The Army Training Programs and the manuals on military instruction are fine.

But why did men go into combat in Korea who couldn't "march, shoot and obey"? Can we isolate and identify the block between theory and practice?

As soldiers we pride ourselves on being practical, down-to-earth, efficient people. We have tried to make our methods of instruction "scientific." We contend that "any good officer can be a good instructor." The only justification I can find for this erroneous idea is that it is administratively convenient.

The idea seems to be that any officer can be given a set of lesson plans and scripts (in my days there Benning called them "Vault Files") and, after proper preparation and rehearsal, stand up in front of a group and "teach." If teaching were a science this would be possible. But it isn't, and the evidence is that we all know of certain officers who, in spite of thorough preparation, were not effective teachers.

Our failure, I believe, is in trying to reduce to a formula the process not only of planning training programs but also of presenting instruction.

The Caine Mutiny was getting pretty close to the truth when it said, "The Navy is a master plan, designed by geniuses for execution by idiots." This is a very nasty thing for a civilian to say about our sister service. And let's not kid ourselves; it applies as much to any other branch of the services as it does to the Navy. But isn't it what we are subconsciously trying to do in our training: to make up a plan that is so round, so full, so soundly packed—so "foolproof" that it can be followed by near idiots?

WHAT is "good training"? How often have you seen this: An inspector finds that the instructor is properly prepared, has a lesson plan, uses visual aids, starts and ends his class precisely on time, uses eye contact and gestures, asks questions properly, and does not have his class facing the sun. Th lighted inspector reports that this "good training." But did you ever of a "training inspector" who rep that training was ineffective even th the instructor was doing all the t the book says an instructor shoul There is no inconsistency here. T ing can be judged only by whethe men were *learning things they n to know*. I repeat: learning, and ing things they needed to know.

Now we come to the principle "training is a command responsib We give lip service to this but we really follow through.

We will all agree that the abil bring troops to the highest possible of training and keep them there i hallmark of the true military le This calls for two distinct abilities. the leader must be able to see the nesses of his unit. Then he must how to prescribe training that wil rect those weaknesses. How many manders have you personally k who had the ability to do either— less both?

We have all seen this: The Old Man sses a soldier who fails to salute—or ybe he passes a couple of them. As n as he hits his desk he tells his ef of staff to get his 3 "up here ick." Then he gives it to him: "Mili- y discipline in this outfit stinks. I nt something done about it." Two ngs are "done about it." All subordi- e commanders are chewed out. The rd is passed that the Old Man is on a page about "military courtesy" and be damned sure to salute like mad the next few days. If things are l lax, next week's training schedule l have a couple of subjects knocked of it and several hours of Military urtesy and Discipline inserted. Is this elligent command interest in training?

You have seen this: A unit comes out the line for rest, recuperation and ning. While in the line it had had a ple of patrols shot up. The com- nder orders "emphasis on patrol train- ." So what happens? The 3 pre- bes a certain number of hours of rolling. Chances are the leader then s he has largely fulfilled his com- nd responsibility—has shown his per- al interest in training.

When his unit returns to the line, l they, as a result of the patrol train- perform any better on patrols? It l depend solely on the quality of the ruction—not on the quantity.

The commander must devote a little et thought to these problems. He st use some imagination and call on the experience of his military serv- Does the failure of a couple of men salute or the failure of a couple of ols prove that the outfit needs more rs of training in each of these sub- s? Might there not be other weak- es much more critical that the com- nder has not had the insight to detect? ut let's assume that training em- sis should be on military courtesy discipline. He has not finished when directs that more training time be oted to the subject. Men have been osed to thirty hours of Military rtesy and Discipline without be- ing one bit more courteous or better plined. The commander who directs ning must consider the training his have already received and then k out a training program that will uce the desired results. The formula 't work without some thought as to t values are to be emphasized.

he commander can't turn it over to 3. The 3 can't simply reach for the 's subject schedules. If he does, the t will be "training." It won't be ing.

Perhaps the most valuable thing to us right now would be some valid system for testing training effectiveness.

Our training is not progressive. At the end of World War I a British officer commented that, "Training has been chiefly composed of short periods out of the line recurring at varying intervals, during which in many units all ranks began again at the beginning and, in consequence, never reached the end." How true that is in our army! We begin at the beginning every time we "start training" and we never get to the end.

When training is closely controlled from topside, and there is insistence on sticking to "the formula," subordinate leaders get little opportunity to use the initiative that is the soul of good instruction. It's at the company level that training is actually implemented.

THE French have a method of developing leadership and training initiative on the part of their junior officers before a unit goes into combat. They run their people through the more or less conventional basic and unit training. But after this, at regular intervals, the platoon leader is turned loose with his platoon and left completely to his own devices. This is his chance to give them precisely what he thinks they need in the way of training. Every now and then the company, battalion or regimental commander drops by to see what the platoon is doing. Platoon Leader A may have all his men taking it easy in barracks—he feels his platoon has demonstrated sufficient proficiency to deserve a rest—or he can't honestly think of anything for them to do. Another platoon leader is at the head of the column on a four-hour march under full packs. A third is lecturing his men on tactics. And so on.

The company, battalion and regimental commanders in their inspections over a period of weeks find out which young officers are learning their trade, which are weak and need help, and which are hopeless and cannot be permitted to command in combat. The platoon leaders are themselves learning in the school of experience. They are getting used to working with their own men. Everyone is learning the strengths and limitations of the others *before the outfit gets into combat.*

Our platoon leaders need such opportunity to bridge the terrific gap between close training supervision and the complete lack of close supervision on the battlefield.

Good training must be simple and honest—designed to teach men, not to impress an inspector or a visiting dignitary. It must be progressive; it must eventually come to an end. It must be tailored to accomplish a specific end and evaluated only in terms of how well it achieves that specific end.

We must learn to distinguish between good training and "good training."

Junior officers should be given more freedom in training their units. Here a lieutenant gives instruction in hand-to-hand combat.

The Survivo

— to keep him in



CAPTAIN GEORGE TANHAM

may be all-important . . . how can it be done?

tomic wars victory in battle may go the side which learns how to restore survivors of atomic attacks to full at effectiveness fast. Through train- and indoctrination U.S. soldiers be convinced that just because they survived an atomic explosion their ing days are not over. They must to accept the fact that atomic ons are, and will be, a part of the al means of war, and that they must epared to continue the fight—just ey do after a heavy and prolonged ntration of conventional artillery But most important, they must e shown how they can fight most ively after they have survived an c attack.

ich has been written about how to e the number of casualties in c warfare. The most stressed meth- re dispersion of units and mobility to present only limited and fleeting s. Soldiers are taught that a deep provides the greatest degree of pro- n. Warning nets are discussed. The reas have plans for damage control he re-establishment of administra- upport. New forms of tactical and cal organization are proposed.

what should the front-line soldier survives an atomic attack do?

RENT doctrine stresses that the antry must stay in position, reor- , and fight after an enemy attack. s good doctrine in a linear defense the line is important and where hard-hit outfit could usually hold th the help of supporting artillery. omic warfare may force a modifica- this concept. In a mobile (hedge- defense the key factor is the fight- rce rather than the line, and so it e more important for the survivors atomic blast to leave certain areas ler to regroup and continue the Especially does this appear to be so since the large area of an atomic blast may mean the total disruption of all communications and the destruction of combat headquarters and artillery and other supporting units.

Thus there seems to be a strong case for a policy of having survivors of units especially hard hit leave the area and form up with survivors from other units, or join unharmed units. My purpose in this article is primarily to call attention to this problem and make a few suggestions.

PAST experience has shown that survivors can play an important or even decisive role in changing the outcome of battles or campaigns. The elder Moltke's question on a reported victory, "But where are the prisoners and guns?" shows clearly how he feared the rallying of enemy troops and was content only when large numbers of prisoners (potential survivors) had been bagged. In the recent war the dogged determination of the German troops at Cassino to survive massed artillery concentrations and air bombardment illustrates how effective survivors can be. In the desert, where tanks dominated warfare, it was Rommel's ability to retrieve and repair tanks (survivors) which often tilted the scale in his favor.

The United States, inferior in manpower to the Soviets, must use its front-line troops effectively in order to remedy this unbalance. Casualties are a part of war. There has never been certain protection from machine-gun or artillery fire. New and somewhat mysterious forms of death—radiation, for example—will cause casualties in future war. But, as in the past, men will have to carry out their missions, regardless, at times of high rates of casualties and almost certain death.

It would be most unfortunate if our soldiers got the idea that their fighting days were over when an atomic bomb dropped nearby.

Many historical cases may be used to illustrate the danger of soldiers believing that after surviving a given battle or event they did not have to fight again. Perhaps the most celebrated is that of the Nivelle offensive in World War I. Nivelle promised complete victory for his planned offensive in the spring of 1916. The French, tired and weary, accepted his word and spoke of "the last battle." The utter failure of the offensive, after promises of great success and the end of fighting, led to a widespread collapse of morale and to mutiny. Some U. S. forces in World War II had the mistaken idea that if they participated in certain landings or operations, they would go home. When they learned otherwise, a morale problem had to be solved. Such experiences show that our soldiers must be indoctrinated against the idea that an atomic explosion near their unit will automatically entail the replacement of the unit and the end of the fighting for its members. The soldier must be taught that when this happens he has just begun to fight.

THE Army believes that the atomic bomb, although a tremendously powerful weapon, is not an absolute one. It is integrating atomic weapons into its weapons systems and is devising tactics for them. This realistic approach should be matched by equally realistic appraisal of what soldiers are to do when they are on the receiving end of an atomic explosion. We stress digging in, dispersion, and mobility, but we have not yet told the soldier who survives what he should do. We seem to be inclined to write off units attacked by atomic weapons. Certainly the center-of-impact units must be written off, but it would be wasteful and foolish to write off the peripheral units that will have a varying

number of casualties, both of men and equipment.

Such peripheral units might have large numbers of survivors. Do these survivors remain in position, terrified, without orders, and unorganized, and at best offering sporadic resistance? Do they wait and join a replacing unit? Do they wander to the rear, cluttering up the area and perhaps spreading panic? Do they move to the left or to the right? Do they wait and become prisoners? We need a doctrine to meet these situations. These men can and must be used. And without delay or confusion arising from the lack of a plan.

Soldiers surviving an atomic attack will not, as some have suggested, likely be persuaded that the bomb is their friend and aid. However, fully aware of the effects and knowing that they are—temporarily, at least—alive, they must be made to realize that their greatest hope lies in continuing the fight. The fact that a soldier knows a bomb has been dropped is reasonable proof that he is not in the center of impact and that other men will also be alive and capable of fighting. Probably the enemy will follow the blast with a ground attack. The greatest safety for the soldier and his greatest contribution to the action is either to reform the unit if it is only slightly hurt, or to join another unit.

ONE of the most effective means of assisting in the re-formation of a hard-hit unit may be to provide every man—the leaders may be casualties—with directions to a rally point. With the present organization rally points may be by division according to arm of service, or by combat command or regimental combat team. The advantage of the former is that the commander can tell at once how many men of each arm he has. However, these men will be concentrated, and they will not be in a tactical disposition.

Rallying by combat command or RCT preserves the tactical disposition. But it has the disadvantage that the remnants might be so small or so one-sided (solely infantry or artillery) as to be unbalanced and of little value.

In certain cases prominent terrain features can be pointed out as the rally point. Considering the great and widespread destruction of atomic bombs, it may be wise to provide each man with a compass bearing (line of direction) and rough distance so that he may know the general area of the rally point. The mere fact that the men have some directions will help them adjust to the situation and speed their re-forming.

If the combat army becomes one consisting of small, self-contained tactical units, neighboring units (centers of resistance) may be used as rally points. Thus there would be automatic reinforcement of these hedgehogs by survivors of harder-hit neighbors. Communications and prearranged plans would determine which units stayed in place and which ones moved if a bomb hit several. Men should know the line of direction and distance to adjacent hedgehogs. Using this plan, reinforced hedgehogs would await the enemy push, hold the shoulder more effectively, and contribute to mobile defense counterattacks.

IF the enemy drops bombs on actual front-line troops he will probably withdraw his own forces before he does so (this is problematical; he may leave them in place and elect to take some casualties). In either case, his front line will not be in a strong position. This suggests that it might be advantageous as a general rule to have the rally points forward rather than to the rear or flank. If, for his own safety, the enemy drops his bombs behind the front lines, the friendly front positions may be intact and need the reinforcement of the survivors to meet the oncoming attack. The psychological advantage of moving forward is sound. Also, it enables the survivors to strike the enemy before his attack gains momentum. There are indications that the enemy is teaching his troops to advance immediately after an atomic blast.

If the enemy follows his atomic blast with conventional air and artillery attacks, troops on the move will be vulnerable. However, addition of the survivors to the hedgehogs or conventional unit rally points may be worth chancing a few additional casualties. Certainly where the unit is very hard hit this will be the case.

Though the confusion created by the atomic explosion may prevent the higher commander from effectively exercising his command, he should feel confident that his men are forming groups and preparing to continue to fight. If the men re-form automatically, it will save considerable time, and this may be a vital factor.

IN the process of moving and regrouping after an attack it would be particularly helpful if the men were to recognize fellow soldiers and especially their officers and noncoms. All survivors, including the enemy, will be covered with dust and dirt. This suggests the desirability of wearing identifying insignia, clearly discernible at fairly close range, but not so noticeable at ranges. The men must also be far with the insignia of neighboring ou As men move to the rally point, will recognize members of their and so be encouraged and reassured

During training, officers and non should become acquainted with, gain confidence in, officers and non of other units of the regiment or divi The identifying insignia would early recognition; familiarity with ers would give confidence and ease problem of regrouping. This woul particularly important if one or two were very hard hit and had few su ing leaders.

THE development of a survival would salvage many useful sol and units. In some cases these surv might slow down an oncoming a and allow replacement units to get position for defense or counterat They could also be helpful in provi information on the terrain and ge situation as well as on the damag flicted by the bomb. Instead of strag back or appearing demoralized and tively ineffective and thus discoura the replacing units, they would by organization and fighting capability courage and reinforce replacement u In the case of the new hedgehog ta the centers of resistance would re valuable reinforcements.

There are advantages for the ind ual soldier too. After surviving an a ic explosion, the soldier has the lem of "What do I do now?" If he k that he is to go (with his surviving lows) to a rally point to join other vivors, reorganize, and fight on, will be reassured.

Rally points would serve a useful pose even if not used to regroup fo mediate fighting. In such a case, vivors could withdraw in an orga and orderly manner to an assembly where they would be re-formed units, re-equipped and reinforced replacements, rested, and become a reserve. The return of front-line t in such an orderly manner would a reassuring effect on all soldiers.

THESE suggestions for solving the lem of the survivor are not the plete answer, but rather an attem stimulate thought on an important lem. In the search for greater protec greater mobility and new tactical or ization, we should not lose sight of survivor who is so important to Army and the successful accomp ment of its mission.

ɔND IN A SERIES

his Concerns You

An officer in CMD writes informally to a friend ordered to duty in CMD

Bob: So you think you should ve written to your Congressman eneral Chevy to get that ROTC ment you wanted! How unin- d are you, anyway? Don't you that your letter would have been ed to The Adjutant General, who l have bucked it to us here in ? The entire process might have ten or twelve days. The joker is he same answer would have been if you had written directly to your branch—and within three or four

w that you are coming to CMD e staff duty your career requires, soon see that intercession by out- ources or senior officers is unneces- Few officers have senior officers er persons of influence to appeal they are entitled to just as much eration as though they did. I say that you can't point out cases oritism in the Army, but I do we try to prevent it. The only el-skipping permitted is when a compassionate case requires im- te action.

rder to prepare you to answer let- ke yours, a rapid briefing on the workings of your new job may e shock of what's ahead.

eer Management Division (or Ko- anagement or Career Manglement ave heard them all) has sixty-five at work placing combat-arms of- where the Army needs them and le their careers in the process. We equalize the pleasant and un- t assignments for all officers. We always do it, but we try. The needs take precedence always.

theory of career management is . But like so many other theories, plementation sometimes gets off ck. You, for example, have a ter- cord as troop commander, but you taff work to develop your career. understand why your CO would keep you. The Good Book states hooling of officers is the responsi- f command, but fifty per cent of the Reserve officers who go to the advanced courses would never get there except for the intercession by CMD.

We in CMD are well aware that every person's problems are extremely important to him. From the viewpoint of handling some really tragic situations, a lot of the cases we get don't amount to a hill of beans *but,* to the officer, his problem is important. We recognize that when we try to solve his particular trouble. You have heard of the requests we have turned down, but have you heard of those we work out?

We are often accused of not reading the preference statements. I once took a test sampling and came to the conclusion that, if everyone were sent to the area of his first choice, Hawaii and Puerto Rico would sink, California would double in population, and Fourth and Fifth Army areas would have about two officers in each state in their areas.

As you know, all officers are encouraged to write their career branches about their problems. We get some unique ones, as you'll see.

I'll admit that I found it difficult to get all choked up over the young officer who just couldn't see his way to go overseas since he still owed $3,000 on his car.

One officer wrote a one-line letter: "When am I going overseas?" My secretary saved me by adding another paragraph to my response: "Dear Lieutenant Ducrot: March 1955. Sincerely, ———."

Humorous incidents aren't confined to the junior ranks. One colonel volunteered for overseas duty and, down in the corner of the letter his wife had written, "Approved, Mrs. ———."

The most unusual case I have reviewed was the officer who had a pack of lion and bear hounds. He wanted to be assigned to an area where he could use them. He asked for concurrent travel for the animals—and his wife.

YOU say that several officers in your outfit want to know their OEIs. Tell them I'm sorry, but we are not permitted to send OEIs through the mail. Officers on active duty (and only on active duty) can drop in any time during working hours and we will be most happy to give them the information they want. It would be a good idea for them to look at their entire record. If they can't drop in, have them designate a fellow officer as their representative (in writing) and we will let him look at the file.

[*The Secretary of the Association of the U.S. Army has performed this confidential service for many officers in the past and will continue to do so as long as the number of requests is not overly burdensome. A recommended authorization letter appears in the box on this page.* —Editor.]

Enjoy these last few days of troop duty, and I'll see you soon.

Sincerely,
Bill

P.S. This may come as a surprise, but I didn't know you were coming here until you had already been assigned.

AUTHORIZATION FOR A REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD

The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

I [name and service number, typed or printed], hereby certify that I am on active duty and request that Colonel Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR, Secretary, Association of the U. S. Army, my authorized representative, be allowed to review my personnel records in the same manner and under the same regulations as would be permitted if I presented myself in person for this purpose.

Signature
Grade
Service number
Current assignment

(Mail your letter to Colonel Symons at the Association's Office, 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. You can expect a delay of a couple of weeks for a report.)

How S2 Caught the Crooks

The mission was unusual and so were the methods

COLONEL WALLER B. BOOTH, JR.

IN the early post-World War II years, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, became a "problem" command. A sprawling military reservation consisting of a port on San Juan Bay, a general depot spread out over several square miles, and a post with barracks for two battalions and quarters for officers and senior NCOs, it handled vast quantities of supplies and equipment, and employed hundreds of local civilian laborers and clerical workers.

By the summer of 1947 the post, the port, and the general depot were plagued by fraud from within and thievery from without. Much equipment was in the open and two thirds of the perimeter of the installation was unfenced, so stealing was an easy matter. The 1st Battalion of the 65th Infantry and the 98th AAA Battalion were stationed on the post, but the guards these units were able to furnish could not cope with the situation.

Conditions steadily worsened. Finally, the commander decided to try some new techniques. He reasoned that methods used to catch spies could be used to trap crooks. He decided to set up a counterespionage unit.

The man he chose to run it was Major Thomas C. Stone, a Reserve officer who, in addition to intelligence work in OSS, had had some experience at spy-catching during the war. Major Stone found the idea interesting, not only as a way to plug leaks and apprehend thieves, but also to train troops in counterintelligence and intelligence operations. He saw this as an opportunity to test his theory that combat soldiers were poor in observing and reporting intelligence because they weren't trained to do it.

When Stone reported to Fort Buchanan on 1 November 1947 for a thirty-day period of duty, which was twice extended for a total of ninety days, the position of S2 was unfilled, so he was placed in that slot. He went to work immediately. First, he scheduled a special class in intelligence which was attended by two or more officers from each activity and unit; next he drafted an order requiring the commanding officer of each activity and unit to select the enlisted men whom he considered best qualified to carry out missions of a confidential and hazardous nature, and to have them report to the post executive officer within forty-eight hours.

As the men arrived at headquarters they were sent one by one to Stone for careful screening. Of these he selected a dozen. They were formed into what Stone called the SSU (Secret Service Unit). Each was given a pseudonym and a letter drop. They were then assigned to the intelligence class that had been scheduled. They were told that though they were expected to take their intelligence training seriously, the class was to be a cover for the SSU. They were informed that their pseudonyms would be kept in the adjutant's safe and that they would be given credit for their secret work.

Stone did not immediately tell them that they were to search for crooks. Instead, he stressed the importance to our country of economy and efficiency and instructed each man to observe and report inefficiency and waste. Reports were to be made twice weekly by means of the letter drops; acknowledgments and instructions from headquarters would be received in the same manner. The phone was to be used only in an emergency. In other words, the SSU was handled as a network of agents would be in the field. The first intelligence classes incorporated simple but intensive instruction and practice in observation and reporting.

RESULTS were gratifying from the beginning. Observation became fun when mixed with the excitement of leading an honest but clandestine existence. Information flowed in. Each member of the SSU was an "undercover agent" working in behalf of his country. Waste of all kinds was repor whether it resulted from carelessnes faulty equipment. Safety hazards, s as broken steps, loose shutters washed-out culverts, were pointed Within the first two weeks a membe the SSU saved a wooden building f burning. The "agent" noticed sm coming from a branch rubbing aga a power line leading to the buil and that had worn away the insula where the wire entered under the ea

Before long, observation began to results more directly in line with colonel's original idea. Members of unit began to notice strange occurre in various shops and warehouses, several ingenious rackets were un ered.

One had to do with the drawin new clothing against that turned in salvage. As far as accounting was cerned, a shirt was a shirt and a of trousers a pair of trousers, whe new or old. This system provided a l margin of profit for several quarter ter employees who were not averse making "a fast buck."

Another dealt with small arms ammunition. The racket was uncove by an SSU operative employed in post office. This was a very serious ter, because the matériel was goin the Puerto Rican Nationalists.

SOME of the developments surpr even Major Stone. Over a perio several months there had been a se of daring burglaries at Fort Bucha that were seriously hurting mor Wives and children became increasi nervous as a character known as " Eel" broke into and entered warehou the officers' club, and private quarters cluding those of the CO. He seem to know the movements of his vict intimately. Several officers had t homes burglarized while they w asleep on the very night they had cas substantial checks at the officers' c

Sizeable guard details were set up

vulnerable areas, but though The was seen fleetingly several times fired at once or twice, his depreda- s continued. He was finally brought ıeel and almost killed in the process member of the SSU, a Puerto Rican eant named Torres. Sergeant Torres studied carefully the reports of The s activities, much as a G2 in combat ıld study the enemy's past tactics, and estimated that the burglar's next ation would take place in the NCO rters area on the payday night. en The Eel appeared as expected, res stalked him noiselessly in the scouting tradition and laid on him a machete. That ended The Eel's ations, sending him to the hospital many months and to jail afterward. lso served as an effective deterrent ıny others who might have been king of emulating him.

OTHER good job was performed y two ordnance members of SSU—a enant and a corporal. For some there had been systematic thievery the fourth-echelon maintenance , which was very near the most te boundary of the post. It ap- ed to be the work of a gang with le help. When special guards were d, the thievery stopped. After a d of some ten days the guards discontinued and that night a tity of equipment was stolen. When guards were replaced the shop was left alone. But one night the ds were warming coffee and leaned rifles against a sentry box. When turned to pick them up, the weap- ıad vanished.

ıe lieutenant and the corporal ed the situation, reported to Stone, together made a plan. They re- ed that the guard again be discon- d the following day. At quitting that afternoon the two SSU men ared to go off duty. Actually they aled themselves in the shop. About ight the shop was entered and the ars were caught red-handed.

ajor Stone left active duty after months and because of the man- r squeeze, Stone's S2 slot was not and the SSU fell apart. Stone's iments were not conclusive, but it d as though he might have been ıe way to devising a method by the intelligence section could late economy and efficiency in life as a by-product of intelligence ng. One significant fact is that no er of the SSU at any time at- ed to use his undercover position ther his own ends.

"When The Eel appeared as expected, Torres stalked him noiselessly in the best scouting tradition and laid on him with a machete."

FRONT AND CENTER

WITHOUT debating whether the new reserve plan will have more or less success in surviving the legislative proces, two related factors ought never to be far out of mind. First any reserve program to be effective must be sustained year after year for as long as the need for it exists. This means that its adoption in 1955 (if it is adopted) is merely a start. Money will have to be spent for many years to build and sustain such a reserve force. It is no criticism of the efforts of National Guardsmen and Army Reservists of the past to say that a vital and effective program will have to be far more purposeful than such programs usually have been. It is primarily a matter of money. The second factor is that there will be a great temptation to use the reserve program (whatever its degree of success) as a reason for reducing the size of the regular forces, primarily Army forces. The President recently spoke of the need for trained mobile forces prepared to move rapidly to forestall or extinguish aggression. It is clear that Army power in being (and not in reserve status) is the only kind of force that can deter creeping aggression. An army-in-being is every bit as important today as a navy-in-being was in the nineteenth century or as an air force-in-being was in the immediate post-World War II years.

At Briefing

Now we turn again
To the acetate overlays
The maps we studied then
The outlines traced for days
Must be found, and studied again.
I wipe off a crayon mark.
Robinson Jeffers dreamed
Of a world dying grand in the dark.

My mind is less large: I see
Certain men, certain names
Are missing at sea in a boat,
Or wounded, or making a speech.
Master Sergeant John Woods who hanged
The leaders of Germany
Now dead in that ocean where banged
Other guns—that implacable sea.

All the hatreds we have
Come down to these things in the end:
Individuals, cowards or brave,
Over the maps must bend
Tracing the overlays.
I cannot weep for unknown
Persons in pain and daze,
Or adopt a religious tone
To explain the little I see.
I must move out my column at three.

ROBERT BERKOWITZ

The mobility of Army power in being that the P dent spoke of will require a far greater effort than been given it. A more concentrated effort is neede force through the kind of program that would give Army the capability of moving and supplying size task forces by air. Many soldiers have a firm gras the concept and understand its requirements but u present restrictions the Army cannot do more than n plans that are largely wishful thinking. The Air F Association recently conducted an air logistics ference that was primarily devoted to the problen how to airlift its own supplies and equipment. U. S cargo capacity is far greater than that of any other na but still a long ways from being able to airlift all ser requirements. Clearly some priorities are needed. (ceivably it could be far more important to hold a tr carrier wing in readiness in the Philippines to fly a mental combat team to the scene of trouble in South Asia than it would be to use the same planes regul to ferry engine parts to air bases in England and N Africa.

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Aviation Week, which keeps on top of military p and thinking in its field, reports that there is a grow feeling among Army officers that within a few years Army will be going directly to the industry to get aircraft it wants instead of depending upon the Force's Matériel Command. "There is no denying top Army aviation men are less than happy with present system," *Aviation Week* reported. It said these men believe that projects of Army interest—li planes, helicopters and convertiplanes—are "stepchil in Air Matériel Command's nursery" and that the A is penalized because Army money for procurement development goes through the Air Force. The re quoted an unnamed aviation industry spokesman agreeing. The Army can't expect to get what it w as fast as it wants it "until it is ready to fill out a ch as part of an R&D program," the spokesman is qu as saying. This can be interpreted to mean that until Army signature is on the check the industry won't much attention to Army requests.

✓ ✓ ✓

The centralization of responsibility for all Army search and development activities in the Deputy Cl of Staff for Plans and Research, Lt. Gen. L. L. Lem zer, may make it possible for the Army to divorce A Aviation development and procurement from the Force, Aviation Week *suggested. This reorganizat takes responsibility for R&D from the Deputy Cl of Staff for Logistics, G1 and G3. Actual direction R&D will be in the hands of Maj. Gen. Kenner F. H ford, General Lemnitzer's Chief of Research & Deve ment.*

Realistic field training leads to a high state of combat readiness

Today's Finest Experience: Troop Command in Korea

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY HARMELING, JR.

rea is rewarding because

ery little interferes with

the brisk business of

eping full-strength units

a high state of readiness

FOR nine months I commanded an infantry battalion in post-truce Korea. The job was so challenging, so instructive, and so satisfying that a record of some of my thoughts and impressions may be of use to others.

After the truce, my battalion operated in the same small sector of Korea—a piece of strategic terrain north of the 38th parallel on the edge of a valley leading south to Seoul. The sector included a river, large areas of flat land, some low hills, and some wooded mountains. The terrain is almost completely devoid of any sign of civilian life—in the few years since the farmers left, the land has reverted to wilderness.

Within this little sector of Korea my battalion accomplished a wide variety of tasks and missions. We salvaged construction materials from the old battle position and built and manned a new position complete with bunkers, trenches, and wire entanglements. We spent two months under division control as the general outpost along the demarkation line. While in regimental reserve we conducted realistic training, which included plenty of battalion tactical problems with live ammunition and a full T/O&E complement of officers, men, and equipment. We maintained a very high state of combat readiness. A battalion in the wilderness is like a city of 1,100 inhabitants. The battalion commander must assume all the problems of municipal government, including water supply, road construction, garbage disposal, housing, drainage, police protection, fire prevention, electric lighting, recreational facilities, sanitation, and preventive medicine. In the States most

of these things seem to be taken care of automatically, but in Korea they are the direct responsibility of the commander and are usually planned and implemented on the battalion level.

IN addition to our military duties, we sponsored and supervised the construction of a Korean school in a ravaged town some twenty-five miles to the rear. We also carried out a program to teach English to our KATUSA and Puerto Rican soldiers and to bring our own less-well-educated soldiers up to an eighth-grade level.

We managed to live fairly comfortably while we carried out our missions and duties. We erected squad tents with floors and diesel stoves. Each company built quonset huts for its day room, orderly room, and mess hall. The food was good and movies were shown every night in one of the companies. Each man had one shower a week. We managed to acquire at least one small generator for each company to light the mess hall and day room. When the weather permitted we swam in the river and played outdoor games. We trained and worked right through the winter months in weather that normally would have been considered too cold for anything except indoor classes; our excellent winter clothing kept us free from any cold injuries.

There were no serious disciplinary, morale, or health problems in my battalion. We worked hard. My men were enthusiastic and very proud of their outfit.

DURING this tour I gained new respect for the American soldier. When I arrived in Korea right after the truce I expected to find a dispirited, disgruntled, sloppy-looking crew with only the thought of home on their minds. (I based this opinion on the situation that existed after World War II.) Instead, I found snappy, clean, well-trained infantrymen who were well oriented on why they must stay in Korea, and who were determined to fulfill their obligations to their country in a proper manner.

The American soldier will strive to attain any standard that is set for him. All a leader has to do is set his standards very high and insist on their being attained. Once a unit has performed a few jobs in a really superior professional manner, it will take pride in its reputation. The rest is easy. I saw many leaders fail just because they underestimated the American soldier and didn't realize what a fine professional job of soldiering he could do, and actually wanted to do, if his leaders insisted on it.

Field artillerymen keep their surveys current

In Korea I learned all over again necessity of "going by the book." Wh er the job on hand is field fortificati military justice, quonset construc machine gunnery, or platoon tactic has all been done before and the usually adequate literature, instructi and doctrine available on the subje sometimes had to fight the tendenc leaders to go off half-cocked w tackling a new job. They would on what they remembered from a c at Benning some three or four y back, or they would rush into the without any preparation at all. I fo that officer and noncom schools big dividends. They were conducte night, and they usually covered the day's work. I always insisted that t schools be formal and that they c exactly what the book says about subject. Even though it is often ne sary to deviate from the book, I bel it is essential that everyone be f aware of established doctrine so that t can use it, at least as a point of de ture.

I CAME to the realization that the c *real* problems that confront a c mander are personnel problems. I commander can obtain suitable men his key positions and if they do t jobs properly, all the other proble such as supply, training, and discipl soon disappear.

The key men in a battalion are company commanders. A battalion w five good company commanders will a good battalion even though the bat ion staff may be weak, but a battal with a couple of weak company c manders will be a poor battalion e if it has the best staff in the world am not trying to underrate the imp ance of the battalion staff. I am j trying to say as forcibly as I can t good company commanders are essent

A good infantry company comma er should be young, because the requires tremendous drive, energy, thusiasm, stamina, and recuperative p er. Twenty-five is about the maxim age I like to have in a company c mander. He should be a career offi because the physical and mental str and the responsibility just don't app to a man who is planning an early turn to civilian life. A career offi realizes that he is laying a necess foundation for more important jobs, a he usually actively seeks command a company. He should be command a company for the first time because challenge and thrill felt by a man h ing his first command usually outwe

KATUSAs are taught the secret skills of a good mortarman

extra experience of someone who been through it all before. Old any commanders tend to play it and pace themselves, but youngsters in with enthusiasm and give it thing they have. And, finally, a any commander must be a good all-id officer.

rean experience has shown me that npany commander should hold the or six or eight months. During the two months he learns the ropes. come four to six months of maxi- efficiency. By this time the com- commander begins to tire out, and ould be transferred to the battal- regimental staff.

relationship between a battalion mander and his company com- ers should be one of mutual loyal- nfidence, and respect. The battal- ommander must always back his ny commanders to the hilt and e complete responsibility for every- they do. They must always be to feel that he is on their side in dispute. If higher headquarters down a series of orders that are sible to perform in the allotted the battalion commander must act as a buffer and prevent his company commanders from being placed in a position where they are forced to omit certain requirements or turn in false reports. As long as the battalion commander secures realistic missions for his companies, he can insist on their proper execution. Sometimes I think that a battalion commander's primary duty is to shield his company commanders from as many frustrating distractions as possible, so that they will be free to run their companies according to their own personal methods of leadership.

UNIT *esprit* will be good when a unit is good and when its members are convinced that they are not only good but the best. A commander at any level should make a planned propaganda effort to convince his troops that they are the best. We use propaganda—call it advertising, publicity, or what you will —to sell all sorts of products and ideas; so why not to sell a unit on itself?

The methods of this selling effort are limited only by the imagination of the commander. He should use every opportunity to express his appreciation for good work, and especially for his unit's success in competition with other units. He should adopt catchy and inspiring slogans, and put up signs calling attention to the excellence of his unit. He should work to have the snappiest sentries and the neatest area. He can strive for more than his share of articles in the unit newspaper. He can invite higher commanders to talk to his unit if he thinks they will be complimentary.

These are only a few of the devices a commander may use to convince his unit it is the best. They are not new or original; my only point is that the commander should devote considerable time and effort to a deliberate selling effort instead of doing it in an instinctive, hit-or-miss manner.

COMMAND in Korea is the finest experience an officer can get in today's Army. There are no distracting influences, the units are at full strength, the training facilities are excellent, and the tempo is fast. Six months with a unit in Korea are the equivalent of eighteen months in the States in terms of work performed, variety of missions accomplished, and experience gained. Officers who seek troop duty in Korea will find that the satisfaction and professional knowledge gained will more than compensate for any minor inconveniences.

Hard play and hard work go together



TARGETS THAT TALK

Lieutenant Colonel Francis S. Kelly

At The Infantry Center automatic targets are being developed that will save time, manpower and make better shooters

IN the event of full mobilization we won't have much time in which to teach millions of men how to fire a rifle accurately. So right now we ought to be finding and eliminating all sources of wasted time in weapons training.

Among the most prominent time-wasters are target devices that require large pit details and bulky equipment. These devices do not give instantaneous results of firing; and they do not disappear when hit.

As a result of numerous requests f commanders and enlisted men in field, Army Field Forces has begun velopment at the Special Devices C ter of a new and improved target syst The system will use target devices wl not only respond instantaneously to effect of fire but which eliminate need for protective pits and the us "target pulling and marking" det Maintenance problems will not be r tiplied by the use of the new ta

ices, nor will the costs involved be ıibitive.

or many years there has been a need an E- or F-type target for field-type ıg that would disappear when hit a bullet, but would not be affected wind. This simple problem was ling, but such a target has now been eloped and is in procurement. This et will be known as the disappearing : F target *(Figure 1)*. It may be used any field-firing exercise. It is a tly mechanical target requiring no er supply, and it may be emplaced kly and easily by the troops using The target will be used in field- g problems that require only that target be identified, engaged, and Once hit, the target disappears. en a number of them are used, fire riority may be evaluated by the ıber of targets eliminated. Scoring ımpires is easy. They have only to ıt the standing targets before and af- he firing. More competitive exercises realistic tests, with a higher premium



Figure 1. This mechanical target disappears when a bullet strikes it

sion systems or from a standard, portable field generator.

A THIRD target now in development is a self-recording target for use on known-distance rifle ranges. This electronic device will record the results of fire and will immediately flash them to the firing line. It will require permanent installation. No butts, pits, or pit details will be needed. With this target device, firing will be conducted simultaneously from one firing line at all known-distance ranges. The bullet striking the target will transmit the location of the strike (electrically) to the firing line. A monitoring device at the firing point, beside the firer, will indicate and record this information so that it is instantly and permanently available to the firer and his instructor. Operation of pits and transfer from one firing line to another, thus limiting firing to one known-distance range, will be avoided, and the time thus saved can be used for additional instruction and training. The

An electronic Maggie's Drawers is the only thing missing from the Army's new target system, which will train marksmen better and faster

ıdividual marksmanship and great- exibility of choice of terrain, will t from the use of this target.

:he development stage at The In- ıtry Center is an electrically pow- disappearing-type E or F auto- : target. It may be made to dis- ar or reappear at the will of an ıtor at the firing point, and it will disappear when hit by a bullet *ıre 2)*. The device will record the ɔer of hits made on the target at a monitor on the firing line. This of target will be used on transition- firing ranges such as those in Table FM 23-5, and Table II, FM 23-55. rate and immediate results of fire ɔe ascertained by both the firer and :orer. The firer sees the target dis- :r immediately when it is hit; the —who is also the target operator— es information at the monitor of umber of hits. This is important g automatic-weapons firing. This will eliminate pit details and give time for instruction and training. elimination of pits, pit operators, nanual operating devices permits r flexibility in the design of transi- ring ranges. The power source ɔe obtained from power-transmis-



Figure 2. This automatic type target disappears either when hit by a bullet or when operator presses a button

cost and maintenance of this equipment will not be prohibitive; over a period of time, it will actually save money.

There is also a need for a remote-scoring, moving target. Most combat targets are moving targets, and increasing emphasis is being placed on this type of marksmanship. A contemplated device is an electric target mounted on the conventional gasoline-driven target carrier that operates on tracks laid to any configuration. The targets will be capable of flashing the hits to a monitor at the firing line. This device will also do away with the necessity for pits, pit operators, and elaborate communication systems. The proposed target will be easily installed and will be able to record hits of all weapons from the caliber .30 rifle to the recoilless rifles and the 120mm gun.

When completed, the target system outlined above will greatly reduce the time needed to train individuals and small units in all types of firing. It will also maintain and increase the firer's interest by immediately making known to him the results of his fire. These targets will stimulate competition between individuals and units, and they will place the emphasis where it belongs —on accuracy.

The answer to
Confusion in Supply Depots

COLONEL ANSTON D. MARSTON

. . Is Knowing What's There

ROSS the wide Pacific, as Mac-
rthur and Nimitz pushed the Japa-
back, the story was repeated island
island. In the Mediterranean, at
and at Salerno and at Naples, the
rience was much the same. In the
rush to get supplies ashore, to open
ps, confusion became normal and
ed supreme. Again in Normandy,
gain in Korea, the story was much
ame.

confusion at supply depots neces-
How can it be prevented in the
e?

ten carefully, you in the corner.
of doughboy and artillery officers
suddenly found themselves acting
se commanders; every high com-
er finds himself responsible for sup-
oints and depots as well as fighting
s. One of these days, it might
en to you!

u can't have order and efficiency
pply depots unless you know what
them, and where. Accurate inven-
and locator systems, the supply
call it.

e real key is to have enough clerks
e depot *at the time cargo is un-*
l, to check supplies and pick them
the records. It is just about as
as that.

ctically all staff plans and direc-
call for accurate inventories, and
to do otherwise would be to come
enly in favor of sin. Every depot
and supply technician who knows
usiness strives to establish and
ain accurate records. Usually re-
bility for faulty inventories lies
with the commander who refused
vide a big enough working force
e (a question of troop priorities),
n the person forcing depots to ac-
rgo faster than it can be handled.
ly.

commander making up a troop list
many difficult decisions. He is
a definite troop ceiling, and must
thin that ceiling the best balance
n combat and service troops. Add-
battalion of depot troops means
without a battalion of fighting
In these circumstances it is nat-
cut down on the allotment to
operations; this cannot be called a "calculated risk," because depot confusion becomes a near certainty. When this happens, the commander who made the decision should accept full responsibility, instead of permitting the technicians to be blamed.

Frequently the problem is settled to the satisfaction of some staff officer by saying, "Tell them to use more indigenous personnel in the depots." Indigenous personnel is a magic catchword these days. But the first few weeks of an operation usually determine whether confusion or order will prevail, and during these weeks local workers aren't very effective for skilled jobs.

Physical facilities in the depot are important, too. This needs more than a little thought in advance, plus plenty of work by engineers—again a matter of troop priorities. In southern France a big depot area at Miramas, built by the U.S. Army at the end of World War I, was available and was used wisely. Such windfalls are rare indeed.

Each combination of facilities and people has a fairly definite capacity for the receipt and issue of supplies. Prolonged overloads lead to trouble, yet without strong supervision by the commander and G4 this capacity is usually ignored. In Naples, after initial confusion, a G4 representative visited every depot reported in trouble and, where necessary, restricted the number of trucks dispatched per hour from the port to prevent excessive overload. Only by this sort of supervision can order be kept.

Obviously port capacity cannot be accepted as the capacity of a new base. There are three figures to consider; the *smallest* of these is the real base capacity. Port unloading capacity, port clearance capacity, and depot capacity all enter into the picture.

Port unloading capacity gets plenty of attention. Base commanders and even theater commanders keep, and closely watch, all charts showing the tonnages unloaded each day or week. Port commanders are rewarded or broken as these charts turn up or down.

Usually, port clearance capacity gets close attention also, because cargo collects in mountains on the beach or on the piers. Sometimes it isn't so obvious, though. In Normandy, for example, the port unloading capacity was built up far beyond the amount which the rail and highway net could move forward. The difference piled up in beach dumps. Much of it was still there on VE-day.

DEPOT capacity is often ignored during the always hectic early days of an operation. In India trucks loaded with fragile radio sets were unloaded by opening the end gates, pushing the sets out to fall on the ground—all because the emphasis was on speedy unloading of ships. In the early days at Naples a quartermaster ration depot had roughly 60,000 tons of unsorted rations in a huge pile, with tractors busy pulling trucks away out of the mud. Much of this food was later destroyed, and the operation of sorting and evaluating the contents was costly and time-consuming.

Once the capacity of a base is known, some strong authority must see to it that supplies are called forward only as fast as they can be handled. In one classic case in the Pacific, a harbor capable of unloading only three or four ships at a time had sixty ships at anchor waiting to be unloaded! It was later rumored that during the early days in Korea certain supplies were shipped merely because someone thought they might be useful some day, without regard for the capacity of the base.

THESE are the danger signs a commander and his G4 must watch: ship congestion in the port or off the beach; cargo accumulating in the port or on the beach faster than removed; congestion in depots, especially in the areas where cargo is received; piles of unsorted cargo in the depots; poor inventories, as shown by spot checks.

Often it requires real courage to take action when trouble develops, especially if this means slowing down the unloading of ships. It is easy to requisition all the supplies demanded by combat troops, hard to pare away the fat and limit requisitions to the base capacity. Yet failure to exercise control can be costly too. Mountains of unsorted supplies, rotting in the mud, are usually worse than no supplies at all. They have to be guarded, they take up valuable space, and they cannot be used.

The Commander's Communication

COLONEL DAVID P. GIBBS

EVERY commander is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the signal communications system of his unit and for its efficient operation as a part of the system of the next higher command.

Those pious lines are from FM 100-5. Few commanders would disagree with them—and yet few follow them!

The Signal Corps is performing most adequately its functions in research and development, procurement and distribution, engineering and technical services, and promulgation of technical doctrine and information. Its global communications system is excellent.

But in the field the Signal Corps is in danger of becoming unable to do its work, because commanders do not assume responsibility for their communications. A year of service in Korea convinced me of this. I know that the relationship between the signal officer and the commander could and should be improved.

"The commander is responsible" is such a well-worn cliché that when used in military circles it generally evokes a knowing smile. But its full impact seldom rises to the surface of the mind. Responsibility cannot be delegated by merely so saying. *It cannot be delegated successfully unless all the required authority is likewise delegated.* And even then this authority must be protected from conflicting authorities.

Particularly in the communications-electronics field, the commander's responsibility must be treated as much more than a cliché. The signal officer normally has operational control of all communications units assigned or attached to his unit. The commander usually holds the signal officer responsible for administration and discipline as well as for the operations and training of his signal units.

THE communications systems of a unit must always be integrated with those of the higher command. Consider, for example, the cryptographic systems required for classified communication with higher, adjacent, and other allied headquarters. It is obvious that a high order of centralized regulation and control is required. In order to carry out the instructions from the controlling agency, be it the Department of the Army or the JCS, the signal officer does not have the needed authority, either by rank or position. He must be able to deny access to cryptographic data and coding rooms, should officers outranking him want to enter.

Only the commander can solve this problem. He should support his signal officer. If a commander permits his staff to make departures from prescribed communications procedures, the bastard system of that unit may have a deleterious effect on the system of the entire field army or theater. After all, the signal officer is protecting something that has been entrusted to his commander.

MANY commanders in Korea organized all their non-artillery Army aircraft into provisional companies or detachments. This generally resulted in removing from the communications system the aircraft furnished for this purpose. In this way we lost one of the few improvements which had been added during a period when the duties for communications had at least doubled! Why remove from accessibility the only means for quick delivery of operations order over rough Korea terrain? There are instances when commanders and staff officers have complained to the signal officer about the slowness of "operational immediate" messages, which had to be delivered by jeep, while the aircraft meant for communications practiced formation flying for a parade!

There is serious concern among many signal officers over the future of Army communications. Were these men to see the comparative retrogression of our communications service when compared to those of both the Navy and the Air Force, they would be horrified.

It goes without saying (or does it?) that communications is an essential ingredient of the military operation. Communications permit the commander to be informed and to control a command beyond the range of his voice. It must be responsive to every phase of his operational plan. In fact, communications intelligence or electronic warfare may provide the spark from which the opera springs.

There are many headquarters w G4 is given "command of the tech services," rather than "staff supervi over appropriate *functions*. In t headquarters, the signal officer is mally left to shift for himself as re communications planning. In addi the signal officer spends many fru hours in conferences during whi G4 staff officer discusses problem supply and service with all of the nical services, or confines himself t business of just one of the other nical services. Certainly the signal ply mission is important. But it i portant primarily because it provide wherewithal to furnish an integ communications system which pe effective control by the comma Communications, contrary to the parent conception of some comma and many staff officers, is not an ite issue to be shipped by transport, re tioned on a Form 445, and issued depots.

ALTHOUGH the job usually *doe* done—in what seems excessive and with extensive paperwork—the seldom a really satisfactory basis plans of communications systems. results in waste or, possibly, the co ment of the command to an imp axis of communications. Further there can be little if any advance ning when the communicator is rele to the operational level.

My recommendation? Comma and staff officers urgently need to re the doctrine on signal communica in FM 100-11. If you don't like manual (many are opposed to it), pertinent sections of FMs 100-5, 1 110-5 (JAAF), and try to apply material.

Commanders, take your signal or munications officer into your confid Bring him in early in the planning keep him informed. Help him a you correctly. Give him license to right in step with G3. Recognize responsibility that is yours or your communications may fail you when need them most.

CEREBRATIONS

Tie That Binds

E assembled company commanders a battalion of the 15th Infantry d hardly believe their ears. It was , and the battalion had recently ed in North Africa.

ne morning, after the company com- ders had received the rest of their ts from the battalion commander, heard him say, "From now on, neck- will be worn at all times—including hike today!"

ne company commanders were ked.

Neckties with full field pack?"

ir," said one, "a man's neck swells ng a twenty-mile hike, especially n he's carrying a heavy load."

sn't it against field regulations?" d another.

et's have no more discussion, gentle- " said the battalion commander. order to wear neckties came ght from General Patton himself. questions?"

here were none.

umly, the company commanders ed down the dirt road that bisected cork forest in which the battalion bivouacked. It was early morning, he steel of their helmets was already n. By noon even the buttons on their would be almost too hot to touch.

ckties with full field packs!

's crazy," said the CO of Charlie pany. "After laundering their o.d. themselves all these weeks, half y men have shrunk the collars so they can't even fasten the top n." Angrily, he turned off the road his company area and called for rst sergeant. The other company anders stopped and listened. . . . ell the men to get out their neckties ut 'em on."

r—" said the startled topkick.

the other company commanders d on, they could hear the groans men of Charlie Company.

vas the same when Able and Baker

> This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Companies received the news. The cork forest hummed with angry murmuring. The scene was different at Dog Company.

While walking back with his fellow commanders Dog Company's young commander had been thinking, seeking a reason behind this order. What could he tell his men that would satisfy them and shut off the gripes?

General Patton was neither a stupid nor a sadistic man, the captain thought, and so there must be a reason behind this seemingly senseless order. By the time he reached his area, the captain had found one. He told his topkick to assemble the company.

When the men were seated on the ground the captain said: "As you know from our previous talks, our foothold in North Africa is still very shaky. Without the loyal support of the French colonial troops, we would have a tough time if Hitler decided to commit his reserves here, or if Spain should intervene with forces from Spanish Morocco.

"So far, the French military have gone along with us even though many of their familes are Nazi hostages. As long as they think we can eventually liberate France, they are willing to pay the price. On the other hand, if the French should decide that American troops aren't *good* enough to whip the Germans, they certainly would be tempted to lay down their arms now and at least save their families.

"That's why the French have watched us so closely since we landed at Fedala. They know our division is supposed to be a crack outfit and they are trying to size up the entire United States Army by what they see in us. Because we aren't fighting now, they can only judge our discipline and training by the way we march, the way we make camp, and the way we look. Especially by the way we *look*; and that's the reason I called you together this morning.

"Have you ever noticed how sharp the French officers and noncoms of these colonial outfits look? Real spit and polish. Always wear neckties—even in combat. They think it's the mark of a good soldier to dress like that.

"Whether or not we agree with them about neckties in the field, we can't let a little thing like a *necktie* give them the wrong impression of us. Starting with today's hike, every man is going to wear a necktie all the time. If it will bolster our Allies' confidence in us and thereby help win this war, what do we care about a little discomfort?

"All right, men, let's put 'em on!"

I don't know whether General Patton issued the necktie order for the reason this captain gave his men, but I can testify as an eyewitness that Dog Company was the only cheerful company in the battalion on that day's hike. Moreover, the company began to show a marked improvement in its general personal appearance.

The CO of Dog Company knew the practical value of troop information and education. He knew it is not a function to be confined to a few prescribed hours of teaching, but something that can be applied any hour of the day to the most routine duties—to an order to wear neckties.

Junior officers and NCOs who neglect to guide the thinking of their men are shirking a command responsibility. It

is in TI&E that the immediate problems of command can be tied to "the big picture." Whether we are dealing with neckties or international relations, it is the tie that binds.

SFC FORREST KLEINMAN

New Approach to M1 Firing

IN "Bulls or Half Bulls" (August 1954) I suggested that soldiers being taught markmanship should be trained to aim at the center of the bull instead of at 6 o'clock. I also said it might be wiser to use only the top half of the bull's eye.

Later tests give this theory strong backing. They suggest that the M1 rifle was designed to be zeroed to the exact point of aim.

A firer on the known-distance range first zeroes his rifle at the range of 100 yards; then he is taught to *lower* his sights by 2 clicks when he steps back to the 200-yard line. He then proceeds to zero at 200 yards. On moving farthei back to 300 and 500 yards, he raises the sights for each range, and zeroes each time all over again.

On the transition range, he uses the battle sight. This is the 300-yard setting. On the elevation knob of the sight are numerals referring to hundred-yard ranges. The only one of these numerals the firer uses is the 3. To set the battle sight, he places the 300-yard setting on the rifle, loosens the elevating screw, adjusts the knob so that the 3 is opposite the index line on the base of the sight, and tightens the elevating screw with the knob in this position. Now he can get his battle sight quickly by lining up the 3 with the index line.

But what purpose did the designer have in putting those other numerals on the elevating knob? Major General Julian S. Hatcher, in *The Book of the Garand,* has said of the M1: "When the sight is set for the battle range of 300 yards, the bullet should strike the exact point of aim at 300 yards." He has also furnished a table showing the number of clicks of elevation needed between each range:

Range	Number of clicks increase
100-200	2
200-300	3
300-400	4
400-500	4
500-600	4

The table continues through 1,200 yards. But can such a table be correct, since no two rifles will have the same zero? After the initial zero has been obtained, the number of clicks increase or decrease for each range should be consistent, since 1 click at a given range moves the strike of the bullet the same distance for each rifle.

Another thing: the table shows an *increase* of 2 clicks between 100 and 200 yards. We have been taught that the elevation should be decreased between these ranges.

In the spring of 1954, several officers of the Small Arms Committee of The Infantry School conducted a test to see if something might have been overlooked in the M1.

The targets used for the initial experiment were the silhouette E-type targets pasted on a 6-by-6 target panel. A white square was placed in the center of the silhouette to be used as an aiming point. The rifles were first zeroed *to point of aim* at a range of 300 yards and the battle sights were set, the 3 on the elevating knob corresponding with the index line. All firers then moved forward to the 100-yard line and adjusted their sights so that the 1 was opposite the index line. It was found that this was the correct zero for 100 yards to point of aim. When the firers moved to the 200-yard line, they raised the elevation on their sights 2 clicks from the 100-yard setting. This change provided the correct zero elevation for 200 yards. The 500-yard setting was found to be the correct zero elevation for 500 yards.

There were slight variations, but with the exception of one firer, these were consistent at every range. The maximum variation was 2 clicks. Approximately fifty per cent of the group had a variation of 1 click consistent at each range. Thirty per cent of the group found no variation from the calibrated settings on the elevation knob.

The variations were in most cases caused by firers who failed to take the same sight picture for each shot or who put their heads in a different position for each shot. The variations could also have been caused by defective bores or loose sights.

Although these tests and others that followed were not conclusive, they suggested that the sights of the M1 were designed so that the firer, after zeroing to point of aim and adjusting the calibrations on the elevating knob, can obtain the correct zero elevation for any range simply by adjusting his sight to the desired setting. If a firer wants to fire at a target farther away than he has ze for, he can now simply adjust his to the desired range setting and be rectly zeroed for that range.

The sights cannot be used as were designed to be used when the is zeroed on a 6 o'clock aiming poi a black disk bull's eye. For one t the sight calibrations on the elev knob apply only when zeroing to of aim. This is demonstrated vividl tween the 100- and 200-yard ra where, in using one method, the must elevate his sight, while in the other, he must depress it.

Further tests should be made. methods of instruction should be justed to the rifle or the rifle shoul mechanically revised to conform to methods of instruction.

LT. JAMES D. PENDL

Message to a Sergeant

THE end of World War II mark low point in the discipline of Army. Everyone wanted out; refor tried to make a democracy of somet which can never be democratic; and prestige of officers and NCOs foll the inevitable downward trend.

I have a message for the noncom sioned officers in my battalion and any other career men who care to l in—a message of hope for all those want to keep our Army the best in world.

The pendulum is now swinging other way. Steps have been taken higher level to restore prestige to NC One is the separation of the techni from the NCO ranks. A techni while absolutely essential to the f tioning of the Army, is not necessar leader or commander. But an NC first of all a leader. His prerequisite —in this general order of importa integrity, character, justice, loyalty, age, initiative, dependability, and nical knowledge.

But in addition to what is don higher authorities, we can at batt level do something to increase N prestige. If you are going to have tige, you must first have confidenc yourself and the backing of your su iors. Confidence in yourself can be d oped by doing your work well, by th ing through everything you do, an seeing your work turn out successf

I have told your officers to del authority to you, to give you jobs t without telling you how to go a doing them, to supervise only w absolutely necessary and to deal with the man in charge, to praise w the results are excellent and to point

rivate the improvements necessary n the results are poor, to give you nany chances to succeed as you de- e but to reduce you and give some- else a chance if you prove you t do the job.

o it is up to you. Your orders will be ed precisely as you give them. If are given weakly and indecisively, will be weakly and incompetently ed. If your orders are firm, crisp, complete, your men will obey in the e manner.

e aloof but not unapproachable. r men must feel free to come to you their problems. Only then can you v what is going on and what you do to help. But your men should r refer to you by your first name ickname. Don't gamble with your and don't be "buddy-buddy." Your friends should be your fellow non- s, not your men.

ou can't gripe and expect to hold the ect of your men. When you receive rder, obey it. Check on why it was n afterwards if you want, but first our men on the job. A griper wear- stripes can break down morale respect. And discipline vanishes n there is a breakdown in morale respect.

ur men want to be treated like ers. Treat them that way and you have their respect and confidence. t them like high-school freshmen you will have a bunch of undis- ned goof-offs. If you make them sol- they will love it. If you let them off, they'll resent you, me, the and the Army.

u are on duty twenty-four hours . You have responsibilities of com- l and control in barracks, in town, ne post, on trains, on buses. It's duty as a noncommissioned officer sume those responsibilities. The ards of our units are high. If you that all soldiers look like soldiers, l be soldiers who will be proud of uniform. Let's keep ours a proud , a worthwhile life, and a respected it.

've heard of RHIP. I plan to give rivileges commensurate with your You will have separate rooms or st the choice spots in barracks. I ry to get something done about ass system so that you can keep passes and not have to show them n leave the post in uniform. You never do the pick-and-shovel part etail but will supervise the entire ion. I will do everything else I can nance your prestige.

Responsibility and prestige go hand in hand. You must accept the former before you can receive the latter. Accept your responsibility; treat your men with kindness and justice, but with firmness and aloofness; be their counselors but not their buddies; know your men and solve their problems, but do it on a sergeant-to-private basis. It will work, and you will have their trust and respect.

You've done well in the past. Now build up the prestige that goes with your stripes. They are the badge of leadership that sets you apart from other soldiers. They state that you are experienced, trustworthy, competent, and honorable. Live up to all the traditions those stripes represent.

LT. COL. EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, JR.

New Tactics of Evacuation

BATTLE-GROUP formations are a response to the threat of tactical atomic bombs on ground combat forces. Whatever the tactical advantage may be, such groups do create great problems for the infantry commander's organic medics.

The forward medical unit tactics used in World War II and Korea were based on a situation in which there was a "front line." Behind this line the medical litter-jeeps could normally move with comparative security and freedom. In the projected battle-group formation this won't be true.

Let's say a typical battle group contains a battalion of infantry and attached heavy mortars, artillery, engineers, armor, and perhaps some antiaircraft. It might normally be assigned the mission of conducting a perimeter defense on critical terrain and eventually of mounting a counterattack from its base. A number of independent battle groups, related only by mutually supporting fires and the will of their commander, may form a position of unconventional depth.

In such a situation, reliance can no longer be placed on surface evacuation, since it is hazardous to move with wounded men outside the perimeter.

The helicopter, which proved its value as a means of evacuation in Korea, seems to be the solution, but its usefulness is restricted by weather, vulnerability, and cost.

The choice of the battle group's position will be based on obvious tactical considerations. Provision for a landing strip cannot be given high priority. The rough terrain that would be most attractive to a defending commander would also be the least suitable for air operations.

Helicopter operation is dependent on weather conditions, including wind currents. The helicopter is generally restricted to contact flying, and it cannot easily be used at night.

A helicopter evacuating men from an isolated battle group would be subjected to all-around fires. If frequent flights were made, the enemy would surely direct his attention to this vulnerable machine.

Economic matters must also be considered. A litter-jeep or a truck costs little in comparison with an aircraft. Maintenance of a wheeled vehicle is relatively inexpensive. A jeep or truck may be driven by an E-2 or E-3 who has had little special training, but a helicopter is piloted by a commissioned or warrant officer whose training has been lengthy and expensive.

Perhaps casualties could be held in the battle-group position until some reasonably safe form of evacuation became possible. The battalion aid station could set up an improvised holding section, and its limited medical equipment could easily be reinforced by air drop.

This solution has severe drawbacks. Certain classes of belly, chest and head wounds have a low mortality rate only when given early definitive treatment by skilled surgical teams. With each hour's delay in treatment the mortality rate rises, until soon there is little hope of recovery. The commander who accepts the battle-group concept without providing for the prompt evacuation of the critically wounded is also accepting an increase in the number of men who die of wounds. And for those who survive severe wounds, a delay of hours before receiving treatment may well mean additional weeks before return to duty.

Though thorny, the problem is not necessarily insoluble. There has been much recent discussion of a proposed combat infantry aircraft. Effectively armored, it could be counted on to get in and get out. It would require only a limited, improvised landing strip, and it would have a high tonnage capacity. With these characteristics, and with the navigational aids that would permit its being used in darkness and bad weather, it could well solve many problems, including that of evacuation.

In any event, changes in infantry formations and concepts make mandatory comparable changes in the tactics of the supporting medical units. This is a factor the combat commander must consider in planning his operations.

CAPT. MOSSMAN ROUECHE

IRONS IN THE FIRE



Barracks for Polar Ice Cap

The Corps of Enginers has designed and constructed a unique typ military installation, the first permanent barracks ever built for use on polar ice cap. The buildings, which are actually steel tubes eighteen fe diameter, house airmen of the USAF Northeast Air Command on duty ing weather observations and collecting other data in northern Greenlanc

In building the installation the Engineers have used the "pressure-hull" ciple employed in constructing submarines. The steel tubes are connected passageways, and the whole structure is evenly balanced like a ship. The b ings are placed on the surface of the snow, which in some places is two miles They then sink slowly beneath the surface at a rate of several feet a As the buildings descend into the ice pack, the vertical entrance towers, w look something like chimneys (top), are increased in height. The passage between the buildings are unheated to lower the overall temperature of th stallation and to prevent its sinking too rapidly into the snow. In the pi at left, airmen carry supplies dropped from aircraft based at Thule, Green through one of the passageways.

Jet Reconnaissance Plane

Republic Aviation Corporation has developed the first jet photo-reconnaissance fighter plane. RF-84F Thunderflashes are now being delivered to the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing of the Tactical Air Command, Shaw Air Force Base at Sumter, S. C.

The Thunderflash was designed to fill the need for a high-speed plane to take reconnaissance photos. It can fly at high and low altitudes, can operate by day or night, and can attain speeds exceeding 650 miles an hour.

The reconnaissance fighter would be used in wartime to obtain pictures needed by ground forces. A joint planning board would determine the need for certain photos, or the ground forces would explain their needs to the Joint Operations Center, which would order them from TAC's 14th Air Force.

The Thunderflash can also be modified to take part in FICON operations, in which the plane is carried to the target area by a long-range GRB-36 aerial carrier plane and released to complete its mission. Then it returns to the "mother plane," which takes it back to its base.

Dual-Purpose Truck

This truck, which has been developed by the Corps of Engineers' Rese and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, can be used either as a c vehicle or an oilfield-type flatbed truck. Its standard 2½-ton truck chass equipped with an A-frame, a rear-of-cab mounted winch and rolling tailbc Though the truck is designed to be used for petroleum pipeline construc it can easily be transformed into a cargo truck by the addition of cargo s troops seats, lazybacks, bows and paulin.

Capable of operation from the side as well as the rear, the truck's A-fr has greater utility and capacity than its World War II counterpart. By m of the truck's 20,000-pound winch and rolling tailboard, the driver can or unload skid-mounted equipment, such as the pump shown above, wit assistance.

mpressor for Tractors

A portable air compressor that can be easily l quickly attached to the rear power-take-off ll makes of tractors has been developed by the rthington Mower Company of Stroudsburg, The compressor shaft sleeve slips over the ned take-off shaft and the single-sleeve thumb-w is secured. The compressor frame rests inst the frame of the tractor when the power-e-off shaft is started. The compressor has a ca-ity of 2 c.f.m at 400 rpm, with pressures up 120 p.s.i. By means of a change-over piston--cylinder kit, the compressor can be converted ckly into a pump that can be used for washing n equipment or pumping drinking water.

ld-Weather Fog Eliminated

A method of dissipating man-made fog at Alas- air bases has been developed by the Corps Engineers' Research and Development Labo-ries at Fort Belvoir, Va. The fog is caused by discharge of exhaust gases into the air when temperature is between minus 24 and minus legrees Fahrenheit. This fog reduces visibility seriously hampers aircraft operations.

he eliminators, which have been developed he Armour Research Foundations under con- with the Laboratories, condense the mois- in exhaust gases by cooling, mix it with air, and finally reheat the mixture and dis-ge it fog-free into the atmosphere. Equipment g this principle can be applied to engine-ered ground equipment.

witzer Lift

my mobility received a major lift when a nillimeter howitzer was transported by heli-r. The aircraft, an H-21C manufactured e Piasecki Helicopter Corporation, carries eaviest load of any in-service helicopter. al loads for the H-21C are 20 fully ped soldiers, 12 litter patients plus at-nts, or 2 tons of cargo. H-21Cs are now delivered to Transportation Corps heli- companies. This helicopter enables one infantry division's basic artillery weapons transported over previously insurmountable obstacles.

French Researchers Use Tethers to Stabilize Missile During Launching





Veronique missile takes off from platform, guided by four cables from a single drum that is centered under missile and protected from blast

Photographs by Howard Levy, Courtesy *Aviation Week*

Correct angle of fire is insured by adjusting drum to shorten the two inner cables. Arms holding the cables are jettisoned in the air.

Winterization Equipment

The Army is testing winterization equipment which will enable its light aircraft to be operated in temperatures as low as 60 degrees below zero. The equipment, which is being tested at Big Delta, Alaska, is designed for use on the Cessna Model L-19.

Included in the equipment is a 25,000-BTU heater. By comparison, an ordinary home furnace puts out about 35,000 BTUs of heat. Another part of the winterization equipment is a four-inch engine pre-heater hose. Only two feet in length when packaged, the hose can be extended to over 13 feet. One end of the hose is attached to the gas heater, while the other end is placed under the engine cowling to raise the engine temperature for ease of starting in extreme cold. Other items being tested are nose shutters, electric oil dilution, electric primer, internal window defrosters, and a carburetor heater unit.

The L-19 is painted the "Arctic Jungle" colors, red and white. Red is easily seen in Arctic conditions, while white is suitable for operation in jungles. The airplane has an 0-470-11 Continental engine, which develops 213 hp.

THE MONTH'S READING

Incentives Pay Off

National Manpower Council
A Policy for Skilled Manpower
Columbia University Press, 1954

The career [military] man is likely to be a better as well as a less expensive skilled worker. Skill and technical competence depend heavily on both experience and motivation. The career man with long experience will know the job better. He is also likely to want to do it better because he thinks of the armed services as at least a temporary career rather than as a period of compulsory service to be completed as quickly and easily as possible. There is no precise information on the cost to the services of poor work in the operation and maintenance of equipment. To take one example, however, there is a widespread impression among well-informed people that many of the losses of military aircraft are caused by poor operation and maintenance resulting primarily from inadequate skill and poor motivation.

It is clearly a matter of national importance to consider the incentive and reward systems now in effect, and to see what can be done to encourage a larger number of young persons to make at least a temporary career in the military. The last session of Congress belatedly recognized this need by raising the reenlistment bonus, by providing funds for military housing, and by providing for medical care for dependents. It thus began, at least, to rectify the damage done previously when Congresses sought to economize by cutting the perquisites of servicemen.

In 1954 as in 1941

HANSON W. BALDWIN
United We Stand!
Whittlesey House, 1941

The changes that are needed in our defense structure to promote unity of planning, unity of procurement, and unity of operations need not be destructive of all that has gone before, need not be revolutionary in concept—much that we have built we have built well—but they must be well conceived and well integrated. They must be tested, not against the touchstone of expediency that too often has been the yardstick of democratic institutions but against touchstone of efficiency. Above all, they must tend reduce the power and influence of the "Colonel Blimps" a the narrow-minded zealots who have held too large sw in the council of our fate. They must promote the sighted and the broad-thinking, and they must tend create an organization that understands that defense in modern world means more than ships and guns and plan an organization that is dedicated to welding the structure the nation into a viable, shining weapon of democracy.

Co-Existence in the Kremlin

BERTRAM D. WO
Foreign Affair
January 1955

As long as the power question [who rules Soviet Russi is not settled and the pyramid of power is without an ap these men [Malenkov, Khrushchev, *et al*] will jealou watch each other and make promises of reforms to th subjects. They will continue Stalin's policy of avoid either all-out war or all-out peace. They cannot toler all-out peace, since the very excuse for the existence their perpetual state-of-emergency régime is "capitalist circlement." Like Stalin, they have two reasons for avoid all-out war. The first is doctrinal: their central belief teac them that they are the wave of the future, that the capita order is in decay, that time is on their side. The other a readiness to risk war at the periphery, limited engageme "calculated risks," for in their activist theory History he only those who help Her, but not to jeopardize their pow center, the loss of which in all-out war might change course of history.

To Stalin's hesitancies they add one more: as long as power question is not settled, they dare not put live a munition and overwhelming force in the hands of army, lest "Bonapartism" settle the problem of power its own fashion. Thus we would do well to remember t their present minuscule concessions in foreign relations co not only from their calculation that they may divide free world, isolate America, and cut off her support fr some sector of Europe or Asia, but no less from recognit

their own internal weakness. "Collective leadership . . . e Party and the Government . . . the wise Central Com- ittee"—so far they have cast about in vain for an over- elming power symbol that can paralyze dissent, command edience and worship in Union and Empire, such as was mmanded by the Stalin cult and Stalin's word and name. e struggle may be muted and concealed, it may be long short, it may be compromised and blunted again and ain, but the whole dynamics of dictatorship cries out for dictator, autocracy for an autocrat, militarized command d militarized life for a supreme commander, infallible vernment for an infallible leader, an authoritarian setup an authority, a totalitarian state for a *duce, führer, vozhd.*

pecialization Loses Its Luster

J. A. LIVINGSTON
Syndicated Business Writer in
The Washington Post & Times Herald
29 December 1954

In his brilliant book, *The Story of Man,* Carleton S. Coon s back to the apes, and tells us why men are rulers of the th. The apes, poor fellows, became specialized. Speciali- ion isn't the virtue we so frequently make it out to be. too limiting. Ask the buggy whip manufacturer. One e of ape stayed in the forest, subsisted on leafy foliage, ds, snakes, and seldom came down from the trees. These veloped powerful arms for tree-to-tree swinging.

Others tried the grasslands and developed powerful jaws l tusk-like teeth, the better to capture and kill land- ming animals. Their strength—their specialty—resulted their stultification. "The apes descended from ground- ng primates that almost became men."

Other primates "remained unspecialized in everything ept those features that prepare them for human living" l became the ancestors of man.

1954 as in 1941

rant as a Symbol

BRUCE CATTON
U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition
Little, Brown & Company, 1954

urprisingly enough, the nation most resembled Grant in nderlying relationship to the military arts and war.

ike Grant, it did not care very much for soldiering, and rdinary times it felt ill at ease about it. It contributed e to military theory, simply because it never put its best ns to work thinking about it. Weapons of course were gadgets, invented or elaborated with great ingenuity, war was a very different question, apparently quite a one, and it got no particular attention. The country er went to war properly prepared for it.

et when war did come the nation seemed to find itself. owed an amazing competence in the practice of those tary arts which it professed to despise. After a certain unt of preliminary fumbling, it discovered that making consisted chiefly in summoning up all of the energy, and resources possible and in applying them inflexibly with a single eye to the accomplishment of a desired —in wartime, the task of making the enemy surrender.

Explorers of the Skies

JOHN JAY HOPKINS
Address at Philadelphia

Space travel—at least to the moon, and possibly farther—seems sufficiently close that I dare utilize it as [a] reason for man's right to optimism in the atomic age. When evidence of recent and published research in rocketry and electronics is coupled with the realities of nuclear power, we can hardly deny the possibility of flight into space. Experiments have led to the recent rapid development in solid state physics wherein atomic techniques are being utilized to rearrange molecules in both metals and plastics to produce new materials of amazing strength, versatility and temperature resistance. These new materials, still laboratory phenomena, may well circumvent the atmospheric frictional heat and the fuel heat problems of space rockets. We may live to see a renaissance of the first Elizabethan age of exploration when men's minds will again be fired by rumors of discovery. Indeed, to paraphrase John Keats, some stout explorer of the skies may in this century stare with eagle eyes at lunar seas—and all his men look at each other with a wild surmise.

Watchdog for the People

J. A. TERRAINE
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution
November 1954

As the first [war correspondent] in the field, [William Howard] Russell sowed a fine crop of journalistic clichés which we have been harvesting ever since; "gallant Allies" and "barbarous foes" are just two of them. But the passion of his feelings was usually capable of surmounting these and other weaknesses of style. He was a great battler against all injustice, the champion of the unmentioned, unrewarded, unpromoted heroes, of the ill-used Naval Brigade, of the Engineer officer who was passed over after 100 tours of duty in the trenches, of anyone who was legitimately wronged by a frigid and detestable military formalism. He was the enemy of inefficiency, red tape, callousness, and waste. He felt acutely that these things were an insult to the high intentions, intelligence, and practical competence of the British people. His duty, as he saw it, was to the British public above all; later he saw that he had a duty to the Army too—the public had the right to be informed about the transactions of its Army, but the Army, equally, deserved that the true nature of its sufferings and achievements should be known. Russell, in the fulfillment of this double duty, played his part in the development of our democracy: he founded the institution through which, in war, the people who pay the pipers are enabled to keep their eyes on the musicians, even if they cannot call the tune. They can at least follow it with the score. This was a most valuable step forward. The more technical and secretive public affairs become, the more we need our Russells. One department of government, at any rate, was never again the secret society, exempt from democratic supervision, that it had been before. We must regard Russell as an important instigator of the slow but sweeping reforms which transformed the Army during the next 50 years.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Camouflage Training

TES offers two courses in camouflage for personnel of all services: a two-week introductory course for officers, and a four-week camouflage specialist course for enlisted men.

Emphasis is placed on the point of view of the observer. Students place themselves over three-dimensional terrain models which they have previously studied by means of aerial photographs and stereoscopes. The students remain stationary while the electrically operated terrain models move to create an illusion of flying at about 50 miles per hour at an altitude of 3,200 feet.

An air-view gallery is used to teach students the problems of observation from various heights. By using different-sized terrain models, heights from 3,000 to 20,000 feet are simulated. Stereo-walls are installed in classrooms to teach students how to use prominent terrain features to disguise weapons, vehicles, troops, living quarters, and supply installations.

TES considers camouflage an extremely important part of the doctrine of security for troops in the field, especially in atomic warfare, when disclosure of a single target may bring destruction on surrounding units. The Engineer School will continue to supply speakers on camouflage upon the request of service schools and Reserve units within reasonable distance of Fort Belvoir, Va.

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Mortar Film

Infantry Weapons and Their Effects —the Mortar Family, FB 280, 14 minutes. This film covers the nomenclature, characteristics, and ammunition of the 60mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mortars. Previous films in this series covered the M1 rifle, caliber .45 pistol, caliber .45 submachine gun, caliber .30 carbine, sniper's rifle and sniperscope, 3.5-inch rocket launcher, portable flame thrower, grenades, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and tank weapons. They are available at Signal Corps film libraries.

Training Aids Display

In order to encourage instructors to devise training aids, TIS has set up a field-expedient training-aids display, containing over 50 items made from scrap material at no cost except the labor involved. Included are a large working model of a switchboard made from cardboard boxes, pieces of broom handle, and string; and a mock-up of the loading deck of a C-119 made entirely from scrap canvas.

New Graphic Aid

A new graphic training aid that has been constructed at TIS illustrates the technique of fire control for the 81mm mortar. It has been approved by OCAFF for publication and distribution. The new aid contains numerous illustrations showing the operation of the 81mm mortar fire direction center.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Artillery Use for 4.2 Mortar

The conversion of the infantry heavy mortar battalion to a field artillery battalion, 4.2-inch mortar, has been recently approved in concept by the Department of the Army. TAS is developing new T/O&Es and new doctrine for the use of the mortar as an artillery weapon.

Artillery technique for the 4.2-inch mortar, M30, involves only two major changes from standard artillery procedures. The mortar is fired with a constant elevation, the charge being varied to obtain range flexibility; and the vertical interval between the mortar and the target is converted to a horizontal range effect based on the angle of all and expressed as a site charge. This site charge, which appears on the ballis data of the GFT fan, is added to charge corresponding to the chart ra as read from the GFT fan. The s of these two figures is the charge wh should be fired.

Mortar ballistical scales have b developed which may be fitted over 105mm howitzer ballistical scale use with the GFT fan. A separate b listical scale has been provided for e of the elevations 800, 900, and 1,0 mils. Elevations 800 and 900 are e divided into two segments to prov data for firing with or without cartri container extension. Elevation 1,065 fired without the extension.

Mortar precision registration pro dures vary slightly from procedures u for howitzers. First, the temporary defl tion index is established at the deflecti on which the mortars are laid plus drift correction to the registration poi By constructing the deflection index this manner, we obtain deflection re ings throughout adjustment phase the registration which are corrected the amount of the drift at the regist tion point range. Since drift differen are relatively small with reasona range change, these differences are nored during the adjustment. The p manent index is placed on the chart the adjusted deflection. In making ran changes in fire for effect, 2/8 of a cha is considered to be a 50-yard ran change.

The adjusted charge is determined the same manner as the adjusted ele tion for the 105mm howitzer. Howev the value of 4/8 charge, which appro mates a 100-yard horizontal ran change, is used for computation inste of the value of one fork. After t adjusted charge is determined, a ga line is placed on the cursor of the G fan in the same manner as an adjust elevation. The charge is announced nearest 1/8 of a charge unit.

Limited firing tests to date indica that transfer limits for mortar fire a

Planetarium Used for Stargazing

TAS now has a "celestial identification demonstrator," or planetarium, which is used by the survey division of the Department of Observation.

Students sit inside a 20-foot dome and see, projected against it, all the stars that would be visible out of doors on a clear night. The observer may view a complete 24-hour astronomical cycle in four minutes, see the sky as it will look at any future date, or view it as it would appear from almost any point on earth.

The instructor can project images of the sun, the moon, and the planets of the solar system by attaching auxiliary projectors to the twelve-faced star projector. He can also show the elements of the spherical triangle, used in the computation of a true azimuth. The celestial demonstrator allows the elements of the spherical triangle to be projected on the celestial sphere in their true relation. The resultant azimuth is then converted to a grid azimuth which is used in artillery survey.

Until the new planetarium was installed, the instructors could project only fixed images and stars of first magnitude. But now many uses are being found for the planetarium in teaching the nearly 360 survey specialists who pass through TAS every six months.



same as those for howitzers at ranges w 10,000 yards. Metro corrections, city error, center of impact, and n-burst registration computations are e in the same manner as for light lery with the exception that we ex- s range correction and site in terms harge rather than mils of elevation.

ninating Radio Interference

lutual interference will sometimes r when two or more receiver-trans- er RT-67 components of the new series radios are operated in close imity to each other, even though sets are tuned to different fre- icies. The interference may either the form of an actual voice trans- on or that of a signal which can ce the ability of a receiver to re- the desired signal. The cause and ble correction of these interferences int explanation.

here are circuits in the transmitter operate at frequencies other than requency being transmitted. These frequencies can be received by a re- r close to the transmitter. If the of each set is properly clamped to ront panel, the majority of un- ed intermediate frequencies will not diated. But many factors must be into account, and atmospheric con- s, terrain, distance between sets, lignment of the sets all may have ing on interference.

additional problem arises from the ment and use of two channels that ly one or two channel numbers apart (0.1 or 0.2 mcs). It is best to keep the assigned frequencies of units in the same locale well separated, but movement of units may make this impossible. Interference of this nature can be reduced by proper operator discipline, and particularly by listening before transmitting.

There are two remedies for interaction caused by unwanted frequencies. Since these radiations have very low power, they can be detrimental only at a short distance from the transmitter. The vehicles should be spaced as follows:

Channel spacing	*Distance between sets*
300 kc (3 channels apart)	150 yds
200 kc (2 channels apart)	200 yds
100 kc (1 channel apart)	1,500 yds to 1 mile
On whole megacyles such as 32.0, 34.0, 35.0	500 yds

It is also helpful to place the sets so that a radio mask (building or terrain feature) is between them. Sometimes even a vehicle will do the job. In addition, the habitual operation of the transmitter on low power may lessen the strength of unwanted radiation. This practice is prescribed by the Signal Corps to reduce enemy electronic warfare capabilities.

Artillery, Signal Vacancies

Department of the Army has announced that it is understrength in certain commissioned grades in Artillery and Signal Corps. Qualified officers in other branches may apply for transfer. The Artillery will accept lieutenant colonels whose age does not exceed 39, majors not over 35, captains not over 31, and first lieutenants not over 28.

Qualifications include an educational background in one of the following subjects: engineering, physics, photography, meteorology, motion-picture production, mathematics, business administration, journalism, and education. Alternatively, officers can qualify if they possess experience in one of the following fields: communications, electronics, signal-equipment maintenance, military aviation, photography, television, meteorology, procurement, supply, previous Signal Corps experience, ASA, business administration, comptrollership, administration, and writing.

Measuring Ballistical Winds

Meteorologists at TAS's Department of Observation have developed a method of measuring and computing winds, using radar organic to field artillery units. The method is sufficiently accurate for most low-angle divisional field artillery fire. But, since tests at higher altitudes have not been completed, use of the method for obtaining wind data above Line 5 (6,000 feet) is not recommended.

A five-man team is required. A small balloon is inflated with hydrogen and attached to a radar target. When the balloon is released, visual positioning of the instrument is required until the target passes the minimum slant range of about 600 yards. This visual positioning

requires three men at the tracker mount:

The azimuth spotter lines up the target directly over the top of the radar reflector and directs shifts in azimuth as required.

The elevation spotter stands on the left of the reflector and, from visual alignment with the dish, directs shifts in elevation.

The telescope spotter, at the telescope on the tracker mount, takes over and directs further elevation and azimuth shifts after he gets on the target.

The elevation spotter telephones azimuth and elevation angles to *the timer-recorder,* at 30-second intervals, as requested by the timer-recorder who is stationed at the control unit and the plotter RD-54.

These initial visual-voice data are taken until the radar is tracking the target automatically. After release, *the radar control unit operator* watches his "j" scope until a strong echo appears, when he switches to automatic track and calls, "Lock on!" The recorder RD-54 is then used to furnish data on height, horizontal range, and azimuth angle to the target.

After lock-on for the radar phase, the timer-recorder observes the height pen of the recorder and operates the local chart-feed toggle switch each time the pen reaches one of the standard heights listed on the computation form. The stylus will jiggle slightly, indicating measured horizontal range and azimuth angle at that height. The timer-recorder also notes the time the target reached the particular standard height. Data are taken and recorded in this manner for standard heights up to 6,000 feet.

Visual phase figures are used to plot time against height of the target, interpolating to obtain exact time-readings for standard heights. The first time read during the radar phase is plotted and the point connected with the origin of the graph. For the ensuing curve, time is read to the nearest one tenth of a minute for each standard height.

In the visual data, elevation and azimuth angles at the standard height are interpolated from the time notations. The horizontal range is found by using the military slide rule and the formula:

$$\text{Horizontal range (yards)} = \frac{\text{standard height (feet)}}{3 \times \text{tangent elevation angle}}$$

For the automatic-tracking phase, the chart trace is evaluated and the data entered directly. Ballistical wind speed is determined from the horizontal range and time at standard height, for any given line number, by using the formula:

$$\text{Wind speed (mph)} = \frac{\text{horizontal range (yards)} \times .0341}{\text{time at standard height (minutes)}}$$

Surveying Manual

Information on artillery surveying methods is now available in one comprehensive volume, TM 6-200. The new manual fills a gap between the basic information in TM 5-232 and the advanced problems covered in TM 5-234. TM 6-200 explains survey theory and practice for field and AA artillery units (field artillery missile battalions excepted).

THE SIGNAL SCHOOL

Airborne Demonstration

Students and instructors at Fort Monmouth recently witnessed a dramatic demonstration of the importance of airborne operations and the necessity for rapid establishment of communications in the airhead. Aggressor forces were employed in a simulated tactical operation that gave an atmosphere of combat realism to the demonstration.

Members of the 511th Airborne Signal Company, 11th Airborne Division, participated in an air drop, and fighter planes of the 4709th Air Defense Wing gave a demonstration of close air support. The Air Force Liaison Officer at Fort Monmouth, in close coordination with TSS, arranged for a flight of F-86D jet fighters to simulate an attack on aggressor forces endangering the security of the airhead. The airborne signalmen were transported to Fort Monmouth from Fort Campbell, Ky., by elements of the 314th Troop Carrier Wing. The demonstration was under the planning supervision of the XVIII Airborne Corps.

Electronic Warfare Conference

A conference on instruction in electronic warfare was recently held at TSS. Instructors from various Army service schools attended a series of lectures presented by the Officers' Department of TSS. A representative of the Electronic Warfare Department, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, presented proposed concepts for the future organization and employment of electronic warfare units in the field. The conference concluded with a visit to the Signal Corps Laboratories, where a demonstration of laboratory techniques and a display of field equipment were conducted.

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

Television in the Army, MF 11-8400 (26 minutes) reviews the development of tactical TV by the Signal Corps in cooperation with civilian industry. Television has so far been used as a method by which commanders can obtain tactical intelligence, as an instructional medium, and as an aid in working with high explosives.

Service of the Piece—280mm Gun, TF 6-1962 (36 minutes) breaks down the duties of individual crewmen in putting the Army's largest artillery piece into action and taking it out of action.

Servicemen going to Britain will be interested in **You in Great Britain, Armed Forces Information Film 56** (34 minutes). The film gives a condensed history of that nation and explains its economics and customs.

Duties of a Jumpmaster, TF 31-1927 (38 minutes) outlines the responsibilities of the men upon whom the success of an airborne operation largely depends. These duties include inspection and, when needed, correction of jump equipment, clothing, plane intercom system, jump lights, emergency bell, anchor line, safety belts, seats, emergency equipment, and projections which might foul chutes. The jumpmaster must also provide tactical information for his men, and supervise the packing and loading of aerial containers and the stowing of the load on the plane.

Location and Construction of Road Obstacles, TF 5-1804 (25 minutes) shows how to slow up or stop enemy armor and motorized units by the use of tank ditches, road craters, steel-beam blocks, and damaged vehicles, and by demolishing buildings and trees. The film also demonstrates how booby traps and antitank fire can be used in conjunction with road blocks.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

›jective Inter-Service Report

SSEY'S ANNUAL: THE ARMED FORCES YEAR-(BOOK, 1954
dited by Rear Adm. H. G. Thursfield
ıe Macmillan Company, 1954
80 Pages; Illustrated; $9.50

iewed by
FAN T. POSSONY

'his is *Brassey's* sixty-fifth year of pub-ıion. Originally the most authoritative ıl publication, since 1950 it has been ›ted to the principle "that the separate ices . . . are equal members of a ınse team in whose whole-hearted col-ration, free from rivalry and jealousy, full strength of each lies." The literary lementation of this concept, though ;r than its strategic and tactical applica- encounters great intellectual obstacles. re is no doubt, however, that the edi- of *Brassey's* have made great progress he road to true team thinking among military. The present volume is an tional and long step forward, not ·ly because various problems of aviation been given a treatment of depth and ight, but because the discussion, al- in its entirety, has been geared to future. *Brassey's* contributors refrain the well-known sterile arguments of service competition. *Brassey's* recog- that ground, sea and air battle are ıere to stay and that the techniques ıch, and their inter-relationships, are ·ging constantly.

addition to a reference section dealing the British armed forces, the current ›n of *Brassey's* presents thirty-four es whose broad themes may be divided lows: the British services; communism war; the Russian armed forces; the world alliance; the "new look" of ·ican defense; air power and ground tions; modern weapons technology; y and training; the wars in Korea, hina and Malaya; and miscellaneous :ts such as night fighting, naval uvers, gliding, and the utility of mili- ıistory for soldiers. Of the authors, :n are army, ten navy and four air s, and seven are "civilians" with mili- ›ackground. "Great names" such as Mountbatten, Asher Lee, Cyril Falls . M. Spaight make useful contribu-

: individual reader will rate the dif-ferent articles according to his personal criterion. I found Spaight's article on total war misleading, inasmuch as he confuses totality which derives from the intensity and destructiveness of modern war with the totality of a conflict which is waged in all spheres of human life and which pits total society against total society. By contrast. I was impressed with the mature discussion of air power in its relation to ground battle and, above all, with the various articles on guerrilla warfare. For example, the story of "anti-terrorist" operations in Malaya, by Brigadier K. R. Brazier-Creagh, should become familiar to all those who might find themselves involved in jungle warfare, and this includes *every* American soldier. Lieutenant General H. G. Martin's history of the Indochina war is probably the most complete and up-to-date treatment of the subject in print. Brigadier C. N. Barclay's "Lessons of the Korean Campaign" and Major General Wilson's "The Army's Supply Problem"—where the author makes the point that "the idea of 'lines of supply' is quite out of date"—greatly enhance our knowledge of modern war.

It is significant to find in a British publication the following passage, written by Jules Menken, a knowledgeable observer of communism:

"Communist world domination must mean ultimately the establishment of a Communist regime in the United States—and, from the Soviet point of view, the

Marchin' shootin' infantrymen of the Confederacy take a break while watching a troop of cavalry pass by. From *Rebel Private Front and Rear*

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ACROSS THE ROOF OF THE WORLD. By Wilfred Skrede. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1955. 223 Pages; Illustrated; $3.50. An epic of endurance by a young Norwegian who traveled from east to west, from Sweden to Canada, during World War II. Crisis after crisis is met with indomitable courage.

BRASSEY'S ANNUAL: The Armed Forces Yearbook, 1954. Edited by Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 504 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $9.50. The sixty-fifth edition of the British Armed Forces standard yearbook. As usual, it contains much solid information and offers many springboards for controversial opinions. A book that serious military students should have available.

THE CAPTAIN LEAVES HIS SHIP. By Jan Cwiklinski. Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955. 313 Pages; $4.00. The famous captain of the even more famous *Batory,* the Polish ship which provided transportation for so many Communists to and from the United States, explains why he deserted his command and discusses Communist control in its worst aspects.

CIVILIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY: An Inquiry for Americans. By Louis J. Halle. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 277 Pages; $3.75. A former member of the Policy Planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of State examines our foreign policy and offers one informed opinion that is infinitely more valuable than the combined outpourings of scores of newspaper commentators. Mr. Halle examines facts and theory and offers some solutions.

CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN GRAMMAR AND USAGE. Edited by R. C. Whitford and J. R. Foster. Philosoplical Library, 1955. 168 Pages; $4.50. The key word in the title is "concise." But what there is of it is excellent, combining an understanding of "American" language with good taste, common sense and occasional flashes of wit and wisdom. It will not replace the combination of a good desk dictionary and a college level grammar.

CONQUEST BY MAN: The Saga of Early Exploration and Discovery. By Paul Herrmann. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 455 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. Up-dated American edition of a popular European account of man's journeys beyond his horizons from known beginnings to Christopher Columbus.

THE DALTON BROTHERS. By An Eye Witness. Frederick Fell, Inc., 1955. 251 Pages; $3.50. An anonymously written account of one of the West's most famous criminal bands. Originally published as a paper-back book in 1892. The old-time phraseology appears to lend authenticity to the account.

THE DAY LINCOLN WAS SHOT. By Jim Bishop. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 308 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. A masterpiece of research that covers 24 hours and 22 minutes of the most dramatic day in the life of the United States. Only slightly "reconstructed." The conversation is the least convincing portion.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDED MISSILE, 2d edition. By Kenneth W. Gatland. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1954. 292 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. A second edition of a British book published for *Flight Magazine* in 1952. This has been a popular text for those interested in the technical aspects of missile development.

ESSENTIAL JAPANESE. By Samuel E. Martin. Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 461 Pages; Index; $3.00. There is no easy way to learn Japanese quickly but this book offers an efficient method to gain a working knowledge of the language.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY. By Erwin N. Griswold. Harvard University Press, 1955. 82 Pages; $2.00, cloth; $.50, paper. In three speeches delivered in 1954, the Dean of the Faculty of Law of Harvard University tells of the origins and reasons for the inclusion of the "privilege against self-incrimination" and "due process of law" in the Fifth Amendment. Americans of all shades of political belief—those who fear that "pleading the Amendment" is an easy way out for subversives and those who fear our liberties are endangered by attacks on the Amendment—can profit from reading this slim book by a lawyer who speaks out in the finest traditions of his profession.

THE FIFTY-MINUTE HOUR. By Robert Lindner. Rinehart & Company, 1955. 293 Pages. A noted psychiatrist-author writes for the layman of five patients and their psychoanalytic treatment. Very valuable for those who are toying with the idea of psychoanalysis and possibly to prepare those who are determined to take advantage of the technique.

FRAGEBOGEN. By Ernst von Salomon. Doubleday & Company, 1955. 525 Pages; $6.00. The controversial and much-talked-about book based on the questionnaire issued by Allied Military Government in 1945 to all Germans suspected of having directed, assisted or collaborated with the Nazi regime. A bitter document by a German whom eighty years ago we would have called an unreconstructed rebel but who must now be characterized as a slippery, cunning and unreconstructed Nazi. This work is not calculated to soothe Americans who fondly believe that Naziism is a thing of the past.

THE GOODLY SEED. By John Wyllie. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1955. 218 Pages; $3.00. A novel of four days in the life of a Japanese P.O.W. camp on an island near Singapore. The characters are British, Americans, Dutch, Japanese and half-castes along with the Japanese and the Korean camp guards. The story is based not only on the expected horror but also on hope.

A POLICY FOR SKILLED MANPOWER. By National Manpower Council. Columbia University Press, 1954. 299 Pages; $4.50. Part One of this collective effort is the NMC's recommendations for strengthening the nation's resources of skilled workers and technicians. Part Two consists of the report of the research by the NMC's executive staff. Like many committee efforts this is a boiled down and sterilized report that will give only limited enlightenment to general readers and will drive specialists to search for the basic documents that were used in preparing it.

JET: The story of a Pioneer. By Sir Frank Whittle. Philosophical Library, 1954. 320 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. The guiding spirit of British jet aircraft development tells his story as he lived it.

THE LOWERING CLOUDS, 1939-1941, Volume III of THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES. Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1954. 695 Pages; Index; $6.00. Volume III of the very controversial Ickes papers.

MACHINE GUNS AND GUNNERY FOR MACHINE GUNS, 218 Pages
MORTARS AND MORTAR GUNNERY, 271 Pages
The Military Service Publishing Company, 1954. Illustrated; Index; $2.00 each. Similar to the material now appearing in ROTC manuals and basic instruction.

PICTURE MAKING WITH THE ARGUS. By Jacob Deschin. Camera Craft Publishing Co., 1954. 128 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.00. This one takes up where the instruction book leaves off. The illustrations should be a spur and incentive to better picture taking.

POLITICS IN AMERICA. By D. W. Brogan. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 467 Pages; Index; $5.00. A noted British historian views our politics at its worst and at its best. A slightly distorted estimate but refreshing because it comes from a foreign viewpoint.

SELECTING AND DEVELOPING FIRST-LINE SUPERVISORS. By George D. Halsey. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 203 Pages; Index; $3.50. Written for use in industry, this has collateral usefulness in the selection and training of noncoms and company-grade officers. Hardly a necessity for the personal military library but should be available for study by those interested in leadership problems.

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II—The War in the Pacific. LEYTE: THE RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES. By M. Hamlin Cannon. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. 420 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.75. The factual account of the fighting that returned the Allied forces to the Philippines.

WITH THE AUSTRALIANS IN KOREA. Edited by Norman Bartlett. Australian War Memorial, 1954. 294 Pages; Illustrated; Index. Twelve short chapters and eighteen personal-experience stories combined with illustrations to tell of the Australian contribution in the Korean War. Highly readable and attractively designed.

blishment there not only of a Com-
ıist regime, but also of one which is
ıinated by the Kremlin. On this point
e must be no mistake. Hitler's view
ıt Germany and her neighbors applies
ı redoubled force to world Communism
elation to the United States. Even if
ımunist doctrine and practice could
lcate an altruism wholly alien to their
ıre, with the result that Soviet Com-
ıists would feel that they had attained
: end if American Communists ruled
pendently in Washington, Soviet Com-
ists who are also Great Russians could
r be content to have as their most
erful world neighbor a Communist
ted States which did not acknowledge
accept Moscow's primacy. From the
et point of view, it cannot be enough
ly to establish a Communist United
s. Communist world domination as the
nly) Great Russians who rule from
Kremlin do and must envisage it,
ot be fully achieved unless and until
prings of American will and American
pendence have been broken. Can this
lone without major war? . . . The
t main blow must be directed against
United States as the main enemy.
munist world policy, that is, *must*
en the United States, divide it from
lies, and prepare for later and decisive
ı."

ıis analysis undoubtedly is correct. But
why is it that the United States lags
lly in its mental preparation for this
st? More particularly, why is it that
is no American counterpart to
ey's, which would devote itself to
ssing the *total* security problem rather
the viewpoints of the individual serv-
There is only one consolation in
dismal situation: that the British
's who have undertaken to do the
and *supra-* service thinking for the
vorld are doing so with a great deal
jectivity and talent.

hine Guns and Mortars

NE GUNS AND GUNNERY FOR MACHINE
UNS
Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.00
RS AND MORTAR GUNNERY
Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.00
ary Service Publishing Company, 1954

ved by
t MARK M. BOATNER III

h of these two new books presents
n one set of covers the information
l by machine gunners and mortar-
The first is "a complete manual for
chanical handling of caliber .30 and
.50 machine guns and the caliber
bmachine gun; crew drill and gun-
r the caliber .30 machine guns; and
n marksmanship for the submachine
The second is "a complete manual
mechnical handling and crew drill
mm, 81mm, and 4.2-inch mor-
d mortar gunnery, including direct
direct fire both with and without
irection center."

The publisher states in a foreword that these two books are first editions and contain material similar to that found in the official ROTC manuals.

Starting with the use of the "organ gun" in 1467 by the Venetian free-lancing general, Coleoni, the machine gun entered the arena of modern warfare after Hiram Maxim's invention and production of the first true machine gun in 1883. A weapon that forced revolutionary changes in tactics during the first half of the century, it remains a significant weapon of warfare even in the atomic age. It is interesting to note that our present machine guns are modifications of John M. Browning's 1917 model.

The mortar, one of the oldest and simplest forms of cannon, traces its ancestry back to a hole in the ground. "In certain ancient fortifications there are mortars which consist only of cylindrical holes drilled in solid rock, deep enough to receive a powder charge and a stone ball, and inclined at an angle to give the desired range," the second book tells us. The mortar remains a simple and highly effective weapon which is gaining importance on the battlefield rather than losing.

Tall Texan

REBEL PRIVATE FRONT AND REAR
By William Andrew Fletcher
Edited by Bell I. Wiley
University of Texas Press, 1954
162 Pages; Index; $3.75

Reviewed by
JONATHAN CARMEN

If Bell Wiley wasn't such a reputable historian—you may know him as the author of some sections of the official history of Army Ground Forces in World War II—I might be inclined to dismiss this memoir of a Confederate soldier as another piece of self-advertisement by a Texan.

My reason for saying this is that Fletcher wrote his memoir forty years after the war, and it is no secret that Time has a way of gilding the memories of old soldiers, and old carpenters—old anything. But Bell Wiley has put his approval on this and that makes it more than reputable.

It's a hell of a note that this fighting Texan—who set a pattern that present-day professional Texans have refined into an attitude of arrogant disagreeableness—was no oil millionaire, or "bad man," or rootin', tootin' cow waddy, or Ranger. He was a carpenter, a calling to which his Maker brought great distinction, but one hardly befitting a hero of the Lone Star State. But that he was, a carpenter before the war and a carpenter after the war; indeed in 1865 or 1866 he picked up his tools and went back to work "about one hundred feet from where I left off work" at the beginning of the war.

In between he was a marchin' an' shootin' soldier who had scant respect for the rear elements or the front-line recruit who turned green at the sight of dead Union soldiers. Fletcher found great satisfaction in the sight of windrows of dead Yankees—and never had any qualms about his personal efforts in swelling Union casualty lists.

Fletcher's willingness to fight gives this memoir a refreshing vigor that most of them do not have—that and his honesty. Writing in a day when s-e-x was a back-of-the-barn word and euphemisms were in full flower, he was as candid as he could be.

For example, after his escape from a Union prison camp, he joined a group of irregular cavalry that operated behind Sherman's drive to Atlanta and the sea. One day he turned in to a farm where he stayed a few days while working out a deal for a new mount. He delayed his departure as long as possible because of a pleasant liaison with the farmer's daughter. I don't know how he could have been much bolder in writing of this incident in the early 1900s:

". . . The balance of my stay was made much more pleasant; the young lady was more talkative and pleasant, and 'bud' [her brother] did not hang around when the young lady and I were wishing the war was over. . . Time now passed rapidly and I wished I had set it twenty-four hours longer, for I had struck a bonanza—plenty to eat, comfortable bed and chairs, boy to make fires and man to feed and curry the mule, and a pleasant, quiet,

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

Actual principles of war apply. A staff officer says, ". . . can be played by admirer of Montgomery or Rommel . . . realistic and sound . . . proves doctrine." Line officer says, ". . . as challenging as chess, but with a practical application that stirs your imagination."

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City.....State.....

good-looking woman for mother-in-law—if the girl said so after the war was over and I passed that way."

He didn't pass that way, and if you ask me, he had no more intention of doing so than you have of going back—to wherever your personal remembrance of a wartime attachment may take you.

You would have to say that William Andrew Fletcher earned his brief interludes of pleasure. He was with Hood's Texans and fought during McClellan's Peninsular Campaigns, at Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga. He rapidly learned his way around camp and battlefield and was a good man to have around, whether in a fire fight, on a scrounging expedition, or as a camp companion. Urged once to run for election to a vacant lieutenancy, he refused because he wanted to be a shooting soldier. He did condescend to accept an acting corporalcy. Actually he was a natural leader who never needed confirmed authority to persuade other people to follow him.

He lived up to the publicists' mark of a Texan in one way: he became wealthy, by going into the lumber business and investing in timberlands.

Quite a fellow, really, completely devoid of the complacency of the loud breed of Texans that has been artificially created in the last twenty years. And as a man who lived in Texas for two and a half years and learned both to love and hate it, let me say that it is comforting to be assured, as I am, that there are Texans like Fletcher even today. Unfortunately, you never hear about them. You can't even hear their busy hammers above the bombast of a lesser breed. 'Tis a pity.

Guide to Guided Missiles

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDED MISSILE
By Kenneth W. Gatland
Philosophical Library, 1954
292 Pages; $4.75

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRIS

The first edition of this book appeared in 1950, after most of it had previously been published in a series of articles in *Flight*. This, the second edition, however, has been completely revised and enlarged to add detailed information on many new missiles and new developments in the fields of propulsion, research and development, and the guided bomb. It presents factually and comprehensively the significant and available information on the contemporary development in guided missiles and rockets for military and peaceful purposes.

Naturally, the author is not permitted to include classified matter pertaining to the late specific developments in Great Britain or the United States. However, this is not so terribly apparent because the author has made an interesting presentation with a wealth of information which is not classified. As an example, the new chapter on propulsion, treating of solid and liquid propellants and climaxed with a splendid treatise on ramjet propulsion, is valuable for the normal Army reader.

In the field of the surface-to-air missile the author outlines the main features of the problem as it was sized up by the Germans at Peenemunde during World War II. Beginning with diagrams to illustrate the beam-rider control system and also the command-guidance system, the author introduces the German *Wasserfall* as one of the best early examples. Picking up after the war, we learn of the problems with the Navy's Lark and Terrier, and then move on to a late account of the development and tests of the Army's Nike, the first postwar surface-to-air missile to enter full production. Excellent photographs of the Nike under tests and in defensive positions are included.

The reader doesn't have to master the intriguing diagram on the star tracking system to find interest in the problems of the long-range missiles. But the diagram is there and also one on the beam-rider system. Along with the fundamentals of the V-2 development there is the story of the Navy's Regulus, the Air Force's Matador, and the Army's Corporal, Honest John, and Redstone, with good photographs.

Mr. Gatland, well known in Britain, is a reputable aircraft design engineer, and so we can expect him to keep pretty well on solid ground. However, he is also a founder-member of the British Interplanetary Society. Our readers may not all agree with him that "the rocket's most outstanding contribution will be in the field of interplanetary flight." Most of them, however, will find interest in his chapter on that subject, as well as the chapter, "Space-Satellite Vehicles."

One appendix shows good photographs, to scale, of 40 notable rockets from various countries. Another tabulates 140 significant powered missiles with their characteristics.

The military reader who wishes to keep apace with the development of guided missiles and their significance will find Mr. Gatland's book interesting and instructive.

Commonwealth Division in Korea

THE FIRST COMMONWEALTH DIVISION: THE STORY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH LAND FORCES IN KOREA, 1950-1953
By Brigadier C. N. Barclay
Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1954
236 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index

Reviewed by
MAJOR MARK M. BOATNER III

Korea provided an excellent opportunity for comparing our military system with those of the twenty-one other participating nations. After making allowances for differences in national temperaments and economies, there were many lessons to be learned from our allies. Americans should find this book of value in pointing out how the British coped with the same problems that we faced.

The First Commonwealth Division unique in that it consisted of units five Commonwealth countries, fighting living in the closest cooperation and o tion under the direction of commar and staff officers from many parts of Commonwealth.

The combat virtues of the British mental system show dramatically thro out this book. This is something at w I think the American reader should ta long, reflective look.

In so many instances, pride in regi was the one thing that supplied that surge of almost superhuman effort spells the difference between victory defeat in battle. An example is the engagement of the Argyll and Suthe Highlanders (Princess Louise's). Two panies were fighting for their lives ag intense enemy fire and determined inf tors. Major Kenneth Muir, battalion ecutive officer, brought up a party o ter bearers. Seeing how critical the s tion was, he remained on the position took command. An air strike was c and there occurred one of those t mistakes that happen in a moving s tion: the planes attacked the two frie companies instead of the enemy. Na and machine-gun fire inflicted h casualties in the already decimated panies. An ordinary outfit would thrown in the towel. The Argylls, how withdrew fifty feet, reorganized the maining thirty effectives, and follo Major Muir back up the hill. Mor wounded some time after consolida his men on the hill, his dying words "The Gooks will never drive the Ar off this hill."

The story of the gallant Glouces covered here in detail, is already leg The last message that got to them b they were crushed by overwhelming f was, "Only the Gloucesters could done it."

The Commonwealth Division was essentially professional outfit. Aside the many manifestations of unit p there were also examples of that pric military ingredient: individual initia For example, the 60th Indian Field bulance unit landed in Korea with months' supply of medical stores. weeks later they were in Pyongyang w the order was given to evacuate the t Since there was no transportation, the was told to destroy its supplies. " was too much for the Commanding cer, who was determined to prevent a disaster if it was possible to do Eventually they found a railway en and a few trucks [cars] in a siding, the engine with water by means of cans' and a chain of men, and gathered wood to run the engine or no coal was available. In the early h of 5th December two Indian soldiers, previous railway experience, drove small train over the last bridge, just be it was demolished. It would be difficu

gine a finer example of initiative and ɔtion to duty. . . ."

could not help but derive a sly delight ı the passing reference in this book to thing many thinking professional sol- ; consider the biggest defect that Korea aled in the American military system: supervision. Under the subheading, ficulties of Command and Staff Proce- s in an Allied Army," the author says: erican higher formations kept much r control over subordinate formations units than is customary in Common- th Armies—where we adopt the prin- of giving a man a job to do and let- him do it his own way. This led, on sions, to misunderstandings. The con- ences were never serious, but they sometimes irritating and resulted in a orary loss of efficiency."

igadier Barclay has dealt skillfully the difficult task of compiling a unit ry. The organization of his book is ıy of serious study by those who may a similar job of writing. Of particular est is his method of integrating the al political and strategic background, ɔle of supporting arms and administra- services into the chronicle without ing the main narrative.

sh Century in Asia

THE BRITISH IN ASIA
By Guy Wint
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954
244 Pages; Index: $3.75

wed by
CHARLES A. H. THOMSON

is is a short but useful book by the ial writer on Asian affairs for *The hester Guardian*. Wint's purpose was ld: first, to set down the essence of happened during the century of Brit- mination of South Asia both in terms itics and society, and of the temper local mind; secondly, to inquire he consequences of the withdrawal tish power from Asia, and to estimate the countries formerly within the Empire in Asia have been faring. two purposes he has attained in high

Americans, accustomed to live in esent and to expect change for the liate and the continuing future, it always automatic to consult the past guries as to what those future changes . For those who do, Wint will pro- small but accurate mirror. He con- first the Indo-British empire, and s a point frequently missed by ans: The British empire in Asia was lo-British empire, in which Indian wer was used to further Indian in- and those of those adventurous enterprisers who were given leave r London government to seek wealth wer in the East. Britain never col- her Asiatic possessions, nor sup- them with more than a minimum s. Hence, the British empire in Asia was more Asiatic than it was foreign.

Wint finds the essence of the difference between post-revolutionary Russian imperialism, and British imperialism, in the fact that Russian Communism has bottled up Asian nationalism as a disruptive force. Communism, or at least the belief in Russia as champion of material progress, set up a countervailing force of unity. And so far, at least, Communism has been able to contain nationalism, and to mold it to its purposes. Pre-revolutionary Russian imperial power, moreover, annexed new territory permanently. British power left the expectation that the conquered territory would regain freedom.

Certain points of Wint's estimate of the situation following British withdrawal are worth keeping in mind as a basis for our own long-term relations with the new Asia. In South Asia there are succession states with political systems based on Anglo-Saxon models. But because they are so new they are unstable. To the north are China and Russia, both Communist, both using to the full their position as champions of international Communism. Throughout the area competition rages between the two systems. The anxiety of the South Asian powers not to get caught in the power struggle between America and Communism leads to the continuing attempt to maintain polite relations with Peking. At the same time, South Asian politicians distrust Western efforts at support, since they feel that the Western powers support the succession states as much to deny them and their wealth to Communism, as to see the survival of the Western legacy of liberty and the rule of law.

It is worth keeping in mind, however, Wint's description of the difficulties raised in the Orient by American actions there: our efforts first to base a policy on China, and then to put main reliance on resurgent Japan. These difficulties are thus rooted in Asian suspicion both of our failure to understand Asia and of our ultimate intentions. While fanned by Communist propaganda, these suspicions need no fanning. Even as Western-minded an Asian administrator as Pakistan's finance minister is quoted as saying that the East-West struggle is a Western struggle, waged in terms of Western ideologies, for domination of the world. "Neither group is inspired by universal values or by the interests of mankind as a whole. To the peoples of the East both appear as oppressors, and it is only their mutual rivalry that keeps them in check. . . ."

And our alliance with Japan gains fearsomeness from the Asian conviction that Japan's future may well include revived military ambitions. Japan's "singular and often calamitous history is not yet over, and its spirit—energetic, macabre, artistic, humourless, unintellectual—has not changed. . . . Whether or not they are likeable, Japanese are formidable."

Wint concludes wryly. South Asia has been very quiet, but she undoubtedly faces a turbulent future as she strives for her own form of civilization, which will not be Western. In her struggle, misery is inevitable, but may be offset by the exhilaration of high adventure. But it is time the East created something instead of borrowing, and, as the Chinese say, the new and turbulent times will make good reading in the history books of the future.

Seventeen Days

GRIERSON'S RAID
By D. Alexander Brown
University of Illinois Press, 1954
261 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $4.00

Reviewed by
N. J. ANTHONY

In April 1863 Grant was about to make his eighth try against Vicksburg by attacking twenty-five miles below it, at Grand Gulf. To distract the Confederates from his main thrust he ordered a five-pronged sweep south out of Tennessee. To Benjamin Henry Grierson, music teacher turned cavalryman, was assigned the mission of leading the force that would operate nearest the Mississippi. His was to be "the feint with the punch."

Grierson's task force consisted of three half-strength cavalry regiments and six guns, in all about 1,700 men. It would have no supply column. His target was the railroads supplying Vicksburg. Grierson was to follow the Mobile & Ohio Railroad south, cut the vital line connecting Meridian and Vicksburg, then proceed west to sever the line between Ponchatoula and Jackson. All these routes are branches of the modern Gulf, Mobile & Ohio.

Starting from LaGrange, Tenn., on 17 April, in seventeen days this force traversed the entire length of enemy-held Mississippi, finally joining U.S. forces in Baton Rouge on 3 May. Of the five forces sent out, Grant said, Grierson's was of most value. Constantly on the move, and almost always in contact with the enemy, it inflicted over 100 casualties, took more than 500 prisoners, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of railroad and telegraph lines, captured or destroyed over 3,000 weapons besides other military stores, sent fake telegrams to Confederate commanders, and raised hell in general. Task Force Grierson covered more than 600 miles in less than 16 days, the last 76 miles in 28 hours, without food, swimming many horses across a river. It reached Baton Rouge with 900 men (the rest had been returned to Tennessee). Grierson's low casualty rate is astonishing: 26 men lost, of whom only 3 were killed.

The story of Grierson's raid has been told before, but not in such vivid detail. This action-packed narrative is based on still unpublished writings by Grierson and other participants, including Confederates. The maps are excellent. Grierson's exploit merits study by military scholars as an example of an operation well planned and boldly executed. It was described by Sherman as "the most brilliant expedition of the war."

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

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UNLOAD THE OLD BROMIDES

"The Military élite is probably the most competent corps of offici
concerned with national policy in the American Government toda

DANIEL LERNER

AROUND much of the globe, military men now chart the course of human apprehension and aspiration. To perceive the new role of the military élites in our time, we must unload traditional stereotypes of "the military mind," along with other conceptual baggage carried along from a time when war-peace was a useful dichotomy. Today, the foreboding of atomic catastrophe weights all factors in the calculus of international politics; and this pervasive threat of violence—neither war nor peace—makes military thinking a major component of all political strategy. Their augmented impact on supreme decision relocates the soldiery in the social landscape.

The simple conventions of an isolate past—idealizing the Military Hero in wartime and thumping the Brass Hat in peacetime—become simple-minded under conditions of global leadership in hot-and-cold belligerence. They likely mislead us nowadays to deprecate the soldiery when they need civil support (*e.g.*, against an "economy" legislature) and to celebrate them when they might better be chastened (*e.g.*, for contriving spurious "war scares"). These soporific effects of old bromides can be avoided by recognizing that the military mind is now an indispensable engine of national action; and further, that the military élite is probably the most competent corps of officials concerned with national policy in the American Government today.

Among current military leaders, competence has been enhanced by *experience:* No other homogeneous group of Americans has had the sustained practice in shaping and administering national policy that has been shared by Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, Clay, Smith, Clark, Ridgway, Gruenther, Radford, etc. Younger members of the military corps are being prepared for future leadership by *training:* Any teacher examining the curriculum at West Point and the War Colleges will see here the *only* programs that coordinate all instruments of policy—military, economic, political, psychological—for training men to think naturally in terms of a global arena of national action. Our diplomats receive no such discipline. Nor do our legislators and bureaucrats. Our traditional faith in civilian supremacy is already compromised in fact, however devoutly the rituals may be cherished, by the sheer superiority of the military corps *qua* corps.

The rise of the military élites to their present eminence is illuminated by the histories and memoirs of World War II, and particularly by the Army's official subseries, *The War Department.* The entire series, while sponsored by Office of Military History, is produced under an Advi Committee comprising our top civilian historians, and individual volumes are written by other civilians of pro sional standing. This relationship illustrates one of the w whereby the military élite has established its predomina in the domain of current research. Superior informatio a potent instrument of military influence and, wedde the product of its own intelligence services and its cont research agencies (ORO, HumRRO, HRRI, RAND, e this method of "internalizing" civilian skills has its va It puts these skills to use, by and large, on problems sele by the military in perspectives defined by the military. General Orlando Ward, [former] Chief of Military Hist says in a foreword: "The viewpoint is from within. .

THE issues of *Wehrpolitik* are still with us, indeed likely to continue as the shaping influence on our fu history. Among these issues are the place of military th ing in our national policy and of military men in our sc structure. It is in the cards that our military élite must an augmented role in national leadership. Hence it is that the soldiers have taken their responsibilities serio and are, by training and by organizational technique, de oping a corps of competent participants in the shaping supreme policy. It is less cheerful that our political spo men and particularly our elected legislators show, by trast, an abysmal ineptitude on issues of *Wehrpolitik,* that our civilian public exhibits an abysmal disinterest.

There is great need for spreading enlightenment on political meaning of military strategy today, for in a gl arena all strategy is geopolitical. This means that mili decisions, unless shaped by clear political goals, will cu latively determine the boundaries within which our poli choices must be contained. Where military prescriptions national security and political requirements for global lea ship have not precisely coincided, the political spokes and their constituencies have usually presented the we case (if any). Since there is no reason to assume higher among soldiers, we attribute their superiority to supe organization and information. This shows itself in l things like attention to historical detail. It is certain, for ample, that large numbers of military men will study c fully the [official histories]. I wonder how many civil will look at them.

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COMMAND PERFORMANCE

...FLYING BOXCAR JOINS SAC TEAM!

The Strategic Air Command crest, which appears on all SAC planes, depicts force through a mailed fist holding in readiness symbolic lightning bolts of destruction and an olive branch. The white clouds and field of blue sky in the crest symbolize the global capabilities of SAC.

•

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Fairchild's C-119 Flying Boxcar has joined the key support elements of the Strategic Air Command, the nation's long-range defensive air arm. To the combat proven Flying Boxcar will go new responsibilities for the movement of personnel, equipment and cargo in the global theatre of SAC operations.

Since SAC was organized it has constantly expanded and improved its facilities, and today stands as a symbol of strength in the maintenance of world peace.

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

OFFSHORE AIRBUS—Going to and from work in Sikorsky helicopters is now routine for crews drilling oil wells offshore. In the Gulf of Mexico, helicopters have made as many as 2000 scheduled flights a month for one compa alone. They have introduced new operating methods o shore. Here, an S-55 nears a tender's landing platfor

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS

NEWFOUNDLAND PATROL—This commercial Sikorsky S-55 now regularly polices Newfoundland's extensive coastal waters, on duty with the Fisheries Department of Canada. Speed, versatility and rugged stamina of the big Sikorsky make it an ideal vehicle, especially for work in remote areas where surface travel is difficult.

NORTH SEA RESCUE—In mid-January, 16 crewmen fro a Norwegian freighter, grounded on the coast of Hollan were rescued by the Royal Dutch Navy helicopter show above with one of the rescued men. The big Sikorsky, a S-55 Navy version from a Dutch aircraft carrier, ma five quick flights to carry the men to the beach.



TREE-TOP MINING PROSPECTOR—Modern electronics and Sikorsky's S-55 commercial helicopter are combined in a new aerial prospecting technique developed by Aero Service Corporation, Philadelphia. Data on underground mineral-bearing formations are disclosed by magnetometer, flown over an area at tree-top height. Such geophysical surveys are far faster, reveal more and cost less than slow ground studies.

HELICOPTER HISTORY:



America's first world helicopter record—set by Sikorsky's VS-300

MAY 6, 1941—Flying his historic VS-300, Igor Sikorsky, nearly 14 years ago, remained in the air for 1 hour 32 minutes 26 seconds, to bring America her first world helicopter record.

The VS-300 was first of the many Sikorsky achievements in advancing helicopter design, development and production.

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

ASSOCIATION'S JOURN

WE should start off with a rousin Out the Vote" slogan in order your attention to the Association's and report of its nominating commit pages 62 and 63. This is the first since the beginning of the Korean wa our members have had a chance to for the Association's officers and for bers of the Executive Council and it hope of every member of the Counci a large and representative vote be Full details as to eligibility will be in the report of the nominating comm The Committee felt that because thi the first referendum of the members would be wise to quote in full the by pertaining to voting requirements. I are one of those persons who abso refuse to mar your copy of the Jou by tearing out a page, drop us a lin we will be glad to send you a copy ballot. If your time is limited you can your own ballot; it's perfectly OK. I are in the Washington area between and the 20 April deadline and wa cast your ballot in person, a supp ballots will be available in the Associa offices. Office hours: 8:30 to 5, M through Friday.

THE PUBLISH

Official Association Seal

The Executive Council of the A sociation of the U.S. Army examin the entries in the Association's se contest at its January meeting a accepted the winning entry by Maj William M. Chapman (as a nounced in our January issue) aft suggesting the substitution of t eternal flame for the initials of t Association on the shield. Maj Chapman accepted the modificati and executed the new design whi is shown here. The seal is now t official emblem of the Association the U.S. Army. Its principal use w be as a medal presented to leadi ROTC graduates.

THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

March 1955 Vol. 5, No. 8

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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a profes-nal military magazine devoted to the dissemination information and ideas relating to the military art d science representing the interests of the entire ny.

ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.

Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.

Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.

Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.

Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

THE COVER

Experiment in Mobility: The Army's XV-3 Convertiplane is rolled out at the Bell Aircraft plant at Fort Worth, Texas.

THE CURRENT SCENE

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

A Medal for Colonel Hall

● I have never written before to the editor; but I must tell you how much I enjoyed "A Medal for Horatius." I think Colonel Hall has done one of the really delightful pieces of this or any other year.

Being something of a practitioner in the field of humorous fiction (I can't quite believe Colonel Hall went to the records for this one), as well as having had some four years of experience with military matters a few years ago, I feel I am a fair judge of someone who has that genuine light touch. It is not often that irony is combined so satisfactorily with gayety. As a faithful and appreciative reader of your magazine, I want to recommend that you persuade Colonel Hall to keep seeing the situation, not as a whole, but in its crazier components.

LT. COL. ROBERT CARSON
1030 Stone Canyon Road
Los Angeles 24, Calif.

The Bigger Journal

The Editors have received a num- of letters commenting on the merger of the Antiaircraft Journal. Extracts from some of them appear here.

. . . It should, indeed, provide a fine professional publication which cannot help but be of great value to all members of the Army.

J. LAWTON COLLINS
Gen., U. S. Army
Special Representative of
the United States in Vietnam

. . . This merger is a major accomplishment and one which will be beneficial to the Army.

The members of the Far East Command extend best wishes to the newly expanded Association.

J. E. HULL
Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Far East Command
APO 500, San Francisco, Calif.

. . . The efforts of the Association of the United States Army to create an Army-wide association and to provide an interesting, valuable publication are noteworthy. That these efforts have been so successful is a tribute to you and the staff of the Association. . .

I heartily indorse the goals of the Association and wish you continued success in your efforts.

H. I. HODES
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. VII Corps
APO 107

. . . I was very pleased to learn that the U. S. Antiaircraft Association and its Journal will merge with our Association and JOURNAL. . .

I am an avid reader of the JOURNAL, which I think is very fine. . .

A. C. MCAULIFFE
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Seventh Army
APO 46, New York, N. Y.

. . . I believe that this combined effort will serve to motivate professional soldiers toward a common goal of purpose and fellowship. . .

F. L. PARKS
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Second Army
Fort George G. Meade, Md.

. . . Without doubt the merger will prove beneficial to the members of both associations. I am also confident that the important status of the ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL as a professional military journal will be even further enhanced. . .

W. G. WYMAN
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Sixth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

. . . The consolidation of these associations and publications will result in an increase in effectiveness and interest, and will add materially to the benefits derived by your mem bership and readers.

You may be assured of my continuing support of the Association and of the JOURNAL.

A. R. BOLLING
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Hq. Third Army
Fort McPherson, Ga.

● "A Medal for Horatius" in the Janu JOURNAL is one of the best of its k I have read since the old *Infantry Jou* published "GI Description of a Shoela

My copy of the shoelace story vanis long before the war was over, to my re ever since. Is it possible to obtain a c in these days?

CAPT. ROBERT H. JOHN
1400 Central Tower
San Francisco 3, Calif.

"GI Description of a Shoelace" appe in the February 1944 issue of the INF TRY JOURNAL. *That issue has long bee collectors' item.*

● Every reader should be grateful Colonel Hall's brilliant article on the fate of Captain Horatius and his disapp ing medal. In the twenty-one hun years which have elapsed since his mi venture there have of course been gr strides in expediting military procedu The scope of this achievement may perh be illustrated by the following episode

On 20 June 1916 a National Gu battery was called into federal serv Within a week thereafter it entrained the Mexican border. Its members re sented the lower-income brackets, if

As every soldier knows, payrolls r cover full months, so the first possible was that of 1 August. From that day 136 men listened with breathless eager for pay call. Silence prevailed. Soon payroll was returned with the ind ment: "Returned because put togethe detachable clips instead of by red tap required by Regulation ABC. Consoli with 1 September payroll."

One hundred and thirty-six men live poverty for another thirty-one days excitement was intense when it was kn that the 1 September payroll—consolid with infinite pains—was on its way. A silence. Again back came the payroll. time the indorsement said: "Returned cause put together by red tape instea by detachable clips as required by Re tion XYZ."

Even though the battery was ther the Rio Grande, the ensuing howl of could have been heard both in Mexico and Washington. Even the colonel of regiment heard it and took action. Fin toward the end of September, three mo after the battery had entered service, men were paid.

DOUBLE BARRELLED!



Deadly efficient are these two defenders of Democracy . . . and the USAF is ready to "let go" with both barrels should the need arise. ➢ ➢ ➢ One of these twins, the ***F84F THUNDERSTREAK,*** *is now in active service and able on instant notice to deliver its nuclear wallop in retaliation. ➢ ➢ ➢ Its photo-reconnaissance counterpart, the* ***RF-84F THUNDERFLASH,*** *has power and speed to locate the target, identify it in detail by use of the latest aerial photographic equipment . . . and if necessary, fight its way home guarding the secrets it has uncovered.*

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Let no one maintain that this account is exaggerated. It is scientifically accurate, as I know all too well. I was the battery clerk! Please sign me . . . .

PANCHO VILLA

Boston, Mass.

Monty's Assessment

● In attempting to assess the nature of future warfare, the condensed version of the talk by Field Marshal Montgomery [January] has been read with a great deal of interest. In particular, I was quite anxious to obtain his evaluation of the now classic problem: Will, or will not, nuclear weapons be used in the future, if war should occur?

However, there appears to be within the article a position that essentially is untenable, and I should appreciate receiving your view as to whether or not I have distorted his meaning by wrenching portions of the talk out of context or whether the implications appear also to you to be present.

The following quotations are pertinent:

". . . It will become increasingly clear that a *hot* [my italics] war will be mutual suicide for the contestants."

"I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used.' It is very definitely: 'They will be used if we are attacked.' "

"The reason for this action is that we cannot match the strength that could be brought against us unless we use nuclear weapons, and our political chiefs have never shown any great enthusiasm in giving us the numbers to be able to do without using such weapons."

The above set of quotations appears to say that a hot war in which atomic and thermonuclear weapons are used will be *"mutual suicide."* (My italics.) The Field Marshal then goes on to indicate that SHAPE cannot "win" a war without the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and is planning to use them. This would appear to be a declaration on his part to the effect that mutual suicide is the only possible result of a future hot war. In the normal meaning of the words, mutual suicide would simply mean that Western civilization, to include both the American and Russian portions thereof, would disappear from the earth.

As you may readily see, such an outcome would call for planning on a way to fight a war in which a decision could be reached without incurring "mutual suicide."

As indicated above, I should appreciate learning the extent to which you believe that the above interpretation is a serious distortion of the intent of the Field Marshal's remarks.

COL. H. F. SYKES, JR.

CO, ERDL
Fort Belvoir, Va.

Colonel Sykes has indeed spotted an inconsistency in Viscount Montgomery's assessment of future war, although it is only fair to add that Monty seems to believe that the "mutual suicide" of a thermonuclear war will come about only by the miscalculation of one side or the other. Our own belief is that great soldiers have as much right as great statesmen to be inconsistent, and so we would fault the Field Marshal less on that account than we would on the basis of his new-found belief in the dominance of air power. Indeed, his own expressed estimate that a future global war will have three phases of which only the first phase will be fought predominantly by air fleets while the second phase will be primarily the battle of the ground armies, and the third will be the "bargaining phase," does not suggest that air power will dominate. If it were, the second phase would hardly be necessary. As a matter of fact, Monty's three phases look strangely like the several phases of World War II—in both Europe and the Pacific.

"Faithful to Our Trust"

● Thank God for people like the author of "Faithful to Our Trust"! I hope he will let me pour him a drink sometime in a room of mine. . .

This article is so germane to the entire problem facing the United States that the author ought to be a party to our Council of State. So many of us who are try to be soldiers know what he is talk about.

THE JOURNAL is doing a courage thing when it prints ideas that bear on integrity of the Army, for the charac of a nation is pretty well reflected not much by the *auxiliary* arms, like the na and air forces, as by the worth of its la forces.

LT. COL. DONOVAN YEUELL,
Arlington, Va.

Artillery Integration

● Your articles on the integration field and antiaircraft artillery have certai provoked a great deal of discussion am the students in the Artillery Officers' vanced Course here. "Integration" is far the most popular break-time bull sion topic.

CAPT. JOSIAH A. WALLACE,
AA&GM School
Fort Bliss, Tex.

● In Iowa, we hear a lot about hybri hybrid corn, that is. The experts w continually to evolve new varieties, which the successful ones are retained the others discarded.

One military hybrid which should discarded as unsuccessful is the merge the field and antiaircraft artillery branc so skillfully pinpointed by Colonel Hall in "It Seemed Like a Good Idea" [Nov ber issue.]

Experience in Korea amply demonstra the fallacy of the merger in practice remember the succession of willing bewildered AAA majors and captains came into our headquarters under the discriminating "Arty" label which seek be all things to all artillerymen. There just so many S1 and S4 jobs.

Now, if anyone presented me wit battery of 90mm guns and directed m fire a trial-shot problem, I should call the executive. If he, like me, happene be an FA peg in an AAA hole, we wo be off to a rough start. Conversely, I h seen the look of utter disbelief upon A faces when in first contemplation of aiming circle in its functional relation to the orienting line, panoramic telesc and 105mm howitzer.

Actually, the chances of these situat occurring are thinning out, as COs personnel officers at the working level to solve the problem in their own Now we often see orders concerning "(tain John R. Jones, Arty (FA)." So have evolved from two branch letter six letters and a brace of parentheses. is progress?

Let's be honest and reconstitute legal branches in law as well as in f the FA and the AAA.

AAA should retain its secondary rol reinforcing FA, but its main job is ant craft fire. FA is far closer to infantry armor in practice than it is to AAA.

MAJOR WILLIAM W. CO
Iowa State College
Ames, Ia.

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Vith reference to General Parker's le, "It will Take a Whole New Gen- on" [January], I would like to be the enrolled in the new generation. Since beginning of cross-assignment for artil- nen, I have commanded batteries and ed on staffs of both field and antiair- battalions, and I am confident that efficiency has not been affected. After experience I have had in the past four s, I am confident that I can perform command or regular staff job in either of artillery, from the 280mm and mis- group to the 105mm and caliber .50 p. I base this on the fact that I have pted the decision of my superiors and that anyone willing to broaden his vledge has a wonderful opportunity in Artillery branch of today.

CAPT. SAM B. CARR, JR.
D, 518th AAA Bn
p Hanford, Wash.

ember Issue

Congratulations on your December is- It is an issue that is very helpful to a commander.

o one can deny that Sergeant Clifford's le, "How to be a Noncom," was ght out and to the point. It was so ly that I am using it as a complete ence for my next noncom class.

olonel Miles certainly pointed up my spots with "Let's Put Sense in CBR ning." Here is a wealth of information can better prepare my unit for any emergency.

Night Ambush Patrol" by Colonel alian is a combat lesson proven by at experience. Yes, we artillerymen some day have to provide ambush ls. I am sure the Y formation will mine succeed.

l in all, I am happy to give a vote of ks for your December issue. I hope more of this caliber are forthcoming.

CAPT. JAMES I. MILLER
h FA Bn
34, NYC

tal Mobility

his address to the National Guard ciation ["An Army on its Toes," De- er 1954], General Ridgway discussed necessity for mobility to give the Army ffective strength it will need in future I was impressed with his statement "Above all, *mental* mobility will be a quisite for successful military opera- Static thinking . . . cannot be tol- d."

e present concept of strategic opera- —the employment of "elite," hard- g forces, with mobility to increase striking power—brings about the need reater centralization of control and ity of communications than ever be- Will it actually be possible for our s to be controlled either in peripheral s or in an all-out war?

lo not feel that the ability to control unications has kept pace with our gic or tactical mobility. This is not because of a lack of scientific advances or technological proficiency. It is rather because of this lack of "mental mobility." We seem to have confined our thinking to the weapon and the vehicle and given too little thought to the problem of controlling our power.

Under our present organization we have so complicated the process of making a decision, translating that decision into an order, and then delivering it, that the advances which have been made in the communications field over the past twenty years are negated.

The problems of staffing papers are too well known to need description here. Basic to the solution of this problem, though, is the other subject about which so much has been said in THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL over the past few years—the lack of trust which is so prevalent in our Officer Corps today. There is so much fear of censure in the Officer Corps that it is like looking for a needle in a haystack to find an officer in the Pentagon who will give a straightforward yes or no answer. And if the question is about an overseas theatre, it is just added to the load on our extended communications lines. . . .

Another reason for lost time in our communications . . . is an exaggerated concern for form, processing, duplicating, recording, etc. Fear or lack of trust requires not only that we make seven copies but that they be of proper size and color with "t"s crossed and "i"s dotted or the information will be delayed for correction.

A little "mental mobility" could well be applied to the problem of arriving at atomic-age decisions and translating those decisions into timely action on the other side of the world.

COL. DAVID P. GIBBS
Hq. FECOM
APO 500

Noncoms at Fort Campbell

• SFC Walter Johnson in the December JOURNAL has some well-taken points, and he will probably be glad to know that many other persons are thinking along the same lines. Next to the establishment of the Air Force Academy and a Medical Officers' Academy, the establishment of an NCO Academy is one of the most important schools the combat forces can sponsor.

His second point, of establishing a system of selection of NCOs, is currently in operation in the 11th Airborne Division. Prior to being promoted to NCO rank, a man must be a parachutist, a qualified jumpmaster, a graduate of the Division's NCO academy, an expert in his basic weapon, and be able to fire all T/O&E weapons of his unit. He must be able to operate all vehicles up to and including the 2-½-ton truck, be proficient in the 25-mile road march and the paratroopers' quick march (five miles in one hour with full equipment), be able to swim a hundred yards in full equipment, and attain a certain educational level up to one year of college for master sergeants. This is a long way from the finished product, but no one, so far, has offered to improve it.

The third point—rotation at battalion level—was put into effect in some divisions in Korea. Of course, the replacement stream was still operating full blast, but battalions were rotated in and out of the line intact. Perhaps the current GYROSCOPE plan will be the answer to this point. It is interesting to note that rotation by unit was recommended in 1947.

As far as making the draft for three years is concerned, it is believed that if the recommendations of the Kean Board of 1947 were followed, there would be no need for the draft.

The fifth point—the return of the old first sergeant—is currently in operation here. We have no such animal as the "field first sergeant" since the first sergeant has resumed those duties along with a few others he used to have. The old first sergeant cannot be requisitioned—he must be developed with the help of the NCOs, and we are doing it. The first sergeant should receive more pay than any other enlisted man in the company and should rank them all for assignment to quarters, for promotion, and in responsibilities and privileges. Furthermore, the sergeant major should be the highest-paid man in the regiment, and then first sergeants would buck for the job instead of dodging it.

The issue of dress blues would not necessarily help the situation since the man makes the uniform instead of the uniform making the man.

The seventh point—demand highest standards of leadership—could be fostered if NCOs committing delinquencies such as speeding, drunken driving, and making false official statements, were punished on the same basis as officers.

Sergeant Johnson's eighth point—return to spit and polish—is practiced in the 11th Airborne Division. We have formal guard mounts, Sunday retreat parades, payday muster and review with full field inspection, and the old Saturday morning inspections. In addition, the sergeant major holds First Sergeants' Call and the division sergeant major holds Sergeant Majors' Call. While it is not recognized by the T/O&E, it is a fact here that the sergeant major is the senior man in the unit and he carries the national colors at parades and reviews. We have restored the NCO advisory council to advise the commanding officer and the commanding general.

The use of NCOs as jumpmasters is stressed and even the junior NCOs are required to be qualified and to be able to jumpmaster a ship. In the mess, the corporals are used as table commandants while the other NCOs are served family style at their own tables with waiter service. All NCOs and their wives are received by the commanding general upon their arrival and are greeted and the facilities of the post explained to them.

M/SGT. RICHARD G. COOPER
Co. F, 188th AIR
Fort Campbell, Ky.

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THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

"IF you strike a prince you must kill him," wrote Machiavelli more than four hundred years ago. The cruel wisdom of these words has a harsh insistence today. The leaders of the Soviet Union know that if they strike at us with thermonuclear weapons they must be able to destroy us totally, or the consequences for Russia will be dire indeed. But if they know that we can parry the blow the Muscovite Machiavellians may well decide that discretion is the better part of valor.

We must have a shield as well as a sword, and it is with this shield that *Col. William B. Bunker's* article "Another Job for the Army: Guarding the Home Front" (page 32), is concerned. Colonel Bunker believes that Army ground forces in a civil defense role will be a major part of the shield.

If bombs fall, national survival will depend on supply, communications, and transport. Colonel Bunker, best known as one of the top helicopter men in the Army, has had a varied experience in logistics. During World War II he was Deputy to the Assistant Chief of Transportation, and in 1945 he became Transportation Officer of the Seventh Army. Three years later he was placed in charge of terminal operations in the Berlin Airlift. He is now Commandant of the Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Va.

Mr. Theodore White (page 20) would rank high in any list of contemporary journalists. He spent most of the Second World War in the Far East for *Time*. His free-lance beat for the past several years has been Europe but he is now back home "covering" the United States for *The Reporter* and other magazines. He was the editor of the papers of the late General Joseph W. Stilwell and the author of *Fire in the Ashes*, a report on the slow recovery of postwar Europe.

Colonel Waldon C. Winston (page 24) is presently on duty with the Troop Training Unit at the U. S. Naval Amphibious Base, San Diego, Calif.

Lieutenant Colonel Bidwell Moore, Artillery (page 26), is assigned to the Department of Combined Arms, The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla.

Colonel Ralph E. Pearson, Milit Police Corps (page 28), came into Regular Army through the Army serve in 1947.

Major Melvin Garten, Infantry (p 30), recently left Fort Bragg, N. C., duty at The Infantry School.

Colonel William R. Kintner, Inf try (page 40), a frequent contributo the JOURNAL, is assigned to the Of of the Secretary of Defense.

Major Frank J. Jansen, Artillery (p 49) is with the Department of Ob vation, The Artillery School, Fort Sil

Four of this month's cerebrators (pa



COLONEL WILLIAM B. BUNKER

46-48), present new approaches to ever-present problem of maintai high morale, while two deal with t niques and equipment that may we used in a future conflict. *Major Joh Murray*, Transportation Corps, is a cial assistant to the Chief of Tr portation. *Captain William E. Mc zie*, Infantry, is on duty at USAREUR Press Center. *Colonel T Dupuy*, Artillery, is a member of Department of Military Science Tactics at Harvard University. *Ca John R. Byers*, Armor, is presentl signed to the 3d Cavalry Regiment, Meade, Md. *Lieutenant Colonel C. Fralish*, Artillery, is attending Command and General Staff Col Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

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

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FRONT AND CENTER

, long-expected redesignation of Of-
, Chief of Army Field Forces, to
quarters, Continental Army Com-
, took place almost simultaneously
the announcement by General
E. Dahlquist of the formation of
sections for armor, artillery, and
ıtry. These sections, headed by
Gen. Leander L. Doan (armor),
Gen. Armistead D. Mead (infan-
and Maj. Gen. William E. Wa-
(artillery), have taken over some
e training functions of the G3
n and replaced the Combat Arms
ory Board. The sections will be
nsible for determining the state
ining of individuals and units, de-
ing doctrine, tactics, technique and
ization, and establishing require-
for improved weapons and equip-
This reorganization will give the
principal combat arms a stronger
entation at a headquarters that has
sed scope and growing importance
ining the Army and in directing
ctivities of the six continental ar-
It also tidies up the staff of
ARC by reducing the responsibili-
nd activities of the G3 section
, as General Dahlquist has noted,
ecessarily grown too large for full
ncy.

✓ ✓ ✓

*e missiles have been fired recent-
r Fort Churchill, Manitoba, in a
lian-American test known as Op-
1 JETFROST. The purpose of the
s to determine the effects of ex-
low temperatures on the Nike.
Canadian troops participating in-
sixty soldiers who received train-
operating the Nike at Fort Bliss
ear. Any publishable results of
st will be released by Canadian
headquarters at Ottawa. Last win-
U.S. Army's 280mm atomic can-
as tested at Fort Churchill.*

✓ ✓ ✓

attalion of 280mm atomic can-
s completing training at Fort Sill
ill soon be sent to Europe to join
e battalions already with Seventh
Army. NATO forces have been strengthened also by the recent arrival in Europe of an Army guided missile battalion. General A. C. McAuliffe, new commander of USAREUR, has also requested additional armored personnel carriers.

✓ ✓ ✓

The long-discussed plan to separate noncoms from specialists will finally go into effect 1 July 1955. Specialists in the top four enlisted grades will receive new insignia before that date. New enlisted personnel records (Forms 20 and 24) will be adopted. New tables of organization will begin to be distributed to field commands this month and all units should have them by 1 June.

✓ ✓ ✓

The root of the reserve problem is that only four out of every 100 draftees become active reservists when their two years of active service are over. At present there is no way to enforce the law, which requires them to attend drills for six additional years. One of the early proposals was to give an "other than honorable" discharge to men who do not fulfill their reserve obligation. When the new reserve bill was sent to Capitol Hill this requirement had been struck out. It is clear that, however the reserves may be reshuffled, they will only be a paper force so long as the draft law lacks reserve "teeth." Meanwhile, a four-year extension of the draft is moving along and probably will become law.

✓ ✓ ✓

Manpower shortages and the need for more streamlined military units in the face of a possible atomic war are bringing about far-reaching changes in the armies of our allies as well as our own. The French have announced plans to organize "pocket" infantry divisions this year. These modernized units, say the French, will be equipped with a radar-controlled antitank rocket that an infantryman can control from his dugout. Details of the weapon are still secret.

The names of 862 Army officers selected to attend 1955-56 courses at service schools are listed in Circular No. 621-5, 28 January 1955. Here is a breakdown of the numbers assigned to each school from the arms and services;

Infantry: NWC 15; ICAF 3; AWC 62; Air WC 3; Naval WC (2d year course) 2; AFSC 20; CGSC 171; Naval WC (1st year course) 1; Naval WC (C&S course) 2. Total: 279.

Artillery: NWC 10; ICAF 2; AWC 45; Air WC 3; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 14; CGSC 128; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 205.

Armor: NWC 4: ICAF 1; AWC 16; Air WC 1; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 5; CGSC 43; Naval WC (1st year course) 1. Total: 72.

Corps of Engineers: NWC 2; ICAF 7; AWC 14; Air WC 1; AFSC 5; CGSC 46; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 76.

Signal Corps: NWC 1; ICAF 5; AWC 8; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 27. Total: 45.

Chemical Corps: NWC 1; ICAF 1; AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 5; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 11.

Ordnance Corps: ICAF 6; AWC 7; Air WC 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 21; Naval WC (C&S course) 1. Total: 39.

Quartermaster Corps: NWC 1; ICAF 5; AWC 8; Naval WC (2d year course) 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 21. Total: 39.

Transportation Corps: ICAF 6; AWC 7; Air WC 1; AFSC 3; CGSC 21; Naval WC (1st year course) 1. Total: 39.

Army Medical Services: ICAF 2; AWC 4; AFSC 2; CGSC 9. Total: 17.

Adjutant General's Corps: ICAF 1; AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 6. Total: 10.

Chaplain Corps: AWC 1; CGSC 2. Total: 3.

Finance Corps: AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 5. Total: 8.

Judge Advocate General's Corps: AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 4. Total: 7.

Military Police Corps: ICAF 1; AWC 2; AFSC 1; CGSC 8. Total: 12.

Editorial

What Ike Said

AT his first press conference following General Ridgway's statement that he believed the proposed reduction in strength of the Army would "jeopardize the security of the country to a degree," President Eisenhower firmly asserted that the decision had been his, that it "was not reached lightly," and that it was correct. The President said that he had come to the decision after long study and "in consultation with every single individual in this Government that I know of that bears any responsibility whatsoever about it." He had conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he knew "exactly who [among them] agrees with me and who doesn't."

It was reassuring to have the President affirm that the decision had been his alone. There had been much speculation in Washington as to the kind of advice the President was finding most persuasive. This however shed little light on the President's own reasoning and guiding purposes. It would seem more helpful to seek to trace the trend of the President's thinking through his public statements.

THIS process would seem to be rewarding in view of a thesis recently advanced by a highly respected Washington newspaperman, Mr. Joseph C. Harsch of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Mr. Harsch, seeking to determine why the President had failed to "logically explain . . . the Army Budget," came to the conclusion that the failure was "an implicit disclosure of first importance." Mr. Harsch suggests that the pulling and hauling between fiscal experts who argued that the nation could not afford to maintain both conventional and atomic warfare forces and military advisors who were moving towards a "point of no return in the use of atomic weapons" had involved the President in an "agonizing reappraisal far more agonizing than any Mr. Dulles ever had to endure over France."

A good place to begin such a review is with the President's 1954 State of the Union message. This hera the New Look defense budget by noting that it was "b on a new military program [that] will make and America stronger in an age of peril." The President the Administration was "taking into full account our and growing number of nuclear weapons and the most tive means of using them against an aggressor if they needed to preserve our freedom."

THIS phrase is reminiscent of Mr. Dulles's "massiv taliation" theme. But three months later (5 April 1 the President said that the hydrogen bomb "was not to be used by our initiative." And six months after th revealed that the possible terrible effects of such wea were weighing on his mind. War today, he observed o October 1954, "does not present the possibility of victo defeat. War would present to us only the alternativ degrees of destruction."

He returned to the theme again in his most recent of the Union message, on 6 January 1955:

"To protect our nations and our peoples from the trophe of a nuclear holocaust, free nations must mai countervailing military power to persuade the Commu of the futility of seeking to advance their ends thr aggression. If Communist rulers understand that Ame response to aggression will be swift and decisive . . . will be powerfully deterred from launching a military ture engulfing their own peoples and many others in ter. Now this, of course, is a form of world stalemate.

While the President did not specifically state that "countervailing military power" is our stock of nu bombs and long-range bombers, it appears that he w ferring to them. Nor did he say that such response w come only if the aggression was by nuclear weapons. points seem worth emphasizing if, as seems evident

ımunists are less than wholly deterred from peripheral ·ntures by the threat of nuclear annihilation. The ıt may have restrained the armies of the Soviet Union ı marching across Europe in the early postwar years ıough war fatigue and the successes Russia was having propaganda and subversion in those days may have ı just as influential), but Korea and Indochina and now ıosa are evidence that their Asiatic partners have been rred (if at all) by their own military weaknesses rather by the threat of massive retaliation.

E theory that a choice had to be made between atomic ·apons and conventional weapons—that we can't have —is highly debatable. Also debatable is the "point of eturn" thesis—the argument that the New Look defense ram was committing us to exclusive reliance on atomic ment.

igadier General Thomas R. Phillips, retired, the *St. s Post-Dispatch* analyst, has discussed the "point of no n" thesis more clearly than any other writer. "Once Army, Navy and Air Force have become atomic armies, es and air forces, once they have discarded the weak outmoded conventional weapons, the time when a ion can be made not to use atomic weapons in war is " General Phillips wrote in an article appearing in his r on New Year's Day.

ıe President may have had the "point of no return" s in mind in his most recent State of the Union mes- when he said: ". . . we must stay alert to the fact that ıe reliance on one weapon or preparation for only kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to ıer. We must, therefore, keep in our Armed Forces ce and flexibility adequate to our needs."

this statement seems to reject the idea of depending on nuclear weapons, the paragraph that followed it ssed the idea that we may indeed be going in that ion: "To keep our Armed Forces abreast of the ad- s of science, our military planning must be flexible gh to utilize the new weapons and techniques which ever more speedily from our research and development ams. The forthcoming military budget therefore em- zes modern airpower in the Air Force, Navy and ıe Corps and increases the emphasis on new weapons, ially those of rapid and destructive striking power." e omission of the Army as one of the services which "emphasize" modern airpower is disappointing. So the one sentence alluding specifically to the Army: ıe Administration's military program] seeks continuous rnization of our Army."

ere is no expansion on this. No suggestion of the or degree or speed of modernization. Should we not e whether there is not some danger that the "balance exibility adequate to our needs" may suffer if the Army ıe deemphasized?

ING back to our original purpose of seeking to find key to the President's purpose through his public ıents, we may find it profitable to continue to examine of his foreign policy statements.

ile the President's course is not on a peace-at-any-price bearing (he once said that he would order an immediate attack against any nation launching an attack on the U.S., and any President who failed to protect the country in an emergency should be worse than impeached, he should be hanged), there is still the question of how far he will go in his very obvious desire to reduce every international tension he can while searching for a way out of the situation that divides the world into two warring camps.

On 5 April 1954 he said that the hydrogen bomb "was not going to be used by our initiative."

On 30 June he said that the hope of the world lay in peaceful coexistence but that he would "not be a party to any treaty that makes anybody a slave."

On 30 August he warned against the dead ends of both isolationism which would "surrender most of the free world to Communist despotism and ultimately forfeit our own security," and war which "would suddenly place in jeopardy the civilization which we are determined to preserve."

On 2 December he said he would not be pushed into any hasty act—such as a blockade of China—that might precipitate war. But, he said, he would not let the Reds get away with the imprisonment of thirteen Americans as spies. He said his personal feelings of anger and resentment were as great as any other American's, but he believed restraint and patience might mean the difference between an act of war and a chance to avoid war.

THIS last statement probably indicates as clearly as any the President's grand purpose: to exercise restraint and patience and avoid war if honorably possible.

That his purpose seems to him to require a defense effort that emphasizes a "countervailing military power" (thermonukes and heavy bombers?), rather than a revitalized and strengthened Army in being and ready, may perhaps be explained by a statement he made at a press conference on 15 December 1954.

He considered prevention of aggression against vital non-U.S. areas to be a secondary problem, the President said. He had planned a program to meet major defense needs and would rather improvise and resort to expedient in little wars than in big ones. Although he considered distinctions between big and little wars artificial, he felt that if the U.S. could win a big war, it certainly could win a little one.

THE best way to conclude this examination is to return to a statement General Ridgway made on 31 January to the House Armed Services Committee:

"It appears to be obvious, therefore, that a primary means of halting Communist armed encroachment is to maintain combat-ready U. S. Army forces in sufficient strength, suitably deployed, with adequate air and surface transportation and support, for commitment at any threatened point. The consequences of adopting an alternate course, and of decreasing those deployed forces, are, I believe, best described in the following excerpt from the President's message to the Congress on the 6th of January 1955. I quote: 'We must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon, or preparation for only one kind of warfare, simply invites an enemy to resort to another. We must, therefore, keep in our Armed Forces balance and flexibility adequate to our needs.' "

MAN: the vital weapon

GENERAL MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

In recent weeks General Ridgway has sought to convey to the Army his deepest convictions on the importance of the Army to the nation and the high privileges of service. This is the text of his talks before the Armored, Artillery and Infantry Schools. The same talk may be made later at the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile School.

DESPITE the remarkable developments in military technology, despite the weapons and machines which have vastly expanded our striking power, it is still a basic truth that the only absolute weapon is man. Upon his determination, his courage, his stamina, and his skill rests the issue of victory or defeat in war.

I will speak on three principal, related subjects—the role of the Army today; the privilege of service; and the officer-enlisted man relationship.

Wars are won when the enemy's will to continue resistance is broken. History has shown beyond any question that, when the people of a nation believe in the cause for which they are fighting, they will accept defeat only when all reasonable hope for success through continued resistance is lost, when their armed forces have been destroyed, decisively defeated, or rendered impotent.

In other words, the military objective in war is the defeat of the enemy's armed forces. It is vitally important to keep this fact in mind.

The means employed to achieve this objective include attacks upon the enemy's ability to support his armed forces with supplies and equipment, munitions and reinforcements. They probably will include pressures upon the basic economic and social structure of the enemy nation—not as ends in themselves, but because of the effect of such pressures upon the capabilities of the enemy armed forces.

However, it is defeat of those armed forces which must be our ultimate military objective.

The Unpredictable Nature of Warfare

AMONG some circles today, a belief seems to prevail that modern wars may be quickly won by means of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons which will make unnecessary the operations of ground combat fo This may prove true. Yet no man can today be su the nature, duration, or outcome of all-out wars of future, if such catastrophes should eventuate.

Therefore, taken as an assumed basis for plan no concept could be more potentially dangerous, haps even fatal, than the idea that the war woul over in a few days, weeks, or even months. War take too many forms and can be characterized by many surprises for any arbitrary or single promise its nature to be warranted. When survival as an pendent people is at stake reasonable people will place their reliance on any single system.

Consider first the situation of a global war. If nu weapons were only used strategically—that is, ag the fixed facilities and industrial installations of ar emy power—it would still be a considerable time b shortages induced by air attacks upon sources of su and lines of communication would begin to be seri felt by enemy forces in the forward areas. Stra bombardment, in fact, is of military value chiefly f long-range, not its immediate, effects.

Furthermore, unless the enemy's attacking gr forces were effectively opposed on the ground, could, by seizure of supplies and facilities in the ter of our allies, replace much of what had been lost i bombing of their own homeland. That would lea with the choice of allowing the enemy to keep wh had taken, or of bombing allied territory at an inevi great cost in lives and property of friendly peoples.

If nuclear weapons were also used tactically, would find remunerative targets only if enemy gr forces were compelled to concentrate in an effo break through our own ground defense forces. A these were too few in strength to compel concentra we would find only unremunerative targets for nuclear weapons.

There is also the possibility, in a war occurring years hence, that atomic and hydrogen weapons not be used at all, neither opponent being willi initiate action which could be expected to bring c taliation in kind. In that case, the role of ground would be apparent.

sum, armies are an essential element in our ability nduct global war successfully, regardless of whether t atomic and hydrogen bombs are used.

importance of the Army's role in geographically ited wars is equally clear.

calized aggression tends to occur in underdevel- regions, and these are usually characterized by ıtain or jungle terrain. In such a war, our ability ıke effective use of many of our most modern weap- s severely limited.

Korea, for example, the comparatively undeveloped ıization of the country produced relatively little ı for the enormous effort we expended in our gic attacks on the enemy's industry and lines of ıunication, both of which we literally demolished. ıe more primitive a country, the more decentralized Therefore, such a country is much less severely by blows struck primarily at the installations and ies which in other countries would be its heart, , and nervous system. It does not depend on them s life, as does a more highly organized and inte- l enemy.

nclusive military results against this type of enemy chieved by destroying or severely damaging the of his fighting forces, and breaking the will to fight s leadership. All the military services, from the ning to the end of hostilities, make essential con- ions to the achievement of that goal, but ultimately ırden must be shouldered largely by the Army.

SO far I have been talking about the responsibility of military forces to win victory in war. They have, however, a vitally important mission in peace—and that is to provide military capability of such a character that it deters aggressors from resorting to war.

This mission can best be carried out by developing military strength which will give any prospective aggressor serious doubts concerning his chances for success. Because of their potential importance for achieving victory in war, ground forces are vitally important as part of our military strength to deter others from starting war.

Since successful diplomacy depends largely on an ability to negotiate from a position of strength, our military capability is an essential element in the efforts of our statesmen to achieve our foreign policy objectives by peaceful methods.

I do not mean to suggest that technology is not having a marked effect on the Army. New weapons and equipment are giving us vastly greater capabilities. Our present tactics and tactical organization are sure to be materially modified.

You are all aware of the tests and exercises which are being carried out to determine the organizations and tactics which will enable us to realize our capabilities to the fullest extent.

One of the most striking effects will, I think, be the increase in dispersion, both laterally and in depth. We must disperse in order to minimize the effectiveness of mass destruction weapons which may be used against us. At the same time, to exploit the effects of our own

mass destruction weapons against the enemy, we must be able to concentrate rapidly, strike hard, and quickly disperse again.

To do this, we are seeking to develop ever increased mobility and ever improved communications. Of these, much the most vital, is mental mobility throughout our entire chain of command, a freeing of our thinking processes from the paralyzing effects of undue reliance upon past experiences. Something new has truly been added to warfare, and we must meet the challenge of the new with new ways of adapting new weapons and new capabilities to old and unchanging human qualities and the basic principles of war.

These tactical developments will place greater responsibility than ever upon subordinate commanders. Even junior leaders will often have to operate independently and semi-independently. On their initiative and their judgment, no less than on their technical skill in the operation of their equipment, will rest a large part of our hope for victory.

The Soldier's Unconquerable Spirit of Service

THIS now brings me to my next major point, which is that as officers of the Army you are being given as great an opportunity as any to which anyone can aspire —the opportunity for useful service.

Our Nation, with all it stands for, lives under a continuing threat of attack by Godless communism. To the Army, and especially to us as leaders of the Army, falls a vitally important share of the responsibility for maintaining the strength which will prevent the outbreak of war—or, if that is not possible, which will bring us victory.

The rendering of service to the Nation is no imposition upon the individual. It seems to me that all too many people are too prone to concentrate on the comforts, pleasures, and luxuries our way of life makes possible—too remiss in showing forth in their lives a principle they utter with their lips and I believe acknowledge in their minds—the principle of the privilege of serving their kin, their country, and God.

The soldier foregoes many comforts. In place of luxuries he has hardships and often grave danger. Sometimes he is called upon to make the supreme sacrifice and lay down his life for the cause he defends. He knows this. If he is a good soldier he early accepts it fully, unhesitatingly. It becomes basic in his actions in peace and in war.

This spirit is eloquently expressed in the inscription on the monument in Edinburgh to the Scottish-American dead of the First World War. It says: "If it be life that waits, I shall live forever unconquered; if death, I shall die at last, strong in my pride and free."

None of this is new. Sacrifices have been made throughout the history of man. Our national history is replete with them. The history of our Army bears eloquent testimony to the dedication of its members to the ideal of service to others.

Nothing is free. Nothing worthwhile is cheap. The service we perform, the sacrifices we may be called u to make, constitute the price we must be ready to to preserve for the future the blessings of liberty justice, of human dignity and of individual free which have been handed on to us from the past.

SELDOM have military men been afforded more c lenging opportunities, more engrossing tasks t those which confront the leaders in our Army to New weapons in constantly increasing numbers are ing made available to the Army. Their mastery requ the application of technical skill and tactical judgr of the highest order. Because we are passing throu period of transition, there is a greater requirement t ever for mental flexibility, for creative imagination, alert minds. "The orthodox mind maintains and serves progress—the non-conformist makes progress." far-flung deployment of Army forces places the Ar officers and noncommissioned officers in the positio ambassadors of our country in many lands and m climes.

And upon the success they attain today in all t varied tasks, may well depend not only the succes our Nation in attaining its objectives, but perhaps our national survival.

At this point I should like to take a moment to tribute to those who serve with the Army in a civ capacity—from our highest civilian leaders to the h dreds of thousands of loyal and faithful employees w out whose contributions the great work of the A could not go forward.

In particular, we should be proud of our high-p cipled Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens. integrity, courage, devotion to duty, and his loyalt the members of the Army merit our deepest apprecia and support.

The Privileges and Responsibilities of Lea

NOW I come to the third and last topic I want to cuss—the officer-enlisted man relationship.

Our achievement of success as soldiers is made e by the high caliber of men and women in today's A One of the chief rewards which goes with member in our officer corps, is the privilege of serving with enlisted men.

In fact the two most important elements in any are first its officer corps and second its noncommissio officer corps.

The soldiers whom we command, like their pred sors throughout our history, have repeatedly proved when properly led, they are the finest fighting me the world. Their intelligence, their enthusiasm, ingenuity, and their initiative are among our stro assets. But the responsibility for bringing out t qualities rests squarely upon the officers.

We must ever remember that we are responsibl our men, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a w and that our success as officers rests solidly upon t and regardless of whether we command a unit, or

a staff. They look to the officer corps for direction, dance, and example.

t is in the intangible, but vital relationship between :ers and men, that leadership becomes an art, not ıere technique. The officer-enlisted man relationship ıe foundation stone of sound discipline, the *sine qua* of morale and *esprit*.

OSELY allied to this relationship is the one which :xists between the noncommissioned officer and his ı. He is the close and indispensable associate of the ımissioned officer in the attainment of the Army's :ctives. The noncommissioned officer corps, with its 'essional cadre of career personnel, is of vital im- :ance in achieving the high standards to which our ıy aspires.

ust as the officer corps must be the great reservoir of grity, professional competence, and courageous lead- ıip, so likewise must the noncommissioned officer ɔs form the great reservoir of character, of devotion uty, of loyalty, of professional competence that gives ngth and substance to our Army. The noncommis- 'ed officer's responsibilities are reflected in the rela- ship that exists between him and his subordinates. 'oddling has no place in the relationship between er and subordinate. The soldier is not a child, nor is he an object of pity. He is a colleague to be respected. He is a subordinate to be trained, guided, and directed. He is a fellow American who can teach us much, no matter how many years we have served—a civilian on loan, whose Army service can make him a far better citizen of the future.

Each of us, regardless of rank, must be constantly ready to share in full the discomforts, the hardships, and the dangers which may fall to the lot of our men. This readiness must be something that the men must know they can take for granted. It must rest upon demonstrated acts.

Inexperienced officers sometimes make the mistake of believing that they must court the liking of their men, as though they were taking part in a popularity contest. Nothing could more certainly lead to failure. Respect and consideration for subordinates are essential parts of the good officer's attitude, but they must never overstep that line which dignity, honesty, and firmness dictate, and common sense demands. Character, courage, competence, and consideration will keep us on our side of that indefinable but ever-present line, and under the stresses and tensions of battle, however great, permit us to discharge our responsibilities in keeping with the Army's finest traditions.



The Mutual Respect of Leaders and Followers

THERE is a single principle, a basic interrelationship, underlying the thoughts I have sought to convey to you today. That principle can be expressed in the statement which I made at the outset—that the only absolute weapon is man.

In the final analysis, the form taken by warfare when the struggle becomes one of men against men—as, in the end, it must—is land combat. Only when we close with the enemy on the ground—as only armies can do—can we finally defeat his armed forces, and only by defeating enemy armed forces can we win victory over an enemy nation.

A basic element in our ability to win victory in battle is the relationship between our fighting men and our fighting officers who lead them. That relationship is grounded in the spirit of mutual respect, of mutual confidence, and of mutual understanding, in which discomforts, hardships, and dangers are properly shared, and in which ours can be the greatest reward that anyone can earn—the abiding respect of those who know us best—our comrades and associates.

To the officers and senior noncommissioned officers of the Army is granted the privilege of providing the example, the inspiration, and the leadership through which the Army can continue to perform its vital service to the Nation in peace and in war.

This opportunity for useful, meaningful service is limitless. On the manner in which it is seized and carried out depends a significant share of our country's hope for a future of peace and freedom. No one could hope for a greater opportunity. No one could ask for a finer challenge.

An Interview with General Gavin

THEODORE H. WHITE

MAJOR GENERAL James M. Gavin runs what they call at the Pentagon "a busy shop." His office—he is Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans—seems always on the bubble; it is where the ferment centers.

"Slim Jim" Gavin himself, a lithe and graceful combat soldier of forty-eight, is as reluctant as any man at the Pentagon these days to talk about the Battle of the Budget—whether its cuts may hurt the Army's muscle and strength. But since he is head of the task force that General Matthew Ridgway, Chief of Staff, has assigned to the biggest overhaul job any army has undergone since the Europeans imported the idea of gunpowder from China, his work is obviously central to the great debate. Recently, therefore, I dropped in at the Pentagon for a short talk with the General.

I found him, like most ground soldiers these days, more than somewhat disturbed. In a way all the generals are hoist by the headlines that recent weapon developments have created. The new missiles of war, several capable of being nippled with atomic warheads, are passing rapidly from experimental production into tactical use. The Honest John, a long-range artillery rocket, the Corporal, a longer-range tactical missile, and the 280mm cannon are already firing and ranging practice not only at Fort Sill, Fort Bragg, and ot American training centers but also at our outposts Europe. What worries the generals is that each tim new technological advance in these weapons is signa a fanfare of headlines informs the public that the A is moving toward "smaller, more mobile units."

Dispersed, but Deep

Which is true, said Gavin, but when you tall smaller, more mobile units, everyone nods—it's being in favor of God and motherhood. Actually, as work of remaking the Army for modern war goes o may be that what is needed is bigger forces of sma units—more men rather than fewer.

For the important thing is to realize that the Rus has the same atomic weapons we have; technologic and tactically he can do to us what we can do to And the object of any military exercise is power in zone of battle, power at point of contact with the ene In the last war you figured a breakthrough of al five miles; the depth of the battlefront was, there five miles. But how deep must a modern battle zon to meet attack with atomic weapons? Say he hits with half a dozen atomic weapons and comes thro fast. The battle zone must be as deep, then, as he travel with the fuel tanks of his armor full and rol immediately after the blast. This is the determinan the battle zone, for he is likely to strike just that d

It will take a lot of men to face off the enemy in new kind of war. Yet not in the density of the old fo of combat, thought Gavin, for all the old forms are vulnerable to atomic weapons. The problem is sim to find the optimum density of manpower over optimum depth—enough to hold the enemy on ground while he is coming in fast, enough to hold until you organize help and reinforcement for a co terblow.

This means, then, that what we have to do no take existing forms and repackage them completely group our forms of fire and artillery, reorganize all ba

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. TOMORROW'S BATTLEFIELD

l communications, think through again our means of ıediate combat intelligence.

Vell, I asked, what does this do to the old division, kind we fought with in the Second World War and Korean War?

the last wars, said the General, an American division as regularly relied on to hold a front of ten to fifteen s, quite thick for the first three miles back, tapering ıt a depth of five miles. Behind that, nothing but ted spots of strength.

ut now the divisional front will certainly be doubled ength—and how far back in depth it goes no one ertain. We have to think in terms of single-day kthroughs of 75 to 125 miles in depth. Supposing Russian throws in a mechanized army of 1,200 or 0 tanks; he throws three or four atomic weapons in he comes in on the blast; he comes dispersed. What ? Your reaction time determines your survival. He'll e without hesitation just as far as the fuel in his

GENERAL GAVIN SAYS—

The battle zone must be as deep as the enemy can travel with the fuel tanks of his armor full and rolling immediately after the atomic blast.

We are trying to discard old concepts of linear control of the battlefield for one of area control —a problem of controlled dispersion.

Divisional fronts will be doubled in length and how deep no one is yet certain.

We'll have divisions made up of battle groups of two or three thousand men—isolated and dispersed, yet controlled.

For every airplane that goes into combat today, there may be fifty behind doing logistical work, hauling fuel and lubricants, men, or supplies.

Air mobility is the key to battle capability. Tactically we must keep isolated units alive over long periods. Strategically we must be able to deliver power to the zone of battle quickly.

Twenty thousand planes for the Army might indeed not be too many.

Peace can be kept by using our technology to get our forces precisely where we want them.

tanks will carry him until he is stopped by a river or by atomic demolition—or until he is contained by other men.

But, I asked, just how will all this be worked out technically? The new battlefield is all diffuse and scattered. Is it amenable to technical solution?

Never Forget Elephants

Gavin paused for a moment. Always in history, he said, the interesting thing is to see man's reaction to new forms of explosive power. Each new explosive form upsets men into thinking that its destructive power is so great that the battlefield is obsolete, that war is impossible. The Nobel Peace Prize, he pointed out, is almost a symbol. Nobel invents dynamite, of hitherto unknown blasting power; men think that war is now impossible; Nobel bases his Peace Prize on the fortune he makes out of dynamite because war is now unthinkable. Yet what use is dynamite in war today?

Or take elephants, he said. I was puzzled for a moment, but the General went on. He had been reading about elephants and how Hannibal used them against the Romans and what the Romans did. The Carthaginian soldiers looked on their elephants the way our troops looked on tanks—they even named them individually as our men name their tanks. The Carthaginians would paint the rears of their elephants a brilliant vermilion, gather cadavers from the battlefield and impale their guts and parts on the elephants' tusks. Then they would stake the elephants down, goading and prodding them for several days. Then just before battle they would unleash the elephants, which would go trumpeting and screaming into a charge on the Roman ranks. It baffled the Romans until they learned a simple thing—merely to step aside, let the elephants through, and then stick them in the belly and the soft sides.

THE modern battlefield is similarly amenable to technical solution. An amateur strategist might argue that since we have as many atomic weapons as the enemy, the solution is not to try to hold him at all. Simply put a man on every high hill with a radio telephone, five men per square mile, and then wait for the enemy to come through. Your scouts simply report how he comes through and then you counterstrike with atomic weapons of your own. But that won't work because if you hold your front that thinly, the enemy can come through with the lightest forms and simply brush your men aside.

'Battle Groups'

The problem is amenable to solution only with new concepts. What we are trying to do is discard the old concept of linear control of the battlefield for one of area control, said the General. The difficulty is in learning how to control the amorphous mass of men who must be dispersed over an entire zone, an entire tract of land, dispersed thinly enough not to invite bomb blast, yet strongly enough to tackle the enemy who comes on the blast. It is a problem of controlled dispersion. The Army both here and in Germany has been workin the problem intensively, both theoretically and in field.

This means, said Gavin, that the "monolithic" sion of tradition has got to be abandoned. It is too nerable to disruption. Instead, the new combat forn the army must be a "cellular" organization—units of or three thousand men—isolated and dispersed, yet trolled. These new units are smaller than the old ment of 3,500 men. Tentatively we call them "b groups." How many the United States Army has is, of course, classified. But the number is signific The term "division" will be retained, to be sure, for organization that binds them to cohesion will still called a division. But it will be something else, hin on an entirely new system of communications with functions. Eventually, as the system and technique velop, the whole Army must be changed over to pattern, and the National Guard and reserves also.

BUT in sum, I asked, what does this mean—will Army need more men for the atomic battlefiel fewer? Certainly not fewer, said the General, q possibly more, almost certainly more. At some point have to dissolve the organization down to the siz units you are not afraid of losing to one blast. These be smaller units, but the organization that controls t may require more men; it certainly won't take less than in the present division. Or take the Eighth A in Korea. Had that been an atomic war with at weapons, with the depth of battlefront required by t weapons, it would certainly have required many m men.

The area and depth of the new battlefront, I poi out, were something new in the thinking of people me. Did this concept of area war mean holocaust vast expanses of ground?

No, said the General; how could he explain it? reflected, then resumed again. A lot of people about the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica as being of great peace, the one dependent on land power, other on sea power. And they say this will be the of Pax Americana, dependent on air power.

But think about it. How did the Romans keep t peace? Not by having soldiers everywhere but building roads. The General had traveled over t roads in Italy, in Africa, and Asia Minor—roads run straight as an arrow where the builders wanted the go. The roads were simply a means of moving men to the area of decision where they could operate at vitals of the enemy, and that's what the Roman p was. What was British sea power? It was the m of delivering power, with mobility, where they wa it. It was the presence of the flag in the harbor, putting ashore of a few men in a key area, the han of a few criminals, that kept the peace where the p might be disrupted.

Our belief, said Gavin, is that the progress of t nology makes it possible to move our forces to im our will on criminals who disturb the peace, to pu

n, and then be able to move on swiftly to the next ı threatened. It's not the idea of using the technology more destruction but the capability of getting our e precisely where we want it.

Moving by Air

Ip to now we had been talking of the battle zone tactics. The General now switched. He wanted to about mobility. Mobility and logistics aren't the t bit glamorous, he said—yet they are of overriding ortance. Most people are inclined to think of mo- y in terms of weapons. Historically they always ict mobility as combat in battle scenes; in their paint- and their tapestries, it is the picture of the wheeled icle or the knight on his charger. Few people really k of mobility as a system of transport that makes on in the battlefield possible. When people think he Civil War and horses they think of Jeb Stuart out knowing that more horses were used for hauling r, ammunition, bread, and wounded in an infantry sion than in a cavalry division in that war. For every lane that goes into combat today, there may be fifty es behind doing logistical work, hauling fuel and icants, men, or supplies.

mobility is the key to battle capability today, the bility to deliver men swiftly to the battle zone and ort them there. Take the Army in the Far East n the Korean War broke out. Our capability then limited to flying over only two rifle companies and rtillery battalion to stop the North Koreans. Con- what would have happened had we been able to e a full division by air that first day, parachuting forward elements to secure the airfields, following a complete division in twenty-four hours, then an- r division twenty-four hours later, a third twenty-four s later still. But we couldn't. We had no mobility. e need, continued the General, two kinds of air ility—strategic and tactical. People are inclined to k of air mobility as getting a lot of planes, putting s in, flying them in, and you have the answer. But nobility is like amphibious war. You need all kinds anes—the large soft-bellied transports that bring us lies and men behind the fire area, the tactical line (like LCTs and LCIs) to deliver them in the fire

u need, for the Army as a whole, at least the ca- y of a strategic lift, a corps lift that can lift three ions from a rear area like Africa to a threatened like Denmark or the Balkans in twenty-four hours. can't be strong all over; you must take risks. Only mobility can you face your risks by lifting your s to deliver them swiftly where they are needed out scattering them all across the globe six divisions six divisions there. And within each theater there ld be a tactical lift. The Army in the Far East d have the capacity, say, to lift a single division for al purposes, and the same thing applies to Europe. e generals, said Gavin, are always accused of trying ht the next war with the weapons of the last. This time we're trying to get ready to fight the next war, if it comes, with the weapons and organization of the next. But until we put our theories to the test in field practice with sufficient equipment, we can't be sure we'll hold.

For the whole character of modern war presumes a basic dependence on air vehicles, not only on parachute drops but on every type of air transport—helicopters, gliders, utility transports. The key to atomic warfare tactically will be how to keep isolated units alive over long periods, still fighting when they are deeply encircled behind enemy lines. The strategy of the globe hinges on our ability to deliver power to the zone of battle quickly.

The New Logistics

An old-fashioned linear war like Korea absorbed only 220 helicopters. We've built more since. We are now experimenting with a few de Haviland Otters, a light utility plane that carries a ton. But no one knows how many the new "area" war or substantial air mobility may require. We need vast reservoirs of planes of varying types. During the Second World War we used the old C-47 all through—but we were developing eight or nine different kinds of new fighters and bombers. Today we need assault transports, brush-hopping transports, amphibious planes, jet assault planes that can come down and take off on water without waiting for clearing a field; we need planes with tracked landing gear.

All this seemed to me to require clouds of planes of shapes and performance I had never dreamed of. I knew, of course, of the transports the Air Force has been developing, from the standard Douglas C-124, which is already operating in group formations, to the new C-132s and C-133s that carry from thirty tons to sixty tons of cargo at a lift, or hundreds of troops at a shot. But Gavin's concept was obviously of an army dependent on and moving in great autonomous fleets of air vehicles of vastly diverse varieties. Would twenty thousand planes be necessary for the new concepts, I wondered?

Gavin, who jumped in with the 82nd Airborne Division on D-Day, recalled that twelve hundred C-47s were used that day in Normandy for support alone. For the new "cellular-type" Army, twenty thousand planes might indeed not be too many. Yet with a sound plan, even this number might be feasible. The Army needs cheap, unsophisticated planes. One complicated B-52, the master strategic bomber, costs $8 million. One group of B-52s costs the equivalent of enough light planes to supply several field armies stoutly enough to hold.

WE did not go on to talk about the debate on Capitol Hill about whether the Army needs more or less money, more or fewer men, more or less research and development. It is civilian leadership that must ultimately decide how the nation is defended in terms of politics, of economics, of strategy. But this leadership cannot do so without being bound by the concrete facts, the limits placed on decision by the stubborn face of the battlefield. And Gavin felt it was best to let the conversation end there.

WHEN is a man too old to lead troops in combat? No one answer will apply to all men. Higher commanders are wisely reluctant to allow the aged, infirm, timid, or tired to command their regiments and battalions. On the other hand, any arbitrary rule that prevents a fit and willing man in his forties from entering combat would be unjust not only to the man but also to the Army. My experience, as a 45-year-old lieutenant colonel, when I tried to get front-line duty during the early days of the Korean conflict, should be as enlightening and surprising to the reader as it was to me at the time.

My desire to volunteer for front-line duty may have been latent for some time. I had brought the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion from Fort Benning, Georgia, to Korea in August 1950. Supporting X Corps in the Inchon landing, my unit went ashore on 26 September 1950 and engaged in port clearance until October, when we moved the 7th Infantry Division across country to Taegu and Pusan.

We supported the 1st Marine Division at Wonsan and Hagaru; the 3rd Infantry Division at Hamhung; and the 7th Infantry Division at Pukchong, Pungsan, Hysenjin, and later at Hagaru and Koto-ri.

On New Year's Eve, when the Communists threatened in the vicinity of Wonju, we hauled the 7th Infantry Division to Yongju, Tanyang, and Chechon. Later, when General Ridgway's Operation KILLER got under way, we hauled ammunition direct to the gun positions in Wonju.

My associates had often hinted, pleasantly enough, that I was an "Infantry" officer and not Transportation Corps. I had been commissioned as an infantryman. Now I wanted to make my crossed muskets mean something. By the time advancing troops had cleared Hongchon in April 1951, I was determined to request front-line duty. This created trouble and personal discomfiture.

No one wanted me. Infantry officers held I was more of a Transportation Corps officer than an infantryman. My basic branch is infantry, but I had also served four years in the Armored Force during World War II. There had been other assignments, too. Others said I had too much rank, or that I was too old.

When I visited G1 of EUSAK, the reply went: "No, I don't see much chance of a reassignment right now. There are about two officers for every job back here. Why, I have a colonel doing the work of a lieutenant or a captain."

"I'm not looking for that kind of a job. How about a line outfit?" I inquired hopefully.

"They've got all the 'reluctant dragons' up there now that they want," was the blunt reply. This uncomplimentary term seems to include overage officers as well as deadwoods. I resented the implication, though it probably was not intended as a personal affront.

"Well, I don't believe I come under that category," I replied, recalling a brief encounter with Communist forces at Su Dong, above Hamhung, when I had assumed command of the 1st Marines regimental trains and led it out next morning. I don't believe those marines would have said I was "reluctant."

"There are a lot of surplus officers," was G1's discouraging reminder.

It was obvious that I wasn't in the pipeline for anything but a dead-end assignment. But I was willing to make another try.

"Suppose I present myself for an interview? Would that be of any value, provided a vacancy exists?" I inquired.

"Maybe, but then they'd probably put someone else in the position if they were reminded of it," was the reply. "Now I could use you in a replacement unit job," he added thoughtfully, as if he had kept this job for a final plug, when all else failed.

"I'm not interested in that kind of job. I have a good outfit."

G1 decided to send me on a round of interviews with division commanders. You may well imagine the depth of my depression when one general officer, in a kindly manner but bluntly, told me I was too old to command a front-line battalion. And that was on my forty-fifth birthday!

The general explained his belief that battalion commanders should be under 38, regimental commanders under 38 or 39, and division commanders under 50. I had to admit, of course, that ten years previously I had been a much better man physically. The general had all the logic on his side as well as the final decision.

An interview with Major General Joseph S. Bradley was the first encouragement I received. He and his assistant division commander, Brigadier General John H. Michaelis, seemed the ones who shared my enthusiasm. regimental commanders didn't want Too old—I couldn't keep up with yo er men.

I concluded that, I should accep invitation from EUSAK Civil Affai join it.

A week later, G1 called to tell me General Bradley had made a person quest for me. I left immediately for 25th Infantry Division, then on the coln Line, and was assigned to the Infantry, the last Negro regimen the Army. Upon reporting, I told eral Bradley that I might be a little on infantry tactics but I felt confi that I could get the job done.

"You don't need to know anyt about tactics," he announced. "Just out there on the line and look after men. Stay right with them all the ti At the time I shook my head in pu ment, but now I am convinced t was a great deal of wisdom in his s ment.

"I'm giving you the 1st Battali Colonel Henry Britt, the regime commander of the 24th, informed "And it's the best in the regiment!"

I thanked him and told him I pleased to become a member of his and would do my very best to des his confidence. He looked me squa in the eye and said, "One of the rea I did not want you in my regime because I don't think you are an in tryman!" I returned his look for a ment and replied, "Colonel, if anyt happens in my unit, I'll be around

I ENJOYED my command from very first day, although there w shortage of company officers—one company for a few days. When I tioned my concern over the shortag officers, the regimental commander me aside and said, "Them as think can't get along with the officers have usually find themselves bac Civil Affairs sections!"

"I'll get along!" I replied.

Survey of my troops indicated th had a lot of replacements. On one casion I found a BAR man who did know how to operate his weapon.

"How long have you been in unit?" I inquired.

"Three days, sir."

Investigation revealed that mos my BARs were in the hands of rep ments. Evidently, being a replacer



Not all battalion commanders are

OVERAGE AT 45

COLONEL WALDON C. WINSTON

was considered ample qualification to become a BAR man!

In a few days I had set up a BAR range in a river bed within my right sector. There was plenty of room, so we improvised a combat course and a machine-gun range. I rotated men through these ranges as fast as I could. I obtained permission to go through our wire barricade and to conduct live platoon problems against a hill in front of our position.

When the 25th Infantry Division moved north toward the 38th parallel in May, the 24th Infantry moved out with them. And an "old man" led the 1st Battalion!

At Sopa-ri, the 1st Battalion dislodged the Chinese from Hill 417 on 25 May. The next day, it was the 1st Battalion that made a lightning thrust of twelve and a half miles to the 38th parallel through mud, rain, and sniper fire, without air or road reconnaissance for the last half of the push. We captured forty to fifty prisoners, and at dark we were about 5,000 yards out in front of units on either flank. There we went into a perimeter of defense for the night. An "old man" was at the head of the column that day and on foot during that action.

The 24th Infantry was inactivated about 1 October 1951, and my days as a battalion commander were over. On Colonel Britt's departure from the regiment I received a strange accolade. I had expressed my special sentiments for the opportunity to serve under him, when he said, "Do you know why I accepted you into my regiment?"

I shook my head.

"It was because of your handshake!" he answered.

MY next assignment was as executive officer of the 35th Infantry. Here I had an opportunity to engage in the administrative activities of a regiment, as well as do my share of inspecting and supervising front-line units. On two different occasions, for about eight days each time, I commanded the regiment in the absence of the regimental commander. On each occasion, we had some very lively patrol action. But at no time did anyone check my birth certificate.

It is my proud conviction that my superiors never had cause to regret their decision to use me. Naturally, I tried hard to deserve that confidence and to earn the respect of my own officers and men. I have been rewarded for my efforts. One lesson I have learned is that if you really want something out of life, regardless of your age, you must be willing to fight for it.

High-Angle Destroyers

No matter how well the enemy digs in, high-caliber artillery mortars will be able to get at him

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BIDWELL MOORE

WE have often found ourselves fighting on rough, easily fortified terrain, over ground that is costly to take. Sicily, Italy, certain Pacific Islands and, more recently, Korea are good examples. In these places the infantry had a heartbreaking and bloody time dislodging determined enemies from well-fortified positions atop commanding heights.

Ordinary artillery and fighter-bombers are our present solution to the difficulties on this type of terrain. Yet the high casualty figures show all too starkly the inadequacy of our current methods for reducing a strongly intrenched enemy.

Let us consider a modern solution to the problem. Heavy-artillery-type mortars such as Germany used with excellent effect in World War I at Verdun and in World War II at Leningrad are the key to this kind of warfare. The Germans never took these two heavily fortified localities, but that was not the fault of the mortars.

Few of us seem to know that the U. S. also has built artillery mortars. In 1944, a 914mm giant, the largest mortar ever, was actually built. Known as "Little David," this weapon fired a 3,-700-pound shell. It had a 38-ton tube that was 6 calibers long, a maximum range of 10,000 yards, and a muzzle velocity of 1,200 ft/second. It was towed into action and its concrete base, weighing 47 tons, was treated as an expendable item when the mortar displaced. It was designed to destroy heavily fortified enemy positions and installations, but the war ended before it was used.

German artillery mortars were rifled, breech-loading cannon which, like infantry mortars, were fired at a high angle. Modern, slimmed-down, self-propelled versions of these titans, firing their projectiles of a ton and more, could accurately and effortlessly have reduced the well-made fortifications of the Japanese and Red Chinese in the Pacific and in the Far East. In addition to high explosive, napalm or some comparable filler could have been used with great effect.

These mortars have a hitting power unknown to conventional field artillery. Even our 240mm howitzer, with its 360-pound shell, is not in the same league with the German behemoths, firing their 2,249-, 3,310-, and 4,400-pound projectiles. These last two projectiles, incidentally, were fired from self-propelled weapons.

In addition, artillery mortars have an accuracy that the fast-flying plane can never match. Remember Monte Cassino? There, not even our heavy bombers succeeded in dislodging the German defenders. And artillery projectiles are quite immune to flak as they are to bad weather and low ceilings.

In the box in the columns below are listed some of the big mortars used by the Germans in World War II. The characteristics cited are an indication of what we can do with these weapons. Earth-and-log intrenchments of the kind ordinarily encountered in the field simply could not live in the face of fire from such mortars. With the possible exception of the 420mm weapon, the cannon listed below are admittedly too heavy for modern purposes; however, that is easily remedied. Cut the projectile weight to 1,500 pounds, keep the range at about 15,000 yards, and reduce the caliber to 400 millimet The tube length should be 15 calib plus or minus 1.

The final product, including s propelled mount, should not exceed tons.

Using artillery mortars makes se economically too. They would cost c siderably less than modern tact bombers. One or two battalions of pieces each would be assigned to e corps, and they could be concentra at critical points to meet the needs particular situations. The mortars co fire an atomic shell if necessary. In t ordinary role, they could be used w devastating effect on enemy artill The artillery mortar would be a coun battery weapon that would not me silence enemy artillery, but would tually destroy it! Its low muzzle velo would mean long tube life; and w the time does come for a new bore, of field replacement could be "built

Self-propulsion and modern de can lift these powerful weapons f the dust heap back into valuable necessary service. Given mobility improved characteristics, they will p a priceless life-saver to infantry tro faced with the necessity of digging a determined, well-dug-in enemy.

	420mm Gamma Mortar (16.5")	540mm Karl Mortar (21.25")	615mm Kar Mortar (24.21")
Length of tube	16 calibers	10 calibers	8 calibers
Weight in action	15.43 tons[1]	132 tons	132 tons
Maximum range	15,530 yards	13,000(?) yards	6,200(?) yards
Muzzle velocity	1,483 ft/sec	(?)	(?)
Projectile weight	2,249 pounds	3,310 pounds	4,400 pounds
Motivation	towed	self-propelled	self-propelled

[1]Saurce back is prabably in errar here. The World War I versian af this mortor, which was prol obly substantially the same as its Warld War II caunterpart, weighed 51 tons in octian, while i tube alone occaunted far 16.1 tons.

Army built this 914mm mortar dur-
World War II for use against the
ied Line, but it never saw action



ping" a shell down the mortar's
was a job for John Bunyan

Life Can Be Beautiful Before You're Forty

The Facts Ab
118 Colonels

COLONEL RALPH E. PEARSON

PROMOTION by selection is working. But you have to demonstrate ability, to win a promotion made possible for outstanding officers by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

Permanent promotions since 1947 do not demonstrate as strikingly as temporary promotions the changes that have taken place since World War II. A group of young officers, who had been temporary general officers during World War II, were moved ahead of their contemporaries to permanent colonel in 1948. But mostly the permanent promotion plan eliminated the unqualified, or dropped them behind their contemporaries. Permanent grade, however, is not the important factor today. Today most officers, Regular or Reserve, have a temporary grade higher than their permanent commission.

Before World War II, Regulars moved up by seniority, and except for promotion to general officer, you usually had only to wait for a vacancy to make your "number." Disciplinary action sometimes resulted in a loss of a number of "files." That was important then. There was practically no temporary promotion, except during World War I[1], and the number of slots for higher grades was definitely limited.

Arguments in favor of promotion by selection include two points which are often heard in discussions of leadership in the Army. One is that officers should serve for a time in the ranks, and the other that what we need is younger men in responsible assignments; trained men of proved ability, but not necessarily those of the greatest "years of service." Promotion by selection was designed to keep good men moving to the top and the required number of years for permanent promotion was reduced for all grades. Provision was also made for temporary promotion on an Army-wide basis, not necessarily on the basis of occupying a T/O vacancy.

To see how the plan is working and what officers get promoted, a survey was made of the lower two-thirds of Regular Army list. The temporary c nels were selected as a sample.

STARTING with the class of 193 the USMA[2], and considering all I ular Army officers to the end of the we find (at the time this study made, late in 1953) that there were who with less than fifteen years of serv were wearing eagles on their shoulde

These officers have been selected the "best qualified" basis, for the pre

[1]After World War I, all officers were reduced to their permanent grade at one time. In 1922 all officers actually had their permanent grade reduced, by legislation, because of a limitation on funds. The Eisenhowers and the Bradleys were reduced in permanent rank after struggling for years to get promoted. Many an officer was a company commander for 15 years or more.

[2]The class of 1939 completed 15 service in 1954, technically half of a no career under current rules. The 118 officers died here averaged 39 years of age—bor 1915. That was the year Eisenhower, Bra Van Fleet and a whole host of World W general officers graduated from West Poin these young colonels of 1954 were babe arms when our World War II leaders wer ginning their careers.

[3]This would never have happened in other period of comparable length. There a time in the late 1940s when temporary e of the class of 1931 or younger were dem The rule in the Army then (and now) "Permanent captains cannot be temporary nels." The class of 1931 had more tha years of service at the time, but officers normally promoted to major after sever years of service prior to OPA 1947.

le, by boards operating under the cer Personnel Act of 1947. They e selected on the basis of their abil- ınd training demonstrated during one he most active periods in the history he U.S. Army.[4] During this period, book of rules for personnel manage- ıt had been changed. Prior to 1947 e were only 700 vacancies for per- ıent colonels allotted to the "line." now grade is no longer based solely ıge and service.

'oday we have new rules for every- ıg, almost, and a lot of talk about ıing the Army more attractive. It is not the era of "push button" war-, nor can one get to be the top man in the Army, or outside, without demonstrating top ability, generally in more than one field. There is plenty of opportunity in today's Army.

IT is interesting to note first, the distribution by branch of these men whose names may be future household words, famous in the days of our sons. The numbers by branch who have made the temporary rank of colonel seem to follow pretty much what we would expect in a period of warfare and martial emergency.

Almost half of the officers are of the Infantry. About 20 per cent are Field Artillery, and when CAC and FA are considered as "Arty" you have 25 per cent of the total. More than 13 per cent are Armor, with the Engineers close behind with 10 per cent. Engineers are supposed to be the brainiest, but the infantrymen seem to have the greatest opportunity to make good or to get quick relief.

WHILE these men have made a record in the field as demonstrated by the more than 500 awards they have won for their work, they have also taken time out for some serious study.[5] Most of them have already completed the work at the Command and General Staff College, labeled as graduate work by many familiar with educational standards.[6] Fifteen have already graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College and one from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.[7]

When not in the schoolroom, and most of this group have spent considerable time there, for many have also completed courses at branch schools prior to C&GSC, these men have been doing things. More than a third of them served as enlisted men. They were evidently willing and able to do what they asked their men to do. Not only have they been awarded 18 Distinguished Service Crosses, a Distinguished Service Medal, five Soldier's Medals, and 67 Legions of Merit, but while accumulating these they have won almost a Silver Star apiece. Every other one of them has a Purple Heart.

And while doing their stint in the field and classroom since Pearl Harbor days, these officers have garnered almost two Bronze Star Medals apiece, and if you add the Commendation Ribbon, the average is well above two each. These medals are considered tops by most of the men whose permanent rank was recently that of captain.

And just to prove that these officers represent a cross section of America, and that what they have done can be done by others with ability and willingness to work, I note that the young colonels were born in 41 States, the District of Columbia, Territory of Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands. I must add that more than 25 per cent of these gentlemen come from the "Ole South, suh."

Iost of these officers are believed to have promoted to the grade of temporary Lt. prior to 1 Jan. 1945, *i.e.*, during World II.

Year of Birth	Infantry	Field Artillery	Coast Artillery Corps	Armor	Corps of Engineers	Chemical Corps	Ordnance Corps	Signal Corps	Total
1910				1					1
1913	3			3	1	1			8
1914	12	10	2	2	4	1		1	32
1915	20	6	1	2	3	1	1	1	35
1916	18	6	3	7	1		1		36
1917	1	1		1	2				5
1918	1								1
	55	23	6	16	11	3	2	2	118
ICAF									AVERAGE AGE: 39
AFSC	7	4	3			1			1
C&GSC	43	19	6	16	4	3	1	1	15
Graduate Degrees	3	4	1	2	13	2		1	93
USMA	33	13	4	11	10		1		25
AB	8	3		1					72
IS	9	5	1	5	2	3		2	12
									27
									UNDERGRADUATE DEGREES: 111
SM	1								1
SC	15			2	1				18
A	1	1		2	1				5
	68	7	1	12	6	2			96
I	28	15	3	8	7	2	2	2	67
M	116	39	4	24	14	3	3		203
	34	7	2	11	5	2			61
	20	6	6	4	2	1	1	1	41
	5	4		1					10
	288	79	16	64	36	10	6	3	502
ce	24	10	1	2	3	1			41

Chart prepared by the author from *The Army Register*, 1 January 1953

[5]Of the 25 graduate degrees from civilian schools, more than half are held by Engineers.

[6]Others were probably in the 1952-53 and 53-54 classes.

[7]Some members of this group also attended the Strategic Intelligence School, Air War College, Canadian ASC, Army and Navy Staff College, British Staff College, and the Naval War College as well as the Air Command and Staff College.

NCO students learn public speaking by actually giving classroom lectures

. . . Very Important Mei

MAJOR MELVIN GARTEN

You could say that "prestige is as prestige does" and at the Fort Bragg NCO Academy noncommissioned officers have their self-respect and dignity raised to a plane that merits the respect of subordinates as well as superiors and gives this corps of Very Important Men the prestige they must have

THE men who operate the "Fort Bragg NCO Academy," which offers a four-week curriculum to a hundred students, agree with their contemporaries all over the world on one important premise: that the U. S. Army noncom is a very important man. They aim not merely to instruct, but also to enhance the dignity and raise the prestige of the Army's corps of noncommissioned officers.

The very first hour, at an official greeting, the students are told of the Academy's policies. They are congratulated on their selection for attendance and are informed that so long as the "trust and confidence," symbolized by their stripes, is not belied, they will be treated with the respect and dignity commensurate with their rank.

Then the curriculum begins. Throughout the course, inspections are held daily. These inspections are strict, designed to show the student how to inspect his men and their barracks.

The purpose of the physical training and dismounted drill classes is to teach the student how to instruct. While these courses do improve the individual's performance, he is made to feel that he is being drilled as a leader and not as a private in the ranks.

One feature of the mess is the "training table," where overweight students can voluntarily follow a menu whose calories and carbohydrates are carefully controlled. The diet is under the supervision of the post surgeon, and all foods are from the regular-issue rations. Some students have dropped as much twenty-five pounds during the fi weeks of the course.

Eight hours are given to "liaison vis during which the class visits each of post's installations and is given a thi minute tour and explanation of e organization. Included in these to are the Psychological Warfare Cen the post bakery and meat-cutting pl the post stockade, the quartermaster pair shops, the signal center, the e neer brigade, the helicopter battali the military intelligence group, and artillery.

All students sleep in barracks. T measure is not too popular with mar men, but it is a necessary part of academic life. A vigorous off-duty gram is constantly in progress. In day room, there is a billiard and p pong tournament; an off-duty educat program is conducted in the classroo in the coffee shop a student can le to play chess or bridge; in the auditori he can see the Army's 16mm films ra ing from "The Platoon in Attack" pictures of the prize fights. Pressur not brought to bear to keep student the Academy area after retreat, bu they desire to remain, their time can pleasantly and profitably spent.

THROUGHOUT the year, NCO Fort Bragg are targets for a pu relations program that is designed make the NCO proud he is attendin has attended the Academy, and to sti late the interest of potential stude

; campaign is conducted through spaper articles and other media, in- ing a fifteen-minute radio program was recently broadcast over all local ons. A television show and a twenty- ute film are also in the works.

each day room on the post are ers describing the Academy as "the ping stone to promotion." The Acad- periodically has a luncheon for all nanders, where problems of NCO ing are discussed. One month all of battalion commanders, the post com- der and his general staff, and the s artillery commander and his staff ided a luncheon. The next month, ne first sergeants received the same tesy. It is planned to invite all the pany and battery commanders and executive officers.

uest speakers are frequently invited ddress the students. In one class, judge advocate's section was rep- ted by Lieutenant Colonel Robert who discussed "Military Justice the NCO"; the provost marshal, tenant Colonel Eugene Carson, nted "The Responsibilities of the O"; the commander of the 66th al Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel is E. Kooken, talked on "Customs ne Service"; and the TI&E officer the adjutant general had their say eir respective fields.

formal graduation dance is held be- the commencement exercise of each All students, their wives, and their s are invited. There they meet Gen- Joseph P. Cleland, the Command- General, and Mrs. Cleland, and dier General Paul R. Weyrauch, Commanding General of XVIII Air- borne Corps Artillery, and Mrs. Wey- rauch, in a receiving line. Incidentally, this is one of the first integrated dances sponsored in this part of the country. Music by a good band, a cheerfully dec- orated auditorium, and punch with cookies provide the background.

Graduation is a formal ceremony com- plete with distinguished speakers, unit colors flying, band, and chaplain. The students who finish at the top are pre- sented individually inscribed awards and certificates of achievement.

Letters of commendation for the credit they have reflected on their parent unit are sent to their commanding officers.

The commissioned instructors of the Academy are young but well-trained officers. They understand that to teach leadership they must be exemplary in their own individual performance. They do all they can in the classroom and during breaks and off-duty hours to im- part to the students the idea of leader- ship and instruction by personal ex- ample.

The Army does not want leaders who have to bluster, threaten, or cajole to get their orders obeyed. It needs leaders who are quiet-spoken and whose word is law. It is believed at the Academy that the quiet-spoken order invoking com plete, cheerful obedience emanates nat- urally from the NCO whose character gains strength through "dignity and prestige." His type of leadership has worked in the past, is effective now and will be necessary in the future. It will always mean the difference between a successful and a defeated army.

Mission completed. A sergeant receives his diploma from the commandant

NCOs are taught that care and main- tenance of weapons are fundamental

ANOTHER JOB FOR THE ARMY

COLONEL

WILLIAM B. BUNKER

GUARDING THE HOME FRONT

"We are in a better position to defend Paris, or Luxembourg, or Stuttgart, or Munich, than we are to protect Wilmington or Portland," says this soldier in arguing that battle damage control of our cities in thermonuclear war is too big a job for any organization except the Army.

IE true meaning of the traditional conservatism of he military mind is that defeat is too permanent to risked on radical new ideas no matter how attractive- they may be packaged. Mutual annihilation can- be a complete program of defense for the next war. erefore, we are forging a globe-girdling concert of d armies with our traditional allies, and even our twhile foes, to hold back a mass overland assault by enemy's ground forces.

But will the next war end with traditional ground nies locked together in a desperate struggle, killing another in a more or less retail fashion with rifles l bayonets while their homelands are being disinte- ted in awesome mushroom clouds? If the nation has n annihilated into atomic dust, what are the armies ting for? It would appear to be of little importance to evaporated government if an invading army should upy its smouldering, radioactive ruins. The purpose land warfare has been to defeat the enemy forces in er that his territory may be occupied and the victor's l imposed upon the government and the people of vanquished nation. But if there is no vanquished ple, if the enemy's government has been eliminated l his industrial complexes atomized, what then be- nes the mission of an army?

f a major segment of the industrial potential or the itical management of a country is eliminated instan- eously and completely, will not the effect on its army ders and troops be equally disastrous? If the capital country and a major portion of its civil and military ders are eliminated, will the armies continue on their dding way protecting the empty ruins of their cities l towns?

Since the introduction of the strategic bombing con- t into warfare it is moot to ask if the basic objective war is still the destruction of the enemy's ground es and the occupation of his territory. In both world s we repeatedly announced that we did not wish to troy the opposing peoples but only their unacceptable ernments, and the portent of what "occupation" has ly become can plainly be seen in the recent occupa- s of Germany and Japan. Armies have become forces for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the conquered territory, police forces to maintain a semblance of law and order until acceptable indigenous civil authorities can be reconstructed.

THERE appears to be a large void in this picture of future conflict, when viewed in the abstract. If we are in fact to have a war of nation against nation, and if the enemy, as he must, recognizes that the decisive straw in the balance is the industrial potential of the United States, sooner or later that war will take the form of a wholesale bombing attack on the industrial, population, and political centers of this country. There is no validity in the assumption that an international forswearing of atomic and thermonuclear weapons would alter this pattern. Our military forces should certainly be deployed to protect the most important facilities and installations exposed to attack. It seems that perhaps, in taking the long view of the importance of a free Europe to our continued existence, we have forgotten that the survival of our own people is even more vital. Our military plans discuss the movement and deployment of large bodies of troops to the scene of operations with the automatic assumption that these operations will be in Europe. We are building and maintaining a strong navy in order

Civil defense was the job of these Army-trained British Home Guards in World War II. In a thermonuclear war our Army may be called upon for a similar role

An enemy attack would cause utmost disorganization, misery, and damage in dense population centers like Chica

to be able to keep our troops and our allies overseas well supplied with food and the munitions of war while they are under attack by the enemy. We are doing nothing, however, for those who will actually be most exposed to the thermonuclear power of the enemy—the people of the United States itself.

WHAT role can armies play in such a conflict? Should it not be the protection of the target area from the effects of the enemy action? Rather than waiting in trenches and battlements for hordes of enemy soldiers to come swarming in for the final blow, would they not better serve the nation by preparing to limit the effects of his attack? Is not the Army's mission, in the terminology of the Navy, one of battle-damage control rather than of waging a fruitless struggle in the mud for some European farmland?

The fact remains that destruction of enemy soldiers is the final objective of ground warfare and all our weapons and doctrines are devised to murder as many persons as efficiently as possible. In discussing the strategy and doctrine of aerial bombardment we still claim that the objective is the destruction of industrial facilities, political records and buildings, transportation, or some other inanimate target. But the crude and brutal truth is that the objective most often becomes the destruction of t people who operate facilities—or at the least, to convir them that unless they evacuate the area or give up t target they will be killed. Certainly this can be t only justification for using a weapon that must devast five hundred square miles in order to damage a few ac of factory. It is clear that in the Air-Atomic Age t primary purpose of war has in fact become the destr tion of not only the facilities but also the people of t enemy's homeland. Our military defensive doctri should be fashioned to give more conclusive recogniti to this fact.

AS the almost unimaginable power of the new weapc to be used against them has begun to be publiciz civil populations have once again started to form m tual protective forces. Air-raid drills are held in factor and schools, shelters are marked on buildings, inforn tional notices are published on television and radio, a low-priced books on civil defense are available to alert citizens. A network of civil defense organizations being laboriously constructed all over the nation, anc school for its leaders and local instructors has be established near Washington. Slowly it is being press into the consciousness of Americans that the next w

well begin—and perhaps end—in their factories or buildings and that they are the ones who will to do the real combat with the enemy, not their cripted military forces.

nfortunately, they may also be deciding that this d never happen to them or, even worse, that there thing effective for them to do about it. This is the disregard of personal disaster that has led men to ore the uncharted oceans, climb the highest moun-, and—yes, even invent the airplanes and devise the bs that have brought us to this crossroad in the ry of humanity on our planet. Such an attitude, ous in other contexts, is what makes it difficult to nize a civil defense unit or to sell hurricane insurance.

the battlefields of the next war are to be Washing- Detroit and Milwaukee; if we are to be precipitated war by attacks on Los Angeles or St. Louis or New , perhaps we should be thinking more seriously t deploying our organized military forces to defend targets more effectively. Today we are in a better ion to defend Paris, or Luxembourg, or Stuttgart, Munich, than we are to protect Wilmington or land. Yet the known resources of the enemy make capable of striking almost any city or town in the ed States, and his ability to complete such an attack creasing with every passing day. It is true that we a Continental Air Defense Command and have oned units of interceptors to protect the airways into vital areas. We hope that the screens of electronic ob- rs and ground sentinels stretching from the Arctic es to the interior of our land will make it possible is to detect the approach of the enemy in time to some degree of warning and to launch our counter- k. However, we readily admit that some of the kers will be able to get into the target area. In can we not say that since such defenses are never effective until they have been put to work, a larger normal share of the first attackers will probably be to deliver their lethal cargos? Since it is quite im- ble to tell at the North Pole what city of the United s has been selected for the American Hiroshima, lefensive net will not be able to give a warning with inty. Many people will ignore the screaming sirens st another practice warning. Around many of our we have stationed ground batteries not only of entional antiaircraft artillery but also the latest ed missiles for a surface-to-air defense; but even measures can offer the reassurance of only a partial age, a "leaky umbrella" sort of defense.

arrival of war on the home front will put everyone he area of the target in direct personal danger. No r does the bomb affect only those in the building happens to be hit, but everyone in the city. If he ves, man's first thought will be to extricate himself perhaps his nearest neighbor; his second thought will find and care for his family; his next will be to way from the area of lingering radioactive con- ination. He would not be able to move into an area eater damage to render assistance or to start the job of reconstruction. And if the aim of the attack was to stop the industrial or governmental processes of the area, the survivor would be actually aiding the enemy in the accomplishment of his mission when he leaves his work and goes to the assistance of the less fortunate. The time has come to turn the problem of home defense over to professionals who can be trained to handle the increased complexities of the job, who can be given the equipment they require, and who will thereby leave the ordinary citizen free to protect himself and continue doing his part in the nation's war effort. We are leaning on a bent reed indeed if we think that the vehicles, fire equipment, medical facilities, and other resources of our cities will be able to carry the primary responsibility for overcoming the chaos of even a "small" hydrogen bomb in a city or industrial area. The stirrup pump and white helmet of World War II are as outmoded as the hand-drawn fire pumper and the bucket brigade.

BUT, with the largest peacetime budget for armed forces and their equipment of any nation in the history of the world, how can we do more to protect ourselves on this third battlefield? Our land, sea, and air leaders are already advising that any further budget reductions will weaken them dangerously and that they cannot meet increasing obligations with smaller forces. We have already decided that since we cannot determine when, where, or how the next war will begin or be fought, we cannot be completely prepared for any type of combat but must accept a compromise which does not leave us completely vulnerable. The need for an equipped and trained home-defense force cannot be answered by robbing strength from our retaliatory Strategic Air Force, our antiaircraft and interceptor defensive systems, our naval forces, or our ground armies to protect the frontiers of our allies.

If a large-scale expansion of our current military establishment is the only answer to this problem, there is serious question if we could afford it no matter how important it might seem. The choice then would be that of withdrawing from the responsibility of protecting the territory of our friends and allies and concentrating our resources on protecting the targets which we feel will be the primary ones and which we know will be the most important to our own citizens. This is impossible and unthinkable in an era when only a few hours separate the farthest corners of the globe. The range from Moscow to Washington is less for today's weapons than was the seventy miles to Paris for the "Big Bertha" of World War I. Our problem becomes one of trying to generate a professional civil defense organization without increasing our military forces or their budgets, without withdrawing our deployed tactical and strategic forces and without decreasing our ability to wage war under either the new or the old concept. It is a problem in gratis self-levitation.

There is an indication of what can be the answer to this dilemma in the events of the Battle of Britain and in the sequence of operations in World War II. After their initial success in France, the Germans unleashed

America's ability to survive a thermonuclear attack will depend largely on the resourcefulness and good sense of her citizens. College students in the Washington area recently staged a practice evacuation. Using portable survival equipment, they slept *(above)* and prepared food for themselves *(below)* in the woods of Maryland

a sample of this new type of war on the British Isles. The success with which the British people withstood these assaults and continued to carry forward the necessary functions of their economy and their government is an indelible tribute to the courage and fortitude of the people. The effectiveness of their civil defense organization undoubtedly accounted for a large measure of this success, but the availability of trained and disciplined army units which had been evacuated from the Continent gave an essential solidity to this force that may well have been decisive. The transportation, engineering, and demolition equipment of the military units, while not specifically designed for this use, were invaluable in assisting in the limitation of bomb-damage effect and compensated for the inadequacy of municipal equipment. Although the primary function of these troops and those of the Allies who were being assembled on the Isles was to invade the continent of Europe and destroy the enemy's ground armies, it was quite obvious that such operations could not be undertaken while the foe could exercise his aerial strength at will. During those days the enemy was the German bomb, and British Army as well as the Royal Air Force was ployed to combat it. In spite of the inability of air ir diction to hobble the forces of the Communists in rea, it is not likely that a major land war could conducted successfully on European battlefields u some semblance of air superiority had been gained our forces. Of what value would it be to establis defensive position on the Elbe after months of com if the enemy could wipe it out in a few seconds?

OUR ground forces under present planning will sist of thirteen "mobile" divisions, plus five "sta divisions, a number of smaller units and service eleme Of these, approximately one half will be deployec areas where we expect they might be called upon to fi while the rest are held in training and reserve within continental limits of the country. In addition, we h a number of Army Reserve units which are kept i state of partial preparedness by weekly drills and nual maneuvers and can be organized into combat u in a minimum of time should an emergency arise. T we have the National Guard units, which consti another reserve. The primary mission of all the do tically stationed units in peacetime is to be as trained and equipped as possible in order to be abl take the field in the shortest possible time.

There is some doubt whether our ground forces ever be used for the purpose for which they are b trained and equipped. Because of the limitation personnel, housekeeping commitments and other p lems, Regular Army units in this country could no expected to be able to move out for a foreign battle in less than three weeks and most probably it w take considerably longer; it would take several mo to assemble the shipping and escorts needed to m them to an overseas theater. Reserve units would ta longer period, and it is doubted if the National G could effectively participate in a modern war in than from nine months to a year. Even this unha schedule is far faster than that of the first two W Wars. But, assuming that this country will be atta by atomic and hydrogen bombs from the opening of the war until our retaliatory forces have convin the aggressor that this tactic is a poor exchange or our defensive forces have whittled his potential d to a sufferable limit, the critical phase of the war for people of the United States and their government industrial might will probably be the first few week the war. Perhaps we will not even be able to stand second day of this type of warfare unless we are far m prepared to cope with it than we seem to be today.

THE home forces of our army must protect the peo the government, and the facilities of the United St while we are using our air power to protect our sh and deliver the counterblow. The enemy for the peo on the ground in this phase of a war is not a foot sol with his weapon, but a thermonuclear monster whic attacking the nation's heart. It is essential that the m power which our national policy requires us to k

er arms and organized into armies be used directly nst the enemy which is threatening our people and :e our government. Our government reflects, even mes of war, the will of our people; we have no fanatic ıtor who will keep the war going while the nation nbles around him. Unless the people are protected assisted, our war effort will collapse in its first days pite of our military strength. Only by using our ed forces to keep the enemy's force from being felt severely by the people can we continue on the ıous road to victory.

cannot discuss here all the steps which must be n in the organization, training, and equipping of army to make it an effective force for this home nse role. Such problems must be resolved as the ils of civil and military relationships, availability of ls, personnel and equipment, and other problems are ored. There are, however, a few basic steps that t be taken for such a plan to be effective. Most imant, it must be recognized that this has become the ıary mission for the forces stationed in this country that, if need be, training for ground combat in the iliar pattern must be sacrificed. Our troops must nore widely dispersed, so that there is at least a ment in the reasonable vicinity of each major target , even though in recent years we have found it more ient and economical to gather our regiments in large s in areas removed from our population centers. will have to reestablish area military commands :h are closely coordinated with the local civil auities, with military planners working daily with municipal and industrial leaders on plans for the disaster. The system of authorities to be reestablished will have to be prepared in advance so that leadership does not vanish just when it is needed most. We will have to establish large military encampments well away from the danger area, capable of housing, feeding and giving medical attention to thousands of evacuees on a minute's notice; it is certainly fallacious to expect that the refugees from Washington will be cared for in the normal civil facilities of Baltimore when that city or its neighbor on the other side may be the next target.

WE think of disasters in terms of the fires, earthquakes and floods which happen once and then give us time to recuperate. But certainly the mercy of Nature cannot be expected of man. Army units will have to be equipped with ample transportation—trucks, ambulances, and especially with helicopters—in order to carry out evacuation, resupply and rescue operations. The loss of local transportation equipment and facilities will be a most crippling factor. Special engineering equipment will be required for the rapid replacement of water and power services and for clearing the essential arteries of movement. All these are problems which the Army is normally trained and equipped to handle. Army units must be well organized and disciplined and ready in an instant to assume the responsibility.

It is an accepted policy for the Army to assist civil authorities in times of disaster, but some will argue that this complete reorientation of mission carries the concept too far. But when this new war strikes, there will be

fighting and preservation of order were everyday tasks for the British Army and Home Guard during Hitler's blitz

British civil defense workers search for victims of a German World War II flying bomb in a suburb of London

no time for consultation between military and civil leaders to find out how much assistance is needed; indeed, there may well be no one to consult. The Army's responsibility and authority must be well defined if the defense is to be timely and effective. The detailed plans must be all finished, the reconnaissances all made, and the commands functioning smoothly or the need for them may vanish before the tool can be fashioned.

THE mission of limiting the effects of the enemy attack must be assigned as the first duty of the Army, and "civil defense" made an integral part of the Department of Defense. The Army must organize area commands that have authority over all units of the Regular, Reserve, and National Guard establishments in these areas as well as emergency control over the necessary civic bodies and municipal fire and police departments. Training and exercise required to teach the highest possible proficiency in these new missions must be intense and continuing, even at the sacrifice of training for land combat of the historic type. Units must possess the highest possible degree of mobility in order to be able to reach any point within their assigned area in a matter of an hour at most. But most vital is that all elements must have complete and detailed plans of exactly what they must do to restore the damaged area to the fullest possible effectiveness in the shortest time and with the minimum interruption to the operations that caused it to be chosen as a target. Only with this protection and assurance of the maximum possible assistance will it be possible to limit the spread of a panic and prevent the hysterical flight that might well make the first attack so successful that no other would be required. We cannot afford in this age to wait for the catalytic effect of a thermonuclear Pearl Harbor to weld together an effective defense force for the home front, even if such an organization were able to cope with the problems of these weapons. Only a well-organized, disciplined, and equipped force that can be moved into the area overcome the dazed shock which is bound to follow attack. This is truly the problem of the United Sta *national* defense.

The assignment of the mission of protection, res and relief of our civil population and of our indust and political facilities as the principal duty of our ar follows the pattern of the missions of today's air a sea forces. This does not leave us less able to prot ourselves and to meet our commitments against the c tingency of a more conventional conflict. The tro organized and trained for this mission might not be well prepared to take the field of battle as if they h devoted all their time to preparation for conventio warfare, but they will be disciplined and physically as indeed they must be, for this assignment. The s cialists in communications, engineering, transportati medical service, and all the other functions which so necessary in war, will be needed under both types operations. Their equipment will be functioning a ready and the troop units will be organized. If the v follows the more merciful pattern of past wars, th units can be taught the more lethal aspects of their tra while the military situation is clarifying and while shipping required to move them to the area of the c flict is being made ready. Similarly, if we are able live through the nightmare of this first assault and the enemy's power to attack the home front can reduced, these troops can then be regrouped into norm army units possessing the benefit of a combat seasoni they would not otherwise get.

THIS change in the mission of the Army will be a bit pill for us soldiers. We are a proud clan, and the tra tions of 180 years are not easily abandoned. The Ar does not relish the picture of surrendering the fi of battle to supersonic aircraft and super-destructive we ons. Defense against this type of enemy seems a job those who cannot fight—a nursemaid's job. A ma job is to pick up his weapon and come to grips w the enemy. We still teach that the man on the grou is the man who wins the wars, and we are emotiona unable to admit that our own technicians and work are somehow really in the war. To say that what t Army needs most is plenty of truck drivers and engine and doctors is strange indeed. But our tradition—a our oaths of allegiance—require us to defend and prot the people of the country from all enemies foreign a domestic. If the enemy has become an inanimate mo ter loosed from beyond our reach, our duty is to prot the people from total destruction by panic or by sh immobility.

We must not allow traditionalism, complacency, wishful thinking to blind us to the awful truth of t problem we face. Certainly we all hope and pray t our goverment will be able to prevent this disaster fr happening. We cannot know the final answers to c problems. All we can do is our best for the human in which we believe and keep our faith in God, who h so far kept us from the ultimate folly of self-destructi

IRONS IN THE FIRE

Aluminum Truck



is experimental, all-aluminum 2½-ton truck has been developed for Army by Chrysler Corp. Although it carries the same load as the entional 2½-ton truck, it weighs only 9,000 pounds and would be espe- useful in airborne operations. Known as the T55, the truck is not luled for quantity production, but it has already influenced the design hicles slated for mass production.

nong the features of the T55 are a fuel injection system (instead of buretor), hydraulic disc brakes, automatic gear shift, and ball joint ension. It has a six-cylinder, 200-horsepower, air-cooled engine, capa- f producing speeds up to 60 miles an hour. It can ford deep-water ns and can climb a 60% grade.

trically Controlled Camera

a aircraft reconnaissance camera has been disclosed that uses an ic clutch to actuate the shutter. The camera, developed by the Hycon ufacturing Co. and the Warner Electric Brake & Clutch Co., is de- d to take clear and detailed night aerial photos from jet aircraft. Power- lash bombs, dropped just before the photo "run," light up the target.

roved Non-Military Plane

ssna Aircraft Company has unveiled its new 1955 model 180. The 's O-470-J Continental engine is operated with an inch less mani- and 100 less r.p.m. than the previous model. These changes give the ft a cruising speed of 150 miles an hour, though noise has been re- l considerably. The one-piece landing gear has been re-angled so tire-to-ground contact is three inches farther forward than in previous ls. This change increases ease in landing and safety in taxiing.

Air-Drop Device



The Office of Naval Research and the Kaman Aircraft Corp. have developed a device, known as a Rotochute, for air-dropping supplies from lower altitudes than is possible with a parachute. It consists of two rotor blades attached to a hub, which in turn is connected to a standard M2 supply container. The blades fold back 90 degrees and telescope to half their normal length, permitting the device to be carried on the external bomb rack of jet aircraft. The container is released as a bomb would be. As soon as it is free of the aircraft, the rotor blades begin spinning automatically. The container comes to earth at approximately the same rate of descent as an autorotation landing of a helicopter.

The Rotochute is shown above with its blades in the retracted position, together with two small-scale models that were used in test drops. Because of the small area of its rotor blades and the low altitude from which it is dropped, the Rotochute is much less susceptible to wind drift than a parachute, and "pinpoint" landings in a small area are possible.

UNUSUAL circumstances surrounded the battle for Pork Chop. Truce talks were reaching a final stage, and the Korean armistice was actually signed less than three weeks after the hill was finally abandoned to the Chinese Communists. It is for this reason that errors were made in violation of sound field-manual doctrine. The best terrain was not always occupied and organized; fortifications and trench systems grew up fortuitously rather than by design; training and orientation were sometimes overlooked because they did not seem important in a war that might end tomorrow at the conference table.

But there were other errors that might occur again in any war, total or limited:

- Much of our counterfire against enemy mortars and artillery was ineffective. The enemy was well dug in, and zone and sweeping fire was inaccurate and had little effect. Fewer rounds, fired with more accuracy at known concentrations, would have been more effective. The results of scatter fire did not justify the high expenditures of ammunition.
- So long as we kept counterattacking the objective that the enemy had selected, we met his fire power head-on. Only if we had forced him to shift it by threatening one of his positions could we have reduced the incoming rounds on Pork Chop and its approaches. An attack on Baldy for this purpose was considered, but it was rejected largely because of the imminence of the armistice.
- Our field manuals call for advancing infantry to rush through incoming artillery fire when making an assault. This is correct when the attack is made on a broad front, when enemy fire has been dispersed by having to meet several threats simultaneously, and when effective counterfire has reduced the volume of enemy fire. These conditions were never fulfilled at Pork Chop. It is significant that the most successful U.S. counterattack was made when armored personnel carriers were used to bring the assault troops to a line of departure close to the objective. Whether facing tactical atomic weapons or concentrated artillery fire, troops must be kept out of the open as long as possible before the actual moment of the assault.
- Consumption of all kinds of supply items was on a scale that may be impossible to duplicate in the future. Supply was adequate, but distribution was poor because water, rations, and ammunition had to be carried through heavy enemy fire. There were too few medics for the number of casualties. The evacuation rate became adequate when personnel carriers were sent out on a planned schedule instead of on call. Most of the supply resources of the 7th Division were concentrated on backstopping a battle for one outpost. If another action had been taking place at the same time, the supply facilities would have felt the strain. Troops who take for granted the supply bonanza of Korea will have to adjust their demands if we are ever called upon to fight a general war.

But criticism that comes from hindsight is notoriously easy to make. The reader will no doubt have his own opinion and find his own "lessons" after he has read the story of the battle for Pork Chop.

PORK CHOP

Battle for a Korean Outpost

COLONEL WILLIAM R. KINTNER

THIS story could have begun in 1951 or 1952. It could have been Elko or Vegas, Charley or Harry, Christmas or any one of the oddly named and fiercely contested outposts which marked the bloodiest spots along the Korean battle line. But it happened to be Pork Chop. Let's turn back to July 1953.

For a hill to qualify as a Korean outpost it had to be smack out in front of the main battle line. Pork Chop qualified. The Chinese were dug in on three sides and were keeping a head count on everyone coming in and out. From Old Baldy they could observe every shovel of dirt tossed out of the trenches and watch us hammer in every cross beam on the overhead cover we were building.

At times it didn't make sense. These outposts marked that last eddy of the UN 1951 offensive. Here the forward troops dug in when the Commies asked for a truce. They were never designed for last-ditch stands. An outpost, in military jargon, is set up "to delay, deceive and disorganize" an attacking enemy, not to be held at all costs.

But Korean outposts were held. The longer the truce talks dragged on, more the diplomatic value of Vegas, senal, and Pork Chop began to outwe their military worth. And when the C nese were pounding away at you, diplomatic factor in the selection of r tary positions didn't make a plea topic.

During the last six months of war, the Chinese made a play for big-name outposts. Pork Chop was hard, and each time, in December 1 and March and April 1953, it held. was a kind of thorn in the pride of

The area of the battle. The supply road leading to Pork Chop is shown by the dotted line

ese. They really wanted that hill. rk Chop was 7th Division proper- It was part of a speculative real- e development which included Old y on the left and Arsenal, on the ern tip of T-Bone, on the right. n the Chinese took Old Baldy in h 1953, Pork Chop didn't have of a future. Old Baldy now nated it, and the access road from eft and Hasakkol and Pokkae to ront and right almost completed ircle. Baldy's loss required major tments in the center of the 7th ion's main line of resistance. In , while these were being made, the munists socked Pork Chop again. almost got it. Two battalion coun- acks finally cleaned out the enemy the position.

HE Chop" was a shambles when he April battle was over. Trenches bunkers were almost nonexistent had to be rebuilt.

ajor General Arthur G. Trudeau, Division commander, decided to re- Pork Chop—to make it impregna- f that were possible. The big of reconstruction fell to the 17th try. The Chinese opposed the idea, gin with. They had observation and the place was ringed with mortars. Day after day more enemy artillery and mortar rounds fell on the few acres of Pork Chop than on the rest of the division.

It took a lot of manpower to rebuild Pork Chop. There was always a company on the hill. This company was so preoccupied with staying alive, keeping its weapons in shape, and defending The Chop at night, that it could contribute little to the rebuilding. Because of the strain, companies were rotated frequently. Lumber, ammo, rations, and water rode out to The Chop on an armored personnel carrier. With full alert all night and the clatter of building during the day, sleep was hard to come by.

One night in May the Chinese made a reconnaissance in force on our defensive setup. They hit every outguard before dropping in hundreds of rounds of artillery, and they then probed the eastern finger of The Chop. Our follow-up screening patrol policed the area in daylight under cover of smoke, and accidentally stumbled upon a Chinese assault position between Pork Chop and Hasakkol; we dubbed it "The Rat's Nest." This was a tip-off that Pork Chop was on the list. We tried to drive them out. We used 155mm and 8-inch guns, air missions and a company sweep to no avail. Everything pointed to a Chinese attack. The only thing we didn't know was when.

It came less than two hours before midnight on 6 July, seventy-eight days after the April battle. The thunder of artillery fire hit all along the division front at once. Simultaneous reports came into the 17th Infantry's regimental operations bunker. Heavy artillery barrages hit the 1st Battalion on Pork Chop and the 3d Battalion on Erie and Arsenal.

The initial attack broke through every effort to stop it. The forward bunkers and trenches had been personally checked by the platoon leaders between the time the shelling began and the enemy hit the positions. The platoons were ready. The Chinese hit in force with carefully prepared assault teams. Each team had a definite objective and used bazookas, satchel charges, and flame throwers. Some of them used yellow sulphur sticks to make fumes which forced the men out of their bunkers.

Wounded survivors told of nine distinct company attacks during the first night. Wave after wave dashed against the positions. It was a saturation attack. An attack in such force soon divided

A Korean hill. Note the network of trenches and bunkers

and isolated the defenders, who could not support or reinforce one another. Communications within the positions were soon gone. A single bunker might contain two or three men who had to resist ten times that many.

A succession of companies and battalions fought to keep The Chop. The first was Company A, 17th Infantry. By 2256 hours, 6 July, Company A was receiving automatic-weapons fire on the armored personnel carrier landing which was adjacent to the main trench leading into the position. At 2300, Company A reported that the enemy was coming into the trenches and that the left sector of Pork Chop was partly occupied by the enemy. The CO called for reinforcements. The Chinese were around and on top of his CP.

During the month before the attack the battalion occupying the Pork Chop sector maintained, on division order, a ready reserve company in defilade behind Hill 200. The 17th's Company B was ready, and it was ordered to move out to The Chop. Its close-by reserve location made reinforcement in time possible.

Shortly after midnight, Company B reached Pork Chop, made contact with Company A, and swept over the positions on the hill. The company retook at least nine bunkers in the left sector and cleared part of the central sector near Company A's CP. Some time later, Company A reported that the enemy had overrun Pork Chop, withdrawn slightly, and then attacked again, but that the right sector was being held. Bugles were heard intermittently, heralding successive attacks. At 0235, Company A reported enemy in trenches at its CP, the trench blocked, and Chinese placing small-arms fire down trench. Sixteen minutes later, Company A requested additional reinforcements. At 0347, Company A requested reinforcements to man bunkers that had been cleared of enemy.

Shortly after the attack began, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was attached to the 17th with a division string attached. The picture on The Chop was far from clear. No one wanted to send a third company out to such a small, crowded position.

Mounting evidence indicated that this was no hit-and-run attack. Incoming artillery continued heavy, and for the first time in months was hitting rear installations as well as the MLR. General Trudeau cut the string to his reserve battalion.

JUST before dawn on 7 July, Company E, 32d Infantry, was placed under the operational control of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, and was sent out to reinforce Company A on Pork Chop. Lieutenant Colonel "Rocky" Read, CO of the 1st Battalion, went out to Pork Chop with a platoon from this company at daybreak. Elements of three companies were now on the hill. The remainder of Company E was sent to the outpost on APCs during the day.

The situation was chaotic. Some bunkers had been taken back, but there were not enough men available to keep advancing, as infantrymen had to hold bunkers as they were taken. Dead and wounded cluttered up the trenches and made traffic through them difficult.

Hand-to-hand fighting for the trenches and bunkers of the outpost continued throughout the day. Friendly and enemy forces continued to rein-

force. Sporadic but well-placed en small-arms, artillery, and mortar came in constantly. Our forces APCs to evacuate and resupply. W out them reinforcement would been almost impossible, since the road to Pork Chop was being syst atically interdicted.

At about noon, General Trudeau Colonel Harris, regimental comman went to The Chop to see the situa at first hand. As a result of an on-ground appraisal, General Trudeau convinced the outpost could be retal

Friendly and hostile groups v mixed together. Positions freque changed hands. During the day Chinese were reinforcing in group from five to ten men, gradually bu ing up their strength on the outp About dusk, a company-size group them was seen from an outpost loc on Hill 200, coming on Pork Cho the right and rear of the outpost. from artillery and 81mm mortars placed on this group.

The stage was set for the nig counterattack. In view of enemy servation and artillery concentrati a daylight counterattack appeared t impractical. The Chinese occupied bunkers on the highest ground of F Chop. Should the counterattack i sion be to seize and hold these bun or to sweep the Chinese off the hill

THE decision was made for a n sweep. Company F, 32d Infan had a few hours to prepare for the i sion. Plans were made to exploit a sible surprise and to support the att with the troops on the hill. The p adopted by Company F was to m down the forward slope of Hill across the swirling stream in the val up Brinson Finger, and then to sw The Chop from west to east. A ni time single-file march through bar wire in totally unfamiliar terrain, ac a swampy valley and a stream swo by heavy rains, was a difficult ass ment. But in addition, the comp had to climb the precipitous slope Brinson Finger, make a right-angle t to the right, and regroup for attack. 2023 hours, Company F departed f Hill 347 for enemy positions on P Chop.

AT 2115 hours, Colonel Read repo a fire fight in progress in frier trenches and on the personnel-car landing on Pork Chop. Heavy inc ing mortar and artillery fire was ported. Meanwhile, Company F

ing its tortuous way toward con- It covered the one or two miles he objective in almost five hours, hing the enemy bunkers undetect-

t 0135 hours, 8 July, Company F d itself in the western trenches al- unopposed. It had surprised the ny. The Chinese immediately called increased artillery and mortar fire more reinforcements.

t 0135 hours, Company F was or- d to stop the sweep and to seize the ground on Pork Chop. It gained trenches but eventually ran out renades and ammunition. At 0425 s, Company F reported that the ny had it surrounded. Remnants e company were able to withdraw n the south side of Pork Chop, re the wounded were evacuated by s, and the remainder of the com- withdrew through the valley be- n Hill 347 and Pork Chop. Dur- the action that night the enemy w an additional battalion into the gement for Pork Chop.

lthough Company F's attack was successful, it did break up a strong ese assault on Pork Chop landing reached its peak just about the Company F made contact. If the ese had taken the landing, the out- would have been lost.

e troops on the position were running low on ammunition of all types. Small-arms ammunition was dispatched by personnel carrier. Friendly casualties were evacuated by personnel carrier. Heavy enemy artillery continued to fall on the outpost and on and behind the MLR. Seesaw action continued for the rest of the night with sporadic small-arms and automatic-weapons fire fights.

WHEN dawn broke, the situation remained much the same. Both sides had reinforced but neither had succeeded in capturing many of the bunkers occupied by the other. Shortly after daybreak, the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, assumed responsibility for the sector.

Plans were made to relieve the remnants of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. During the day, Companies A and B, less one platoon, were relieved. Because of its location, the 2d Platoon of Company A could not be relieved and remained on outpost. The rest of the 1st Battalion, 17th, except for its weapons company, was returned to regimental rear for rehabilitation. This battalion, the first involved in the action, was to be recommitted before the battle was over.

When it became apparent that the night attack had failed and that the troops on position were unable to make any real progress toward clearing Pork Chop of the enemy, other measures were considered. At a conference at the 17th Infantry CP at 0800 hours, 8 July, General Taylor, Eighth Army commander; Lieutenant General Clarke, I Corps commander; Major General Trudeau, 7th Division commander; Colonel Harris, CO, 17th Infantry; and Major John Noble, CO, 2d Battalion, 17th Infantry, whose battalion was to make the next counterattack, completely reviewed the situation. The decision was made to launch a two-company daylight attack in the middle of the afternoon. The attack was to be preceded by twenty minutes of preparatory time fire on position, with surrounding enemy OPs to be smoked and enemy mortar and artillery positions neutralized. Troops were to be moved by truck to the forward checkpoint. Company G was to attack the east side of Pork Chop and secure high ground, jumping from a line of departure on the forward slopes of Hill 200. Company E was to follow the stream bed on the reverse slope of Hill 200, attack up the western side of Pork Chop, and tie in with Company G on the high ground. Special instructions were issued to the troops to stay out of the trenches until they were on their objective.

The attack, begun at 1540 hours, encountered a holocaust of enemy fire.



7th Division troops and Korean laborers move up a hillside road

Both companies pressed home their attacks vigorously until their leaders were decimated. The momentum of their attack carried forward elements of both companies almost the whole way to their objectives. By 1800 the rain of artillery and mortar fire and the Chinese small-arms fire from the bunkers stopped them.

The weather, which had plagued us from the beginning, remained overcast. Our air was socked in. Counterbattery had not located all the new gun positions the Chinese had set up to support their attack. Actually, it couldn't. You can't silence hundreds of mortars and artillery pieces that are firing at a well-known piece of ground on which they have registered for days. The only solution is what the manual says—a diversionary attack to split the fire. Few troops have ever attacked through such concentrated fire. The elimination of hostile fire power is indispensable to any successful attack against strongly held positions.

The failure of the attack had been a near-miss and no one was calling it quits. At the morning command conference, a tentative decision had been made to relieve the 17th's 3d Battalion on the regiment's right section. In the event the 2d Battalion attack failed, the 3d was to make a pre-dawn attack the next day. This battalion was holding the equally vulnerable Erie-Arsenal outpost on the tip of T-Bone. To use the 3d Battalion on The Chop required that two of its companies be pulled off the line. It was too risky to relieve Company L on exposed and often-hit Arsenal in the midst of a battle on the neighboring outpost.

Participation in the Pork Chop action by the 3d Battalion began with the relief of Company I by the 1st Provisional Company, 17th Infantry. The relief was completed by 1730 hours, 8 July. At 1805 hours, Company K was ordered to move to an assembly area near the Pork Chop checkpoint. Major Costigan, CO of the 3d Battalion, reported to Colonel Harris at 1820 hours and was briefed on the situation. At 2230 hours, Major Costigan was ordered to prepare to counterattack Pork Chop with two companies, which were to arrive on position at first light.

It was planned to send both co nies across the cut to the right of 200, then west along the base of 200 to Pork Chop. This route wa lected to avoid the intense enem tillery and mortar concentrations kn to be in the valley south of Pork C

Because of the late arrival of C pany I, it was decided to start Comp K out first so as to insure having c ness to cover the movement to I Chop. It left the attack position at 0 crossing the LD at 0315.

Before Company K had cleared attack position, Company I arrived crossed the LD behind Company The two companies moved along route and assaulted the enemy-held sitions in their zone of advance at 0 hours. As soon as the assault was tected, intense mortar and artil concentrations fell on the attacking ments and inflicted heavy casualtie both units. The fighting soon bec a series of small, isolated actions few men against one or two bunl Officer casualties were high. By 0 Company I had one officer left Company K had none. The momen

Infantrymen in Korea take cover as a Communist mortar round lands ne

ıe attack was lost when the men finally hit hard by the heavy shell-

ıis attack also fell into the might-happened category. Little time was ıble for briefing and preparation. ıse of the resulting inadequate orientation, the attack failed to ılize on its biggest asset—surprise. ı daylight breaking, the troops were ht out in the open under murder-ıostile fire. Control of the elements ese two companies passed to Major e on The Chop who now had un-ıis wing Company E, 32d Infantry, elements of Companies E, F, G, H, l K of the 17th.

'BREAK brought the sun, and veltering heat. Water became a ous commodity. Air attacks on en-reinforcing and resupply routes and exhaustion of continuous conflict it possible that the Chinese might up first. On this chance another k was planned. A concerted attack the eastern finger to the bunkers ıe crest of the hill might tip the In the hope that it would, the ion was made to move Company 7th Infantry, out to The Chop on nnel carriers to deploy for attack trenches on the eastern finger. pany C had been on Hill 200 since beginning of the battle and had to elieved. Several reliefs were put effect to make this possible. The ese stepped up their artillery while shift was made. Casualties sus-d here plus exhaustion from three of living under constant barrage terrific heat reduced the combat iveness of the company. Never-ss, after reaching Pork Chop and its of departure, Company C made antial gains. It cleared most of right finger before darkness fell. was the most successful counter-k yet.



The situation on Pork Chop on the night of 9-10 July was not according to the book. There were remnants of Companies E, F, G, H, I, and K of the 17th, and Company E of the 32d, all under command of Major Noble. With almost no staff, poor or nonexistent communications, with Chinese bunkers intermixed with friendly, control became extraordinarily difficult. Besides, many of the men had been there for several days, surrounded by dead and wounded whom it had been impossible to evacuate.

Plans were made to effect relief of all elements and complete evacuation of dead and wounded during 10 July. Both the relief and evacuation would be completed by personnel carriers. The 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry, was to make the relief, and to prepare The Chop for a full counterattack by the 1st Battalion, 32d, on 11 July, supported by a diversionary battalion attack on Old Baldy, next door, if army approved.

These plans were knocked out. At midnight, at the same time as the arrival of Company I, 32d Infantry, behind Hill 200, the Chinese launched a series of attacks on Pork Chop which continued until dawn. Simultaneously, the MLR and the roads to the battalion CP were shelled. Plans to effect the relief were suspended until the situation on The Chop clarified. Many FOs on The Chop were no longer teamed up with their infantry commander. FOs with higher-powered radios were able to get "the word" to the rear better than the infantry. Piecing together a comprehensible picture received from so many, and often so conflicting, reports was almost impossible.

Company I, which had been assembled to effect relief, was dispatched just before dawn in armored personnel carriers with instructions to reinforce the threatened right sector. But upon their arrival the threat disappeared. The relief was resumed, Company K, 32d Infantry, taking over the left half of the hill and Company I the right. All day long the APCs, under constant fire, moved men out and brought weary soldiers back. By 1800, Companies I and K of the 32d were the only friendly forces on Pork Chop.

THE night of 10-11 July, the Chinese hit again. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, in command of the 32d's 3d Battalion, took over on The Chop. Some additional bunkers were lost, but at daylight we still retained substantial positions on the outpost.

By Saturday the battle had been raging for five days. Five battalions had been thrown into the struggle to regain complete control of a one company-sized outpost. By then it was known that the Chinese had thrown an entire division into this battle.

Another command conference was held at the 7th Division CP. The Eighth Army commander reluctantly announced his decision to withdraw. The closeness of the armistice and other factors unknown to the men who had put their hearts into this bitter battle lay behind that heart-breaking decision. To give up voluntarily what so many

had sacrificed their lives to retain was a hard order to execute.

A daylight withdrawal by personnel carrier was planned and executed. Colonel Read skillfully coordinated this pull-back. A carefully devised supporting fire plan kept enemy interference to a minimum. By the end of the afternoon, most of the troops, including the wounded men, had been withdrawn. Engineers went out to plant demolitions. By sundown The Chop was abandoned and its systematic pulverization by artillery fire and air strikes began.

CEREBRATIONS

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

The Campaign Hat

THERE'S a lot of talk about returning to the old traditions. The salute has been reinstated. New uniforms are in the offing. The prestige of the NCO is on the upgrade.

There is nothing more important to *esprit* than a soldier's headgear. Headgear is as vital to the soldier as the beacon on a lighthouse or the meringue on a lemon pie. But today's most prevalent covering for the military head, the overseas cap, is no more likely to foster tradition or *esprit* than a lefthanded salute.

This wobbly cloth canoe is as practical an adornment on a soldier as mammary glands on a boar. Can you imagine this ungainly cross between a bellhop's pillbox and a wayward napkin perched on MacArthur's heroic head? Why did Generals Van Fleet and Ridgway and Taylor disdain it in Korea? It's taboo around the Pentagon. Why prescribe it for the field? That cloth caricature of a headpiece was probably why old Vinegar Joe Stilwell was so devoted to the old campaign hat. Now *there's* a hat!

Let us consider what a hat should have. What is its purpose? First, it should protect its wearer from the elements—wind and rain and sun. No wind could ever blow off the campaign hat, with its chin strap. No rain could penetrate it. No sun came down that it didn't offer shade.

But what of the present cloth contraption? A mild zephyr will send it sailing. A dew will saturate it. And your face will boil and blister in the sun while it idly slithers in your sweat, catches dirt, and causes aggravation.

Then consider the constant balancing act it requires. The book says to keep it cornered over your eye. But nod and it slips down over your eyes. Shake your head and it spins around and looks like what Napoleon wore at Waterloo. Tuck it into your belt and it wrinkles as irretrievably as a paper towel.

If there is anything that a uniform should have, it's uniformity. But the sizes, shapes, and mutations of the overseas cap are about as standard as the stuff that a pitcher like Yankee Ed Lopat tosses across the plate. Overseas caps vary from the sliver-like Hiawatha's canoe that covers about a sixteenth of the pate, to the stately galleon which is held up by the ears.

Then there is your hair. Take off a campaign hat and your hair remains as neat as the drill field at West Point. But take off an overseas cap and the top of your head looks like Hurricane Hazel had passed through. And if you have little or no hair, you ought to insert some little suction cups on the sweat band to prevent slippage.

Then there is the problem of ventilation. The old campaign hat had holes that allowed some healthy circulation. Even the peaked service hat provides means for oxygen to get in. But the overseas cap serves as a hermetic seal.

It is a mystery why the old camp hat was discarded. Everyone who wore it speaks of it with so much n eyed affection that one would t they were speaking of Mother, hom the chicken farm they're going to when they retire. But though it se all the necessary purposes of a h was replaced by a purposeless piec limp cloth.

There is much talk about brin back the Army saber. But a saber h much utility to the modern soldier bow and arrow. Let's start a camp for the campaign hat. Why not the American soldier on whether like the old hat back? It would be a portunity literally to crown him wi fine old tradition.

MAJOR JOHN E. MU

Amphibious Trailers

AFTER reading THE JOURNAL's ploration of the problem of the-beach logistics ["Ship to Shore," vember], it occurred to me that mayl the search for new equipment a t tested principle is being overlooked- use of trailers.

Because the application of powe water-borne craft and land vehicles fers so greatly, any combination is bo to emphasize the worst features of b For example, the DUKW, while us isn't much of a truck or much of a b But it is expensive.

Why not get a good boat and a g wheeled prime mover, and let them operate in moving amphibious trai They could move more tonnage per lar than any of the devices that h been proposed.

The trailers, when on the water of a beach, would be clamped toge in two rows to form a single large b of up to 12 units. If cargo nets w

, 12 swings of a ship's boom could the group. A fast tug could push ı ashore, an automatic uncoupling ce could then free them and tractors d pull them from the water and on ıe depot area where cranes could lift :he still-loaded cargo net.

he trailers would have the following ifications: a capacity of 10 tons; t-based tracks mounted inside the els 4 to 6 inches off the ground; :ient freeboard when afloat to allow ation in rough surf; rugged simple truction to allow cheap mass produc- simple coupling procedure, includ- ı hand-operated winch. One pair of ers in each train of 12 would have ng front ends.

n exceptionally steep beaches, aux- y power from winches on the prime ers, or even a chain installed on the h with a separate engine, could be e available.

his system would have several ad- ages: the units would be easily sportable by sea; maintenance costs ld be low; only a small amount of equipment would have to be tested; e would be no amphibious power ts, which would be made idle by of over-the-beach operations; rela- y few men would be needed; opera- ; ashore would be flexible; and dam- to a portion of the train would not ıp the entire unit.

CAPT. WILLIAM E. MCKENZIE

h Standards and Morale

ERE has been widespread complaint ıt the new Uniform Code of Mili- Justice has been largely responsible owered morale among career officers NCOs because it has seriously un- ut discipline.

his is not so.

have compared the new UCMJ and 1951 manual for courts-martial with old Articles of War and the 1928 ual and I am convinced that there been no substantial change which— w the divisional level—limits the :s, authority, or prerogatives of a nander beyond those which former- :isted. There are actually only three ɔrtant changes that affect the unit nander and his men.

rst, noncommissioned officers can n a court if an enlisted defendant es them. In my opinion, this is an llent change. In fact, it might well ıade mandatory. Too many impres- ıble young lieutenants can be ed by the oratory of trial and de- : counsels. Now that these gentle- are usually trained lawyers, this ;er is even greater. But oratory means little or nothing to an experienced NCO who fully understands the stern requirements of discipline, as well as the problems of the enlisted man.

Secondly, there is the Bad Conduct Discharge—introduced by the Army even before the adoption of UCMJ. But this has not limited the authority of commanders. It gives the officer with Special Court-Martial jurisdiction a power which he did not previously possess, a power formerly held only by the commander with General Court-Martial jurisdiction.

Finally, there is unit—company or battery—punishment. This used to be administered under the authority of Article 104, and now comes under Article 15 of UCMJ. But the authority of the commander has not been decreased, nor has the possible punishment been decreased. On the contrary, the maximum period of punishment has been increased from one week to two.

But many fine officers and NCOs *know* that the authority of the commander has been limited in recent years. They *know* that supervision from above has taken the "justice" out of Military Justice and has substituted picayune legal details.

They are right. Yet this is due to other, somewhat more elusive causes than UCMJ itself.

We know that an officer or NCO today lacks the command authority and prerogatives that were enjoyed by men of comparable rank in "the old Army." And he often has a well-founded suspicion that he lacks the professional competence of his "old Army" predecessors.

The reasons for this are discernible. There is a climate of distrust of the military commander which partly stems from the fact that discipline and command authority are anathema to many Americans. It is also a reflection of a growing tendency toward military bureaucracy and over-administration. In addition, the Army often limits the authority of commanders because many officers are less well qualified for command than in the past.

This lowering of professional competence in the Army is alarming. There are many fine, dedicated officers, but they are a minority. Only a small percentage of Army officers read such professional service periodicals as THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. Most officers and NCOs do little serious studying beyond the absolute minimum necessary to get by in their daily duties. Although to some extent this may be a reflection of a society built around movies, TV, and the worship of idle leisure, it is also attributable to inadequate measures by the Army to assure maximum efficiency and high professional attainments.

No Army officer, for instance, is required to prove his professional qualifications for promotion. There is no procedure for gauging accurately the effectiveness of a commander in performing his duties. Promotion through the grade of lieutenant colonel is in practice automatic for an officer who performs minimum duties in a mediocre manner and who has avoided serious trouble.

In our system of efficiency reports, each officer's performance of duty is rated by his immediate superior. Every effort is made to inspire the superior to rate his subordinate impartially, but the efficiency report can only be an individual assessment of a fellow man. Prejudices and personality clashes inevitably creep in, as well as sympathy for "good old John," who hasn't killed any of his men—yet. Meanwhile, the young officer with gumption and initiative can be hurt by one or two unfavorable reports from excessively conservative or unimaginative commanders.

It seems incredible that there is no longer a system of examinations whereby, before promotion, an officer has to prove his technical competence for the duties of the higher grade. Such examinations would force every officer to study his profession. The incompetent would eliminate themselves, while good officers would become better.

Almost equally incredible is the lack of a set of standards by which the achievements of a commander can be measured and compared with those of other officers of comparable grade and experience. The Army has always prided itself on "results." The Army's inspections and combat-readiness tests lend themselves readily as bases for forming standards for measuring these results.

COL. T. N. DUPUY

Reenlistment Blues

THE Pentagon has come up with various plans to increase *esprit* and enlistments at the same time. One of these ideas, to set up a new system of computing reenlistment bonuses, was made into law by the Reenlistment Bonus Act of 16 July 1954. Another, to change the uniform from olive drab to a more colorful and attractive color and design that could compete with the smart-looking Air Force, Navy, and Marine jobs, was also adopted after the inevitable hassling that accompanies any change in the *status quo*, and word about the new greens was sent out to the troops.

Along with the change in the uniform came a resurgence of Army blues. The GIs wanted a special off-duty uniform, something snappy, something sharp, something to wear on those very extra-special occasions. They've always *nearly* had such a uniform, but somehow just never got around to buying it. Some enterprising units, however, have recently encouraged wearing blues by awarding them to outstanding men for exemplary service. For example, Second Army gives a set of blues, along with other awards, to its Soldier of the Month. This particular program receives widespread publicity, and competition is spirited. The troops really perk up when they see a man in blues stepping out through the area. Yet the blues are still rarely seen where enlisted men gather, and the biggest reason seems to be the cost. When you're buying shoes for the kids, it's pretty hard to shell out $90 for another uniform. This is a problem that must be solved if the dress uniform is ever to be more than a rarely seen curiosity.

When a first-three-grader or a corporal with seven years' service reenlists, give him, in addition to his regular bonus, a set of blues on a one-time-issue basis. Give the Regular a uniform to match his pride in his profession. This won't cost the Government an exorbitant amount, and it will give NCOs a formal uniform befitting their station and rank. By making it a one-time deal, the Government will keep the expense to a minimum. By limiting the award to NCOs, the Government not only saves money but also helps the reenlistment program by encouraging continued service of Regular NCOs. Of course, some system must be worked out to accommodate our NCOs on indefinite tours, especially since many of our senior men are in this category. But once the idea is sold, the details of its administration can easily be worked out.

Some may complain that this proposal discriminates against the young recruit who enlists, the man who is drafted, or the reservist or Guardsman who comes in with rank. Not so. Each man has the same opportunity to work for the required grade and, having attained it, to reenlist and win his blues. Far from being a discriminating barrier, the awarding of blues will be an added incentive to old soldiers to stay in service, and for younger ones to strive for a higher goal.

CAPT. JOHN R. BYERS

The Officers' Mess

RECENT efforts to restore discipline, tradition, and privileges are very gratifying, but one important foundation of morale has been overlooked. I mean the officers' mess. I am not referring to officers' clubs, which have for some obscure reason been renamed "open messes," but to government-ration messes that are restricted to officers.

There has been a drive to abolish these messes, apparently for the sake of economy. At some posts managers of the open messes, well aware that nobody with a monopoly on food has ever gone broke, have supported this drive. I am just as cost-conscious as the next fellow, but there are limits to economy. We could certainly save a lot more money by ladling out food with an entrenching tool and letting officers eat out of their helmets. No army is going to show a dollars-and-cents profit, and the small operating expense involved in the maintenance of officers' messes is well justified, especially in view of the tremendous sums spent on "morale" activities with results that are at best debatable.

The officers' mess is the one place where the officers of an organization may assemble in an atmosphere of fellowship and unit solidarity. It offers an opportunity to get to know one's fellow officers away from the mask of official business, and to benefit professionally from relaxed discussion. An officers' mess is almost indispensable for the establishment and perpetuation of any long-range regimental tradition. A good mess will check the current trend toward an "eight-to-five-just-another-job" Army. Dinner, which I still maintain is served at noon, allows the married man to meet the almost extinct bachelor. The latter is furnished decent dining facilities and is rescued from a deadly diet of assembly-line hamburgers and wax-flavored coffee.

The splendid regimental messes of the British Army stand as an excellent example of what may be accomplished. I recommend we attempt to secure the same.

CAPTAIN REACTIONARY

Automatic Artillery

EVEN the most active imagination is staggered by the pace at which military equipment is being made automatic. For the artillery, the future promises gadgets that absorb all elements of firing data, including weather effects and rotation of the earth, and provide automatic solutions. Let's liberate our imaginations and see what devices we may be using in the not-too-distant future.

Imagine a super gadget that can be placed on a hill overlooking the ta area. It will be built around a li weight radar set, which will accura measure the azimuth, distance, height (relative to its own position the target. An altimeter and a transmission system similar to that p ently used by the antiaircraft will tr mit data directly to a master electr computer located at the gun positior

The guns will be equipped v automatic loaders, rammers, and f setters. A nearby metro station, serv either a battery or a battalion, will a matically compute corrections for we er, incorporate corrections for the ear rotation when necessary, and trans the corrections directly to the ma computer.

All these elements will be connec by data transmission cables, buried derground or armored with a tou flexible, lightweight armor so that sh fire or tanks will not damage them. batteries of the battalion will be c nected by the same cable, so that can be fired on one target. And whole system will be powered by p able generators.

In a typical mission, an operator observer at the OP sees a target or pi one up on the radar. He "locks" radar on the target and pushes a but to start transmission of data electric to the computer at the gun position, to load and fire the guns. A choice buttons allows the observer to select proper fuze for each volley. If he wis to fire all three batteries of the battali he pushes a button to transmit data all three. If one battery is already firi a light informs the observer of this.

How can we mass more than battalion on the same target? All OP locations will have to be kno and plotted on a master chart at divis artillery, corps artillery, or group FD Data will be transmitted between th headquarters by radio or telephone. element of the automatic computer the battery position allows the opera there to "overrule" a battalion obser and join in a TOT on an import target when necessary. Data furnish by higher headquarters will then fed into the computer, and the gu will be loaded and fired automatica

Certainly, all of this is purely aginary at present, but one only has recall what our electronics engine have produced in recent years to real that, given the requirement they co produce such a system within the p scribed limitations of time, mon weight, and transportability.

LT. COL. JOHN C. FRAL

ly 'em in with Artillery Radar

MAJOR FRANK J. JANSEN

Korea limited experiments exhibited ıe use of field artillery radar equip- ıt to track and control Army light raft, thus assisting pilots in the per- ıance of night surveillance flights, rop of supplies and equipment, or nination missions with aircraft flares. se techniques have since been fur- developed at Fort Sill.

'he standard field artillery radar—the /MPQ-10—is a tracking type radar ch graphically portrays the horizontal ;e, azimuth, and height data of the et being tracked. The AN/MPQ-10 furnish all the information needed the radar section to guide—vector— aircraft to a predetermined point within the radar's range. It is done in three phases: preparation of initial data, guidance of the aircraft, and identification of the predetermined point.

The request for a vectoring mission contains the location of the predetermined point (or target) by coordinates or similar references that fix the location of the point on a map. The request also contains the location of the aircraft orbit or pick-up point. With these items known, the radar plotter computes the data necessary to make the initial pick-up of the aircraft at the orbit. With these data the operator searches for the aircraft. After the control-unit operator has identified the aircraft, the radar is set on full automatic. At this time the orbit and predetermined points are plotted on the plotting board (*see cut*).

Once these plots are made, guidance begins. There is direct communication between the pilot of the aircraft and the controller at the radar. As soon as possible the general bearing of the aircraft is determined by obtaining three or four successive plots of the aircraft's position. This establishes a flight direction. The controller then transmits initial flight correction instructions. This correction should cause the aircraft to cross the radar-target (R) line.

As the aircraft approaches the predetermined point along the radar-target line, a short "down count" is transmitted to the pilot. Zero time in the down count corresponds to the exact moment the aircraft is over the point.

If the initial mission is not sufficiently accurate, adjustments can be relayed to the radar. Corrected data are then prepared and the aircraft is guided to a new release point.

These methods will guide an aircraft to a landing, and can be used in aerial photography, or in dropping supplies from relatively low altitudes. Additional factors are involved when dropping flares as the controller at the radar must inform the pilot of the precise moment to drop the flare. There are two methods to accomplish this. One is the use of fire direction center, and the other the use of the radar control center. In the first method, free fall and wind corrections are considered by the FDC and applied in the computations for the flare release point. In the second method the aircraft is vectored to a point over the target just as in an equipment drop, and the flares are released at the predetermined point.



The Plotting Scale showing the orbit and radar-target line

THE MONTH'S READING

False Label

ROBERT S. BYFIELD
The Fifth Weapon
The Bookmailer, 1954

THIS includes many terms made familiar by the speeches and writings of Communists and their agents everywhere. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate to the Security Council of the U.N., referred to mislabeling on the part of Mr. Malik of the U.S.S.R. as "upside-down language." M. Chauvel, the French delegate, told Mr. Malik, "You point to a table and call it a chair." Here is a partial glossary or dictionary of "upside-down language" through which the FALSE LABEL often becomes effective:

THE PEOPLE
: The Communists, their sympathizers or collaborators in any satellite nation or prospective satellite nation.

ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE
: All anti-Communists, their sympathizers or collaborators in any satellite nation or prospective satellite nation.

TRAITOR
: A particularly active individual among the anti-Communists.

SLANDERER
: Anyone who tells the truth about the Soviet Union.

PEACE
: A condition of helplessness and indefensibility before the military might of the Soviet Union. A cloak for the dagger of subversion.

PEACE-LOVING
: Any nation, people or individual willing to cooperate with Moscow.

WAR
: Not necessarily the physical clash of men on a conventional battlefield, but propaganda, intrigue, assassination, policy diversion, sabotage, blackmail, economic pressure, infiltration, subversion, counterfeiting, agitation, kidnaping and shakedowns.

A Nation Mourns

CARL SANDBURG
Abraham Lincoln
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954

SHERMAN on his way to a conference with the Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had a decoded telegram handed him from Stanton: "President Lincoln was murdered about 10 o'clock last night." Sherman pledged the operator to say nothing to anyone of the telegram. When Sherman and Johnston sat alone in a small farmhouse, Sherman handed over the telegram. Johnston read. On his forehead sl came sweat "in large drops," as Sherman watched him, S man remembering so clearly and for so long a time a wards how one of the greatest of Confederate captains that "Mr. Lincoln was the best friend they had" and assassination was "the greatest possible calamity to South." In the surrender terms they were to sign, Sherm motive, according to his keenest interpreter, probably ra around a thought: "Lincoln is dead. I will make his of peace." . . .

Like a vast sunset of flame and changing gold endi day and punctuating a period of time their faraway frier Washington had vanished into the overhead planets and same constellations of mist that had taken that long call of soldiers no longer answering "Here" to the comp sergeant calling the names.

In a million and more American households they so words that might help and assuage. "The land mour every family apart," ran one Easter Sunday text. . . . On arch of crape and white over Broadway in New York the sentence "The great person, the great man, is the mi of history."

Soviet Military Leadership

HARRISON E. SALISI
American in Russi
Harper & Brothers,

I HAVE always had, since those World War II days, g respect for the Soviet Army and its leaders. I saw a g bit of behind-the-lines operations of the Russian army command and I shared the belief of most foreign obser who were in Russia during the war that it was a fine b force, skillfully managed and led.

True, it did not resemble a Western army. Orders v usually verbal, not written. Paper work was practically n existent. Units often foraged for their own supplies. G erals were lavish in expending the lives of their sold and comfort and convenience were nonexistent by standards. Men were sacrificed instead of materials bec materials were scarce and men plentiful.

No doubt the United States could not operate an a like that of the Russians. No USO. No PX. No pin-u No movies. No packaged rations except what they from us. Yet the fact remained that the Soviet troops fou the Germans to a standstill; that they withstood the sh of losing millions of men and much of their best eq ment in the opening weeks of war (largely, I am cert due to blunders by Stalin himself); they gave up thousa of square miles of homeland, including the best indust regions and the Ukraine breadbasket—and yet the ca were vast enough and strong enough and the leaders had sufficient resilience so that the Russians were able turn the tide of battle and, inch by inch, drive the Germ from their soil. . . .

seemed to me that the military minds which conceived executed such bold and successful maneuvers as the ıtion in the vicinity of Moscow in November-Decem- 1941, which gave Hitler his first defeat since he had ıted his blitzkrieg, or the brilliant encirclement at ıgrad in the following year, December 1942-January, , or the little-known (in the West) operations on the ıt Kursk-Orel were forces which, eventually, the world d have to reckon with.

ı Can't Go Home Again

The New York Times
December 1, 1954

EN the veteran got out of the service he made a point visiting all the favorite places—the night clubs, ball ;, campuses—he had remembered so longingly while . And to some extent each such visit was a failure. places, most of them, were exactly the same. And there the difficulty. They had not changed, grown, improved ɜteriorated with the observer. The sick loneliness many ɜeran felt on his first visit to the old familiar places per lasted only an instant. Whether that or longer, it was ɔittersweet nostalgic sentimentality. It was a reaction to ɜed lifelines and a drifting out of reach.

ıch considerations are luxuries that only the live and whole can indulge in, but they are a genuine part of live and the whole. More poignant than places were faces of pre-soldier friends who could no longer be ds. How many gay greetings were followed by an 's deadly exchange of incomprehension? The common ɜests which only a few years before enabled two people imb to wonderful heights along the alternating steps ıch other's thought were gone. And in their place was ove, little sympathy and a merely intellectual under- ling that made for caution and hypocrisy. Many old ds, of course, remained friends. But essentially they me new friends. All the half-conscious probing into ictions, ambitions and tastes had to be made again, as ıe two were meeting for the first time. That was it: ecoming was a time for remaking, yet many veterans to make it a time for recovering. The physical and ıer spiritual devastation of World War II we all could en years ago. Some of the subtler changes perhaps have ı time to become visible.

—by the Numbers

The Canadian Military Journal
(Courtesy Canadian Sapper)
Christmas 1954

SUBJECT—DISCIPLINE

ıas been brought to the attention of A.H.Q. that there ve been many cases within the units of men dying with- permission or consent of their commanding officers. practice will cease forthwith.

must be clearly understood by all commanding officers the men of their units, that the man power shortage is acute and any man that dies without first obtaining ıission commits an offence to which the only answer can be: Severe Disciplinary Action taken against him.

I have been instructed to bring to the notice of all Ranks, through their commanding officers, these instructions which WILL be shortly incorporated.

DYING—CONTROL OF
(the drill for)

. . . the following drill will be complied with by all Ranks of CAA Force.

1—No man below the Rank of A/U/L Cpl. will give the order to Die.

2—The man ordered to die will in all cases be known as the Victim and under no circumstances will he die on his own time. This is a Parade.

The following drill movements will be adhered to:

On receipt of the command Die, the Victim will come smartly to attention and will then stagger 1 pace of 30 inches forward. This will be followed by 2 paces (short 23¼ inch.), at the same time allowing his eyes to glaze. This requires practice and a drill period should be held each week.

On the command "2" he will sink slowly but smartly down to his knees counting the correct drill time, 1 pause 2 pause three. On the count of three he will fall forward onto his face with arms outstretched and thumbs in line with ears, feet together.

There and then on the Victim's own time will he be allowed to draw his last breath on a CAF 512 Repayment properly signed by the Victim.

Before Dying, map of the Regimental Route to Heaven will be drawn (where applicable) clearly marked, from the QM stores. This route will be strictly adhered to. Unexpired portion of day's rations will be drawn from SQMS and devoured en route.

There will be no passing en route to heaven, and all ranks will pay the proper compliments to all officers passing en route to Subterranean depths.

REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS

On arrival at destination all ranks will report to Orderly Room Royal Canadian Angel Corps for documentation. From there all Ranks will be issued with the following articles of kit:

HARPS—BASIC, playing with strings—pairs 1.
WINGS—General issue—pairs 1.
CLOUDS—General issue, Fleecy or cumulus—clouds 1.

WINGS

Wings will be Blancoed daily with IT Stardust Drab No. 7. Harps will be cleaned brightly and highly tuned at all times. Clouds will be checked daily for condensation and filled with anti-freeze when necessary.

HALO FITTING

There will be a Halo fitting parade one hour after arrival.

DRESS

Very loose order, wings at the side and harps at the high port.

Signed: A. J. Q. Z. Black,
for PETER, Angel Commanding,
18 Royal Canadian Angel Corps Cloud Bank Depot.

3 | This Concerns You

COMBAT ARMS SCHOOL SELECTION

THE U.S. military service school system has proven beyond dispute its importance in developing necessary leadership in the defense establishment. It is possible, however, for an individual officer to distort the real influence attendance or nonattendance at a certain school will have upon his career. This condition is particularly true if he overlooks the fact that formal military education is used to offset deficiencies of actual experience. While attendance at military schools is certainly desirable, it is not in itself the final goal. Our large army offers opportunities for practical experience that is the equivalent of the concentrated teachings of the schools. In the final analysis the recognition an officer receives depends upon his accomplishments.

Regardless of how the reader perceives and evaluates the Army school system, he cannot help but recognize the complexities devolving on Career Management Division in the selection of officers for courses at service schools. Some of these include the establishment of an order of merit among eligible officers, the coordination of assignments with school attendance, the maintenance of uniformity of criteria, and the measurement of each individual's potential. As a solution to these problems, the combat arms branches of your Career Management Division have developed a systematic approach to the selection of officers for career schools. The standard scoring system devised gives weight to such factors in an officer's record as the level of the command positions which he has filled successfully, the degree of responsibility exercised by him as a staff officer, the amount of time he has spent with troops and in combat, the periods spent as an instructor, and the manner in which he has performed all duties.

Such an objective and uniform evaluation of each record, coupled with mature judgment, should detect those intangibles which properly separate those best qualified for school attendance.

Provision is made for separate consideration of specialists to compensate for the fact that their careers will not reflect the variety of assignments available to those not restricted by specialization.

CMD takes notice of the "hump" year groups so that an officer's opportunity for selection for school will not be adversely affected by the fact that he may have a disproportionately large number of contemporaries. This "fair share" distribution of available quotas gives all officers initially the same mathematical probability of selection prior to the qualitative comparison of records.

A by-product of the standard scoring system is the capability of the career branches to project with greater certainty those who will probably attend a selected school in the succeeding two or three years and whose assignments can thus be coordinated to permit attendance in conjunction with a normal perma change of station. This projection numerous advantages which accru the service and the individual in form of greater stability, longer plan time and early notification to the off selected.

Through reliance upon a unif systematic approach to school selec the combat arms branches of CMD phasize the importance of the indivi officer's record speaking for him in keen competition for school attenda

THE tabulation in the chart on page shows the conditions under wl a Regular Army officer of a combat is eligible for consideration for ca schools. It is essential that the indi ual officer recognize that eligibility al does not assure attendance. The lim capacities of the colleges require tha officer must be better qualified t many of his contemporaries to war attendance. Waivers of eligibility teria are rare and usually are grar only when outstanding officers h been unavailable for school becaus overriding military necessity.

The inevitable question of an of interested in further military school is, "What can I do to influence my lection?" The answer is as forthrigh the query: "By performing all assig duties with his utmost capability, a whenever possible, by seeking new greater responsibilities in command staff assignments."

DIGEST OF FACTS RELATIVE TO EDUCATION OF REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS OF COMBAT ARMS

	Eligibility Factors				Approximate percentage of RA Officers of Combat Arms Who Will Attend	Numbers Now Attending	Approving Authority
	Years Promotion List Service	Age	Grade	Prior Education Required			
National War College	15-25			C&GSC	2.4	29	Chief of Staff
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	15-25			C&GSC	.5	6	Assistant Secretary of Army
Army War College	15-25			C&GSC	10.0	118	Chief of Staff
Naval War College (2d Year)	15-25			C&GSC	.2	4	Chief of Staff
Air War College	15-25		Col	C&GSC	.5	7	Chief of Staff
Armed Forces Staff College	10-21			C&GSC	6.5	39	Chief, CMD
Command & General Staff College							
Regular Course	8-15	41		Branch Advance	50.0	337	Chief, CMD
Associate Course	15-19	49		Branch Advance	5.0	30	Chief, CMD

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

INFANTRY SCHOOL

ɔnal Guard OCS

ɔ will conduct a special Officer idate Course for National Guard s and warrant officers this sum- The eight-week course is designed n platoon leaders for Infantry Na- Guard units.

e course was first given in the sum- f 1953 at Fort Riley, Kan., and it ontinued last year at Fort Benning. will be two classes this year, one ng from 2 May through 8 July ne other from 13 June through 19 st.

Warfare

ɔ has begun instruction in the new warfare doctrine recommended by econd Mine Warfare Panel. The loctrine incorporates the use of a nd more effective minefield pat- employing clusters of both antitank ntipersonnel mines; and a large sin- eet record form, including a lined n to facilitate sketching. The new n and record form are easier to and use than the multiple systems eplace.

ult Firing

ts are being conducted at TIS n view to arriving at an additional table for the M1 Rifle Transition e. The proposed table will test the ability in assault firing during the tages of an assault. Present plans te that hip firing will be permitted g the last 35 yards of the assault.

ARTILLERY SCHOOL

opters Overhead

ıdquarters and Headquarters De- ent, 45th Transportation Battal- Helicopter) (Army), a helicopter ort company, and a maintenance ment were activated at Fort Sill nuary. This new command, in on to providing transition training aduates of the Army Aviation l at Fort Rucker, Ala., will be n demonstrations for resident students of TAS as well as for reservists and national guardsmen on active-duty training. The units will receive H-34 helicopters on a monthly shipment basis. These larger helicopters will permit further experimentation in the TAS-developed technique of delivering artillery weapons to new positions by helicopter lift. Until now, major components of 105mm howitzers were transported to the firing position and reassembled there. The H-34s give promise of being able to transport 105mm howitzers complete, and major components of larger-caliber field artillery weapons.

Radio SOP Emphasizes Vigilance

TAS has developed an "SOP for Radio Conservation," which prescribes the minimum number of radios that must remain in operation during "radio conservation time." During periods of stabilized operations when wire communication is complete, and when an enemy attack is not imminent, it is desirable to conserve radio and associated motor equipment, as well as radio personnel, by temporarily closing down certain FM radio sets or radio nets. The possibility of unexpected situations, however, dictates that all unit radios should never be turned off at the same time, and that the off-the-air stations should be held in operational readiness.

The SOP stresses the following points:

(1) One FM radio set in both battalion and battery FDCs will keep operating on the battalion "K" and "A" channels. Depending on the Division Artillery Radio SOP, the battalion FDC may be required to have an additional set operating on the division artillery "K" and/or "A" channel.

(2) Liaison officers' and forward observers' sets may be turned off at this time, but will remain tuned to their assigned frequencies. Moreover, a wire communications check will be made to LnOs and FOs at least once every 30 minutes.

(3) All radio nets will be checked at least every two hours with all stations reporting in as directed.

(4) Wire checks will be made of all trunk lines and direct circuits every 30 minutes.

(5) All other FM radios in the battalion will be turned off, but all will contact the battalion FDC on their assigned frequency at the first indication of wire communication failure.

THE SIGNAL SCHOOL

Amphibious Training

Sixty-five Signal Corps officers attending advanced courses in TSS's Officer Department recently participated in an amphibious assault.

The group attended the five-day training session at the Marine Corps Amphibious School, Little Creek, Virginia. Supervised by Marine and Navy personnel, the training included classroom sessions, operational planning, actual amphibious landing, and rapid establishment of communications facilities on a beachhead.

On the first day of the training, the students were assembled on one side of a large auditorium, whose floor area represented a scale terrain map simulating water area and contingent beaches. They were shown an entire amphibious operation, including the approach of landing craft toward the beaches. To demonstrate air transport of assault troops, miniature helicopters, suspended by wires, were employed. Extensive use was made of "black light," a form of lighting by which boundaries or specific objects are illuminated by reflection without the source of light being visible.

Other demonstrations were made on large terrain boards of the techniques of naval gunfire and close air support, by use of mechanical and electronic devices. Problems involved in firing at night and under poor visibility conditions were explained.

On the morning of the amphibious exercise, the students boarded the USS *Burleson*, where equipment was again checked, and the officers were instructed in the method of going "over the side."

The movement to the beaches was made in approximately twenty minutes, during which radio contact was main-

tained with the control boat. Since an ebb tide made it impossible for the landing craft to go all the way to the beaches, they ran aground on sand bars a short distance from the beaches. Students and members of the faculty waded ashore in the icy waters of Chesapeake Bay.

Operations on the beach consisted of a ship-to-shore command post exercise during which the students were exposed to all the problems confronting a communicator during an amphibious assault. It was the task of the students to establish wire and radio communications for a simulated task force the size of an infantry division. Two regiments of the division comprised the attacking force.

Communications were established in rapid order, with command nets opening eight minutes after the first teams made the landing. Wire communications to regiments from the division advance command post were established immediately after the latter group had made its landing.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Traveling Instruction Team

A special Engineer Generator Maintenance Instruction team from TES is moving across the country giving special maintenance instructions to tactical field units and batteries of the Antiaircraft Artillery Command. The instruction is concentrated on the new 400-cycle generator equipment used to operate the Nike defense systems. Constant and considerable maintenance is required for the large number of generators that are being operated on an around-the-clock schedule.

The special team consists of one officer and four enlisted men, all of whom are capable instructors fully qualified in all phases of generator theory and operation.

Home base for the team is the electronics section of the Electronics and Utilities Branch, Department of Mechanical and Technical Equipment, TES. This section has the primary responsibility for training enlisted specialists who maintain and repair the Army's special electronic devices and weapons.

While on tour, the team carries the various charts and training aids required for complete and detailed instruction. The team stays at each installation an average of four days, the duration of the visit varying according to the number of personnel requiring instruction. TES, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and the Antiaircraft Artillery Command coordinate the activities of the special team.

The team has been on its present mission about four months. Upon completion of its tour of instruction sometime in May 1955, the members will resume their normal duties as instructors in the regular courses at the Electronics Branch, TES.

Tactical Maps

Maps are so important in modern war of movement that map makers with truck-mounted reproducing equipment follow closely behind front-line troops. Success in battle requires that objects be precisely located on a map for infantry and armored attack, and that map targets be pinpointed for artillery, air and missile concentrations.

TES has complete facilities and equipment, including the topographic vans used in the field, to train personnel for the map reproduction mission of the Corps of Engineers. An annual average of 150 enlisted specialists learn the entire offset press operation at Fort Belvoir, and they actually turn out finished maps in standard colors on topographic equipment similar to that used in the field. The enlisted course is eight weeks long, and an officer course of two weeks' duration is planned to start this year. Reserve topographic units attend a special two-week course at Fort Belvoir.

Grading Performance Tests

Large classes, scarcity of instructors, and complex subject matter make performance testing extremely difficult. Yet performance tests are the only valid measure of learning in many mechanical courses.

TES has recently developed a method for administering performance tests in mechanical subjects by setting up a rigid test situation.

For example, in a maintenance test on crane shovels, many short mechanical adjustments are devised. All necessary tools are laid out on each side of twelve crane shovels, with two students and an instructor-observer on each shovel. Limited time, precise instructions, and experienced observers ensure objectivity.

The improvements in performance tests at TES give students' grades greater validity than ever before. They form a basis for better classification and assignment of graduating students.

Further information on these developments in performance testing may be obtained by writing to: The Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va., ATTN: Educational Advisor.

THE MONTH'S FILM

Each month in this space Captai F. McAhon, who is in charge of picture distribution for the Pic Branch, Department of Defense Ol ports on the new films available services.

A new series of films, known as t ficers' Conference series, is design stimulate thinking about world prol The films two of which are already libraries, take the form of intervie which students at the National Wa lege question American statesmen their particular fields. In the first, **S Objectives, OC-1** (58 minutes), C Kennan, former Ambassador to the U is interviewed. In the second, **Which the Germans? OC-2** (42 minutes expert is Walter Bedell Smith, forme der Secretary of State and World W Chief of Staff of SHAEF.

Film Bulletin 281 (10 minutes) latest in series "Infantry Weapon Their Effects." A color film, it cove 57mm, 75mm, and 105mm recoilless their ammunition and capabilities.

Icecap I, FB 286 (30 minutes), a trip taken in 1952 by the U.S. Transportation Corps to the Gree Icecap to test equipment designe transporting men and supplies to ad bases in cold climates.

Loads and Loading of Ge Transport Vehicles, TF-1918 (18 utes), stresses that loading is the res bility of the operator of the vehicl also covers the principles of loadin safety precautions to be observed.

M-1937 Field Range Fire Uni 10-1960 (36 minutes), is a useful for Army cooks. It reviews the comp parts of the M-1937 and their func and it explains the assembly and dis bly of the unit, the principles of oper and safety precautions.

A helpful aid for officers planni use training films is the **Index of Motion Pictures and Film Strip 110-1-1.** The "Index" has four su ments, which bring it up to date June, 1954. It will soon be super however, by DA Pamphlet 108-1.

HE MONTH'S BOOKS

omats and Soldiers

ATION AND FOREIGN POLICY:
Inquiry for Americans
Louis J. Halle
er & Brothers, 1955
Pages; 3.75

wed by
GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

er a century ago Alexis de Tocque-
varned us Americans that "it is espe-
in the conduct of their foreign rela-
that democracies appear to me de-
y inferior to other governments."
nly the failure until recent years to
ate military and foreign policy has
diminished our ability to gain our
al objectives without burdensome
h lives and resources. There can be
doubt that if soldiers and diplomats
more familiar with one another's
ms and principles of action, our
racy would be in a stronger posture
ense.

nsequently there is good reason to
in the appearance of this excellent
It is written by a diplomat who in
was assigned to the National War
ge for an academic year. It shows that
diplomats and soldiers in the United
are working together. The book is
rdinarily readable, a rare quality in a
of this sort. It has the closely reasoned
gical approach to its conclusions that
s are accustomed to in a military
te of the situation. It gives a clear
of the challenge to our policy-makers

American people need this book.
thinkers and the planners in the
t forces should welcome it as a
nion volume for their manuals of
y. Soldiers long ago formalized in
rinciples of strategy the pragmatic
on of military theory. Nothing com-
e had been done in the theory of
n policy, at least in this country. As
Acheson writes in his appreciative
uction, Mr. Halle's "adequate body
ory" "helps amazingly."

Halle examines the kind of nation
ve become, the kind of world that
our environment and the challenge
ce today. As a nation dedicated to
gnity of the individual man, we are
d by governmental regimentation
hought control. American foreign
therefore, must be directed to the
of making our civilization strong
h to resist the attack of barbarism
vithout.

s mission demands an orderly ex-
tion of the power available to us—
much a specific analysis of military
val strength, of our economic re-
s or of the other elements of our
al power, but rather the significance of a balance of power system and the legitimate use of force to win friends, influence peoples, and prevent our enemies from gaining their ends.

The soldier may well ask what Mr. Halle's theories lead to in matters in which the combat forces have a primary concern. Fortunately the author has defined the requisite practical application of theory in these recommended military policies:

"In order to realize the objective of deterring a nuclear attack by our opponents and the further objectives of deterring or frustrating other kinds of military aggression we need:

"(a) To maintain a nuclear offensive power of our own sufficient to make the probable cost to our opponent of starting a nuclear war unacceptable;

"(b) To protect that power and the nation on which it is based by provisions for defense against nuclear attack that would discourage our opponent from undertaking to incapacitate us and destroy our nuclear capability by a surprise attack;

"(c) To develop and maintain such military forces as would deter or, at least, frustrate any military attack of a more traditional nature, in the event that the nuclear power on both sides was such as to deter either side from using it against the population centers or industries of the other."

Such a program is costly in the extreme, but Mr. Halle reminds us that if we balk at the high price of survival "we would be repeating the mistake of the Carthaginians who, like us, enjoyed an incomparably high standard of living but would not take away from it for the sake of their own survival."

The Return

THE U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
By M. Hamlin Cannon
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954
420 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $6.75

Reviewed by
COL. ROBERT F. COCKLIN

In American strategic planning, the invasion of Leyte was never envisioned as a decisive battle. The primary purpose of the campaign was to establish an air and logistical base in the Leyte area in order to support operations in the Luzon, Formosa, and China areas. However, the Japanese high command determined that if the American forces were to be defeated in the Philippines, it would have to be done by driving them from Leyte before they gained a strong foothold. Thus Leyte did become a decisive battleground. The Japanese lost a major portion of their naval and air forces and weakened large army units originally intended for the defense of Luzon.

In this fifth volume of the Pacific subseries of the Army's World War II history, Dr. Cannon provides a detailed, well-organized and fully documented text. He makes it clear that in some respects American planning and execution of the operation were faulty. Though the Japanese

General Douglas MacArthur on Leyte in October 1944 talks over plans with division commanders. From *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*



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By
CAPTAIN JOHN G. WESTOVER

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Every member of every technical and administrative service will want a copy of this record of service to the line. Every line soldier should have a copy to fill in the blanks of his own experience.

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lealt a severe blow, the original ob-
s of the campaign were never fully
d. The Japanese gained the initia-
everal times in the campaign and
can commanders were often hard-
l to regain it.

did triumph in the end, and this
it of how victory was achieved is a
ibute to the tenacity, courage, and
ity of American soldiers and sailors.
the largest Pacific campaign up to
ime from the point of troops, with
257,766 American troops opposing
y 70,000 Japanese. American casual-
mbered over 15,500, including more
3,500 killed and 12,000 wounded.
se casualties were considerably high-
wo Japanese commanders estimate
etween 50,000 and 60,000 Japanese
eir lives in the Leyte operation.

pite the large numbers of troops
ed, the battle for Leyte was essential-
ries of actions involving smaller units.
ders from Imperial General Head-
rs, Japanese commanders abandoned
rong beach fortifications they had
reparing in their policy for "annihila-
n the beachhead" and turned to
nce in depth. They made effective
the swampy and mountainous ter-
nd prolonged the campaign far be-
the original timetable.

here is any basic defect in Dr. Can-
work, it is an overemphasis on small-
ctions, which at times obscures the
corps, and division tactics as well
se at the regimental and battalion

s to his credit, though, that the au-
eeps very much in mind the objec-
or which the battle was fought. In
nstance, American high-level plan-
was faulty. Prior to the decision to
the Leyte invasion, Colonel William
, executive to the Sixth Army en-
, protested against the employment
te as a major supply and air force
Colonel Ely pointed out that the
ion would be launched in the sea-
heavy rains, high winds, and ty-
s. The harbor was so shallow and so
cted by coral that approaches would
o be as much as 800 feet long. He
d out that the flat Leyte Valley was
ced by many streams and rice pad-
d that the soil was so unstable that
ld be almost impossible to lengthen
ablish air strips and supply depots
it tremendous efforts to haul rock.
y, he pointed out that the existing
nd bridge nets were so narrow that
could handle only one-way traffic
ould undoubtedly disintegrate under
ing by military vehicles and the
His prophecies were substantiated
letter, and Leyte was never satisfac-
a base.

Leyte campaign made an impor-
ontribution in still another respect.
same time the Japanese were losing
portant battle, American top com-
, notably Sixth Army and X and
Corps, were gaining valuable experience that stood them in fine stead for the Battle of Luzon which followed. There were many important lessons learned, many of which will be a part of our army training for years to come. General Walter Krueger, who commanded Sixth Army on Leyte, issued a memorandum to his commanders which may well be pondered by commissioned officers from now on. His memorandum was prompted by the fact that as late as ten days after the landings, no unit—including the higher headquarters—was operating a mess or serving hot meals. Although there was considerable rain and mud, few units made any effort to get their men under shelter even when the tactical situation permitted. Night after night, officers and men slept in wet foxholes even when no enemy troops were in shooting distance. Krueger wasn't pleased. This is what he had to say: "It must never be forgotten that the individual soldier is the most important single factor in this war. He is expected to do a lot, including risking his life. But to get the most out of him he must have the feeling that everything possible under existing circumstances is being done for his well-being and comfort. This is a prime responsibility of command. . ."

General Krueger's overall excellence as a combat leader is often attested to as the Leyte campaign unfolds in Dr. Cannon's work. The military virtues of General MacArthur likewise come into sharper focus in this account than in several of the highly emotional books which have been eulogizing him in recent months. We see him here in his proper role as Supreme Commander, making the major decisions and setting the policy, and then turning over the execution to his subordinate commanders without trying constantly to look over their shoulders. For example, one recent book attributed the decision to make the enveloping landing at Ormoc to the tactical sagacity of General MacArthur. The factual material presented here shows clearly that this maneuver was planned and executed by the army commander, General Krueger, as it properly should have been.

Melodramatic Day

THE DAY LINCOLN WAS SHOT
By Jim Bishop
Harper & Brothers, 1954
308 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75

Reviewed by
LT. COL. WILLARD WEBB

The fourteenth day of April, 1865, was certainly a melodramatic day in the history of the United States, filled with incredible plotting and planning, culminating in national tragedy. It was a day so replete with melodramatic significance that no sophisticated drama critic would accept it. The day has fascinated Mr. Bishop, as it has many other people. Over a long period of time he has collected the fragments of the story of that day and put them together in a quite readable sequence.

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

Infantry—Artillery—Armor

By

Major Russell A. Gugeler

Here is the war in Korea—at the fighting level. The true accounts of outstanding small-unit actions written by a trained soldier-observer and historian from on-the-spot observations and interviews with the men who actually did the fighting. Working as a member of the observer team from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Major Gugeler has made the most of his unique opportunity and material to bring out the drama and boredom, the gallantry and fear, the flashes of brilliance and stupidity which add up to a splendid digest of combat lessons that every soldier should read.

Reviewers say:

". . . For anybody who has ever served in war, for anybody who will ever have to serve in war." George Barrett, in *New York Times Sunday Book Review.*

". . . Of considerable professional interest to any military student and of particular interest to those who were there." Maj. J. R. Stevens, in *Marine Corps Gazette.*

"The ground forces would do well to set this book up as required reading." Army Times' *The American Daily.*

". . . The most effective literary indoctrination available in our language to those who seek a vicarious introduction to war at the fighting level." Charles B. MacDonald, in *Armor.*

$5.00

260 Pages

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY. By Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Henry Regnery Company, 1955. 208 Pages; $3.75. Admiral Kimmel's side of one of the most controversial questions of all time. A man who deserves to be heard has his say; the rights and wrongs have not yet been resolved.

AFRICA TODAY. Edited by C. Grove Haines. The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955. 510 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.00. Twenty-four articles designed to offer a comprehensive picture of the Dark Continent as it is now.

AMERICAN IN RUSSIA. By Harrison E. Salisbury. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 328 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. A *New York Times* correspondent's narrative of five years in Russia.

THE AMERICAN LEGION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Roscoe Baker. Bookman Associates, 1955. 329 Pages; Index; $4.75. Written by a Legionnaire, this is something more than an apology and something less than a whitewash.

BLACKBURN'S HEADHUNTERS. By Philip Harkins. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955. 326 Pages; $3.75. For those who enjoyed Volckmann's *We Remained,* this story of Colonel Blackburn's efforts as a guerrilla in the Philippines will be even more readable and more exciting.

CASANOVA. By Hermann Kesten. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 396 Pages; $5.00. An amusing and light biography of the great lover. Also valuable for its sidelights on the history of Europe in the eighteenth century.

ESCAPER'S PROGRESS. By David James. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955. 205 Pages; $3.00. Another in the long series of POW escape stories—this one by a British torpedo-boat officer who escaped from the Germans.

THE FIFTH WEAPON. By Robert S. Byfield. The Bookmailer, 1955. 67 Pages; $1.00. A study of Russian propaganda and psychological warfare.

THE FRENCH THEORY OF THE NATION IN ARMS 1866-1939. By Richard D. Challener. Columbia University Press, 1955. 305 Pages; Index; $4.50. A scholarly and well documented work which can be of value to our own manpower and mobilization experts.

HAWAII UNDER ARMY RULE. By J. Garner Anthony. Stanford University Press, 1955. 203 Pages; Index; $5.00. A critical account of martial law in Hawaii by the lawyer who persuaded the U. S. Supreme Court that parts of it were unjustified, with full text of basic documents.

INDEX-DIGEST AND ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. By Col. Lee S. Tillotson. The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. 505 Pages; $4.00. Third edition of a popular text.

LOW NOTES ON A HIGH LEVEL. By J. B. Priestley. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 160 Pages; $2.75. Fine if you like the type of British humor that lies somewhere between P. J. Wodehouse and Dickens.

THE MISSING MACLEANS. By Geoffrey Hoare. The Viking Press, Inc., 1955. 247 Pages; Illustrated; $3.75. Written for the soap opera audience, this leaves too many gaps to be particularly informative and treads rather closely to the sob-sister line.

PERSPECTIVE OF JAPAN. Intercultural Publications, Inc., 1955. 78 Pages; Illustrated; 35¢. Leading Japanese writers write on religion, economics, literature, social changes, architecture, etc. Well illustrated with ten reproductions of Japanese art in color. The material originally appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly.*

THE RESERVIST'S GUIDE AND RECORD. By Major Daniel J. Kern and Lt. Comdr. George L. Cantzlaar. David McKay Company, Inc., 1955. 277 Pages; $3.50. A record book and guide combined. The main difficulty with the book is the fact that there will have to be a flood of new editions to keep up with changes in regulations.

THE SUSQUEHANNA. By Carl Carmei Illustrated by Stow Wengenroth. Rinehai & Company, Inc., 1955. 493 Pages; Illus trated; Index; $5.00. The Susquehanna i a river particularly rich in American histor and Carl Carmer will not disappoint hi own fans or those who collect this out standing Rivers of America series.

TIME OUT FOR TURKEY. By Davi Dodge. Random House, 1955. 235 Pages $3.50. A humorously written travelogu from the French Riviera to Turkey. Ver amusing but hardly a guide book for th serious traveler.

THE TWO JACKS. By Will R. Bird Macrae-Smith Company, 1955. 209 Pages Illustrated; $3.50. Still another POW es cape story—this one of two Canadians wh worked with the French Resistance afte getting away from the Germans.

UNDERSTANDING THE FRENCH. B Elliot Paul. Random House, 1955. 18 Pages; $2.75. A sympathetic interpretatio of what makes the Frenchman tick.

THE WASHINGTON PAPERS. Edite and with an introduction by Saul K. Pad over. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 430 Pages Index; $5.00. A one volume treasury o the important writings of George Wash ington.

THE WORLD IS SIX FEET SQUARE By Alan Caillou. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc 1955. 255 Pages; $3.00. A personal experi ence story of two young British intelligenc officers captured by the enemy while work ing with the Arabs in the Western Desert

THE WORLD'S FIGHTING PLANES By William Green and Gerald Pollinger Hanover House, 1955. 240 Pages; Illus trated; Index; $3.50. Photographs and three elevation silhouettes of most of the plane we have heard of and many that will be new to all but the experts.

THE YUKON. By Arthur Cherry Hinto with Philip H. Godsell. Macrae-Smith Com pany, 1955. 184 Pages; Illustrated; Index $3.50. An illustrated and thrillingly writte history of an area that is becoming mor and more important to the defense of th United States.

The book covers 24 hours 22 minutes, from 0700, 14 April, to 0722 (the minute that Lincoln died), 15 April. While the naming of the chapters is by hour through the day, the author has reached back for some retrospective material in a chapter entitled "The Days Before." While this is a well-organized job of editing the information already known, it adds no knowledge which does not already exist in printed form; in fact, Mr. Bishop's bibliography does not include such well-known works as those of Otto Eisenschiml.

This author concerns himself very little with the mystery of the assassination plot. He simply narrates the events as the record indicates they occurred. He apparently accepts the statement of the superintendent of telegraphs that the reason all of the telegraph lines out of Washington went out of operation immediately following Lincoln's assassination was because of the purely casual and incidental mistaken crossing of wires in the telegraph office. Mr. Bishop makes no effort to evaluate the possible significance of John Surratt in the plot and the possibility that he may have had contacts in connection with wartime espionage which were useful to the group of little punks who surrounded John Wilkes Booth. The book does the statement concerning Mrs. Surrat "there is no corroborative evidence to that she ever knew anything of the p A military court and a number of sequent historians have had a reaso doubt that she was innocent. He dra implication from the fact that Lin guard left his post and was not even rimanded, and he sees nothing sinist the sentry on the Navy Yard bridge a ing Herold and Booth, and only the pass.

Since Washington's geography is cussed in some detail, it is unfortu

: is not discussed more accurately. A s shown on the endsheets and also ted in connection with the title page. ver, it is done on such a small scale t is difficult to use, and while Mr.) talks in some detail of Washington's ıphy it is apparent that his knowl- ɔf that geography is somewhat hazy. efers to South Capitol Street as ɔl South and refers to the "upper :s of Wisconsin Avenue in George- ' Numbered streets in Washington orth and south, but he says "to the ɔf the theatre—toward F Street—was son's Restaurant." Toward F Street the theatre is north, and not west. escribes Grant as "the little giant." is the first time I have ever seen an appellation applied, but it was d to Senator Douglas. In one place ers to "cadre of dejected prisoners." s, to say the least, a nonmilitary use : word "cadre." He accepts without on the fact that Stanton said, when ln died, "Now he belongs to the Some unusual imagery is used in ɔhrases as describing an individual as ; "poached eyes."

: story of the Lincoln assassination racy remains one of the tantalizing ies of history, and Mr. Bishop has n an interesting summary of much ıt is known.

Cause

IGHT SWORD
:leanor Perényi
hart & Company, 1955
Pages; $3.50

ved by
NEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

n Bell Hood—his intimates called Sam"—was a fine figure of a man ll as a dashing leader. The son of ıtucky small-time farmer, he grad- from West Point in 1853. Resigning outbreak of the Civil War, he be- first the adored commander of a brigade, then—upon the recom- ıtion of both Jackson and Long- -a major general, leading a division latter's corps. Always in the forefront tle, he had suffered an arm wound :tysburg.

' story opens with Hood and his n rattling westward over the rails; :reet's corps is going to reinforce Hood himself, as it turns out, to a leg at Chickamauga. What hap- ıfterward, in love and in war, to a ged 32-year-old major general filled ımbition and soldierly spirit, is the of one of the most delightfully ı historical novels this reviewer has ı many a moon.

ely, the author has restricted nar- of actual combat to a few well-done nts, filled with color and movement. ıajor portion of the book concerns :ogress of Hood's courtship of a FFV belle, carried on in the midst -torn Richmond's Alice in Wonder- land existence in 1863-64. Beautiful Buck Campbell and her soldier lover, Sam Hood, are caught in the network of political rivalries, military jealousies and aristocratic fantasies. What might have turned into just another mawkish love story is saved by Eleanor Perényi's splendid characterization and dramatic ability.

Hood's emotions flash before the reader; from the crescendo of army command, the frustration of Atlanta's siege, the quick-ended hopes of his ill-considered offensive in the Franklin and Nashville campaigns, down into the slough of despond when his army cracks and he is relieved. It would be unfair to the author to reveal the final outcome, although many readers may suspect it.

A good story, and a fine historical pictorialization of a short-lived and fantastic epoch in our national life. An amazing background of historical research must have gone into it.

Curmudgeon's Report

THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES
Volume III: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-41
Simon & Schuster, 1954
695 Pages; $6.00

Reviewed by
LT. COL. H. A. DEWEERD

FDR's Cabinet had more big-time diarists than any other in history. Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau kept very detailed and voluminous diaries. Forrestal left a valuable but briefer diary. Hull and Leahy have written their memoirs. Perkins wrote a book about Roosevelt. Now we have the third volume of a diary kept by the most aggressively honest and cantankerous member of the Roosevelt team—Harold Ickes, long-time Secretary of the Interior. Ickes attracted controversy as a magnet attracts iron. He was always in trouble with someone, but usually in defense of what Ickes thought was the public welfare. He clashed with Willkie, Wallace, Hopkins, Garner, Farley, and Woodring.

This volume of his diary covers the story of the Roosevelt Administration from the fall of 1939 to the entrance of the United States into the war in 1941. It was not kept on a day-to-day basis. Ickes was too busy for that sort of journalistic activity. He dictated it in batches during moments of leisure. Despite his apparently accurate memory, this kind of a diary has less historical value than one written immediately after the events described.

President Roosevelt never had a more loyal subordinate than Harold Ickes. This was true despite the increasing disillusionment Ickes suffered on account of the President's sloppy methods of administration and his repeated delays in carrying out promises. Throughout the period covered in this volume Ickes was deeply exercised over the President's failure to transfer Forestry from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior. He promised Ickes he would do this sev-

ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES is a compact handbook of good procedure chock-full of pertinent and valuable information. I have "put it to work" in my own office.

Colonel QMC



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eral times but excused himself on the ground of political expediency.

After the outbreak of war in 1939, Ickes wanted the President to take a stronger stand on the revision of neutrality legislation. After France fell, he wanted a larger measure of military support for Britain. He opposed trade with Japan in strategic materials, particularly oil. In this field his efforts to turn off the spigot ran counter to Roosevelt's policy of attempting to string Japan along until the Western allies were in a better military posture. But in spite of Ickes's concern for these things, this diary is of greatest value as a revelation of the nature of the politics at the top in Washington.

Ickes draws sharp pictures of his political associates. Hull is portrayed as affecting the pose of a Christian martyr in Cabinet meetings. Hopkins appears as an incessant intriguer determined "to keep his place under the President's bed"; Perkins is shown taxing the patience of the Cabinet with her regular one-hour lectures "on the nature of government." Ickes's story of the confusion and intrigue of the Chicago convention of 1940 is in a class by itself. It shows Roosevelt's political methods at their very worst. One should point out, however, that Ickes was among the many Democrats who considered themselves a better Vice Presidential choice than Henry Wallace.

Interestingly enough, the one job in Washington, outside of the Interior, which seemed to attract Ickes (aside from the Vice Presidency) was the War Department. Along with LaGuardia, Jackson and others, Ickes considered himself a leading candidate to succeed Woodring, after the President finally acted on his repeated promises to put a strong man in as Secretary of War. Ickes admired Stimson but frankly thought he was too old for the post in time of crisis.

Recommended for students of national affairs.

Officers' Mess

THE WOOLWICH MESS
By Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne, DSO
Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1954
94 Pages; Illustrated; Index

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

How does one tell the story of a unit mess?

Someone once said that the soul of a regiment is its colors. Perhaps it is equally true that the heart of a regiment is its headquarters officers' mess. At least this reviewer so believes. Colonel Burne, whose well-written and interesting *Lee, Grant and Sherman* is well known to many American officers, has not been too effective in his presentation of the Woolwich Mess.

This is the story of the officers' mess of Her Majesty's Royal Regiment of Artillery, whose guns have spoken the world over since its founding in 1716, as its proud motto, *Ubique,* indicates. The story should be a pulsating and inspiring one, filled with human interest. Colonel Burne, however, has chosen to present it in the form of a dry staff study enlivened here and there by all too few anecdotes.

Now the Royal Artillery Mess, situated at Woolwich, home of the Royal Military Academy, has a parallel in our own West Point Mess. We also have—or had—the old 1st Artillery Mess, established at Houlton, Maine, in 1842, and still in being at Fort Totten in 1917, although the regiment had ceased to exist. These are only two of many American army messes, of which all too little is known.

The value of this book lies in the store of historical fact buried in its pages. As a reference work it should have a place on the shelves of everyone interested in the British Army.

Memorial to the Aussies

WITH THE AUSTRALIANS IN KOREA
Edited by Norman Bartlett
The Australian War Memorial Canberra ACT
293 Pages

Reviewed by
COLONEL CHARLES W. MCCARTHY

This is both a contribution to the history of the Korean episode and a memorial to the Australians who participated. Let us first consider the contribution it makes to historical literature.

In many respects this book has the atmosphere of a unit history and as such, like many unit histories, is dull reading for those without association with the units involved. Coupled with this dullness is confusion since the book tries to cover not one unit but several units and these drawn from the three Armed Services. We become acquainted with the efforts of three battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment, an infantry unit, the 77th Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, a fighter unit, a transport squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force, and several units of the Royal Australian Navy including the carrier *Sydney.* And right here we have discovered a basic fault which will make the book a difficult problem for students or researchers.

Nowhere is there a complete list of the forces that participated. It is necessary to thumb through the book to find the units unless one has a facile memory. There is no effort to compile those statistics so important to military students such as number of men engaged, casualties (battle and non-battle), sorties flown and other information which indicates the degree of participation.

The maps are few and poor while the illustrations are plentiful and excellent.

The book is divided into two parts. The first is a running account of participation by the Australian forces, land, sea, and air.

The second part is a collection of eighteen sketches or essays, "Told By Those Who Served." These range from an excellent piece of writing by Roy Macartney of the Australian Associated Press, "How War Came to Kore some rather immature efforts writte style imitative of Ernie Pyle. Ho this part of the book is good readin humor and fine description in ma stances. This kind of treatment mi considered in unit histories since, voting a special section to reportin standing instances, these events m placed in their proper perspective i of being lost in the main body of th tory.

Without an intimate knowledge country or the people one could be v but the impression gained from the is that the Australians are the Tex the British Commonwealth of N They didn't "bugout." They only drew because some American comm ordered it. If a unit suffered a reve was often because of the failure t form on the part of some American porting unit. They did not try to their way through" as American unit but by the application of proper t achieved their objectives with the mum of loss. All of this may be ver but the telling of it without the maps and other statistical data to su it leaves the reader a little cold.

Most of the book is devoted to th played by the Royal Australian Reg although the Air Units (and they w action in the very early days) an Navy receive a fair amount of atte

As a memorial this book will live hands of veterans and on the bookshel homes throughout Australia. It is an mate book about Australians for A lians. Let the great historians of the bother with the detailing of the cold and figures of history.

An Australian of Mr. Kipling's ma while fighting in South Africa in the War, said ". . . the big things pas the little things remain." The edit the Australian War Memorial are en oring to ensure that there will rema Australia for many years to come a ry of the sons and brothers of their trymen who died on far Korean hil for a good cause.

Doctrine for Disaster

THE FRENCH THEORY OF THE NATION IN 1866-1939
By Richard D. Challener
Columbia University Press, 1955
305 Pages; Bibliography; Index; $4.50

Reviewed by
MAJ. EPPES W. BROWNE, JR.

"The Nation in Arms" is a slippery cept, which Mr. Challener admits i ficult of definition. Its essence was fea distrust of a professional Regular A and a mystical—and highly impracti reliance on a huge National Army of ly-trained reservists mobilized *en mas* M-day. In the 1860s, this was a po concept, the military insisting on a s year enlistment "old soldier" army, ing no part of the reserves. Subseque

Army High Command accepted the
ept too, and nobody listened to the
dissenting voices (such as Col. de
lle in the 1930s).
he political doctrine dated from the
ch Revolution and the Napoleonic
s, when the armed French citizenry
ated mercenary troops over most of Eu-
. Those glorious days dazzled French
ical and military thought for a cen-
and a half, with disastrous results
frozen doctrine in a fluid world.
ecause 1870 was a blitz war, later
ch plans were based solely on the
, quick war, ignoring entirely lessons
ie American Civil War and the Boer
. The 1914 plan required complete
ary mobilization and stockpiles of am-
ition, but no economic mobilization.
heavy artillery; it reduced mobility too
h.) Challener says:

In brief, the commercial and busi-
ess world shut down, political life
ame to an abrupt termination, and—
a very real sense—France herself ad-
urned, *sine die,* to await the news
om the battlefront."

ordnance procurement shut down
went off to war.
iey on the border (Pittsburgh is a
parallel) was abandoned early in Au-
1914 because it was not readily de-
ble. It took four years to recover,
years of steel shortage in a war of
ion. Vast amounts of improvisation
conomic mobilization, and returning
from the front to run factories and
ads, were necessary before 1918. The
unition stockpiles didn't last through
ember 1914.
ie French learned their lesson from
ld War I. Defense was superior to
se, particularly when supported by
lete economic and military mobiliza-
The Nation in Arms now included
sexes and all ages to man and supply
Maginot Line. The peacetime Army
ne a mere training school for one-
reserve classes (read: UMT).
gain they planned it in detail, so
they could have mobilized a million
in 1936, when Hitler invaded the
eland, but could not field one corps
ish the Germans out. Protecting the
eland would have put the French
in *front* of the Maginot Line; they
n't prepared for that.
iey couldn't defend west of the Line,
r, in 1940, but Challener doesn't
that action adequately.
scholarly work (488 footnotes), this
is not for general military readers.
yourself: "Am I a scholar?"] Un-
nately, it appears to be addressed to
academicians. A simpler version,
ed (perhaps by the War College) of
ninutiae of French parliamentary de-
and similar barbed-wire entangle-
s, might be of considerable value to
Congress, the State and Defense De-
ients, Selective Service, and Civil
ise.

Pass In Review

It is saddening to observe the occasional inroads of tarnish on the shining armor of one's heroes. There is for me, however, one gallant soldier-statesman whose luster remains undimmed. He is that master of many trades, Sir Winston Churchill. Having given the benefit of my prejudiced point of view, let me call attention to a new book on my favorite subject. *Assignment Churchill* ($3.75) is written by Inspector Walter Henry Thompson of Scotland Yard, who spent some nineteen years as Churchill's personal bodyguard. Obviously, in such a close association over such an extended period, Thompson came to know his subject well. Thompson's memoirs make fascinating reading and provide a unique picture of Sir Winston from an unusual angle.

For crossword puzzle fans or those with a geographical bent, there is a new reference book just out that will be most useful. *The Macmillan World Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary* ($6.95) covers in detail all sorts of information on the countries, cities, oceans, rivers, lakes and climates of the world from Aabenraa (Denmark) to Zwolle (Netherlands). Even though the subjects are arranged in alphabetical order, a supplementary index makes the book even easier to use. There is also a list of abbreviations and contractions.

Since my job has been to keep up with the books being published, I have been impressed with the number of works that are produced to improve the quality of our luncheon or after-dinner speaking. One must assume that the ranks of these captive audiences are well populated with long-suffering authors. At any rate, the publishers seem to be doing their best to improve things. The latest contribution is *The Speaker's Handbook of Epigrams and Witticisms* ($3.95) by Herbert V. Prochow. This comprehensive anthology contains over 5,000 literary quotations, maxims, proverbs, familiar phrases and unusual expressions, all arranged in alphabetical order by subject matter. For example, if you are called upon to discourse upon the subject of "Accidents," you turn to page 1, run your finger about halfway down the page, and come to this little gem to brighten an otherwise morbid subject: "What may be the perfect accident has been achieved in Santiago, Chile, where a concert soprano fell from a hotel window onto a dentist.—*Atlanta Constitution.*" This is the sort of thing the publisher firmly declares "will delight the public speaker's audience."

The battle of words as to who was to blame for our lack of preparedness at Pearl Harbor continues apace. This month's effort was written by one of the principals in the controversy, and is entitled *Admiral Kimmel's Story* ($3.75). Kimmel, it will be remembered, was the Navy commander in Hawaii on the fateful day. There is no gainsaying the good Admiral's right to present his side of the story, and I might add that he does it more effectively than the hysterical outburst of his friend and counselor, Admiral Theobald, some months back. Nevertheless, this is purely a defensive book which does not provide a well-rounded view. It is unfortunate that a lack of public interest will probably preclude the publication of a thorough study of this debacle written by a competent, disinterested historian. Meanwhile, the reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General Short will have to bear the same burden that has vexed those of other military commanders in the past—the commander gets credit when things go right and must take the blame when things go wrong.

Contrary to the view which some of our readers may hold, most of us in the book-reviewing business make an effort to learn more about the subjects of the books we review than that which the author gives us. Consequently, we were particularly pleased the other afternoon to have an office visit from General Walter Krueger, USA, retired, former commander of Sixth Army in the Pacific. General Krueger's visit coincided with an appraisal we were making of the latest volume in the series *The U.S. Army in World War II (Leyte: The Return to the Philippines)* ($6.75) by Dr. M. Hamlin Cannon. This book is being reviewed in some detail in THE ARMY JOURNAL, and it certainly was considered with heightened interest as a result of the absorbing discussion with General Krueger. It was amazing indeed, to find this army commander with such a thorough recall of the full details of that campaign some ten years later, particularly in view of the numerous other campaigns which he so successfully led. I feel he could still give a good account of himself in a similar role if called upon to do so today.—R.F.C.

Report of Nominating Committee

To the Active Members of the Association of the U. S. Army:

1 As provided by the By-Laws of the Association of the U. S. Army, the Executive Council elected the undersigned members as a committee to nominate candidates for election to vacancies occurring in June 1955 among the officers and members of the Executive Council.

2 The Committee met on 21 January 1955 and found that the terms of office of the President and one Vice President would expire in June 1955 and that ten members were to be elected to the Executive Council for three-year terms. The members we nominated for these vacancies appear on the ballot on the facing page. For the information of the membership we have added the present assignment of each nominee.

3 This Committee desires to inform the membership that since the incumbent President is from the Infantry arm we considered it desirable that the next elected President should be an artilleryman. For that reason the two officers nominated for President are from the Artillery arm. To balance this, both nominees for Vice President are infantrymen.

4 The Committee calls the attention of the membership to the By-Laws pertaining to the nomination and election of officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association:

"Art. I. Sec. 1. *Active Membership.* Active membership in the Association shall be open to all members of all components of the United States Army, and to all members of senior Army ROTC Units."

"Art. I. Sec. IV. *Voting Rights.* Only Active Members shall have the right to vote."

"Art. IV. Sec. 1. *Nominating Committee.* In December of each year, the Executive Council shall elect a Nominating Committee of five from among the active membership of the Association, which shall fairly represent, as nearly as practicable, the Active Members as to grades and components."

"Art. IV. Sec. 2. *Election Procedure.* The Nominating Committee shall submit a slate of at least two nominees for each position falling vacant in the coming year, which slate shall be submitted to the active membership by printed ballot, not later than 1 March of the following year. The printed ballot shall contain appropriate spaces for write-in candidates. Such ballot may be distributed to the active membership by return postcard or by ballot printed in the Association's magazine or otherwise, as the Executive Council may determine. Ballots will be counted under the direction of the Executive Council not later than 1 May, and the winning candidates shall take office at the June meeting of the Executive Council. A plurality of the votes cast shall be sufficient for election."

"Art. IV. Sec. 3. *Eligibility of Candidates.* Only Active Members shall be eligible for election to office under this Article."

5 In the upper left hand corner of the envelope in which you mail your ballot please write the words "Association Ballot," followed by your signature, your name typed or printed, and your rank and organization. The illustration below shows how this should be done. Your name will be checked against the roster of members of the Association and if you are an eligible voter your ballot will be counted. Envelopes carrying names of ineligible voters will *not* be opened. Address the envelope (as illustrated below) to: "The Secretary, Association of the U. S. Army, 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C."

6 All ballots must be mailed so as to reach the office of the Association by 20 April 1955.

James C. Fry
Major General, USA
Chairman, Nominating Committee

Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, USA
Maj. Gen. Harry McK. Roper, USA
Col. Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Lt. Col. John E. Connor, Jr., USA
Members.

This is the way to address the envelope in which you mail your ballot



BALLOT FOR ANNUAL ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

FOR PRESIDENT

(Vote for One)

- ☐ Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Artillery)
  Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research
- ☐ Lt. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, USA (Artillery)
  Director, Joint Staff, Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- ☐ _____

FOR VICE PRESIDENT

(Vote for One)

- ☐ Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, USA (Infantry)
  Commanding General, Second Army
- ☐ Maj. Gen. Wayne C. Zimmerman, USA (Infantry)
  Inspector General of the Army
- ☐ _____

FOR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (Terms ending June 1958)

(*Vote for Ten;* names are listed alphabetically)

- ☐ Col. Ralph W. Arthur, QMC-USAR
  Office, Dep. Chief, Logistics
- ☐ Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, USA (Inf)
  Chief, Plans Division, OACS, G3
- ☐ Lt. Col. James E. Cook, Jr., Arty-USAR
  Not on active duty
- ☐ Col. Robert L. Cook, Inf-USA
  Commanding Officer, 3d Inf
- ☐ Lt. Col. Joseph P. D'Arezzo, Arty-USA
  Office, Dep. Chief, Logistics
- ☐ Maj. John W. Donaldson, Inf-USA
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THE MONTH'S MAIL

February Issue

● Your February JOURNAL had so many articles of close and cogent importance for personnel of our "early ready" active reserve unit that I want to order twenty extra copies.

Our command has all the problems of the weekly warriors: men who are individually expert in their technical service MOS, but must be trained up to the "theater thinking" responsibilities of this unit, which would support a full field army; men who were keen, alert unit commanders in World War II and are staked out in T/O deadends not always commensurate with their abilities or past performance; young men of magnificent potential who wear out the years as Indians under many chiefs; and damned good line soldiers who have to learn how to work as staff officers. Our enlisted men are half returnees or previous service and half youngsters who are picked off one or two a month for active service.

My sergeant major has been with the unit less than a year. He was a Navy yeoman, and though almost sacrificially willing to work, he must learn about the Army. My message center chief joined even later, and broke in—due to his good humor and resourcefulness—successfully, in the hell's mess of summer camp when forty-odd attached units were dumped on us.

So, to these two men—my right and left hands—I will send copies marked with "To a Sergeant" as well as the splendid article by General Palmer; to our CG and his C/S go copies of the Palmer article; to some of my sweat-and-swear buddies of the long and dogged nights at summer camp go certain other articles which may help their morale and keep them with us.

You couldn't have drafted a better issue for my personal purposes. My father, who was an infantry major in World War I, wants to express his admiration and appreciation for your magazine, which I share with him. He and Mother keenly enjoyed your fifty-year issue, as I did.

MAJOR GEORGE A. PADDOCK, JR.
322d Log Com (C)
Chicago, Ill

How Do You Command?

● I was one of Colonel Harmeling's company commanders when he commanded an infantry battalion in post-truce Korea ["Troop Command in Korea," February]. In his article he states, "Sometimes I think that a battalion commander's primary duty is to shield his company commanders from as many frustrating distractions as possible, so that they will be free to run their companies according to their own personal methods of leadership." His line of thinking created a mutual respect between him and his company commanders.

I think Colonel Harmeling has hit upon two of the major causes of demoralized company commanders:

One is those "frustrating distractions" that include the endless certificates that "every member of this unit has personally . . ."; the inspectors from higher headquarters who come into the area to play squad leader; the numerous trivial reports that have to be submitted and are used for God only knows what; the constant picking away at a company commander's key personnel for the sole purpose of making higher headquarters a showplace; and so on.

The other is that in some battalions each company has two COs—a captain and a lieutenant colonel. Maybe it's a normal human weakness for battalion commanders to want to play company commander, but I've seen what it can do to a subordinate's initiative. In Colonel Harmeling's battalion each company had only one CO.

LT. ROBERT E. PRICE
Fort Ord, Calif

Thanks

● I would like to tell you that I like the Association of the United States Army and THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. It has been a tremendous help to my military study. I was recommended for special work and it was so wonderful because your JOURNAL furnished a good background for this work.

COL. ARCHIMINIO PEREIRA
Brazilian Army
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Solidarity and the Mass Army

● Congratulations on your February issue. It was beautifully put together and I'll bet it stirred up a hornets' nest of letters. Your articles by Bill Mauldin, Captain Little, and Major Boatner set each other off nicely. They also set me off, particularly "Solidarity is the Key to the Mass Army."

Captain Little's very first sentence bel me between the eyes. Down here at b tery and battalion level, where we d with this potential mass soldier daily, find that soldiering *must* be a way of li If it were not a way of life, almost a r gion, we would not be able to retain old soldiers who, contrary to Capt Little's ideas, are invaluable to the succe ful completion of our mission. The C tain evidently has never seen the angu in a battery commander's eyes when loses that crackerjack supply sergeant w eighteen years of service; the cries of w of the battalion executive officer when hears his wonderful sergeant major l decided to retire after doing his twen We at this level are hurting now beca we have so little to offer a good man an effort to retain him. Our most effect appeal is directed at his pride in his u trying to sell him on the idea of a lo and honorable career in an honorable p fession. And, thank God, this approa has shown encouraging results. All we c promise him is a "way of life." Take th away and what have we left?

Captain Little comments on the "p chological theory of emulation." Child p chologists also propound this theory, a it is a good one. A child learns by imit ing the parent, and by constant repetiti of this imitation. If the parent is go barring accidents, the child develops in satisfactory manner. . . . Is it not reas able to assume that these children, gro into adults with sound moral backgroun can transfer this need of imitation to son one else who corresponds roughly to t parent? And it is reasonable, is it not, assume that this imitation will be selecti based on reason and intelligence? If based, how can this be wrong? The C tain may argue that the man at the t has no one to imitate and therefore m do anything and be anything he lik thereby starting a chain reaction that co change our civilization. I say that t leader, intelligently chosen by a mo people, must and will have the image a god to imitate as much as human frai will show.

I refuse to clear away the old catchwo like *esprit, discipline,* and *morale.* It the shame of the Army that these cat words have been cleared away as of no inadvertently in some cases, I must adm

, down here at battery and battalion our men thrive on esprit, discipline norale. Captain, come down here :ell Charlie Battery's first sergeant ıis unit is no better than Baker Bat- Bring iodine! Catch the look of in a soldier's eye as he watches the Man cheering like hell for the bat- team at a basketball game. Go ask oldier who was busted last week ıer or not he deserved it and if he the Old Man for busting him. He'll bly tell you that "the Old Man is a you can't get a damned thing past The amazing thing about it is that unit commanders have not been d by these men, nor has anyone at- ed to "reinforce" or "modify" the of their leaders. The discipline :s from a set of reasonable principles, ı by all, being enforced by a reason- commander. For any man to take himself the radical modification of :t of principles, rules or laws, would in immediate reprisal, not only by ommander, but by the men who re- eeing a good unit fouled up. This is ırity," but the type of solidarity that :sult of esprit, discipline, and morale, ot a negation of the three.

ɔtain Little writes of the "trade-union ophy." Does he infer that the clerk- in time of national desperation, refuse to shoot when shoved into ıfantry? I know a few clerk-typists yped out a thousand rounds per min- ı the Battle of the Bulge. They 't overjoyed at being there, but they job to do and they were the johnnies it. And they did it. . . .

e sentence of Captain Little's is par- :ly interesting if you compare it with er article in the same issue: "He not be exposed to the carefully or- :d and precisely scheduled program training center." I urge the Captain ıd Major Boatner's article on page :e best I've seen on the training pro- in quite a while. Not only are these ully organized and precisely sched- programs" failing to impart any edge to our soldiers, but they are g some of our younger officers by g them into unwieldy and unfamiliar Initiative and responsibility must be ɔped right here, while the tree is still and unbent, and there is no room y sort of development except that of ıarrowest kind in Captain Little's ım.

ɔtain Little gets down to the meat of oblem when he says, "The problem idarity does not necessarily destroy ɔtential effectiveness of an army in t." Up to this point he has been along, making confident, concise, 'e statements, and suddenly he shifts defensive. On this single paragraph libraries could be filled, and I will tempt to discuss it here. Rather, let fer to the author's standard of "soli- ," the nebulous something that iden- tifies one soldier with another. In combat, when this soldier's solidarity is destroyed, nothing is left, least of all an effective fighting unit. However, we "old Army" sticks-in-the-mud have three gimmicks to help us along: esprit, morale, and discipline. By destroying one, or, in some cases, even two, of these you may still have an effective fighting force.

* * *

I would like to presume for a moment to refer Generals Patton, Ridgway, and Van Fleet to the following: "Commanders at higher levels may continue to use the symbolic techniques of the historic commanders, but they will not be effective because the mass soldier does not understand them, nor do others who are members of the society from which he is recruited." Captain, you and I have never known three more "effective" gentlemen than those three officers.

Captain, can't you see what you are advocating? Can't you see the tragedy of the mediocrity you are trying to force upon us? Where is the fire, the spirit, the initiative, the individuality that has won all our wars and made us the strongest nation in the history of the world? Must we beat everything into the conform, the average? May you and I never serve in an army where the average leaders will lead the average army down the average road to a hotter-than-average hell!

Yours for any kind of an army that wins wars,

LT. BART V. MITCHELL

12th AAA Bn
Miller Field, NY

• I wish to compliment you for publishing "Solidarity is the Key to the Mass Army." I just finished reading it, and nothing has impressed me so much in a long time. It was a very poignant piece of writing that was obviously written by a first-class craftsman, but I almost wept when I had finished it. Not just for the loss of the fine traditions in our Army, but the obvious lessening of importance of the individual in our society for the cause of efficiency.

The sentences, "Under industrial management principles, all activity must yield to criteria of 'efficiency' and 'utility,' rather than 'good' or 'right.' Habits and customs must be made 'systematic,' " I think brought out the whole tenor of life and thought of our society and Army. We have been lamenting the passing of prestige of our noncoms and junior officers, but actually it is only a reflection of modern technology. It is no longer required to be a leader or know every aspect of one's trade, because the junior leader no longer makes decisions or possesses authority. His job is only to carry out directives from someone higher up. The company and battalion commanders are tied down to their desks running their units by paper directive from above. The clerks and administrators in some far-distant personnel office have more to say about their men than the noncoms and platoon leaders. Consequently there is a loss of respect for the junior leaders by the men and a loss of self-respect by the junior leaders who realize that they are flunkies and possess no real authority.

The Army used to be accused of treating men like numbers without regard for individuality. This may be so, but the Army is not to be blamed, as it has only reflected our modern society and its methods. The individual has been submerged in the interests of efficiency. The Army cannot revive prestige for the noncoms and junior officers so long as they are shop foremen and not unit leaders. One might as well try to return the King of England to a position of power and authority. It used to be that a soldier could be recognized by his lean, tanned visage from days in the field and on the drill ground. Now as a manager the CO, through hours at a desk, probably has a large spread both front and rear as his symbol.

I am not griping, but I do feel rather like the frontiersman who saw the great buffalo herds, and then one day realized that they were no more. I am sad because, like our frontier, which is no more, the old Army produced some great men. I only hope that in our quest for efficiency we do not lose sight of our heritage. I hope we are not selling our birthright for a mess of pottage.

LT. ROBERT CEDER

Box 116, Rogers Center
Bloomington, Ind.

• Although a brief review of the Army's history since the beginning of World War II would not inspire one to take issue with Captain Little's article on what *has* happened to the Army's pride, morale, and *esprit,* his appalling assertion that it is right and meet that the United States Army should properly be reduced to a mass of uniformed MOS'd nonentities is in itself a tragic contemporary reflection of the attitude of so many "scholars" who attempt with analytical precision to foster technological mass psychological dogma on a basically *human*—not industrial—organization. The Army fights—it does not produce. In the final analysis, the killing of an individual enemy with a rifle, grenade, bayonet—yes, even the bare hands—is the mission of the Army. People so organized to perform this mission are not a union of journeymen. This mission has no civilian counterpart.

Consequently, no material assets, real or imagined, no community relations techniques, will ever convince Private X that there is sufficient reward to justify his performing this necessary mission.

There is only one *rationale* which *can* convince Private X that the killing of a human being is justified and that is an unswerving devotion and loyalty to his country. The so-called frills that Captain Little so casually, even scornfully, casts

aside as superfluous to the "mass" Army are but symbols of that dedication to service. They are but a local transition of a basically idealistic inspiration. The regiment's colors—with the battle streamers representing the glories of that unit's participation in the defense of these United States—the ribbons, the pageantry, if you will—represent idealism, not mass material motivation.

We would venture to say that when these symbols of patriotic devotion to service of country disappear and IBM efficiency standards measure performance while technological controls replace personal leadership, the twilight of the fighting army is near at hand.

It is true that because of public apathy to military living conditions the colonel and the corporal have become fellow straphangers as they commute daily to their posts of duty. Yet each is still a *man*, whether or not he may have been transformed from a ruralite to an urbanite. In each is a heart and a soul, within which there remain a conscience and emotions.

Are we to believe that no longer shall one come a little closer to a clear comprehension of the greatness of America when he observes Old Glory fluttering in the evening breeze as she is lowered at Retreat to the air of the National Anthem played by bandsmen who share the meaning of the words with Francis Scott Key? Are we to believe that the human heart shall no longer experience a surge of strength as the human mind beholds the sacrifices of those who have gone before us when the simple notes of Taps invade the silence of the night? Are we no longer to find mutual respect and deep, abiding, and unswerving devotion to the cause we serve when the colonel and the corporal exchange salutes?

When the day dawns to find these human feelings beyond our sensitivity, then America shall not be worth defending—for the heart and soul of her manhood will be as common stone, and just as worthless.

COL. GEORGE I. FORSYTHE
Infantry
LT. COL. HAROLD H. DUNWOODY
Armor
Washington, D. C.

• Captain Little's article is a superior job of temporizing Clausewitz's awareness that social institutions are the primary elements in shaping the soldier. His general image of the urbanization of the Army by our fast, mobile, cosmopolitan society is superb. All his observations are precise. But one might question his assumptions and conclusions.

To say that "soldiering is no longer a way of life" may just as well mean that society, rather than destroying that way of life, is assimilating it: that society, rather than saying that soldiery is no longer a necessity, may be saying that it can no longer do without it. Society may realize it must completely integrate the military function of man into its day-to-day life. When military experts warn that war can now reach Kansas City and all the world, perhaps man has reasoned, however feebly, to a conclusion that it is necessary for every individual to assume the soldierly stature in self-defense.

Captain Little's disturbing assumption seems to be expressed in his closing words: "to be done in a business-like way . . . and then go home." It is quite possible that society has realized there can be no such thing: that one cannot "go home" in an age in which war means a foxhole in your front yard.

One must heartily agree with Captain Little when he says "the mass soldier stands alone." Whether or not he stands alone spiritually is the question. The character, motivation and conduct of that individual may be entirely different from what Captain Little has intimated. Moreover, one might question whether or not the loss of symbols, discipline, and traditional pageantry *is* the portent of the mass army. It is possible, under a different assumption, that the cosmopolitan nature of an army may contain the seed of greater and greater interest in those symbolic aspects of the military life. Such losses may well be the portent of an army's failure to adjust to social changes. . . .

Captain Little's observations that "the size of the group with which the mass soldier can express solidarity becomes smaller" and that "mass soldiers become increasingly dependent on symbols" are outstanding. However, his distinction between "solidarity" and *esprit* is semantic. One may consider platoon "solidarity" or *esprit* the product of impersonal or imposed discipline, and mass "solidarity" as a product of self-discipline. But the distinction is a very fine one. Discipline of some kind is an essential of any social endeavor. In a society with a changing pattern of morality (apparently for the better, in Western countries) only a shift in the origin of authority or discipline is being observed. If the medieval knight could be a prototype of our cosmopolitan soldier, perhaps the Army's job is to encourage the natural tendencies of men to express their combative urges and to symbolize them.

Thank God "the mass Army is still in the process of development." It is unnecessary to conclude, as Captain Little does, however, that the process will be so sterile that man will not attempt to personalize his life with his limitless imagination. On the contrary, man will surely attempt to idealize or "egofy" his military affairs. American man may even go to the opposite extreme (as De Tocqueville observes) and so individualize his military activity that there will be a new boom of heraldry: more symbols, more crests, more flags than ever before. Certainly men will alter their dress more drastically when they search for identity with the transcendental greatness of "the group" as the Army increases its mass. The problem of identification of groups in atomic war may well bring b the chevrons of cadets, campaign hats, a host of distinctive apparel.

Who knows the future composure o individualized and integrated soldiery?

CAPT. RICHARD J. B
2807 Yale Station
New Haven, Conn.

History of 59th CA

• I am preparing a history of the 5 Coast Artillery Regiment, now the 5 AAA Battalion (SW) (SP). Most of records of the regiment were lost with fall of the Philippines. I want to get touch with anyone who may have authoritative information about the 5 or the names of any former members w can help write this history of a unit w a fine record.

CAPT. PETER A. ABRUZZ
30th AAA Btry
Fort Bliss, Tex.

Warrant Officer Insignia

• The Air Force has already done it. W can't the Army?

This question arose in a class on court and discipline. The instructor used training aid consisting of a chart wh showed Army, Navy, and Air Force ficers' cap, collar, lapel and shoulder signia of rank and branch.

One of the men in the class asked, "W can't the Army keep up with the tir like the other services? The cap and la brass and the bars of the warrant offi are strictly WO. But the Army is assi ing WOs now by branch and MOS, same as commissioned officers. Why ca they wear the same brass as commissio officers?"

This touched off a vigorous discuss which ended with the majority favor the idea. Why can't WOs wear the sa cap and lapel brass as commissioned c cers, with no change in warrant bars?

SFC V. F. GIARRATA
Hq 2d Trans Port Com C
APO 503, San Francisco, Calif.

Building the Reserves

• COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL has been essential part of my military educatio program for the past several years and l steadily improved in value.

In view of needed emphasis on devel ing a Reserve force adequate to meet ture emergencies, those of us who lab to keep State Guard cadres on their to would appreciate space and comment c ering that important area of our milit strength.

With some encouragement from t Army and a modest outlay for clothi and equipment, we could develop a su stantial support force capable of handli most local and State security missions at fraction of the cost involved if such m sions were assigned to Army units.

MAJ. WALTER M. FERR
Cleveland, Ohio

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THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

IF a casual visitor from outer space were to drop in on the United States for a couple of hours and read a few newspapers and magazines, and tune in on a few TV newscasts and forums, he might get a rather pessimistic, if inaccurate, picture of the present state of our defenses. Unification is eight years old, and there are few in the know who would say that it is either perfect or an organizational disaster. Interservice jealousies have not disappeared, and there still are officers who shortsightedly put their own service first every time. We think fewer of these are Army officers—which may be a boast or an indictment, depending upon your state of mind.

But all the services possess great numbers of officers who know that cooperation and compromise in modern warfare is a job for all and that weapons of all kinds are needed to defend America. Such an officer is COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN, author of "Guardian of Our Air Frontier" (*page 14*). As executive officer of the 52d AAA Brigade, which provides the antiaircraft defenses of New York City, Colonel Thielen does not belittle the value of the Air Force. If we are attacked, *every* enemy plane will have to be shot down. The H-bomb and even more frightful devices make attrition meaningless. It will take every available antiaircraft weapon, properly coordinated, to do the job. Colonel Thielen's plea is for effective cooperation and for changes in the command structure of our antiaircraft defenses in order to insure that cooperation.

Cooperation—interbranch, interservice, and international—has been a constant theme through Colonel Thielen's military career. A 1932 graduate of the Military Academy, he became a Field Artillery officer. In World War II he served overseas with Sixth Army Artillery. Since the war he has served with the Army General Staff, the JCS Secretariat, SHAPE, and the office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1948, while on duty with the State Department in Hungary, he was "kidnaped" by the Red Army but was soon released. After a tour as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Princeton, Colonel T len took up his present assignment in 1954.

IN the last ten years, countless mili writers have speculated on the of infantry in an atomic war. while the pundits propose, The Infar School disposes. The impact of nuc warfare has already had some far-rea ing effects on the training and insti tion that are given at the august eminently practical academy at

COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN

Benning. In this issue, BRIGADIER G ERAL CARL F. FRITZSCHE, Assist Commandant of TIS, shows how c we are to having "Tomorrow's Infar Today" (*page 20*).

General Fritzsche has been an inf tryman since he graduated from Military Academy in 1928. After a t of duty with the 10th Infantry at Thomas, Ky., he attended The Infar School's company officers' course, later served with the 15th Infantry the American Barracks, Tientsin, Chi

In August 1941 he was appoin assistant chief of staff for intellige of the 1st Armored Division, and April 1942 he accompanied the Divis to the European theater. He was s

(*continued on page 56*)



Salute to "The Angels"

FAIRCHILD congratulates the 11th Airborne Division on its 12th Birthday

Clearing the mountains in the Leyte Campaign, the hard-fought battles from Nasugbu to Manila, the Los Banos Raid, the campaigns in Southern Luzon and Malepunyo and the more recent outstanding campaigns in Korea . . . these are but a few of the proud achievements of the 11th Airborne Division, celebrating its Twelfth Anniversary today.

Born on February 25, 1943, the 11th Airborne Division has earned presidential citations, scores of individual citations and medals and the world's esteem in a record of engagements that is second to none. This battle-scarred division will long be remembered by the 2100 grateful prisoners of war rescued at Los Banos who gave them their proud title . . . THE ANGELS.

Here is a salute to the courage and patriotism of the officers and men of this outstanding combat organization, from Fairchild Aircraft Division, home of another combat veteran, the world-famous and dependable C-119 Flying Boxcar.

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Aircraft Division
HAGERSTOWN, MARYLAND

"where the future is measured in light-years"

Editorial

Preserve the Seed

IN 1939, when war clouds somewhat bigger than the shadow cast by a man's hand began to darken the world, President Roosevelt asked General George C. Marshall if it wasn't possible to strengthen the Army garrison in the Philippines. The Chief of Staff's answer was that it could be done only by sending out of the country the Army's all too "few grains of seed corn."

Less than two years later the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. In those intervening months the Army's seed had been planted and bountiful crops were in prospect (crops that materialized in the great victories of 1944-45), but too late to save the Philippines. Much suffering would have been alleviated and much wealth would have been saved had General Marshall had a couple of cribfuls of trained and equipped Army forces instead of the pitiful cadre of seed that he had to conserve and nourish during the long months it took to build and equip the Army that won World War II.

How wasteful this nation is in its conduct of its military affairs! It seems not to learn from experience, nor to heed the advice of its experts. In Korea in 1950 it almost threw away its best seed because it had not had the foresight to be prepared for such an emergency. In its penny-wise-pound-foolish policies this country would have long ago frittered away its military strength had it not been for the labors of professional soldiers, faithfully conserving the seed of military knowledge in the service schools, tirelessly working on new and better methods and equipment, always conscious that a second-best army is no better than no army at all.

KNOWING too that it takes time to build an army and that as wars increase in violence and velocity, less time is given in which to create them. So little time now that you may be able to count the time on the face of a clock rather than by turning the pages of a calendar.

So little time, indeed, that it is only realistic to acknowledge that the primary need is for trained Army fo in being, equipped and ready to fight. We have tl in Europe along with the forces of our NATO al We have them in the Far East, though we don't l enough in that ominously explosive part of the wo Though we can't be strong everywhere and we shoul try to be, we could and should be strong at home. Str in trained Army forces ready and able to take off at receipt of a coded telegraphic order.

THIS is not a new thought. Indeed, it has been vanced by high authorities. But instead of action lowing the expression of the desirability, there has b more than inaction, there has been a drift in the o direction. A dangerous drift that has weakened and weaken the combat capability of the Army. A drift history tells us will be followed by the utterly foo policy of wasting some of our precious seeds of A corn, leaving the Nation woefully unprotected and able rapidly and purposefully to train and re-equip armies that can move in as the committed forces are w down with losses and combat fatigue.

This is not a plea for saving the professionals f combat. Not at all. It is a plea that this country face to reality and make it possible for the Army to l trained professionals to throw into the battle lines w the balloon goes up and to have professionals man cadres and to staff the all-important training comma and schools so that a new army of whatever siz necessary can be put together rapidly and efficient and in time to be used.

The great need today is for a corps or more of ganized, trained, and equipped fighting men—a Strat Army Command, if you will. A deterrent force as po in brush fires as in global holocaust. A force that give this nation's leaders the strategic flexibility must have in a world of peril.



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* * *

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FRONT AND CENTER

Unit rotation. Operation GYROSCOPE is given large credit for boosting the reenlistment rate of the Regular Army from 22 per cent last July to 54 per cent in December. Furthermore, there has been an avalanche of applications by married noncommissioned officers for transfer to units labeled for early transfer under the unit rotation plan. For example, Fort Carson, Colo., recently reported that 300 men had applied for transfer to GYROSCOPE units and more than 200 had reenlisted in GYROSCOPE outfits. So many married noncoms seek assignment to the 10th Infantry Division that the Department of the Army was forced to limit approval so as not to exceed the number of housing units available to it in Germany.

Regimental traditions. Senior officers discussing possible reorganization of the infantry division into combat commands carefully explain that these combat commands will be created from existing regiments and will carry regimental colors and perpetuate a regiment's history. And a study is progressing in the Pentagon designed to make it possible for Regulars—officers and noncommissioned officers—to be members of a regiment throughout their entire service. Based on the British regimental system, the plan would allow a soldier to retain ties to a "home" regiment even when at school or on staff duty. Prospects of approval depend largely upon the feasibility of the plan that is devised.

Tactical organization. It is clear from informed comment about the 3d Division's FOLLOW ME tests and the similar armored tests at Fort Hood (still incomplete) that the assumption of some commentators that smaller divisions mean a saving of manpower is not valid. One general has observed: "The choice is not between a division of 18,000 men a division of 12,000 men, because 12,000 men simply cannot do what 18,000 can do. The choice is between two divisions of 18,000 men each three divisions of 12, men each. The question narrows down to whether we can get more efficient service and at less cost in overhead from 36,000 men divided into two or three divisions."

Reserve Program Flops. It is regrettable that the ambitious reserve program of the Department of Defense appears to be a casualty of legislative inattention, because improvement of the reserves is a crying necessity. The Congress gave the DoD program a cold shoulder for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Congressmen who have always looked at such programs with a fishy eye, while paying proper homage to the Minuteman folk story, can't reconcile repeated warnings that wars of the future will come with startling swiftness and be fought with unprecedented violence and speed, with a program designed to substitute reserve forces of questionable readiness for "in being" forces. But it was this very substitution that led DoD officials to promote the reserve program. They oversold themselves when they discoverd that a big reserve program costs less than "in being" forces. As in the case of the New Look budget of a year ago, the attractions of the giant-sized economy package were irresistible.

No like Nike. Great Britain has turned down a sugge that it be licensed to build the Nike antiaircraft guided mis *Aviation Week* reports. The magazine says the reason is the British feel that Nike is too operationally limited, too plicated, and too expensive for them. In this regard the a significant comment in the British "Statement on Def 1955": "The nature of the potential threat from the air to two countries differs in many significant aspects. As a r the weapons required by each country must often have diffe characteristics."

Airlift. Senator John Stennis, a member of the Se Armed Services Committee, has suggested an investigatio reductions in airlift available to Army combat forces. He quoted as saying, ". . . there have been developments in W ern Europe and the Orient affecting our defense program. concerned as to whether we could, should we be called u fill two commitments at the same time—in Europe and the East—if the reductions [in Army combat-ready forces and lift] are made."

British defense problems. The printed transcript of British Government's statement on defense plans for which touched off the debate in the House of Commons re that many of Britain's defense problems are almost exactly same as ours.

More inducements to persuade regulars to reenlist for er periods are one similar problem. The official statement s of the need for "building up and maintaining a 'hard cor men of long service and experience."

A strategic reserve of Army forces is another similar The statement says: "The main burden of the cold war a our other peacetime military commitments in the Colonial pire is borne by the Army . . . [and] conventional forces conventional arms are required. The Army is now able t build a strategic reserve in the United Kingdom. This ha long been a primary aim of our defence policy; it is esse both in the cold war and in our preparedness for a major

The need for greater flexibility in Army tactical orga tions so that units can "move from dispersion to concentra as quickly, and with as little confusion, as possible," is o the effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the state declares. It sees the need for "greater elasticity of outloo commands at all levels." "Experimental organizations an vised scale of weapons and equipment, including transport being worked out" and will be tested in maneuvers durin coming year.

Home defense of the British Isles will require forces. "For this work the Services must themselves be tra local organizations developed, and a link provided betwee two. The Government have therefore decided to form a M Defence Corps as part of the Army and RAF reserve forces, statement says. Responsibility for this corps will be in the Office and permanent instructional and administrative staff be from the Regular Army.

ENEMIES' MORTARS LOCATED BY RADAR

rmy Used Device Against Reds in Korea, NY TIMES, DEC. 12, 1954

THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY:

"Hundreds of soldiers now returned fely from Korea literally owe their 'es to the extreme accuracy and speed the new counter-mortar system." This od news was revealed by the Signal orps in December when the public first arned of the existence of the MPQ-10 ortar Locator, one of the Army's best pt secrets.

How could a carefully concealed emy mortar be located and destroyed after just one or two shells had been fired? And how could such devastating accuracy be repeated over and over again—no matter how often the enemy relocated his mortars? These were important questions in Korea.

■ Actually, the uncanny efficiency of the MPQ-10 Mortar Locator was due to the joint efforts of the Army Signal Corps and Sperry engineers. Working together, they developed a new portable radar system for use at the front lines. How does it work? An automatic radar tracker detects and "locks on" the path of enemy mortar shells. In effect, it traces each shell back through its trajectory and reveals the enemy position. This information is then relayed to an artillery fire direction center which directs a return barrage against the enemy mortar in a matter of minutes.

■ Delivering this Mortar Locator to the troops is another example of Sperry engineering and production solving a problem to meet a critical need. Today, in the air, at sea, as well as on land, Sperry is helping extend our nation's capabilities with instruments, controls and systems for all branches of the military as well as for important segments of industry.

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Nike crewmen manning Washington, D. C.'s defenses respond swiftly to a practice alert

The Growing Problems of the Lusty Outfit that is the

GUARDIAN OF O

COLONEL BERNARD THIELEN

NOW that we antiaircraft artillerymen have joined the Association family, the other brothers might want to know more about us. Most JOURNAL readers already know something about the AAA with an army in the field—which is essentially field artillery. But we have another role, which may have had less than its proper share of attention. American strategic centers are ringed with artillery—guns and guided missiles which, with the men who man them, make up the antiaircraft element of the Air Defense Command. This segment of the arm has inherited the tradition of the Coast Artillery Corps of living and working in fixed defenses. Rarely, however, have antiaircraft defenses inherited the comforts for which the CAC won lasting envy.

Unfortunately, an operationally independent mission leads to remoteness from the rest of the Army. Anything not concerned with field armies falls outside the concern of most of the Army. This is too bad, because if the AAA defense fails to do its job there won't be any field armies. Accordingly, the Army should be interested in our capabilities. It also seems that the Air Force regards us with something less than whole-souled enthusiasm. Thus our requirements are perpetually in danger of falling between two chairs in high military councils. And there is no overwhelming public appre-

ion of our role. To a great extent, of course, this is own fault. Perhaps we have not told our story very ctively—or very loudly.

'he first tenet in the creed of air-defense artillerymen ıis: We believe that neither massive retaliation nor raft-to-aircraft interception can give a complete reply ll-out air attack on the United States. Our reserva- s with respect to those defense concepts could be eloped at length but only highlights need be indi- d.

.s for retaliation, we think it might be mounted too to preserve our country. We do not discredit it. appreciate the deterrent effect of the Strategic Air ımand in being. But in our business we have had ollow nuclear developments rather closely, and be- e we have enormous respect for what the weapons do we find it hard to believe that either the military luction of the United States or its will to fight d survive a successful attack on the scale that must ll reason be anticipated. The deterrent effect of an regnable air defense is something we believe in very ıly. And we think that has been somewhat neglected.

s for air-to-air interception, we feel that it does not cannot provide the nation with total security, regard- of what the public may believe. Our own Air Force ırently does not believe that fighter aircraft can stop

R FRONTIER

fleets of big bombers. Indeed, there are inherent tactical dangers in the concept of sallying forth from a prepared defense to seek out the attacking force. That is the tactic that cut backward to destroy the tank destroyer. All too easily our interceptors can be drawn off by feints and secondary attacks. Time and direction are controlled by the attacker. It is hard to see how aircraft can be brought to bear immediately at any point throughout the vast air space surrounding a defense, how saturation attacks can be met with sufficient force, how continuous operation can be maintained for long alert periods, how vulnerability to defensive weapons of the bomber fleet can be diminished, how heavy losses can be long sustained. Above all and in sum it appears that the battle in the sky, no matter how well fought by defending aircraft, will permit many attackers to survive. Attrition is not good enough now, as it was over Britain in 1940. Total destruction of the attacker must now be contemplated.

IT seems to us in the AAA that the weapon characteristics essential for the final air defense are those inherent in artillery—and by *artillery* we mean all projectiles launched from ground bases under conditions of predetermined or continuous control. Artillery fires are almost instantly maneuverable throughout their range. Fires can be quickly massed or spread as the situation demands. Fires can be maintained so long as ammunition and parts are supplied. Properly sited, artillery is practically invulnerable to high-level bombardment. The only substantial attrition factors derive from wear on matériel and expenditure of projectiles. Finally, the object is theoretically attainable and practically approachable, of delivering artillery fires in such intensity that no airborne structure within range can survive them. Although this object may be somewhat beyond reach of existing weapons and control systems, most readers are aware that means exist which can guarantee destruction



of all aircraft within a tremendous radius of the point of burst.

Artillery bias might be misinterpreted as reflecting conviction that AAA can go it alone in the scheme of air defense. No such foolishness is intended. Air defense must always reach out beyond the range of artillery weapons. The full capabilities of the Air Defense Command are vital to early warning, identification, and generally to action analogous to what cavalry did in land warfare. We hope the Air Force can clobber an approaching formation far from the home defenses and destroy its potential for wholesale annihilation. But the job is not finished there. AAA must be able to drop the birds that get through. The whole job is too big for one arm or one service. If infusion of field artillery blood into the AAA has no other good effect, it should dissolve any idea that artillery exists in a vacuum. *Support* is what artillery lives for and dies without. When the Air Force and the AAA can get along like the infantry-artillery team, many problems will disappear.

Irrational motivation underlies some communication failures between Air Force and AAA elements of the Air Defense Command; attitudes carried over from the pre-atomic past. Airmen have an understandable distaste for flak in any form; AA gunners regard aircraft as natural enemies. Tragic errors in aircraft identification have been made—and friendly gun positions have occasionally been strafed. There have been times when guns were less than spectacularly effective; fighter pilots probably felt with reason that the full weight of air defense was on them. That is what many Americans believe today. Flyers who know what Nike and post-Nike weapons can do to an airplane undoubtedly hold them in respect. Many Air Force people don't seem to grant that any missile is proper possession of men in brown suits. Extremists on our side counter by saying that the piloted aircraft has had its day; that the future air battle will be an intercontinental artillery duel. All this is reminiscent of ancient quarrels about what color hatcords the infantry cannon company should wear.

NOT all mutual difficulties in communication are irrational, however. Our own faulty organization is partly to blame. The antiaircraft defense has a tortured command structure, hard to describe and harder to live with, which has little discernible correspondence with any element of the Air Force and no clearly stated relationship with the rest of the U.S. Army. Even in the trade, few feel entirely at home in the shadowy areas of liaison and "coordination." A defense commander may have a dozen widely deployed battalions and no intermediate links in the chain of command; on the other hand, he may have only two or three. ZI armies exercise command in some matters, Continental Army Command in others, and there is the fact that the Air Force now has a command role—not yet defined to the field—as a result of the recent creation of the joint Continental Air Defense Command. On no level except the top can an antiaircraft commander positively identify his opposite number or direct-support contact in the Air Force. There is no antiaircraft headquarters parallel to an air division, for



A soldier plots information received by radar and t mits it to the operations center of an antiaircraft

example, and an antiaircraft defense cannot estal liaison with more than one interceptor control statio matter how many there may be in the area. The commander broods over his private operations boar stead of sitting beside an Air Force counterpart in a ter where the integrated defense can be controlled or basis of coordinated information. All this is not to that there is no interservice cooperation. There is a g deal; problems are worked out in reasonably good o

THE faulty command structure of the AA defen even more apparent in administration than in operations. The antiaircraft defense commander is c limited in his command functions. He is dependen his smallest administrative support requirements on a cies outside antiaircraft command channels which not report with him to a common superior below Pe gon level. Personnel matters are deeply involved h replacements, reenlistments, enlisted promotions promotion vacancies, public relations, courts-ma overseas levies, and the rest—all of which affect the rale of the command. The lack of means to ha these matters with some autonomy is probably not p iar to the AAA situation, since there is a tend throughout the Army to hamstring the comman personnel jurisdiction, but the derivative problems exacerbated in the AAA by twenty-four-hour-man requirements, community relations of isolated units necessarily limited amenities on site, and other c tions peculiar to our situation which are not fully u stood outside our circle.

Especially important is the maintenance su needed on a continuous basis for radar and other cialized electronic equipment peculiar to antiair units. Radar is vital to warning and control; witho we are completely blind and partially paralyzed. result of this requirement is that a substantial cor technical-services personnel is maintained for the

ırpose of serving the antiaircraft defense. But they ist entirely outside antiaircraft command channels. ıme technicians are factory representatives and not en under military jurisdiction. This might not be too d if all these technical people—mostly civilians— me under the same army commander. Some, however, ɜ based on class II installations. In other cases, ele- ɜnts of the same AAA brigade may be located in dif- ·ent army areas. Because of gaps in proper command ationship, antiaircraft firing units are constantly visited hordes of inspectors who swarm through the sites ;tributing instructions and memorializing their passage monumental reports which eventually land in the bat- y commander's lap. The morale of junior officers on ɜ probably suffers as much from uncoordinated in- ɜctions as from any other single cause.

It would be wrong to assume that antiaircraft artillery ınot and does not get along with the technical serv- s, supply agencies, factory representatives, and army ɜa functionaries on reasonably matey terms. It would unfair and ungracious to competent and hard-work- ; ordnance technicians, post engineers, quartermasters, d the like, to suggest that they are not doing a good). But it is still a hell of a way to run a railroad.

HIS sad story would have no good purpose and little nterest if it were anything but a prelude to proposals improvement. The tremendous importance of the ssion of the AAA, the leading place the arm has and ıst maintain in technical development—above all, se hard realities demand the attention of the Army d the Nation. The best brains we have are needed solve the problem of providing full effectiveness. It l also take men and money—but less money, probably, n a single carrier of the *Forrestal* class. We must fear expansion if expansion will secure the Republic inst annihilation. Charges of empire-building should deter us; such charges are no adequate rebuttal to ɜlf-evident need. The only real question is: Exactly at is needed? A few basics can be indicated rather ɜfly.

)n the matériel side, the problem is well on its way heoretical solution. The new weapons in being and ıdvanced development are adequate tools for the job. ıat we want is enough of them—recognition of the ırity they deserve in the overall military scheme. A, like its parent arm, has unusual technical com- ɜnce at top levels; there is no lack of appreciation in trade for the necessity of keeping up with scientific arch and its military application.

)n the other hand, the problem of bringing order to organization of the AA defense would stagger the ·vard Graduate School of Business Administration. that can be offered here is a soldier's solution—and only in broad terms. Two major axioms are self- ent: first, that the organization must parallel that ıe supported service so as to provide command liai- team training, and mutual understanding at clearly ıed levels; secondly, that internal organization must ide (1) a closely linked chain of command based ;ound management theory and traditional military practice and (2) control by the commander of all the means essential to the accomplishment of his mission.

NO student of management can examine the modern infantry division without admiring its attributes as a cohesive corporation, able to reflect the will of its commander both in independent action and as an element in large operations. It has the anatomy and physiology for cooperation. It is by no means static; it adapts itself to new weapons, new tactics, and new missions. And it is no monster—all arms, all eyes, or all nerves. It is a whole body with members to take care of its own needs. The division has evolved through centuries. With any faults it may have, it is more nearly perfect than what any one man could create or what many men at any one time could devise. It has grown like an oak and cannot be duplicated in structural steel—or magnesium.

Is it unreasonable to believe that divisional organization could profitably be adapted to any large military body having a combat mission? This thought may be



Antiaircraft gunners load a 75mm Skysweeper

foreign to the traditions of fixed artillery, but that should not make it unworthy of consideration. Prince Hohenlohe, in his classic, *Letters on Artillery,* tells how Von Hindersin "changed the whole spirit" of the garrison artillery in 1869 by integrating a command from isolated units "which had received but a step-motherly care from the brigades of artillery." Surely a modern Hindersin is needed to form artillery divisions for the essential task of defending American air space.

THE size of the artillery division is not the important thing; completeness is. The commander must, above all, be an executive in the business sense—a *general* manager. He must have a thorough understanding of what his immensely complex weapons will and will not do, but he need not be a technical specialist. It does not belittle technical specialists to say that they should not command divisions; they have other important work to do. The division commander must have a full-scale staff: a general staff having his own cast of mind—managers and planners—and a special staff including not

only a complement of technical men who can chase electrons through a maze of transistors but also the chief doctor, judge, priest, storckeeper, paymaster, policeman, and the other solid types who look after the many needs of men and machines in the divisions of field armies. It is most important that all essential functions be integrated *in the command and under the commander*. Similarly, service and technical supporting units must be incorporated in the artillery division. The command must be self-sufficient in routine operations. The present system of catch-as-catch-can support is not good enough. It must be realized that a mobile division has all these elements not primarily because it is mobile but because it is a division. And it is a division because it has a job that is not functional but tactical and administrative.

AS for the fighting edge, its exact organization within the division calls for intensive study. One would be inclined to favor a firm regimental formation; groups are too ephemeral, too limited in their fatherhood. The number of regiments in a division might vary (within narrow limits) to accommodate either one large vulnerable area or several smaller ones as the division's zone of responsibility.

Should each regiment include both the primary missile weapon and its own direct support, which is the gun or its successor? That question is moot. A possible answer lies in the traditional organization of divisional field artillery. Within the AAA, the support mission is to cover dead areas and lower altitudes; accordingly it would seem feasible to put separate weapons battalions in the direct-support role. All that lies within the scope of doctrine to be developed on the framework of a self-contained tactical and administrative corporation. The features that need underlining are broad tactical direction and information from the top, lateral communication within the division, and positive external coordination. None of these facilities is properly provided now.

Artillery division level should be the level of a single large defense or two to three smaller defenses not too widely separated. Unfortunately, the area flown by a defensive air division is much larger. Accordingly, the next higher echelon in the artillery command should be co-located with the air division and should have the same geographical limits. Continental armies can have little part in this business so long as their responsibilities are isolated from those of the Air Force. The ideal, perhaps, would be a truly joint command at air division level and above.

A FUNDAMENTAL problem not yet mentioned (and there is no point in beating it to death here, since it is not peculiar to our arm) is: Where do you get the right people for this important job? If you have them, in adequate force, your problems of organization, morale, operational effectiveness, and technical progress have a way of diminishing. But how do you attract them and how do you keep them? Unfortunately, the antiaircraft artillery has not yet solved that one. In fact, our conditions of service, which are not conducive to the uxorious life so highly regarded these days, seem to spook promising youngsters and turn the eyes of exp enced officers and men toward lush grass elsewhere. share the problem of training and keeping good n with the military establishment as a whole, but we that it has particular force in the AAA because we h such complex technical requirements and because alone in the Army are maintaining a wartime condit of readiness. Thus we have a peculiarly vicious cir The need for AAA to maintain a condition of readir demands highly trained people but the strain of demand tends at the same time to drive them out. face the real danger of having to substitute civilian te nicians for soldiers. And the ability to handle the n est electronic equipment is in such demand that inc try is outbidding us in the civilian technician field. M of these men got their training from us as junior offi and enlisted specialists in the upper grades. Why c we hold them in uniform? There are many obvi reasons with dollar signs on them, but the reason t strikes us hardest is the fact that on-site duty comp unfavorably even with other Army assignments. I only technicians, but line officers and NCOs who tend to remain in the service prefer the amenities post life or the perquisites of civilian-component dut around-the-clock conditions of site alert. Accordin our immediate objective in the AAA should be (and realize it is only a partial solution) to provide conditi comparable to normal Stateside garrison duty for people. As the early-warning network develops, becomes feasible. We can concentrate our troops at talion or regimental strength on permanent posts wh the basic amenities, including family quarters, can made available. Only thus can true *esprit de corps* developed.

AAA does have quite a lot to offer as a career field. weapons and their employment challenge the a leryman's skill and imagination. Our unsolved c mand problems have more than passing interest for military man priding himself on his management leadership potential. The professional soldier who w clear-cut responsibility for direct action in meeting main military threat to the existence of the Un States can find it in the Antiaircraft Command. is a job incredibly neglected in many respects. nation ultimately stands or falls on its ability to sur attack by nuclear weapons. What job could a sol have, short of combat, that is more in keeping with ancient traditions of his calling than a part in buil an essential line of defenses?

This is no aerial Maginot Line. The right arm m be cocked for the nuclear counterpunch and the cavalry must be mounted. Field armies that can s and hold ground at the bayonet's point must be re But the good commander looks also to the security his force and of his reserves for sustaining the att The antiaircraft artillery must be the ring of steel aro production and population centers which are the mate force and ultimate reserve.

We have a mission that leaves no alternative to acc plishment. But we must have the means to accomplis

4 This Concerns You

CIVILIAN SCHOOLING OPPORTUNITIES

AREER Management Division has just completed the process of select-g officers to be enrolled in universities June and September 1955. CMD is direct control only over selection of mbat arms officers. Officers of the chnical and administrative services are lected by the chiefs of their respective anches.

Officers are not sent to civilian schools raise their level of education, but to ceive specialized training not provided service schools. In short, the objec-e of the civil schools program is to ovide adequate training in appropri-e fields of study to produce officers pable of coping with the political, onomic, scientific, and social problems lated to the military duties they per-rm. Approximately 100 combat-arms icers and 200 officers of the technical d administrative services are enrolled civilian schools each year.

How does an officer apply for gradu-civil schooling and when will he rn whether or not he will be selected? ficers of the combat arms apply un-r the provisions of SR 350-230-52, ile officers of the technical and ad-nistrative services apply under the visions of SR 350-230-1. A list of various subjects is periodically pub-hed by the chief of each branch. hen an application is received, the cer's military and academic records reviewed and, if he is found to be alified, his name is placed on a com-itive order-of-merit list in the fields his choice. Each year, normally in cember, the order-of-merit lists are eened and officers are selected to en-schools in June, September, and the lowing January, in the fields of study which civil-school-trained personnel needed. A few officers are selected other times.

Once an application has been made civil schooling, it is not necessary the officer to reapply each year. Ap-cations are retained on file and the licant is considered competitively h year for the subjects of his choice. application will remain active until he is selected for schooling, until he becomes ineligible because he has reached the age limit, or until he requests that his application be withdrawn.

GENERALLY speaking, an officer selected for graduate civil schooling must be able to fulfill the following requirements:

- He must apply in writing for the type of training desired and agree to remain on active duty for four years after completion of the course.
- He should be able to complete the course by the time he reaches the age of thirty-seven for work on the Master's degree level or forty-two for training on the Ph.D. level.
- He should have a minimum of five years' commissioned service (but an officer may apply at any time after he is commissioned).
- He should have completed, or have credit for, his branch advanced course.
- He must have an above-average undergraduate academic record. Applicants for engineering and physical science courses must have an excellent undergraduate record in mathematics, including calculus.
- He must have a well-rounded military record. The officer's military record plays a vital part in the selection of officers to attend civilian universities. For example, an officer lacking troop duty, or who is extremely vulnerable for an overseas assignment, will not be selected until he has fulfilled these qualifications. Care is taken to see that civil schooling comes at a time in the officer's career when it will not jeopardize his chances of selection for a service school.
- In exceptional cases, waivers of one or more of the above requirements may be granted.

AFTER completing civil schooling, an officer is assigned to serve a three-year utilization tour in a position which requires special knowledge in the field of his graduate training. He then reverts to the normal career pattern of his branch. While he may not be required to serve another utilization tour, he remains available to fill positions requiring his special training. The utilization tour can be interrupted to permit an officer to attend a service school or for other career-broadening assignments.

A list of the fields of study can be found in SR 350-230-52. There is a definite shortage of applicants for the physical science and engineering courses, especially nuclear physics, guided missiles, aeronautical engineering, and meteorology.

Since 1948 Reserve officers have not been eligible to participate in civilian courses of longer than five months' duration. Provisions are now being made under which "career reservists" may participate. Details of the policy applicable to Reserve officers will be announced in the near future. They should not apply until formal announcement has been made in Army directives.

THE foregoing discussion deals with graduate training for officers possessing a Bachelor's degree. The Army also offers a great deal of assistance to active-duty officers who, on their off-duty time, pursue undergraduate courses leading to the Bachelor's degree. This program comes under the supervision of the Chief of Information and Education. Approximately three-fourths of the cost of tuition is made available through unit TI&E offices. Officers who do not possess a Bachelor's degree are encouraged to participate in this program. If a university or college is not located near the officer's present duty station, he may request on his next assignment preference form (DA Form 483) that he be considered for an assignment to an Army installation near a university. Needless to say, not all requests for such an assignment can be granted; but consideration will be given each request in so far as the needs of the service will permit.

Additional information may be obtained by writing to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C. (Attention: AGG-ES).

Tomorrow

BRIGADIER GENERAL CARL F. FRITZSC

TOMORROW'S infantry is not yet here, but at The Infantry School we keep this thought in mind to accelerate our progress in examining new ideas, in formulating new doctrine, and in testing new weapons. Out of infantry's experiences in World War II and Korea, The Infantry School is turning to the task of mastering the intricacies of atomic warfare.

We know that future conflict cannot be won with archaic tools. The forging of new tools of warfare—weapons, doctrine and techniques—in our service schools in time of peace helped win the Second World War. So today, while looking toward the future, we are not overlooking the significant lessons from the past.

Evolution of Doctrine

The Korean war gave The Infantry School an opportunity to reexamine and reaffirm, and in some cases to modify, certain World War II conclusions. This reexamination cleared the way for further work on the tactics of atomic war.

The Infantry School had early assumed that as atomic weapons become relatively plentiful, they would become "conventional" weapons. It began by setting requirements for atomic weapons for tactical emp ment by the infantry. Some early data and thou suggested that tactical atomic weapons would be expensive for use by Army forces. The Infantry Sch however, contended that in terms of money and l future warfare would be less costly if atomic weap were integrated into our fire-support plans, just like other weapon. Recent scientific developments, mak more efficient use of fissionable material, reinforced soundness of this contention. Consequently the infa now can anticipate atomic battalion-support weap

Thus, many problems now taught at The Infa School require solutions based on atomic as well as atomic conditions. Students must consider the effec mass-destruction weapons on tactics when employed their own forces as well as those of an aggressor.

Our doctrine was necessarily predicated upon the emy's capability to use atomic weapons and so we ha seek and adopt measures that would give us an adequ



AJ. GEN. JOSEPH H. HARPER BRIG. GEN. CARL F. FRITZSCHE
Commandant and Assistant Commandant, The Infantry School

IFANTRY Today

fense if he should use atomic weapons. It was also cessary to develop an offensive using atomic weapons. l these requirements are leading us to new techniques, w training methods, and to establishing new require- nts for equipment. The aim is to enable infantry to ht an atomic or nonatomic war effectively.

Changes in Doctrine

The resulting changes in tactical concepts fall general- into three categories: dispersion, mobility, and pro- tion.

Dispersion decreases troop density and results in a r atomic target being presented to the enemy. Basic ts, probably a reinforced battalion, will be widely arated until called upon for a task that will require re than one of them. For maximum protection, con- tration must be rapid and as near the enemy as sible.

All the above results obviously in greater stress on ependent and semi-independent operations by single alions. Consequently, increased emphasis is being ed on communications. It follows as an imperative that infantrymen must know their communications equipment and how to make it work.

We must focus our attention on improving existing security means for surveillance of the increased intervals between units. The emphasis placed on massing in terms of time rather than space calls for greater mobility. All these factors as well as the very nature of dispersion call for skilled officers capable of taking independent action.

Mobility. The Army is earnestly engaged in developing and improving its air mobility through the use of assault transports, helicopters, and parachutists. To keep pace, The Infantry School's Airborne Department now trains students in all phases of basic parachute and jumpmaster techniques as well as air transport and aerial delivery. Officers and senior noncommissioned

officers are now being taught how to use helicopters, assault transports, and the more conventional transport aircraft in air movements.

In recent months the training of pathfinders has been brought back into the curriculum. This course is aimed primarily at training pathfinders in operations involving the use of Army aviation with ground units. Students learn the techniques required to operate aircraft navigation and personnel-assembly aids. These are designed to aid in the accurate delivery of troops, equipment, and supplies by helicopter (or fixed-wing aircraft) by day or night. The pathfinder course has been responsible for the development of new night-landing aids and techniques and also determines requirements for navigational aids and communications equipment.

The effort to attain air mobility has not been at the expense of ground mobility. The requirement for greater ground mobility has continually been stressed by The Infantry School, which believes that a most important requirement is the infantry's need for armored personnel carriers which may not be organic to a unit but available on call. The infantry also needs a utility-type tracked vehicle to replace our present fleet of vehicles.

Air and ground vehicles will be desirable and lucrative enemy targets. Therefore the infantryman must assume that the infantryman on foot may again be the fastest moving thing on the battlefield. This has led The Infantry School to continue its efforts to lighten the load of the individual soldier, while seeking to increase his sustained fire power.

Protection. To reduce the vulnerability of infantry units to atomic attack, we are placing increased emphasis on movement and maneuver at night. We teach that daylight and night operations are not separate and distinct types of operations but rather a single operation that requires continuous planning on the part of commanders and staff so that there is no halt at dawn or dusk.

Greater stress is being placed on digging in and camouflage. Instruction now includes the protective measures to be taken by the soldier against the effects of atomic explosions. The psychological conditioning that enables an individual soldier to cope with the awesome nature of atomic weapons is also stressed.

Mobile defense. The greatest change in our tactical instruction is the revamping of the infantry's doctrine of defense. Atomic weapons have outmoded our traditional concept of position defense: holding the enemy forward of a given line. Certainly at the beginning of a war, and for some time thereafter, we will not have sufficient troops to permit us to stretch units along one continuous line, even if this was tactically desirable.

The result is mobile defense—a new offensive-defense employed by separate units. Battalion-size units of combined arms are deployed in positions of depth as strongpoints or grouped in islands of resistance. These positions are situated to force the enemy into known killing zones where he will become a conventional and thus a lucrative atomic target, or become more vulnerable to counterattack by our uncommitteed battalions.



This type of defense renders the "close" or "desirable ntage" position defense virtually obsolete. In its place have an open or "sponge-like" defense in which units erate independently beyond mutual fire-supporting tance and which are organic to the infantry. How- r, these units must be mobile enough to concentrate o a cohesive force should the enemy bring sufficient ce against it.

The concept of mobile defense has led to increased phasis on the importance of surveillance between units l the use of dummy positions and other deceptive asures. It has indicated a requirement for more ef- ent barrier systems if we are to compel the enemy to ncentrate. It shows the need for better use of trans- tation to enable troops to concentrate rapidly for ultaneous attack. This emphasis on mobility has also nted out our need to keep troops in top physical ndition.

The Infantry School has found that tactics geared to mic warfare require us to obtain accurate intelligence ch faster than in the past. This is true since atomic gets will be more difficult to locate and more "fleeting" nature. It has also found a greater need for deceptive asures, in addition to camouflage, in which the in- tryman must be versed.

Staff functioning. These changes in doctrine will uire greater effort by staffs at all levels. Greater dis- sion of units will make planning, coordination, and ervision of logistical support operations, administra- functions and security measures far more difficult. Massing in terms of time, rather than space, will require the utmost accuracy in troop movements plans. Frequently staffs will have to operate in two or more echelons. Solutions to these and many other problems in the area of staff functioning occupy a considerable portion of the advanced student's time.

Better Coordination and Assault Techniques

We have not overlooked the major lessons learned during World War II and in Korea, namely: The need for continuous fire-support coordination and for improving the conduct of the assault.

Fire-support coordination. During World War II, and initially in Korea, we failed to shift overwhelming concentrations of fire power as well as we were able to. To correct this, The Infantry School requires a solution for fire-support coordination and planning in problems of the battalion and regiment.

Conduct of the assault. The infantry is always concerned with the last 100-150 yards of an attack. Analyses show that improperly conducted assaults account for the greatest percentage of battle failures. A comprehensive study consisting of a review of historical examples, seminars, and numerous tests indicates three means of improving our assault technique. These are the following:

Leaning into our fires. This is directly related to fire-support coordination. When they become aware of the precision and reliability of their support weapons, infantrymen will "lean into" these fires in order to take



advantage of their devastating effect upon enemy ground troops. The Infantry School now teaches students to assault the enemy before he has an opportunity to recover from the shock effect of the fire delivered on him.

Delivery of assault fire. The School now emphasizes an intensified volume of accurate fire by flat-trajectory weapons directed against positions occupied (or suspected of being occupied) by the enemy as the fires of the indirect-support weapons are shifted. A new underarm position for firing the rifle in the assault has been developed and is currently taught at The Infantry School.

Use of tanks in the assault. The value of tanks in the assault should best be termed a *rediscovery*. Tests conclusively reveal that infantry should not assault alone unless it is impossible for tanks to accompany them. This idea, battle-tested in such unfavorable terrain as Korea, led to numerous other "discoveries" at The Infantry School. It reaffirms the need for tanks in fairly sizeable quantities in order to form infantry-tank teams. Infantry needs the mobility, fire power, and shock action of armor just as tankers need infantrymen for protection. This need led the School to teach that tanks, in addition to being massed for shock action, should habitually be attached to attacking rifle companies rather than be held in reserve. This is a premise no longer disputed within the infantry.

If infantry is to use tanks whenever possible for offensive maneuvers, it follows that infantrymen must know how to employ their new and powerful battalion antitank weapons.

Better Marksman

Changes in doctrine and weapons may require al tions to the present organization of the infantry b ion. Tests are being conducted and will determine w if any, streamlining may be necessary. Current thou however, indicates a trend toward a battalion i sufficient organic artillery, engineer, and tank sup to fight independently. This team should be capab entering combat on foot without an excessive "tai vehicles or by personnel carriers, helicopters, or as aircraft. These considerations have dictated tha equipment be lightened to make it air-transportable

Korea gave us tangible evidence that the ability to a rifle accurately was rapidly becoming a lost art. revive the skill, The Infantry School has materiall creased its marksmanship standards and has found i effective means of teaching the subject. Any stu who fails to qualify receives additional instruction, fires on weekends until he qualifies. To increase petition and interest, marksmanship badges are awar These are difficult to win and are with considerable p

THIS is The Infantry School's blueprint for suc Much has been done, more will be done to resolve questions left unanswered and the problems that arrive with the advent of new weapons. We will tinue to initiate action that will lead to the developm of doctrine, tactics, and techniques necessary to prep for any eventuality—any type of war. We are confi that graduates of The Infantry School leave fully q fied to lead infantry battle teams in combat.

WHAT ABOUT ZHUKOV ?

IEUTENANT BENSON LEE GRAYSON

E re-emergence from semi-obscurity of Marshal orgi Konstantinovich Zhukov is one of the most ilizing facets in the recent shift of power in Moscow. erally conceded to be the most capable military com- der the Communists have produced, the sixty-year- soldier has been appointed Minister of Defense, g rise to speculation in the West that he is the gest man in the present Soviet government. This tremely speculative, but certainly the office he now ; and his undeniable skill as a military commander him as a man who can influence important deci- in the Kremlin. For that reason his career and cter must be taken into account by the West.

the end of World War II Zhukov was second only alin as a military hero and architect of victory in ast. As Supreme Commander of the Soviet occupa- zone in Germany, Zhukov was in frequent contact the military leaders of the West and his photograph mpany with General Eisenhower and Field Mar- Montgomery and other Western military leaders red in the world's press. A few months later he ed out of sight and until his re-emergence in recent hs it was popularly supposed in the West that Stalin banished him from Moscow and high command. reasons were given. One was that Stalin was jealous e adulation heaped on Zhukov (there is room for one super-hero in a dictatorship). The other was Zhukov was becoming contaminated by his con- with Western leaders.

atever the reasons for his years of disappearance, ov remained a loyal soldier and faithful Communist functionary. He continued to serve Stalin in the role in which he had won his wartime reputation and for which he was best suited: as a military trouble-shooter. Evidence of Zhukov's ability in these lines can best be developed by tracing his career.

GEORGI ZHUKOV was born in 1895 in the village of Sterkovka, about a hundred miles southwest of Moscow. His family was of Great Russian origin, a distinct advantage, today, in the face of Soviet official discrimination against minority groups. His parents are officially described as "poor peasants," but that is the background the Soviet Government ascribes to most of its high-level officials. As a young man, Zhukov moved to Moscow, where he began working as a furrier.

In 1915 Zhukov was drafted into the Tsarist army, and served with a cavalry unit in combat. He displayed extreme heroism, and was twice awarded the Cross of Saint George. Following the Revolution, Zhukov joined the Red Army, where he served as an officer in Budyenny's famed cavalry corps. He joined the Communist Party in 1919, when the fate of the Soviet Government was still in doubt. This facilitated his rapid promotion; during the Civil War, the Red Army high command desperately needed skilled officers who could be trusted.

At the close of the Civil War, Zhukov decided to remain in the Red Army, although many of his associates exchanged their military posts for high positions in the government bureaucracy. In 1932, Zhukov studied at Frunze Academy, the highest Soviet staff college, where he specialized in studies of armored and parachute warfare. He later joined the faculty of Frunze Academy.

In 1936 Stalin chose Zhukov to be the Soviet senior military observer in the Spanish Civil War. Zhukov advised the Loyalists on the employment of their Soviet-supplied tanks, and he was able to observe the German weapons and tactics used by the Spanish Nationalists.

THE purge of Marshal Tukhachevsky and most of the Red Army high command in 1937 left Zhukov as one of the few surviving senior officers. The following year he was given command of the Soviet Red Banner Army, an élite force stationed in the Far East to prevent a Japanese attack. The border clashes between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1938-39 enabled Zhukov to show his ability. When the Japanese Sixth Army launched an attack upon the Soviet satellite state of Outer Mongolia, Zhukov's brilliant strategy resulted in the complete destruction of the invading force in a series of engagements along the Khalka River.

Zhukov was one of the few Soviet military leaders who opposed the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939, warning that Germany still intended to attack the Soviet Union. In November 1940, negotiations between Hitler and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov over the partition of Europe collapsed, and Hitler ordered preparations for the invasion of Russia to begin. Reports of the German mobilization reached Moscow, and Stalin conferred with his military advisers to decide whether Hitler was bluffing. Zhukov once more argued that a German invasion was imminent, and this time he was believed. On 12 February 1941, Zhukov was appointed Army Chief of Staff and Vice Commissar of Defense.

When Hitler began the invasion of Russia in June 1941, the reorganization of the Soviet Army had not yet been completed. Stupidity and confusion among Soviet officials and hatred of the Russian people for the Communist dictatorship contributed to early German successes. By October, German troops were near Moscow. As the Germans approached, rioting and looting spread through the city. The Soviet Government evacuated Moscow and a state of siege was declared. In this desperate hour, Zhukov was appointed commander of the Russian Central Armies.

The approach of winter and the arrival of fresh troops from Siberia enabled Zhukov to save Moscow. Zhukov was hailed throughout the Soviet Union as the defender of Moscow. In 1942, Zhukov represented Stalin at the fighting near Leningrad, and was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union for his performance there. In January 1943, he was sent to take overall supervision of the armies in the southwest, and he directed the operations which led to the encirclement and surrender of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, one of the most sensational Soviet victories of the war.

Throughout World War II, Zhukov was used as a trouble-shooter by the Soviet high command, employed wherever decisive results were desired. When Marshal Vatutin's illness deprived the First Ukrainian Front (Army Group) of its commander at the start of the Soviet 1944 spring offensive, Zhukov took over this command, which he retained for the duration of the w

AFTER leading the first Soviet troops to enter Ber Marshal Zhukov was appointed Supreme Comm er of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany in J 1945. In this position, he had frequent contact w Allied officials, and the most reliable descriptions Zhukov's personality come from this period. Presid Eisenhower, then commander of Allied forces in Eur described Zhukov as "a firm believer in the Commu concept," his support of Communism coming from ner conviction and not from any outward compulsio

This period of Zhukov's career was followed by period of mystery and "disappearance." At the end the war, Zhukov was elected to the Presidium of Supreme Soviet, a body in some respects similar to U.S. Senate, although with little actual power. In Ma 1946, rumors circulated in Berlin that Zhukov wo soon relinquish his post in Germany, owing to the diffi ty of attending the sessions of the Presidium, which held in Moscow. On 10 April 1946, Zhukov left Be and became commander of all Soviet ground force

Zhukov was seen on 1 May, reviewing the ann May Day parade, in the company of Stalin. In Ju *Pravda* announced that he had been transferred to command of the Odessa Military District. Then Zhu dropped from sight and from mention in the Sov press. Then followed the speculation in the West Zhukov had been demoted, both because of his cont with the West, and because Stalin distrusted his po larity with the Russian people. It is possible that t factors did enter into Zhukov's descent into obscu But there are certain clues which suggest that Zhu far from being in disgrace, had been returned to wartime role of trouble-shooter for the Soviet high c mand. In 1946, some regions of the Ukraine had r in revolt against the reimposition of prewar Commu controls. It is possible that the Soviet Government cided to send its best military leader to subdue a tentially dangerous rebellion, with no thought of rem ing him from a position of authority.

IN September 1946, there were reports that Zhukov inspecting the satellite armies of Rumania, Bulg and Yugoslavia, with the view toward improving efficiency and eliminating any elements opposing So control. For two years, nothing further was hear him until, in 1948, the Soviet press revealed that kov was no longer in charge of the Odessa Military trict. There followed frequent rumors, however, he was advising the Chinese Communists in their quest of China. This is not illogical. Zhukov had won fame in the Far East, and in 1936 he had ga experience in advising foreign armies while helping Spanish Loyalists.

Zhukov was seen publicly in June 1950, when was identified as one of the deputies attending a mee of the Supreme Soviet. This indicates that Zhukov standing and position during the period of supp disgrace. The start of the Korean War brought

N. S. KHRUSHCHEV
Party Secretary

MARSHAL BULGANIN
Prime Minister

›orts that he was directing Communist operations in : Far East. The Chinese Communist winter offensive 1950 was followed by information, from fairly reliable ›rces, that Marshal Zhukov was advising the Com- nist forces from a secret headquarters in Mukden. Jnrest in the Soviet satellite armies caused Zhukov ·eturn from the Far East. In July 1951, he and Molo- went to Warsaw to address the seventh anniversary ›bration of the establishment of the Polish Communist ›ernment. In his speech, Zhukov praised the effi- ›cy of the new Communist-controlled Polish Army. ›kov's real mission in Poland became apparent nine s later, when the Polish Government announced that e high Polish Army officers had been arrested and e being charged with spying for the United States. ›fter this incident, Zhukov was not mentioned in the iet press for a long period of time. It was not until announcement of Stalin's death, and the installation Malenkov as Soviet Premier, that Zhukov's where- ›ts became known. On 6 March 1953, Marshal ›kov was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense. 'hroughout 1954, Zhukov apparently gained in stat- as articles by him began to appear in the Soviet s. When Marshal Bulganin was named to replace ousted Malenkov as Soviet Premier on 8 February 5, it was Zhukov who succeeded Bulganin as Minis- ›f Defense. In this position he is the supreme military ›rity in the Soviet Union, supervising the Army, y, and Air Force.

s vital to the interests of the United States to proper- evaluate the significance of Zhukov's appointment. re has been some speculation that as Defense Minis- Zhukov is now the most powerful individual in the et Government. This appears unlikely. Over seven- ven per cent of all Soviet uniformed men are mem- of the Communist Party, or of its youth organiza- and both the Communist Party and the MVD t police have chains of command in the armed s to prevent the growth of independent military r.

ukov, moreover, does not command the absolute y of the Soviet officer corps. The Soviet generals ivided in their allegiance, some, for example, hav- een executed for supporting the purged police chief, . For these reasons, it is doubtful whether Zhu- s as powerful as is sometimes claimed. I would suggest that Marshal Zhukov now occupies a position roughly comparable to the combined positions of our Defense Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Certainly an important position, but at the same time controlled by civilian authorities.

It has been suggested by some hopeful persons that Marshal Zhukov's rise to power will result in a more cordial Soviet attitude toward the United States. This opinion stems from Zhukov's friendly relations with President Eisenhower in 1945, and from an article Zhukov published in *Pravda* in May 1954. In this article, which appeared during the celebration marking the ninth anniversary of the victory over Germany, Zhukov praised "the fighting valor of the troops of the United States and England" for their actions in World War II, as well as complimenting the Allied commanders, General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery.

When placed in context, however, these comments seem dwarfed by the rest of the article, which follows the usual Soviet line. Zhukov attacks "the American bankers [who] not for the first time, are profiting on war, on foreign blood, on the unhappiness of others." The article states that "the people of Europe and Asia do not want to be cannon fodder for the United States and will never accept such anti-popular ideas as are ceaselessly propagandized by Dulles, Adenauer and others." Significantly, Zhukov concludes by warning that the Soviet Union is "supplied with first-class military techniques and new weapons." Only the most complete optimist could find in Zhukov's article a suggestion of future Soviet cooperation with the United States.

A KNOWLEDGE of Zhukov's career and personality gives some indication of the policies he will follow as Soviet Minister of Defense. As a specialist on armored warfare, he will work for the rapid mechanization of the Soviet Army. In order to increase combat efficiency, he will urge the elimination of the triple chain of command which gives so much authority to the political officers and the MVD secret police. Zhukov's experience with the Soviet satellite armies may lead him to integrate them with Soviet forces to insure loyalty and efficiency. While Marshal Zhukov has often expressed his high regard for the fighting qualities of the U.S. armed forces, it now appears that he is devoting his energies to building up the Soviet armed forces to the point where they can successfully challenge those of the United States. It is important to note that one of the first acts of the new Soviet Government was to increase the budget for the armed forces by ten per cent.

Marshal Zhukov is both a Russian patriot and a loyal Communist. It is exceedingly unlikely that he will permit his once-stated friendship for President Eisenhower to impede current Soviet activities, any more than President Eisenhower determines U.S. policy in the light of his personal regard for Marshal Zhukov. A survey of Marshal Zhukov's career and personality indicates only one conclusion. The appointment of this man of proven ability to the leadership of the Soviet armed forces makes him one of America's most dangerous opponents.

Pull the attacker off balance, then . . .

Divide and Conquer

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND W. MILLICAN

IF war comes, the Army's first job will be defense. But unfortunately, we have had little experience in conducting prolonged defensive operations. In addition, we will be defending against an enemy who will outnumber us. We are likely to remain on the strategic defensive for a long period of time, and so we must become adept at tactics suitable for this situation.

The strategic defense uses both the tactical defense and offense. Covering forces and outposts delay and exhaust the enemy, a main line of resistance breaks his attack, and counterattacks destroy any elements that penetrate our MLR. We resort to the tactical defensive only as a necessary evil until we can attack from strength, hard and purposefully. Our defensive aim is to place the attacker in such an unfavorable position that the advantage passes to us. Then we hit him.

Our problem is essentially that of a lightweight boxer who is paired against a heavyweight. The lightweight must have superior skill, particularly in footwork. He must avoid the heavyweight's haymakers, exhaust him, punish him when he is exposed, and finally, he must bore in and land a series of decisive blows. Or we have a problem like that of a man beset by three cannibals on a desert island. If he fights all of them at once, he will become soup very quickly. If he runs away, t will eventually capture him and he will become so The solution is to run until the cannibals becc separated, then turn and fight them one at a time.

As the enemy attacks, friendly forces withdraw to MLR



A PLAN becomes visible. We will give ground, haust and harass the enemy, then attack and dest elements of his force, and so reduce his margin superiority. There is nothing original about this. M of the successful defenses of history embodied the f damentals of retreat and attack. Lee did it in Virgi It was done in the First Battle of the Marne, the Ba of Tannenberg, and Rommel's defense of Cyrenaic the summer and winter of 1941.

The MLR will absorb the impetus of the enemy tack and serve as a springboard for our counteroffens We must not engage the enemy's full force in a s fest on the MLR.

Every mile the enemy moves toward us weakens h The rate at which he loses strength depends on terrain he crosses, the mobility of his force, his logist system, his rate of advance, and the attrition effe by our air power and covering forces. The rate at wh he weakens can be estimated, and the point at wh the balance will swing in our favor can be predic Our MLR should be located at this depth, on the ground in the area.

It must be anticipated that the commander will under pressure to place his MLR where it will pro areas of political or economic importance. But if pressure is allowed to supersede overriding military siderations, our force will be destroyed and the area be lost anyhow. The only absolutely vital areas are th that are vital to the defense of our air bases and p

The covering force is used to gain time. It del exhausts, and punishes the enemy, and it obtains telligence. It must be mobile, strong in armor and l range fire power, and it must have excellent commun tions. Because of the increased mobility of armies, enemy's manpower superiority, and our need for t the covering force may have to operate through a of 100 to 300 miles.

LET'S see how this defense will actually work. A the enemy's advance has been under way for 2 72 hours, we should be able to determine the loca composition, and direction of advance of each of primary and secondary efforts. The defending

nder must then select one enemy column as the first ıdidate for destruction. The remainder of the withıwal is conducted with the aim of drawing this column o an exposed position.

The covering force, its artillery, partisan groups and power will delay the enemy column and channel it o favorable routes of advance. Its strength, position, l rate of advance can be partially controlled by obcles, interdiction, and opposition. As the column to destroyed nears our proposed killing ground, full ort will be made to impede the advance of those other umns most likely to support or rescue our intended tim.

All possible units must be used. The MLR will be risoned only in the area where we expect it to be ıcked. Elsewhere, the covering force must continue lelay the enemy's superior forces.

The bulk of our divisions will have been disposed in

One enemy column is picked for destruction

e general areas where principal routes of advance the MLR. The selection of the enemy force for dection will determine the general location of the sive battle. The divisions will move at night, both secrecy and for protection against air attack. The osition of forces in the critical area will conform to plans for the block-attack maneuver.

Ve need not be too worried that the enemy will be e cautious and refuse to enter the trap. It is more ı likely that he will be eager to destroy our forces in ırry, before our air power can wound him mortally.

the enemy advances, his capabilities will become learer. If it appears that the column will bog down t of the MLR, the defending commander must be ared to shift his mass forward and attack. On the r hand, if the enemy seems to have sufficient strength each the MLR once he reaches it, the commander : either move his MLR to the rear or use special ons to cut the enemy down to beatable size. Unless areas are in immediate jeopardy, we should never decisive battle under conditions favoring the enemy.

Conventional and atomic weapons blast the enemy column

When the enemy attacks our MLR, he will be repulsed. Our attack must follow rapidly, for the enemy will grow stronger with every hour that passes, and we can't afford to delay our attack to make minute refinements.

The attack must be decisive. We must strike with every ounce of force at our disposal. At least temporary local air superiority is required to protect the concentration of forces before the attack is launched. Special weapons should be used to speed up the attack and so reduce the period during which our forces remain concentrated, and to liquidate enemy pockets. With local air superiority, we can launch an airborne attack on the rear of the enemy column. The mere appearance of airborne troops, coupled with the sudden reversal of conditions, will tend to panic the enemy.

Our attack, coming like a bolt from the blue, will create terrible confusion in the enemy command. Some columns will halt, paralyzed with uncertainty, while others will press frantically to the aid of the column under attack. When one enemy force has been destroyed, it may well be possible to turn and pounce on a second exposed column. With surprise, skill, and luck we can start a chain reaction of victory.

The next enemy column is now exposed to flank attack

Homburgs

The word from the Princeton Class of 1944 is that 3 per cent have ulcers, 25 per cent make more than $10,000 a year, the 71 per cent that are married average 1.8 children; 1 is assistant coach of the Navy football team, and 1 admits that he keeps a mistress.

CAPTAIN RICHARD P. TAFFE

THE United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and Princeton University at Princeton, New Jersey, are only an afternoon's automobile drive apart, but the differences in their programs and in their methods of preparing students for later life are greater than mere mileage would suggest. Two surveys were recently conducted which should be of more than passing interest to West Pointers who occasionally wonder what their lives would have been like had they gone to a liberal arts college instead of to the Academy on the Hudson, and to graduates of Old Nassau who have at times pondered the glories and pitfalls of a military career.

On the occasion of their tenth anniversaries, the class of 1944 of each of these eminent institutions published alumni books intended to revive old memories and to bring the members up to date on the doings of their sometime fellows.

The books make fascinating reading, especially when the facts they report are compared. Not all the facts, to be sure, are of earth-shaking importance, but it is a rare man who will not get a warm glow of satisfaction from finding that seven per cent of the West Pointers own cats and that one of the Princeton men keeps a mistress. And who cannot feel just a bit sorry for the 58 per cent of the West Pointers who have gained weight (an average of 15.5 pounds) or the three per cent of the Princetonians who have ulcers?

BENEATH the restrained language of the alumni books are many untold stories of happiness and woe, of ten turbulent years of American history. It is also possible to draw some interesting comparisons. For example, the West Point men, though a vast majority of them still roam around the world on active duty, are a considerably more domestic bunch than their civilian counterparts. Ninety-five per cent of them are married, as opposed to only 70.8 per cent of the Princetonians. The married military men have an average of 2.1 children, while the Princeton average is only 1.8. However, only 23 p cent of the West Pointers own hom against 50 per cent for the Princet men. But this must be attributed to t nomadic character of Army life.

WHERE money is concerned, the s tistics hand out few surprises. Prin ton graduates are wealthier than W Pointers. Approximately 75 per cent the Princeton class of '44 were maki over $6,000, and over 25 per cent m than $10,000—or so they reported wh the statistics were being assembled. C man reported earnings of $56,000 a another $62,000.

Sixty-three per cent of the W Pointers were drawing about $7,00 year as majors. Two Air Force li tenant colonels were nearing $10,0 About 15 per cent of the class were p ing down approximately $6,400. Th is no record of the incomes of the per cent who are in civilian life.

But money is the only category which the Military Academy gradu clearly come out second best. Civil critics who think military life is nar in scope and opportunities can get eye-opener from the two surveys. just ain't so. The variety of purs of the West Pointers certainly matc that of the Princetonians.

Their careers began in much same way. The West Point class 1944 graduated on a symbolic dat June 1944—and immediately went to war. So did 89 per cent of the Pri ton men. Only a year of war remai but 73.5 per cent of the West Poin got overseas before it was over. Twe one per cent of the West Pointers 10 per cent of the Princeton men ticipated in the Korean war.

The young men picked up their s of medals during these wars. The V Pointers have a total of 495 award medals and decorations, including: 1, Silver Star 27, DFC 13, Bronze 164, Air Medal 82, Purple Heart Combat Infantryman Badge 59, C mendation Ribbon 59, Soldier's M 1, and foreign decorations 9. The Pri ton survey doesn't indicate the nun

and Helmets

decorations received, but acknowl-
ges an impressive number of awards
the Silver Star and Purple Heart.
The medals were paid for. The Prince-
n class lost 22 men in World War II
d the West Point class lost 9 men.
he Military Academy class lost five
en in Korea. Eighteen of them have
ed in aircraft accidents and seven
om other causes.

HILE the Princeton report doesn't
tell how many of the class have
med advanced degrees, it does point
th pride to the fact that it has pro-
iced several authors of books ranging
om the physiology of behavior and a
itical study of Wallace Stevens, the
et, to a do-it-yourself book that has
ld half a million copies.
The Military Academy class doesn't
port on the literary activities of its
embers, but some of them have con-
buted to THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES
URNAL. Twelve of the class have been
the Command and General Staff Col-
ge at Leavenworth and 13 to the Guid-
Missiles course at Fort Bliss. Thirty-
ght per cent have earned either an
S or MA degree at some civilian uni-
rsity or college and three have a Ph.D.
Since 1945 the West Pointers have
ndled a wide range of assignments.
iginally, 171 of them were assigned
the Air Corps and 303 to the Army.
these, 137 were on duty with the
r Force and 237 with the Army when
e report was compiled.
Many of the West Pointers are com-
t leaders, staff officers, and pilots.
nong the other jobs that have been
ld by the class of 1944 are: military
server for the United Nations on the
ise-fire line between India and Pakis-
n; White House aide; Atomic Energy
ommission military group; engineer ad-
er to Turkey; Big Inch Pipeline in-
ector for the Corps of Engineers; In-
-American Geodetic Survey officer in
uador; escort officer for VIPs touring
e U.S.; attaché to the Embassy in
n; POW of the Chinese Communist
rces; liaison duty with General Elec-
Company; and Russian language
student at the Army Language School.

Among the West Pointers who have left the service are a structural engineer with the Department of the Interior; a vice president of a shoe company; a management consultant engineer; a securities investment salesman; several Foreign Service men with the State Department; a doctor in Australia; a publisher; a reporter; a rancher; a logger; a few attorneys; and others in paper, pants, and petroleum.

The Princetonians too earn their bread in many different ways. The largest categories, in the order given, are: doctors, lawyers, engineers, salesmen, teachers, manufacturers, bankers, insurance brokers, stock brokers, advertising men, oil men, chemists, ministers, geologists, editors, writers, and publishers.

The West Point class has one distinction unmatched by the Princetonians: one of its members was far-sighted enough to select parents whose present address is the White House.

Despite the disparity in incomes of the two groups, their standards of living do not differ greatly. Ninety-two per cent of both groups own cars, while 46 per cent of the West Pointers and 53 per cent of the Princetonians have TV sets. Sixty-four per cent of the Princeton men say that it is a struggle to live within their incomes, while it would be surprising indeed if the 95 per cent of the West Point class that is married do not agree.

THE surveys show that the military men have lost more hair, gained less weight, and stayed in better health than the civilians. Beyond that, it is difficult to make any generalizations. Both groups, engaged in diverse pursuits, have already contributed much to American life. Men of these classes are now entering a period when their leadership will be significant. West Pointers will agree with the Princetonian who, when asked for a credo for his class, suggested: "Be strong, be determined, be calm, be willing to compromise, be receptive to new ideas, be generous, be stubborn, and, above all, be patient."

The word from the USMA Class of 1944 is that 58 per cent have gained weight, most of them earn about $7,000 annually, the 95 per cent that are married average 2.1 children, 13 per cent are civilians, and not a single one admits to keeping a mistress.

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Commanding General, CONARC

MAJ. GEN. R. M. MONTAGUE
Deputy Commanding General

MAJ. GEN. W. M. MILEY
Chief of Staff



COL. J. F. GRECO
Deputy Chief of Staff



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G3

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

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THE MONTH'S READING

Friendship Without Illusions

THEODORE H. WHITE
Collier's
4 February 1955

We Americans have gone through enormous cycles of naïve, almost adolescent, enthusiasm for foreign potentates and princes only to be betrayed and let down later. None of us should or can forget how our wartime honeymoon with Stalin was succeeded by the betrayal we invited by our naïveté.

Our most enduring and fruitful alliances have been with the French and the British, two powers whom we have constantly criticized, called to account, subjected to every form of debate and discussion—yet with whom we have always ended by making common cause.

We have for the past nine years enjoyed a honeymoon with the German people and with Adenauer even more complete than our honeymoon with the Russians and Chinese during the war and, in the individual case of Adenauer, with much better cause.

The last 20 years have proved such honeymoons dangerous. Our friendship with Germany will be solid only if it rests on the same base that sustains our friendship with France and Britain. That friendship rests on no illusion that sovereign nations make alliances and commit their destinies because of honeyed words alone. It rests rather on the belief that in even the strongest alliances each partner must examine each common goal first in the light of its own national self-interest. We are the allies of the Germans today because we need them. Yet they need us more, and it would be best for both peoples to keep this hard, cold fact always in mind.

The Soldier in Politics

THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD
Extension of Remarks in the Senate
21 February 1955

. . . What is the danger to our security inherent in the exposure of military leaders—whether sought or unsought—to the political conflicts of the day? It is this: Military leaders who are so exposed will find themselves in agreement with one side of a political issue and at odds with the other. They will be applauded by political leaders whose position they uphold and looked upon with suspicion by their opponents. When military officers become subjects of partisan politics they are no longer viewed as unbiased, objective career servants, nor will their military judgments be accepted as those of politically disinterested professional experts. From that, it is only one step to the loss of confidence in the military judgment of our military leaders

This central problem was clearly illustrated prior t last presidential election when a Senator publicly calle a change in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staf had, he said, lost confidence in their judgment. The administration, moreover, subsequently did appoint Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a new look at the mi program. Surely we cannot have Republican general admirals for one administration and Democratic ger and admirals for the next without danger to the nat security.

Now, possibly as never before, we cannot afford to politics with our security. No political party, and no fa of a party, stands in the long run to benefit from mi insecurity in this country. Certainly, the armed servic a whole do not.

In mentioning this tendency of some military offic slip into or to be drawn into the political orbit of our s of government, I do not wish to imply that the mi experts should have no contact with Congress. Cer Congress has a right to know what our military e think about military matters under consideration in gress. The danger lies, not in this, but in military o being employed as experts outside the area of their s competence in support of or in opposition to policy m concerning which political and not military decision be made.

There is no easy solution to this problem. Part answer lies in the restraint which civilian leaders must cise to avoid placing military officials on the spot in po issues. Part of the answer must also lie in the fortitude which military leaders resist the temptation to project selves into nonmilitary questions. . . .

Idealism is Good Sense

FRANK TANNENBAUM
The American Tradition in Foreign
University of Oklahoma Press, 1

There is a peculiar consistency in this notion of ou the little nation has the same rights as the big one. quarrel with Russia is founded on it. The Truman d is a modern version of the basic propositions of Pre Monroe; and our defense of Korea is explainable conviction that the only kind of world the American can comfortably live in is one in which Korea has n right to attack and dismember Russia than Russia attack and dismember Korea or Finland. . . . And it conviction that underlies President Eisenhower's stat that "We will never acquiesce in the enslavement people in order to purchase fancied gains for ours

To some, these American notions seem impractical and lish. Influential scholars and counselors would have us ndon them. They suggest that we cease being childish l idealistic and recognize that the "national interest" and tional security" require us to become disciples of Machilli, take our lessons from Richelieu, Bismarck, or menceau. The fact that Germany and Japan have comted national suicide by consistent adherence to these trines, and that other nations, who in their own way owed the same teachings, have been greatly weakened, ms not to dampen the eloquence of those who would suade us to surrender the beliefs and practices by which have lived and prospered from the beginning.

But the American people cannot accept this counsel. It is against the grain of their experience. Our history is unlike that of most of the other nations of the earth that see things in a special light. In ways not readily describa-, our conception of the relations between states is difent from that which has governed the international beior of most other great powers. American attitudes td foreign policy derive from a unique historical experie. While the United States is culturally a child of estern Europe, and its religious and political ideas stem n the Hebraic-Christian and Greco-Roman tradition, it been deeply influenced by the pervasive impact of the w World. The discovery, conquest, and gradual occupa- of the American continent have shaped the European itage into something markedly unlike its original form. r view of the world is not European, and the difference lains the grounds upon which we would build our relas with the rest of the world.

ar Armchair Strategist

Speech attributed by Livy to Lucius Æmilius Paulus to the people of Rome before the Pydna campaign

n every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the p ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied troops; when and through what pass that territory should entered; where magazines should be formed; how provis should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is per to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet.

And they not only determine what is best to be done, but ny thing is done in any other manner than what they e pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on l before them.

These are great impediments to those who have the manment of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious rts with the same constancy and firmness of mind as ius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned ugh the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage public business with a high reputation.

am not one of those who think that commanders ought o time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem man more proud than wise, who regulated every proling by the standard of his own single judgment.

What then is my opinion?

That commanders should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent; by those who have made the art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger.

If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia.

He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his travelling charges shall be defrayed.

But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot.

The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any councils but such as shall be framed within our camp.

The Danger Lies Within

LOUIS J. HALLE
Civilization and Foreign Policy
Harper & Brothers, 1955

In its innermost significance the ideological opposition of our traditional civilization and Soviet communism . . . is the opposition between two concepts of man. To our concept of individual human dignity based on that potentiality which resides in each of us the Communists oppose a materialistic conception of man as a soulless animal moved only by economic considerations. This animal exists in herds and is subject to herding. It is mass man, having no existence as a self-contained individual but only as a statistical component. By the devices of socialistic science this mass man can be trained ("conditioned") to react automatically in whatever direction his masters choose to the stimuli they provide. . . .

While this is the Communist attitude toward man, it is not exclusive to communism. In our own society as belief in human dignity has weakened a "science" of mass communication and manipulation of the mass mind has been developing. Propagandists, public-relations experts, sociologists, and advertisers have been learning how to condition (or train, or indoctrinate) "the public" so that it will support a certain policy and oppose another, so that it will demonstrate for one man and against another, so that it will feel a desire for a certain kind of beer and spend its resources accordingly. . . .

If our own civilization remained in full possession of the vision on which it depends the ideological challenge of communism would be quixotic. It could not endanger us any more than termites can endanger living wood. The danger to our civilization today comes from within, from the weakening of its vision, and the challenge of world communism, although so conspicuous, is an incident that has significance in proportion to the weakness that it confronts.

Another Look at the Y Formation

. . . TOWARD A MOR

CAPTAIN FRANK M. TATUM

LIEUTENANT Colonel George Juskalian's "Night Ambush Patrol" [December 1954] deserves comment. I am familiar with this type of formation and feel qualified to comment on its effectiveness.

My first criticism of the Y formation as described by Colonel Juskalian is the size of the patrol. FM 21-75 states: "A patrol consists of as few men as are needed to accomplish its mission. Large patrols are hard to control. They do not move rapidly and they make noise in moving. The smaller the patrol, the easier it is to control and the more rapidly it can move." Thirty-two men and their supporting weapons can certainly take care of a small enemy patrol no matter what formation they are in if it is reasonably well planned and executed. Were all those men actually needed? Or was it an attempt to outnumber the enemy—an enemy whose primary strength lay in numbers rather than in aggressiveness and resourcefulness?

Contrary to what was stated in the article, the Y formation patrol is not very flexible. Initiative is lost when a unit is deployed in a formation or along a line. Control is fair so long as the patrol fights from its Y formation, but any movement of the patrol automatically destroys the advantages of fighting from this pre-planned position. The arrangement of the men of the squad in a single line makes control by the squad leaders somewhat difficult. This is particularly true if the original formation is broken by shifting one or more of the groups of the patrol. True flexibility cannot be gained unless the patrol leader can quickly shift his fires or his men to meet any situation.



Figure 1

We cannot overlook the difficulty of extracting the Y patrol from a fire fight with a superior force. The difficulty of moving a large patrol into position undetected must be considered, and we must also consider that the enemy has the capability of moving an equally large force out to intercept our patrol. This leads to the need of a plan for extracting elements of our patrol and reorganizing them before moving back to friendly lines. This maneuver is quite difficult at night, and the Y formation is not nearly so maneuverable as a platoon in a simple perimeter or a more conventional platoon formation.

A two- or three-man screening force cannot hope to operate in the area where the enemy was met unless the enemy has been completely neutralized. A single enemy soldier armed with an automatic weapon could almost wipe out such a small force. If the enemy were in sufficient strength to require the fires of two reinforced rifle squads to neutralize them, would it not seem logical to send out at least a well-supported squad as the screening force?

THE Y formation looks good on paper, and the theory behind the formation is sound, but it is difficult to actually place on the ground. *Figure 1* sh how the average platoon leader w place his squads while employing Y formation. The squads are show a small hill. Although a more desi location would probably be on te



Figure 2

that is more level than the one sh the teams should be at least high en to sweep the areas between groups fire. The point is this: Would an my be stupid enough to blunde tween two dangerous ridges wi first checking to see if they were pied? Even on level ground an i gent enemy would avoid open area

To say that fifty per cent of the the enemy would run into the s of the Y instead of into the spaces, s entirely within reason. (Actually own unit had an even poorer av than fifty per cent. Invariably the nese hit the spokes.) To be hit o end of one of the spokes is serious. enemy is usually so close to the on the end of the spoke that to him or the man behind him w alert the enemy and allow him to fire first. To leave him there is dangerous because once the fire has started, it is very difficult to m ver from the Y formation. The

LEXIBLE PATROL . . .

in contact with the enemy are un-
e to help because they do not know
ictly how the team in contact is
neuvering. To support by fire would
pardize the team in contact. The
m in contact must maneuver as much
possible, hoping to outfight an un-
own number of enemy without any
p from the remainder of the 32-man
rol.

Figures 2 and 3 show how an enemy
ce could endanger the Y patrol by
nching a powerful attack against
her one or two spokes of the Y. This
ms a bit more realistic than blindly
nching attacks into several of the
p areas at one time. Once the enemy's
d elements have been fired on, would
the average enemy then seek to find
flanks of the spokes firing upon
n? Then he could assault the flank
a known enemy rather than blindly
indering into a trap by attempting
louble envelopment in the middle of
night. The only time a prudent
emy would blunder into two of the
p areas simultaneously would be
en he was either feeling out the
positions of the friendly patrol or
en he was closing in with a superior
ce to destroy the patrol. In either
e the friendly patrol leader would
better off in a formation from which
could maneuver more rapidly. In the
ormation his only recourse is either to
ckly disengage when hit from more
n one direction, or to dig in and fight
lo-or-die defense.

the platoon leader is expected to
ight in more than one direction,
uld he not be better off in a platoon
ormation or in just a plain perimeter
ense? He would then have his squad
lers where they could better control
ir squads and he would have a re-
ve to use as needed, either to hit the
enemy, screen the area, or cover the remainder of the patrol while they disengage from a dangerous situation.

The Y formation seemed to fare pretty well against small Chinese patrols that were obviously instructed to fan out and circle the UN patrols. But the Y was certainly not the only formation that checked this enemy maneuver. The very size of the Y patrol gives it an advantage over small patrols, but this advantage is not retained as the enemy patrols increase to an equally large size.

Increasing the size of our patrols that are operating in enemy territory is not a guarantee of success. Nor does giving



Figure 3

a patrol leader a complete SOP to follow and a formation to adopt assure success on the battlefield. If the primary mission of a patrol is to fight from a piece of terrain, why not establish an outpost or patrol base and give the patrol the benefits of local security and all-around defense? But if a normal patrol is needed, why not dispatch a small, mobile, aggressive patrol that can move quickly and silently and function as a patrol and not as a combat outpost?

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon, who is in charge of motion picture distribution for the Pictorial Branch, Department of Defense OPI, reports on the new films available to the services.

Mortars are an invaluable ally of the infantryman. **Observation of Mortar Fire by the Combat Soldier, TF 7-1729** (40 minutes), tells what information the mortars must have to complete their mission. It explains the bracketing and creeping methods of fire adjustment, the WORM rule for zeroing the target, and the use of marking rounds and reference points to determine the location of the target in relation to the mortars.

In **Armies of the World, Part II, the Russian Soldier, TF 30-1966** (29 minutes), a Russian training film is shown, while a narrator describes the rigorous training that soldiers of the Soviet Union receive. The film outlines the Russian soldier's background, political indoctrination, and weapons, pointing out his weaknesses as well as his strengths.

Combat Formations—Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon, Parts I and II, TF 9-1919 (36 minutes), is a useful film for basic unit training instructors. It uses diagrams and live demonstrations to explain the basic combat formations and tell under what circumstances each should be used. It also describes the hand signals that are employed to control the formations.

Recoil Mechanisms, Principles of Operation—Hydrospring Types, TF 9-1869 (15 minutes), shows, by means of cutaway models and diagrams, the recoil mechanism used on tank guns and some self-propelled pieces. The film also explains the use of oil with the piston system, the use of the counter-recoil spring and buffer, and the concentric recoil mechanism.

Dismounted Drill: Part I, Squad Drill; and Part II, Platoon Drill, TF 7-1947 (32 minutes), can be used either for the training of recruits or for review by seasoned troops. Part I covers falling in, dressing right at close and normal intervals, inspection of arms, flank and column movements, oblique marching, and forming single column and column of twos. Part II covers the corresponding movements for platoon drill.

MONTHS ago your JOURNAL began to plan a series of articles that would give the most thorough possible picture of the new German Army. It was our intention to publish them when the high diplomatic negotiations had been concluded and the West German government was fairly embarked on its military program. However, press reports indicate that it may be some months before final approval can be expected, and since the articles we have do not reflect on those negotiations, we are publishing them now.

Major Hargreaves's article, which begins on this page, is not an apologia for the German. On the contrary, through showing the record of the relationship between the German and those who fought *with* him rather than against him, it reaffirms the old truth that the standard set by the leader governs the conduct of the led. Our own army hardly needs to be reminded that the German-American (many of them immigrants or first-generation Americans) have been among the best soldiers we have produced, high-minded and loyal comrades and excellent fighting men.

The second article, by Lieutenant Colonel DeWitt Armstrong III, gives an excellent picture of the tactical and technical capabilities and deficiencies of the Federal Border Police, which many persons consider a cadre for the German Army to come.

In the final article, Captain Boyd T. Bashore reports on the plans of the Blank Office in Bonn. In preparing this article Captain Bashore visited that office, and interviewed its officials and obtained their unofficial assistance.

THE GERMAN AS AN ALLY

MAJOR REGINALD HARGREAVES

IT would be disingenuous to disregard the fact that a German Army in NATO is contemplated with an irrepressible feeling of dubiety and unease in some quarters. It is comprehensible enough that many of the members of those Western nations, who twice within a single life-span have been forced to take up arms against trampling Teutonic aggression, should experience an instinctive mental reservation as to the wisdom not only of acquiescing in German rearmament, but of deliberately furthering its consummation.

The gravity of the problem is not to be belittled; but in weighing the pros and cons in the balance it is impossible to arrive at an impartial judgment if attention is concentrated exclusively on the immediate past. To achieve a true perspective the German war record back over the centuries must be compared with that of other nations, and carefully related to the particular leader under whom the Teutonic armies took the field.

It has been written that "When the sword is drawn, all lusts warm the mind"; and in the dawn of world history war was conducted on lines of unalleviated savagery. But with the emergence of Western man from the Dark Ages, a change came over the manner of waging war, a metamorphosis which tended progressively to debrutalize it. Conflict became hedged about by all manner of chi ric prohibitions and taboos.

There were, of course, many infractions of this l standard of behavior, and in most instances they v punished with exemplary speed and severity. For t were enormities committed, in the main, by a negli minority of the rank and file rather than by the lea And almost invariably *it is the standard set by the le which governs the conduct of the led.*

In more recent times, the cold-blooded murder of thousand Polish officer captives at Katyn, and the sa nalia of pillage, rape and irresponsible destruction marked the Red Army's advance into Germany, f fully reproduced the spirit of barbarous, compassion atavism by which Stalin's whole policy was unfalteri actuated. The old proverb, "Scratch a Russian and get a Tartar," has never applied with greater coge than to the Soviet forces that took their inspiration f the wolfish, pitiless autocrat of the Kremlin.

NOW of all peoples the Germans most faithfully mi the characteristics—good or ill—of those who bec their leaders. With a man of the unblemished pro of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the brilliant c

ınder of the Anglo-German forces throughout the ven Years' War, the Teutonic fighting man proved mself capable of a standard of behavior—in battle, in llets, and on the line of march—as exemplary as any of ıich record survives. If he lapsed into senseless, ınton brutality under the shifty, unscrupulous Fredick the Great, he was perfectly restrained and circumect under the eagle eye of King William I of Prussia, roughout the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

But with a head of state of the satanic character of lolf Hitler—a raving paranoiac, without ruth or conence—the average German, having surrendered his will the *Führerprinzip* his current demigod embodied, omptly proceeded to reproduce all those damnable traits which Hitler was the unabashed exemplar.

Over and over again history has demonstrated that as e chameleon changes hue to harmonize with the bric on which he finds himself, so will the German ient himself to match up with the leader to whom he s surrendered his destiny—as surrender it he must, for ch is the nature of his particular psychology.

"Yesterday's rice is neither eaten nor paid for twice." ıe changing scene calls for a fresh approach, a new sessment. The choice today is not between German ırmament and no German rearmament. It lies between ntrolled and uncontrolled German rearmament; beeen a German armed force restrained by wise and temrate leadership and a German horde which, under Soet inspiration, would be capable of a perfidy and barbars excess without parallel since the days of Attila.

There is another aspect of the problem, however, and e whose consideration has been singularly neglected—e character and quality of the German as an ally.

ERMAN fighting men made their first appearance in relatively recent military history when Swabian *Landsechts* superseded the Swiss mercenaries in the pay of e warring *cinquecento* princes affluent enough to supement their own raw levies with a contingent of tough, ttle-hardened experts. They were employed on an tensive scale by Emperor Maximilian I (1493-1519) the eternal quarrel between the royal houses of Hapsrg and Valois. Sternly disciplined, dutiful, forbidden loot save under certain specific conditions, their fideli- to their current patron was unexceptionable.

English men-at-arms first made acquaintance with the litary quality of the *Landsknechts* in the campaign ıinst Louis XII of France, inaugurated by Henry VIII 1513. In an expeditionary force of some 15,000 men, 0 German mercenaries marched "all in a plump"—that in close order—in the place of honor immediately ore the English King. That they were entirely worthy the trust reposed in them was sufficiently witnessed their skilled activities at the battle of the Spurs and siege of Thérouanne.

In the unhappy kinsmen's quarrel which led to the ar of American Independence, France was a menace so near her shores that Britain was forced to retain many of the best of her own and the Hanoverian troops within the homeland. Lord North's egregious administration conceived the idea of hiring mercenaries from the complacent rulers of Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse and Waldeck. It was a move which proved as politically inept as it was militarily unfruitful. Apart from a handful of skilled artillerists, the raw rustics who were hustled, willy-nilly, into the contingents destined for service in North America, were uncouth peasants, bankrupt tradesmen and fugitive apprentices.

Half-trained, and even then on the wrong lines, they were never more than a horde of bewildered yokels.

Wellington made the fullest use of the services of the King's German Legion throughout the campaign waged against Napoleon's marshals in the Iberian Peninsula; the Legion Cavalry proving invaluable, both in action and as preceptors to the British Horse.

If the operations of the international force at the time of the Boxer Rebellion be left out of account, Waterloo was the last occasion on which British and German troops served in the same cause.

On this momentous occasion both Wellington and Napoleon confronted each other with somewhat scratch forces; the former, indeed, had frankly stigmatized his own as "an infamous army." And with many of his tried and trusty Peninsular regiments either on Foreign station or the high seas, there was reason enough for his perturbation. But among his units, in addition to some doubtful Dutch and Belgian contingents, were eight battalions of Germans, made up of Hanoverian Electoral troops and the King's German Legion. All of them were woefully understrength, but in the 3,994 officers and men at his disposal the Iron Duke reposed such confidence that he entrusted one weak battalion with the defense of the vital strongpoint, a little in advance of the left of his line, into which the farm of La Haye Sainte had been turned. Moreover, he maintained absolute faith in the Prussian Marshal Blücher's promise that, despite the setback he had suffered a couple of days earlier, he would reorganize and return to attack Napoleon's right flank with all possible speed. History records that the Iron Duke's confidence in the Germans was not misplaced.

GERMANS always respond to leadership; but the devil of it is that their reaction is just as fervent with evil leadership as with good. None the less, it is always to be borne in mind that the range of a man's capabilities is revealed as much by the depths to which he can descend as by the heights he can scale.

Whenever the German has found himself integrated with the troops of other nations his emotional instability has yielded to the steadying influence of his associates and the inspiration of sound leadership. As part of an international force under international direction, there is every reason to believe he will play a part worthy of all the best in an industrious, virile race.

The Federal Border Police

CADRE FOR A NEW ARMY?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEWITT ARMSTRONG III

THE *Bundesgrenzschutz,* or Federal Border Police Force, is a professionally led 15,000-man internal security organization which was established in 1951 and has been slowly but steadily expanding ever since. Although it is definitely a police force, it is the closest thing to an army that the Germans have had since 1945, and it is as sharp an outfit as you ever saw. Its main mission is to provide mobile strength to back up the various German border security agencies. It functions under control of the Federal Minister of the Interior and works closely with the various police, customs, and security officials on and near the zonal border.

Actually, it is not a crystal-clear mission which has been given to the BGS (BundesGrenzSchutz). The British and Americans still retain considerable respon bility for border security. Stationed close to the Ir Curtain are various Allied mobile troops, three U. cavalry regiments included, and these operate regular on security duty near the frontier. Germans from va ous and numerous federal, provincial, and local agenci actually man the crossing points and enforce the ci laws relating to border crossing and smuggling, usi various combinations of fixed posts, check points, a patrols. BGS duties and responsibilities must be do tailed with these. In general, you might say that t BGS task is to maintain the territorial integrity of t Bonn republic and to keep order in border areas by re forcing the less powerful civil agencies operating the The BGS does its job in three ways: it garrisons t border region; it conducts mounted and dismount patrols in certain border areas; and it trains towa combat readiness as a mobile light infantry force.

Stationed usually by battalion in old Wehrmac *kasernes* near the border, resembling the old Germa Army in physical appearance, and doing its training a operating in a most military fashion, the BG does look very much like an embryonic arm

West German border police held large-scale exercises which included a river crossing last year

ing such things as the extent of authority of noncommissioned officers and the off-duty relationships among the ranks. In these respects the BGS has pioneered, and the lessons it has learned will surely not be ignored. It is to be expected that other innovations introduced by the BGS without the stimulus of ministerial decree may also find their reflection in the *Streitkräfte*. So a look at Germany's BGS of 1954 may perhaps be a preview of the German Army of years to come.

IT is not a modern combat force and could not stand up to an organized attack. It lacks aircraft, tanks, antitank guns, and artillery, and is without heavy weapons of all kinds. It doesn't have mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, or even rifle grenades. It is restricted to small arms and the MG42, the rapid-firing bipod-mounted light machine gun so famous in World War II. Each battalion has three armored cars, but they are the practically roadbound U.S. M8s from which the 37mm gun has been removed. So the BGS is severely limited in what it can do, and of course this limitation is reflected in tactical doctrine and training.

These restrictions do give the BGS a clean, straightforward organization. Starting with a rifle squad that

Border policemen race down a country lane during recent maneuvers at Kassel, Germany



is natural to see the BGS as a cadre for the new ıan Army. Speculation to this effect has been nuous since the inception of the BGS in 1951. speculation is now more intense than ever. It does very natural to merge the BGS right into the new or at least to draw very heavily upon it for cadres. until some army units are trained up to combat ness, there will still be a border security task to rm.

gardless of its future status, the BGS's four years perience will profoundly influence the shape of s in the new German Army. Adenauer's govern- has long since declared its intent to change many ional features of the military establishment, includ-

has 10 men and an MG42, they put three squads together and have a platoon. Three such platoons and a very small overhead make a company. Three companies plus a headquarters company containing reconnaissance, pioneer, and communications platoons, make a battalion. Three battalions and a headquarters make a regiment. Simple, when you don't have to fit in all the supporting weapons, isn't it?

Above regiment there is an area organization fitted to the political territories of the Republic. At that level are found the various administrative establishments such as schools and depots. These, by the way, are few in number and small in strength, for the manpower is concentrated at the business end of the outfit, as was the Wehrmacht custom.

Since it is a police force, a para-military organization, it does not use the normal military terms for these units. Instead, there are such synonyms as "hundred-man group" for company. The grades and ranks, for that matter, also have sanitized names, like "senior patrol leader." But the units and the rank structure fit precisely into the military pattern; you have only to convert the words and there you have an infantry regiment—less supporting weapons—with captains commanding companies and lieutenants leading platoons, and so on. After all, what would be a more sensible way to organize a lightly armed constabulary force?

THE most impressive feature of the BGS is the high quality of its leadership. Its officers are an exceedingly able group, and so are its noncommissioned officers. When the BGS was first organized, in 1951, practically all the NCOs were former officers or noncoms of the World War II Wehrmacht. Now, however, the natural evolutionary processes of an expanding organization have thinned the proportion of experienced ones.

These BGS noncoms are alert and capable men. There are no deadheads among them who are merely drawing the extra pay and marking time. They are very much in earnest about their responsibilities and duties. In the field they actively and most energetically command their several elements; they never sit and wait for orders when initiative will help get the mission done. They expect quick obedience from their men, and they get it.

Of all the ways in which the BGS has pioneered, perhaps none has greater significance than the question of relationships among officers, NCOs, and men. The Adenauer government has stated that the new *Streitkräfte* must break sharply away from Wehrmacht tradition in this respect, and the BGS has broken trail for them. To understand, we must glance at the background.

German military men have long thought themselves enlightened in the matter of discipline. They have smiled indulgently at the Prussian militarism of Frederick the Great, considering it an anachronism from which progress has freed them. After World War I, they say, there was deliberate development in the 100,000-man army of a "comradeship" among all ranks, and the spirit carried on through the expansion in the and through World War II. Yet the Germans ha their modern army an authoritarianism which we w regard as almost tyrannical. Meeting a superior in a ridor or upon a city street, a soldier was required to st at rigid attention and ask permission to pass. Sh an officer chance to enter a restaurant where a sol was eating, the soldier was obliged to get up, go o and ask the officer for permission to remain. It m no difference if the man were on leave, nor did it ma whether he were with his wife or his father or wh

Seldom were officers involved in enforcing such r as these, for the habits of the NCOs made that un essary. The question of disobedience by a Ger private was almost academic, for his noncoms had s to it that his obedience was total. They did so thro a high degree of personal control and a wide latitud punishment. It was not unusual for a corporal to h one of his men crawl on his belly from one end of camp to another for making a mistake. The corporal the authority to do this, and he used it. If the corp figured that digging a hole in the ground would help private see the error of his ways, the private did just t

For several years there have been press releases ing out of Bonn saying how different will be the of the new army. The idea has been planted that relationships among officers, noncommissioned offi and men will be no longer authoritarian but instead like those of a benevolent employer, his benevolent men, and their happy workmen. They have said, instance, that the soldier will have a free hand in dec ing his barracks room, that the power of noncoms be reduced, and that the soldier no longer will hav ask an officer's permission to ride on the same stree

Now, all of this may very well come to pass. ceivably, they might go farther, perhaps to the extre of the Doolittle Board, but I don't think so. Jud from the 1954 BGS, discipline in their new army still look hard to us.

This is true in spite of definite effort, contin since the birth of the BGS, to break away from Wehrmacht pattern of discipline. The Germans that they have been successful in this. And it is un able that they have toned down the Wehrmacht pract Brutality is absent. Company officers no longer authority to confine men (on bread and water three out of four) for periods up to ten days. Men wear ian clothing when off duty. The endless close-order has been greatly reduced. Officers are closer to men both physically and spiritually. Nevertheless American standards, discipline in the BGS is quite s Men still salute all superiors. Juniors still spring inst to a very rigid attention when an officer enters a r even if it is a class in session.

WHILE Allied restrictions on its armament keep BGS from being up to date in its weapons, its m zation is modern. Gone are the many horses which

nd in Wehrmacht divisions; every operational BGS t is completely motorized. No one has to shuttle, ıer. Two units of the same type will not necessarily e the same type of equipment. There is quite a iety in their transport, in fact; one company may be unted entirely in trucks while the next company may e a number of small Mercedes roadsters. A little of ir authoritative equipment is American, some is Brit- but most is German. The basic type of vehicle is a verted four-wheel commercial truck, with very limit- off-road mobility. A new type of vehicle just being ed is the German equivalent of our quarter-ton, built arry four men, operate across country, and be paddled ɔss rivers.

By American standards, the BGS has very little equip- ıt. Much less gear is issued to an individual soldier, the quantity of radio equipment in a battalion is ıger. Partly this is because of the standard peacetime ıplaint of all armies: no money. But the Germans er did believe in giving out equipment on a lavish e. Probably as much for that reason as because of ir discipline, their equipment is remarkably well cared The standards of maintenance of everything from vehicles through the soldier's clothing are higher n you ever find in our army.

een alone with his soft hat on, the BGS private looks one of the many uniformed civil servants in Ger- ıy, where the postmen, railway watchmen, foresters, dozens of others are more or less militarily garbed. put that man in his squad, and put the squad out he field with the rest of the platoon, and you'll rub r eyes in astonishment. The resemblance to the old man Army is most striking. The color and cut of uniform are different, but the coal-scuttle helmets, jackboots, the rifles, the camouflaged ponchos, the 42s, the grey gloves on the officers—they are all e! It is only gradually that you begin to miss the overcoats and the gas-mask carrier. Even those funny e field telephones and the hinged wooden map rds are back again. It is an odd sensation, seeing n again! Nor is it only their equipment which looks same, for many methods are also unchanged.

ecause of their mission they do not operate just as Wehrmacht did. A small force, widely dispersed lightly armed, they are capable of reinforcing other ce groups. But they are not capable of establishing ng defense lines or of attacking organized defensive tions. Therefore, their doctrine and training are istically based upon a constabulary or skirmisher type ombat, where BGS forces locate hostile elements, k their movement by roadblocks and outposts, and to disperse or destroy them by local light infantry cks.

the light infantry part of their job, the BGS troops e nothing short of magnificent. Squad leaders have r men well in hand, and they move them over the ınd in a most professional way. Riflemen do not bunch, individual men make excellent use of cover and concealment, and the light machine gun goes in and out of action with remarkable swiftness as it bounds from one well-chosen position to another. In their training exercises these troops play the game to the hilt, taking pride in showing how well they know the rules.

But where mobility is concerned, the BGS is less skillful. Many of the tricks of the trade have apparently been forgotten, although their ranks include many former panzer division and panzergrenadier division officers. True, the nature of their automotive equipment does restrict them to roads, but they could operate perfectly well on unpaved third- and fourth-class roads. Many times proper use of their inherent mobility requires that they do so, but they do not. If the road is a paved highway, they use it; their vehicles never move off paved roads, however. Whether moving or halting, they are usually virtually bumper to bumper.

Control is excellent. Extensive use is made of pyrotechnics, just as during World War II. While the platoon is attacking, the platoon leader controls its fire and its movement with his flare pistol and flares. Tighter and more centralized control is kept over radios. For the battalion command net, the battalion communications platoon sends radio vehicles out to the companies in a supporting role when necessary; they are still battalion's responsibility to maintain and operate. Motorcycle messengers are used a great deal. Most important of all, staffs are kept small. The regimental headquarters works with four or five officers, and the whole battalion headquarters will be the commander and two other officers, plus a very few NCOs. This not only tends to winnow out trivia but also focuses the attention of the commander and his few assistants upon the really significant matters. Their coordination does not seem to suffer, either. It is a simpler system than our own, and it does seem to produce a high degree of responsiveness of the individual rifleman and machine-gunner to the will of the higher commander.

A FINAL and vital point is the attitude of the BGS toward Americans. Happily, it is one of warm friendliness. Although most German civilians like American soldiers, some occasionally do disparage the military effectiveness of the U.S. Army. They do so from a superficial, inexpert judgment, based more on fit of uniform and absence of heel-clicking than on anything else. The BGS, however, has a professional and discerning eye, and even though we do not train or operate with it, it can see enough to judge. It is clearly evident that its respect for the U.S. Army is high. And even clearer is its general attitude of fondness for the American nation and its army. This attitude, I believe, will probably carry over only slightly diluted into their new army. The more opportunity we give them to see American systems and techniques, the more they will copy us and the stronger will that friendly attitude become.

PLANNI

CAPTAIN BOYD T. BASH

IN an unpretentious red-brick office building at 105 Argelanderstrasse in Bonn, a small group of men have undertaken a formidable and highly controversial project. Literally translated, the title of their office is "The Representative of the Federal Chancellor for Matters Connected with the Increase of Allied Troops," but this agency is usually called the Blanksamt, or Blank Office, after Theodor Blank, the hard-working ex-labor leader who runs it. Whatever tongue-twisting euphemism may be used to sugarcoat Herr Blank's official title, he is in reality the defense commissioner for the West German Federal Republic. The success or failure of his important project will affect immeasurably the economic, political, and military planning of the United States during the next critical years of the cold war.

The purpose of Blanksamt is to plan the West German defense force, the *Streitkräfte,* the new army, and air force that will stand shoulder to shoulder the other troops of the free world and face resol eastward. Approval of this project is being slowl tained from the rest of western Europe. It now ap that the West German defense forces will be fo under the terms of the Western European Union, v is essentially the 1948 Brussels Treaty Organizatic expanded by more recent London and Paris prot Blanksamt is ready for a smooth launching, wher if it is finally approved.

While the Blanksamt blueprint seeks to eliminat traditional German General Staff, every militar ganization must have staff functions. So in place c General Staff there will be a corps of professional o who will be completely divorced from behind-the-s

LT. GEN. ADOLF HEUSINGER
Military planner at Bonn

HERR THEODOR BLANK
West German defense chief

E NEW ARMY

ics and properly subordinated to the West German ocratic government.

ne of the greatest deterrents to the revival of the tyle general staff is the fact that much of Germany's egic planning will be done by the North Atlantic ty Organization and SHAPE. German officers will on the NATO and SHAPE staffs with the officers her Western nations to plan for the common de- of the entire continent.

TY-EIGHT-YEAR-OLD Theodor Blank, the De- se Minister, is a civilian by character and philoso- A battlefield first lieutenant's commission in the ve of the German Army was the highest military ion that he held during World War II. Prior to 940s Blank had an excellent reputation as a Catho- bor leader in the Ruhr but was eliminated from work by the Nazis. Today, in addition to serving efense Minister, he is also the Bundestag deputy senting the Ruhr district of Aarhaus-Borken-Bo- . In short, Blank's background is civilian and polit- not military.

appears that none of Germany's ex-field marshals lly senior generals will serve on active duty as of- in the new German defense forces. A few ex-high-ranking officers, however, may act as advisors. Hans Speidel, for instance, who was Chief of Staff to Rommel in France, served until the death of EDC, as the German representative on the European Army Interim Committee in Paris. He is presently the military advisor to Hasso von Etzdorf, a career diplomat, who is the German representative on the steering group which is working out the details of the German entry into NATO. Another very influential ex-general working actively with the Blanksamt in Bonn is Adolf Heusinger, one of Chancellor Adenauer's chief defense experts, and a logistics expert. Both of these ex-generals helped plan the bomb plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler on 20 July 1944.

THE German contingent to the NATO army will be, proportionally, the most armor-heavy fighting force on the western side of the Iron Curtain. Although the final organization of this army of 400,000 men is not yet definite, it will be the same plan, slightly modified and brought up to date, as was scheduled for the now defunct European Defense Community. Germany will furnish twelve divisions: four will be armored divisions, averaging 300 tanks each; two will be mechanized divisions, with approximately the same number of tanks, but having more self-propelled artillery; and six will be motorized infantry divisions, each having about 80 tanks. Backing up the combat units will be the necessary staff, corps, and technical forces to train the army and support it logistically.

The exact organization of these various 13,000-man divisions is classified, but it is obvious that they will contain the infantry, armor, artillery, and technical services essential for independent tactical action. At present there are no plans for German airborne divisions. Contrary to many reports, the *Bundesgrenzschutz,* the 15,000-man federal border police force presently standing guard along the Iron Curtain, will not be used as a nucleus for the *Streitkräfte,* although certain selected units of the U. S. Army's German labor service units may be incorporated, complete with men and equipment, into the Federal Republic's army.

THE West Germans have agreed to certain limitations in the manufacture of army equipment for this rearmament. Chemical, biological, and atomic weapons

will not be developed, nor will magnetic or influence mines, although antitank and antipersonnel mines for defensive use may be made. Restrictions are placed on the manufacture of ammunition, guns and howitzers above 90mm, and tanks or armored fighting vehicles of over ten tons. The armaments agency of the Western European Union will have the power to inspect and control the manufacture, stock level, and importation of all these critical arms.

The new German air force will not be designed for strategic bombing, but instead will stress close tactical support of the ground forces. It will have approximately 1,400 aircraft, including fighter, reconnaissance, transport, and light tactical bomber planes. Each air wing will have from 48 to 75 aircraft and will be backed up by technicians, mechanics, and service troops. This new NATO Luftwaffe will number approximately 20 wings, which will be evenly divided between fighter-bomber and interceptor wings. The total strength will be around 90,000 men, of whom only about 2,000 will be pilots. The British Royal Air Force is expected to be a model for the new Luftwaffe in many things, including uniforms. West Germany has agreed not to build strategic bombers or any military aircraft except training planes, liaison aircraft, transports, and helicopters. Military air frames and jet, turbo-propeller and rocket engines are also prohibited.

Plans have not been completed for the new German navy, but it will probably be confined to vessels necessary for the protection of harbors and the sea lanes of Germany and the other European union countries. It will have an estimated twelve to fifteen thousand men. No German battleships, cruisers, or aircraft carriers will be built, but emphasis will instead be placed on the construction of swift patrol boats, minelayers, minesweepers, amphibious craft, and perhaps a few coastal submarines. Surface warships may not have a displacement of over 3,000 tons and submarines of over 350 tons. It is highly probable that part of the cadre of the new German navy will be the U.S. labor service naval units stationed at Bremerhaven, whose German officers and enlisted men have been trained by the U.S. Navy in the handling of small vessels.

APPLICATIONS for service in the *Streitkräfte* are flooding into Bonn. The day after the London rearmament pact of 1954 was signed, the daily number of volunteers jumped from 180 to 750. At last count the total number of applicants was about 150,000. The Blanksamt will have more men than it needs to organize the cadre of 100,000 men needed for the 500,000-man West German contingent to NATO forces. The volunteer cadre will consist of approximately 60 generals, 300 colonels, 20,000 other officers, and 80,000 enlisted men, most of whom will be noncommissioned officers. Volunteers will be accepted from the following categories: permanent professional officers, who will receive commissions; noncommissioned officers, who will be given the option of enlisting under four-, eight-, or twelve enlistments; and finally, enlisted men who will be to volunteer for three- or four-year periods.

A sufficient number of applicants to the new however, does not overcome some of the most impo obstacles faced by Blanksamt. These volunteers can say, "if and when you have the *Streitkräfte,* we w like to join it." The West German government rec amended its constitution and expressly authorize Federal Republic to raise an armed force, but ex when such an army will be formed is still indef

After the initial cadres have been trained, the destag (German lower house) will be requested to a law authorizing an eighteen-month conscription p This conscription law will give Blanksamt the ci soldiers needed to bring the German defense forc to their authorized strength of 500,000.

Although no one can say exactly when M-day wi Blanksamt has done much of the detailed ground in anticipation of it. Although volunteers are pler the German planners still have the difficult job c ticing back into uniform highly qualified ex-servic who were free from close political ties with the N It is only natural that most competent ex-officers ar soldiers have proved equally adept in civilian life. ing the ten years since the abrupt end of their m service these people have found secure careers in ci business.

WHEN the green light flashes, these veterans wil denly be expected to give up all they have gain civilian life and accept a rather nebulous futur first Bonn will only be able to enter into a contract three- or four-month weeding-out course, at the e which the volunteer can be dropped. A succ civilian will have a difficult decision to make, si four-month absence from his civilian job could jeopardize not only his seniority but the job as well will pose a serious problem unless the governmen vides some sort of safeguard.

Picking the right man for the right job out of 15 volunteers is a formidable undertaking. Since Blan possesses no old military service records, the govern has no accurate means of judging the military suit of most of the applicants. Blanksamt wants to elir those ex-soldiers who were close to the Nazi Pa who would be, for purely military reasons. All it go on, however, are the statements of each indi and people who knew him, and civilian records. recruiting method is haphazard at best and could in some unfortunate choices.

SOLDIERS of World War II will be taken bac the army in their equivalent wartime rank. I tions were fast during the war, and Blanksamt b that many of these men will now be at a more st age for their rank in a peacetime regular army. ing the high-ranking officers for *Streitkräfte* will

ous problem. Selections for high-level assignments ɔe based on merit and will depend entirely on the idual, his record, and his health. Most of the high ıands will probably be given to men who were : regimental commanders during the war, since of the higher commander are now too old. In any , there will be many competent candidates to choose

critical shortage will exist, however, in the most tant ranks of any professional army—the junior s and noncommissioned officers. The lieutenants ɜ war are now too old to be platoon leaders, but do not have the command experience needed to battalions or regiments. Many of the combat-d NCOs will be too old for duty with troops. ing an army without a solid corps of company-leaders is a task almost unprecedented in military y. The efficiency of the German army may very lepend upon how this problem is resolved.

e only workable solution would be to accept the suitable volunteers, subject them to intensive train-nd then put them in the job to see if they can do here will be unparalleled opportunities to obtain issions from the ranks. At first, officer candidates ut previous military experience will be trained for y months, while candidates with previous service ɔe commissioned after twelve months of training. r candidates joining later will be trained for a long-iod. Academic background will be an important in picking junior officers.

ere will be some major changes from the old theory rman military discipline. Much of the Prussian ıd-polish will be eliminated in an attempt to train e adaptable citizen soldier. In drill, the goose step e forbidden. Civilian clothes will be authorized f-duty hours, and after basic training the soldier e able to get weekend and overnight passes. Dur-ormal training, however, he will have to be in ks by 2230. The citizen soldier will retain many rights, including the right to vote. He will salute s and noncommissioned officers of his own unit.

EMENDOUS amount of administrative planning ıains to be accomplished by Blanksamt before M-hen written directives will be issued and training ctually begin. Since Germany will not manufac-ıany heavy materials, most of her tanks and artil-ill be of foreign design. The United States recent-ounced that it had stockpiled military matériel for *räfte* use once mobilization starts. The job of ing the technical directives and field manuals for veapons is staggering, and it is complicated by the at Blanksamt does not know exactly what arms it entually have. Many references must be trans-rom English, French, or Italian, revised, and then l in German.

ntly HICOG announced the arrival of the ad-contingent of the United States military advisory group and military and air attachés to the West German capital. The advisory group will instruct the German NATO contingent in the use of the American equipment that will be assigned to it. Blanksamt is interested in the lessons learned by our army in fighting the Communists in Korea, and it is eager to incorporate those lessons into tactical training. At first the Germans probably will participate in Allied maneuvers only as observers, but their role will increase as their forces increase. It will take an estimated two years before Germany will actually field her divisions as trained units.

The allotment of training areas and billets is a knotty unsolved problem which the various higher headquarters are negotiating. The NATO forces already stationed in Germany are fully using the limited training areas. One of the biggest jobs of USAREUR's G3 is the equitable distribution of these areas for the field training of combat units.

A TICKLISH morale problem concerns the wearing of German campaign ribbons and medals from World Wars I and II. Many German veterans feel that if they return to soldiering they should be permitted to wear the decorations they won in combat. Many other Germans and allies do not want these medals worn because they contain the Nazi swastika or because they glorify Nazi political conquests, such as the annexation of Austria, Memel, or the Sudetenland. A German commission has recommend that veterans be allowed to wear their badges for combat infantrymen, parachute troops, and armor troops, and their decorations, provided the Nazi eagle and swastika are removed. The commission also recommended that the campaign ribbons with a purely Nazi political tint be forbidden, while others such as those awarded for the Russian front, the Afrikakorps, Crete, and the Crimea be honored. This recommendation will be presented to Parliament as the basis for a law. Except for those national emblems, the uniforms worn by the German army troops probably will closely resemble the present olive drab American uniform, with battle jackets, combat boots, and tucked-in trousers, and American-style helmets.

THE Bonn government intends to pay its way as much as possible with the new army. At present the West German government has the most stable economy in Europe and has set aside 33 per cent of its new federal budget for defense costs during the year 1954-55. Earmarked for defense is a sum of $2.2 billion out of a total budget of approximately $6.5 billion. Actually this amount is about the same as that paid this last year to cover the occupation costs of Allied troops.

This is what the prospective German army will look like. The phoenix is stirring in the ashes. Five hundred thousand ex-soldiers, from privates to generals, who probably know as much about fighting Russians as any other people in the world, are waiting somewhat uncertainly for the bugle to blow.

An ex-draftee speaks up

Here's Why I'm Not an Active Reservist

CORPORAL JACK STANLEY



IN my wallet I carry a small red identication card that states I am a corporal in the Army of the United States and will remain one until November 1959. That card is my one and only connection with the Army. I have not worn a uniform for a year and a half, when I was "separated" from active duty after two years of service. I am one of America's millions of "sleeping" reservists—according to figures I have seen.

I cannot speak for anyone but myself, but I believe my reasons for being indifferent to my reserve obligations are shared by many of my fellow ex-draftees. I know I am not unpatriotic. Although I didn't find military life especially fascinating, I am glad I had a chance to be a soldier for a couple of years and I know I am as willing as anyone to do my part when my services become necessary to the defense of my country.

Why, then, am I not fulfilling my legal reserve obligations? The most important reason is that I am unconvinced that such service would enhance the military security of my country. Even if I concede that reserve service would make me a more proficient soldier (and I don't altogether concede that), I still have doubts whether I would ever be called upon to put whatever proficiency I might attain to the test.

I am familiar with the argument that an atomic or nuclear war will require even bigger armies, but to me that means bigger armies in being—ready for quick and decisive action. I don't honestly see how a big force of reservists could do any good in a war that will be over before it is ready to fight.

I could be wrong about this, but the arguments I have heard don't seem very strong. When I am convinced that trained reserve soldiers will really be needed I'll be one of the first to report t the armory every Wednesday night.

When I was separated I was given several pamphlets about the Army Reserve. They gave a lot of information, but they didn't answer some questions I had on my mind. How much of my freedom would I give up by joining? If I wanted to move to another state, could the Army prevent me or make it difficult for me? If I decided to take a month's trip to Canada, would I have to get permission? I think the Army has these things worked out, but I'm not going to join anything until I'm good and sure. At first glance they may seem unimportant, but I don't think the average American likes to take any chances on losing his freedom to change jobs or just move about.

I cannot accuse the Army of not making an effort to get me to become an active reservist. I have received and read at least a dozen pamphlets on the subject. The only trouble is that this literature is much more likely to appeal to a man of 45 than to one of 25. The opportunities for promotion do not mean much to anyone unless he has already decided to take the plunge. Retirement benefits are comforting to know about, but they aren't the kind of thing that will stir up the blood of a young man, especially if he is unmarried and more interested in opportunity than security.

THE other big argument that the Army uses for persuasion is historical. The reserve is compared to the militia that defended American liberty in the early days. This is an appealing argument—but I think most Americans of my age secretly believe that it is absurd. We know very well that if we are attacked we can't do much good by pulling a rifle off the wall and rushing into the street. We will go to a camp in South Carolina or Kansas or California, where we will most likely receive a six-week refresher course; then we will probably wait around for a few months while some-one decides where to send us. By the war will be over, or so most think. And anyway, non-reservist also be training and will be just a pared as the modern "Minutemen.

I'M not saying that this is wha happen. I have no way of kno But it is what many reservists (in only) believe, and that is why w not doing what Congress and the say is our duty. Let the country us some idea of how we might be and why we are essential to na defense; let the men who represen picture of Uncle Sam pointin finger at me put some reality int militia idea (I'm not at all sure it be brought up to date), and "rese will be flocking to the colors.

I think Reserve units should get publicity. Maybe even a few co parades and demonstrations of the cial techniques and equipment for ians and potential reservists to There's a good chance the civilian begin to take the reservists to hearts—to feel that they belong to and not to a distant and forbi Army.

I read in the papers the othe that only four out of every hu draftees join the Active Reserve their two years of active service. A people will say, "Why not *make* join?" The answer is that a rese unwilling men wouldn't be as de able as one composed of eager teers. If you want a closely kn well-trained force composed of me are civilians for all but a few h week, they've got to be men who to do what they're doing.

Most Americans are patriotic will do an unpleasant job if th some meaning in their efforts. problem is for the Government to it clear why reserve service is nec

CEREBRATIONS

ning vs Instruction

are getting school crazy in the rmy these days. There is a tend- to make the entire Army one ıtic school—to the the detriment of ınits for whose benefit the program originally intended. Certainly mili- education is important, but it is a means for training officers and in their profession. When entire ; assume the form and substance of ɔls or groups of schools, we are ing the school idea too far.

ıe basis of the school program, as ɔplies to combat training, is the ılty" or "committee" system. It was ining method admirably suited to iginal purpose—turning out replace- :s in as short a time as possible. s fighting a war could not take the to train their own replacements ɔletely, and in this way they were ed of a constant stream of trained

ıe needs of the Army are very dif- t today. This fact has been rec- :ed by the Army's unit rotation (see "World Wide Rotation," No- ɔer 1954), which adapts training :dures to a more stable, peacetime ;. Under this program, there will o training divisions as such. Re- ; will be assigned to a division in States upon their induction, and will train with the unit in which can expect to spend the major part eir Army careers.

e have come a long way from the ıilitary axiom that a company com- ler is responsible for everything his ɔany does or fails to do. We are ;etting a long way from developing company commanders. Although npany commander may learn all is to know about administration e school system, he will not learn ı about how to run a company in at, where he will actually be re- ible for everything his company or fails to do.

hen I was a lieutenant I was usual- ;en a training directive somewhat lows: "Lieutenant Swift, tomorrow vill take your platoon out in Area d give them squad problems." In iay and age, when every move the e (not soldier, you understand, but *trainee*) makes is planned to the last detail by experts in some big headquarters, such a directive would be looked upon with horror. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Swift studied his Field Manual, made his reconnaissance, organized his problem, ran the problem, and gave the critique. In those days lieutenants made mistakes. They made them by the score. Every critique of every maneuver was filled with incidents which illustrated the "deficiencies of small-unit leadership and training." But we learned by those mistakes, and we didn't make them later on the battlefield. Nowadays, about the only mistake an instructor can make is not following the lesson plan or not having his charts in the right order.

Lieutenants these days are excellent instructors. But I wonder if they ever get the professional pride and satisfaction I felt one day when the regimental commander, a great soldier who ran his regiment the way he wanted it run and insisted that his subordinate commanders do the same, observed one of my little problems and told me: "Lieutenant, that was a well organized problem and an excellent critique." To me this was *the* accolade because it was *my* platoon, *my* plan, and *my* problem. If a lieutenant today got the same commendation, he would be sharing it with the nameless individuals who planned the problem in the first place, those who organized it on the ground, those who devised the various training aids and charts, without which no problem can be run these days and—oh yes, the trainees themselves, who were perhaps a little sharper than the last couple of batches that ran through the problem.

I maintain that the training of small-unit leaders from company commanders down was better in the days just before and in the early phases of World War II than it is today, simply because it made *leaders* responsible for the training of their units. This is not the case in the "faculty" or "committee" system of training. Many reports from Korea indicated that units received well-trained replacements from the ZI, but some reports were not so favorable concerning the caliber of non-combat-experienced small-unit leaders coming from training divisions here. According to the reports, these leaders were hesitant to exercise leadership and did not know how to take care of their men. It is just possible that their training emphasized being efficient instructors more than being efficient leaders. The two are not necessarily synonymous.

I think we have all met officers or NCOs who have been assigned as instructors at service schools or at large training centers for an excessively large portion of their careers. Many of these officers and NCOs are not effective commanders because they do not realize their responsibilities to their men. They do not realize that the commander-soldier relationship is considerably different from the instructor-student relationship. They are inclined to be perfectionists in nonessential details while neglecting more important principles of leadership. They have a tendency to resort to excessive cleverness and sarcasm in dealing with their subordinates, which may go over big before a class, but is not generally the best way to handle day-to-day problems with subordinates who cannot be clever or sarcastic in return. When following a fixed routine thoroughly covered by the book, they are all right, but when confronted by unusual situations or problems, they are not so sure of themselves.

The best way to learn how to be a platoon leader is to lead a platoon, not just to instruct it, and that goes for every other type of unit in the Army. Training is a command responsibility. The sooner we give it back to the commanders, the better the training is going

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to be. At any rate, the commanders will be better. The "instruction" may suffer a little bit, but the unit as a whole will be better trained and will have higher morale and *esprit*, which are qualities that cannot be learned in school from an instructor.

LT. COL. EBEN F. SWIFT

First-Day Casualties

"I WONDER why it is," a grizzled old corporal said to me outside a hospital one morning, "that every time I get throwed into combat, somebody shoots me on the first doggone day?"

In examining the unhappy experience of any infantry unit in its first day of a shooting war, many possible explanations for high casualties crop up: the lack of seasoned leadership; the strangeness of an honest-to-goodness battlefield; fear—all of these and many more. But as soon as we find tentative answers to the corporal's question, we find ourselves facing an even more important question: "What can we do to *prevent* first-day casualties?"

Poor leadership is a prime cause of first-day casualties. It is not enough to say, "There's got to be a first time for everybody," nor is it enough to assume that good pre-combat leadership will necessarily stand up. Perhaps the only conclusion that may be drawn with respect to leadership is this: consider first-combat leadership a thing apart, assume nothing, and have absolutely no illusions about its effectiveness. In time, training will show through and the fittest will survive; but the problem is to keep the blood-cost of this evolution down to a minimum.

Another cause of unnecessary losses has to do with the individual soldiers—including the leaders. During the days and hours before they hit the enemy they aren't busy enough, and yet there is always plenty to do. The leaders must take care of that. Too often they allow themselves the luxury of idleness, and the men take their cues from them.

What ought these men to do during the slack periods? First, they should prepare adequate foxholes. Secondly, they should improve their defenses by setting up observation posts and by checking the man-to-man communication. Thirdly, the leaders should give specific duties to each man; they should *make* work, if necessary, so that there will be constant checking and reporting all the way up and down the chain of command. Security is the most obvious thing that ought to be checked; but communications and the effectiveness of night observation are equally important.

We must allow for the confusion of the battlefield. Crack-thump and battle noise training is fine as far as it goes; but something more is needed. Men must know what to do when they think they are under friendly fire. Men must know what to do about casualties. Men must quit laughing at pre-combat three-day problem snafus and begin to realize that those mix-ups are but pale shadows of the authentic.

Units must prearrange as many details as they can in anticipation of being shot at for the first time. If I were a platoon leader again, I would have my platoon spend the last training period before embarkation running through a problem that is especially designed to accustom the platoon to what life in the combat zone may be like for the first two or three days and nights. Such a problem would enable the leaders and men to make their personal adjustments to these once-in-a-lifetime conditions, and would require the combat-loaded platoon to march to an assembly area from a simulated dockside or airstrip, to spend the night in a tactical position behind the line, and to attack a platoon objective the next morning. In all of these requirements, heavy emphasis would be placed on the idea that the problem is really one of learning to survive being green. In the attack problem, for example, the leaders can learn that they can make more realistic estimates of the situation when they allow for the tendency of their men to run for cover upon first being shot at.

Unit leaders can make use of many otherwise useless hours during the movement to the combat zone by talking their men through hypothetical situations, like this one: "Jones, you are a squad leader on the right flank of the platoon. An enemy machine gun cuts loose over your head, but two of your men are hit. What are you going to do?"

The answers may be something less than brilliant, but that won't matter: discussion of the problem will set the men to thinking about the tremendous difference incoming live ammunition is going to make, and the more they think about what they must do to remain combat effective, the less their leaders need worry about their being shocked and surprised into uselessness.

This kind of training is most effective at the lowest level. If a unit commander sees his men sitting on hatches or huddled in corners of troop compartments talking these things over with their leaders, working out things to do when the outfit gets ashore, he sho feel very grateful ideed. His next t is to get his subordinate leaders toge to keep the chain reaction going.

This is by no means the answe the twice-hit corporal's question, bu is what his platoon leader could d prevent first-day casualties if he ha take another platoon to war. This stab at the kind of analysis infantryn must make of many similar problem unit rotation is to be a success, if cas ties are to be held to a minimum, an we're going to keep on winning w

CAPTAIN E

Inseparable Team

THE importance of armor is grow The ratio of armored divisions to fantry divisions has been increased b in the active Army and the Natio Guard. There is now a tank batta in every infantry division and a t company in every regiment. Infan and armor work everywhere as an separable team. Since armor and in try operate so closely together, it se to me, an infantrymen, that they sho be combined into one branch. An fantry officer in the course of his ca may be assigned to such varied unit an infantry battalion, an armored in try battalion, a regimental tank c pany, and a combat-command staff. an infantry battalion, he will freque be supported by tanks of the regime tank company, which may be attac to the unit of which he is comman All or part of the division tank batta will often work with the infantry. an armored infantry unit, the infa officer will constantly work with ta He may command a task force con ing of both armor and infantry, o may be a member of a task force which infantry troops are attached tank unit.

Should the infantry officer be assig to a regimental tank company, he h know as much about the technical of armored vehicles as any armor off Although these "infantry" tanks are ployed somewhat differently from tanks in a tank battalion, the t themselves are identical. In a com command staff, we find both infa and armor officers, and they must have a thorough knowledge of the ployment of both kinds of units.

The armor officer is in a similar si tion. In the armored division, whe he is assigned to a tank battalion combat-command staff, he works infantry units. He may even be assig to an armored infantry battalion

nmand infantry troops, or he may ve in the tank battalion of an infan- division, where he will also work h infantry. In almost every possible tical assignment other than an ar- red cavalry regiment, the armor offi- is in close association with infantry its.

Infantry and armor officers must be alified to work with, and in some es actually command, units of each er's branch. One proof of this is the t that some positions may be filled h officers of either branch. The re- onship between infantry and armor much closer than between artillery l either. Infantry and armor do not rely support each other; they actually it side by side and are so closely in- mingled that the duties of officers of h branch cannot be clearly separated. ay not recognize this and combine two branches into one?

Arguments can be raised against this posal. The first is that officers would ve to become qualified in two nches. But this would not require ch more versatility than most success- officers now possess. Another possi- argument is that the merger would luce the effectiveness of both nches. The answer to this is that cers who have in the course of their eers served in both tank and infantry ts will be better qualified to perform ir duties in task forces and combat mands containing both types of ts.

CAPT. LOTHROP MITTENTHAL

Should We Always Assault?

SHOULD we always assault the ob- jective in an attack? The term *as- lt* is used here in its strict sense— loyment, assault fire, and fixed bay- ts.

No one seriously contends that, as- ned an attack mission, we will do thing but assault an objective which suspect is occupied by the enemy. what if our objective appears to be ccupied?

There are many who argue that an necessary" assault wastes time, sacri- s secrecy and surprise, expends am- nition, and increases problems of con- —all without purpose if the objective es to be unoccupied.

Although this line of reasoning seems cal at first glance, it will not stand under close scrutiny. I believe we uld *always* assault. Our doctrines not contain any suggestion that there other ways of taking objectives in a ight attack. This omission is not an accident. Its purpose is to eliminate any doubt that we must assault.

Assault fire was stressed in General George S. Patton's "marching fire" concept, first widely advocated in 1943-44 for the Normandy divisions then training in the United Kingdom. General Patton's idea was simply to be firing from the time of crossing the line of departure until the objective was taken. I recall no doubts about the likelihood of enemy being present. No doubt we were universally confident that we weren't being sent across the beaches for a route march. In any event, emphasis was placed both on the terrifying effect such a volume of advancing fire would have on the German if he were there, and the psychological lift assault fire would give our own troops. Marching fire was widely practiced in the European Theater after 6 June 1944, and at no time was it regarded only as a last resort. It was an accepted part of the attack, almost as automatic as the last hot meal.

The principal difference between marching fire and our present-day assault fire is that the assault position has replaced the LD as the starting point for its delivery. The advantages of this change are obvious. Our intentions are not prematurely disclosed, control is made easier, and less ammunition is expended—all for the same gains. *But the same basic idea is there.* We don't probe an objective in the attack, or patrol it, or sneak up to it. We *assault* it.

And why not assault it?

Because, they say, it isn't necessary if the objective turns out to be unoccupied by the enemy.

Let us examine that argument. The assault is a rifle-platoon operation. The company is, at best, a coordinating echelon. Decisions respecting the assault are not appropriate at echelons higher than the rifle platoon. What medium exists in the procedural hierarchy for the company commander to waive or prohibit the assault by his platoons? What could he plead at his board of inquiry when the Government entered in evidence an extract of his order like this:

3. *a.* 1st Plat: Atk and seize Hill 1. . . .
   s. Don't assault (unless you have to).

So the decision not to assault would have to rest with the platoon leader. Let's set the stage for him and follow him through his estimate.

He's 100 to 150 yards from his objective, at the tentative assault position he selected earlier. The two courses of action open to him are to assault or not to assault. He sees no indication of the enemy. Haven't they told us for two wars now that you never do? General Patton probably had this very point in mind when he called for marching fire.

Assault, then, if you're not certain. But how can you be certain? You can't be, so we should not for any reason deprive the American soldier of the protection our collective assault fire will give him.

Let us hope that in this situation our platoon leader would decide to assault. What would have been in it for him not to assault? Let's look into his thoughts:

Ammunition? What are a few bullets now, more or less? Need them for reorganization? I'll cross that bridge when I come to it.

Secrecy and surprise? If they wanted me to sneak up to this hill I expect they'd have issued me some knives and blackface paint and maybe some Rangers.

Loss of control? Who said that? I hold my arms out parallel and the squads give me the skirmish line. At least they're up and moving. If we were creeping along in column or had split up, it would be hard to get the show on the road when we have to.

Time lost? I'm under no deadline to get this battle over with. It's not part of my mission, or any platoon leader's, to take the objective by a given time. True, I might report to the Old Man that the hill looks vacant, but that along with his meditation might take as long as an assault. Anyway, I believe I can walk up there shooting in less time than any other way.

Later objectives after this one? That's another one of those bridges. Even as good as I am, I'm not wearing this gold bar to think of campaign strategy. My job is to take this hill.

Authority and responsibility? Given an attack mission, I wonder about my legal right to change it to a patrol. If higher headquarters believed there was nobody on that hill, they would probably have ordered a march objective or a phase line.

So he assaulted. However good the risk that no harm would come to his platoon if he didn't assault, our platoon leader found no good reasons not to assault. That's the advice of our school of thought. Assault 'em all, brother, if you're attacking in the light of day! We won't even concede that it will take longer. And we're positive that you'll be a lot better off legally, spiritually, and physically.

LT. COL. JAMES W. GRAHAM

IRONS IN THE FIRE

Battlefield X-Ray Unit





The Army Medical Research Laboratory has developed a portable x-ray unit for use on the battlefield. Weighing only 48 pounds, the complete unit can be carried on the back of a medical aid man (*above right*). It is powered by a tiny piece of radioactive thulium, and a ¼-inch lead plate protects the user from accidental radiation exposure. The x-ray can produce a picture without electricity, water, or a darkroom. The thulium is effective for about a year, after which it can be rejuvenated by means of an atomic pile.

Instead of film the x-ray unit uses radiosensitive paper and pads, which are saturated with developer and stabilizer and are held in a cassette that is wrapped in a light-proof, water-proof covering. When the cassette is exposed, the paper records the radiograph. The device does not produce pictures with the fine detail of standard x-ray films, but it is suitable for field and emergency use.

An average man can learn to operate the x-ray unit in a few hours. The complete process of setting up the machine and taking and developing a picture takes from five to ten minutes. It is estimated that the unit will cost approximately $200 when it is commercially manufactured.

Transport Gets Auxiliary Jets

In tests conducted recently, two small jet engines were used as auxiliary power sources for the C-123B assault transport, in order to increase safety on take-offs. The two Fairchild J44 turbojet units were placed on the plane's wingtips, providing an additional 2,000 pounds of thrust. No special fuel is needed, since the J44 operates on regular aviation gasoline drawn from the plane's main nacelle tanks.

Maintenance Made Easy

The Corps of Engineers' Research and
velopment Laboratories are getting re
from a program to reduce maintenance p
lems by modifying the parts of heavy eq
ment that give maintenance crews the
trouble.

One development is the hydrajuster, a
vice that permits adjustment of a bulldo
track with a standard grease gun. Ano
time-saver is the installation of hinges on
two-piece radiator guard. One man can
remove or place the guard in position, a
formerly requiring three men. By rerou
hydraulic lines, the engineers have mad
possible to remove a bulldozer's cylind
tank, hose, and pump without having to
move the complete hydraulic unit and dr
ing the hydraulic system.

Remote-Control Helicopter



A remote-control helicopter has been de
oped by the Office of Naval Research
the Kaman Aircraft Corp. The control
tem is similar to that used for fixed-wing
craft, but the varied flight capabilities of
copters make the problems far more com
In these tests a pilot has remained in the
craft to take over in case of emerge
The helicopter, which is controlled from
ground, is designed for research and dev
ment purposes.

Curved Relief Maps

Maps showing the earth's curvature as
as relief have been produced by Panor
Studios. Measuring 23 inches in diam
each map represents a continental section
en from a 30-inch globe. They are mad
colored plastic and can be hung on wal
TI&E boards. Each map weighs 14 ou

:kside Crane

n experimental 100-foot cargo-handling al gantry crane has been developed by the :rican Hoist and Derrick Company, to ifications prepared by the Transportation :arch and Development Command, Fort :is, Va. The crane, which is being used at Army's Hampton Roads Sub-Port of Em- ation, can pick up a ten-ton trailer on a le hook.

›ke Provides Atomic Shield

he Chemical Corps has devised a method vhich it hopes radically to reduce casual- of an atomic or hydrogen attack. Recent have shown that heavy smoke, such as strial plants produce, will absorb much of heat from an atomic explosion and thus tly reduce the radius of an atomic bomb's ıl heat effect.

ısportable Atomic Plant



:tures have been released of the Army age Power Reactor, which will be the atom-powered generating plant whose ›onents can be transported by air. The ›r, designed by American Locomotive under contract with the Atomic Energy mission, is expected to be ready in three . It will be built at Fort Belvoir, Va.

New Helicopter

The Army has contracted with Bell Aircraft Corp. for a new medium-sized helicopter to be used for evacuation, general utility, and instrument training. Designated by Bell as the Model 212, the helicopter carries 800 pounds of cargo, has a cruising speed of 100 knots, and a ceiling of 6,000 feet. Its rate of climb is 1,500 feet a minute.

The 212 is similar to the Bell H-13 but somewhat larger. It is designed to provide a compromise between small helicopters, whose payloads are severely limited, and the large models, whose costs are excessive. It is not known how many of the 212s will be purchased by the Army. A number have already been ordered for testing and evaluation.

Sub-Machine Gun for NATO

The British Sterling sub-machine gun may soon become standard equipment for all NATO forces. Weighing six pounds and firing 575 rounds of 9mm ammunition a minute, the Sterling has been battle tested in Korea, Malaya, and Kenya. Among its features are accuracy up to 200 yards, a self-cleaning breech block that automatically removes fouling, and a double-feed 34-round magazine.

When its butt is folded away the gun can be fired with one hand like a pistol. The Sterling has been adopted by the British army, replacing the Sten gun. It is expected that it will soon be put into mass production in Canada, since 15 countries have already placed orders.

Mine Exploder



An experimental mine-exploding device consisting of parallel steel discs has been developed by the Corps of Engineers' Research and Development Laboratories. Known as the High Herman, the device weighs 36 tons. It is shown here being pushed by an M46 tank. During World War II, several types of tank-propelled rollers, rotating flails, and plows were used for detonating mines with varying degrees of success.

All-Magnesium Aircraft

The Air Research and Development Command has announced the completion of an experimental all-magnesium aircraft. The plane, an F-80C, was built by East Coast Aeronautics, Inc. and is currently being run through tests at the Wright Air Development Center, Dayton, Ohio, in order to determine the suitability of magnesium in the structures of fighter-type aircraft. Engineers list several advantages of a magnesium airframe: the metal is probably the best substitute known for aluminum; its supply is almost inexhaustible; it is probably the most efficient structural material throughout the usable temperature ranges of light alloys; and its cost is less than that of aluminum.

Detector of Germ Warfare

A device to detect the presence of biological and radiological agents in the air has been developed at the Biological Warfare Center, Camp Detrick, Md. Called the aerosoloscope, this instrument automatically counts germs and radioactive particles, and it can be used to give warning of an enemy germ warfare attack.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

Meteorology Training Aids

Field artillery electronic and antiaircraft artillery meteorology sections are currently using the new Rawinsonde system for the measurement of weather elements aloft. This system consists of a radiosonde, a Rawin set, and a radiosonde recorder. The radiosonde is used to measure and report temperature, pressure and humidity in the atmosphere above the ground, and acts as a target for measuring wind direction and speed. The radiosonde is carried aloft by means of a hydrogen-inflated balloon. It is a box containing a transmitter; a modulator; an antenna; and pressure, temperature, and humidity-sensing elements. The transmitter operates in the ultra-high frequency band. The radiosonde's radio wave is modulated at an audio rate determined by the pressure, temperature, and relative humidity in the vicinity of the radiosonde.

The Rawin set is a transportable radio direction-finder which automatically tracks the radiosonde during its flight and processes the radiosonde signal. The Rawin set also indicates and records on a control recorder the azimuth and elevation angles and time in flight of the radiosonde. These azimuth and elevation angles, representing the flight course of the radiosonde, can be plotted with the height (computed from temperature and pressure data) to determine wind direction and wind speed. The radiosonde recorder is an electronic instrument which records on graph paper the weather information transmitted by the radiosonde. The weather soundings are fed to the recorder in the form of audible tones. A preflight calibration establishes the relationship between the audible tones and both temperature and relative humidity. As the data are received, they are converted into actual temperature and relative humidity values. Pressure values are determined from a preflight setting and a pressure calibration chart which is issued with each radiosonde. The Rawinsonde system is capable of measuring weather elements up to altitudes of approximately 100,000 feet over horizontal distances up to 125 miles. These measurements are used in the preparation of ballistic corrections for the effect of the atmosphere on the trajectory of projectiles, missiles, and rockets.

This system has certain disadvantages. The cost of the expendable equipment used for each flight is about $100, and the radiosonde is a poor instructional aid owing to its complex nature and small size. TAS has adopted two training aids as measures to reduce the considerable expense involved in the instruction in the operation and theory of the Rawinsonde System and to provide an element large enough to facilitate instruction.

The first of these training aids is a commercial-type magnetic tape recorder. The audible tones representing the atmospheric soundings made by the radiosonde during flight are recorded on a tape recorder. The



Radiosonde mock-up

tape is then played back to as many as 20 radiosonde recorders during instruction on the evaluation of radiosonde soundings. The necessary preflight calibration and instructions are also recorded, so that each playback represents a realistic radiosonde flight. The meteorology division of TAS has built up a library of tape-recorded flights taken during various weather conditions. The use of this training aid not only assures uniformity of instruction but also saves approximately $8,000 a year.

The second of these training aids is an operational mock-up of a radiosonde (*see cut*) which is large enough to instruct a class of forty students. Its unique construction permits uniform and simplified instruction in the following subjects: Operation and theory of the radiosonde; preflight calibration of temperature and humidity tones; and preflight setting of the barometric switch.

The mock-up was designed and constructed at TAS at an estimated cost of $300. Plans and schematics are available to interested agencies by writing to the Secretary of The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

THE INFANTRY SCHO

Regular Officers at TIS

All new Regular Army officers are required to take the Ranger and airbo courses at TIS. The purpose of this ru is to encourage the aggressive spirit to successful combat leaders, to incr self-confidence through the completion difficult training, and to develop a hi standard of physical fitness. The firs the new officers, most of them 1954 g uates of the Military Academy, compl the training in February.

ROTC Summer Camp

Approximately 1,500 ROTC cadets attend the 1955 summer camp at Benning from 25 June through 5 Aug Most of the training will be in the and will include technical service unit c onstrations and exercises staged by

New Films

The Concept of the Attack and the angular Infantry Organization, TF 7-1 21 minutes. This film shows how the angular concept of organization in the tack can be applied at all levels of c mand and on all types of terrain. It i ceiving Army-wide distribution.

Shooting began in March at TIS new training film, *The Airborne Sol* and eight supplementary film bulle The bulletins will cover the following jects: assembly problems after the no jump; personnel parachute malfunctio personnel parachute entanglements; chute landing falls; parachute trainin the 34-foot tower; conduct of a parach in the aircraft; the swing landing trai and parachute recovery during no training. The release date for the films be announced.

TIS Instructional Material

The following new instructional terial suitable for non-resident as we resident instruction may be ordered the Book Department, The Infa School, Fort Benning, Ga., at the p shown. On orders of less than one do add 25¢ for postage and handling.

Battalion in the Attack, 2211-US Practical work in planning a battalion tack, with emphasis on the plan of ma ver and plan of supporting fire. Princ

:able to interior units in offensive ıt (*e.g.* a reinforced interior battal- emphasizing the employment of the e during an attack. Four hours. 30¢.

mmand and Leadership—Problems in ıing and Combat, 6182-R-USAR. ɜrence and practical exercises designed velop leadership problems at the bat- and regimental level. Two hours.

ıp and Aerial Photograph Reading, USAR. Application of photomaps to round. Includes orienting the photomap, plotting and locating points on the ground from the point-designation grid, comparing ground forms to the photomap, locating points by polar coordinates, applying intersection and resection, locating positions by photomap-ground inspection and a daylight cross-country march. Four hours. $1.

First Aid, 7731B-7747. A discussion of the principles of first aid and the employment of these principles in treating wounds. Two hours. 35¢.

Tank Recognition and Identification Pamphlet. An aid for the uniform training of personnel in the recognition and identification of tanks, methods used in training and vehicles that (at present) are considered operational. 10¢.

Mechanical Training, AR M1918A2, VF-1108. Mechanical training on the AR, methods of instruction and the use of training aids and assistant instructors. Four hours. 10¢.

Rocket Launcher, 3.5-Inch, VF-1221. Characteristics of 3.5-inch rocket launchers and rockets, methods of instruction and marksmanship firing. Four hours. 10¢.

Considerations of Offensive Combat, the Infantry Battalion, 2200-USAR. General considerations of the infantry battalion in offensive combat. Two hours. 35¢.

Battalion Coordinated Antitank Defense Plan, 2413-USAR. Development of the antitank defense plan. Consideration of the characteristics and tactical employment of antitank weapons organic to the battalion and those weapons normally attached to or in support of the battalion. One hour. 20¢.

General Considerations of Defensive Combat, 2500-A2. Fundamentals and types of defense. Includes mobile defense and the influence of atomic weapons. One hour. 50¢.

Command and Leadership—Problems of Command, 6108-R-USAR. Discussion of command and leadership problems which may confront a company officer. Includes an analysis of techniques employed in the solution of such problems. One hour. 15¢.

New Vehicle-Bridge Classification Signs

ΓHE Engineer School has developed a system by which drivers can quick- y tell whether or not their vehicles ɜn safely cross any given bridge. Numbers are fixed on vehicles and ɔridges, and the driver can cross if ıis vehicle's number is lower than that f the bridge. This system has been dopted by all NATO countries.

Bridges that are used for both two- vay and one-way traffic will have two ıumbers on their signs. If the bridge ; being used for two-way traffic, the river will compare his own number vith the number on the right of the ɔridge's sign, while if it is being used ɔr one-way traffic, he will read the ɜft-hand number.

Other bridges will have different umbers for tracked and wheeled ve- icles. The number for the former vill be at the bottom of the sign and ɔr the latter at the top. Combination ɜailer-trucks) and towed vehicles will ɜrry their own numbers on their des and a temporary combination umber on the front. The combina- on number will not necessarily be as igh as the sum of the two numbers.

This new doctrine will be contained ı FM 5-36, *Route Reconnaissance nd Classification,* which has been re- ɜritten by TES. It will be released ɔon through AG publications depots.

Figure 1. A sign for a two-lane bridge. The right-hand number is used when the bridge is being used for two-way traffic, the left-hand number for one-way traffic.

Figure 2. A sign for a dual-class bridge. The top number is for wheeled vehicles, the bottom one for tracked vehicles.

Figure 3. Two signs are needed for a dual-class, two-way bridge. The sign at the left shows the numbers that the driver of a wheeled vehicle must refer to when the bridge is being used for one-way traffic (number on left of sign) and two-way traffic (number on right of sign). The right-hand sign shows the same thing for tracked vehicles.



igure 4. A combination vehicle such as this trailer-truck will carry a sign ɔr each component and another temporary sign for the combination. Note that the combination number carried on the front of the vehicle is smaller than the sum of the other two numbers.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Course in Refrigeration

The Refrigeration Section, Dept. of Mechanical and Technical Equipment of TES offers a complete course in refrigeration and air-conditioning. The intensive 12-week training program teaches the theory, installation, maintenance, and replacement of refrigeration equipment and other equipment that directly supports it.

Each year approximately 600 men are graduated from the course, which provides the personnel needed for the installation and sustained maintenance of all Army and Air Force refrigeration equipment.

Air Compressor Manual

A technical manual on the air compressor used on Nike sites throughout the U.S. is being prepared by Design Service, a private engineer consultant firm, with the assistance of the Dept. of Mechanical and Technical Equipment of TES. The manual will cover the assembly, disassembly, operation, and maintenance of the 3500-pounds-per-square-inch compressor.

COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA

Infantry—Artillery—Armor

By

Major Russell A. Gugeler

Here is the war in Korea—at the fighting level. The true accounts of outstanding small-unit actions written by a trained soldier-observer and historian from on-the-spot observations and interviews with the men who actually did the fighting. Working as a member of the observer team from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Major Gugeler has made the most of his unique opportunity and material to bring out the drama and boredom, the gallantry and fear, the flashes of brilliance and stupidity which add up to a splendid digest of combat lessons that every soldier should read.

Reviewers say:

". . . For anybody who has ever served in war, for anybody who will ever have to serve in war." George Barrett, in *New York Times Sunday Book Review.*

". . . Of considerable professional interest to any military student and of particular interest to those who were there." Maj. J. R. Stevens, in *Marine Corps Gazette.*

"The ground forces would do well to set this book up as required reading." Army Times' *The American Daily.*

". . . The most effective literary indoctrination available in our language to those who seek a vicarious introduction to war at the fighting level." Charles B. MacDonald, in *Armor.*

$5.00

260 Pages

THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

(continued from page 8)

called back to the States, however, where he served in the Office of the Chief of Staff and later as executive officer of the Department of Tactics at West Point.

General Fritzsche returned to Europe in 1945 as intelligence staff officer of the 12th Army Group, and later in the year he became deputy assistant chief of staff for intelligence of U.S. forces in Europe. He attended the National War College from 1948 to 1949, and then assumed command of the 23d Infantry at Fort Lewis, Wash. After serving as an instructor at the Army War College, General Fritzsche went to the Far East in 1952 and became assistant Commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Korea. He assumed his present duties at Fort Benning in May 1953.

Lieutenant Benson L. Grayson, MI-USAR ("What About Zhukov?" *page 25*) is a reservist and a student at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, where he is completing the requirements for a Ph.D. in Soviet military operations.

Captain Richard P. Taffe, Infantry ("Homburgs and Helmets" *page 30*) has recently completed a tour of duty in the Office of the Chief of Information and Education. He is currently attending the Advanced Officers' Course at The Infantry School.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond W. Millican, Artillery ("Divide and Conquer" *page 28*) is a 1940 graduate of the Military Academy. He is assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.

Captain Frank M. Tatum, Infantry (". . . Toward a More Flexible Patrol . . ." *page 36*), is an instructor in infantry tactics at The Artillery School. He served in Korea as a company commander with the 7th Infantry.

Major Reginald Hargreaves ("The German as an Ally" *page 38*) is a retired British Army officer whose articles about some of the lesser-known byways of military history have appeared in several publications, including previous issues of The Army Combat Forces Journal. Being a combat veteran of the First World War, Major Hargreaves has a perhaps too intimate knowledge of the capabilities of the German soldier. He writes: "I am punched as full of holes as a colander and still walk with a bit of a limp owing to his professional attentions."

Lieutenant Colonel DeWitt C. Armstrong, III, Armor ("Cadre for West German Army?" *page 40*), c mands the 1st Battalion, 2d Arm Cavalry, in Bavaria, where he has an opportunity to observe the Ger border police force in garrison, on der patrol, and in field training.

Captain Boyd T. Bashore, Infa ("Planning the New Army" *page* was on duty with the 42d Armored fantry Battalion in Germany until fall, when he was assigned to the 71 Tank Battalion at Fort Benning.

Corporal Jack Stanley ("He Why I'm Not an Active Reservist" *p 48*) is the pseudonym of a journ who was separated from active duty 1953.

This month's cerebrators (*pages 51*) discuss training, tactics, and ganization. Lieutenant Colonel E F. Swift, Infantry, is assigned to Range Control Section at Fort Benn He enlisted in the Army in 1933, later went to West Point where he graduated in 1940. Captain Easy the *nom de plume* of a Regular A Infantry officer who has had wide perience in military writing and edu tion. Captain Lothrop Mittenti is S3 of a California National Gu armored infantry battalion. While active duty he served with infan units. Lieutenant Colonel James Graham, Infantry, is on duty with Tactical Department of The Infan School.

Our book reviewers this month clude Dr. Stefan T. Possony, is a professor of political science Georgetown University in the eveni and a civilian working for the Air Fo during the day. He is the author of S *tegic Air Power,* and other books military and foreign policy. Colo Frederick Bernays Wiener, JA USAR, is a Washington attorney has been a regular contributor to magazine for several years. Major G eral H. W. Blakeley (retired) commander of the 4th Infantry Divis in Europe during World War II. has written many articles on milit subjects. Burton D. Munhall is ordnance engineer who has collabora in the writing of two books on cen fire pistol and revolver cartridges. Li tenant Colonel E. G. Piper, A USAR, is on duty with the Correct Division of the Office of The Prov Marshal General in Washington.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

tegic Alternatives

MERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE
By Colonel George C. Reinhardt
University of Oklahoma Press, 1955
236 Pages; Index; $3.75

wed by
AN T. POSSONY

ost readers of THE JOURNAL undoubt- know Colonel Reinhardt as a highly etent professional soldier-engineer and hor with Colonel William R. Kintner well-known book, *Atomic Weapons nd Combat.* In the present work, the r has attempted a highly ambitious taking: he has tried, within some pages, to discuss all world strategical presently confronting the United and to do so in simple language. The is a highly readable book packed full rect and inaccurate information, chal- g argument, and attractive, though ways persuasive, solutions.

s book should satisfy the general and the strategic thinker, but proba- ill arouse the ire of any specialist area of interest has been slighted; esumably this will include most spe- . There is a great need for short mprehensible books on strategy. If tical faculties of the various special- ups must be satisfied (if that were tical objective), a 2,000- rather than -page volume would be required I am afraid, no one would read, let buy. This is the rare book, then, faults are identical with its virtues: and simplicity had to be paid for neglect of full documentation and ve reasoning. The author just does all he knows. It is a great tribute onel Reinhardt that he succeeded so setting forth the main alternatives ssibilities of American strategy.

is highly objective. The military neither a cure-all nor a phantasma- It does not stand alone but is ac- ied by the peaceful atom. Military h is required and war remains a dis- ossibility, but a really effective for- licy with a convincing ideology be- is no less necessary. There is a ide threat posed by Communism re are also many regional and local ns within whose framework Communism does its damaging work. Anti-Communism is indispensable but not enough; there also must be a positive program. American interests must be defended more effectively than in the past but the interests of our allies must be satisfied too. The free and democratic nations must unite their efforts but alliances without leadership, common purpose, and a modicum of courage do not work.

As I understand it, the author proposes the following broad strategy: American foreign policy must be made effective by basing itself on firm operational "guide lines"; the author presents such "guide lines" in forceful language. It must use the various strengths at its disposal, including economic resources such as the peaceful atom and spiritual resources such as our political values. It must aim to effect the necessary "conversions"—surely this term has never before appeared in a strategic treatise. American policy also should aim at ending the current two-power duality and bringing about a global multipower balance, with Europe again being self-reliant and secure, and U.S. overseas forces largely redeployed to the Middle East. The economic strength of the free world must be stimulated into further growth, the alliance of free nations be revitalized in an organization called CONATS (for truly cooperating nations), and the Soviet leaders be persuaded to see that they cannot achieve world domination, nor even maintain the *status quo* as unwelcome conquerors of many non-Russian lands. Once the free world finds itself in a position of true strength, once "dormant discontent" within the Soviet orbit begins to "burgeon," we might attempt to negotiate "the withdrawal of the Red Army to new borders." It will take at least a decade to reach a point where such a negotiation can be undertaken with some hope of success.

Can we not get there faster through force?

"Historical situations involving a two-sided power struggle have usually resulted in a military showdown disastrous to both contestants, the victor too weakened to enjoy his triumph. This reason, plus the shadow of the hydrogen bomb, favors a strategy which will eventually roll back communism, not destroy Russian power even were that within our means to accomplish. . . . We cannot, if we are to succeed, demand or instigate a complete abdication of Soviet power or a complete recasting of the Soviet people in our image. We can encourage Soviet leaders who are willing to consider a retraction, not the abolition, of Soviet power in return for tangible benefits. . . . History indicates that men can be found who will themselves believe that some accommodation with the free world is a necessary step in a progressive alteration of the Soviet system. Any basic alteration in Soviet society will have to be conceived and carried through by the varied peoples comprising it. External manipulation cannot achieve what the people themselves do not want. We need only do what has been done so often in history—help those leaders, even from the top level of the Party, who will risk working with us to better their own people. If the German General Staff could open Lenin's path to power, is it beyond our capabilities to find the man, or men, to lead a more liberal Russia to cooperate with, rather than undercut, the United States?"

This is a novel approach which may be startling to many readers. Yet Colonel Reinhardt's case deserves an attentive hearing. The careful study of *American Strategy in the Atomic Age* is strongly recommended.

How Not to Do It

HAWAII UNDER ARMY RULE
By J. Garner Anthony
Stanford University Press, 1955
204 pages; $5.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

As VJ-day recedes into the background of the past, the story of martial law in Hawaii appears at first blush to be just another chronicle of

> Old, forgotten, far-off things,
> And battles long ago.

But as the brooding threat of nuclear warfare is more and more impressed on our thinking, as the civic dislocation which

would inevitably follow the dropping of even a single bomb—A or H—becomes increasingly a subject for study and concern, it is appropriate, not to say necessary, to review the only recent example from our history of virtually complete military control over domestic territory.

Martial law was initiated in Hawaii by proclamation of the Governor on the afternoon of Pearl Harbor Day. But instead of calling on the land and naval forces for assistance, instead of calling on the local commanders for military aid to the civil power, the Governor asked the commanding general to become the civil power—as Military Governor. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this step was not warranted by law. None the less, from December 1941 until July 1944, the senior Army officer in Hawaii bore the title of Military Governor of Hawaii, and until February 1943, exercised virtually complete governmental powers.

Unfortunately, he and his advisers lost sight of the principle that as necessity creates the occasion for martial rule, so it limits the extent and duration of such rule, with the result that convenience rather than necessity became the governing yardstick in Hawaii. Most questionable of all was the military order that closed the courts, and of course it is well known that, in 1946, the Supreme Court held illegal all military trials of civilians.

Some of the intervening incidents had all the earmarks of *opera bouffe*. When the Federal judge issued a writ of habeas corpus, the commanding general countered with a military order, the notorious GO 31, prohibiting this judge (by name) from entertaining any such proceeding, under pain of trial by military commission and punishment up to imprisonment for life. The judge thereupon cited the general for contempt, the general played hide-and-seek with the marshal who attempted to serve him, and, in the end, had to be rescued by a Presidential pardon from the consequences of his own militant precipitancy.

The validity of military trials of civilians had been upheld by the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit late in 1944. Before the cases could be heard in the Supreme Court, the war was over; but the prisoners were not released. "We've got to back up the theater commander!" Well, he was backed right up into the buzz-saw of an adverse decision that will be a substantial stumbling-block in any future dislocating emergency. And a good many questions, vital to future commanders, remain unanswered. For instance, if the writ of habeas corpus should be validly suspended in a future invasion because, in the language of the Constitution, "the public safety may require it," may a court inquire as to the necessity for such action? And if a commander, during such suspension, detains suspected individuals, is he thereafter subject to damage suits after the privilege of the writ is restored?

The volume under review is written by an acknowledged leader of the Hawaiian bar, who was Attorney General of the Territory during part of the war, and who was winning counsel in the Supreme Court cases to which reference has already been made. The picture he paints is, needless to say, a critical one, and his book reflects as well some personal animosities that could profitably have been deleted in the editing process. None the less, it is an account that the Army should ponder, for in large measure it is a how-not-to-do-it book. Certainly this is a subject worthy of the attention of the most senior of our service schools.

One basic criticism, however, must be noted: The thrust of Mr. Anthony's argument is that martial law was allowed to go on for years without correction from the War Department because of the precept that the judgment of the military commander in the field should not be disturbed. He repeats the statement, cherished in Hawaii, that President Roosevelt never saw the Governor's original proclamation of martial law. And so the picture presented is that of stubborn military adherence to error, without action by superior civil authority.

But is it conceivable that FDR never knew what went on? Even if it could be supposed that Mr. Stimson did not properly keep the President advised, can it be imagined for a moment that Secretary Ickes, who was fighting martial law from at least the summer of 1942, or Attorney General Biddle, who was on Ickes's side in the controversy, never got to the White House to protest? In order that the matter might not rest in conjecture or on the probabilities, this reviewer made inquiry of the Honorable John J. McCloy, who was Assistant Secretary of War during all of the period in question. Mr. McCloy replied:

> . . . I do not have all my papers at hand and so can not cite you chapter and verse. However, the situation in Hawaii was gone over with President. Secretary Stimson was in constant touch with the President both by visits and telephone; drafts were discussed with the Attorney General, and I know there was a conference with the President about them.

This book, then, merits careful study. But the definitive history of Hawaiian martial law has yet to be written.

Provocative View

THE INFLUENCE OF FORCE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Captain W. D. Puleston, USN, Retired
D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955
261 Pages; Index; $4.50

Reviewed by
MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY

Captain Puleston's current book is controversial. Among those who will not like it are believers in the United Nations, friends and admirers of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, many Air Force off and all those who believe that an inh element in the American philosoph that our armed forces must not strike first blows in any future war. Perha would be more accurate to say that of these diverse groups will not like of *The Influence of Force in Foreign lations.*

In a chapter called "Is the World R for the United Nations?" Captain P ton's answer runs along the line tha objective of the UN organization is a and permanent peace, and that everyt is to be subordinated to that end, temporarily, peace itself, because the curity Council is directed to prepare a forces to be used to avert or suppress This, he argues, would, if success carried out, result in a static world poli ly, and "such a world might well stagnant world." Elsewhere he says Great Britain, Russia, and the U States agree, the super State is superfl if they disagree it is helpless."

Fleet Admiral King is by far the aut favorite character. The book is dedi to him, and among the compliments him is an interesting one in conne with a discussion of whether or not should have been given command o fleet in the Pacific: "There is no que that King was needed in Washington he was badly needed in the Pacific strain MacArthur. It would have been for the nation if the Navy had had disposal two Admiral Kings."

Also in the field of personal appra the author's comment that Churchill' quent notes to his land, sea, and air commanders (many of these notes a cluded in the appendices of his World II volumes) indicate "a complete la confidence . . . in his professiona sistants." The true picture seems ratl be that of a leader on top of his job, it every minute, and using the judiciously and, admittedly, vigorousl

Captain Puleston's discussion of characteristics and limitations of air and land forces is of professional int Air and Army officers will inevitably that it has a Navy slant, but ther many indications that officers of al armed forces are becoming more rec to the consideration without resen of the points of view of members of services.

At times, Captain Puleston seems arguing against unity of command. calls General Marshall's proposal just Pearl Harbor to establish unity of mand over all the forces of Am Britain, Holland, and Australia, in t called ABDA area, "catastrophic." H disagrees, as did the British Govern with the idea of the American Ch Staff that a Supreme Commander s be appointed to command all the operations against Germany from bot Atlantic and the Mediterranean. It be that Captain Puleston is actually

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A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

AIR COMMANDO. By Serge Vaculik. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1955. 320 Pages; $4.00. A factual story of a young Czech who escaped from the Germans to join De Gaulle, was captured by the Spaniards and was recaptured by the Germans while working with the Free French. Some of the adventures are close to incredible; very good reading but it out-fictions fiction.

THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM. By Lewis Mayers. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 589 Pages; Index; $7.50. An examination of our legal institutions as distinguished from our laws, written for the layman. It has a rather extensive section on military courts and tribunals in which the author mentions the problem of separating the commander's wishes from the actual outcome of the trial.

AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE ATOMIC AGE. By Colonel George C. Reinhardt. University of Oklahoma Press, 1955. 236 Pages; Index; $3.75. A geopolitical approach to America's foreign policy with positive recommendations that do not include the necessity for a shooting war.

FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS. By Charles Abrams. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 404 Pages; Index; $5.00. An examination of the problem of minority groups and race prejudices in American housing. A rather complete study and one that may become a rather important tool for sociologists.

FROM HERE TO SHIMBASHI. By John Sack. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 214 Pages; Illustrated; $2.75. Another slightly strained attempt at Army humor but this one, strangely enough, brings forth a few chuckles from those whose service has lasted more than a couple of years.

AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPAN. By Herschel Webb. Columbia University Press, 1955. 130 Pages; $2.75. A short once-over-lightly which offers in a very few pages helpful information on the land and the people, history, government, economic life, social and cultural life, fine arts, literature, religion and philosophy. A masterpiece of compression.

MAN ON EARTH. By Jacquetta Hawkes. Random House, 1955. 242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. A book on man's early beginnings and following man's evolution to the present, with a slight projection to the future. Written in inspirational vein.

MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. By William B. Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel. University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 430 Pages; Index; Appendix; $7.50. A textbook based on the decisions of the Court of Military Appeals rendered during the first three years of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

THE NAVY WIFE. By Anne Briscoe Pye and Nancy Shea. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 336 Pages; Index; $3.50. The third revised edition of what has long been a standard military book.

NO FACILITIES FOR WOMEN. By Charlotte Ebener. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955. 291 Pages; Index; $3.75. A feminine war correspondent writes of her adventures in odd corners of the world, beginning with China in 1944 and going on to Korea, Indochina, Yugoslavia, the Middle East and the Himalayas. Not an important book, but it does give a slightly different view of late events in some of the odd corners of the world.

NO. 13, BOB. By Jean Overton Fuller. Little, Brown & Co., 1955. 240 Pages; $3.50. A book about a failure of British intelligence in World War II which may cause quite a stir. It is a story of the success of German counter-espionage and, according to the publishers, an attempt was made to suppress the author's investigation of this particular case.

THE PASSIONATE STATE OF MIND. By Eric Hoffer. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 151 Pages; $2.50. 280 aphorisms by the author of *The True Believer,* for the same audience. Biting and provocative.

THE POOR MAN'S GUIDE TO EUROPE, 1955. By David Dodge. Random House, 1955. 307 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50. How to do your European traveling on a slim budget. Chattily written and on the whole should prove a useful guide book, especially for military personnel overseas.

SCOTLAND YARD. By Sir Harold Scott. Random House, 1955. 256 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. Another in a long series of descriptive books of probably the most glamorous of police agencies. This one was written by a man who was the Commissioner of Police during 1945-1953 and covers a wide area of information from recruiting to planning for state visits by foreign royalty.

SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD. By W. H. B. Smith. Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. 768 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00. A revised and enlarged volume of a standard text; contains information on the F.N. rifles and other new matériel. A useful book for weapons experts and just plain gun bugs.

SPIES AT WORK: A History of Espionage. By Ronald Seth. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955. 234 Pages; Index; $4.75. A history of espionage in 228 pages cannot be very profound; in portions it is quite interesting.

STILL THE RICE GROWS GREEN. By John C. Caldwell. Henry Regnery Company, 1955. 312 Pages; $3.75. Mr. Caldwell finds very little good in our handling of the Far East question by the State Department and USIA and much to criticize in the Army's role in our relations with the Orient. The underlying theme is one of hope that the people of Asia are not lost to the forces of evil.

TWO STUDIES IN SOVIET CONTROLS: COMMUNISM AND THE RUSSIAN PEASANT and MOSCOW IN CRISIS. By Herbert S. Dinerstein and Leon Goure. The Free Press, 1955. 254 Pages; Notes; Bibliography; $4.50. A particularly timely report on Russia showing the difficulties of effective control of the Russian peasant under the collective farm system and the reactions of the people of Soviet Russia to the seemingly imminent capture of Moscow by Hitler's armies in October, 1941.

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS. By Mattie E. Treadwell. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. 841 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.25. A thicker-than-usual volume of the official history that will explain to the World War II soldier many points in connection with the Women's Army Corps that seemed inexplicable at the time.

WHY JOHNNY CAN'T READ AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. By Rudolf Flesch. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 222 Pages; $3.00. The famed author of *The Art of Plain Talk* advocates what is basically a return to the fundamentals that we 40-year-old-and-over people were drilled in before educational concepts changed. Phonics is the answer although it is not quite that simple.

cerned with what is permissible in the geographic size of a command rather than disagreeing with the principle itself. He does have an interesting point in discussing the fact that the Japanese General Homma refused to accept the surrender of Corregidor unless Wainwright included all the United States troops in the Philippines. "Wainwright, thanks to the Army system of extending commands over vast areas, felt obliged," says Puleston, "to comply with Homma's demands. . . ." Nevertheless, at some level, unity of command is gen regarded as necessary. The question well be: "What level?" And suppose eral Bradley had been surprised and f to surrender in Luxembourg City d the Battle of the Bulge. Would he

to surrender the entire 12th Army ıp? An absurdity, of course, but it is ɜtimes possible to argue from the ex- ıes of a problem back to a sound solu-

aptain Puleston is strongly opposed to theory that in any future war the ny must be allowed to strike the first ɾ. His alternative is essentially de- lence on an ultimatum when a dan- us situation is thought to exist. He be- ·s that if we persist in a policy of npted retaliation on an enemy priv- d to deliver the first blow, some fu- historian will record how citizens of United States "committed national de."

Code is Here to Stay

ARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

William B. Aycock and Seymour W. Wurfel
e University of North Carolina Press, 1955
0 Pages; $7.50

ewed by
ONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

he Uniform Code of Military Justice, its capstone, a civilian Court of Mili- Appeals, has now been in operation early four years, and, notwithstanding current rumbling from the services, will be with us in essentially their ·nt form for a long time to come. It be galling to the high JAG brass that hitherto inviolate system of military ·s is now subject to review by out- s, but so long as the members of ɜress can reply to anguished commu- ions from constituents with the re- ing news that the misconduct of poor nderstood and maltreated Johnny may ɔpealed to a civilian tribunal, there is anger—or, depending on the point of , no hope—that the Court of Military ·als will soon be abolished. The 531 ɜmen on the Hill are now out of the -martial business, and few if any sh the slightest desire of reentering it. ıe Court then, and most of the Code, ıere to stay—but until very recently was no workable key to the mass of ons, not always too consistent, that been handed down.

ɔfessor Aycock and Colonel Wurfel filled the previously existing gap, and written a first-rate and eminently l textbook on present-day military They cover jurisdiction of courts- al, the law officer, all of the incidents ɜ trial, appellate review, the problem ɜ sufficiency of the evidence as a mat- law, punishments, the rules of evi- , the punitive articles, military habeas s, and the vexed problems of "mili- lue process" and "general prejudice." several chapters are logically subdi- , making it easy to turn to the precise on which guidance is sought. All opinions through 13 August 1954 been considered.

y criticisms of the work under review shade into personal preferences as to emphasis and interpretation. On occasion there is too much reference to military antiquity, in other places the historical development of jurisdictional concepts and of the machinery of military appellate review, both of which are still illuminating today, seems not to be sufficiently emphasized. Parts of the discussion on military habeas corpus appear more hopeful than the most recent decisions on critical analysis would seem to justify. But then, as is well known, any time three lawyers gather together, they express four opinions, and a reading of recent CMA decisions (with often two and three separate opinions per case) will assuredly dispel any notion that military law is either an exact or a predictable science.

To repeat: This is a first-rate text, which every military lawyer will want—and need.

For the Gun Bug

SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD
by W. H. B. Smith
Military Service Publishing Co., 1955
768 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $10.00

Reviewed by
BURTON D. MUNHALL

In December of 1943 Walter H. B. Smith published *A Basic Manual of Military Small Arms.* This 213-page paperbound volume, selling at two dollars, enjoyed immediate favor with service men and civilians who at that time were particularly thirsty for knowledge of military small arms. Since 1943 this volume has been issued in five revised and enlarged editions in eleven printings. This 1955 volume is the fifth revised and enlarged edition with 250 additional pages and resembles its forebears only in the fact that it remains a treatise on military infantry weapons of many nationalities.

The first 230 pages are devoted to a historical discussion of all types of military small arms explaining, in brief, the development of each type. While no one volume could possibly give the full history of arms, Smith presents an interesting story which covers the more important achievements in this field.

The most valuable portion of the book to the arms student is Part II entitled "Current Weapons." This 526-page section is subdivided alphabetically by nationality and covers twenty-nine countries. It apparently was the author's intention to discuss the present pistols and revolvers, rifles, submachine guns and machine guns of each nation, and it is regrettable that in many instances his material on a particular country is extremely meager. As a case in point, under "Argentina" only the Argentine Mauser rifle is listed with a note stating that other Argentine arms are pictured in Part I. This reviewer would prefer to have some of the historical material in Part I omitted in favor of showing more arms of a nation under that country's sec-

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☐ **THE NEW WARFARE** by C. N. Barclay. Brigadier Barclay, known to many as Editor of "The Army Quarterly," discusses and develops the theme that the existing conditions in world affairs amount to war, *the new warfare,* not a full-scale shooting contest, but the modern substitute of propaganda, underground activities, armed threats and limited war by proxy. $2.75

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☐ **THE NEW MILITARY AND NAVAL DICTIONARY** edited by Frank Gaynor. This is the first comprehensive and up-to-date definitive glossary which covers all branches of the armed forces—Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Civil Defense. Charts and tables. $6.00

☐ **SPIES AT WORK** by Ronald Seth. Here are all the great names of espionage, and a host of lesser ones. Mr. Seth illustrates the development of the espionage with story after story of cunning, daring, resource and personal courage—and often abject failure—which makes the most exciting and complete account of espionage ever written. The author of A SPY HAS NO FRIENDS, and a Secret Service agent during the last war, Mr. Seth brings to this work authentic knowledge of his subject. $4.75

☐ **TWO YEARS IN THE ANTARCTIC** by Kevin Walton. This is the first personal account of two years spent in British Antarctica since the war. Kevin Walton went to the Antarctic as a member of the newly formed Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey and during his first year he trained himself and his dogs to live and travel in difficult country. The next year, an American expedition arrived and later both parties combined to complete an extensive survey of the East Coast of the Graham Land Peninsula. $4.75

☐ **EUROPEAN FIREARMS.** A richly illustrated history covering arms of the 16th and 17th centuries. Compiled by J. F. Hayward of Victoria & Albert Museum. $7.50

☐ **FLIGHT HANDBOOK.** The fundamental theory of aerodynamics is simply explained, and the design principles of each class of antiaircraft, from balloons to missiles, are lucidly described. Engineering principles in piston engines, gas turbines, ramjets, pulse-jets and rockets are discussed, and the theory of aerial navigation is also covered.
On the practical side, there is a vast amount of information on modern aircraft and engine construction, on auxiliaries, controls and instruments, furnishings and fittings, armament, landing gear and similar matters. Types of aircraft dealt with in detail include balloons, airships, gliders, sail-planes, piston-engined and jet fixed-wing machines, helicopters and other rotorcraft, and even guided missiles. *More than 200 photographs and drawings.* $6.00

☐ **SPACE TRAVEL** by Kenneth W. Gatland and Anthony M. Kunesch. An illustrated survey of its problems and prospects. $4.75

☐ **A TREASURY OF PHILOSOPHY** edited by Dagobert D. Runes. Here is one of the most comprehensive collections of philosophical writings ever to be gathered between the two covers of one book. In a text of over 1,200 pages, under more than 37[illegible] separate entries, are to be found, not only the great philosophers of the West, but the important, and less familiar, thinkers of the Orient. $15.00

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

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tion in Part II. It is always an annoyance to be referred elsewhere in arms research, although it is conceded that many times this is unavoidable. It is a matter of public record that all modern armies use handguns, rifles, submachine guns and machine guns. Information on the makes of these weapons is available and we believe it should have been included under each nationality, if only a single line entry giving the name of the weapon type. Under some nationalities the author does not give the data on later model rifles which are a matter of common knowledge. Under Turkey no mention is made of the Turkish Model 1924 Mauser chambered for the 7.92 x 57mm cartridge, although a mention is made that certain German and Belgian Mausers have been used by that country. Similar references appear under Belgium and Germany but the idea is conveyed in the Turkish listing that the earlier Model 1903-1905 is the standard infantry rifle.

In the data on Swiss rifles the Model 1911 Swiss Schmidt-Rubin is discussed at some length with a brief reference to the 1936 models. In the evaluation, the Swiss rifles are discounted to some extent due to the locking lugs being to the rear of the bolt, a weak design. No mention is made of the important difference in the 1936 models where the locking lugs were placed forward, a marked improvement. Such omissions create a false picture and are to be avoided in an arms reference book wherever possible. It is believed that further research would have corrected these errors.

The general pattern for the treatment of each weapon type is the listing of the specifications, an explanation of the basic operation and a step-by-step procedure for dismounting the arm. Many unique illustrations are included to show the salient points. Such information is not available on all arms, but, in fairness to Mr. Smith, such a treatise would run to many volumes. The data that are presented are in an orderly fashion and with the aid of the seven-page, closely printed index are readily accessible for quick reference.

The print style makes for easy reading and the many fine sectioned gun drawings are extremely valuable. As in many books, there are some illustrations which are too contrasty, thus not showing some details of interest. A few illustrations are misplaced, which is regrettable, but happens in spite of the best efforts of author and proofreader.

It is a very easy task to find fault with the work of others, but any book which discusses and illustrates several hundred weapons is worth this asking price in spite of the faults pointed out in this review. Having taken an active part in the preparation of a few books, we can fully appreciate what a monumental effort this represents. Those interested in modern infantry weapons will find it most informative and worthy of a place in their library.

Record of Disaster

ASSIGNMENT TO CATASTROPHE

Volume II: The Fall of France, June 19
By Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Spears
A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1955
349 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5

Reviewed by
MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY

This is the story of the French Gove ment during the final seventeen days fore it capitulated to the Germans in J 1940. It carries on the very frank personal account begun by General Sp in his *Prelude to Dunkirk*. He pulls punches, particularly in regard to French commander in chief, General W gand, and Camille Chautemps, Vice P ident of the Council. The troubles c historian in writing an accurate recor a period could hardly be better illustra than by comparing this book with W gand's *Recalled to Service*. It is diffi to believe that the two authors are writ about the same events.

Spears, as his readers know, has, t marked degree, the rare asset of achiev what the fiction writers call "reader ide fication" with himself as the main chara in his chronicle. This is true even w he is engaged in a rather routine serie conferences and visits. And he slips in little touches of humor in a mast fashion. For example, he tells of the ra cloak-and-dagger affair of getting DeGa out of France. General DeGaulle, ing as a friend who had merely com see Spears off, was by prearrangem hauled on board after the plane had tually started to move. They are soor England: "I asked de Gaulle if he war anything, and he said he would like a of coffee. I handed it to him, whereu taking a sip, he said, in a voice which dicated that without implying criticism must nevertheless tell the truth, that was tea and he had asked for coffee. was his first introduction to the t liquid which, in England, passes for ei one or the other. His martyrdom had gun."

As has been indicated, however, he not qualify with humor or anything his opinions of men who he thought fa to measure up. Of Weygand, for exam "His own hostility to me, and, I felt tain, to the British point of view, wa perceptible as is sulphuric acid, and, I, my side, was as loth to be near him a someone suffering from a virulent dise I need not have worried; a thirst to render is not a contagious complaint."

On the other hand, Spears seems n to have forgotten that a liaison offic main job is to put oil on the machin not on the fire. In London, he triec present the French arguments and exp their troubles, but the hard fact was the French Army, so often proclaimed best in the world with the usual apolog comment that of course they didn't g much for smartness and the outward fo of discipline, was lacking in firm comm

ıtrol not only in terms of the qualifica-
ns of senior commanders, but in lack of
nmunications, and in discipline. And,
ıost from the first and still inexplicably,
acked mobile, properly located reserves,
ıtrolled by aggressive commanders and
ked to them by multiple communica-
ıs.

Unfortunately descriptive of American
thods of personnel management, now
ng improved it is hoped by unit rota-
ı and similar steps, is Spears's comment
Weygand: "Surely no one knows better
n the Commander-in-Chief that you
not throw packets of men at divisions
you slap plaster on a wall. A military
nation is something more than a flock
herd made up of so many bodies."

Another point which Spears emphasizes
l which has not been given very much
ntion, in this reviewer's experience at
ıt, is the question of the authenticity of
ers, both written and oral, not only to
itary commanders, but to mayors, post-
sters, police chiefs, and managers of
ımunications installations. The Ger-
ıs in 1940 apparently used false orders
en in writing, by messengers, and by
phone and telegraph to all these key
sons with resultant major confusion.
th America now within easy reach of
prise attack from the air, the point
ht well be a vital one, particularly in
lian defense procedures.

eful for the Layman

EX-DIGEST AND ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

y Colonel Lee S. Tillotson
ilitary Service Publishing Company, 1954
ırd edition; 505 Pages; $4.00

iewed by

UTENANT COLONEL E. G. PIPER

lthough Book One of this third edi-
reflects little change from the corre-
ıding section of the 1952 edition, Book
presents more than 1,800 annota-
s, 950 of which are new. There are
new annotations to the punitive arti-
Consequently, anyone who has found
er the 1951 or 1952 edition valuable
want to retire his old book and buy
latest revision.

ervice lawyers, who usually have ac-
to excellent libraries, are not likely to
an annotated code of much use ex-
as a handy point of departure. They
probably criticize the third edition
use it makes no provision for a sup-
ıent or "pocket port" and will there-
have to be again revised in a year or
to include the large volume of deci-
that will be published during that
d.

he layman, however, required to in-
gate charges, practice before and sit
member of courts-martial, with nothing
than the Manual and certain pam-
s and local poop sheets, however ex-
ıt these may be, to guide him, will
the annotations interesting, informa-
easy to understand, and something of
gain at four dollars.

Pass In Review

This promises to be an interesting spring for the many Civil War fans among our readers. We lead off this month with four new titles that deserve particular mention.

Those who read Earl Schenck Miers's fine story of General Sherman, *The General Who Marched to Hell,* should welcome his new work on Grant at Vicksburg, *The Web of Victory* ($5.00). This book follows somewhat the same pattern of the Sherman book, in that you get a portrait of the principal subject as well as a detailed account of the battle in question.

Although we have not yet seen a review copy, we are most intrigued by what we have learned about the forthcoming *Decisive Battles of the Civil War* ($4.00), by Colonel Joseph B. Mitchell. This book should be valuable. First Manassas, Shiloh, The Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Murfreesboro, Chancellorsville, Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Petersburg are the decisive battles described. Perhaps the outstanding feature of this book is the effort to show the war in maps. There will be 26 two-color and 9 black-and-white maps. The campaign maps will show the roads of the Civil War period with the roads of today superimposed, so that the book can be used as a guide book for visits to the battlefields. Nine maps are designed to show the progress of the war and to integrate the battles into the overall picture.

A reissue of a memoir that has long been out of print is *Destruction and Reconstruction* ($7.50). The original was written by Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor and brother-in-law of Jefferson Davis. This is a view of the war years and the reconstruction period through the eyes of an ardent Confederate with an acid pen. He discusses Confederate strategy in three theaters and has some interesting sketches of his associates and some pointed comments on his "damyankee" opponents.

The last title of our quartette is not in the strict sense a "Civil War" title, but it belongs in this grouping. Jim Bishop's *The Day Lincoln Was Shot* ($3.75) is certainly one of the most talked about books of the day. Of course, the fact that it was a February Book-of-the-Month Club selection has brought it to the attention of a wide audience, but we have been surprised at the number of people who have gone out of their way to say how much they enjoyed it. The reader gets an hour-by-hour close-up of the activities of not only the two principals—Lincoln and Booth—but many of the supporting characters such as Grant, Stanton, Seward, and Johnson as well as Booth's band of conspirators. It's a fascinating account uniquely told.

As you may have noted on the back cover of the March issue, the new edition of *Psychological Warfare* ($6.00) by Paul M. A. Linebarger is coming off the press now. This is a most important book in a vital field and one that is useful at all levels. Our Combat Forces Press is also producing another volume of unusual interest at this time and that is the companion volume to our popular *Combat Actions in Korea* ($5.00). The new book is *Combat Support in Korea* ($5.00) and was written by Captain John G. Westover. Westover has written an excellent record of the unusual and outstanding accomplishments of the technical and administrative services in their support of the battles in Korea. Certainly we have fought in few places where the initiative and ingenuity of the support elements were more sorely taxed than in Korea. The terrain, the elements, and the enemy conspired to make things as difficult as possible and it is encouraging and heart-warming to see how these American soldiers met and overcame the challenge.

For the record: The latest volume of *The U.S. Army in World War II* series just out is *The Women's Army Corps* ($6.25), by Mattie Treadwell. C. S. Forester has introduced the modern counterpart of Horatio Hornblower in *The Good Shepherd* ($3.75). This topnotch sea yarn concerns itself with the suspenseful action of the destroyer escort *Keeling* during the Atlantic convoy days of World War II. Captain Krause, the *Keeling's* skipper, is the main character. Three other recommendations: *Crusade in Asia* ($4.00), by Carlos Romulo; *From Lexington to Liberty* ($6.00), by Bruce Lancaster; and *Duel of Wits* ($4.00), by Peter Churchill. The last is a Resistance thriller set in France during the early years of World War II. R.F.C.

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

THIS ISSUE

The Regimental Spirit Can Live in the New Army



INFANTRY MUST FIGHT

. . . for itsel

COLONEL EBEN F. SWIFT

AS an infantryman I do not mean to imply in my title that U.S. infantrymen are not good fighting men on the battlefield. I am referring to a fight far from the battlefield, which the infantry may lose unless it does something about it. When I say that infantry must fight, I mean that it must fight for itself. I think this needs saying because I am convinced that infantry doesn't fight hard enough for itself. Either its tactics and techniques in the fight for itself have been wrong; or, more likely, it doesn't know what it is to fight for.

This is going to take some explaining, but the explanation will, I hope, make clear why infantry must fight, and what its objectives are.

The infantryman's mission is to close with the enemy and destroy him. But now there appears to be a way of waging war that makes it unnecessary to close with the enemy. Most people want to believe that. A war without closing with the enemy? Will there ever be one? I don't know, but I'm *not* willing to risk my country's fate on it. Therefore, I'm willing to fight for the infantry, because I believe its mission is the most important mission in war. All infantrymen should believe that.

We of the infantry don't want to antagonize our friends and colleagues. We don't think interservice bickering promotes national security. How can you advance your own cause without tearing someone else's down, or maybe kicking an innocent bystander in the teeth? The infantry has scrupulously avoided doing this—perhaps too scrupulously. It seems axiomatic that if you are going to fight, you have to have an opponent. But maybe that isn't so. Perhaps we infantrymen are mistaken in believing that we can't fight for ourselves, without hurting others who are on our team.

It appears to me that in our efforts to see the other fellow's viewpoint, by submissively handing over our share of money, manpower, and matériel, and by trying to do more and more with less and less, we are damaging our own infantry arm. We are lowering our combat efficiency. Maybe the enemy is our own complacency, our own misguided ideas or lack of ideas. But whatever it is, I do know that we must fight for ourselves.

We infantrymen have been told for a long time that we are the best soldiers in the world. We, in turn, have told the world that we have the best infantry in the world. I regretfully challenge this. If we face facts, I thi a lot of us must admit that we may n have the best infantry in the wor and haven't had for some time. Ho can we have the best infantry in t world when we don't give the infant a fair share of our best men, our bo equipment and, compared to oth branches, our most enthusiastic su port? How can we even say that w have the best infantry in the worl when of all the services, our you least prefers to go into the Army, ar if in the Army, least prefers to go in the infantry? How can we have th best infantry in the world when w have so much trouble convincing ou citizens that we can't win a war wit out superior infantry?

I SAW this army of ours, includir the infantry, disintegrate from or of the best in the world in 1945 t probably one of the worst in 1946. W have had another test and rebuilt agai in the meantime. So what about now This business of boom and bust, pro perity and depression, inflation an deflation, cannot be experienced re peatedly in the military world an more than it can in the economi

(Continued on page 34)

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

GULF COAST—Specially designed float-type landing gear, pictured here, is now available for commercial Sikorsky S-55 helicopters regularly used to fly men and equipment between the mainland and oil well drilling rigs offshore. It weighs about the same as the wheel-type gea replaces, which means S-55s so equipped can carry t normal large loads. These S-55s can land on wate marshes, on regular heliports, or on platforms at sea.

UTH AMERICA—Maps needed for civil development South America will result from an Inter-American odetic Survey to be undertaken soon. Five U. S. Army orsky H-19 helicopters will be used on the project. e big red and white Sikorskys will work in ten South erican countries. Similar surveys in Alaska are planned.

SWEDEN—In Stockholm, air experts from Finland watch Ostermans Aero, Ltd., a pioneer commercial helicopter operator, demonstrate rescue techniques with a big Sikorsky S-55 helicopter. Ostermans plans to begin helicopter passenger service soon between Malmo, Sweden, and Copenhagen, Denmark.

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Flotation Gear Pioneered by Sikorsky's VS-300

EARLIEST USE of flotation gear on helicopters was on Sikorsky's historic VS-300, the first successful American helicopter. This picture made at Stratford, Connecticut on April 17, 1941, shows Igor Sikorsky at the controls of the VS-300. It had three rubber floats. Later versions used two long floats, similar to those on today's S-55s.

CALIFORNIA—Los Angeles Airways' passenger service with Sikorsky S-55 helicopters now has been extended deeper into Southern California. A new route connects Santa Ana and Orange with Long Beach and the Los Angeles International Airport. Passenger service as far east as San Bernardino is planned by early summer, and to more than a score of other cities around Los Angeles (see map) by the year's end.

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Capt. Sam W. Sacra, Armor-USA

"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

LT. GEN. W. B. PALMER, a member of the Execut Council of the Association of the United States Arr has been elected to the office of President of the U. Armor Association. Armor is to be congratulated on taining an outstanding President. Our own Execut Council passed a resolution congratulating General Palr on this latest recognition—and members of our Associat can congratulate themselves on having General Pal consent to continue as a member of our own Execut Council. In other words, a very happy situation all arou

THE regular quarterly meeting of your Executive Cou was held the evening of 28 March. The usual busir of such a meeting was taken care of in regular order; Council was pleased both with the financial condition the Association and the strides forward made in the edito content of the JOURNAL.

The Council accepted with regret the resignation Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, our President, and passe resolution honoring his services to the Association. Gen Decker now commands VII Corps in Europe.

The Council discussed, among other matters, the ac tion of a pension plan for the Association's employees, decided to accept the plan brought forward by the c mittee appointed for that purpose and headed by Gen Marquat. Your Circulation Manager has more than years of service with the Association, and several emplo have over ten years with the organization.

Generals Weible, Hertford, Roper, Abendroth and M burn, and Colonel Bunker volunteered their services members of a Membership Committee, which will ad and assist the JOURNAL's Business Manager in launchir new and continuing membership campaign. The Cou and the staff hope that all members of the Association consider themselves extra members of this committee talk up Association membership each time the opportu arises. We repeat: the more members, the bigger and b your JOURNAL can be, and the more effective your Assc tion.

THE Association is in the throes of its first open elec since the early days of World War II. Ballots are con in with every mail. Some units have mimeographed productions of the ballots to make it easy for all mem to vote without tearing their magazines (the official b appeared in the March issue). Each ballot must be chec against membership records to insure that the voter i fact a member, and there were in excess of 300 alread hand on 5 April. The June issue, which goes into the 25 May, will carry the results.

AS we go to press we are happy to have received wor professional recognition of the high caliber of our I eth Anniversary issue, published last October. The W ington Art Directors' show awarded Mr. Gil Walke gold medal for editorial illustration, for his drawings in issue. An unusual feature of the award is that it was g for the artistic merit of the entire special section and for just one piece of art.

THE PUBLIS

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EDITORIAL POLICY

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military magazine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

- Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.
- Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.
- Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.
- Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.
- Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

May 1955 Vol. 5, No. 10

COVER: Ten-minute break during maneuvers in Germany.
Photograph by Corporal Kenneth B. Josephson

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

A Man's Word

• A letter by Col. David P. Gibbs (March) correctly spots the lack of mental mobility in current Army communications, attributing it to fear of censure and bureaucratic complexities.

Fortunately, one man is already doing something about this, but his efforts are long-range: Lt. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy.

In a rather detailed description of General Bryan's efforts to instill into today's West Point cadets a rule of "character plus leadership," Nardi Reeder Campion told about it in *The New York Times Magazine* of 27 February. She quoted General Bryan: "I want to cut into the practice of having a cadet certify his word in writing. An honorable man's spoken word has to be as good as his written word. What we are trying to do here is build character, not keep a record. And I want to increase strict adherence to the disciplinary code because these are the men who will have to sow the seeds of discipline through the rest of the Army."

This, indeed, is an excellent example of mental mobility, a concept taken from General Ridgway, being applied in the field of communications. To meet the immediate problem Colonel Gibbs notes, the Army must carry out General Bryan's aim beyond West Point, right into the everyday life of the whole Army.

As a reservist, I've wondered the same thing before but never in precisely the way Colonel Gibbs pinpointed it. And yet the expression, "An officer's word is his bond," is as old as the officer corps.

LT. JOHN F. FOLTZ
Charleston, S. C.

Dim View of Statistics

• It is my intention to use "Life Can Be Beautiful Before You're Forty," by Colonel Ralph E. Pearson [March] as part of the supporting data for a thesis being prepared for the University of Chicago on the subject, "How to lie with statistics." It is unlikely that this intelligence will unduly perturb the editorial staff, and it is not intended to do so. The quality of Colonel Pearson's article compares favorably with most releases on the subject which habitually appear in the daily press and in military periodicals. So far as it goes—which is practically nowhere—there appear to be no glaring "specific" untruths. There is, instead, the equally misleading illusion of substance without supporting fact. It would seem to me that an opportunity exists for some responsible military publication to undertake a really thorough examination of the promotion policies pursued by the three services during the past twenty years. Such an analysis should have real value both to the reader and to the entire military establishment.

LT. COL. BURLEIGH B. DRUMMOND
Park Forest, Ill

Engineers in Korea

• I know THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL would be the last publication to deny due recognition to the role of the combat engineers on the combined-arms team. So I wish to call to your attention a small error in your March 1955 issue. On page 44 there appears a picture bearing the caption, "Infantrymen in Korea take cover as a Communist mortar round lands nearby" (*see cut*).

Actually, the picture was taken in

Combat Engineers in Korea

April 1951 by an official photographer of the 25th Infantry Division's PIO section and shows three members of the 77th Engineer Combat Company taking shelter from flying rock fragments resulting from demolitions work accomplished some two hours following the assault crossing of the Hantan River, some five miles north of Yonpyong, by a battalion of the 24th Infantry.

Largely as a result of the efforts of one platoon of this company, commanded by Lieutenant (now Captain) Robert W. Green, an adequate far-shore ap proach for medium tanks was provide some seven hours after initiating wor similar to that shown in the pictur

Lieutenant Green is the center figu in the picture; he is armed with an M rifle which he normally carried. Sinc I was in the immediate vicinity at th time the picture was taken, I assum that I am the lieutenant to his left.

CAPT. DAVID K. CARLISL
Fort Belvoir, Va.

The caption on this official Army ph tograph identifies those pictured as bein members of the 3d Battalion, 24th I fantry Regiment; the place near the Ha tan River in central Korea; and the tim 11 April 1951. Experience has taugl us that photographers sometimes are i expert in preparing captions and we a therefore inclined to accept Captain Ca lisle's description. And we must add th we would never deny due recognition the combat engineers.

"Solidarity"—Sociologist Comments

• In general I agreed with the analys by Captain Little and found the enti article very well written, from both t sociological and military viewpoints. was of particular interest to me becau I am a sociologist though of lesser trai ing than Captain Little's and am now the field as a social worker. My milita experience was in World War II with t Army Air Forces and in the Californ National Guard after the war.

However, the one point in the artic with which I wish to take exception the conclusion or the over-all policy su gestion of the analysis. To show the d velopment of my exception would take paper as long as the Captain's and muc more research than I am presently pr pared to undertake. But basically Ca tain Little points out the trends American culture toward urbanizati and industrialization. In this he is co pletely correct. Then he shows how the are affecting the Army and developi it into a "mass" army based on conte porary industrial design. His conclusi is that the Army should go along wi the trend and only attempt to establi solidarity between "the larger compo ents of military organization" and ". the small group in which he [the in vidual soldier] feels he belongs." T

ıble with that statement is that Cap-
ı Little has previously shown that
re are no, or very few, such small
ups in today's Army. But the larger
v is that made by almost all social
ntists (including social workers) that
: must conform to the group and go
ng with the trend. It is generally for-
ten that trends can be stopped,
ersed, controlled, or cancelled, de-
ıding on the *will* of those taking part
them. If the Army can actually be a
ter Army, which I doubt, by going
ng with the trend, then it should do
However, if the Army is something
tinct from the rest of the nation,
ich I believe it to be, then it should
pare itself to carry out its traditional
: in its traditional formation with par-
ular emphasis on discipline, the
iqueness of its profession, and what-
r "frills" seem necessary.

Finally, I feel that such information
can be supplied to the Army by the
ial scientists should be used to the
lest possible extent but under the
ervision and control of the professional
dier who will use it wisely and con-
ıctively. It should be considered to be
t what it is: one other set of data
ıilable to the military man for use in
ıjunction with those many other sets
already has, or is investigating.

FRANCIS J. JOHNSTON

nning, Calif.

olidarity"—Sergeant Strikes Back

A regular reader since *Infantry Jour-*
days, I attest that I am fairly well
d in military matters, although I do
t always agree with what I read.

Captain Roger W. Little ("Solidarity
he Key to the Mass Army") [February
55] wrote on a subject of prime im-
tance considering that we do have a
ss (or civilian) army. While not a
rary critic, I would like to set forth
: several reasons why I do not agree
th Captain Little's suggestions.

First, he says that "the Old Army way"
no way of life. I would like to ask
ıere anyone could find a better-disci-
ned, sharper, more contented group of
diers. They were soldiers mainly be-
ıse they were in the Army by their
n choosing and not (as in most cases)
ause they were forced in. . . . I do
t believe it is impossible to produce
diers from men who have an adverse
itude toward the armed forces.

Secondly, the statement "old soldiers
fading from the Army." If that were
e I would consider it a deplorable
ıation. But fortunately my concep-
n of "old soldier" is entirely different
m that of the Captain. I consider
yone who fits the bill of "soldier" to
an old soldier. He does not neces-
ily have to be a veteran of twelve or
teen years' service, although I will qualify that by saying he should have at least three years' service. An old soldier is a seasoned man who understands and likes his job. He doesn't have to be an NCO, although he usually is.

Thirdly, the reference to "the mass army." While it is true we do have a mass army, some aspects of this mass army are particularly discouraging to me. By "mass" one usually rightly associates a mob of unruly persons, and while it is true that the mass army is not all that can be desired, it certainly is not a mob.

Fourthly, Captain Little's evident belief that the MOS system is perfectly foolproof, and that without it it would be impossible to operate the Army. I submit that long before some bright brain brought forth the MOS idea, the Army performed its duties and performed them well. Does the author remember that before World War II there were no prefixes on service numbers? Did men become better soldiers when RA was placed before their service numbers? Certainly not, and neither did a well-trained rifleman suddenly become a superior rifleman because he had a 4745 tacked on as an MOS.

Fifthly, Captain Little's statements regarding an army of civilians are mostly correct, but his implication that a civilian army is the only army we have or ever had, is, to my way of thinking (maybe biased), perfectly wrong. As fighters, no one doubts its prowess and loyalty, but as for becoming what I consider to be an "army," no.

Sixthly, his final glowing statements as to the future of the mass army. On what does he base these? On the specialist system, the reenlistment bonus program with no promotions to NCO grade already announced for this month? The new pay raise they are still arguing about? The entire New Look which boils down to harassment?

There has been entirely too much coddling ever since the inception of the civilian army (I grant it is necessary to have a civilian army) and consequently morale suffered and continues to suffer. . . . A man should be inducted to serve a minimum of thirty months. This would make men available for duty as trained soldiers for about two years, thereby greatly increasing the efficiency of units to which they are assigned. It seems to me the chief drawback to the present system is the constant turnover of manpower. . . .

It is my opinion that sociology and soldiering are anything but closely related. . . .

As for my qualifications to write on the subject: during my periods in the Army my service numbers have been 6647812 and O321430, and I am a sergeant at the present time.

PROUD "OLD ARMY"

Captain Little Replies

● The basic argument in the letters that I have read about "Solidarity" is that I was wrong in *advocating* the elimination of soldiering as a way of life. The readers support this charge with instances much like those I cited in my article: valuable career men are *leaving* the Army because it *is no longer* a way of life. Some mention the difficulties of training recruits who *refuse to accept* soldiering as a way of life. Others deplore the extent to which words like "*esprit*, morale, and discipline" are now ignored.

These instances support my thesis, which is that regardless of what we would *like to see* happening, the Old Army has been gradually whittled away, and a new army—the mass army—has developed in its place. Indeed, I must reject the charge that I have advocated the condition that I have only sought to describe.

This method of analysis is common in scientific writing. A condition is described, its development traced back, and then the effects of the condition on the organism or structure are discussed. But to describe a condition is not to urge that it become more prevalent. I only sought to make others aware of the condition as I saw it, so that it could be treated.

This was my objective in "Solidarity." We must know what the disease is before it can be treated. Since the end of World War II we have tried to bring back the Old Army, but this method has failed. Now can't we reorganize this failure? Cannot creative military minds seek and find alternative solutions? I for one am willing to try.

Finally, many readers continue to defend the psychological theory of emulation. To those who reject all alternative explanations for social behavior, I have only this to ask: If the theory of emulation is valid, where do our problems come from? Is it because our officers lack discipline, *esprit* and morale? The condition I have described is precisely one that cannot be explained by emulation. And this is what I wanted the readers to recognize.

If "Solidarity" has provoked such critical consideration of the social problems of modern military organization, I have succeeded. For these critical thoughts are the first steps to a new solution. Then we can get on with the job of building and maintaining an Army that can still fight effectively, even though it is a mass army, and the result of a changed society.

CAPT. ROGER W. LITTLE
Psychiatric Field Research Team
c/o Med Co, 8th Cav Regt
APO 201, San Francisco

Religious Action

● I am a military man on active duty. Naturally I am constantly looking for any weakness in our potential enemy. The rejection of God by the leaders in

the Kremlin is built on atheistic Marxism and is their greatest weakness and our greatest strength. It is a strength as yet unused, a strength that can and should be built into a spiritual dam against the spreading tide of engulfment.

I attended the first National Conference of the Spiritual Foundation of American Democracy. To me, as a layman, these meetings proved that a real united effort by all who have spiritual belief can in the end defeat the stated aims of Communism. Leading clergymen of all faiths are united as one behind the expressed aims.

President Eisenhower informally joined one of the meetings and said that the most important thing in our whole theory of government was its recognition that man is worthwhile because he is born in the image of God; fundamentally, democracy is nothing but a spiritual conviction; all our liberty, justice, and power spring from this basic conviction.

The clergymen who have given their lives to bringing man closer to God are qualified by lifelong training to develop this effective weapon against atheistic communism. Contributions will substantially strengthen the structure of the dam against communism and should be sent to: Foundation for Religious Action, 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington 6, D.C. Or, if you desire fuller information, you may write to the Executive Director at the same address.

COL. A. C. MCKINLEY
USAF
Washington, D.C.

Bunyan Blooper

● I enjoyed immensely your article by Lt. Col. Bidwell Moore on high-angle destroyers [March].

Aren't you robbing Paul to credit John in your illustration at the bottom of page 27? It seems that loading the huge mortar is more a job for the fabulous Paul Bunyan than for the English preacher and author, John Bunyan.

MAJOR JOHN E. GLAB
Dept MT&G, USMA
West Point, N. Y.

It would be Paul and his Blue Ox, not John and his Pilgrim.

Play that Fiddle

● I must disagree with Major Cover whose letter on AA and FA integration appeared in the March issue. As a field artilleryman, I would regard an AA command as an interesting challenge and, while it wouldn't be the kind of job I would actively seek, I would certainly have a sorry opinion of myself if I didn't think I could do a good job of it.

Says Emerson in his Essay on Power: "When Michelangelo was forced to paint the Sistine Chapel in fresco, of which art he knew nothing, he went down into the Pope's gardens behind the Vatican, and with a shovel dug out the ochres, red and yellow, mixed them with glue and water with his own hands, and having after many trials at last suited himself, climbed his ladders, and painted away, week after week, month after month, the sibyls and the prophets. . . . 'Ah!' said a brave painter to me, thinking on these things, 'if a man has failed, you will find that he has dreamed instead of working! There is no more success in our art but to take off your coat, grind paint, and work like a digger on the railroad, all day and every day.' "

I firmly believe that more than half the difficulty in the integration program is that both branches are loaded with officers who are still fighting the program. Any officer worth his salt should welcome the opportunity to learn something new. The other side of this coin is that commanders should never accept unfamiliarity with the job as an excuse for sloppy performance. It was never tolerated within either the FA or the AA before the merger and it shouldn't be accepted now in *the* artillery. . . .

Let's be like the farmer who, when someone asked, "Can you play the fiddle?", replied: "I expect I can; I never tried."

MAJOR LLOYD E. JONES, JR.
Colo A&M College
Fort Collins, Colo.

That Campaign Hat Again

● A recent Cerebration [March] called for the return of the old campaign hat, and praised the same a bit more than it deserves. The old felt job wasn't *that* good. But all the same, it did have certain virtues. Rifle shooters liked it because it kept the sun off, pit details because it kept out flying sod caused by bolos. As a field hat it was disreputable looking but could be restored to good appearance once back on post. It could be used for a pillow or a water container, even though not too waterproof.

Time has passed and brought some new things. If the broad hat comes back, there are a few things that can improve it. Back during the Spanish War, I think, a test was made on the British cork helmet versus the old slouch hat, and the testers found that by placing a ventilating sweatband in the slouch job it would be made as comfortable as the helmet. In addition it was far more rugged. After this discovery, the sweatband continued in use until the day when the hat was abandoned in favor of a succession of miserable contraptions such as the wool cap; the field cap which, stuffed with cardboard or stencil backing paper or commercial steel springs, has fallen off many a head in a high wind; and the good Lord only knows w contemplated abortions await us.

Use of a suspension in the campa hat as in the helmet liner would all ventilation to become very good, and addition realize the QM dream of fitt everyone with one size. There sho be a *couple* of sizes to help uniform pearance.

Adoption of this rig would open sorts of new vistas to garrison soldi I can visualize the fancy hat stuffi that will come into use, and the vari slants which SOPs will require. W knows? Someone may discover fluo cent dyes, and hatcords will blossom splendor never before seen east of Haw

One thing I'd like to see. *The Mar Corps Gazette* once said that the c paign hat went out because it wa uniform in appearance. Let's be unif on parade with them, but when in field, to hell with the fancy work so l as the hat remains clean and respectal We won't always be fighting wars Korea with houseboys available to i and clean stuff for the rear areas sometimes even for the front ones.

JOHN B. O'STET

Loyalty and Leadership

● In renewing my membership, let express my congratulations on the mendous forward strides made by Association.

My only military contact has b through the ROTC program. That perience favorably impressed me w the caliber of persons in the Departm of Military Science. Perhaps more p nent, I find concepts that I've h receive a deeper meaning as the y go by. The concepts of "loyalty" or fective leadership," while simple to st are complex in application. The o conclusion I've reached is that trainig *per se*—regardless of source—can change the basic personality of men has been pointed out to me that m young ROTC graduates enter the s ice with high ideals, only to be disi sioned on finding that officers are man and do not necessarily possess lo ty, integrity, nd the like. I recog that what I've stated is symptomatic every human institution. There can be any "solution" in the sense of term. It is only my hope that poten reserve officers such as myself can m tain a high ethical standard regard i...mediate circumstances.

I've read with great interest the cles by General Ridgway and ot on what is essentially human-chara study. Perhaps one essence of leader is the maintenance of personal et and "the human touch."

BRUCE BRO
Worcester Poly Inst
Worcester, Mass.



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THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

TO the military man, the study of terrain is as important as the study of bones is to the medical student. General military principles have their place, but the soldier does not fight on sheets of graph paper. He fights on hills and plains, across rivers, through swamps and deserts.

Few Americans have more than a hazy notion of the geography of China. Here is a vast subcontinent containing just about every kind of land, from mountain peaks to rice paddies. Its size makes good reconnaissance an absolute necessity, and its lack of roads makes impossible the type of reconnaissance that the U. S. Army is accustomed to perform. If we ever have to fight a war on the mainland of China, reconnaissance will be a job for that hardy and versatile individual, the foot soldier.

There are probably few men in the world today better qualified to write about reconnaissance problems of Chinese terrain than General Sun Li-Jen. A veteran of many years of combat against the Japanese and the Communists, he is now commander in Chief of the Chinese forces on Formosa. General Sun developed his article (*page 36*) from a lecture he gave last year to officers and enlisted men of Military Assistance Advisory Group teams serving in Formosa under Major General John C. MacDonald.

General Sun holds degrees from Purdue University and Virginia Military Institute. He commanded a Chinese division in Burma under General Joseph W. Stilwell; and, according to the editor of Stilwell's papers, "Stilwell regarded Sun as the ablest of his officers in Burma." After taking part in the jungle fighting that resulted in the reopening of the Ledo Road in 1945, General Sun became commander of the New First Army.

During the early days of the Chinese civil war General Sun won several victories over the Communists in Manchuria and in 1947 he was appointed Deputy Commander in Chief of the Chinese Army. He assumed his present duties three years later.

THE problem of every democracy is assimilate the new and at the sa time keep what is good in the old. T glory of American and British democra is that these nations have learned to this, to effect inevitable changes pea fully and gradually. The U. S. Army faced with the same problem. It m change its tactics and organization to i corporate its new weapons, while p serving the traditions that are its sou

In this issue, two authors tackle t problem from two different points view. Significantly, both of these offic



GEN. SUN LI-JEN

see the regiment, that grand old rep tory of Army tradition, as the keyst of the "new army."

Lieutenant Colonel Spencer Edwards, Jr., Infantry ("Build on Regiment," *page 16*), wants the regim to be the home of the active-duty sol and the reservist alike, even thoug may lose its status as a tactical u

(continued on page 12)

Shown here is a giant step toward tomorrow.

Conceived and developed by a team of Martin people who have been working with Navy scientists since 1946, Viking 12 is the latest of a series of high-altitude research vehicles.

It was designed to explore the problems of controlled flight in the near-vacuum conditions of the outer atmosphere and at speeds in excess of 4,000 m.p.h.

In this long-range Viking program, technical problems are continuously being solved which support advancements that are now being made toward the next frontier of flight—rockets having intercontinental ranges.

And beyond that lies space itself!

MARTIN

BALTIMORE · MARYLAND

(*continued from page 10*)

COLONEL BRUCE PALMER, JR. ("Let's Keep the Regiment," *page* 22) sees a tactical future for a flexible regimental combat team, and offers specific suggestions for changing regimental organization to meet modern requirements.

A graduate of UCLA, Colonel Edwards served during World War II with the 14th Infantry Regiment of the 71st Infantry Division, in Europe. In Korea he commanded the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry Division. He is now on duty in the Pentagon.

Colonel Palmer is a 1936 graduate of the Military Academy who transferred from Cavalry to Infantry in 1945. In March 1954 he left his job as Chief of the Plans Branch, G3, USAREUR, to take command of the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, which is presently stationed at Schweinfurt, Germany, about twelve miles from the Iron Curtain.

COLONEL EBEN F. SWIFT, Infantry ("Infantry Must Fight," *cover* 2), has made previous contributions to the JOURNAL, including the justly famous "Division Objective" in the October 1953 issue. He graduated from the Military Academy, in 1940 and is presently on duty at The Infantry School.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES S. HARRIS, Retired ("The Theater Support Command," *page* 24), is associate editor of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and former editor of the *Antiaircraft Journal.*

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, Retired ("Mines Might Make the Difference," *page* 29), is a frequent contributor to THE JOURNAL and other military publications. He recently prepared a technical manual on mine warfare for the Corps of Engineers. As assistant division commander of the 4th Infantry Division, General Blakeley was one of the liberators of Paris in August 1944.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD W. DAVIS, Artillery ("The New Airborne AAA Battalion," *page* 46), is very likely one of very few active Army officers who can claim a degree in painting. He gained his Bachelor of Fine Arts from the University of Illinois. A veteran of World War II, Colonel Davis has had experience with self-propelled antiaircraft artillery, and is a master parachutist. He is commander of the 80th Airborne AAA Battalion of the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N. C.

OUR Cerebrators this month (*page* 49) are concerned with training and communications. LIEUTENANT CHARLES J. V. FRIES, III, Infantry, offers a plan for developing a stronger corps of professional NCOs. A graduate of Pennsylvania State College, he served in the Marine Corps for three years before accepting an Army commission in 1951. Lieutenant Fries is presently stationed in the Canal Zone.

CAPTAIN TACTIC (a pseudonym) offers some trenchant criticism of some of the new training requirements for Regular Army officers. He is an officer serving at Fort Benning, Georgia.

CAPTAIN STEPHAN G. MARTIN has some constructive thoughts on atomic-age communications problems. Captain Martin is serving with the Communications Department of The Infantry School.

CAPTAIN GEORGE E. WHITNEY, Infantry, and CAPTAIN JOHN M. BEERS, Artillery, offer new training aids. Captain Whitney is presently on duty at the Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey, Calif. Captain Beers is Assistant Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Iowa State College.

OUR book reviewers this month (*page* 57) can all boast considerable practical experience as well as academic knowledge of things military. DR. STEFAN T. POSSONY, a frequent contributor to THE JOURNAL, teaches political science at Georgetown University and works for the Air Force at the Pentagon. COLONEL S. LEGREE is the *nom de plume* of an artilleryman of long service whose writings have been appearing in military publications since the thirties. MAJOR PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER is a reserve officer ' teaches at the School of Advanced Intern: ional Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. He served with OWI in China during World War II; he was a consultant to the Army on psychological warfare in Korea. His book, *Psychological Warfare,* is a definitive work in this field.

LYNN MONTROSS is a well-known journalist and military historian. Among his published works are *War Through the Ages* and *Cavalry of the Sky.* MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY served in Italy and Southern France on the regimental staff of the 442d RCT (a Japanese-American unit). Now on inactive duty, he runs his own advertising business in Washington and is a JOURNAL Contributing Editor. N. J. ANTHO... is a member of the staff of THE JOURNAL. BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES S. HARRIS, Retired, and MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, Retired, are mentioned elsew' ere in this department.

THE MONTH'S FILMS

Captain Jack F. McAhon

Purification of Water, TF 8-1816 (20 minutes) explains how the engineers and Medical Corps purify water on a large scale and how individual soldiers can make water safe.

Army Pamphlet 30-75 is brough to the screen in **Armies of the World, Part II, The Soviet Army in the Defense, TF 30-1936** (20 minutes). Made from a Sovie training film, it outlines the Russian methods of employing weapons, mines, dugouts, obstacles, and troops in defensive situations.

VT Fuzes, Field Artillery, T 9-1875 (25 minutes), shows how VT fuzes are used and what ca be accomplished by projectiles tha incorporate them. The film als covers CVT fuzes and timing de vices and impact elements.

Pioneering by Armor, TF 17 1978 (20 minutes), covers meth ods of clearing road blocks and by passing obstacles, with the use o equipment organic to armor.

The Antiaircraft Fire Contro Problem, TF 9-1843 (22 min utes), covers the spherical coord nate system and ballistics corre tions. It discusses projectile dro and lift, superelevation, standar conditions taken into consideratio in firing tables, and non-standar conditions with effect firing an accuracy.

Dressing, First Aid, Individ ual, SFS 8-188 (7 minutes), wi be useful in first-aid training. Th sound film strip explains and ill strates the nomenclature and pro er application of first-aid dressing

A series of short films (4 to minutes each) has been made th employs humor to instruct soldie in such subjects as frostbite, me sanitation, and the use of inse repellent.

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— not "on the way"

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MACKEY AIRLINES
MOHAWK AIRLINES
NATIONAL AIRLINES
NEW YORK AIRWAYS
NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES
NORTHEAST AIRLINES
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES
OZARK AIR LINES
PACIFIC NORTHERN AIRLINES
PIEDMONT AIRLINES
RESORT AIRLINES
SOUTHERN AIRWAYS
SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
UNITED AIR LINES
WEST COAST AIRLINES
WESTERN AIR LINES
WIEN ALASKA AIRLINES

FRONT AND CENTER

Army power inevitable. Not to go back farther, five years ago it was Korea's 38th Parallel, a year ago it was Dien Bien Phu, this year it is Quemoy-Matsu. Next year it may be some other place with a strange name that quickly becomes familiar to newspaper readers. When the Communists marched across the 38th Parallel five years ago, it was first assumed that U.S. air and sea power could turn back the Red tide. That idea was quickly disabused with results we all know now. A year ago there was support for the theory that all the hard-pressed defenders of Dien Bien Phu needed was the help of an air strike, probably atomic. But cooler heads prevailed, and if we are to believe the unconfirmed reports, largely because the conviction grew that intervention in Indochina could not be successful without U.S. Army power. Today we are told that air and sea strikes can stop the invasion of Quemoy-Matsu.

The Chinese Communists may be tyros at the difficult business of amphibious attacks, but that is not evidence that air and sea can stop them. General Ridgway is on sound ground when he insists, as we are told he does, that the U.S. Army will be needed if Quemoy-Matsu are to be defended.

The tendency to consider only the greatly increased power that atomic weapons have given air forces overlooks the increase in army fire power since the end of 1945. There is great validity to the point that the increase in power and velocity of "conventional" weapons would have caused armies to make adjustments in their combat organization and tactics even if the atom had not been split. We know that the fire-power potential of the U.S. Army has increased in the five years since the Korean conflict began, and it would be a foolish man who would say that the Chinese Reds have not made some gains too. The old saw that you can't fight the next war with the weapons of the last one applies to the enemy, too. You can't assume that he will fight just like he did the last time. Also, it would be foolish to suppose that the Communists are hell-bent to imitate our emphasis on strategic air-striking forces. We rather imagine they are working toward developing methods that will give their armies a chance to survive attacks by atomic air.

If this is so, it means that inevitably U.S. Army power will have to meet the Communists on a ground battlefield. Whether that battlefield be Quemoy-Matsu, Formosa itself, or some other place, may be less important in the long run than the importance of creating and maintaining a U.S. Army force in being that will be ready at all times to do the job. Such a combat-ready strategic Army striking force would be as great a deterrent to aggression in other parts of the globe as the NATO forces are in Europe.

Pat on the back. "The whole nation should be glad that the Army still can laugh at itself," the esteemed *Cleveland Plain Dealer* decided editorially after chuckling over "A Medal for Horatius" which appeared in our January issue. Calling Colonel W. C. Hall's little story "charming satire," the *Plain Dealer* said it was "particularly delightful" that the "Army has the courage to josh itself."

Conduct of prisoners of war. The new regulation on the conduct of soldiers who become prisoners of war supersedes a regulation that had its genesis way back in the days of the Civil War. By the time you read this there may be considerable current news about the whole problem of prisoners of war, "brainwashing," and the policies of the services. One national magazine is reported to be preparing a long and detailed report on the subject. A television play on the court-martial of an officer charged with treason in Korea recently appeared.

Unfortunately, the courts-martial of soldiers who misbehaved in prison camps have created some unjustified criticism of the Army. Many unthinking persons have jumped to the conclusion that because the Army is ing more former prisoners than other services, soldiers were less a to resist Communist blandishments punishments. This is totally unt The fact is that the Army's record probably better than that of the er services. Many, many more sold than airmen, marines or sailors w prisoners, and the percentage of diers who turned against their cou and their comrades when in priso very small. One factor in the Arr insistence on trying alleged violati of the law (whereas the Air Force sorted almost entirely to administra procedures) is that soldiers live in c proximity to enemy lines day after and have many opportunities to render, whereas airmen do not. T a higher degree of moral fortitud required of a soldier.

H-Bomb Information. The Jo NAL has copies of the new lea "Facts About the H-Bomb," and mail them to Association member request. The leaflet was released by Federal Civil Defense Administrat It summarizes the Atomic Energy C mission's recent public statement garding the problem of radioactive out.

Army aviation. Appointmen Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. Howz Chief of the Army Aviation Divi of G3 (it had been a section in O&T Division) and the redesign of the Aviation School at Camp R er, Ala., as the Army Aviation C are the two outward manifestatio the growing emphasis on Army power. Most emphasis is going int training of Army aviators and avi technicians and mechanics and in proving operational use of Army craft. What eventually will be nee and the time may be now, is full control of research and developme its aircraft programs. As it stands the Air Force supervises such pro

Air logistics. The speed of n ment of military supplies from re

fillment has not greatly increased Napoleon's day. In World War pplies moved at about four or five an hour, and a study by the ard Business School indicates that ir movement of supplies at several red miles an hour would speed e movement to about seven miles our. Administrative procedures are ulprit. What price rapid transit r if the supplies land in a depot e they remain for long periods be- eing used? In an unofficial mono- , "Air Logistics and the Army," Transportation School suggests a Special Deputy for Logistics ovement be appointed by the Dep- Chief of Staff for Logistics to de- methods and procedures for the ansportation of Army supplies. monograph says that one of the teps is to rescind the present "al- nce of thirty days' emergency level pplies for reserve over and above ting levels in overseas depots." To who say that the Army cannot l this increase in its logistical rability, the monograph observes 'this would be valid if we did not shortages under the present sys- The only true test of the concept e obtained by a complete elimi- n of physical reserves."

the Army's lack of a long-range eet of its own, the monograph "Either the Air Force should give inite commitment of the tonnage available, or there should be civil- ontractors allocated to the Army to sh the service, or the Army should npowered to form an air transport ization similar to the Navy's fleet ic wings or the organic air trans- gencies of the Strategic Air Com- . If required, the Army should nasize the importance to the id troops of this program by in- ng in the Army budgets both opment funds and procurement to support the Air Force trans- programs."

lunteers. By law each issue of *Official Army Register* publishes a of Honor" listing the names of l volunteers who participated Major Walter Reed in the Yel- ever investigations in Cuba. This f soldier volunteers in scientific igations continues at the Army nical Center in Maryland where ldiers volunteer each month to quipment and techniques devised ientists of the Chemical Corps. tests are rigidly controlled by physicians and scientists and the volunteers are carefully screened.

Alabama Story. Ten years ago a band of German scientists and technicians and their families trekked southward from Peenemunde to escape the Russians. With them they carried vital secrets of German rocket and guided missile research. Leader of the group was Dr. Wenher Von Braun. After screening by the Americans, they were invited to come to the U. S. as civilian scientists and technicians attached to the Army. For the first few years they lived in converted barracks at Fort Bliss, Texas. In 1950 they moved to Huntsville, Alabama, to continue their work at Redstone Arsenal, the Army's missile research center. Last month in an impressive ceremony at Huntsville, 103 of these men, women and children became American citizens. Of them, the Mayor "Spec" Searcy said: "These are our folks now and we're mighty happy with them." Dr. Braun said: "As time goes by I realize ever more clearly that it was a moral decision we made that day at Peenemunde, that somehow we sensed that the secrets should get only into the hands of a people who read the Bible."

REUNIONS

1st Armored Division. 1-3 July. Hotel New Yorker, New York City. For details write: Sal Marino, 215 Del Balso Blvd., Wappinger Falls, N. Y.

1st Infantry Division. 26-28 August. Congress Hotel, Chicago. For details write: Arthur L. Chaitt, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.

3d Armored Division. 28-30 July. Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis. For details write: Paul W. Corrigan, 80 Federal St., Boston 10, Mass.

8th Armored Division. 1-3 July. Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: Henry B. Rothenberg, Suite 1300, 134 No. La Salle St., Chicago 2, Ill.

Ninth Army. 22-24 June. Treadway Inn, Coonamessett, Cape Cod, Mass. For details write: C. B. F. Brill, 202 East 44th St., New York 17, N. Y.

37th Infantry Division. 2-5 Sept. Biltmore Hotel, Dayton, Ohio. For details write: Jack R. McGuire, 21 W. Broad St., Rm. 1101, Columbus 15, Ohio.

76th Infantry Division. 18 June. Hotel Commodore, New York City. For details write: Henry C. Evans, 6 S. Calvert St., Baltimore 2, Md.

94th Infantry Division. 21-24 July. Hotel Bellevue-Stratford, Philadelphia. For details write: Anthony H. Mirra, Jr., 2810 Springfield Rd., Broomall, Pa.

Attention: Hoover Commission. It cost $8.78 a day and $3,035.24 a year to fire reveille and retreat at Fort McPherson, Ga., until Maj. Robert B. Borden, the Post Ordnance officer, and Frank S. Phillips, a civilian machinist, devised an attachment that fits into the muzzle of the 75mm field piece and fire a 10-gauge shotgun shell that costs 10 cents. Reports from Fort McPherson say that no one noticed the change when the new charge was used. The attachment costs $50, is removable and doesn't do any damage to the muzzle. Annual savings: $2,967.64.

Family travel. The Army has begun shipping dependents overseas with military personnel. The 216th Field Artillery Battalion and the 12th Ordnance Battalion, comprising 786 men, recently sailed for Germany from the New York Port of Embarkation, accompanied by 63 families of members of the two units. The men and their families sailed on two transports, while the units' equipment was carried simultaneously on a freighter.

Special assignments. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, is encouraging qualified officers to apply for duty as military attachés with the diplomatic staffs of U.S. embassies and legations, and as intelligence and foreign-area specialists. Attachés are selected under the provisions of SR 600-147-1. They receive training in the language and customs of the country for which they are slated.

Intelligence specialists are assigned to Strategic Intelligence, Army Security Agency, Counterintelligence Corps, and specialized intelligence units. Information about the program may be found in SR 605-150-30.

Foreign-area specialists are trained at the Army Language School, civilian universities, and overseas schools. Training sometimes last as long as four years. SR 350-380-1 contains details of the program.

OLD ARMY, NEW ARMY

Build On the Regiment



3d Infantry Regiment

36th AAA Missile Battalion

5th Field Artillery Battalion

72d Tank Battalion

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SPENCER P. EDWARDS, JR

ALL over the Army we hear the cry, "Let's get back to the Old Arr
One sees nostalgic reminders of this turn in presentations of sa
to cavalrymen, in parades of the "Old Guard" on Armed Forces I
and in an incessant clamor for the return of martial music to garrison
Occasionally some brave soul turns up at a party in a blue uniform

We all know that traditions and standards of behavior are essenti
the smooth working of an organization. The notions that all man
ment procedures must be coldly numerical, that there is no need to h
past achievements, are tempered by an awareness of the human n
for symbols and value systems.

Must we sacrifice the little tradition we still have in order to creat
army that can face the requirements of a new arsenal of weapons
adjust its organization to a new set of rules for their use? Can we
set forth in new fields of endeavor and at the same time draw stre
from the past?

Fast-firing weapons destroyed close formations on the battlefield. I
atomic weapons demand an even greater dispersion. Widened fo
tions make great demands upon leadership, as indeed they did in

(Continued on page 19)

To meet the stepped-up needs of industry . . .
for more power—better performance—longer life . . .

ALLIS-CHALMERS PRESENTS TWO NEW, POWERFUL DIRT MOVERS

ALLIS-CHALMERS **TS-360**

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280 hp
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20-yd capacity, heaped

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NEW BIG YARDAGE WORK CAPACITY!

Power that pays A great new Allis-Chalmers engine spearheads a whole new power train that offers more rim pull at all speeds for high-volume performance; faster acceleration, easy shifting and quick getaways.

New operating ease and safety Everything an operator needs to work easily, yet efficiently . . . new Double-Safety air brakes, new selective steering, direct electric starting, new multiple-disc cable control.

Strength to back it up! Including a new all-welded, heavy steel main frame and an all-new final-drive gear train that mean longer equipment life.

BIGGEST, MOST POWERFUL CRAWLER IN PRODUCTION . . . ANYWHERE!

New standards of output The HD-21 introduces the new Allis-Chalmers engine and a great new power transmission team. With its advanced design torque converter (*the result of 15 years of leadership by Allis-Chalmers*) the HD-21 puts its power to work with less shifting than ever before possible.

New standards of durability Here are just a few of the long-life features you can't get from anyone but Allis-Chalmers . . . at any price: all-steel Box-A main frame, straddle-mounted final-drive gears, 1,000-hour truck wheel lubrication, oil-enclosed track release mechanism.

New low cost per unit of work The HD-21 offers 20 percent greater over-all performance. Add the *planned* approach to service offered by Allis-Chalmers dealers, and it's the ideal team for men tackling today's big jobs.

Nowhere can you match these two . . . in the amount of work they do!

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BEHIND this announcement is creative engineering and manufacturing ability, geared to meet today's needs in both civilian and military equipment.



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

Enlist to fly in the U. S. Air Force

's when the Army fought the Indians in the West. e leader needs all the knowledge, skill, and leader-p that he can acquire in order to carry out his mis-n. If he is fortunate enough to command a unit sessing a tradition of having served the nation well, se past performances can set high standards and ome valuable tools in the leadership process. In a v, traditionless outfit, the standards will have to be during the period of training and organization. This ces a heavy additional burden on the leaders. Though ch of the success of a unit with traditions depends n the present leadership, some of it can neverthe-be charged to the successes of previous leaders. But n outfit without traditions, all success will depend n the immediate leadership.

All the advocates of a return to tradition have said at we should have, but few have presented a work-plan. Traditions will die a-borning if the Army tinues its present policies of managing manpower commodity. Men like to think they are completely sufficient individuals, but group identity and be-ingness are important parts of the individual's ings about himself. Fortunately, the unit-rotation n promises increased stability of unit membership.

T unit rotation is only a part of what should be lone to restore the best of the old traditions of the ny and still allow flexibility for mobilization and ations. At least four other things are needed. First, stem of unit designations should be applied which absorb expansions and contractions of the Army without disruption of unit lineage. Secondly, a flexible organization similar to that of the armored division should be established for infantry divisions. Thirdly, a combat-loss replacement system should be developed that is consistent with the Army's needs for flexibility but still preserves the unit identity and belongingness feelings of replacement personnel. Finally, civilian components should be included in the program for preserving Army traditions.

Flexibility is essential to any system that seeks to attain any degree of permanence. It must be readily adjustable to changing conditions without frequent major alterations. Our Constitution is an example of such a system, having shown itself to be adjustable to major changes in governmental requirements, but at the same time forming a strong, traditional framework. The broken lineages of the Army's regiments are a result of "inflexible plans"; the failure of the World War I divisional replacement system can be traced to the same fault.

How can we achieve traditional permanence and retain operational flexibility? Here is a plan for the Army which, to paraphrase Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, allows us to salvage the spirit of that past wherein lies the hope for the future.

IN peacetime, unit rotation will be an important part of the program to preserve and enhance Army tradition. The professional soldier in a GYROSCOPE unit will be able to acquire property, develop his career in a framework of continuing associations, and establish permanent social standards for himself and his family.

GYROSCOPE must, however, be discontinued upon the outbreak of hostilities. It is a system adapted for a particular set of conditions, and is quite inflexible to the demands that would be set upon the Army by mobilization. Unit rotation should be considered as only an important peacetime phase of the overall plan for regaining the spirit of the Old Army; it should represent permanent policy when overseas garrisons must be maintained.

The Traditional Regiments Will Live On

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN

Comment at a Press Conference, 10 February 1955

ON the relationship between the regiment and the battle groups we have, for example, in the 3d Infantry Division, the 7th, 15th and 30th Infantry Regiments. Those regiments and their staffs are now—although with some modifications—combat commands. They occupy a position comparable to that of the combat command in the old armored division. You marry up a tank battalion, an infantry battalion and other units—they used to give it the name of the task force commander—and you send them off to do a job. In the proposed infantry division—in the 3d Infantry Division—it will be the 7th, 15th and 30th Combat Commands, and those commands will have with them all the background, tradition and records of the old regiments. They will have given to them the means to do a job. This may mean several battle groups or one battle group, it all depends where you want this particular entity. It is reasonable to suppose that some of these battle groups will be given to some of the combat commands in peacetime for training and combat maneuvers, there may in time be a growing relationship—permanent character—between the battle groups and the combat commands, somewhat similar to the old regiments. But the flexibility will always be inherent in the division, of being able to take any of the battle groups and give them to a combat division to do a job.

A permanent, but flexible, framework for salvaging and preserving Old Army spirit during time of war as well as in peace is a device we shall refer to here as the traditional regiment. Most of the Old Army traditions centered around regimental posts. History shows that our regiments have been engaged more or less as such in most of our wars. The Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery can all trace the lineages of their old regiments. Only a few of these, however, can claim continuous histories or records of participation in all our major wars. It is extremely difficult to mobilize a wartime army and spread the traditions of the regiments to fit it, so long as the regiment remains fixed in size as a tactical unit.

The regiment should cease to be a tactical unit with a limit of three battalions, and should become a repository of tradition and *esprit,* with an indefinite number of member battalions, some in the Regular Army, and some in the Army Reserve. Each regiment should be the embodiment of its total lineage, and all the battle honors and traditional symbols should be incorporated into it. Each traditional regiment would maintain a small headquarters in peacetime, located at a post where its member battalions are likely to be stationed, and where, upon mobilization, a replacement training center would be established. We would charge the regimental headquarters with the peacetime functions of maintaining the regimental publications, conducting personnel management functions as they relate to regimental affairs, maintaining contact with reserve members and the regimental veterans organization, and maintaining a cadre for the regimental replacement training unit to be formed upon mobilization. Every member of the Army would then belong either to a combat-arms regiment or a technical-service corps for all of his military service, and for all his life if he wishes.

Regular Army active battalions of the regiment wo be assigned to regular divisions, subject to the mo ments and employment of these divisions to fulfill Ar commitments. Reserve battalions would have sim assignments in Reserve divisions. The tactical he quarters controlling infantry battalions within an fantry division would become combat commands combat teams. The nine infantry battalions of division might all owe membership to different re ments. These principles apply to Armor and Artill as well as Infantry.

So much for the active Regular Army battalions the regiments. What about the Army Reserve? H does it fit in?

THE 1st and 2d Battalions would be the active-du elements under peacetime conditions. As many m battalions as mobilization plans require may be orga ized in the Army Reserve. These reserve battalio would be distributed throughout the United States t ritories and possessions, assigned to reserve divisions the basis of population density and mobility. We shou then be able to recruit a man for service in the Regu Army and assign him to the regiment represented by

:serve battalion nearest his home. He may then serve is tour and participate in the reserve afterward—and ever lose his membership in his regiment. If his regi- ıental veterans organization is on the ball, he will be onored for his active representation of his community ı the Army and his regimental affiliation will continue ·en when he is a grandfather and his grandsons are ·rving in the regiment.

Reserve units and reservists will thus gain much atus through their membership in a traditional regi- ent. Whenever feasible, summer training for the Re- rve battalions would be conducted under the auspices a Regular Army battalion of the regiment. Individ- ıls would also be able to serve short training tours ith Regular battalions if they are unable to train at eir usual summer encampment.

Provisions can be made for forming traditional regi- ents for the National Guard on a somewhat different sis. Each state might have at least one infantry regi- ent. Some states with large populations might have ·o. The unit designations for National Guard regi- ents might well be chosen by the membership. During acetime all the infantry battalions of a National Guard division or combat team would belong to a single regiment. The regimental headquarters would be located in the regional metropolis, with a mobilization station designated for the formation of the regimental replacement training unit. Upon federalization of the Guard, adjustments in division orders of battle may be necessary so that specific regions will not be overburdened.



During a partial mobilization, in order to provide the Guard as a way of serving his men who have had active duty in the Regular Army, certain of the Regular Army regiments may be designated as "sister regiments" of National Guard regiments. Thus a man choosing the National Guard as a way of serving his reserve obligation would enjoy a continuity of service.

It is not easy to preserve flexibility and retain permanent unit identity in a combat-loss replacement system. During World War I, it was planned to rotate divisions, with fresh divisions relieving depleted outfits at the front, the relieved units then rebuilding with new levies at rear installations. The system failed. Its principal fault was inflexibility, and the result was mass cannibalization of new divisions arriving in France to fill the depleted divisions at the front. In World War II we used an individual-replacement system. Korea saw some administrative improvements in the replacement system, but the replacements brought no feelings of unit identification with them, and they left all such sentiment behind when they were rotated out. Many a soldier has said that he would reenlist if he could stay with his overseas outfit; but when he lost his unit identification in the process of rotating home, he lost interest. The Army had lost meaning to him, apparently because he had lost meaning to the Army. This is a needless loss.

EACH regiment would maintain a headquarters which would form a regimental replacement training unit upon mobilization. Several of these training units would be formed into a replacement training center similar to those organized in World War II. The RTUs would train replacements in numbers sufficient to satisfy the probable requirements of the battalions of the regiment engaged in combat operations. Packets of trained replacements would be shipped to theaters of operations on the basis of the numbers of battalions of each regiment stationed in that theater. These replacements would then be assigned to battalions of their regiments, as required by the theater replacement control center. It is important to note that a man would always go to a battalion of that regiment in which he was recruited and trained.

In this way we will have preserved most of the flexibility of the individual-replacement system and have gained the permanence of unit identification for the replacement. The more battalions of regiments present in a theater, the more flexible the system becomes, since the dispersion of the requirements for replacements approaches that which prevails for an individual replacement system.

WITH unit rotation, the traditional regiment, and this combat-loss replacement system established, we can then proceed to build a real grass-roots army. We can recruit our army, both in peacetime and wartime, on a basis of the deployment of the National Guard and Reserve forces. Since the battalions of the Army Reserve are deployed throughout the country on a population basis, a young man can join a regiment before he goes on active duty, serve with that regiment, and be honored by his regiment when he dies. Many communities throughout America can thus share the past glories of "The Rock of the Marne" or "The Right of the Line." Just as the American people look to their Constitution as the symbol of their heritage of political liberty, they will be able to look to their army as the symbol of the right to defend that heritage. The strength of the Army will then represent the strength of the people from which it arises.

We can streamline the infantry for modern combat without altering its basic structure

Let's Keep the REGIMENT

COLONEL BRUCE PALMER, JR.

ANY organization the Army adopts for combat obviously will be largely influenced by the character of the area of operations. The organization I discuss here is based on operations in western Europe, where we must deal with a highly mechanized enemy, heavily weighted with armor, who will be operating over ground generally favorable to his formations and tactical concepts.

I think we should retain the regimental character of our infantry organizational structure. Operating as part of a regiment, infantry battalions have a permanent administrative home with permanent "parents" who can share their troubles. The battalion should be primarily tactical and free to fight where needed. It should be self-sufficient logistically, but it should not be saddled with the administrative woes of the separate battalion. Advocates of the combat-command type of organization make a mistake when they separate infantry and armored divisions. In the armored division, all units have one thing in common—armor—that binds them together and transcends branch pride. This tends to create *esprit de corps* as a division rather than at subordinate unit level. The same is true in an airborne division. But it does not apply to the infantry division as the only infantry in the division are the three regiments. Were the regiment to be abandoned, much *esprit* would be lost to our infantry, and the separate infantry battalion would become a stepchild.

The front-line infantry regiment in Europe accepts the so-called "wide" front as normal. Assigned frontages for a reinforced regiment run from a minimum of 20,000 yards up to 35,000 yards and more. Missions on such frontages may vary from mobile defense of a river line to maximum delay in wide-open tank country. The frontages expected for a position defense simply don't exist for a regiment in Germany.

Because of the frontages involved, our operations i Europe are necessarily based on an RCT organizatio Extensive maneuvers of RCT, division, and corps sco have amply demonstrated the soundness of this concep A typical RCT consists of:

- An infantry regiment (motorized by the attac ment of a truck company);
- An armored cavalry battalion;
- A field artillery battalion (105 how);
- An engineer company;
- Detachments from division ordnance, signal, med cal and MPs.

THE current U.S. infantry regiment can be adapte to such an RCT organization in a remarkably efficie manner. In the first place, a well-trained regiment far more flexible than most people realize. The organ zation of the regiment is basically sound, and it is sui able to perform a wide variety of missions. Regiment headquarters can operate readily as a combat tea headquarters without any augmentation, and can ha dle five or six battalions with ease.

For current missions, however, certain weaknesses a apparent in the present regimental structure. Change in organization to overcome these deficiencies are pr posed below.

¶ *Insufficient armor and AT defenses.* Motorizing th

giment with 2½-ton trucks does not mechanize it. ıfantry in 2½-ton trucks needs more armor protection. his has been greatly improved by the inclusion of an mored cavalry battalion in the RCT. In addition, ›wever, we should:

• Eliminate the I&R platoon of regimental head-ıarters company and add a reconnaissance company equipped with infantry-type radios).

• Add an AT platoon (four AT guns of high-veloci- type, towed or SP) to regimental headquarters com-ıny. Likewise, add an identical AT platoon to each ıttalion headquarters company; this would be in ldition to the recoilless-rifle platoon of the heavy-eapons company.

Inadequate radio communications. This has been rgely remedied in Europe, where each regiment has en issued considerable additional radio equipment for atoon, company, battalion, and regimental use. The sult, in general, has been to raise each unit to the xt higher echelon so far as communications are con-rned. What remains to be done is to standardize this uipment in the infantry T/O&Es, and to provide:

• Suitable self-contained command-post vehicles for gimental, battalion, and company headquarters. Mo-le, armored-type command vehicles are required.

• Adequate personnel to operate and maintain the ditional equipment.

Regimental air section. This element should be ex-nded to two fixed-wing light aircraft and two heli-pters from the presently authorized one each. The ht aircraft of the infantry regiment are indispensable. daylight hours they are one practical answer to the ›blem of adequate surveillance of large areas. They also invaluable as airborne radio relays. The heli-pter makes possible close personal contact between mmanders despite wide fronts and, in addition, is a luable alternate means of communication when radios l.

Battalion trains. The infantry battalion should be gistically self-sufficient so that it can continue to erate even when cut off from the regiment. This ı be done by beefing up the battalion ammunition d gasoline trains which should always operate under talion control.

OTE that I have emphasized increased armor, more mobility, and better control, in terms of improved nmunications and increased air observation. An RCT built around a motorized and partly mechanized infantry regiment can fight on wide fronts and over varied terrain. It is capable of effective delaying action in good tank country, or on relatively rough ground, and it can conduct a mobile defense with reasonable assurance of success. On extended fronts, it has good capabilities for detecting enemy infiltration or penetration into undefended areas, and then moving swiftly to meet such threats. Although it can perform armored-type missions, it can still fight effectively as infantry on any kind of ground and through any kind of weather.

Current experience in Europe strongly points toward making the RCT, rather than the division, the basic unit of the combined arms. The battalion would continue to be the basic fighting unit, but the RCT would become the basic major unit. Under such a concept, the division would become a sort of corps in nature. A proposed basic organization for the division would include:

• 3 RCTs formed from 3 infantry regiments (motorized and modified as proposed above); 1 armored cavalry regiment (3 battalions; should be equipped with infantry-type radios); 3 field artillery battalions (105 how); 1 engineer battalion (division type); 2 tank battalions; 4 field artillery battalions (medium); 1 AAA battalion; 1 engineer battalion (corps type); 1 helicopter company; 2 armored personnel carrier companies (these units, each containing 25 to 30 APCs, would greatly increase the division's capabilities to exploit an attack); and necessary service units.

There are several compelling advantages favoring the adoption of these changes. In the first place, they will meet the particular and urgent demands of European conditions with minimum disruption to current personnel, training, and logistical practices. They present the simplest, quickest, and most economical way to effect needed reorganization, since present organizational structures are basically retained. Thus, drastic and radical reorganization, with its attendant risks and disruptions, is avoided. Secondly, battle-tested regimental and divisional organizational concepts are not discarded in favor of untried ideas of dubious value. Lastly, the time-honored traditions of our fighting infantry regiments are preserved. The value of tradition and proud battle records to a green regiment entering combat for the first time cannot and must not be overlooked. The venerable colors of our oldest regiments bear silent witness to this fundamental truth.

Logistics—servant of tactics, not its maste



THE THEATER

LOGEX-55, an Army training exercise to be conducted at Fort Lee, V ginia, from 2 to 7 May, takes on a new and important significance t year. Conducted annually since 1948, this logistical training exerc has already achieved recognition for its value in practical training and a progressive meeting ground for the advanced students of all the te nical and administrative service schools.

Each year one of the services takes the primary responsibility for pl ning and conducting the exercise. This year the Medical Corps ta that lead, with Brig. Gen. James P. Cooney, Commandant of the Medi Field Service School, serving as maneuver director. On hand to as him will be logistical experts from the Chemical Corps, the Corps Engineers, the Ordnance Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, the Sig Corps, and the Transportation Corps. Representatives from the Adjut General's Corps, the Judge Advocate General's Corps, the Corps Military Police, and the Finance Corps will also participate to furn the administrative touch.

Some five thousand officers and men from the logistical services w participate in the training exercise, with student officers assuming co mand and staff positions appropriate to a combat area. The exercise being conducted under the supervision of Gen. John E. Dahlquist, co manding general of Continental Army Command.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES S. HARRIS





FIGURE I

SUPPORT COMMAND

THE particular significance of LOGEX-55 is that it will test a new communications zone organization called "The Theater Support Command," developed by the 1st Logistical Command at Fort Bragg under the leadership of Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Bixby, its commander. The details of that organization and the modern concepts for its employment are outlined in an observer handbook, *Logistical Concept and Organization: Theater of Operations,* LOGEX-55, published by the 1st Logistical Command, and from which we quote freely.

The basic concept is to make "logistics the servant of tactics—not the master." "Combat commanders should be relieved of maximum administrative and logistical functions so that they may devote their attention to the primary mission of defeating the enemy." The concept is further developed that the logistical support of the combat troops can be directed and controlled more effectively by a logistical commander than by the army combat commander and staff. Thus, G4's responsibility is reduced. But it is advanced that more definite authority and responsibility are secured thereby.

The main idea is to keep pace with the combat troops in their efforts toward streamlined organization, mobility, and flexibility to be prepared to meet the conditions threatened by atomic warfare of the future. The keynote here in the control of logistical operations is decentralization. Let's stop to say amen and Godspeed to that idea. In our current trend toward pursuing unduly the vagaries of close supervision in a search for perfection we are not developing resourcefulness, decision, action. Along with decentralization it is proposed to improve and expedite supply by dispersion, by reducing the number of echelons, the number of depots, and the level of stockage, and by substituting more direct hauling from coastal depots to division supply points. The tempo of atomic warfare will not permit the processing of requisitions through a pyramidal supply structure.

"The support area (former ComZ) commander should extend operations



FIGURE 2

. . . far into the combat zone . . . and conduct all logistical and administrative operations . . . except those which must be under the command and control of the combat zone commander." In the establishment of facilities tactical considerations, rather than zone boundaries, should govern.

Whether from an atomic holocaust or from guerrilla warfare, it is assumed that damage and disaster will occur in the area of logistical support. "This requires that dispersion of units, supplies and facilities be accomplished to the point where they are no longer profitable targets. . . . Complete decentralization is essential for commanders to have the ability and flexibility to react instantly. . . ."

"Accordingly, under this concept higher headquarters have been reduced in size and confined to broad plans and policies." That, of course, is easier said than done.

The main subordinate units under the theater army commander are the field armies or army groups and the theater support commander. The theater army headquarters includes a general staff to formulate broad plans, supervise and coordinate; however, it has no technical and little administrative staff. The commander delegates all detailed logistical planning and operations to the theater support command. That headquarters includes the senior representatives of all technical and administrative services. They assist the theater support commander, who is the principal adviser to the theater army commander for all logistical matters. The same relation exists between the field army commander and the army support commander.

FIGURE 1 shows the position of the theater support command within the theater army organization.

"The theater support command is ganized into coastal support section((former base section) and direct su port section(s) (former advance se tion). There is no intermediate secti nor will that area be occupied oth than by routes of communication. . Installations are dispersed along t coast and directly in rear of field arm

"Wherever practicable, supply del eries are made directly from the coas support section to field army supp points or even to division issue poin . . . This avoids unnecessary picki up and setting down, . . . and t creation of a huge pipeline. . . . N mally, supplies in the direct supp section are used only to supplement rect shipments where required. Wh forward displacement is imminent, rect support section depots are exhau ed by issue and reconstituted forwa by direct shipment from the coas section.

"The coastal section remains gen ally close to the ports and does r echelon forward. Responsibility for ground lines of communications creasingly falls on the coastal sectic . . . [It] pushes its service forward relieve the direct support section logistical operations as it displaces rear boundary forward. Within bo coastal and direct support sections pot complexes composed of branch ty



FIGURE 3

epots are established. Each depot vithin the complex carries balanced neater stocks and is subdivided into ubdepots. Subdepots are dispersed vith three- to five-mile intervals. Each handles] only designated classes of upply.

"In the coastal support section depot omplexes are dispersed from the ports. . . In the direct support section they ollow closely behind the field army . . to serve the combat forces."

'HE organization of the theater support command headquarters is shown Figure 2. It is a small staff for planing and coordinating. All operations e decentralized to the coastal and upport sections. The headquarters is omposed of four major elements: a ommand group, a functional staff, a ecial staff, and a service staff operatg under a deputy for service.

Note that the functional staff takes e place of the conventional general aff. It is designed specifically for the gistical problems at hand. It is ornized into four groups: requirements d acquisition (what is needed and tting it—in men, materials, facili-s); storage and distribution (holdg and dealing it out—involve reacement personnel and POWs as ell as supplies); movements (deliverg it); and maintenance (repairing or sposing of it) involve hospitalization, acuation, rehabilitation, retraining of rsonnel as well as maintenance of uipment. This identical functional ff is also to be found in the coast- and direct support sections and in e army support command. Uniformi- promotes prompt understanding, mwork, and efficiency.



FIGURE 4

HE special staff includes the senior fficer of each of the services in the ater. They advise the theater comnder and his staff on matters perning to their own services; likewise y develop theater policies and mainn supply control for their own servs. However, they operate in a staff acity and exercise supply control by ad allocations. They don't have to w or control the stockage in each ot or exercise other prerogatives of support commanders down at the port section level.

'he deputy for service is one of the wrinkles introduced. The primary sion of the commander, termed olesale," is to provide support for the combat troops in the theater. The secondary mission, termed "retail," is that of supporting the logistical troops in his own command. Note that the terms "wholesale" and "retail" as used here have no significance as to volume, but rather to the recipient of the support. In order to free the commander and his main subordinates for their main mission of supporting combat troops, and in order to reduce the usual complaints on preferential treatment for service troops, the deputy for service has been established to provide the support for the logistical troops. Whether or not this device will serve well remains to be seen. Note too that at this level the deputy's office is a planning and coordinating agency. Down at the support section level the deputy for service gets into operations, with service commands and service centers.

THE headquarters organization for the coastal support and the direct support sections is shown in Figure 3. The two structures are identical. The headquarters is similar to that of the theater support command in pattern. However, the support section is an operating agency.

The main subordinate units are the technical support commands concerned primarily with the support of the combat troops. Their commanders also



FIGURE 5

serve as staff officers to the section commander. The chemical, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal support commands are engaged primarily in wholesale supply and maintenance, and are organized for that purpose. The medical command, however, is engaged primarily in medical service, hospitalization and rehabilitation of personnel. The transportation command is engaged in its main mission—the transportation service. The adjutant general and replacement command has an entirely different problem in personnel replacement.

"Service centers are small subordinate units established in the vicinity of groups of wholesale installations to relieve the support command units and installations of routine activities connected with their own existence." The center commander commands and controls his own troops engaged in retail operations. He does not command elements of the technical support commands engaged in wholesale operations.

Figure 4 depicts the relations of the support sections and the field army support command.

Figure 5 shows the organization of the field army support command and its relation to the rest of the army. The organization is similar to that of the support section.

"Field army is stripped of all depots, evacuation hospitals, and maintenance operations above third echelon. Similarly, the direct support section depends on the coastal section for depot facilities beyond minimum levels of supply, protracted hospitalization, and all maintenance above fourth echelon. Neither field army nor direct support section performs any functions which prevent them from 'keeping up' with tactical operations."

THE field army headquarters does not have a conventional special staff. The work is delegated to the army support command where the senior representatives of the services are assigned. They perform their services for the entire army. Technical service commands and the replacement and adjutant general command constitute the operating el ments. In providing logistical suppo for field army units no distinction made between retail and wholesa support. The same operating unit working under the deputy for servic serve both the combat and the logistic troops.

Coordinator teams, composed of re resentatives of the functional staff an the deputy for service and operatin by areas, arbitrate and coordinate logi tical activities.

ACTUALLY, American armies hav usually developed and perfected a effective system of supply before a wa was over. Even in the Revolution, N thaniel Greene as Quartermaster Ge eral and Jeremiah Wadsworth as Con missary General both demonstrate outstanding ability in procuring an delivering supplies. In the Civil Wa despite the fact that even Rebel so diers voiced loud growls against th poor quality of Union Army shoes an other equipment, the fact remains th the Union's troops were very well su plied by the standards of that perio The main trouble has been that aft each war the supply organization w broken up and the procedures forgo ten. This proposal from the 1st Logi tical Command constitutes a splendi step toward the development an standardization of an effective syste before our next war, which can we serve as an excellent starting point fo familiarization and mutual understanc ing between the logistical elements an the combat forces.

Today every soldier must know mines and how to use them

MINES MIGHT MAKE THE DIFFERENCE

AJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY

the world strategic situation, now ıd in the foreseeable future, the mil- y initiative will not be ours. The ımption of hostilities in Europe or ea would find us on the defensive ting for time to get reinforcements ıed and into the theater of opera- s. Mines, properly employed, might :e the difference between victory disaster.

lines are no longer an exclusive ps of Engineers specialty. All ps, combat and service, must know ething—in fact, a great deal—about characteristics of mines, how to lay ı and how to remove them. In a kthrough by the enemy or a rapid nce by our troops, literally every- including medical personnel in hospitals and Wacs in administra- installations, must at least know basic facts about mines.

ow in the mill is a field manual ıine warfare. It is tentatively titled : Employment of Land Mines," al- gh the text includes breaching of ıy minefields and the clearing of s from routes and from our own fields. Significantly, it is num- l FM 20-32, thus putting it in the "general" classification pertaining to all branches instead of in the engineer series as was the old FM 5-32.

Some changes in the terminology of mines and minefields are introduced. The new manual emphasizes the need of a broader knowledge of mines by having its first part directed to the individual soldier and written to encourage self-study. "Individual soldier," in this case, means every officer and enlisted person, male or female.

Part Two covers the subjects of minefield planning and siting, how to lay a minefield, how to mine a route, and how to report and record a minefield, and how to breach or clear a minefield. This part of the manual is primarily for the platoon or company (battery) commander, but contains much of interest to battalion and regimental commanders and their staffs. Part Three deals with mine warfare at the higher levels of command and includes doctrine and staff functioning Part Four is a brief guide for training.

Mines are obstacles, but they are also a special kind of weapon—one which usually acts because the enemy has pulled the trigger. An exploding mine is likely to do damage to the enemy in a higher percentage of cases than will result from the firing of a rifle, a machine gun, or a cannon. But mines are also more dangerous to our own troops, if our troops are not well trained in their use, than any of our other weapons. Moreover, minefields must be sited with real strategic and tactical skill, for the reason that minefields limit the maneuverability of our own troops as well as those of the enemy.

We didn't use mines very skillfully during World War II or the Korean campaign. The United States Army has always been attack-minded. Mines can be very useful in offensive action, but they are primarily a defensive weapon, and our soldiers, of all grades and branches, were not prepared to use them effectively in sudden shifts to the defensive, such as the Battle of the Bulge and the Chongchon River affair.

AMONG the most carefully prescribed requirements in the new mine manual are those pertaining to the questions of what commanders are authorized to employ minefields of the various types—protective, defensive,

Left: a mine cluster. *Right:* clusters laid on both sides of a strip center line

barrier, nuisance, and phony—and particularly what reports and records are required.

When the Germans in 1940 made a deep penetration of the Allied positions in western Europe, the operation might not have ended in a Dunkirk if routes had been adequately mined and command installations protected by minefields. Admittedly, a "mass of maneuver," properly located and imbued with a will-to-win spirit, would have been necessary to insure a decisive defeat of the German breakthrough, but mines, properly used, would have helped. With war a fact for several months, such mining should have been possible.

The situation in Europe today is different, and political and economic factors prevent any large-scale interruption of traffic or use of farming land. The mining task would be far beyond the capabilities of a limited number of specially trained troops. Reserves and administrative troops must be able to mine a route or lay a minefield. Similarly, in any later counteroffensive, the administrative and supporting elements of our troops might well be hurried forward into enemy territory where they themselves would have to clear areas for their installations.

MINES and minefields are as subject to technological advance as are other military weapons and methods. Most countries have, in some stage of development, various methods of initiating the action of mines in addition to the well-established means such as the pressure of a man's foot or of the wheel or track of a vehicle, the pulling or breaking of a trip cord, the closing of an electric circuit, or the use of some delayed-action device such as clockwork or the eating by a chemical through some material in a predictable time. These newer methods include magnetic induction—impulses from a large, metallic mass such as a tank; vibrations in air, water, ground, or a structure; audio frequency—sound waves from a vehicle; and frequency induction—a radio signal, or perhaps merely the operation of a mine detector near the fuze of a mine.

A mine is by definition an encased explosive, or other chemical, biological, or radiological toxic agent or incendiary agent, designed to destroy or damage vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate personnel; it may be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled means. There is no information available from any country as to whether this "encased explosive" is in some cases a fissionable material, but FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, in his description of what he called "atomic bombs," specifically described two types—one about five inches in diameter "if in the shape of a sphere," and the other, the "gun-barrel type," five to twelve inches in diameter and probably about two and one-half feet long. Such devices, whatever they may be called, concealed like a mine in a geographic or tactical bottleneck and either set to be fi by remote control or by enemy cont would have one problem of ato warfare solved—that of accurate de ery on the target.

THE small-unit infantry or artil commander will, of course, be marily concerned with standard is mines. When he is ordered to la minefield or part of a field, he normally have indicated to him tactical purpose of the field and general location, but he, after a rec naissance of the terrain, will have select the actual location of the m strips. He may add lanes, as requi for patrols, for example, but not g He will also be given definite infor tion about the supporting fires av able, but he, of course, plans the support of his own organic weap Finally, his instructions will incl what and how many mines are av able, sources, transportation, the t by which the field must be comple and a statement of the reports records required.

The trend of techniques in the ing and laying of minefields is tow simplicity, particularly toward the of a single standard pattern. A sta ard pattern makes minefields sligh easier to breach, but this disadvant is more than compensated for by s plification of training (and the ma tenance of training), speed in layi uniformity in coverage (replacing mines removed or destroyed, for exa ple), and in easier clearance.

The captain or lieutenant charged th the siting and laying of a part a defensive minefield, for example, ıst consider his instructions as indi- ted above, the need for the tying-in his part of the field with parts laid adjacent units, the location and mouflage of his mine dump if one to be established, probable enemy ıtes of approach, enemy observation his area, and the desirability of good servation over the field by his own ops. He must make full use of nat- ıl and artificial obstacles in his area. A typical, but not prescribed, organi- ion of a platoon for a minelaying k might be:

	Off	*NCO*	*Pvt*
pervisory	1	1	
ing party		1	3
ırking party		1	2
cording party		1	2
ying parties (3 par- ties: 1 NCO, 6-8 pvts in each)		3	18-24
	1	7	25-31

In the new manual, the suggested ties and procedures for each of these ties is spelled out along lines devel- ed, largely, at The Engineer Center Fort Belvoir.

The unit in the design and laying a minefield is the *cluster*. The clus- normally consists of several mines, *may contain only one mine.* All nes in a cluster must be within a nicircle with a two-pace radius; no ster may be closer than two paces an adjacent cluster. Clusters are laid on both sides of strip centerlines. The resultant two rows of mines constitute a *strip.*

Most clusters will usually contain both antitank and antipersonnel mines. If only antitank mines are used, enemy troops can remove them (unless the minefield is well protected by observed fires) with relatively little hazard. If only antipersonnel mines are used, enemy tanks driven through the field can breach it for foot troops. The mixed field is therefore normal except for such situations as the use of antitank mines in temporary roadblocks against tanks or a minefield of antipersonnel mines in an area where armor cannot operate. The standard pattern is suitable in all cases.

The minimum effective antitank field consists of three strips with about one cluster per three yards of strip, plus a very irregular strip on the enemy's side of the field. This strip is called the IOE (irregular outer edge), and the other strips are designated A, B, and C, beginning with strip A nearest to the enemy; additional strips, if desired to give greater density to the field, are lettered from D in alphabetical sequence.

Variety of pattern within the field is achieved by varying the types and number of mines in clusters, and by varying the distance between strips with a prescribed minimum of 18 paces centerline to centerline. The IOE adds to the enemy's difficulties if he attempts to breach the field.

Breaching enemy minefields at the start of an attack is often a vital phase of offensive action. The problem is under constant study in all armies. The methods are usually classified as manual, mechanical, or explosive. None is entirely satisfactory and all are subject to enemy interference. Here again new detectors, and new explosive and mechanical devices and methods, are under test with air explosions of atomic missiles over the minefield entering into the picture, but the breaching problem may nevertheless often land in the lap of the infantry company commander. This is particularly true of the reconnaissance phase of a breaching operation, and regardless of what explosive or mechanical means are available, he must have men well trained in the basic method of mine detection: *looking, feeling* with the hands, *probing* with anything available such as a bayonet, a knife, even a pencil.

The important current fact about mine warfare is not in the field of new developments in matériel; it is rather in the field of training and discipline. Soldiers cannot afford to be, in Mr. Wilmot's phrase, "ill-schooled in the art of 'de-lousing' mines." *Every* soldier must know how to deal with mines—our own and the enemy's—and he must conform exactly to the prescribed methods whether he is a private who discovers a mine, an infantry platoon commander laying a protective minefield, or a theater commander planning the use of minefields in his whole area of responsibility.

A three-strip minefield. Each strip has an approximate density of one cluster for every three yards of front



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

The MUV pull fuze is the most commonly used fuze of this type in the Soviet Army. The detonator is screwed into the base of the fuze when it is to be inserted in a mine



The VPF pull fuze is used with improvised mines of all types. Three pounds of pull on the ring at the top releases the striker if the fuze's safety pin has been removed

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

The YaM-5 wooden box mine contains about 11 pounds of explosive. When 300 pounds of pressure are applied, a wooden safety pin is pushed out of the fuze, exploding the mine



The TMB-1 paper antitank mine is an asphalt-impregnated cardboard container holding 11 pounds of explosives. Twenty-six pounds of pressure will actuate the fuze

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

Several of these POMZ-2 shrapnel mines can be driven vertically into the ground and connected by trip wires. A pull-type fuze is inserted in the top of the mine



The TM-38 antitank mine contains 62 pounds of TNT and is detonated by a pressure fuze. It should not be disarmed by hand, but either blown in place or pulled out by ropes



The TMD-B wooden antitank mine contains 11 pounds of explosive and requires 300 pounds of pressure to set it off. It can also be set to detonate under 50 pounds



The TM-41 antitank mine has a steel shell containing 9 pounds of explosive. 350 pounds of pressure will detonate an MV-5 pressure fuze placed under the lid

INFANTRY MUST FIGHT

(Continued from cover 2)

world without severe repercussions. Are we going to do it all over again? Infantrymen should not deceive themselves or anyone else into thinking that they can maintain peak effectiveness entirely by taking cuts in personnel and appropriations manfully with a stiff lip and making up the deficiencies entirely by practicing supply economy. It just can't be done. We have got to show that we have our limitations in the infantry now, and fight to prevent them from becoming worse. Here are some examples from personal experience, which will show what I mean:

My battalion, when it went into combat in 1945, may have been among the best infantry troops in the world. I thought so then and I think so now. But the fact is that the combat efficiency of my battalion declined over a period of three months of combat, and it was not the fault of the men of that battalion. At that time my rifle companies were down to two platoons of seventeen men each, and the weapons platoons were approximately at half strength. When I heard replacements had come to the regiment, and I didn't get any, I went back to the CP to give the S1 hell, and instead caught hell from the regimental commander, who told me that the 3d Battalion needed them more than I did. I got no replacements.

Although I did not have a battalion, but a reinforced company, I was still getting battalion missions. We accomplished them by depending more and more on artillery support, on armored support, on air support, which had consistently improved. But the battalion had not improved, and no matter what the reasons, it was not the best infantry battalion in the world.

If this was an isolated case, it would not be worth writing about, but I have talked to too many other infantry leaders of World War II and Korea not to know that there were plenty of infantry battalions and other units in the same shape, or worse, after a long period on the line. Few of them would admit, as I have, that the combat efficiency of their units had deteriorated, but it had, and all the courage and hot-shot leadership and dodging the issue would not change it.

When my outfit came off the line in early 1945 I found out where the men were. I took my jeep back through the base section and saw thousands of big, husky, healthy men busy driving trucks with strange initials on the bumpers, unloading ships, directing traffic, performing the engineering and supply miracles for which our army is justly famous. There is no doubt that they were doing a tremendous job serving that great force. Even supplying, equipping, and maintaining the base itself was a terrific task. All these men may have been more essential in supplying the army than in serving as infantry replacements, but then why does the infantry get the dirty end of the stick so far as supplies, equipment, and living space are concerned?

AFTER World War II, I served in the G2 section of an army staff, a theater staff, and in the G3 section of another army staff. Career Management believes an officer should have a well-rounded career, and I agree. However, in some cases careers will go flat instead of round if an officer doesn't do something about it. And here again, I learned that infantrymen must fight. I learned this first when, toward the end of my tour in the army G2 section, I looked through my records and discovered that my primary MOS had been changed from 1542 (infantry unit commander) to 9301 (intelligence staff officer). I had a lengthy conversation with a WAC personnel officer, who insisted that regulations stipulated that she couldn't possibly change the primary MOS to conform to what I was primarily qualified to do. I'm afraid I got a little ungentlemanly and may even have pulled my rank in order to get her to change it back to 1542. She must have been thoroughly confused. After all, being an intelligence staff officer connoted some kind of intellectual accomplishment, whereas, to her way of thinking, any damned fool could be an infantry unit commander. Except for the fact that my efficiency reports were the lowest I have ever received in the Army, I believe I benefited professionally by my experience in G2.

After a tour with an infantry division, I was transferred to an arm headquarters, this time to the G3 se tion. I noticed while serving he that the remarkable phenomenon which the infantry seems invariably get it in the neck was being perpet ated.

THE army commander was an infa tryman, and one of the best leade this Army has ever produced. Certai ly the infantry has reason to be prou of the higher commanders who ha come from its ranks. Our command was one of the finest. But an infanti man at that level must be imparti He must have the Big Picture ar cannot allow partiality for his ov branch to influence his decisions. fact, he probably should lean ov backward to avoid it. He must depe upon his staff to present all sides the problem. If I had to pick out t key positions on this particular arm staff—that is, the most important me bers of it—I would name the chief staff, the deputy chief of staff for plar the army artillery officer, the G3, ar the G4. Of these officers, all we artillerymen except the G3, who w an infantryman. All were general o ficers except the G3, who was a colon

On that staff the artillery viewpoi got plenty of careful consideration every staff problem that concerned For that matter, so did the infantry viewpoint in most cases. The sta was an efficient, smooth-working on competently supervised and not afra of hard work. However, sometimes problem arose in which the interests the infantry and the interests of t artillery were opposed.

An instance of this occurred whe in working on maneuver plans, I su mitted a necessary revision of the a proved plans to the deputy chief staff for plans, in order to give a infantry division a more important mi sion. He listened to me make m spiel and then asked, "How are yo going to coordinate the artillery i your plan?" I thought that over an said, "I don't know about that, si but the artillery section assures m that it can be coordinated and h prepared a tentative artillery anne based on this revision." "I know," h said, "but can't the artillery be bett coordinated under the original plan? For me to argue artillery coordinatio with a brigadier general of artiller was little less than ridiculous, so I sai "Yes, sir; I guess so, if you say it can.

The point is not that one infantry taff officer did not get his way. The oint is that it was another case of the ıfantry viewpoint getting lost in the ıuffle, as it seems to time after time ı situation after situation, all the way p and down the line. I do not intend) be critical of our artillery. If anyıing, I think we should emulate . It looks out for its own interests and ɔr its own people. It has developed ıe best system of artillery support in ıe world, and it has done it for the inıntry. Except that now, there seems to e a question, as with the Army and ıe Air Force, as to who is supporting 'hom. While everyone proclaims his ıission of supporting the infantry, the ıfantry's interests are damned seldom ɔnsidered paramount. This is probaly no one's fault but the infantry's.

FTER the above experiences and a few more like them, my first inclinaɔn is to shun staff duty. Give me an fantry battalion or, in time, a regient, and I'll be happy for the rest of y career. There are infantry officers ke that. They won't go near a staff signment if they can help it. This not the solution. The infantry repsentatives in key positions on higher affs should be the first team. You n bet the other branches are sending eir first teams to those assignments, ıd we must deal with them on a basis equal proficiency as well as equal nk.

What I have had to say here means me that when the interests of the fantry were neglected, they were negcted because someone, or everyone, d not fight hard enough to protect ose interests. If these examples are ɔt exceptional—and I am convinced ey are not—the morale, *esprit,* and, ɔst important of all, the combat efiency of the infantry cannot fail to ffer or decrease. I don't pretend to ve the solution to all the infantry's ɔblems, but I do contend that our ıeen has had her crown knocked ɛew and her robes dragged on the ɔund a little bit too often for us to nd by idly and tolerate it. However, correct this situation is going to take ɔre than just waving the blue flag d assuring ourselves and everyone e that the infantry is still the Queen Battles because it always has been. is going to take infantrymen, good antrymen who have the courage of ɛir convictions and who will fight them—and for the Infantry.



GOING UP

Infantrymen must be able to go anywhere. These rugged soldiers of the 196th Infantry Regiment emulate mountain goats as they scale an almost vertical cliff during intensive training in Alaska.

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The Chinese enemy and the Chinese terrain will gang up on those who would reconnoiter by ai or in mechanized units along roads, for in China, where few roads exist, he who controls the space between the roads controls the roads

In China, Recon Is for Foot Soldiers

GENERAL SUN LI-JEN

TH an armament often desperately bsolescent, the Chinese Commu- military forces have conducted a essful war of attrition for many s. From a small corps of regular es and innumerable guerrilla ls, they have succeeded in build- an army which has surprised the tern World.

lost of the Communist successes ld have been impossible without detailed and comprehensive reports ieir reconnaissance, on which their ers could base their planning. Anti- imunist reconnaissance, on the oth- iand, proved disappointingly un- essful despite air superiority and orization.

ne geographical conditions of a vast of the Far East are unfavorable r, mechanized, and motorized re- aissance. The terrain of the Asian subcontinent, which stretches from Siberia to the frontiers of India and down to the Indonesian archipelago, is varied, but it has one common feature—a scarcity of roads and strong bridges in the Western sense.

NORTH of an east-west line, roughly one hundred miles north of the Yangtse, people grow grain, and traffic moves on oxcarts over unimproved dirt roads. These roads become quagmires when it rains or when the snow melts. During the dry season every moving vehicle stirs up a big cloud of dust. In the great plains of this area, vehicles can move across country when the soil is dry.

South of this line, rice is grown. The fields are under water from spring to autumn in the northern part and practically during the whole year in the southern. With the exception of a few roads built in recent times, there exist only footpaths, about twenty to thirty inches wide, on which people move in single file.

The bridges in the interior cannot carry heavy vehicles like tanks or armored cars. River beds are muddy, and the rivers cannot be forded. With the exception of the mountainous areas and the steppes and deserts of the northeast, the whole subcontinent is densely populated. Fighting can be done almost anywhere, and supply lines could easily extend thousands of miles.

The northern part of the subcontinent is covered during the summer with millet, corn, and sorghum, the latter growing about nine feet high, and there is plenty of cover. After the autumn harvest until March the country is bare. In the south the plains are

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Bret Harte might have said it this way: "Which I wish to remark . . . the terrain Chinese is peculia

full of bamboo groves and the mountains are covered with high grass and shrubs. As you go southward, the cover becomes denser, until you reach the jungles of the tropical belt.

WESTERN concepts of reconnaissance are ill fitted to this geography. The experiences of two World Wars in Europe have led to the belief that reconnaissance is largely the task of the air force and of mechanized or motorized units. Reconnaissance on foot is done mainly for security purposes or on the actual battlefield, and therefore is the duty of all troops.

These concepts will not work in the Far East, where you cannot fill the country by moving along the roads, where spaces between units may be 100-200 miles wide, where the enemy is not hampered by heavy equipment, and where he moves large contingents only by night, and in the daytime breaks his troops up into such small groups that aerial reconnaissance cannot easily get a clear picture.

The geographical facts rule supreme. In Manchuria, Chinese Nationalist troops carried out motorized reconnaissance carefully in accordance with American regulations. They failed, beaten by the geography of the country. Moving along the few roads, they were unable to drive across country and were bogged down during the spring thaw. Time and again, reconnaissance units were ambushed. Moving forward along the road, they seldom found a trace of the enemy, but when returning they ran into mines and ambus In a country where few roads exist, who controls the space in betw also controls the roads.

SINCE the Communist reconn sance seems to have been more s cessful than that of our side, it wo be wise to study their methods organization.

The strength of the reconnaissa units of the Chinese Communist mies is not much different from of most armies. The organization vides for a platoon for each infar regiment, a company for each divisi and a battalion for each corps. this organization is very flexible. Th reconnaissance units are more cadres around which they organ

errillas and civilians willing and able serve as reconnaissance troops.

Communist army regulations pro- le for the concentration of the regi- ental platoons and divisional com- ny into a single reconnaissance unit der the direct command of the divi- n G2. One-third of all the reconnais- nce units operate in civilian clothes teams of three men, who receive cial training. Communist recon- issance units have practically no ve- les, but they make a limited use of ycles and horses.

The Communists have acquired a gh degree of skill in camouflage. ey prefer to move silently at night. ey move on foot, and they make of the terrain for the purposes of servation and ambush. Their pur- se is not only to establish and main- n contact with the enemy forces, but *pervade* the enemy by aiming at his nt, flanks, center, and rear.

Communist reconnaissance units op- te far forward of their parent forces. hile fighting them in Manchuria in 46-47, we generally encountered ir patrols fifty to sixty miles in front their assembly areas. It is a special ture of Communist tactics to keep ir forces well hidden behind this flung reconnaissance screen, out of ch of the enemy. Then when the ment seems opportune they strike ghtning blow with everything they muster.

Communist reconnaissance is aggressive. Patrols carry out nuisance raids at night, ambushing, minelaying, and sniping. They carry a feeling of insecurity deep into the rear of their enemy, they force him to increase his security elements, they rob his men of rest, and they wear down his morale, all with a small number of men.

The chief drawback in the Communist methods of reconnaissance is a slowness of movement, especially when reporting, but this handicap will soon be overcome as they obtain more light, portable radio equipment.

IF war should break out again in the Far East, we will have to wrest the initiative in reconnaissance from the enemy. Reconnaissance units will have a wide variety of duties, including the suppression of guerrilla warfare. In the wide spaces of the Far East, an enemy aiming at infiltration into our rear will always find his way through gaps and around open flanks. Our aim must be to deal with this problem actively, and to relieve the main body of troops of the burden of security tasks as much as possible. We must harass the enemy, instead of permitting him to harass us. We must become secure against ambush and other surprises, whether in the front or the rear or on the flanks.

While Communist reconnaissance offers us many lessons, we should not merely imitate their methods. They owed much of their success to incomprehensible mistakes of opponents who tried to fight a stationary war by holding scattered strongpoints in a wide theater of war against a highly mobile enemy. The latest example of this misconception of the essentials of strategy in the Far East was the defense of Dien Bien Phu with its catastrophic results.

The machine gun has eliminated cavalry, and the terrain in the Far East is not suitable for armored vehicles. Reconnaissance therefore has to be done on foot. But several problems have to be solved before reconnaissance units can operate successfully far ahead of the main forces. They are:

- The problem of carrying the reconnaissance units quickly into the vicinity of the enemy.
- The problem of reporting and directing the reconnaissance units while they are reconnoitering.
- The problem of supply.
- The problem of rejoining the parent forces.

To reach the vicinity of the enemy, reconnaissance units can move on vehicles or bicycles, or can be flown in or parachuted.

Light portable radio equipment has solved the problem of reporting. Reports can now reach headquarters as quickly as reports from air or mechanized forces. Reconnaissance units can

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be briefed on the situation and receive instructions without having to return. The use of radios enables reconnaissance on foot to develop its potentialities to the full, for neither bad weather, darkness, nor difficulties of terrain can prevent foot reconnaissance units from carrying out their duties.

The reconnaissance units may have to carry food for several days with them. Sometimes they will have to live off the country, as cavalry used to. Supplies can also be dropped by parachute. The supply problem for reconnaissance units is the same as for guerrilla units, and it has to be solved in the same way.

The problem of rejoining the parent forces will arise only if a sudden retreat or change of direction of movement becomes necessary, or if the units are operating behind the enemy lines. If vehicles or bicycles cannot be used, evacuation may have to be done by helicopter. Foot reconnaissance units must know that fulfillment of their task is no longer a question of a few hours, but of days or even weeks.

THE men in reconnaissance units should be of the same nationality as the local population, especially if the country is densely inhabited and if the population has been indoctrinated and organized by the Communists. Men of a different race, no matter how carefully they camouflage themselves, cannot remain concealed from the population. This lesson was learned in Indochina and Korea.

In a wide, undeveloped Communist country, it will be necessary to have stronger reconnaissance units than we now have. For an infantry regiment, a strong platoon (50-60 men) is the minimum. For a division, a reconnaissance battalion of two to three companies, and a heavy-weapons unit (antitank weapons and trench mortars) will be the best solution. In addition, there may be a reconnaissance battalion under army or corps headquarters. This unit may be partly or wholly mechanized for use in the plains of North China, Northwest China, and Manchuria. But equipment and training must be such that dismounted reconnaissance can be carried out in the same way as demanded of the regimental and divisional reconnaissance units.

Reconnaissance on foot must have depth. There must be reserve patrols to track down and frustrate enemy reconnaissance which has penetrated the outer screen, as well as to cope with an advancing enemy in force. For dismounted reconnaissance units do not necessarily retreat in the face of an advancing enemy. The outer screen of patrols will report, but it may let the enemy's spearheads pass. The rear echelons then take over, until the enemy is enmeshed in our reconnaissance network.

Members of reconnaissance units must be carefully selected and given specialized training. You cannot use man in this difficult task unless he h acquired a high degree of self-con dence—in his resourcefulness, maste of arms, concealed movement and ca ouflage, and ability to extricate hims from difficult situations. This kind training is an excellent school for lea ers of the lower ranks.

Mechanization or motorization of connaissance units in the Far E should not be completely abandone Whenever and wherever mechaniz war is conducted, mechanized reco naissance will be necessary. Motori tion should be regarded mainly as means of transportation, valuab where roads permit its use. Vehic enable reconnaissance units to be shi ed rapidly; but once dismounted, t units must not be tied to their vehicl A road is an objective to be watche not something to march on, and reco naissance forces should not be co pelled always to return to the road.

Reconnaissance troops in civili clothes are needed in a country whe the population takes part in the figl ing. They should be an integral pa of reconnaissance units, as in the Co munist army. Their training is ve complicated, and their system of r porting sometimes needs elabora planning. They work individually in teams of two to three men. Behi the enemy's lines, they report to an i telligence center, which in turn repo by radio or other means.

A foot reconnaissance company ould consist of company headquar- s and three platoons. Each platoon nsists of four patrols, or squads, 9-12 men each. The platoon com- nders have necessary signal men th them. Company headquarters, the toon commanders, and each patrol uld carry a high-frequency radio th a range of four to six miles. In dition, the company commander, h platoon leader, and each vehicle uld carry a portable radio set with ange of thirty to fifty miles.

The table of equipment must be ible enough to allow the command- o select for his patrols the armament t suited to the terrain, situation, , and enemy to be expected. Patrols uld normally carry semiautomatic es (for two-thirds or one-half of the n), automatic carbines, and hand nades. For night operations, car- es may be substituted for the rifles. nk mines, rocket launchers, auto- ic rifles, and light mortars may be ied if the task demands it. Bicycles one-third or one-fourth of the men uld also be available.

visualize how a reconnaissance nit would actually operate, it is ful to develop an imaginary but ical situation. The terrain is that Central China. The flat ground con- of rice paddy fields with scattered ges and bamboo groves. The hills covered with high grass and shrub. ere is only one vehicular road, its ace a mixture of earth and gravel. this road there are only narrow paths, where vehicles cannot travel.

this situation, a division is rest- in an area twelve miles south of ground in *Figure 1*. Company A connaissance) has advanced north- d on foot on a sector six miles wide. weather is rainy and the ceiling w.

t 1100 hours Company A contacts enemy mechanized reconnaissance of company strength, moving hward on the road. The enemy rhead halts on Lion Mountain for purpose of observation. The Com- A commander reports this to his lion headquarters, and he is or- d to let the enemy penetrate. He eanwhile to continue his advance river-line objective, eight miles of the area on the map. Battalion prepare an ambush, using Com- C and the headquarters antitank mortar platoon. Company A is to



Figure 1

harass the enemy in case he decides to retreat.

Figure 2 shows the situation at 1400 hours. The enemy reconnaissance unit has continued southward unmolested. The Company A commander has ordered his 3d Platoon leader to take one section of his platoon and to prepare a road block in defile on Liang Mountain to block the enemy if he retreats.

The company has reached the points shown on the map when it makes contact with an enemy marching column. The company commander orders his 1st Platoon, minus one squad, to continue the advance to Yuan Mountain, to gain observation on the river-line objective two miles north of Yuan Mountain, and to reconnoiter against the enemy column from the east. The detached squad remains on Camel's Back Mountain, under company control.

The 2d Platoon continues reconnaissance against the enemy column from a line stretching from Stone Mountain to Flat Mountain. Company headquarters moves into the area of Camel's Back Mountain, where it establishes an observation point.

The reconnaissance company has thus placed itself in a position to complete its reconnaissance mission and at the same time help ensnare the enemy in a net that tightens as he penetrates more deeply. Division may order the reconnaissance battalion to allow the enemy to penetrate it, or the battalion may trap the enemy reconnaissance company itself.



Figure 2

THE vast terrain of the Far East is unsuitable for stationary warfare. Armies cannot move with their divisions shoulder to shoulder. The scarcity of roads necessitates movements with many small columns on a wide front. The problem is to prevent the enemy from destroying isolated columns before other columns can come to their assistance. We must be able to concentrate quickly in superior strength for the destruction of part of the enemy while weaker forces hold off the enemy's neighboring forces. This strategy is possible only if there is a strong, wide-flung reconnaissance screen in close contact with the enemy, giving the commander a clear, comprehensive, and detailed picture of the disposition and movement of the enemy.

There are no miracle cures for this reconnaissance problem. Mechanization and superiority in the air have failed when they have not been linked with an understanding of the fundamentals—perfect concealment, silent infiltration, uninterrupted observation, and, when possible, action against enemy supply lines and use of ambush. The Far Eastern subcontinent is a potential theater of war. Its geography must be studied carefully, and methods must be changed, when necessary, to suit it. The problems can be solved by common effort and a flexible mind.

WIND 'ER UP. An electric starter is applied to the prop of the four-cylinder, 72 horsepower engine. Mechanic behind the prop is adjusting a needle valve. Man in far background with right arm extended is signalling for a full right turn command and ailerons have been so positioned.

SH-BOOM! Under 2,600 pounds of JATO thrust the RC is catapulted down a 60-foot launcher and is airbor

RCAT Aloft,

THE dark red bird shoots up off of the floor of the Sou western desert, climbing 2,700 feet a minute. Then is le off, circles a couple of times and streaks for its life at 200 kn

Too slow and too late. On the ground a battery of 75 Skysweepers opens fire and another RCAT (Radio Contro Airplane Target) is lowered to earth by a blossoming parach

In the past fifteen years more than 40,000 target drc similar to today's RCAT have been fired upon by Army Navy AA gunners. They have been used almost everywh Last year the 48th AAA Detachment (RCAT) flew RC a little more than 100 miles south of the Arctic Circle.

Army RCAT detachments provide high-speed, radio-contro targets for AA fire. The drones provide targets for all AA w ons from the caliber .50 machine gun to the Nike mis RCATs can climb, roll and dive to simulate fighter aircraft.

RCAT mounted for takeoff from launcher cart. This is the usual method of launching the RCAT. The launcher is attached to a 150-foot cable which rotates around a pylon. Mechanic is making last minute fuel adjustment to get full power. When the soldier in the background pulls the lanyard the launcher cart will be released.

CIRCLING ABOUT the rotary launcher the RCAT works



bing at a rate of 2,700 feet a minute. The tip pods contain corner re-
ors to increase radar reflectivity. Radio controls flight of RCAT.

But Not for Long

T at 12,000 feet presents about the
silhouette as a bomber at 24,000

typical RCAT detachment consists
rteen men and an officer. The officer
he single master sergeant generally
rm as ground controllers ("beeper
"). The detachment can make as
as 20 target flights a day and usual-
ves four battalions.
rition rates depend upon the type
apon firing at the targets. Automatic
like the Skysweeper take a rather
toll. A fair average would probably
flights per RCAT.



Accurate AA fire knocks off a wing. The 38-foot parachute opens automatically when a hit is made.

) miles per hour before it is released and becomes airborne.

THE MONTH'S READING

Infantry Had to Do the Job

LT. GEN. L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
Command Missions
E. P. Dutton & Co., 1954

Until the final campaign in northern Italy, close air support for ground troops was never as effective as it should have been and was often entirely missing. This is not to say that ground forces did not derive some advantage from the interruption of enemy communications and the blasting of industrial targets hundreds of miles away, for these air missions did have a vital effect upon the course of the war. They did not, however, help the ground soldiers much in overcoming serious obstacles on their immediate front. It was not until the Air Force accepted the principle of control by a forward ground controller and the Tactical Air Commander established his headquarters with the Army commander that close air support became truly effective. This is, in my opinion, a minimum requirement for effective air support for ground forces.

The Fifth Army, like other American forces, was actually a highly mechanized force with many tanks and tank destroyers, much motorized artillery and antiaircraft artillery, and trucks and other vehicles in profusion. Traffic control became a vital problem. Our two and a half ton truck and our jeep made us far more mobile even in mountain warfare than our British Allies, for these vehicles had far greater cross-country mobility than any of the British vehicles.

Yet, with all of the support made possible by mechanization both in the air and on the ground, it was the infantryman who bore the brunt of the Italian campaign.

The Personal Touch in War

LT. COL. GEORGE B. PICKETT, JR.
Armor
November-December 1954

Robert E. Lee surrendered on 9th April, 1865. Immediately the Confederacy collapsed. Why? Because Lee was the motivating force of the Confederate Army. Members of his Army of Northern Virginia never referred to themselves as "members of the Army of Northern Virginia" but as part of "Lee's Army." If you pushed them they would also tell you that they belonged to "Hood's Division" of "Longstreet's Corps." They prided themselves on their leaders. However, these stalwarts were just as quick to ridicule what they considered mediocrity. After returning to Lee's Army from service in East Tennessee, Longstreet's men told some of their withdrawing comrades at the Ba of the Wilderness that they "acted like Bragg's men." T reflected their opinion of the Confederates who had fa Grant at Chattanooga. But this identification of the c mander with his men did not end with the Civil W The Third U.S. Army in Europe was more often refe to as "Patton's Third Army" than just "Third Army." an outfit is referred to by its members as "Dingblatt's Tank"—Dingblatt is well on the road to success.

Even the foe respects a good leader. When Grant sumed command in the East in 1864, the veterans of Army of the Potomac were prompt to remark, "He ha met Bobbie Lee yet." In North Africa in 1940 and 19 the British used to refer to any clever act as a "Romm They had to be ordered to stop giving Rommel credit being almost superhuman.

Weapons and Allies

HENRY A. KISSIN
Foreign Affair
April 1955

An all-or-nothing military policy will also sap the vita of our system of alliances. If we assert that nuclear we ons represent the only deterrents to Soviet aggression, of two consequences becomes almost inevitable: either Allies will feel that any military effort on their part is necessary, or they may be led to the conviction that pe is preferable to war almost at any price. With the end the American monopoly of nuclear power, our demons tions of weapons in that field may actually work to Sov advantage. Thus our explosion of the hydrogen bomb certainly a factor in deterring British action in Indochi Our only policy consistent with a policy of alliances, the fore, is one which minimizes (or seems to minimize) risks of nuclear war and at the same time offers protecti against Soviet occupation through the use of conventio armies.

'Copters Belong with the Army

Journal of the Royal United Service Institut
February 1955

"Which service ought to run the Army's helicopters On the face of it, one might say that this new cross-count

·hicle, which is going to replace the Army's jeeps and rries, ought naturally to be army transport. But the other hool of thought will object on the ground of vulnerability air attack. It will be claimed that helicopter movement ll be completely dependent upon the air situation. Until certain degree of air superiority has been gained, so it ll be said, helicopters will have to keep out of the air. ıey must therefore operate strictly under the Air com- ınd, so as to synchronize their movements with fighter eeps and so on.

There is no validity in this argument. With equal logic e might put all the lorry transport of the Army under RAF, for it is far more vulnerable to fighter attack than low-flying, tree-dodging helicopters of the future will There will, of course, be helicopter casualties—perhaps times very heavy casualties—but this will be an ordinary of war, rather lighter than the risk already accepted normal in the case of lorry columns. There will be only commander who will be in a position to assess this and decide whether it is justified—the *military* com- nder, for whom all these helicopters will be moving, and the air commander, who will not be qualified to judge importance of the work which the helicopters are doing the land battle at any given moment.

ing with Our Problems

LOUIS J. HALLE
Civilization and Foreign Policy
Harper & Brothers, 1955

ı international affairs, especially, we must recognize certain problems are not susceptible of solution, at t for the time being. They are not susceptible of solu-, often enough, because they are inherent in the exist- and personality of other nations with which we have eal. Europe, for example, continues to have a German ɔlem because it continues to have a Germany, and even many's total defeat in warfare still leaves the problem ıany millions of vigorous German people constituting a nan nation. Theoretically it might be possible to e" the German problem by exterminating the German ɔle. But that, if it were actually possible, would surely more and greater problems for those who undertook an the one it solved. Our job in situations of this sort nply to find the best way of living with the problem , in the vast unraveling of history that always goes on, mstances have changed it or brought forth the possi- of a solution. This calls for patience, for the long , and for a just appreciation of our own powers.

e cannot, then, formulate an American foreign policy in the foreseeable future, will abolish the insecurity ır times and give us back the security which we erly had virtually without working for it. We shall ly wreck ourselves and the world if we insist on acting nothing else were tolerable. The endurance of men gh the ages shows that, in fact, the normal insecurity ınkind is tolerable. To hold the other view is to be like the spoiled rich boy who finds it intolerable to have to walk to school although most of his classmates do it every day.

The Next War?

BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS R. PHILLIPS
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
October 1954

The side that gains aerial domination in the opening battle [of atomic war] will almost certainly win the ground battle—assuming a reasonable equality of forces. The side that has aerial domination will clean out such items as atomic cannon, missiles, and pilotless bomber launching points. They will also be able to lay down a defensive barrage against the enemy ground forces, and blast and burn a corridor through the defense, enabling their own forces to pass.

From this point of view, the atomic armed ground forces are an anachronism arising from an effort to adapt armies to conditions they cannot cope with. The ground soldier is quick to point out that armies have survived all the changes in weapons of the past—machine guns, incredible concentration of artillery and tanks—and now will disperse more and dig deeper in order to survive the atomic weapons.

* * *

Out of all this speculation—and it cannot be anything else—one solid conclusion can be drawn: Air power—defensive power to protect our troops and installations, and offensive to destroy the enemy—is the key to victory and survival.

Some military thinkers believe that it is quite unlikely that atomic cannon and giuded missiles such as the Corporal guided rocket and the Honest John short-range ballistic rocket will have any place in an atomic war. The Army argues, however, that aircraft must take off from runways two miles long, which cannot be hidden, while the Matador, the Corporal, and Honest John can all be launched from a cleared space, the size of a tennis court. The soldiers believe that the airdromes will be destroyed while many of the missile launching sites will not be touched.

* * *

General Omar N. Bradley . . . once said that if we had negligible ground forces in Europe, the Russians could place their soldiers one hundred yards apart and march across Western Europe despite our atomic weapons. The thermonuclear bomb spoils this statement. It has been estimated that a one-megaton bomb would kill 17,000 men in such a dispersed formation, and a five-megaton bomb would kill 39,000, and a ten-megaton bomb 50,000.

In the face of such capabilities, ground warfare as it is currently conceived, can no longer exist in war between atomic powers. The only defense against the thermonuclear bomb for the ground forces would be to mingle with the enemy on his own territory. Thus, ground warfare becomes a problem of infiltration and guerrilla action.

Airborne capability traded for more ground mobility

The New Airborne AAA Battalion

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GERALD W. DAVIS

THE 80th Airborne AAA Battalion of the 82d Airborne Division has been reorganized and reequipped under the changes effected by the new T/O&E 44-275. Before long the 88th Airborne AAA Battalion of the 11th Airborne Division and two separate AAA batteries with airborne RCTs will be similarly reorganized.

Paradoxically, the improved version of the airborne ack-ack battalion does not increase its parachuting ability. In fact, that ability is decreased. But its battlefield mobility and its capability to support and keep up with the airborne division are greatly increased. The venerable towed 40mm AA mount has been dropped and in its place the battalion now has the new self-propelled M42 mounting twin 40mm AA guns on the new light-tank chassis. It is exactly the same weapon as that manned by the organic antiaircraft with the infantry and armored divisions—a wicked weapon to turn on the enemy in the air or on the ground.

The mission of the battalion is to support the airborne division in much the same manner as the organic self-propelled AAA battalion supports infantry and armored divisions, except that it requires the flexibility and capability to support the lightning strikes of paratroopers.

IN a typical airborne operation there will be a parachute assault echelon to envelop the enemy in a mass surprise, with a powerful force descending upon the enemy i.. a snow of nylon puffs. These warriors will seize and expand the airhead so that the assault echelon can be reinforced with the division's own air-landed, heavier stuff. Later, we hope, the division will be reinforced for further offensive action by the timely arrival of masses of air-landed troops and machines or by a ground link-up with friendly forces.

Normally, air superiority in the area will be established before airborne assault operations are undertaken. However, it may well be impracticable to maintain that superiority continually, day after day, all day. And for that reason an antiaircraft force will be required to accompany the assault. Since antiaircraft requires many aircraft to lift it, it will be subject to close scrutiny. The commander never has enough planes to transport as much infantry as he would like. That fact has influenced the reorganization.

This organization does not represent the final word, as our airborne antiaircraft is still very much in a fluid state of development. Nevertheless, it does mark the forward progress that has been made since the first airborne AAA battalion was formed. That first T/O&E provided three AW and three MG batteries in the battalion. In 1950 it was revised to provide only three batteries, each battery manning eight 40mm AW mounts and eight M55 quad .50 MG mounts.

HERE are the major changes that the new T/O&E makes in the battalion:

- *The towed 40mm AA mount has been replaced by the self-propelled M42. There are still 24 of these.* Th towed 40mm AA mount is unsuitab for air drop. It is too heavy and n rugged enough. After the electrica power tracking equipment was r moved to improve air-dropping qualiti it was found that hand-tracking w erratic and failed to give accurate fi control. Then, too, the weapon w lacking in battlefield suitability, an its requirement for aircraft for both th weapon and its prime mover was e tirely out of line. So the airborne a saults will forego 40mm AA guns u til the M42 can be brought in by ground link-up, or until it can be ai landed, if such practicability develop
- *The battalion now has twice th number of M55s, a total of 48.* Eac firing battery has 12. Heretofore th would have made 36, but
- *Battery D, a fourth firing batter has been added.*
- *The battalion now has 8 groun observer teams.* I don't know how the ever got these, but they will come i handy when we can expand our futu



M55 rigged for an airdrop. The machine guns are packed in a canvas containe Prime mover is dropped from another aircraft

heads into the 8- to 15-mile radius. ıtil then they will make fine "fight infantrymen."

- *The strength of the battalion is reased by 127 men.*
- *Both the number of vehicles and number of radios in the battalion doubled.*

HE 80th is now testing the new or-anization, and the procedures being eloped for its use in airborne opera-ıs.

Ve particularly like the M42 with battlefield mobility and rapid-fire tructive power. However, we are ady noting some matters that need rection. The first is a much-need-modification in the M55. It is effec-: in action, and we like it. It packs a neat parachute package; we can ver two—possibly three—of them in h C-119 airplane. But it could e a much more suitable mount.

n an airborne assault operation the 5 is now our main antiaircraft re-ce. It goes in with the leading ele-ıts of the assault echelon. We ıld like to take in all 48 of them; if the enemy air gets active we l need every one. But the trans- requirements are terribly heavy. the ground this weapon is trans-ed in the bed of a 2½-ton truck. ıt is not good, but the weapon will tow. To carry the 48 M55s requires C-119 aircraft. But it takes 48 more 19s to transport the 48 2½-ton ks. These 72 planes could other-carry 2,880 infantrymen with all r rifles, grenades, and other gear. gine pleading with the command-general for more aircraft when he n't have enough to lift his reserve ntry battalions!

/e are concerned, too, because we ıot load tactically. Since the C-119 not carry both the M55 and its ıe mover, the 2½-ton truck, they loaded in two separate airplanes, airplanes are notorious for drop-their loads at widely separated es.

'e've tried to tow the M55 with in tandem. This is a good way ıin jeeps quickly. We've tried it ¾-ton trucks. It will tow at slow ls on hard-surfaced roads with a ging, swerving, swooping, clang-motion that sets your teeth on . I have never had the nerve to vhether the mount or the towing e would last very long. We have red the pintle on 2½-ton trucks in an effort to find a solution. This is no good. It gets hung up in ridiculous ways and also the small wheels don't give enough ground clearance.

We need larger wheels to facilitate cross-country mobility and a suitable wheel suspension to permit towing with the ¾-ton truck. That would give economical and efficient operation, as well as tactical loading for airborne operations.

ANOTHER change which I would recommend is in organization. Each firing battery has three platoons, and each platoon has two M42s and four M55s. I would put tne six M42s in an AW platoon and the twelve M55s in two equally divided MG platoons. My reasons:

- The two are different weapons in operation, maintenance, employment, spare parts, and ammunition supply. The platoon commander would have a simpler job handling the training and operations for one type of weapon.
- In an airborne operation—our main job—only the M55 would be parachuted. The M42s would be left behind to participate in the ground link-up operation.
- In typical airborne AA employment, movement may be expected. As the mobility of the two weapons is entirely different, we would sacrifice the fine mobility of the M42 if we tie it down to the M55.
- In supporting the infantry in ground operations the same factors generally apply. The M55 is essentially a defensive weapon, whereas the M42, though no match for a full-fledged tank, is a fine offensive weapon. It can dash around (drivers in the 80th beware!) to support an infantry attack from objective to objective, or wherever needed. It should not be tied down with the M55.

Gun crew at drill on the M42—twin 40mm guns mounted on Walker Bulldog tank chassis. Highly mobile on the ground, it cannot be airlifted

IF I were a regimental commander employing an attached airborne AA battery in a purely ground support role, I would like to use it about this way:

In defense. Attach one MG platoon to each infantry battalion on the line to supplement defensive fires; keep the M42 platoon in reserve in blocking positions prepared to rush to the most serious threat.

In offense. Attach one MG platoon to each infantry battalion in the attack for preparatory fires and to support the attack on the initial objective; to be brought up later for assistance in consolidation. Keep M42s in reserve to give reinforcing fires for the initial attack with plans for direct support of the main effort.

In all this I believe the communications and control would be much simplified with a battery organization such as I have suggested.

Meanwhile, we are proceeding with our tactical and firing tests, developing procedures to fit the new organization and attempting to test all angles under realistic field conditions.

5 | This Concerns You

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

JAPANESE bomb Pearl Harbor! Germans attack in Ardennes! Chinese Reds cross Yalu! Many casualties might have been saved had we been able to predict these events. What price would you attach to timely and accurate information concerning the imminence of a nuclear attack against the United States? Of course, it is not known whether such information is actually available, but these questions point up the importance of intelligence.

The headlines in your newspaper are ample proof that someone is interested in collecting and evaluating detailed information about potential enemies. Although specific individuals or methods are not mentioned when the press reveals that a high-ranking foreign official has defected, that a spy ring has been broken, or that workers in a remote region are discontented, behind each of these events is an untold story concerning the work of intelligence officers. Deception, security of operational methods, and avoidance of publicity are essential to the intelligence mission. That is why few civilians or military men are aware of the effort the Army puts into the production of intelligence.

THE scope and size of our intelligence effort expended in the past have varied according to the imminence of war. Today, technical innovations and ease of intercontinental transportation and communications have greatly increased the proportions of our intelligence effort. While few officers performed intelligence duties before World War II, present-day officers have assignments as photo interpreters, interrogators, censors, order-of-battle specialists, language and area specialists, interpreters, and general intelligence officers. Others are assigned in counterintelligence, psychological warfare, special forces, field-operations intelligence, Army Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, attaché, and strategic intelligence.

What is an intelligence officer like? Sherlock Holmes and Mike Hammer notwithstanding, eccentricities will disqualify rather than qualify an officer for intelligence duty. Intelligence wants only the normal and well-qualified officer wanted by every other arm and service. Pertinent regulations such as SR 605-150-30 (Intelligence Specialization), AR 600-148 (Assignment to the Counterintelligence Corps), AR 614-46 (Assignment to Field Operations Intelligence Duties), SR 600-147-1 (Assignment in Army Attaché System), and SR 350-380-1 (Foreign Area Specialist Program), outline the basic prerequisites for selection and assignment to some of the fields. Assignment to the remaining fields is covered by similar regulations and directives. In general, men selected for intelligence duty must be of normal appearance, free of possible compromising affiliations, receptive to language and area background training, and imbued with the desire to perform intelligence duty. Above-average ability and unblemished character and integrity are mandatory.

Officers are selected for the various programs at Department of the Army level by Career Management Division of The Adjutant General's Office. CMD also makes the appropriate assignments within these programs. Most intelligence officers eat, live, and sleep with intelligence after being selected for such duty. Intelligence specialists selected from the career reserve officers are usually assigned to high-level intelligence agencies. Regular Army officers chosen for the Army Security Agency specialization program remain assigned to Army Security Agency for the remainder of their military careers. Area specialists, regardless of component, are committed to a seven-year training and utilization tour with intelligence agencies. Army Security Agency and MI-USAR career reserv on active duty, who comprise the l est single source of intelligence offic remain, respectively, with ASA various intelligence fields through their military careers. In order maintain branch qualifications, Re lar Army intelligence specialists are tated regularly for the duration of t careers between tours with their b branches and selected intellige agencies. With a complete career intelligence before them, all the af mentioned intelligence officers rec the same opportunity for training, velopment, and advancement tha offered by any arm or service. In remaining intelligence fields, offi normally serve one three-year tour, gardless of their components, and vert to their basic branch unles longer assignment is desired in the terest of the service.

WITH the advent of the jet-propel plane, the intercontinental ballist missile, and nuclear weapons, the n for accurate and timely information quires that every commissioned off give more than mere token ackno edgment of our intelligence effort. must be realized that highly trai and specialized intelligence officers intelligence agencies are available the production of intelligence, and t men of high character and ability essential to the continued operat and effectiveness of the never-end quest for information. Despite the strictions that deny the intellige expert widespread recognition or knowledgment of his achievemen every officer should realize that production of intelligence is a field endeavor as vital to our cause as other single arm or service. Wh these requirements are met by the ra and file of the military establishme the only weak links in our over intelligence program will have be strengthened considerably.

CEREBRATIONS

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

West Point for NCOs

MERICAN professional soldiers generally agree that our Army needs tronger noncommissioned officer ›s. While such benefits as added stige, unit NCO schools, and spe- living accommodations will serve improve our present noncommis- ed officers, we must at the same e pay attention to the development uture NCOs. For this latter pur- e, I propose that an NCO academy ormed.

this NCO academy is to meet the ls of our way of life, it must be e than just a purely military school. addition to producing disciplined, ied professionals, it must strength- he scholastic and moral standards ur leaders. To accomplish this goal, academy must be attractive both to individual and to the country.

igh standards should be required admittance. Each applicant should male citizen of the United States, er twenty years of age; a high- ol graduate or the equivalent; able ass the Army standard physical if s not already in the Army. Eligible icants would be granted admis- on the basis of relative standing ompetitive examinations. Students ld be required to enlist for a three- period after graduation.

he noncommissioned officer acade- would be a recognized two-year or-college course, offering elective r and minor subjects. Each student , however, pursue either a gen- course in the combat arms or a alty such as accounting, electron- r mechanics. The NCO academy d not take the place of the Army's ch schools; it would, rather, give student a background for further study in either the combat arms or technical services.

Pay and privileges would be equal to the senior service academies. Students would be issued general-wear (green) and dress (blue) enlisted uniforms. Although these uniforms should be worn in the regulation manner, a distinctive academy lapel insignia, as well as insignia of cadet rank and authority, should be added.

Students would receive longevity and retirement credit for the two years served at the NCO academy. In addition to the regimented academic schedule, two summer tactical training periods would be held. The first summer would consist mainly of basic infantry training, including those subjects required by CONARC. During the second summer, students would learn the practical leadership skills needed in all the combat arms. Both summer training periods would permit a fifteen-day leave, accrued in accordance with Army regulations.

The establishment of a permanent NCO academy would produce several good results. Regular Army sergeants, thoroughly indoctrinated in leadership techniques and combat skills, would reach the Army in steady numbers each year; a better prepared corps of NCOs would be developed, who could more easily move into positions of commissioned officers if rapid mobilization should be necessary; the educated NCOs turned out by the academy would be well qualified to assist in the development and operation of our more complicated weapons.

The enrollment should be limited to 500 men per class, in order to maintain a student body of battalion size. The academy could be later expanded to a minimum of 4,000 men if the results would seem to justify the added cost. The faculty should include qualified NCOs of the first three grades, as well as officers of the active Army. A logical choice for the first commandant would be a colonel of a combat arm who is both enthusiastic about and experienced in service education. The grounds and buildings should, if possible, have a collegiate atmosphere, and the academy should be free from daily association with the active Army.

LT. CHARLES J. V. FRIES, III

U. S. Grant Wasn't a Trooper

IT'S still too early to evaluate the impact of the regulation on forcing new Regular Army second lieutenants to "volunteer" for either ranger or airborne training at The Infantry School, but I certainly would like to make book on the following results:

- Standards of both Airborne and Ranger Departments will be lowered.
- Prestige of airborne- and ranger-qualified soldiers will decline.
- The Regular Army will lose hundreds of potentially excellent officers

for the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Signal Corps, and Engineers.

Why this obstacle was placed in the path of the potential career officer in the combat arms is hard to understand. Are we to believe that the USMA and ROTC programs are not already effectively weeding out the undesirables? Or is their purpose to establish an élite corps of young Regular officers, bedecked with silver wings and black-and-gold shoulder tabs?

Rangers and paratroopers have always prided themselves on exclusiveness, and on the fact that to volunteer for the rigors of either is an indication of "determination and courage." Prestige of membership in any unit based on achievement diminishes in inverse proportion to the increase in membership. Standards of performance and achievement in both Airborne and Ranger will inevitably be relaxed. It's asking a little too much of human nature to assume that cadre men can ignore the fact that a bust-out will write *finis* to the career of a Regular Army officer who already has weathered an extensive and hitherto conclusive weeding-out process.

The USMA class of 1954 chose airborne over ranger 2 to 1—a pretty realistic choice, for few officers fail to qualify in this course, whereas the rangers frequently fail both officers and men. But we can anticipate fewer ROTC aspirants from the five affected arms. Maybe the technical services will get some of them, but so will civilian life. Self-styled "hard guys" thump their chests and growl, "Let 'em go! Probably would make lousy officers anyhow."

There are thousands of officers on active duty who have never volunteered for airborne or ranger training. Are we to assume that they are second-rate? Jumping out of aircraft or helling around Okeefenokee Swamp and Stone Mountain never have been requisites to effective military leadership in the past. Has the nuclear era dictated this significant change?

The implication seems to be that weak sisters will thus be eliminated from the combat arms. If we are granting Regular commissions to men who are weak sisters, perhaps a more realistic and logical—not to mention economical—solution would be to alter the system of selection.

In all fairness to DA, we must reject the thought that the new program is designed to correct inadequacies in the selection system. One other reasonable assumption remains: ranger and/or airborne training is necessary to command combat units in this atomic age. It is reasonable to blame the atom—otherwise how did we manage to blunder through three modern wars, four nineteenth-century wars, and the War of Independence under the leadership of officers who, in the main, had had no opportunity to acquire the sterling qualities inculcated by these two special programs?

Just what are the magic properties instilled into the man who successfully weathers airborne or ranger training? Advocates of the two *gung-ho* regimes maintain that their respective programs "make the man tough—physically and mentally."

True, both departments establish minimum acceptable performances on the physical fitness test, and PT certainly is an element of both programs. Physical fitness, however, is one of life's most fleeting achievements. One thirty-day leave, or six months behind a desk, will undo the results of years of PT. And mental attitudes are more subject to change, and infinitely more difficult to instill or regain, than are physical attributes.

Nothing will be accomplished of a positive nature that could not be accomplished throughout the Army by tougher, more realistic training. And, if airborne/ranger training does produce some special quality, let's give this training to everyone. It might even be a good idea to incorporate the most desirable features of both types of training into our regular training programs.

If the nature of the training is such that it cannot be implemented Army-wide, the probable impact of some thousand so-trained second johns annually will be negligible. This ill-considered scheme for the bedevilment of officers who already have demonstrated ability and desire for Regular Army service stands to achieve little and lose much.

CAPTAIN TACTIC

Tomorrow's Communications

SINCE the introduction of mass-destruction weapons at the tactical level, the Army has been formulating a new system of tactics designed to allow the infantry combat team to survive and win on the atomic battlefield. The two most important factors in these tactics are mobility and dispersion. Dispersion is a passive defensi measure, and mobility enables d persed units to concentrate rapidly strike or to repel offensive blows.

Dispersion places great reliance the system of communications fro the commander to individual stron points. Even though the strongpoir are expected to fight alone, they mu be controlled and directed by the ove all commander. The commander's ab ity to influence the action of his sep rate strongpoints, or to mass quick for an offensive strike, depends on h communications.

Considering the two major electric means of communication—radio a wire—we can readily see the new pro lems posed by the mobile defense by any other tactical operation bas on mobility and dispersion.

Distances alone impose serious bu dens on wire communications. Tl labor and time necessary to install tl system over these extended distanc would tend to forbid the use of wir But the fatal shortcoming of wire a pears during the actual conduct of tl defense. Even if lines have someho been installed between all units befo the attack, what happens to these lin when the enemy flows around, betwe and behind our strongpoints? His v hicles will break our lines even if h preparatory artillery fires fail to do tl job. The result will be that at tl moment of decision, the command will have no wire communication wi any strongpoint actually under attac

If the foregoing is true, then wi should be considered only as a mea of internal communication betwe units of a strongpoint. We must tu to radio for communication betwe strongpoints.

Theoretically, there is no reason wh radio will not serve admirably; we ne only issue the commanders radi possessing sufficient range to rea throughout the position. We alrea have such sets on hand. But the u fortunate fact is that the enemy ca jam these radios whenever he cares devote the equipment and personn to the effort.

Considering the vulnerability of wi and conventional radio to enemy a tion, we must amend our communic tions doctrine to keep pace with ou tactical doctrine. Another means communication must be provided take the place of wire and radio. Fo tunately, such a means is already avai able; it is called carrier equipment.

;embles the microwave relay used by mmercial telephone and television mpanies. A narrow beam, resembling 'ight beam in that it will not pene- te obstacles, is aimed from the trans- tting antenna to the receiving anten- . Because the beam is narrow and ectional, it is extremely difficult to ercept or jam. The disadvantage ıst often encountered is the necessity locating carrier stations on high ɔund. This need not be prohibitive, wever, since any vertical masks be- een stations could be used as the :s of relay units.

Carrier equipment in light, portable its is now being developed for use the infantry battalion level, and the ıt few years will undoubtedly wit- s the relegation of wire to a minor : in the communications system. ce carrier equipment requires in- lation, we will continue to rely on ventional radio in fluid situations. e effects of enemy jamming must countered to the best of our ability ɔugh improved training methods l improved radio sets.

CAPT. STEPHAN G. MARTIN

unterfire Training Aid

'ING scraps, salvaged parts, and the services of one radio repairman, we e devised an aid that facilitates the ning of infantry counterfire opera- . When a student used the stand- GR6-A sound-locating set, the ructor heretofore could not make ections because he could not see or t the signals with which the stu- t was working. Only the operator ld receive the acoustical and visual als, through his headset and view- tube.

luch instruction time is lost while student tries to operate with the ng signal or searches tediously in wrong direction. If the instructor ıes to help or check he must make student remove his headset and ıge places, thus interrupting the ent's procedure. On the other hand, e instructor does not interrupt but s to see if the student's answer is ect, much time may be wasted.

he problem, then, is to make the ıls simultaneously available to the ent and the instructor. This can done with the acoustical signal ly by attaching a public-address o the recorder, which will broad- the sound ordinarily heard through ıeadset. The visual signal can be : available to the instructor by re- moving the cathode-ray tube from the recorder and connecting it in the usual place by a length of specially fitted cord. The cathode-ray tube is then boxed to prevent the escape of light.

When this training aid is used, the instructor knows immediately whether or not the student has stopped the recorder on the right sound signal. The training aid can be used indoors or outside. When outdoors, it is a good idea to pitch a CP tent so that the sunlight will not interfere with the visual signal. The PA set and the visual aid need not be used in conjunction. The visual part may be used alone when the instructor is satisfied that the student has become proficient in recognizing the sound signal.

CAPT. GEORGE E. WHITNEY

Classroom Howitzer

A SIMPLE new training aid promises to solve several of the problems in teaching the fundamentals of gunnery to artillerymen. Artillery basic training includes gun section drill; the use of the panoramic telescope; the gunner's rule (Left Add, Right Subtract); and the relationship between deflection, base angle, and compass direction of fire. The training aid can be of great use in teaching all of these.

The familiar cardboard device, representing the howitzer tube and pano-



Gunnery Training Aid

ramic telescope, which has been used for many years in this training, has drawbacks, chief of which is that it is not easy to make the transition from the aid to the actual sight and weapon. It is usually necessary to devote at least an hour to the training aid before the students have even a vague idea of how it operates. A second hour is spent teaching the panoramic telescope, and a third hour to cover the material taught the first hour, with the actual equipment instead of the training aid.

Using the new training aid, this material can easily be covered in one hour. The aid represents a howitzer (*see cut*). The black portion represents the bottom carriage and the light portion the upper carriage—everything that moves when the weapon is traversed. The sight is mounted on this "howitzer" by means of a simple angle iron of spring steel. Nails can also be used. When the weapon is traversed, the sight also moves. Now you have everything that is on a real howitzer except a sight mount for elevation and the cross-level bubbles.

The training aid has many uses. The use of the telescope itself can be taught employing the actual piece of equipment. If the telescope is properly mounted, the whole training aid can be picked up without any danger of the sight falling down. The aid makes it much easier to teach the gunner's rule because the student can easily visualize the howitzer tube and howitzer trails. The aid can be employed to teach the use of aiming posts and to show that they can be used as a reference point at any deflection, not just 2800 degrees to the left front or right rear.

It is also possible to lay the little howitzer. If you take an aiming circle to class, you can teach the duties of the executive officer in laying and the duties of the gunner at the same time. In short, it is possible to teach just about everything that concerns the howitzer, the gun sight, and the various rules—in the classroom. And when the students move to the actual equipment, they will do so with a good understanding of the basic principles involved.

The training aid can be as easy or difficult to make as you want it to be. A rough model can be constructed with two blocks of wood—one 2 x 4 and the other 2 x 6—held together by a nail through the center of each. A nail can be drilled in the 2 x 4 to hold the shank collar of the sight.

In the more polished model, shown in the cut, the two pieces of wood have been shaped and painted, and the telescope is held to the upper carriage with a piece of steel bent at an angle. A hole has been drilled in the top of the angle iron, and the shank-locking projection on the telescope, plus the tension of the steel, hold the telescope in place.

CAPT. JOHN M. BEERS

IRONS IN THE FIRE

Transport Helicopter

The Army has received its first delivery of the Sikorsky H-34. The new helicopter can carry from 12 to 14 fully equipped men or 3,000 pounds of cargo. It is powered by a Lycoming-built Wright R-1820 engine of 1425 horsepower. Army pilots have been given extensive training in the operation of the H-34, under the direction of Sikorsky's chief test pilot.

Rip Cords for Broken Jaws

The rip-cord principle of the parachute has been applied to the treatment of military patients with broken jaws. Should a patient suffer from airsickness during an airborne evacuation, he is in danger of choking unless he can free his mouth instantly. An officer of the Navy Dental Corps has devised a method whereby an ordinary hypodermic needle to which a thread is attached is placed beside the teeth and slipped through the rubber bands or wires fixing the broken jaws. In an emergency, the patient jerks the string, pulling out the needle and freeing his mouth.

Convertiplane Tested

Transcendental Aircraft Corp., under contract with the Air Force, is currently flight-testing its Model 1-G Convertiplane. The plane has a rotor assembly on each wing-tip, each powered by a 160-horsepower Lycoming engine. Successful tests have been conducted in which the rotors have been tilted 35 degrees from the vertical position. The goal is to tilt them 84 degrees for forward flight. The Model 1-G has reached a speed of 115 miles per hour as a helicopter, and has flown at 3,500 feet. It is expected to reach a speed of 150 miles per hour when full forward flight is achieved.

Atomic Exposition

The world's first major atomic exposit will be held in Cleveland's Public Aud rium next December. The exhibits will confined to non-classified nuclear produ and equipment. Military applications not be shown. Among the exhibits will chemical processing equipment; protect clothing; gauges and inspection devices; struments; plastics; radio and televisi equipment; models of reactors and com nent materials; safety devices; tracers; a X-ray and radiographic equipment. The position will be sponsored by the Ameri Institute of Chemical Engineers.

Film Printing Kit



Gordon Enterprises has developed a p able 70mm film processing and printing for the Navy. The compact kit, which is signed chiefly for use on submarines, c tains all the necessary equipment for cont printing. Among its features are a buil self-timer, and a unique device for cutt sheets of paper down to 70mm size.

Individual Radiation Detector

A radiation detector, no bigger than package of cigarettes, has been develo by the Army, according to the Chemi Corps. Known as a tactical radiation dos eter, it measures accurately the amount radiation that a person has absorbed. T dosimeter is expected to replace the f badge. Unlike the film badge, it can be u repeatedly and no processing is needed. L uids in five tubes change color when dangerous amount of radiation is present the individual wearing the dosimeter.

b with Vertical Lift

Mack Trucks has announced that it has ted production on a new type of cab-over-ine truck that has a power lift which es the cab vertically, providing easy ac- to the engine. Mack plans to build a es of trucks and trailers employing this rti-Lift" principle. The chassis of these ks distributes more of the load on the it axle and permits greater payloads. The ks are slated for commercial use.

htweight Tarpaulin

new type of lightweight tarpaulin is ig produced by Fellowcraft Engineering Known as Herculite, this material in- orates the use of nylon and vinyl plastic . It weighs approximately one-third as h as standard tarpaulins. All seams are tronically welded.

y Transistor



ransistor Products, Inc., under the spon- of the Signal Corps, has developed a -power transistor that is smaller than a ut. It may be used to replace moving in the electronic systems of guided mis- and radar-controlled beacons. Moving in many electronic instruments cause us problems. The transistor will elim- sparks and electrical activity that gener- n unwanted noise in radios.

Low-level Ejection Seat

A British company has developed a lightweight ejection seat that will parachute a pilot to safety even when his plane is flying at ground level. Previous ejection seats have been considered unsafe at altitudes under 500 feet. This development may save the lives of many pilots who develop trouble during landings, take-offs, or strafing missions. When the pilot pulls down a protective face-blind, the canopy over the cockpit is jettisoned, and the pilot is shot about eighty feet into the air. A time switch releases two small parachutes that slow down the seat, and then another time switch jettisons the seat and releases the main parachute, which allows the pilot to float down slowly. The seat is being installed in the latest British jet fighters, and it has been praised highly by American military observers.

Cargo Door



Fairchild Aircraft has developed a flight-opening cargo door for installation on the C-119 Flying Boxcar. The bottom section of the door may be retracted into the upper section while in flight to provide an opening for paratroop operations or the release of supplies. Alternatively, the entire upper section of the door can be raised to provide an unobstructed opening of the height and width of the fuselage for an air-drop of heavy equipment.

The cargo door is operated hydraulically and may be controlled by either the pilot, co-pilot, or at a crew station in the cargo compartment. Fairchild will refit 100 C-119s with the new doors.

Automation in Signal Production

The Signal Corps has announced that the General Electric Co. is building a new electronic automatic component assembly system capable of handling all types of military electronic equipment. The system operates automatically by means of punch cards. It will serve to eliminate human errors in production which during World War II caused as much as 20 per cent of electronic communcations devices to be rejected by the military services, according to Brig. Gen. Herbert L. Scofield, chief of the Signal Corps Procurement and Distribution Division.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Airborne Statistics

During 1954, 7,150 students enrolled in airborne training at TIS. Of this number, 5,586 completed the course successfully. The students made 34,-882 parachute jumps. The injury rate was .12 per cent, a marked decline from the previous year.

Heavy Mortar Course

TIS's Infantry Heavy Mortar Officers' Course trains officers to command, supervise, and direct the fires of infantry 4.2-inch mortar units. The six-week course is open to commissioned officers on active duty or in USAR and National Guard units. To be eligible, an officer must be a graduate of the Infantry Officers' Basic Course, the Associate Infantry Company Officers' Course, or the Infantry Officer Candidate Course. The course includes instruction in survey, fire control, forward observation, fire planning, organization, tactics, and signal communications.

Leader's Reaction Course

A Leader's Reaction Course, the first of its kind in the Army, has been included in the program of instruction at TIS. Its purpose is to help potential infantry commanders to improve their leadership ability.

An area 60 yards long and 20 yards wide is marked off for the course and divided into 12 compartments, in each of which is performed one team task. An elevated boardwalk runs the length of the course. The instructor controlling the problem and observers stand on the boardwalk.

The class of students is divided into groups of twelve and each group is assigned an officer rater. He divides the group in half and gives one half the first task while the other half watches. He usually does not appoint a leader until he has observed the team attempt two or three tasks.

Solutions to the tasks require initiative, decisiveness, judgment, enthusiasm, tact, and cooperation. A typical task might require a team to cross a swiftly flowing stream, using only two planks, neither of which will span it. The leader of the team (or a member if a leader has not been appointed) must take the initiative and decide on the best course of action. He must explain in a forceful, understandable way what must be done and who is to do it. All team members get a chance to display leadership. The tasks are based on infantry situations, but no specific military skill is needed to complete them successfully.

After each task, the rater conducts a short critique. Then all teams rotate to the next task. A maximum of 144 students can go through the course in four hours. Later, the rating officer counsels his 12 students individually. He takes about ten minutes to point out to each student his strengths and weaknesses and to suggest ways of improvement.

The course is currently given to students in the Basic Infantry Officer and Officer Candidate Courses. It can also be conducted in NCO schools and basic training centers, in order to discover soldiers with high leadership abilities.

Air Mobility

In line with the Army's policy of increasing its air mobility, an Airborne and Army Aviation Department, composed of the former Airborne Department and a newly organized Air Mobility Group, has been established at TIS. The new department will develop new doctrines, procedures, and organizations; conduct tests and evaluations; and prepare and revise training literature necessary to carry out operations calling for air mobility.

The Air Mobility Group will determine how men are to use aircraft in combat, how to load the aircraft, and the types of aircraft to be used in various tactical situations. It will work with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and eventually with convertiplanes. The new department, which is headed by Col. John J. Tolson, plans to cooperate closely with the Army Aviation School at Camp Rucker, Ala., and with other service schools.

TIS Instructional Material

Commander's Automotive Prev tive Maintenance Training Progr A suggested course of instruction infantry regimental and battalion c manders and their staffs in order qualify them to plan, direct, and ev ate the results of command inspecti of motor vehicle equipment and op tions within their units; and to lend fective command support to a program for preventive maintenanc wheeled and tracked vehicles. T booklet may be ordered from the B Department, The Infantry School, I Benning, Ga. The price is $1.50.

THE ARTILLERY SCHO

Artillerymen Need Math

Scientific psychological tests c ducted at TAS during the past year veal a close relationship between ma ematical ability and student success artillery courses at all levels.

A study or 98 students in a typi basic officers' course revealed a corr tion coefficient of .55 between gra in a nationally standardized mathem ics test, and the gunnery subcou and a coefficient of .48 between mathematics test and grades in the tire basic officers' course.

A close relationship between stud rank and amount of mathematical ba ground was also found. Roughly, th times as many students in the up one-fifth of the gunnery subcourse h taken a course in trigonometry as h in the lower one-fifth. In the ent basic officers' course, the ratio was to 1.

Among students who had taken or more mathematics courses of a hi er level than trigonometry, none rank in the lower one-fifth of the gunn subcourse and only five per cent w in the lower one-fifth of the entire ba course. Among students who were e gineers, none ranked in the lower per cent of either the gunnery su course or the entire basic course.

The testing expert concluded th the degree of proficiency in artill the student develops during the ba officers' course is directly related to h

:iency in mathematics. Students :essing less than twelfth-grade ematical proficiency have little :e of developing a high degree of :ry proficiency during the course. ›rs other than mathematical abili- ıdoubtedly contributed to success e gunnery subcourse and in the : basic course. General mental ty, general educational back- ıd, special abilities, and degree of 'ation must also be considered.

ar Mission to NATO Nations

ree field artillery radar instruc- : teams have been sent to NATO ries, following training early this ›y the Department of Observation AS. One team has gone to Nor- ıone to The Netherlands, and a to Belgium and Luxembourg. : teams are expected to be gone eriods varying from three to six ıs and will instruct soldiers of countries in the operation and ›yment of radar sets used to locate y weapons.

: ENGINEER SCHOOL

: Warfare Training

support of the new doctrine on mines, the Department of Train- 'ublications of The Engineer School has produced an integrated group of publications to facilitate land mine training throughout the services.

Field Manual 20-32, *Employment of Land Mines,* has been written, approved, and submitted to the printer. During the past year, 11 training films have been shot at TES on all practical aspects of land mines. All these films are in the final stages of editing. Seven graphic training aids dealing with land mines have also been prepared by TES. These have been distributed by The Adjutant General to training aid centers from which they are issued to units of the active army and reserve components upon requisition. The general format of all these mine warfare GTAs follows a similar sequence of presentation: nomenclature; installation; and neutralization.

A film-strip program has been initiated at TES, which follows the same method of presentation as the seven GTAs. To date, two have been completed and are available in Signal Corps film libraries. Making film-strips from the illustrations used in the GTAs eliminates storage problems, permits wider and more economical distribution, and permits viewing by larger groups.

A pocket-size mine card has been designed, and is currently being reviewed by higher headquarters. This four-page, folded card contains minimum information for laying a minefield and for marking lanes through a minefield. It also portrays in line drawings the standard U.S. mines and mine fuzes, and gives illustrated instructions on installing and arming these mines.

With the printing and issuance of these aids and FM 20-32, the Armed Forces will have an integrated family of publications and training aids on mine warfare. It is expected that all these training materials will be distributed to the field before the end of 1955.

THE TRANSPORTATION SCHOOL

Simulated Railroad

The Transportation School at Ft. Eustis, Va., has designed and is using a new type of training aid for instructing dispatchers and operators on military railroads. It consists of a series of booths, each containing a field telephone, a section of "track" with sidings, a timetable, and train order blanks. The tracks are actually bicycle chains which pull along model trains made of wood. The booths represent stations along a simulated 50 miles of railway, and one student operator is assigned to each. As the chains, powered by electric motors, carry the train or trains from booth to booth, the student reports their arrival and departure, and any special action over the phone to a dispatcher who coordinates and supervises the operation. The dispatcher, who stations himself near the line, receives messages from his operators and sends them appropriate orders.

The booths are constructed so that no student can see into the adjoining compartment. Students must rely on their timetables and over-the-phone information in planning action. As in a real railroad situation, they must keep constantly on the alert to meet unforeseen occurrences.

The operators along the way and at the terminals perform such tasks as making up trains, writing out train orders, reporting deviations in schedules to the dispatcher, checking or changing markers and signals, noting car numbers, notifying "train crews" of simulated hot journal boxes and slipping wheels, siding trains and allowing those with high priority to pass through, uncoupling cars, and switching tracks. Several separate lengths of bicycle chains, geared for different

Vehicle-Bridge Classification Signs

The JOURNAL was in error in two of its captions for "New Vehicle- idge Classification Signs" [April, page 55]. In using this system, by ich drivers can tell whether or not their vehicles can cross any given dge, the number on the *left* of the sign refers to two-way traffic and : number on the *right* to one-way traffic. The correct captions appear ow:

sign for a two-lane bridge. The t-hand number applies when the dge is being used for two-way ffic, while the right-hand number is for one-way traffic.

Two signs are needed for a dual-class, two-way bridge. On the left-hand sign, the number on the left is the number to which the driver of a wheeled vehicle must refer when the bridge is being used for two-lane traffic. The number on the right side of the same sign is for one-way wheeled-vehicle traffic. The right-hand sign shows the same thing for tracked vehicles.

Only a simple chain sling is required to lift the assembled 4.2-inch mortar

The mortar goes airborne. An H-19 helicopter lifts it vertically, elimin swinging. The weapon can be moved, put into action in a matter of mi

The 4.2-inch Mortar Gets There — the Easy W

The 4.2-inch mortar, latest addition to the Artillery's weapons family, has one notable advantage over conventional light artillery—it can be lifted as a unit by a helicopter. Troops at Fort Sill recently demonstrated a helicopter lift, by which a mortar was displaced and put into action in a new location in a few minutes. The 4.2, which has previously seen service with the Chemical Corps and the Infantry, weighs 670 pounds. It can also be mov six parts, none of which weighs over 162 pounds.

The combination of helicopter and 4.2 seems to natural for rapid displacement, especially over obst that would slow down ground movement. The wea crew and ammunition can be transported simultane in other aircraft.

speeds, simulate a multiple track system and make possible an increase in the number of trains and the complexities of the problems.

This elaborate rail setup, over 100 feet long, enables soldier-trainmen to learn the rudiments of operating a railway division without the trouble and expense of using actual railroad facilities. These facilities are employed in the advanced stages of The Transportation School's dispatching and operations courses.

THE SIGNAL SCHOOL

Refresher Course

Twenty-nine Reserve and National Guard Signal Corps officers recently completed a two-week intensive refresher course given by the Officers' Department of The Signal School. This course, the first of its kind at TSS, was created to keep USAR and NG officers abreast of modern communications techniques and equipment. The course included instruction in radio, wire, comcenter, military justice, supply, organization, and general subjects. Most of the students had previously attended either the Basic Officers' Course or the Advanced Course.

THE AA & GM SCHOOL

School Reorganization

The AA & GM School has recently been reorganized for more efficient accomplishment of its mission. This reorganization includes: activation of a School Brigade composed of instructor and student regiments; activation of a Tactical Support Group comprising all Fort Bliss troop units whose primary mission is school support; elimination of the General Subjects Department; and a transfer of responsibilities for instruction among the various academic departments. The School Brigade now performs administrative logistical functions which previously were activities of academic departments. Subjects formerly taught by the Ge Subjects Department are now th sponsibility of the Department Guided Missiles, Gunnery and térial, Electronics and Enginee Command and Staff, and Non- dent Instruction.

Guest Speaker Program

The School has recently condu a guest speaker program, designe supplement resident instruction an broaden the general background of Artillery Advanced Course officer dents and officers of the Staff Faculty. The program covered military topics and national and i national affairs. Eleven lectures given by professors from civilian versities, and military authorities. jects included: "U. S. National I ests, Objectives, and Policies"; "U Foreign Policies"; "Economic Sou of Power"; and "Fundamentals of M tary Strategy." Each lecture was lowed by a question period.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

Defense of Freedom

RICAN MILITARY POLICY: Its Development Since 1775
Major C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, Ph.D.
litary Service Publishing Company, 1955
8 Pages; Index; $5.00

ewed by
. Gen. H. W. Blakeley

oth *Time* and *Newsweek* gave con-able space in recent issues to the lishment at Harvard of a graduate-course for civilians on National De-e policy. "War or defense," said e, "has dominated world affairs—from ets to foreign policy—for more than ears. Nonetheless, the nation's aca-cians still brush off the study of war matter best left to professional mili-men. Result: a hard-to-fill hole in the ation of civilians who shape U. S. y at home and abroad."

similar hole has existed for a long in the lists of books on war and de-. There are, of course, thousands of s dealing in varying degrees with our ary policy, but they either cover a al phase, are not objective, are high-chnical, or do not bring the story date. Oddly, Emory Upton's *The tary Policy of the United States,* is the first book to come to mind in ention of the subject, is not listed in per alphabetical place in the bibliog-of the present book, nor is Gen-Upton's name in the index, although ook is cited in footnotes and he is oned in the text. Nevertheless, the t book is somewhat similar in pur-to Upton's: to inform the public of ccesses and failures in military pol-d, like the new Harvard course, to ivilian readers, particularly, a fac-ackground for the forming of opin-bout military problems as they arise. book's interest for military profes-s is obvious.

h authors had military service in l War II; both have a Ph.D. from etown University; both are teachers rofessional historians, although Dr. rdo is currently on active duty as r.

the subtitle indicates, the book cov-S. military policy from the nation's t days through Korea. The treat-is chronological and largely at the al level. The authors make the n the preface that it "is impossible r fully all the elements of military which constitute the whole, but it ved that readers who desire further light on these topics will find ample references in the text." It is this thorough documentation which constitutes a particular value for military readers who may have occasion to investigate the background of some specific phase of our military policy.

In their concluding chapter, the authors make a strong plea for avoiding in the future situations like the many in our past history where men fought and died, "their sacrifices and efforts . . . needlessly compounded by the failure of the Nation to provide an adequate military establishment." They point out that "economy is desirable and laudable, but not at the expense of our national security." They think that many people have long opposed a strong military force for fear "the military" would exert a dangerous and baneful influence upon our institutions. They argue that, on the contrary, the Nation's armed forces are one of its principal bulwarks and inspirations.

As has been indicated, this volume fills an existing gap in our military book lists. It also, for the reason that it is not a military history and does not attempt to analyze our campaigns, highlights the fact that an even greater need exists for a single volume to cover the Punitive Expedition of 1916, World Wars I and II, and the Korean conflict in the geography-operations-lessons format of Steele's *American Campaigns.* That useful classic, even in the edition brought out by Combat Forces Press in 1951, only carries the story of our military operations through the Spanish-American War. Can't some publisher afford the gamble of sponsoring a sequel?

Growing Pains of Air Power

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II
Volume VI: Men and Planes
Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate
University of Chicago Press, 1955
860 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $8.50

Reviewed by
Stefan T. Possony

This is the sixth volume of the official Air Force history prepared by the Historical Division of USAF, and deals with the organization, recruitment, training, industrial procurement and logistical services of the Army Air Forces, as well as with the air defenses of the United States. While the subject lacks the glamor of the previous volumes which described air strategy and combat operations, it discusses matters of exceptional importance which still today are of topical interest. In competence of analysis and judgment, clarity of presentation, and readability of style, the volume is fully the equal of its predecessors.

The AAF fought the war in a fashion which leaves no doubt that its basic plans, weapons and personnel were of superior quality, even though a great portion of this success must be ascribed to the overwhelming industrial capacity of the United States. Unfortunately, postwar developments have not permitted this country to rest on its laurels. It is therefore more important to become aware of serious blunders which may have left their imprint on present activities than to take pride in unquestioned accomplishments.

This volume brings to light many wrong decisions and faulty organizational schemes which precluded the full and timely development of U. S. air power and which, in less fortuitious strategic situations, might have proved disastrous. For many years, the present organization of the Army Air Forces was delayed by service politics. As a result, the AAF did not attain a proper internal and external organizational structure until *after* the end of the war. Planning was handicapped by frequent changes in the projected size of the AAF, and by lack of a suitable and accepted method of determining its required strength. Neither organizational nor planning difficulties were solved by the often amateurish recommendations of civilian fact-finding "boards;" the Baker Board had a particularly nefarious impact. The development of proper offensive weapons—heavy, long-range bombers—was needlessly delayed and curtailed, an error which contributed its share to the Pearl Harbor disaster. While this may have been partly the fault of "ground-warfare generals," the Air Corps must take the blame for its failure to develop first-class fighters and particularly long-range escort fighters —the AAF's "most glaring pre-war omission," to quote the editors of this book. This failure is partly explained by the doctrinal assumption that bombardment was "in ascendancy over pursuit."

Other weaknesses resulted from poor organization of aircraft procurement, in part caused by difficulties of plant conversion and fluctuating performance specifications, and in part by complications arising from frequent budget changes, irregularity of orders and purchases, and, above all, from politically imposed limits on corporate profits. Had it not been for

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

THE ASSASSINS. By Robert T. Donavan. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 300 Pages; $4.00. The story of the assassins and would-be assassins of the United States Presidents and Secret Service's organization to baffle such attempts. Written by a long-time newspaperman and 2d Division soldier in World War II whose style combines some of the best of newspaper and magazine writing.

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD: Napoleon in Gray. By T. Harry Williams. Louisiana State University Press, 1955. 345 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.75. The author of *Lincoln and His Generals* tries his hand with the much misunderstood Beauregard. Somewhat scholarly for easy reading, but it is still a worthy biography of a complicated man.

BINOCULARS, TELESCOPES AND TELESCOPIC SIGHTS. By Truman Henson. Greenberg: Publisher, 1955. 515 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $9.50. As complete a treatment of this particular subject as exists. The layman who studies it will be able to make his own optical equipment from surplus lenses and will understand his present optical equipment much more intelligently. The price is steep but well within line for what the book contains.

CARNOT, 1753-1823. By S. J. Watson, The Bodley Head, 1954. 223 Pages; Index. A biography of Napoleon's famous Organizer of Victory. A well researched document on this important but comparatively little known (in this country) figure of the Napoleonic era.

CRUSADE IN ASIA: Philippine Victory. By Carlos P. Romulo. The John Day Company, Inc., 1955. 309 Pages; $4.00. The dramatic story of how the Philippines were nearly delivered to Communism through indifference and widespread corruption in government.

THE DIGNITY OF MAN. By Russell W. Davenport. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 338 Pages; $4.00. A beginning of an inquiry into the nature and destiny of man of which Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., has said "Russell Davenport has thrown a bright light . . . on the problem which free men must solve in order to be strong enough to defeat Communism."

DOWN TO EARTH: A Practical Guide to Archaeology. By Robin Place. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955. 173 Pages; Illustrated; Index. A "first" book on archaeology for those who believe they might become interested in this hobby, which is becoming increasingly popular with military personnel as they travel to sites rich in history.

EGYPT'S LIBERATION: The Philosophy of the Revolution. By Premier Gamal Abdul Nasser. Public Affairs Press, 1955. 119 Pages; $2.00. Recent events in Egypt as they appear to the present premier. A very short book that could be important as the balance of power wavers in the Near East.

FORBIDDEN LANDS. By Gordon Cooper. Philosophical Library, Inc., 1955. 165 Pages; Illustrated; $4.75. Descriptive material of those quarters of the world where the civilized white man has rarely been. Not all of it was written from the author's own travels.

FRANCE: THE TRAGIC YEARS, 1939-1947. By Sisley Huddleston. Devin-Adair, 1955. 360 Pages· Illustrated; Index; $5.00. An English reporter who died in 1952 as a French citizen, offers his version of the events in France from 1939 to 1947. The book is intensely anti-Communist and rather strongly pro-Pétain.

GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION. By Alan Barth. The Viking Press, Inc., 1955. 231 Pages; Index; $3.00. An examination of the investigative powers of Congress, with some attempt to show the difference between useful and legitimate investigations, side shows, and those in which Congress usurps the powers of the judiciary. Probably not completely objective but most informative.

HOME MUSIC SYSTEMS. By Edward Tatnall Canby. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 302 Pages; Index; $3.95. Almost three hundred pages of pliers and soldering-iron information on home high-fidelity music systems. The jacket says that $200 and this book is all you need for the best. The layman can understand practically all of it.

HOW TO GET LAND FROM UNCLE SAM. By Harry Kursh. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1955. 219 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.95. Covers rental as well as purchasable and homesteading land. Necessarily sketchy but a good take-off point for the serious land-hungry citizen.

KEEPERS OF THE LIGHTS. By Hans Christian Adamson. Greenberg: Publisher, 1955. 430 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.50. A fascinating story of our lighthouses and the men who keep them lit. The book offers history as well as contemporary information and is written for the select few who find romance in navigation or the magnificent isolation of these shore sentinels.

MY NINE LIVES IN THE RED ARMY. By Mikhail Soloviev. David McKay Company, Inc., 1955. 308 Pages; $3.75. The author of *When the Gods are Silent* offers an amazingly frank account of life in what is laughingly called the People's Army. Regardless of your last efficiency report, you wouldn't want to trade.

NINE SOVIET PORTRAITS. By Raymond A. Bauer. The Technology Press and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955. 190 Pages; Illustrated; $3.95. Word pictures of nine Soviet citizens. Guaranteed not to attract any reader to the joys of life under Communism.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1955. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1955. 230 Pages; $3.75. A standard annual that offers essential political information on every country in the world in almost tabular form. A valuable reference book for any library.

RUN SILENT, RUN DEEP. By Commander Edward L. Beach. Henry Holt & Company, 1955. 364 Pages; $3.95. A novel of the submarine service in World War II by the naval aide to the President. Good reading with the added romance of the submarine to lend it interest.

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST STORIES, 1954. Edited by Ben Hibbs. Random House, 1955. 341 Pages; $3.50. The 1954 edition; a standard yearly issue that many people prefer to the *Post* itself.

SOMETHING OF VALUE. By Robert Ruark. Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955. 566 Pages; $5.00. Ruark's well received novel of Kenya colony and the Mau Mau terror.

THE WEB OF VICTORY: Grant at Vicksburg. By Earl Schenck Miers. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955. 332 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00. The author of the popular *The General Who Marched to Hell* covers the period of Grant's Vicksburg campaign and offers an unusual combination of scholarly research and vivid writing.

THE WINGED LIFE: A Portrait of Antoine de Saint-Exupèry. By Richard Rumbold and Lady Margaret Stewart. David McKay Company, Inc., 1955. 224 Pages; Index; $3.50. A friendly biography of one of the world's famous flying authors, a man who was well versed in many, many fields. Short but compact, it offers much information about the well-loved poet.

THE WISDOM OF CATHOLICISM. Edited by Anton C. Pegis. Random House, 1955. 988 Pages; $2.45. An anthology of the spirit and substance of Catholic life, faith, and history from the writings of the saints, martyrs, mystics and philosophers of the Church.

WORLD WIDE TRAVEL REGULATIONS MADE EASY. By Richard Joseph and Muriel Richter. 130 Pages; Index; $1.50.

WORLD WIDE MONEY CONVERTER AND TIPPING GUIDE. By Richard Joseph. 64 Pages; Index; $1.00.
Both published by Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955. Two pocket-size handbooks for the traveler.

YOUR HEALTH, SIR! By Miriam Lincoln. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 211 Pages; $2.75. A layman's book on those problems of male health that most men neglect to take up with their doctors until too late. Offers some really important information for the maintenance of health and the recognition of physical difficulties.

uge aircraft purchases by France Britain, American aircraft produc- vould have risen far more slowly, he AAF might have been in real e.

retrospect, the most disappointing e is that, with the exception of the , long-range bomber, the AAF "was successful . . . in improving existing ns than in developing radically nes." In "jet planes and guided mis- America lagged far behind Ger- " And without British lend-lease magnetron, a key to microwave VHF radio and many other elec- equipments, the instruments pos- of American aircraft would have poor. With the greatest technologi- tential at its disposal, the U. S. air did not possess qualitative superi- The organization and procedures research and development were quate, and this inadequacy was unded by a distinct lack of techno- imagination.

s volume is history-writing at its t does not suppress the mistakes, does not belittle the triumphs. is no point in studying history un- e are willing to learn from and to pired by the past. The editors and s of this book have rendered an nding service to our country.

to Napoleon?

G KAI-SHEK: An Unauthorized Biography
mily Hahn
leday & Company, 1955
Pages; Index; $5.00

ved by
PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

iously, it has taken a woman to the first really good biography of the great soldiers of our time. er, Miss Emily Hahn is a most dinary woman, a first-class author, China expert who qualifies by her nce of Chinese life itself.

ng is still a subject of hatred to Americans. To other Americans he atinum-plated hero. Your reviewer own Chiang Kai-shek for twenty- ears, and finds himself believing iang will remain in history as one great soldiers of the twentieth , a man who had more experience tual fighting than Pétain, Luden- Kesselring, MacArthur, and Mont- added together.

ng the soldier has been forgotten controversies over Chiang the poli- Chiang has failed. Napoleon too.

China of today is a grotesquely ed military power; it is, nonethe- military power, as our experience ea testifies. That it is a military at all is the work of Chiang Kai- le unified China; the Communists over. Without him the Commu- uld not possibly have succeeded in taking over China because there would have been no China for anyone to take over—just a group of provinces with war lords posturing in each of them.

Emily Hahn's book is wonderfully good reading. It is possible that a mere male might never have gotten the information she has put into this book. She has all the backstairs gossip about Chiang's family life, his personal property, his political antagonists, and his relations with Stilwell and Marshall.

Chiang Kai-shek is full of humor and is unashamed of tenderness. At last there is in print a real "other side" to the grotesquely partisan compendium of *The Stilwell Papers*. Your reviewer was in Stilwell's headquarters at the time of the Stilwell recall. He knew almost everyone involved on both sides, from Chiang and Stilwell themselves all the way down to the newspapermen who did so much to smear the Nationalists, extol the Communists, and precipitate the crisis. This account given by Miss Hahn, while not perfect, is incomparably better than anything else in print.

Neither the book itself, nor the jacket supplied by the publisher explains that Miss Hahn is the wife of Major Charles Boxer, a retired regular officer of the British Army, and that her understanding of the soldier Chiang may derive, in part, from the experience of her own life. She makes it plain that the only way Chiang could fight was to play enough politics to have an army and a government to fight from and with.

An eminent American once expressed the wish that the dust should settle in China. This book, along with Herbert Feis's *The China Tangle*, settles an awful lot of dust.

The Chiang who emerges is a man with weaknesses and a man who, like Napoleon, committed mistakes as great as his most impressive accomplishments. He is, first and foremost, a Chinese and a soldier. We Americans have not done with Chinese as soldiers. Friends or enemies, they hold the key to much of our own future.

Emily Hahn's *Chiang Kai-shek* is not only the biography of a famous soldier: it is a good key to modern China.

Defeating the Huks

CRUSADE IN ASIA
By Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo
The John Day Company, 1955
309 Pages; $4.00

Reviewed by
MAJOR ORVILLE C. SHIREY

If *Crusade in Asia* does nothing else, it will shock many readers, as it did this reviewer, into awareness of how close the Huk movement came to victory in the Philippines.

It may well be the clearest picture we have of Communism, not as a military force, but as a scavenger that moves in

THE CIVIL WAR IN TEXT AND MAPS



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". . . Of considerable professional interest to any military student and of particular interest to those who were there." Maj. J. R. Stevens, in *Marine Corps Gazette.*

"The ground forces would do well to set this book up as required reading." Army Times' *The American Daily.*

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to assume control "in a country where Democracy has died." General Romulo makes it painfully clear that Democracy was well on the way to dying at the hands of corruption and self-interest in the Philippines until Ramón Magsaysay appeared as a leader who would be faithful to his trust as a public man. With his appearance on the scene, and under his leadership, the Huk movement began to lose ground until it was reduced to the status of a minor nuisance.

General Romulo was a good newspaperman, and his account of these years of struggle is terse and dramatic. But the General is also a statesman, and he has something else of equal importance to say. He believes that the future security of the United States lies in Asia, with its masses just entering a period of intense nationalism in reaction against years of colonial rule. He believes that the spread of Communism can be stopped once the peoples of Asia are convinced that the United States is unalterably opposed to colonialism in any form. He suggests that one way to prove this is to implement the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty with specific machinery to turn back aggression.

Our propaganda program in Asia also comes under General Romulo's fire, mostly on the ground that it is pitifully inadequate. This is a criticism that is nearly irrefutable.

While *Crusade in Asia* is not specifically a military book, it deserves a thoughtful reading, especially by those military men who are unconvinced that our stake in Asia is large and vital to our security. General Romulo knows both Asia and the United States intimately, and he makes a convincing case.

War for Independence

FROM LEXINGTON TO LIBERTY
By Bruce Lancaster
Doubleday & Company, 1955
460 Pages; Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
LYNN MONTROSS

When diligent research is combined with a special feeling for an era, the product is likely to be good historical writing. This has been the case with Bruce Lancaster's *From Lexington to Liberty,* an excellent popular history of the American Revolution.

Once the adjective "popular," when applied to history, was considered downright insulting in academic circles. Happily, this sort of snobbery is vanishing, and one of the most encouraging signs of the times is the frequency with which historical books are appearing on best-seller lists.

Publishers are responding in a big way, and *From Lexington to Liberty* is the third offering of Doubleday's "Mainstream of America" series, edited by Lewis Gannett. Harper is making meanwhile with the comprehen "New American Nation" series, ed by Henry Steele Commager and Ric B. Morris. Younger readers are not b neglected, and Random House has a great success with its "World L mark" series of well-done historical b appealing to the teen-age group.

History, in short, is no longer the relation of fiction. History is here to and Mr. Lancaster has turned ou whopper of a 225,000-word accoun the Revolution which is both sound interesting. He devotes some 8,000 w to the Lexington fight alone, so that reader becomes well acquainted with embattled farmers of that April da 1775. There are also some good des tions of the Redcoats, their uniforms, their tactics.

The military results have been as handled, generally speaking, as the po cal causes. Sometimes the author wor little too hard at being interesting, an occasion he paints the lily by adding terpretations after events have spo eloquently for themselves. But th are minor shortcomings of a book wh gives the reader a fairly complete pic of the Nation's beginnings.

It is unfortunate that the publis of a book priced at six dollars h skimped by using a poor grade of pa and omitting all maps and illustrat from the text. Two large-area maps in endpapers are the only concession to reader who likes to know "where he's in geographical respects.

A bibliography is perhaps not to expected. But there is a good index, this reviewer can attest that the sou are respectable as to both quality quantity. Mr. Lancaster knows his R olution.

A native of Massachusetts, a Harv man, and World War I veteran, served in the State Department in Ja before breaking in at writing histor novels. Specializing in Revolution b grounds, he made a name for him in this field.

Background Characters

THE FORGOTTEN LEADERS OF THE REVO TION
By Howard Swiggett
Doubleday & Company, 1955
284 Pages; $4.00

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. CHARLES S. HARRIS

Howard Swiggett, author of T *Great Man: George Washington a Human Being* and a score of other torical studies, novels, and advent tales, is well practiced in finding thread of human interest to hold reader. In this book in particular he gi little direct attention to the main po cal, military, or economic developme

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By
CAPTAIN JOHN G. WESTOVER

The thousands, soldier and civilian, who have read—and enjoyed and profited from—*COMBAT ACTIONS IN KOREA* will want this companion book. Here is more combat action, plus the workings of the vast logistical system that makes it possible for the infantry, artillery and armor to fight.

Every member of every technical and administrative service will want a copy of this record of service to the line. Every line soldier should have a copy to fill in the blanks of his own experience.

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of the period. Instead, he has searched out the unpublished private letters and other sources of gossip to provide background and to portray the "forgotten leaders" as human beings.

In the case of Jeremiah Wadsworth, the "Solid Man of Connecticut," and the capable Commissary General of the Revolution, the intriguing center of interest in the background was the attractive Catharine Greene, young widow of the famous Revolutionary general. In the cases of Robert Morris, John Nicholson, Henry Knox, Light Horse Harry Lee, and others, their financial manipulations to keep ahead of the sheriff furnish the theme of interest.

The chapter on Horatio Gates, most controversial military character of the Revolution, cannot be categorized so easily. We get a concise summary of his start in America as a British officer, then as a Colonial settler, an American major general, the victor over Burgoyne at Saratoga, and the defeated victim of Cornwallis at Camden. The real story begins after the Revolution and after the death of his first wife, when Gates became lonely and started a romantic search for a helpmate. After some ups and downs, his efforts eventually were highly successful, when he married prosperously, moved to New York, established himself as the "Hermit of Rose Hill," and continued in the stream of events for years. Gates does not come out of the story a hero, but at least he fares far better than does Aaron Burr, the subject of another chapter in which the private letters add some blistering light.

The period of the Revolution produced a remarkable number of men outstanding in patriotic achievement, from New England to Georgia. Living under widely varying conditions and with the barest minimum of opportunity to visit one another and exchange views, it is remarkable how well they knew one another, from colony to colony, how much they respected one another, and how willing they were to work out compromises in order to achieve their liberty and to establish the new republic. Leaders of this period like Franklin, the Adamses, Jay, Robert Livingston, Rush, Jefferson, Randolph, and the Pinckneys of South Carolina move through this book as human beings. We read of the frailties as well as the strength that kept them going.

ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES is a compact handbook of good procedure chock-full of pertinent and valuable information. I have "put it to work" in my own office.

Colonel QMC



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The Great Creole

P. G. T. BEAUREGARD: Napoleon in Gray
By T. Harry Williams
Louisiana State University Press, 1955
345 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $4.75

Reviewed by
N. J. Anthony

Beauregard opened the Civil War at Charleston, which made him a universal idol overnight. He planned Bull Run and Shiloh and was field commander during those actions. He was a capable engineer —his fortification of Charleston defended it against the combined amphibious assault. For a time he commanded in the West. His defense of Petersburg against enormous odds was a magnificent performance. A popular hero from beginning to end, Beauregard was one of the South's eight generals, outranked only by Cooper, Lee, and the Johnstons. Yet, though he held six important commands, it was his lot never to be top commander in a great battle.

A most romantic figure in the age of Southern romance, Beauregard fancied himself the very model of a modern general, to borrow from Gilbert and Sullivan. Early in his career he became a serious student of Napoleon's battles, and his studies of Bonaparte's generalship influenced his military thinking thereafter. Beauregard registered horror at plans that departed from the book. The application of the principle of concentration became an obsession; yet he never could devise a plan of concentration that worked. Arriving on the field, he would quickly scrape together a complex plan that completely disregarded the capabilities of his own forces, and proclaim certain success. But, as Beauregard and many another general learned through the ages, the enemy can display an annoying habit of not conforming to o plans.

Mr. Williams's subtitle is an apt o for many Southerners, the Great Cre himself included, regarded Beauregard America's Napoleon. Being forced to p second fiddle must have rankled deep causing Beauregard to rationalize to extent of never considering himself subordinate of his commander. At B Run he issued orders as though he w in command instead of Johnston, a startled that worthy by asking him leave the field. Beauregard must have honor of winning that first great bat Soon after he became involved in bi controversy with the Administration, a bombarded Richmond with angry lett for the rest of the war. His contempt the Richmond authorities reached su a pitch that when leaving the west command he appointed a successor wi out consulting his superiors. Duri quiet periods he drew up grand and i possible strategic plans for theaters oth than his own. Invariably they igno the paucity of Confederate resources manpower and matériel. Beauregard ev tested Lee's authority, maintaining, reply to Lee's order, that transfer troops from Petersburg must have W Department approval.

Summing up, it is difficult to pl Beauregard in the hierarchy of the C federacy's great. Bull Run was taken o by the troop commanders, and their c duct of the action decided the day. In t West he showed some ability. While termed Shiloh a victory and the retr to Corinth a "planned withdrawal," t Confederate tactical plan at Shiloh v prepared hurriedly. For the loss of Shil Beauregard would be blamed the rest his life. But who knows what wou have occurred had Beauregard order that one more assault instead of endi the action on 6 April? He could empl ruses successfully, his evacuation of C inth under Halleck's nose being the m prominent of the war. At Fort Wagr (he would insist it was a battery, not fort) his conduct of the defense mig have caused greater loss to the Feder had he adopted delaying tactics. The c fense of Petersburg showed Beaurega at his best. But despite his flair for th atrics, his pompous pronouncements, a slipshod planning before action, on t field Beauregard was a courageous co bat leader, and an excellent one.

With his engineer training, Beau gard had no difficulty in finding rea employment with railroads and municip bureaus, and unlike most other pron nent Confederate generals, he becar wealthy. He fought the war to the e of his days, putting into print his rec lections of battles that varied little in c tails. He became ghost writer for h ghost writer. *The Military Operations General Beauregard,* by Colonel Alfr

›man, was written by Beauregard him-
f. And every article by Beauregard in
ttles and Leaders, many will be sur-
ised to learn, was written by Roman
d edited by Beauregard.

Mr. Williams will be remembered for
; penetrating *Lincoln and His Generals*
ot to be confused with Kenneth Wil-
ms's *Lincoln Finds a General*). In
auregard he gives us a fine character
dy, definitely from the objective view-
int. His work should find a place near
: top of the list of best military books
the year.

inter in the North Atlantic

THE GOOD SHEPHERD
By C. S. Forester
Little, Brown & Company, 1955
310 Pages; $3.95

viewed by
LONEL S. LEGREE

C. S. Forester always writes a good
n—or nearly always if we must in-
de *Randall and the River of Time.*
rnblower fans will take Commander
ıuse to their hearts—he is one of For-
:r's almost standard characters, dedi-
ed to duty and just odd enough to
inguish him from the common run.
inking in Biblical quotations is indeed
ueer aberration for almost anyone, and
:e so for a destroyer skipper in a tight
t, but Forester makes Commander
use, U. S. Navy, sound plausible.

By an accident of rank, Krause finds
ıself in command of a four-vessel fleet
lestroyers and escort vessels, protecting
North Atlantic convoy. He has not
d any shots in anger; his subordinate
›pers, British, Canadian, and Polish,
all veterans of the submarine war.
l to this embarrassment the fact that
use was passed over twice and owes
continuing duty to the war, and is by
ıre an introvert, and we have a sit-
on.

'he convoy takes a beating, including
loss of the Polish destroyer, but
ıse's outstanding devotion and su-
or training result in what our British
ıds call " a good show." How Krause
ays an inadequate screen of four de-
ers into a force to protect the bulk
is convoy against a submarine wolf
is a stirring story, and one that
ster can tell probably better than any
r contemporary writer. The reader is
d up by the skillful weaving of the
until the final end of tension takes
unaware.

his is a tale of a man, and only in-
ıtally of a portion of a war. The de-
tions of destroyer *versus* submarine
:s are fascinating to the landlubber,
surprisingly understandable. But it
e man who stands out—Krause, the
›ted thinking machine, who is
gely human withal.

s a corking good tale, and worthy
.e honors already bestowed upon it.



Pass In Review

This department has commented from time to time on the general excellence of the World War II histories published by the Army's Office of the Chief of Military History, the Marine Corps Historical Division and, of course, Dr. Samuel Eliot Morison's series on the Navy. The record would not be complete if we failed to record a similar appraisal of the volumes which have been produced on the Army Air Forces in World War II. These have been edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Professors of History at Princeton and Chicago Universities, respectively. We have at hand Volume VI of the planned seven-volume series. The earlier volumes provided excellent coverage of the combat performance of our World War II Air Forces and this latest book, *The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes* ($8.50), deals with the air activities in the zone of interior. This book gives us a comprehensive review of the origins of the Army Air Forces; the development of base facilities; production planning and organization; logistical organization; the foundations of the war training program and personnel procurement and similar administrative matters. Certainly these volumes are important to any well-rounded military library.

Before leaving the wild blue yonder, we should note that we are looking forward to an opportunity to read *U.S. Military Doctrine* ($3.50) which has been written by Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF, and is soon to be published. Advance notices indicate that it will be a thought- and argument-provoking dissertation on our past and current military doctrine as viewed through the eyes of a high-ranking airman. Following on the heels of Thomas K. Finletter's *Power and Policy,* this should give us a full measure of how the air-power advocates feel we should adapt our military doctrines to meet the supersonic-nucleonic age.

Our Civil War recommendation for this month will be covered in greater detail elsewhere in "The Month's Books" but lest we lose our self-appointed status as Civil War-publications-recording secretary we must announce the new and highly entertaining *Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray* ($4.75) by T. Harry Williams. You will remember Williams for his well-done *Lincoln and His Generals* which was published a couple of years ago. In this new book Williams maintains his objective viewpoint and gives us a most interesting portrait of one of the South's most colorful characters.

Merriman Smith makes a good living as the White House correspondent of the United Press and on the side writes books about the President of the United States. In *Meet Mr. Eisenhower* ($3.50) Mr. Smith describes some of the homelier details of our President's official and private life and avoids the deeper realm of assessing the impact of his administration on world affairs. Unpretentious in aim, the book will undoubtedly enjoy a good sale; this conclusion is based on the insatiable curiosity of the American reader for intimate details of famous personages.

In view of the great interest in space travel it seems entirely plausible to suggest that there will be many of our readers who would like to know about a new book coming out describing the Viking 10 Rocket designed to explore the upper atmosphere. Written by Milton W. Rosen, Chief of Rocket Development at the Naval Research Laboratory, *The Viking Rocket Story* ($3.75) traces the development of the Vikings from the V1s and 2s of World War II up to the present model 10. He describes the design and materials problems and by avoiding a morass of technical detail manages to make the story of interest to the novice in the field.

Likely choices . . . *My Nine Lives in the Red Army* ($3.75) by Mikhail Soloviev with a foreword by Admiral Leslie Stevens. An interesting picture of life in the Soviet Army . . . *How to Watch Birds* ($3.50) by Roger Barton. A valuable guide-book for the present or potential bird-watchers (don't laugh; there are literally millions of them) that provides information on identification, nesting habits, field trips, and so on . . . *Headquarters* ($3.95). Quentin Reynolds's fine portrait of the New York Police Department. . . . R.F.C.

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

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TEST OF NEW TACTICAL CONCEPTS

Armored Task Force Advances after A-Bomb Blast

Welcome News

The Regulars Are Reenlisting

MORE Regulars are reenlisting in the Army than at any time since the year the Korean conflict broke out. Department of the Army reports show that the reenlistment rate of Regulars during the last six months of 1954 rose from 22 to 54 per cent. In 1950 the rate was 59 per cent, but by 1953 it was plummeting and the rate for fiscal 1954 (July 1953-June 1954) averaged only 23.7 per cent. Then came a welcome reversal of the trend; a few months later the percentage began to climb back to near pre-Korean figures.

Here's what happened. In July, August, and September of 1954, 13,800 Regulars reenlisted without a break in their service. But in the following three months, 21,665 reenlisted immediately. This is an increase of 56 per cent. Also, more men who had previous service, but who were civilians, came back into the Army during the second three-month period than during the first.

WHY did this happen? What caused this encouraging reversal in the attitude of the men the Army needs most: the professional regulars, the noncommisioned officers and hard-to-replace specialists?

It wasn't due to hard times on the outside. Jobs are plentiful and the country was never more prosperous. Any man capable of performing as a noncommissioned officer in the Army could find a well-paying job in civilian life if he desired to leave the service.

The answer must lie within the conditions of service.

Without a doubt, bigger reenlistment bonuses played some part in this. So did the effort to stabilize assignments and to assure noncommissioned officers Stateside service of at least eighteen months after a tour of overseas service.

At this time Operation GYROSCOPE had not beer. announced, but soldiers generally knew from the statements of their leaders that the Army was working on plans that would give Regulars a better break and the expectancy of this doubtlessly led some to re-up.

Among other improvements were the adoption of a new uniform, the announced plan to separate noncommissioned officers and specialists (without degrading the latter), the individual assignment by name of first-three-graders, and slightly lower commissary prices (brought about by reducing overhead surcharges).

THERE was also the National Housing Act of 1954 which makes it possible for servicemen to become home owners just as their colleagues who have left the service.

More recently, there has been a raise in pay, which certainly provides an added incentive for Regulars to reenlist.

Lest this attractive picture suggest that Army life is now one long, perfect dream, it must be noted that the serviceman's family still is without guarantee of dependent medical care, that it must often live in substandard quarters or pay high rent for off-post housing, and live dangerously because of inadequate survivor benefits in the event of the death of the soldier-husband and -father.

THE housing problem remains acute at many posts and stations both in the U. S. and overseas. Many service families rightly deplore losing their entire quarters allowance when they live in substandard quarters on a post. They would welcome authorization to pay a lesser rental on such substandard quarters. However, the only lasting alleviation of the housing shortage is more Government housing adequate for growing families.

With such housing, with assurances of decent medical care and survivor benefits, stabilized assignments and the effort to restore the old esteem and respect for the valuable services of noncommissioned officers, the reenlistment rates of Regulars could well continue to improve to the benefit of the Army and the nation.

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. . not "on the way"

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

ASSOCIATION'S JOURNAL

THE ballots have been counted; the returns are in. G eral Lyman L. Lemnitzer is your Association's new Pr dent, to take office for one year at the June meeting of Executive Council. General Lemnitzer has been Preside of course, since General Decker left for Europe in Februa Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks is our new Vice President.

Members of the 1958 panel of the Executive Coun elected during the balloting, were: Major Generals W. Lawton and G. C. Mudgett; Brigadier Generals Paul Caraway, Philip F. Lindeman, and William C. Westmc land; Colonels Robert L. Cook, Walter F. Ellis, Harold Haskell and Alexander D. Surles; and Master Serge William O. Wooldridge.

Pictures of the new officers and members appear page 30.

Congratulations all! The Association staff welcomes yo advice and help in making the organization even m effective.

SINCE shortly after the end of World War II your As ciation's Book Service has been fighting to render t service our members deserve, without losing too mu money in the process. Unfortunately, today's Army is n a reading army, and the Book Service's volume is so l that we have had an almost impossible fight to keep it existence for the comparatively few members who app ciate a one-stop, money-saving method of acquiring boo

In Association business, as in the Army itself, paperwo is an expensive luxury. Operating charge accounts costs too much, even though our collection rate is so high th ordinary commercial firms would drool if they knew ho little we lost on bad debts. We have had to institute a ne policy, effective 1 June 1955. The essential elements of t policy are these:

No charge accounts to individuals. Unless cash acco panies the order, the order will have to be returned, u filled.

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And if you have any Dividend Coupons around th house or in your footlocker, *please* use them up before th end of 1955—or send them in and you can have a *cash* r fund. It would help considerably to have all Dividen Coupons out of circulation before the end of the year.

And Buy Your Books From Your Association! Yo save money (10%) and your Association makes a little.

ARE you doing your part in the Association's preser membership campaign? Tell your friends we appreciat their interest in reading The Army Combat Forces Jou nal, but it's membership in the Association of the Unite States Army that pays the bills. The only way to guarante a more useful and influential publication is to acquire mor members. Talk it up! The Publishe

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The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a professional military mag zine devoted to the dissemination of information and ideas relating to the military art and science representing the interests of the entire Army. The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to—

- Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.
- Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.
- Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.
- Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.
- Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

June 1955 Vol. 5, No. 11

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Armored task force advances after A-Bomb Blast in Nevada. *Wide World photo.*

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

The Army Wives

• When in September I read your impressive articles, "The Army Yesterday," by Mrs. Craig, and "The Army Today," by Mrs. Rigg, I planned to write you to say how splendid I thought both articles were and how much I would like every Army wife to experience reading them. In the issues of The JOURNAL since that time I have looked in vain in "The Month's Mail" for letters congratulating you on their excellence.

I hope many other Army wives have been more articulate in expressing their interest in these articles than I. At least I have passed our copy to numerous friends to read. It has occurred to me that there would be great value in reprinting these articles in *The Reader's Digest.*

RUTH B. HOLLIS
(Mrs. R. P. Hollis)
2800 S. 20th St.,
Philadelphia 45, Pa.

• *Thank you, Mrs. Hollis. Our love and respect for Army wives is now back on its former high plateau. We'll admit it dipped a bit when a vast silence followed the publication of the articles by Mrs. Craig and Mrs. Rigg, but we are reassured not only by Mrs. Hollis's letter but by the knowledge that many an absent-minded Army husband is still carrying about a letter addressed to us, given to him for posting by his ever-loving.*

Direct Line for the JA

• In General Harris' fine paper on "The Theater Support Command" [COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, May] charts 2, 3 and 4 show the Staff Judge Advocate layered several echelons under the Inspector General, Comptroller, Public Information Officer, Headquarters Commandant, and others who are given direct access to the Commanding General.

Such a depressed position for the legal eagle not only appears to violate the statutory command that "convening authorities shall at all times communicate directly with their staff judge advocates . . . in matters relating to the administration of military justice" (Article 6(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice), but, more important, it impairs the desirable close relationship between the CG and his JA. When several echelons of non-conductors are interposed between those two, trouble results. See, generally, the military justice mess of World War II, and the legislative straitjackets imposed on the services in consequence.

JUDGE WINTHROP

He's Now in the Count

• Regarding your statistical study on page 2 of the April issue: Please add one (1) manufacturers' representative (fancy title for traveling salesman) with three and a half years World War II service and three years USAR time, who is still interested in Army doings.

RICHARD H. POE
23 Seaton Road
Stamford, Conn.

Off-Duty Training Facilities

• One of the problems in training is finding time to teach the soldier the many subjects that would add color and interest to military life. Since our training day is crowded, I feel that the Army would do well to examine its off-duty facilities. By redesigning them we can provide a military atmosphere for the soldier to live in.

Most Army posts are well provided with off-duty activities. There are bowling alleys, theaters, swimming pools, gyms, craft shops, radio stations—in fact, any soldier can find his favorite avocation on the post. In spite of all these activities to entertain the soldier, few of them provide any training. One of the things that Army posts lack that all good amusement parks have is a shooting gallery. What a natural for ground soldiers! Just go to an amusement park and watch the uniformed servicemen blasting away.

The magazine rack caught my special attention. There were the run-of-the-mill magazines that feature everything from women's fashions to the racy little sex and sadism things. But nowhere on the rack was THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL or any of the branch magazines. Most military magazines seem expensive to the average soldier when he is asked to subscribe for a year at a time, but buying a magazine once a month doesn't seem half so bad. A look at the pocket-book shelf was nearly as impressive as the magazine rack. There was everything from Lincoln to Lonigan. The bookshe needed copies of noncom textbooks f the new corporal, and some of the mil tary classics and pamphlets for the inte ested reader.

Most of the military magazines can b read at the post library, but most soldie will not go to the library to spend the fe minutes before the movie. Most men c not go to the library without a speci reason, and then many of them woul not know what to look for. If the militar publications cannot enter the market o the same basis as civilian publication then the PX should be able to dispose c outdated military magazines in the sam manner as they do soiled and damage merchandise.

The average recruit enters the Arm with the idea of doing the best job h can while he is in the service. They ex pect to live in an entirely differen atmosphere. Instead of making him "quasi-civilian," we should saturate hi off-duty time with military recreation thereby increasing his interest, his pro fessional knowledge, and his value t the service.

LT. WILLIAM B. BOYLE
Hq Co, 33d Inf.
Fort Kobbé, C.Z.

• *We're prepared and anxious to suppl a monthly stock of* JOURNALS *to any PX that will display them.*

Mental Mobility

• Any time a few articles move someone to write a letter to you, *that* is mental mobility. This letter is in tribute to Col David P. Gibbs, who wrote "The Commander's Communications" [February] and "Mental Mobility" [March]. It is a pleasure to see such material from one of the same branch as myself.

The commander's confidence in the commo officer, bringing him in early on planning, keeping him informed, licensing him, are merely basic principles of positive leadership. The commo officer will be faithful to his trust. We are human; we have all had our failings. But success will be had only through teamwork to the *n*th degree; trust in others to get a job done effectively. The Buffalos (17th Infantry) in Korea were successful

ɔugh just such efforts. The head of herd gave his commo officer great tude. Communications were always re.

Communications were successful only ause the commander allowed his com-ıy-grade commo officer to energize his as and because he always backed him on *how* communications could and uld be established. Mental mobility, hful to our trust—call it what you may; cess depends on dynamic and positive nking.

CAPT. GEORGE A. NIGRO
), TSS
t Monmouth, N. J.

r Defense Problems

I read Colonel Thielen's "Guardian Our Air Frontier," in the April issue, h considerable interest. Colonel Thie- has made a very penetrating analysis the air-defense problem. Possibly the ıtion to many problems lies in his tement, "When the Air Force and the A can get along like the infantry-llery team, many problems will dis-ɔear." At the risk of being ostracized the Army, I should like to offer a ıtion: make the AAA part of the Air ce. There are many advantages to h a merger, but the biggest is that we uld then have unity of command and a ater degree of simplicity plus economy forces.

We have long followed the principle placing our artillery under centralized ıtrol. Considering that interceptor air-ft and the surface-to-air missile are in lity two types of antiaircraft artillery ing the same mission but different abilities, should they too not be under tralized control? If that is true, then AF should control Nike as well as interceptors, since they already have nary responsibility for the air defense the U. S. Another reason is that the ıpons of AAA are technically more ilar to AF weapons than to conven-ıal Army weapons. The AAA com-er and the AF bomb sight solve es-tially the same problem. The more AAA and the AF know about each er's capabilities and limitations, the ter each can accomplish its mission. e AAA must rely on the AF now (for y warning, and so on) to accomplish mission. If AAA were actually part he AF, then AAA would not receive same general treatment as the illegiti-e child at the family reunion, which sually what happens now when AAA resentatives confer with either the AF with the rest of the Army.

ɔome AAA officers are of the opinion t the SAM of the future will enable army commander to gain air superior-over his army's area, even if we do have tactical aircraft available. This ght be fallacious reasoning; if we have superiority we may not need the army-controlled missiles. If we do not have it, then no amount of missiles will help the situation very much. The enemy air force would merely start its own isolation of the battlefield, and we would soon lack the means to maintain large-scale operations. Actually, with our air superiority in World War II and in Korea, our AAA seldom fired *in the air-defense role*. The most important function of AAA in the theater of operations then would be to protect our air bases and to help our own aircraft maintain air superiority. Once the balance of air power shifts, then it continues to shift, and at an increasing rate. The most efficient means of protecting air bases would surely be under AF control.

There are, of course, many good reasons for keeping AAA under Army control. There do seem to be enough advantages to putting AAA under AF control to warrant its serious consideration, however.

CAPT. C. R. ABEL
AA&GMB, TAS
Fort Bliss, Tex.

• *This proposal is Captain Abel's and NOT the editor's. Those of our readers who want to set Captain Abel right should do it now as we will be able to publish only a limited number of comments and none containing blasphemy.*

Cooking with Gas

• Colonel T. N. Dupuy in cerebrating on "High Standards and Morale" [March] discussed the necessity for officers and noncoms to do some serious studying beyond what is required to get by in their daily duties. "Only a small percentage of Army officers read such professional service publications as THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL," he wrote correctly. Percentagewise, most of the members of the Association are general officers, which is not surprising. I would like to inform Colonel Dupuy that the membership is now on the increase. At least by one.

In the bar of the officers' club was a major wearing a 7th Infantry Division patch on his right shoulder. He was reading "Tomorrow's Battlefield," in the March issue. A captain wearing an 11th Airborne patch on his right moved up to the bar and occupied the stool on the major's left. After he ordered his beer his eyes rested on the article "General Gavin Says. . . ." "What's he saying?" "Have a look," answered the major. The captain did, and read the complete article. He asked, "May I have the magazine when you are through with it?" "I'm never through with it," the major replied. "Can you buy it at the PX?" "Sure, but you get it for nothing if you are a member of the Association." "What is the Association?" "Look on page 4. It will tell you what it is all about in sixty-seven words." [Page 2 of this issue.—ED.]

FAMOUS MILITARY MAXIMS:

That's an order

When you get orders, you'll continue receiving *The Army Combat Forces Journal* if you send your new address to:

CIRCULATION MANAGER
1529 Eighteenth St., N.W.
Washington 6, D. C.

After a few minutes the captain exclaimed, "Say! One of the vice presidents is my old division commander." "Yeah," said the major, "mine too. And that isn't all. He's on his way over here now to take over this command. When he gets here he may be interested in knowing how many members of his command are also members of the Association of the U. S. Army. Now, if you will fill out this card that came with the magazine you may become eligible to vote. Best you send it air mail. While you're at it, make up a ballot as appears on page 63, follow instructions as appears on 62, and get it in by 20 April 1955." The major added, "Your former division commander is running for president of the Association."

MAJOR GEORGE E. BANIGAN
Hq AFFE 8th Army
APO 343, San Francisco, Calf.

SBC?

● I have just read Colonel Swift's Cerebration in the April issue, and regret deeply that I did not write the article, for I too am bitterly opposed to the faculty system of present-day training in RTCs.

It is my contention that a company commander, aided by four lieutenants, can train two hundred men who will be better qualified for combat duty than men trained under any faculty system that I have had the displeasure of seeing. Furthermore, the four lieutenants will be more capable of leading men in combat than will the lieutenant who has been solely a committee specialist.

Lieutenant Blank was the instructor in chemical warfare at Camp Normal for eighteen months before being shipped to Korea. The first time he moved his platoon forward in attack, he encountered enemy machine-gun fire. Chemical warfare instruction had left him unprepared for such an event. He froze. He thought wildly, "Why wasn't I an instructor in tactics?" and broke for cover. While running, his gas mask became entangled with his sniff kit; the mask strap twisted tightly around his neck and, in frenzy, he really pushed the panic button. Since they couldn't very well say, "Strangled by the committee," they called it "Killed in action."

Colonel Swift deserves a hearty congratulation on his article.

CAPT. ROBERT L. LYONS
Camp Tortuguero, P.R.

Basic Branch of WOs

● In reply to SFC Giarrantano's letter re warrant officers in your April issue, I'd like to give my answer to the questions, "Why can't the Army keep up with the times like other services? The cap and lapel brass and bars of the WO are strictly WO. . . . Why can't they wear the same brass as commissioned officers?"

To set the record straight, let's go back in time to the point before an air force, *per se*, existed. Then the Air Corps was an arm of the Army. Four or five years (give or take a month or two) before the Air Force came into being, the Army decided to pin the branch insignia on warrant officers, just as the officers wear such insignia. The resulting howl of indignation, in which I participated, apparently was heard in Washington. Not many moons later the WO's insignia again nestled securely on the collar and lapel.

Of course, the real reason that use of branch insignia for WOs was not considered practical can be seen by merely reading the history of a warrant officer from 1941-42 to date. Even my own history for that period (except from 1948 to 1951, when I had temporarily reverted to master sergeant) might serve to illustrate why WOs should not wear branch insignia.

Assignments chronologically by branch: Infantry, Coast Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, Air Corps, Adjutant General, Infantry, Adjutant General. In these seven branch assignments, it may be further noted that various types of duty were performed on levels from company to army headquarters, including specialized headquarters such as the Assembly Area Command in Reims, and Headquarters, Exercise LONGHORN at Fort Hood, Texas.

As can be seen, a warrant officer would spend five-sixths of his service in a branch other than basic, if someone could determine the basic branch. Over such a period most commissioned officers attend service schools of their branch. Very few WOs take time out for service schools, since they usually obtain their training in an on-the-job status.

CWO A. E. O'BRIEN
218 Brettonwood Drive
San Antonio, Tex.

State Defense Forces

● The JOURNAL has been an essential part of my military education program for the past several years, and has steadily improved in value.

In view of needed emphasis on developing a reserve force adequate to meet future emergencies, those of us who labor to keep State Guard cadres on their toes would appreciate space and comment covering that important area of our military strength.

With some encouragement from the Army and a modest outlay for clothing and equipment we could develop a substantial support force capable of handling most local and state security missions at a fraction of the cost involved if such missions were assigned to Army units.

MAJOR WALTER M. FERRIS
Ohio Defense Corps
Cleveland, Ohio

Keep Our Banners High

General Ducrot
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I hope you don't mind a junior officer, who served under you in peace and war, writing this personal note. What I shall write about is not in connection with my official duties, but is of grave concern to me as an officer of the United States Army.

I have just returned from the local post theater in which the movie, "An Annapolis Story," was shown. This film outlines the traditions of the Naval Academy and the principles expected of an officer. What disturbs me was the laughter of the soldier audience at those principles which are morally and religiously sound and right and for which we should all strive. This is not the first time I have observed such reaction to pictures in which loyalty, honesty, duty, and honor are brought out in connection with our officer academies. It makes me wonder why we rely on Hollywood pictures to inform our basic element—the individual soldier—of the principles so important to the individual, his unit, our Army, and our Nation.

I am wondering if a series of true stories could not be put into pictorial form telling the stories of individuals from all walks of life—officer and enlisted—who have upheld our traditions. There are stories as good as any Hollywood effort in our Medal of Honor citations and in other citations for meritorious service. These pictures should clearly outline the tradition that the individual upheld and could relate the proud history of the unit in which the individual was serving.

I know that this subject is not new and that action in this direction was instituted when the distribution of "This is Your Army" was ordered. We must reach the key to our success—the individual soldier, be he enlisted or officer—with the ideals that have made our country great. We must keep our standards high.

Having had the privilege of serving in combat with my fellow American and under your leadership, I know you will understand the feeling behind this letter.

Respectfully,
LIEUTENANT DOE





tic 'tac' toe!

In the event of surprise attack, today's new and more powerful USAF Tactical Air Command can now carry war to the enemy anywhere in the world—around the clock and in any weather.

Here at a glance are some of the elements that might be used in such an attack and which are contributing to Tac Air's new mobility and striking power.

In modern warfare, major fixed bases are certain to become targets for initial enemy action. The Martin zero-length launcher makes possible swift mobility and advance-area operation of the TM-61 Matador tactical missile and—if need be—of piloted jet fighters.

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And for tomorrow's Tactical Air Command arsenal, new and more powerful Martin weapons systems are on the way.

MARTIN

BALTIMORE · MARYLAND

FRONT AND CENTER

O-Day plus 180 years. The U. S. Army's Organization Day comes on 15 June—the anniversary of the day General George Washington took command of the Colonials at Concord. We hope the bands play on that day and that the troops will pass proudly in review, their flags and banners rippling bravely. We hope, too, that there will be much partying—as is proper on any well conducted Organization Day—and that the beer will be cool and the fellowship warm. We hope that that there will be a minimum of speechifying. Perhaps little more than the reading of such moving history as this, taken from *Revolution in 1776* by John Hyde Preston:

"The fox-hunter from Virginia was coming to take command of his sprawling bucolic forces. He rode a white charger and glistened with regimentals. People flocked out to catch a glimpse of the great man in every town he passed through. Little girls gave him nosegays and white-haired ministers coupled his name with Divine Providence. He was embarrassed by it all and accepted it with a shy half-smile.

"When he arrived at the encampment at Cambridge he stood out under a big dusty elm, shaded from the scorching heat of the July sun, and made a short speech to the militiamen gathered there in motley uneven ranks. He asked them to have faith in the future of this country, to be patient under reverses and to believe that he would do all in his power to save them and make them happy. Legend says that he unsheathed his sword and waved it in a slow circle, like a bishop administering a benediction. There is nothing to prove it, and Washington was not the kind of man who goes in for mystic rites.

"The army that he found at Cambridge was saved from being ridiculous only by being so pathetic. At least, it was pathetic to military eyes, and Washington was trying to train those steely gray eyes of his to be as military as possible.

"But for practical purposes, this armed mob of farm hands and periwigged aristocrats was not pathetic at all. They had cleaned out the British at Lexington and Concord and at Bunker Hill with a kind of uncanny genius for the art of war. An artless art, in a way—like the skill of children or the luck of beginners. But it had worked miraculously."

Baseball. If you're in uniform and in New York City you can attend major league baseball games at the Polo Grounds, Yankee Stadium and Ebbetts Field (Brooklyn) free of charge. The three clubs have special servicemen's gates that must be used for free admission. For some of these clubs this is an old custom going back to World War I. If it exists in other major league parks Front and Center will pass the word along if properly informed.

Mr. Helicopter speaks. Dr. Igor Sikorsky, dean of helicopter designers, doesn't believe there is any limitation on helicopter size and that it "woul be possible to produce giant helicopte as soon as they would be needed." I an address before the Institute c Mechanical Engineers in London, D Sikorsky predicted that the future carg helicopter will have no body compar ment but will pick up its load throug a hoist arrangement and carry it unde neath. He thinks the single-rotor heli copter will remain the most importan type and piston engines or turbine will be the usual source of power. Nu clear power is possible but poses specia problems and may not be necessary i such a short-haul craft as the helicop ter. He thinks 200 mph will be abou the most economical top speed.

Convertiplanes are quite feasible Dr. Sikorsky said, but he believes the have limited usefulness because the will be "considerably more expensive and less efficient than either the pure helicopter or the pure airplane of equal lifting capacity."

"Maintenance, life expectancy and reliability of helicopter transmissions . . . are all quite reasonable even at the present time," he said, taking a dim view of current criticism. He thinks the metal gear transmission will be used for a long time because hydraulic or pneumatic transmissions cannot "even approach the 96 to 97 per cent of efficiency currently reached in well-designed modern metal gear transmissions of helicopters."

Cargo aircraft needed. W. R. Rhoads, chief military operations research engineer for Lockheed Aircraft Corp., believes the nation's present air transport fleet is out of date and a whole new family of aircraft must be developed. He sees the need for three types of airplanes: (1) Vertical takeoff and landing craft that can carry up to 10 tons, for short hauls; (2) aircraft that can take off and land from short, hastily prepared runways and carry 25 tons at ranges up to 3,500 nautical miles; and (3) heavy duty cargo transports capable of carrying 100 tons for

'Constructive View'?



This "pro-Army" cartoon from *The Chicago Tribune* is fine stuff from our point of view and we are tickled to be able to print it. But it also serves as an example of the tough job Secretary Wilson and his information assistants are going to have in trying to keep service rivalry from getting into the press.

Into jet training—safe, slow-speed landings

Cessna T-37. . . Designed for Jet Training

Everytime the T-37 returns from a test flight in Wichita it is apparent that jet training is being made easier, safer. The reason: the new jet trainer has a slow landing speed, makes the move into jets relatively simple.

The shift from prop driven to turbojet airplanes is a big step, imposes stiff requirements on the men who train to fly with the USAF. To meet these, the Air Force designated CESSNA responsible for building an aircraft which would readily fit into the pilot training program. This, the T-37 is designed to do. Naturally, this means real savings in time and money.

* * *

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distances of 4,000 miles. Mr. Rhoads says that within the next ten years the nation must increase its air cargo fleet four or five times and reconcile the differences between military and civil requirements for cargo aircraft.

This is easy. We have a three word answer for the researchers from HUMRO who have been sent into the field to find out how soldiers think the Army should promote: fast and often.

Square feet per family. In recent years the government seems to have been trying to encourage servicemen to have smaller families. All recent appropriations for family housing have limited construction to a maximum of 1,250 square feet for all ranks and to an average of 1,080 square feet. But the Department of Defense, taking a more realistic view of the situation, has asked Congress not to write these limitations into the new bill for family housing and let the housing be built in accordance with the permanent law which provides a sliding scale ranging from 2,100 square feet for homes for general officers to 1,080 for the families of enlisted men.

New Look in Insignia

These are the noncommissioned officer and specialist insignia that will be worn after 1 July when the Army's new personnel management system goes into business. Along with new MOS numbers, there will be a new qualification record (Form 20), a new Service Record (Form 24), and a new method of keeping the 201 file.

Eyes only. No patriot could possibly find fault with the President's recent comment that "I just don't believe it is justifiable for any Government official to release anything that applies to the secret war plans, war policies, war purposes and war equipment of this government." The difficulty is to keep what should be secret strictly segregated from what an official thinks would be helpful to him if kept secret but which isn't a secret. While contemplating this we happened upon an article in *The Saturday Review* by Mr. Jonathan Daniels, who was President Roosevelt's press secretary during the latter part of the war. In the magazine article, Mr. Daniels told a story that points up the difficulty:

"For a long time I saved a wartime message from General Eisenhower t General Marshall. It was marked 'Ey Only,' which is a full echelon abov 'Top Secret.' I kept it because m copy, though the message was only fo the eyes of the Chief of Staff, w marked Copy No. 36. But if even mo eyes had seen it the Germans woul not have been greatly helped. Eiser hower was complaining about th number of VIPs who were arriving i the European Theatre."

Security of information. Front an Center can report that in the mont or more that has elapsed since th President and Secretary Wilson de cided that there were too many leak in the Pentagon, this magazine ha had no unusual difficulty or delay i clearing manuscripts for publication In one instance, indeed, an article tha appeared to the editors as being a bi questionable (on grounds other tha security of information) went throug the security review process much faste than is usual with similar articles. Thi magazine's experience thus far sup ports Mr. Wilson's statement that th new policy would work if the pres would just be patient and give it time

How to reduce. In losing 74,80 officers and men to get down to th required strength of 1,027,000 by th end of June 1956, the Army thinks i will lose 2 general officers, 750 fiel grade officers (while gaining 174 colo nels), 6,048 company grade officer (gaining 2,837 first lieutenants), 1,00 master sergeants, 2,000 sergeants, 6, 000 corporals and 60,000 privates firs class and privates. This will bring officer strength down to 113,400 (from 120,200), and enlisted strength to 1, 025,000 (from 1,101,800). The Army anticipates no change in the numbe of five- four- three- or two-star generals or warrant officers. It expects an in crease of 200 in the number of cadets at the Military Academy.

35 million records. A new 12½ million dollar six-story building is near ing completion in St. Louis that will be used to house the records of 35 million ex-servicemen. It will be known as the Department of Defense Military Personnel Records Center. Army and Air Force records are already in St. Louis at the Army's Military Personnel Records Center. Navy and Marine Corps records will be moved from Garden City, New York, to the new Center when it is completed later this year.

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Jet Powered YH-32

PIONEERING: New Flight Principles
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Especially designed for safe, swift air-landing or para-dropping of men and material at advanced bases, the C-123 brings new mobility to tactical air support under any conditions of climate or terrain.

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Speed Control Division, St. Augustine, Fla.
Stratos Division, Bay Shore, N. Y.

THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

IN the April 1955 issue of *Military Affairs*, publication of the American Military Institute, its president, Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, U. S. Navy retired, asks why "the U. S. military profession today [is] unable to produce writers?" He is alarmed because as he sees it, the "American military profession, now at its peak and holding the destiny of the world in its hands, is unable to know itself except through foreign pens." We expect to say more about this next month when we review a new book, *U. S. Military Doctrine,* by Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF. But right here we'd like to call Adm. Hayes' attention to the fact that the U. S. Army has officers who are able to write intelligently and meaningfully about current history. And in evidence of this we present MAJOR LAMAR M. PROSSER, Armor, who successfully undertakes the difficult task of analyzing "The Bloody Lessons of Indochina" (page 22).

Major Prosser enlisted in the Army in 1939 and won his commission three years later. His knowledge of Indochina stems from an assignment with MAAG in Saigon. He returned to the United States a few months ago and is now on duty with the 4th Armored Division at Fort Hood. He is the author of "Put 'em on Tracks," which appeared in the JOURNAL of April 1953.

A couple of sentences of the letter that accompanied Major Prosser's article are worth quoting: "I am sending you this manuscript reluctantly. After a year in Indochina, having travelled pretty extensively throughout the country and discussed operations with literally thousands of French and Vietnamese officers of all ranks on all levels, I think I am beginning to understand what went on here. . . . I have never run into a more complicated politico-military situation and, of course, no matter how objective you try to be, it is inevitable that personal opinion and even perhaps prejudices are going to affect what you write. I believe this piece presents fairly well the majority opinion, at least among the U. S. military people there.

"I think you will be surprised to find me advocating fewer vehicles and an infantry capable of using its legs and the lightest possible equipment. I was forced to that view by the terrain, the enemy, and the evidence. . . ."

COLONEL WILLIAM C. HALL, Corps of Engineers ("Statistics for Commanders," page 11), is a 1931 graduate of the Military Academy who is presently on duty at Fort Meade, Md. His "A Medal for Horatius," which appeared in our January issue, received favorable comment in the civilian press. He has been an occasional contributor for many years.

THE editors of this magazine reject far more articles than we accept and we imagine some of our most persistent contributors have more rejection letters than check stubs. One exception that comes to mind is MAJOR ROBERT A. SCRUTON, Infantry (page 18). We can't recall ever sending Major Scruton a rejection letter. He didn't contribute often but when he did it was almost surely a bell-ringer. We mention this now because we have just learned that Major Scruton has retired after twenty-six years of service as an enlisted man and officer. In addition to being a successful contributor of articles with a light touch, Major Scruton has been a standout tennis player for many years. We are told that he began his tennis career by being the junior half of a father-son tennis team that won the Fort Benning doubles championship in 1929. During military service that took him from Fort Eustis, Virginia, to Panama, Hawaii, Texas, Germany, Japan, and back to Fort Benning, he won such tournaments as the Hawaiian Open, Central American Open, Panama Canal, Eighth Army, Hawaiian Department, and All-Japan. We hereby nominate him for at least honorable mention in our informal military services' writing sweepstakes.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY LEVIERO, USAR (inactive) ("Task Force Razor Shaves Big Apple," page 38), is a veteran newspaperman and Pentagon correspondent for *The New York Times*, an assignment he undertook several months ago after covering other Washington beats for his newspaper. During that time he has beaten his competitors on a number of good stories, all unclassified and, we are confident, "constructive" by Mr. Wilson's standards. M Leviero began his military career in 192 in Brooklyn as a member of the 106t Infantry, New York National Guard. I 1935 he transferred from the Nationa Guard to the Organized Reserve Corp and in 1941 he was called to active duty Assigned to G2, he spent the war con piling those immensely valuable tactica technical and organizational facts abou the Japanese and German armies tha were issued in several "Handbooks" an in the regularly distributed "Tactical an Technical Trends." He returned to civil ian life in 1945, and in 1948, failin to pass a physical he lost his standin in the active reserve. Mr. Leviero mad the march from Camp Irwin to Yucc Flat with Task Force Razor and stuc out the many days of frustration whe the shot was delayed by weather. H came through the experience in goo shape except for a slight cold and w suggest that the doctors might take an other look at him with a view to getting him back into the active reserve.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES W EDWARDS, Infantry ("Web Defense," page 31), enlisted in the Army in 192 and became a lieutenant in the Nationa Guard in 1935. He was integrated into the Regular Army in 1945. Colonel Edwards holds a degree in law from Jefferson University.

LIEUTENANT CHARLES L. SNYDER, Infantry ("The Sergeants Take Over," page 19), is currently serving as Chief, Press Division of the Public Information Office, at Fort Carson, Colorado. He saw combat in Europe during World War II and in Korea.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEAN E. PAINTER, Artillery ("It's an Artillery Weapon Now," page 48), holds a degree in agriculture from Oregon State College. He received a commission in the Regular Army in 1939. Colonel Painter is presently assigned to the Department of Gunnery, The Artillery School.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK G. FORREST, General Staff ("Helicopter or

(Continued on page 54)



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All in all, the new Allis-Chalmers HD-16 brings you an outstanding combination of performance and long life with both mounted and drawn equipment . . . a higher rate of production, more working time, more work done on military and civilian jobs.

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STATISTICS for Commanders

COLONEL W. C. HALL

I WAS caught with my charts down! The new army G2 was being briefed by his comptroller at a staff meeting in the Pentagon. Almost too relaxed, I listened as the usual tables and charts illustrating functions and operations were presented. Then the comptroller produced something new—a series of charts showing problem areas.

Most of them concerned the Army's mapping program. For example, "the production of maps of Lower Saxony [the name has been changed to protect the innocent] was only one per cent as against three per cent in the previous quarter," and "The production of plastic relief maps is only *half* in square miles of the production of the previous quarter."

The G2 demanded, "Who's responsible for the mapping program?"

I was.

Immediately after the briefing, I was called on for an explanation. Fortunately, I had the pertinent facts marshalled. We had recently completed negotiations with the Saxons to obtain maps to our specifications from their production. We were obtaining the maps on schedule at a saving of almost a million dollars—but the chart showed *production* and did not include acquisition.

In the production of plastic relief maps, we had shifted some production from small scale (1:1,000,000) to large scale (1:50,000). Since it requires 400 large-scale panels to cover the same area as a 1:1,000,000 sheet, it is no wonder that the production *in square miles* dropped.

Where had the figures come from? The army comptroller had taken them from a periodic report from the Office of the Chief of Engineers. The figures were correct. But, as I have noted, the conclusions of the G2 comptroller were in error.

We live in a world of reports and statistics. Like our G2, the commander and his staff officers see many of them. Which are significant, which point out the need for corrective action?

The operator (the officer in charge of the statistics-producing action) is frequently on the spot. Why are his unit costs higher than those of the same operation at another station?

The operator invariably has an explanation. Is it a valid reason or an alibi?

This article gives some background on statistics, a points out some simple steps that will assist in th evaluation.

The Need for Better Statistics

The requirement for statistics is quite apparent. U costs are needed to establish costs of elements of t budget programs. Allocation of funds and programmi to reach definitive objectives is impossible witho work measurement and cost data. Evaluation of p formance usually depends upon cost or workload f ures.

UNFORTUNATELY, we do not have, in gener good data for our purposes. For broad budget pu poses we have much useful information, but the mo we get into detailed programs and operations, the le likely are we to find satisfactory data.

The statisticians have far too often used data whic represented a small fraction of an operation or whic while they covered an entire operation, did not produc

Inexact or misleading statistics (of which

ir picture of that operation. The heart and soul of istics is the work-measurement unit. Too often these e been selected arbitrarily, without adequate study he operation measured.

'he operators are, in part, responsible for some poor k-measurement units by failing to cooperate with statisticians. We all have a natural resistance to nvestigator probing into our work—too often.

'he need for good basic data being apparent, the ımander has two coordinate responsibilities: first, to ermine that the statistician produces the best pos- e work-measurement units; secondly, that the people is measuring cooperate with the statisticians and ıre that assumptions are correct and that technical siderations are properly considered. This coordi- on will at times resemble a shotgun marriage be- en an eager beaver and a stubborn mule.

elopment of Statistical Data

o far we've discussed statistical data very generally; ı let us take up a specific case.

'or budget, programming, and performance analysis poses, the Corps of Engineers has a requirement for trical consumption standards. To establish elec- ıl targets at each post requires consideration of a ıber of factors: maximum post capacity, current population, safety and security lighting require- ıts, and operation of electrical machinery.

f a post, such as Fort Meade, has a population of)00 and this is the capacity of the post, there will ı basic unit need and consequent total utilization of trical current. This use consists of all structure ting and heating, operation of utilities and electrical ıt, and safety and security lighting. If the population is reduced, say to 15,000, the barracks use of electricity will be reduced almost proportionably, but the other uses will be reduced to a much smaller degree.

Also, in our usage we must provide for the several thousand employees working on but living off the post. It has been found satisfactory to consider each of them as using one third as much electrical current as an inhabitant.

We can work up a target figure based on so many kilowatt hours per month per inhabitant, off-post worker, street light, motor, air-conditioning unit, and so on.

The engineers have used experience data for all requirements at full occupancy to determine basic electrical load and have developed a graph to determine the over-all requirement at greater or less than full occupancy. For example, a fifty per cent occupancy requires about seventy-five per cent as much electrical energy as full occupancy.

So far we've determined *amount* of electrical consumption, but what we need to find out is the *cost*. Now we arrive at further complications. Electrical costs are divided into two parts: consumption charge, and demand charge. The latter cost is due to the fact that the electric company must have enough equipment available and operable to meet our *maximum* needs. The greater our demand, the greater the electric company's capital investment. Both demand and consumption are metered charges. At Fort Meade, currently, the demand charge runs about thirty per cent of the total cost.

One more complication: the basic cost of electricity varies from one area to another.

I believe that finding the electrical consumption

many) make the world of figures in which he must work a maze to the commander



target in dollars for a post such as Fort Meade is more difficult than most of our statistical problems. In this instance, targets have been established and accepted to an accuracy such that an overrun of one or two per cent is considered significant by the post engineer and the army engineer. However, the problem must be kept under study at all levels since there is a continuous increase in over-all and *per capita* electrical consumption—some of it by labor-saving equipment (which cuts manpower requirements while adding to the electrical load).

Significant Measuring Units

I do not intend to overemphasize the use of experience data. Conditions in the army change frequently and radically. Experience figures invariably require comparison of past and present factors in order to check their validity.

Analysis of an operation will frequently point out significant factors. A number of years ago an Inspector General officer was ordered to locate baffling losses in a post commissary. As a result of previous experience, his first act was to check the purchases of beef. When he found that these purchases indicated a *per capita* consumption of twice the Army average, he checked transactions in this item and quickly located the cause of the loss—a commissary clerk who was selling quarters of beef on the side. Such *per capita* figures can be used to point out over-stockage and waste as well as theft.

Some significant indicators may be indirect effects. For example, a midwestern city's water consumption had for years followed a smooth curve—with an early evening peak which dropped off gradually to a low after midnight.

Recently, unusual demands put small peaks in this curve. A careful study indicated that these peaks occurred on the quarter hour. This clue led to a determination that the cause was the widespread viewing of television. Washing dishes, bathing, and other uses of water were being postponed until the end of programs. During "Dragnet" and "I Love Lucy," the consumption of water dropped way down, with a sharp peak after the program was completed. The degree to which the public "holds its water" may be a better indication of program popularity than the so-called scientific ratings.

As with other statistics, the simple method has drawbacks. We may obtain readily an over-all television viewing rating but other methods would be required to determine the relative popularity of programs shown at the same time.

Guides to Appraisal of Statistics

Regardless of techniques employed, the commander is primarily interested in the answer to one question: "Are the statistics presented to me significant?"

I shall discuss seven guides for the use of the commander and his staff. They do not include any highly technical or mathematical analyses. Such detailed ana yses will, in most instances, provide additional bas for evaluation. The guides are presented as gener questions with explanatory examples.

(1) *Is the over-all conclusion reasonable?* Does agree with other related reports? I recently saw a repo consisting of seventeen graphs or charts on certain logi tical operations. One comment was favorable; sixtee were unfavorable. Since this field has been inspecte by a number of qualified inspectors and elements rate excellent or superior, the predominance of unfavorabl remarks at once cast doubt on the reasonableness c the report.

I remember seeing a six-page report written after three-hour visit to an installation. The length of th report was unreasonable for such a short visit, and ir vestigation showed that the report was padded wit data from other reports three to twelve months old.

(2) *Do the listed figures make sense among them selves?* Recently I studied an army's reports on quarte master operations at post level of the two allied opera tions "supply administration and stock control" an "stock receipt, storage, and issue." These two operation are supervised, at each post, by the same officer, an are subject, generally, to the same conditions of fund ing, manning levels, and operational environment.

The division of line items processed divided by man hours produced figures given as "percentage of effi ciency." Efficiencies at posts varied from 50 per cent t 500 per cent. Some posts were rated as being *ten* time as efficient as others in the same command. Such relative rating is not reasonable.

In addition, the following situation prevailed:

	Supply Administration and Stock Control %	*Stock Receipt, Storage, and Issue* %
Post A	50	300
Post B	90	500
Post C	200	70
Post D	300	60

At the *same posts,* one operation was five times as efficient; at another, the operation was a sixth! It was Mark Twain who noted that you don't have to be able to lay an egg to tell when one is rotten.

(3) *What is the variation or range of operations rated?* Some time ago, it was proposed to the Engineering Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, that the work-measurement standard be "plans completed" divided by "man-hours required." Since our plans varied from drawings of simple utility attachments to designs for 1,000-bed hospitals (requiring literally hundreds of sheets), or, in other words, the range was greater than from 1:1,000, this measuring unit would never produce a meaningful average.

In another example, a recent inventory indicated the value of unserviceable signal equipment at an installa-

n had more than doubled during one quarter. This ıs found to be due to the extremely high value of a v pieces of radar equipment awaiting spare parts.

The inventory was in dollars. If it had been in *pieces* equipment, the picture would have been quite dif- ·ent. The repair of a few flashlights might have offset ɜ deadlined radar sets. Neither dollar value nor item ınt will give, without further consideration, a true :ture of the deadline condition.

(4) *How many units are measured?* Are enough nples taken to show a condition or trend? Let us ;ume that Fort Knox has a thousand tanks. There ɔuld be sufficient tanks repaired each month to give ısonable statistics as to average man-hours and costs. small post repairing two or three tanks a month might ɔve to be much more or less efficient using the same rdstick. Also, efficiency might be expected to jump ɔm very good to very bad. It is generally true that the ıaller the sample, the greater will be the variation ɔm the average.

(5) *Have all the elements of the operation rated en considered?* A sound comparison of depot "stock :eipt, storage, and issue" gives a rating on a fraction the operations of a depot and may or may not indi- :e relative over-all depot efficiency.

The example of the maps of Lower Saxony applies re. Maps produced plus maps acquired gives the true tus of progress.

If we are measuring "map production," we cannot :e one of many programs, such as that for Lower xony, but the entire world-wide program (if this ar's budget is only slightly less than last year's, there ɔuld not be a substantial drop in production), or an tire plant such as the Army Map Service (the same mber of employees should produce a consistent num- r of maps).

If we use miles traveled per vehicle assigned, we :asure vehicle utilization, but unless we consider the ffic pattern—that is, the normal routes and their ıgth—we cannot fairly compare stations. A large, dis- :sed station will require more vehicles and longer uls than a compact industrial-type installation.

(6) *Are combined operations properly integrated?* some reports on equipment, inspections and repairs included in the same report. If the average repair es ten times as long as the average inspection, the :iods devoted largely to inspections will show a highly cient operation.

In this instance, crediting an inspection as one tenth a repair job would give a more reasonable basis for rk measurement.

In the Army's mapping program, we noted that the t of map revisions averaged about a fifth of the cost ɔriginal mapping and simplified some of our statistics converting revisions to equivalent new mapping.

(7) *Are experience factors employed?* There are, in Army, usually elements affecting operations which ınot be measured. In identical outdoor operations in :erent areas, weather will have an effect.

In an indoor operation—say, a laundry—one area may have a very stable work force, while another may be cursed with a rapid turnover. One laundry may employ old equipment while another may have the latest devised. And speaking of laundries, the relative hardness of the water available at each location will affect costs.

One method of considering variations such as weather, equipment efficiency, and hardness of water is to employ an experience factor. If a series of inspections evaluates two operations as being of equal efficiency, we may establish a factor to give equal ratings over this period and use this same factor so long as there is no appreciable change in the conditions considered.

On a golf course, par is established as 3, 4, 5 and, occasionally, 6. We expect to use more strokes on the longer holes! It is possible to take average scores and set up par for rifle courses. I remember that, in one company, we worked on the basis that a 38/50 for off-hand and a 45/50 for 500 yards prone were par for making expert. Similar scores were established for all ranges for marksman, sharpshooter, and expert. The fact that a score of 30 off-hand was all that was required to make marksman was useful to the coach and psychologically helpful to the recruit.

A GOOD statistical report should meet the seven criteria listed above. A further mathematical and technical analysis to establish the variation to be expected is helpful. Water, sewage, and electrical-consumption targets for a post can be established very accurately (within one or two per cent), but try (as once I saw proposed) to schedule *snow-removal* costs. Maybe it can be worked out in Alaska, but in Maryland we haven't located a good enough almanac to predict snowfall by months or quarters. We should not expect, at Fort Meade, to estimate any closer than within thirty per cent for snow removal costs for a quarter. However, such information might be of value in determining the types and quantities of equipment to be purchased. (Once again, a complication. The most efficient snow removal, moneywise, would use a minimum of personnel and equipment, but such a solution would probably handicap post operations for an unreasonable time and be entirely unacceptable.)

Eventually, we'll come up with good data on our operations for integrated use in budgeting, programming, and performance analysis. But in the protracted interim, the commander must determine whether particular statistics establish facts, provide indications, or are largely meaningless. If the statistics are indicative, then he must be able to evaluate the inevitable explanations for poor showings presented by the responsible operator.

The slide rule army is at least as far away as push-button warfare, and there will be for a long time a requirement for technical background, widespread experience, and sound judgment in the evaluation of statistical analyses.

How to Get Lasting Peace

When everything is Staff, nothing Line, war will be impossible

MAJOR ROBERT A. SCRUTON

A VISIT to any headquarters will quickly impress the observer with the atmosphere of harassment in which staffs are compellcd to work. This is due to the inadequacy of their numbers to efficiently plan, direct, supervise and administer the activities of the units under them. Often it appears that the numerical strength of these units is equal to that of the supervisory staff. There are cases where it is actually greater.

This clearly calls for a substantial increase of all staffs in order that they may properly carry out their duties.

Staff expansion will rightly increase paper work. But there is today too little paper employed in conducting the Army's business. Too many affairs are settled verbally with no record for the file. Staffs must commit thcmselves to writing in all that they do and everyone in their sphere of operations must be on the distribution list. Understrength staffs cannot do this, although they do well, considering.

Additional paper will require more typists. A large corps of well-trained typists must be our immediate objective. There is the case of a staff section which employed nine typists who went on a picnic. They caught ptomaine and were laid up for a week. That section, unable to publish anything, became helpless. The units supervised by this staff received only verbal guidance and were themselves almost helpless. A reserve of typists would have prevented this situation.

WE have always been niggardly in regard to our staffs. In combat, replacements are assigned to line units when vacancies exist on staffs. Replacements have been ordered to the front while exhausted staffs worked night and day. Celebrated artists and athletes have been routed to rifle companies as Special Services staffs carried on with second-string talent. Troop Information & Education staffs—an activity whose endeavors are said to be unappreciated—have watched helplessly while degree-holders in education were rostered solemnly to infantry regiments. In peacetime we make fewer mistakes of this nature, but even so, officers and men continue to be assigned to line organizations.

In effecting our staff augmentation program we must simultaneously change certain basic beliefs concerning staff assignments. One of these beliefs is that the achievement of high rank depends on a liberal amount of command duty. Another is that too many staff assignments will deny a man's wife the opportunity to pin on his star.

There is sufficient truth in this to trouble all good staff men. Therefore they make great efforts to command something—a battalion, a regiment. Often they succeed, only to find themselves supervised by the very staff they deserted. It is the Army's loss, for trained desk soldiers, wisely prolific in the ways of papcr, chartmongering and office management, provide the guidance for our defense effort. Thc more guidance we have, it is said, the bette we are guided. Only the militarily un sophisticated can deny this.

CONSEQUENTLY we must provide unlimited advancement opportuni ty to members of staffs. TO&Es anc TDs, staffwise, must be expanded elas tically in order that the periodic cam paigns for reduction in force (RIF) wil have little effect on the large numbe of personnel who will choose a staff career when this program is promulgated. Only in this way can we forge the Ultimate Weapon.

"But what," questioned a staff officer whom I interviewed while researching this article, "but what do you mean by 'The Ultimate Weapon'?"

"Just that," I told him. "The Ultimate Weapon. Like the H-Bomb—you can't fight against it."

He put down a sheaf of reports. "But if we buy your proposal—not that we don't like the idea," he said, "will we have anyone left to do the fighting?"

"Not many," I said.

He seemed uncertain. "But . . . but . . ." he said, giving me an odd look.

"It's like this," I lectured him. "If the world's military forces adopt this staff concept, it will operate to eliminate war. Everything will be Staff, nothing Line. Staffs don't fight—they write. Therefore staffs will become the Ultimate Weapon, against which it is impossible to fight. . . ."

He ran screaming in the direction of his staff section.

THE SERGEANTS TAKE OVER

FC William Medina points out a minor correction to a basic trainee of his unit during an M1 sighting exercise

Noncoms at this basic-training camp give instruction to the men in their own units. The result: better guidance for trainees, more prestige and responsibility for NCOs

Lieutenant Charles L. Snyder

NCE World War II, the "committee" system has been ısed almost exclusively for teaching trainees the basic ıbat skills. Committees of instructors are organized on alion, regimental and division level, each being respon- e for some particular phase of training for the entire t.

'hough this method of training often achieves a high ree of technical excellence, it has some weaknesses. ior officers and senior NCOs teach the same subject months at a time, and are likely to become deficient in er skills and bored by repeating one subject over and :. Many NCOs are used for little but to shepherd their ges from committee to committee.

)ne consequence of this is a lack of leadership by non- missioned officers while they themselves complain that no longer have any authority. The 8th Infantry Divi- at Fort Carson, Colorado, has instituted a system of ıing that tries to overcome these deficiencies.

ast November, the 8th Division, which had been a gen- reserve division since the previous winter, received rs to prepare for the reception and training of more ı 20,000 basic combat and individual advanced trainees

Cpl. Farrell Snider shows recruits how to stack arms

These recruits of the 8th Infantry Division learn how to use the bayonet from one of the noncommissioned officers of their own company, Sgt. Robert Stak

Close personal contact with the instructor means high morale and a keen sense of competition between units

Leadership and instruction are twin responsibilities for NCOs at Fort Carson, Colo. Cpl. Clifford Marshall shows his men how to operate a field telephone

during the first half of 1955. Th planning which began with that war ing order has resulted in a type o training which, while not unique, is departure from the replacement trai ing methods that have been used a most exclusively since the early days o World War II.

The division's new training progra stresses decentralization. With the e ception of a few technical subjec such as CBR, squad leaders have ult mate responsibility for the results o their squads. An average class begi with a short explanation and demo stration by one of the company office or a representative of one of the tec nical services. The class is then broke down into squads, each of which r ceives the remainder of the instructio *from its own squad leader.*

Under this system, NCOs supervi everything their men do from reveil to retreat. Often they supplement the instruction in informal "bull session in the barracks after duty hours. Sinc the trainees receive 90 per cent of the training from the same instructor, the are constantly reviewing what the have been taught. The results are i creased enthusiasm and efficiency, an a highly competitive spirit among th squads.

An example of the results of this i dividualized training came when Con panies A, B, and D of the 28th Infa try regiment completed their reco firing on Fort Carson's known-distanc ranges. Competitive spirit betwee squads was unusually high and, d spite adverse weather conditions, th three companies qualified an averag of 80 per cent of their men. This con pares most favorably with the percen age of qualification in other install tions in the Fifth Army area that a engaged in the same type of trainin

THE emphasis on all training is o "doing." In the teaching of drill an other subjects in which technique must be performed, Major Gener John G. Van Houten, Commandin General of the 8th Division, directe that the trainees should spend 90 p cent of the time actually executing th required actions or movements, leavin no more than 10 per cent of the tim for lectures, films, and demonstration

Lesson plans for the new trainin program were written by the units an then submitted to a six-man board o senior officers for review, approval, an standardization with lesson plans su

mitted by other units. The approved plans were then attached to a separate training memorandum for each subject, which outlines policies and objectives. Division also prepares notes for the instructor to guide him through the execution of the training.

"We want to train our NCOs and junior officers," says General Van Houten. "We want them to know their men and to know every phase of their jobs. We want them to know that all their men have the right equipment, to know those subjects in which their men are deficient and to correct those deficiencies."

Though the new program has greatly increased the workload of the division's noncoms, it is popular with them. According to Colonel James M. Hanley, whose 28th Infantry Regiment first used the new training system, "A kind of metamorphosis took place in our NCOs. They suddenly found themselves in the position of being 'old soldiers' with the kind of authority and responsibility they should have had long ago." A veteran master sergeant said, "These young corporals and sergeants are learning more from this than they ever learned in their lives before."

THE program has three main objectives. First, it is designed to train NCOs and junior officers to know their men and be able, if necessary, to lead them in combat. Leadership is developed by giving them responsibility and authority commensurate with their positions. Secondly, *esprit* is developed by having units live and work together with the same leaders and instructors. And thirdly, the emphasis on "training by doing" is designed to produce a more efficient soldier out of the trainee.

This system does not allow for the intense specialization that obtained under the committee system, but General Van Houten believes that the advantages of personalized training offset any lack of "professionalism." "Not that we don't strive for excellence and for the same professional techniques found at installations such as The Infantry School at Fort Benning," he says. "But we feel that this personal contact, the sense of pride and initiative developed in the squad leader when he realizes that he is directly responsible for every performance of his squad, whether on the rifle range or the drill field, will produce not only a superior trainee, but a superior noncommissioned officer."



SFC J. K. Fisher is first-aid instructor as well as first sergeant of his basic-training company. Here he shows two trainees how to apply a stomach bandage

These trainees learn skills by performing them. They spend 90 per cent of the training time in practical work

The mysteries of Army bed-making disappear as SFC Howard H. Smith demonstrates. Trainees and instructors both benefit from the stress on leadership





French forces were scattered over 281,000 square miles to defend fortified positions like this one

The Bloody Lessons of Indochina

The tragedy of Indochina is that a primitive army, consisting mostly of riflemen, was able to defeat an army equipped with modern weapons largely because its bold and novel tactics were not countered with equal audacity

MAJOR LAMAR McFADDEN PROSSER

T is often painful and always embarrassing to pick through the litter of a defeat. But it is a necessary chore, for if we can determine the mistakes which produced defeat, we may avoid them another time. Facts, as opposed to theories, about the war in Indochina are hard to come by. It has been a war waged by four countries: France, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam; and supplied by a fifth, the United States. It has been an astonishingly expensive war. It has cost France alone more than she has been able to spend to rebuild and repair the wreckage of World War II. The cost in manpower was 65,000 killed and 82,000 wounded. The number of regular officers totally disabled or killed is five times the annual graduating class of the French Military Academy at St. Cyr. Entire units of regimental size, élite, well-trained units containing the best officers and NCOs of the regular service, have been annihilated. And France has not been the only loser. The cost to the United States in military aid to the French Union forces has been heavy.

Figures do not define the cost of the defeat

Razor-sharp slivers of bamboo and barbed wire form *chevaux-de-frise* in front of a Vietnam blockhouse

in Indochina. The true cost will become apparent only when the free countries have readjusted their strategy in Southeast Asia and taken up the new political pressures it has generated.

Even if it had not been so painfully expensive, this "limited war" cannot be dismissed as unique because the pattern is being repeated in other areas of the world at this moment. Other limited wars are brewing. It has been said that this may well be the pattern of war in the Atomic Age. A candid study of Indochina should be useful preparation for the future.

How War Came

There is nothing novel in the way the war came to Indochina. The pattern of colonial wars fought in the past by England and by France herself, remained unchanged. As in most underdeveloped countries, the cross preceded the flag. As early as 1787, French missionaries were attempting to penetrate Cochin China and Annam. In 1880, a French officer with only 188 soldiers established control in the Tonkin delta.

During World War II, France, herself occupied by the Germans, was forced to admit the Japanese in Indochina. The propaganda theme of the Japanese—"Asia for the Asiatics"—contributed to the growing nationalism and a real will for independence. In 1945, there were no French troops available to reoccupy Indochina, and so the British established control, later giving way to the French.

During the Japanese occupation, individual Indochinese Communists agitated among the people. They organized and focused the first uncertain yearning for an independent Vietnam.

IN 1946 came the isolated "incidents," the demonstrations, and the occasional murder. These scattered incidents increased in scale and frequency. Grenades were tossed into crowded sidewalk cafés in Saigon, an ammunition convoy was ambushed, a train derailed. The culmination of all these separate incidents was the carefully planned, well-organized, and brutally executed Christmas massacre in Hanoi in 1946. Dissident groups of minority factions had by this time become consolidated and were being led and incited by fanatical leaders who had been well educated in the techniques of subversion, disruption, and guerrilla warfare. Now the incidents were planned to cause the greatest embarrassment to the native governments and to France. United under the National Political Party (*Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi,* later abbreviated to *Vietminh*), these resistance groups were able to exert a concentrated effect. The war had moved on into a second phase.

The Vietminh now had an army organized, armed, and trained. The rebel army was organized by Ho Chi-minh and other Communist native leaders. It was trained in jungle camps far off the few main roads, and impossible to locate. It was fed on rice captured in raids on native villages, or commandeered from frightened farmers in the swampy rice deltas, and on fruits, game, and fish, which are abundant everywhere in Indochina. It was equipped and armed originally with weapons and ammunition left behind by the Japanese, and later by those captured in ambushes and raids against the French and loyal native troops. Some of its equipment was American, bought from unscrupulous Chinese officers.

In March 1945, the Vietminh announced the independence of Vietnam. The lines were drawn. The issue was the classic cry for independence. Exactly a year later, March 1946, France granted independence to Vietnam *within the French Union.* The Vietminh had tasted victory, and though they continued to negotiate until September 1947, they now would accept nothing less than absolute independence without commitments of any kind toward France, and with no economic ties whatever. The Communist control of the nationalist movement was now obvious.

Where modern vehicles and weapons are effective they are more effective than a dismounted soldier. But the danger is that they defeat their purpose if we allow them to dictate the form of our tactical dispositions or schemes of maneuver. Speed of movement is no index of mobility. When mechanical means are immobile we must be ready to rely upon that most mobile of all fighting machines: the leg power of soldiers.

Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny developed bold and original airborne raids deep in enemy territory. Had he lived, the story of Indochina might have been different

VILLAGES became either Vietminh or loyal. Whole areas of the country could be entered by French and Vietnamese Government forces only in strong, armed patrols. All main roads were kept open in daytime only by incessant patrolling. At night the Vietminh controlled. It was during this period that the fatal attitudes were formed; attitudes which persisted until the end. The French forces undertook a stable defense. Myriad small, fortified positions were constructed. Occupying these defensive positions which were scattered over the entire country, the vastly larger French army could be easily outmanned in any separate engagement. Tied in and tied down by their own barbed wire, the choice of where and when to attack was left to the rebels. One post after another fell to the lightly armed, highly mobile Communist forces who simply encircled, annihilated, and disbanded. One is reminded of the tactics of Francis Marion in the subtropic tangles of the Carolina swamps. The Vietminh tended their rice fields in the passive daytime and struck aggravating blows against the organized positions in the treacherous dark. The blockhouse concept of the French was a tactical throwback, antiquated even before World War II, but with the exception of one short period, it persisted through the last and most gallant blockhouse of all—Dien Bien Phu.

The Influence of de Lattre de Tassigny

During the tenure of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny—easily the most dynamic and original of the succession of French high commanders—a very decided trend toward a more active form of operation was evident. By sheer personality, as well as by his aggressive concepts, Marshal de Lattre completely revitalized the dispirited veterans of Indochina.

He began using airborne forces in what he referred to as "airborne raids" deep in the enemy zone. The mission of these air raids was to destroy known enemy concentrations, to seize and destroy caches of arms and equipment which were being smuggled into north Vietnam, or to seize communications nets and so prevent the Vietminh from collecting their strength while operations were being conducted elsewhere in the Tonkin delta. In some cases these airborne operations were launched in conjunction with flying columns on the ground. In others, the force was airlifted out of the area after its mission of destruction was completed.

UNTIL the arrival of Marshal de Lattre, no real Vietnamese army existed. Seven separate religious sects had organized men under arms, but they often worked at cross purposes because there was no centralized command. They were not uniformed, and were equipped with a hodgepodge of weapons gathered catch-as-catch-can from many sources. De Lattre furnished them equipment and brought a long-needed measure of unity to the command of the indigenous forces. These forces took their orders only from their own religious leaders and, since the confidence and loyalty of the religious

leaders were tied to De Lattre personally, upon his passing the situation quickly drifted back to the old disorganization.

In addition to the religious forces, Marshal de Lattre reorganized and trained the local militia. Together, these two types of organizations were called *suppletifs*. They manned many of the guard posts, outposts, and blockhouses, particularly in south and central Vietnam, and many of the units fought bravely in the Tonkin delta. But after Marshal de Lattre's death in 1952, their effectiveness as a coordinated fighting force rapidly decreased.

The story of the next two years is mainly a tale of muddle and confusion. Inconclusive fighting continued for eight months of each year. During the rainy season both sides accepted stalemate. Operations with stirring code names were undertaken without marked effect in various parts of the country in this interval. Vietminh strength increased after each successful encounter. The war did not become professionally interesting again until the gamble of Dien Bien Phu.

The Gamble of Dien Bien Phu

The organization by the French of the position of Dien Bien Phu has been severely and, I believe, unjustly criticized since its fall. When it was conceived it was at least a justifiable military move. It represented a break from the old pattern and a seizure of the initiative by the French.

The problem at that time was to force the Vietminh to come into the open and fight. In order to do so, the French command deliberately selected a position which was weak enough to tempt the rebels, yet strongly fortified and capable of prolonged resistance. If the Vietminh accepted the French bait and entered into an all-out battle, the French reasoned, the full advantage could be taken of the French Army's technical and numerical superiority. For obviously, the French Army was superior. It had artillery, which the Vietminh did not. Moreover, the French enjoyed complete domination in the air. They could strafe and bomb without interference. They could deliver troops and supplies in more adequate quantities to support a major action. Here was an opportunity to fight a battle along traditional lines where tremendous losses could be inflicted by the superior automatic-weapons firepower of the French against the mass manpower attacks of the Vietminh. These were the reasons why the French Army accepted battle in terrain which was admittedly unfavorable to defense. The French command gambled that merely by holding this position until the rainy season drowned out all fighting on the ground, by beating off with great casualties all Vietminh attacks, they could break the back of the rebel forces.

Not all the cards were stacked in favor of the French. Many of the advantages on which the French had counted were cancelled out by Chinese Communist intervention in the war. Now there was effective artillery on both sides of the perimeter at Dien Bien Phu. There were antiaircraft guns in surprising numbers, surprisingly well handled. The Vietminh were no longer a guerrilla band but a disciplined, cleverly led army, fully equipped with modern weapons with the single exception of air power.

ON these terms the contending armies engaged. No martial prose could possibly add to the valor of the forces at Dien Bien Phu. Their courage and grit can never really be understood. It can only be admired. And so it is unpleasant to recall two facts which must be a part of this saga: no effort was made to relieve the besieged garrison at Dien Bien Phu either by an overland column, strong reinforcement by air, or by action on other fronts; and the fall of the garrison did not make the French position in Indochina militarily impossible, as has been suggested since.

With the intervention of Communist China the war changed as dramatically and as definitely as was the case when she intervened in Korea. But the loss of the fortress was not militarily decisive. French intelligence could not have been good at this time. The arrival of enemy artillery, antiaircraft guns, and troops in such numbers should not have surprised the French. Yet, apparently, there was no warning of this reinforcement, and so it had twice the effect it should have had.

The Unanswered Question

Once the airstrip at Dien Bien Phu was lost, the outcome of the battle was no longer in doubt. To supply and reinforce a force of this size by airdrop was completely feasible. As a matter of fact, this was done for more than seven weeks, but the build-up inside the perimeter was not sufficient in either personnel or equipment for a major operation against the forces besieging the fortress. Why the French declined to increase the garrison sufficiently for offensive operations is the great unanswered question of the war. Once again the French preponderance in numbers was not to be applied. Once again the concentrated strength of the enemy was exerted against a portion of the French forces. Defeat in detail proceeded. The struggle of those surrounded fighters was heroic and valiant in the classic sense, but it was meaningless militarily. It should have had absolutely no effect on the issue of the campaign.

The defeat of a contemporary army, equipped with the best matériel which could be provided from the arsenals of Europe and America, by a primitive force, primarily infantry, is a shocking development. Without air superiority (or, in fact, any air force at all), without tanks or airborne forces, or any of the contemporary "necessities," this native force defeated the best of the French army. They won because they were highly mobile and because they used their mobility with great skill. The French lost because they committed their strength in small, ineffective combat groups and because they relied upon modern matériel and modern means of movement in terrain where they could not be exploited.

Heavy equipment is more of a burden than a help in a country where rainfall is heavy and roads primitive or nonexistent

Communists must be tracked relentlessly, attacked at night by murderous, aggressive combat patrols—a hide-and-seek game in which the pressure is always on the enemy

Riflemen are the most mobile of all fighting forces in mountains, jungles, swamps—and rice paddies

THAT is the lesson of Indochina. Mobility, as General Gavin has said, which does not result in concentration for battle, is of no use whatever. A man moving through the jungle can be more mobile than a truck moving, no matter how fast, on a road. Speed of movement is not an index of mobility. A man with his feet on the ground is, in the final analysis, the most mobile of fighting forces. A commander who permits his soldiers to become dependent upon transport of any style (truck, plane, or tank) does so at his peril. Colonel Lelandre, the commander of strongpoint ISABELLE, the last position to surrender at Dien Bien Phu, was emphatic in his conviction that we have added so many mechanical aids to mobility that commanders now feel inadequate without them. Colonel Lelandre is determined to preach this gospel in France: that the army must not accept restrictions on its mobility whether these restrictions come about because of terrain or overdependence on vehicles. An army is mobile so long as its soldiers can walk.

It is not necessary to point out that where modern vehicles and weapons can be effective at all they are more effective than a dismounted soldier. The danger seems to be that we may mistake the means for the end. Our present vehicles are given us because in most circumstances they do provide greater mobility than we should have without them. But they defeat their purpose if we allow them to dictate the form of our tactical disposition or our scheme of maneuver. They are a means only.

ROADS where they do exist at all in this primitive country are narrow, earthen causeways, threading across the inundated rice fields. A few coolies working with hand tools can quite easily destroy several hundred yards of road in one evening. There are sections of the colonial highway which were destroyed at night by the Vietminh and hastily repaired again in the daytime by the French over and over for seven years as though the issue of the war hung on the maintenance of this one mile of road. The roads were interdicted with artillery during the night, but the destruction continued. Often the roads were mined by the enemy, and where this happened the obstacles were covered by snipers dug in and perfectly camouflaged in lush tropic growth. When questioned about the feasibility of combat patrols to intercept the rebel destruction parties, French officers shrug and reply, "We were ordered to avoid casualties."

In mountainous or jungle sectors it was always difficult for columns to operate with flank patrols. When flank guards were thrown out they had to hack their way forward through dense jungle growth, or through boggy, shoulder-high rice fields—a slow and dangerous job where a soldier could be silently killed without warning other members of the patrol or alerting the main column. The speed of a column working in this way had to be geared to the speed of its flank guard. Two kilometers an hour was exceptionally good time.

The *esprit* of the Foreign Legion was maintained in Indochina by such men as this hard-bitten soldier

Because this method was difficult and slow, it was neglected, and ambushes were frequent. When confronted with such tough tactical operations, the Vietminh simply melted into the forests or returned to his village, only to rise and strike again when the opportunity occurred.

IT is easy to criticize what was done. It is another thing to suggest acceptable alternatives. But most observers would agree, I think, that the Vietminh must be met and defeated in their own type of warfare. To fight them effectively they must be hacked out of the jungles, tracked relentlessly to their villages, met at night by murderous, aggressive combat patrols. It is a slow and nasty kind of warfare, but to depend on fortified positions dissipates the defender's strength and leaves all initiative and freedom of maneuver to the enemy.

What Might Have Been

Strategically, it was uneconomical to attempt to maintain thousands of guardposts and blockhouses scattered over 281,000 square miles of undeveloped country. French superiority in manpower was thus dissipated in casual engagements, none of which could be decisive. Now that the pressure is off and the problem can be considered objectively, most observers are of the opinion that a sounder policy would have been a more active, mobile operation which would have permitted concentration in overwhelming strength.

A brutal seek-and-search operation, fought mainly

New Officers and Council Members of AUSA

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Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks
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Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett



Brig. Gen.
W. C. Westmoreland



Brig. Gen.
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Col. Robert L. Cook



Col. Walter F. Ellis



Col. Harold G. Haskell



Col. A. D. Surles, Jr.

M/Sgt. W. O. Wooldridge

off the roads and rolling gradually northward in combination with airborne and motorized operations against known enemy concentrations, would certainly have been necessary. Beyond any doubt, casualties would have been heavy in such a campaign, but a quick, deep wound is often less bloody and less dangerous than a more superficial one which results in a slow but steady loss of blood. Every experienced soldier understands that it is often necessary to accept casualties today in order to avoid excessive casualties tomorrow. In the end, battles of attrition are always the bloodiest. Furthermore, they are indecisive.

Air power was not as thoroughly exploited as it might have been. Column cover would have made more feasible the sort of road-bound motorized work which was attempted. Air transport, air supply, helicopters and observation craft could have been used to greater advantage since there was no opposition whatever in the air. The French air force, created since World War II, lacked experience in the techniques of airdrop and aerial supply which were perfected over Europe. It will doubtless benefit immeasurably from the effort in Indochina.

Hundreds of motors do not guarantee mobility. Nor does a lack of transport prevent the use of the principle of mobility. Mobility is relative and, in final analysis depends on perseverance and determination. An up-to-date contemporary army must not accept a static battle where its technical superiority of weapons and equipment is nullified. Terrain does not exist which does not permit mobility.

Rebels are always receptive to new ideas because their very weakness, in the traditional sense, forces them to multiply their combat effectiveness by utilizing to the utmost the factors of surprise and boldness. Professional armies are most often conservative in their tactics, relying upon the proven and the traditional ways of war. When a rebel force faces a traditional army, it is necessary for the professional soldier to adjust his mental processes and to treat each tactical situation as though it were brand new. Nothing can then be done by rote. Novelty is then at a premium. For the rebel commander counts on the methodical approach of his traditional opponent and the professional's operating procedures become easily predictable.

A military gamble must be played out to the last card. Having invested heavily in a great battle, the commander must use every trump and finesse fearlessly. If he does not, the enemy collects points by default. No leader is justified in carrying on a battle one hour after he decides that victory is beyond his capabilities, but he owes it to his army not to concede a trick while he still holds unplayed cards. On the timing of this decision he must be judged. No preponderance of strength can substitute for a burning desire—a necessity to win.

THESE are the simple, but bloody, lessons of the tragedy of Indochina.

WEB DEFENSE

Our purpose is to enmesh the enemy in a web of defensive perimeters and then to strangle him by denying him logistical support. Like a fly caught in a spider web, he becomes more entrapped

Lieutenant Colonel James W. Edwards

THE threat of atomic weapons makes changes in our defensive doctrine imperative. Instead of clinging to the linear concept, in which the organization of mutually supporting defensive areas is precluded, today's warfare calls for a type of defense that permits all units in an area to support one another. I call this system "web defense," though it could also be named "hedgehog," "area," "center of resistance," or "perimeter" defense. It is not a new idea. It was used with great success by German divisions in Russia in 1941 and 1942; and the Russians, finding the system hard to defeat, incorporated the German methods into their own defensive doctrine. Our own units, notably the 23d Infantry Regimental Combat Team at Chipyong-ni, Korea, in February 1951, have also used a type of web defense successfully. This defensive doctrine can be used equally successfully in atomic or "conventional" warfare.

Web defense is an area defense which abandons most of the concepts of the present doctrine. Under the new concept, the commander would analyze the terrain and attempt to defend only that which is critical. If the terrain is carefully chosen, the enemy will have to secure it.

There would be no "normal" frontage or depth. The critical terrain would be divided into areas limited in width and depth by boundaries. Each division commander would be responsible for the defense of his assigned area. The areas will vary in size with each situation. The non-critical terrain will be kept under surveillance by air and ground patrols.

THE critical terrain features of each area will be occupied by a regimental combat team or its equivalent, organized in a perimeter for all-around defense. A battalion combat team will generally be too weak to do the job, and a regimental combat team is almost as difficult to hit squarely with an atomic burst. It is better to take this calculated risk and have an organization capable of conducting either an atomic or a conventional war. For atomic warfare we need changes in tactics but not in organization.

In web defense there will be no MLR, no battle position, and no rear battle position. The RCTs need

not be within supporting distance of each other. Each RCT will remain within its perimeter until ordered to move. The phrase "hold at all costs" should be deleted from all FMs.

All units, including those which are normally kept in reserve under the present doctrine, will be assigned areas to defend. The areas will be at least two deep in every direction. A web will thus be produced, composed of defensive areas adjacent to each other, with at least four regimental perimeters in each area.

All regimental perimeters not actually under attack will be available as reserves and may be ordered to leave their positions to counterattack an enemy penetration. The fact that an area is located behind another area under attack will not automatically make it a reserve. If an enemy attack penetrates the area, the rear area will become a battle area. An area or a perimeter within an area can become a reserve for a higher unit only on orders of the higher-unit commander.

The division commander will have complete freedom to defend his area as he sees fit, and he can order any of his perimeters to become a reserve for a counterattack. But he must inform the next higher commander that he has used a regiment as a reserve, so that the higher commander will not use that regiment as his own reserve.

Warning of the enemy's approach will be received from the air and mechanized units in the covering force or from the patrols that are continuously being sent out from the regimental perimeters. As soon as the enemy comes within range, the artillery of all nearby perimeters will begin to fire on him. If the enemy attacks a perimeter, the RCT within that perimeter will defend itself according to present doctrine. Air units and the artillery of other perimeters within range will assist by firing on the enemy with conventional or atomic missiles. The perimeter under attack will be resupplied by airdrop or cargo helicopters, which will also evacuate the wounded.

If the enemy avoids the perimeters and advances between them, he will be taken under fire by all artillery within range and will be kept under continuous bombardment from the air. If he avoids the critical terrain features, he will have to advance without proper logistical support, since he will have only the food and ammunition that his attacking troops can carry. As soon as he is forced to slow down or halt, several RCTs can deliver a coordinated, converging counterattack.

THE present-day doctrine on critical terrain, which stresses fields of fire, concealment, observation, and natural obstacles, is rapidly becoming obsolete. The emphasis on the defensive organization and retention of high ground is a mistake in modern warfare. Liaison planes are all we need for distant observation.

There is no need for small arms to have fields of fire to the limits of their ranges. Only expert riflemen armed with sniperscopes can consistently make hits beyond 500 yards. Machine guns on our MLR are usually kept silent until the enemy assaults and they begin firing on their final protective lines. And anyway, if we can observe and shoot at the enemy at great distances, he can do the same to us.

The theory that a good defensive position must have natural obstacles is also losing its validity. Paratroopers, air-landed troops, modern bridging equipment, landing craft, and amphibious wheeled and tracked vehicles have all reduced the effectiveness of obstacles. The entire subject of obstacles and barriers needs further study.

The most important factor in modern defense is lines of communication. The modern army needs roads and railroads to move its supply trucks, artillery pieces, tanks, ammunition, and equipment for any appreciable distance. Without these, its forward assault echelons will "wither on the vine." This is true, too, of the Communist armies, as they become increasingly mechanized. The term "lines of communication" is misleading, since it suggests a telephone or power line. "Lines of supply" or "logistical lines" would more clearly portray their main military function.

Critical defensive terrain is the ground which, if occupied by us, will deny the enemy the use of supply lines. This is the chief criterion for choosing a defensive position under the doctrine of web defense. Of lesser importance are observation points, fields of fire to mid-range, cover and concealment, and natural obstacles. Our purpose is to enmesh the enemy in a web of defensive perimeters and then to strangle him by denying him logistic support. Like a fly caught in a spider web, he becomes more entrapped and weaker the farther he proceeds, until a counterattack finishes him.

A DIVISION will normally defend an area. The division commander will have four RCT-size units. Three of these are actual RCTs, each consisting of an infantry regiment and a field artillery battalion, while the fourth, which will be weaker in manpower but stronger in mechanized power than the other three units, consists of the remainder of the division.

The division commander will place his four units so that they block the lines of communication in his area most effectively. He generally will attempt to "checkerboard" his four units in order to give his defense both width and depth. The units must never be so close together that the maximum damage area of one atomic burst would cover any two of them.

The RCT commander will usually establish his regimental perimeter around a point that blocks a critical line of communication. He should never let more favorable but distant ground lure him into extending his perimeter beyond the distances prescribed by Infantry School doctrine. All foxholes and weapons emplacements should be constructed with heavy overhead cover and connected by shallow trenches to deep underground shelters, stocked with several days' supply of ammunition and rations. The shelters should be deep enough to protect all members of the garrison from atomic air bursts. No protection can be provided against

surface or sub-surface bursts, but a direct hit of this nature would be about as likely as a direct hit on a foxhole with a 155mm shell.

The division of the future will probably have to be provided with heavy excavation equipment for the construction of deep shelters. No time should be wasted digging dummy positions because they seldom deceive an intelligent enemy and they also provide the enemy with cover when we counterattack him. Only the minimum transportation should be dug in within the perimeter; the remainder would be sent to the rear areas.

When not under attack, the perimeter command will send daily patrols in all directions. These patrols will return to the perimeter before dark. They will contact adjacent perimeters. This will eliminate the need for combat outposts. If necessary, a reconnaissance of up to a battalion combat team in strength may be sent out of the perimeter, but it must also return by dark.

IN the event of an enemy attack, most of the garrison of a perimeter should remain in the deep shelters until the enemy is within 500 yards. If the enemy suddenly withdraws, the garrison, except for the necessary lookouts, will retire to its shelters in anticipation of an atomic attack. After the burst, radiation instruments will quickly check the positions, and those found safe will immediately be reoccupied. Sectors found dangerous may have to be occupied by a minimum number of men wearing protective equipment, who will be relieved by others before they can absorb fatal dosages of radiation. The enemy assault that follows a nuclear burst will be repulsed in the conventional manner.

When an enemy attack hits an area, the division main supply route will be closed, and all subsequent supply to perimeters will be by air. Division supply points, like the present-day division ammunition offices, will be merely mobile coordinating points that allocate supplies and direct transportation to the rear-area supply depots.

Each perimeter will make plans to assist adjacent perimeters by counterattack. Routes, line of departure, and all other necessary details for a counterattack will be reconnoitered on the ground by all key personnel. Having placed his reserves in the best possible locations, the division commander will not have to worry about moving them long distances when the enemy attacks.

When an RCT leaves its perimeter, it will carry all its weapons and equipment with it, abandoning the position completely. After it has accomplished its counterattack mission, the RCT may be ordered to reoccupy its original perimeter. But if the enemy has occupied perimeter during the absence of its garrison, no attempt will be made to recapture it. The RCT that has been displaced will be ordered to organize another perimeter from which it can accomplish its original mission.

The addition of a fourth infantry regiment to the present infantry division would allow an area commander to organize five perimeters. A fourth battalion in each regiment and an additional armored infantry battalion in each division would make the perimeters strong in defense, would give the division more power in the attack, and would furnish the division commander with a strong mechanized force for attack or counterattack. Nevertheless, web defense can be employed without these additions.

THE corps commander will be assigned a corps sector by the field army commander. He will divide the critical parts of his sector into areas, each of which will be allotted to a division commander. He will never assign more of his divisions to defend the width of his sector than the depth, but if his sector is narrow he may well have more divisions disposed in depth than in width. The blocking of each line of communication should be made the responsibility of a specific division. Even those divisions that are now called corps reserve will be assigned areas. In the corps, as in the division, all units not being attacked will be considered as available reserves for counterattacks and all areas as future battle areas.

Corps artillery units will also be formed into regimental-size perimeters. Units assigned long-range interdiction missions may initially have to occupy firing positions in front of their perimeters to accomplish their initial fire missions. Even the corps mechanized units will occupy perimeters. Corps headquarters, like division headquarters, will be in a perimeter. The perimeters of corps troops will be assigned to provisional areas, with at least four perimeters to each area. The present system of supplying divisions directly from army supply points will be continued. Independent corps will form their own webs, with corps troops in the center, surrounded by combat division areas.

If a strong enemy attack penetrates the corps web, the corps commander may order divisions in areas adjacent to the battle area to counterattack. The corps commander will also use the corps artillery and any air units available to him, to assist areas under attack.

All field army supply points and other rear-area installations may be formed into perimeters. All supplies and equipment that cannot be included in the perimeter will be destroyed if an enemy penetration or airborne attack forces the depot troops to withdraw within their perimeter. Airfields will be defended by establishing perimeters around them; they will be the only perimeters not tactically located.

To defend the terrain that he has chosen as critical, the field army commander may occupy it with a field army web, placing his service troops in the center and surrounding them with corps webs. Or he may assign the necessary number of corps to defend the critical terrain and place any corps remaining in field army reserve. Corps in field army reserve will still organize webs no matter where they may be located. The field army may also use variations of these two methods.

WEB defense has several apparent disadvantages: the high ground is usually abandoned to the enemy; ene-



A division area in the web defense. Note that the perimeters are located at points that control communications

my assault troops can avoid the perimeters and advance deeply into our position; overwhelming enemy forces can be massed against one perimeter at a time. But these disadvantages are more apparent than real. Since we do not occupy all the terrain, we can conserve manpower to defend the lines of communication. The enemy is sometimes allowed to occupy high ground, but any observation posts that he can establish on them can be blasted by our direct-fire weapons or by air bombardment. Enemy assault troops that are foolish enough to advance deep into our position will be under constant air and artillery bombardment. When lack of logistical support has weakened them, they will be counterattacked by reserves that are already in position. And the fact that the number of enemy troops will be limited by the terrain will make it impossible for the enemy to eliminate one perimeter at a time. The massing of the enemy will furnish excellent targets for our artillery and air. In addition, pressure against a perimeter can be relieved by counterattacking the enemy assault troops from the rear. In the final analysis, if the enemy, at a terrific cost in casualties, does succeed in taking a perimeter, this local success will not seriously handicap the overall conduct of the defense.

Our present defensive doctrine leaves our forces extremely vulnerable to atomic attack. It offers the enemy the concentrated targets along the MLR that he desires. The variations of this doctrine—extended-position defense and mobile defense—present large, concentrated reserve formations in the open for comparatively long periods of time.

IT is evident, then, that in nuclear warfare we cannot afford our present defensive doctrine. As long ago as 1950, Lieut. General James Gavin wrote in COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL ["Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb" Nov. 1950]: "Land warfare will change in character, both offensively and defensively, to accommodate itself to [atomic weapons]. Great and continuous dispersion out of immediate close contact with an enemy, an ability to fight effectively in all directions, better communications, lighter and more numerous automatic weapons, electronics systems to 'close' the gaps between physically isolated units, and a high degree of air and land mobility should all characterize the defense of tomorrow."

Web defense has the characteristics that General Gavin calls for, and it has the additional advantage that all elements of a unit, including supply installations, would be protected from nuclear air bursts. In web defense, only critical terrain is occupied; manpower is conserved; the enemy is denied vital lines of communication; a true defense in depth is organized; reserves are dispersed, protected, and located adjacent to their areas of probable employment; the defense is equally strong in all directions from which the enemy may attack; air power is made full use of; there is only one defensive doctrine for all units and all situations; the perimeters are capable of withstanding massed enemy attacks for an indefinite period; and the fall of one perimeter will not seriously hinder the conduct of the remainder of the defense.



A corps area. The deeper the enemy penetrates, the more of our units enter the fight to trap and destroy him

This article is taken from Combat Support in Korea, *a new book published by the Combat Forces Press in cooperation with the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. It is a companion volume to* Combat Actions in Korea, *published last year by Combat Forces Press.* Combat Support in Korea *describes the work of the technical services that made it possible for the Eighth Army to fight in Korea. The narrator of the article published here went to Korea early in that conflict as an observer for the Quartermaster General. His report, made in April 1951, discussed frankly the bad as well as the good aspects of rations in Korea.*

Rations in Korea

As told to Captain John G. Westover by Major Lawrence Dobson

TO accomplish my subsistence and packaging mission, I visited the three orps headquarters, all division headuarters, and units within the diviions. In addition, I visited all the army upply points and the mobile bakeries.

I would like to start with a discuson of the operational ration since I eel that was the major portion of my ission. As you have heard, the troops n Korea are fed two hot meals a day henever it is tactically possible. It desirable, of course, to have three ot meals, but we say a minimum of vo: normally breakfast and supper. loon meals are an operational ration. ot meals were started by necessity ecause of a shortage of operational tions. Today we have plenty of raons, but the troops and the leaders preciate the benefit of kitchen-prepared meals. It is a terrific morale builder among the forward elements.

First, I would like to discuss the 5-in-1 ration. During the last part of February 1951, Eighth Army asked that no more 5-in-1 rations be sent to Korea. That was quite a shock because we in the States had always considered the 5-in-1 our most acceptable ration.

Its military description said it would be used to serve small detachments—tank crews, gun crews, isolated units. I found that Eighth Army did not want the 5-in-1 ration because it was not satisfactory for the forward units. The men of these units do not have their mess gear or heating equipment with them; they travel as light as possible. Therefore, the 5-in-1 was difficult to break down and eat. I found that the ration was unacceptable when consumed cold. Still, that was the way it had to be consumed when it was issued to forward units.

The 5-in-1 was used in several cases as an emergency B ration. For example, the 31st Infantry was well advanced when a thaw hit. Roads were impassable, the regiment's kitchens were forward, and the men had to be supplied by air. So the 5-in-1 ration was dropped and used as a B ration. It was quite successful, but the mess stewards complained that there were not enough vegetables.

Before its cancellation request, Eighth Army decided there was insufficient food in a case for five men, and changed the basis of issue from 5-in-1 to 4-in-1. That again caused waste, since the accessory items—candy, chewing gum, cigarettes, peanuts—

were put into the ration on the basis of five men. Still, four men used it.

I said that the 5-in-1 was unacceptable cold. When it was heated, the men did not care for the beef and gravy or the pork and gravy. They complained that there was too much fat, too much gravy, and that the meat was over-processed—just a mess of shreds and nothing to chew on.

As for fruit and jam—well, the best-accepted item is canned fruit. You can't give the men too much of it and, if you ask which is the most acceptable, they will think a while and then they might say "peaches," or they might say any of the other fruits. Vegetables are the same as in the B ration, and are a matter of preference. Canned puddings and desserts were well received. The precooked cereal in the ration was rated very low to fair. If the men had to add hot water to it themselves, it had poor acceptance. If the mess sergeants added milk and heated the cereal, it had very high acceptance. If only cold milk was provided, it had fair acceptance.

I would therefore recommend that the 5-in-1 no longer be considered a combat ration, but rather a ration to be used by small detachments in a semi-permanent location with ample cooking facilities available to them; and that the ration also be considered an emergency B ration—one that can be moved in as I have explained.

WHEN we started, we had the C-4 ration. We procured the C-6 ration and, later, we had a C-7.

The C ration is the most acceptable ration we have in use in Korea. Everyone likes it. The relative acceptance ratings of the meat items are: (1) beans and frankfurters; (2) beans with pork; (3) meat and beans; (4) ham and lima beans; (5) spaghetti and meat; (6) hamburgers with gravy; (7) pork sausage patties with gravy; (8) meat and noodles; (9) chicken and vegetables; (10) beef stew; (11) corned-beef hash.

This ration is a combat ration, and one of its characteristics is its capability of being consumed hot or cold. The reaction of the men was that the only items acceptable cold were the three bean items. The principal complaints were against the meat-and-spaghetti and the meat-and-noodle combinations. Both items were too dry, and when heated they would burn. The hamburgers and the sausage patties had too much fat and too much gravy. It is difficult to determine the acceptance of the chicken and vegetables. In the C-4 and the C-6 we had a chicken-and-vegetables combination. The men disliked it. We had previously received reports on this, and in the C-7 we have a product of the same name but from a different formula. The men interviewed who have eaten the C-7 reported that the acceptance of the chicken-and-vegetables was very high. It is a very good product.

THE corned-beef hash and the beef stew had very low acceptance ratings. Part of this can be attributed to the fact that, when operations started in Korea, we had a limited stock of meat items to be issued in the B ration. Supply Bulletin 10-495 has the menus we had planned to use, but we didn't have the items in stock. We had quantities of beef stew and corned-beef hash on hand, so they were shipped. The men had corned-beef hash and beef stew; beef stew and corned-beef hash. So the principal objection to the corned-beef hash in the C ration is that it has become the Spam of the Korean campaign. Beef stew—well, too much fat; very poor acceptance when cold.

It had been reported previously that there was too much meat in the C ration. I found that for those men in the rear areas—those who used the ration only when they were making a movement—there may be too much meat. But we must remember that this ration was designed for the fighting man. He is a young man—old men cannot climb hills. Fighters work hard. They will eat practically all you can carry up to them.

The B units—that is, bread-type units in the C-7—were slightly different from those in the C-4 and the C-6. In the C-7, we attempted to put in each can all the components that would be required for a meal, so that a man would not have to open a second can or open an accessory packet. As a result, the arrangement of components within the C-7 was very well received and liked better than our previous arrangement. Also, in the C-7 for the first time we had a soluble milk product for coffee and that had high acceptance.

The chocolate and the starch-jelly discs are liked. Complaints were made of the starch-jelly discs being too hard to eat during the cold months. Also, the men got a little tired of having the same thing repeatedly, and requested additional types of confection.

The most acceptable item is fruit. In the C-4 and in the C-6 we had two 6-ounce cans of fruit. In the C-7 we had one 8-ounce can of fruit. The first reaction soldiers have to the C-7 is: "What? Only one can of fruit?" Mess sergeants, platoon leaders, and everyone else complained. It was too difficult to divide the ration. They tell of fights among the men over who is going to get the fruit. So I would recommend that in the future we change from the one 8-ounce can back to our two 6-ounce cans.

When I asked, "What do you think of the individual combat ration?" the first thing said was, "Where is the spoon in the C-6?" And the next thing: "The C-7 is a lot better ration; it has a spoon."

As I mentioned before, the men carry nothing. Mess kits are kept in kitchen trucks. Soldiers are stripped down—no packs—just the clothes they wear. We also used to think a man would never lose his eating utensils. That is not so. They lose them, and unit commanders cannot have them resupplied as fast as they are needed. In many cases knives, forks and spoons are kept in the kitchen. At first the C ration came without spoons, and we got reports of men eating beans with their fingers. One Marine colonel cut his finger in trying to make a spoon from the top of a can. I would say—and I am stating the opinion of everyone I interviewed—that plastic spoons are a *must* in the operational rations.

THE condiment issue in Korea has been very poor. The troops did not have enough spices, and those they did have arrived spasmodically. Condiments reached Pusan in bulk, but there wasn't time to break them down. In Japan a spice pack was made up—three thousand rations to a pack. I feel there is a definite need for a spice pack. If we ship loose condiments, they will get lost at a depot. They will not be broken down and sent forward. Supply points have difficulty in issuing them to small units.

The cooks were doing a great deal of extra baking, but they were not getting condiments. I found, in some companies, that when a soldier was going on rest and recreation in Japan, his company commander would have him report to the mess sergeant to determine what was needed. The com-

pany commander then gave him money from the company fund and the soldier bought condiments in Japan so the company's kitchen would have nutmeg, cinnamon, cloves, vanilla, maple, and the like. I think this shows a definite requirement for a spice pack.

The fire units actually are holding up well, but spare parts are a problem. For instance, the 3d Infantry Division followed the book and issued all the spare parts. As a result, spare parts were all over the division but not in the place where they were needed. In the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, the food-service supervisors set up equipment repair shops. Faulty field ranges, Coleman lanterns, and one-burner stoves were turned in to the regimental supply officer, taken to the quartermaster when the regiments drew their rations, and exchanged for serviceable units at once. It was surprising how few unserviceable units were in these divisions. The repair men are better mechanics and better at improvising than the average cook.

The cooks in the forward areas appreciate their position. Part of that might be attributed to the policy in some divisions that each cook must go forward once a week and spend twenty-four hours with the riflemen of his company.

"The farther forward you go in Korea, the better you eat."

I FOUND that the cooks are really doing more than I thought they could. Our cooks are doing a marvelous job. They know how to prepare dehydrated eggs and milk, and have made granular potatoes more acceptable when mashed than fresh potatoes. I recommend we reduce the quantities of fresh potatoes and limit the use of fresh potatoes to French fries and an occasional boiled potato. Cooks are baking pastry and rolls far more often than the menu calls for. The men like the baked products.

I hope I have not left the impression that our cooks are perfect. Not all our replacement cooks are adequately trained. They can cook, but some do not know how to clean a field range. Others do not know how to light one. As to care and maintenance of field equipment, not all have the knowledge and training. Some do not know how to put up a tent, and it is quite difficult for a person who has never erected a tent himself to direct a crew of Korean porters who don't know either. Field sanitation is sometimes poor. The plea of the people in the field to the food-service school is "Give more field training."

THE farther forward you go in Korea, the better you eat. In Pusan menus are planned for three areas: Pusan, Taegu, and north of Taegu. In other words, north of Taegu is the fighting front; Taegu includes Eighth Army headquarters and its supporting units; and Pusan is the dock area. When any item is in short supply, it is distributed first north of Taegu, then to Taegu, and finally to Pusan. If the quartermaster had limited supplies of frankfurters and frozen turkey, the frozen turkey would go north of Taegu, the frankfurters to Taegu, and corned-beef hash to Pusan.

I am sure you have been told before of the method of feeding forward elements in Korea. The meals are cooked in the battalion area, then carried forward in jeeps as far as possible, and finally packed by the Korean bearers using carrier straps or A-frames. Now, there are problems involved. Bearers cannot carry water up to the top of the hill except for drinking, and they cannot carry a stove to heat mess-kit water, so no one on the hill keeps his mess kit. The kits are all kept back in the kitchen and are carried forward with the food. This is a problem, since the meat cans do not nest very well. Fifty mess kits to take care of an average platoon will fill a foot locker, so the mess kits are carried forward in foot lockers, boxes, or duffel bags. They are washed first in the kitchen, but they become dusty on the trip forward.

Everyone asked: "What are we doing with the mess kit? It is no good. Throw it out. Give us a tray."

All except one colonel who asked: "What would the men do if they found some eggs? How would they cook them?"

When I inquired where his unit carried their meat cans, his reply was that they kept the mess kits in the kitchen. I asked how they would cook the eggs then, and he answered that they *might* have the meat can with them.

TASK FORCE RAZOR SHAVES BIG APPLE 2

ANTHONY LEVIERO

Three teams of tanks and armored infantry advance across the floor of Death Valley during Task Force Razor's tactical march from Camp Irwin, California, to Yucca Flat and the rendezvous with the atomic bomb.

Robert Phillips from Black Star



YUCCA FLAT, NEVADA

THE claim of tankers that armor will be the decisive ar in atomic war put in an impressive bid before dawn o 5 May when the tanks and armored personnel carriers c Task Force Razor crashed forward under the churnin mushrooming burst of Apple II, minutes after zero hou The steel monsters shook off atomic heat, blast and radi tion, leaving the occupants unharmed. It was the first tim men had been above ground on Yucca Flat during a atomic explosion.

As the task force moved forward it blazed a trail th military tacticians and technicians will necessarily follo closely. For they are the ones who will decide what si nificance it may hold for the future. However it was plai to those who participated or witnessed the test that armor claim was impressive.

Apple II was the Army's code name for the atomic d vice that packed the power of 30,000 to 35,000 tons c dynamite. When that power was unleashed, Task Forc Razor let it blow over them. Then, with crews and infa try aboard, it plunged through the danger area unharme and unimpeded. It got under way within eight minut after the shock wave jolted the massive M48 Patton tan and could have moved even quicker. Ordinary infantr could hardly have reacted as fast.

The test suggests some obvious questions: Should w have more armored divisions? Shouldn't we give infantr a lot of armored carriers? Is Task Force Razor a good prot type of a battle group for atomic warfare? Questions lik these are already being examined in the reorganizatio experiments at Fort Benning, and Fort Hood. The lesso from Apple II ought to help the researchers.

THIS will be a report on Task Force Razor's rendezvo with the atomic bomb, by an observer who went alon for the ride. The task force made history in more wa than one. It was the first armored unit to maneuver wit

Anthony Leviero

From the loader's hatch of Tank 21, Reporter Leviero snapped this picture of M48 tanks moving in a simulated attack across the Nevada desert eight minutes after a tactical atomic bomb had exploded 3,200 yards from the nearest tank. Behind the tanks came infantry, mounted in armored personnel carriers, while overhead roared a flight of H-19 helicopters carrying a platoon of infantry to the objective—a high ridge to the left of point zero.

he simulated battlefield use of an atomic bomb. It was the rst time that men had been above ground on the test te during an atomic explosion.

Before the task force reached its bivouac on Yucca Flat marched cross-country, 171 miles, over some of the worst errain in the world. It was the longest cross-country march ver made by the M48 Patton tank and the M59 armored ersonnel carrier. Task Force Razor did all these things ithout great strain.

In the clear, moonlit morning of 5 May, Task Force azor was deployed in wedge formation, ready for combat. arrived by jeep at 3:30 A.M. and climbed aboard Tank l, 2d Platoon, Baker Company. In the light of the full oon lowering on Mine Mountain, the hulls of the Pattons ood out prominently, their 90 millimeter guns bespeaking ower on the brooding silence of the desert. All around, the arms of the Joshua trees were silhouetted grotesquely. Squat yucca trees bulged above the sage.

Over this landscape of desolation a bright twinkle atop a 500-foot tower marked the box-like structure that concealed Apple II.

On the right were the tanks of Company A, in the center Company C, and on the left flank and echeloned to the rear was Company B. Between Company A and C were Lieutenant Colonel John G. Wheelock and his staff in four tanks. The nearest elements of tanks were 3,200 yards from the shot tower.

Deployed in a line 3,845 yards from the tower were twenty-four APC's loaded with infantry. And behind them were the engineers, the artillery, and tank recovery vehicles. In these ninety tracked vehicles waited 460 men, some tense, some nonchalant, but all conscious that

anks deployed in a edge on Yucca Flat with e shot tower in the dis- nce. Reporter Leviero apped this picture one orning as dawn broke

Anthony Leviero

Armored engineers simulate the bridging of a river by throwing helicopter-borne timbers across a highway.

Robert Phillips from Black St

New kind of recon team—consisting of commander in jeep, armored personnel carrier and squad of infantry, medium tank and crew, and H-23 helicopter.

they were the first in a historic test of great significance.

Back on Mine Mountain, at 4,900 yards, were more than 300 other men of the task force. Brig Gen. Charles A. Sheldon, commander of the Armored Combat Training Center at Camp Irwin, California, also was observing from Mine Mountain. This was in part a payoff for all that he and Camp Irwin stood for.

The men were rather weary from three previous all-night vigils as the tests were postponed by weather, and those who could caught catnaps. Radio silence was maintained so as not to interfere with the delicate instrumentation of the tests and the crews listened for instructions and orders on land telephone lines that linked every vehicle with headquarters.

All the guns were turned away from the shot tower to avoid possible atomic effects in the tubes and through the optical instruments. All openings were sealed except, in Tank 21 at least, two glass slits that faced away from the tower.

Engines were warmed up and then cut off a half hour before shot time, also to avoid interference with test instruments. The atomic explosion was scheduled for 5:10 A.M. and as the time approached a voice on the telephone announced "It is now Sugar minus thirty minutes. The shot will go definitely."

It was a long half hour and it ended in a thirty-second count heard indistinctly because of the roaring of an air intake to which the crew had connected their gas masks.

APPLE II blew right on time. The interior of the tank suddenly grew far brighter than the glaring desert day. Eerie light flooded through the two slits and it seemed to come through the armor itself. It lingered for a seeming long time for a light without apparent source. After about twenty seconds the light faded, the ground trembled, the tank rocked and a tremendous explosion pressed in on the ears and chest. Within the tank the atomic blast was lil the crash and cracking of steel boilers, and the interi boiled with choking dust.

The crashing explosion had barely ended when Secon Lieutenant Ralph S. Howard got his platoon of five tanl into action. The turret turned to point the gun towar where the atomic bomb had breached a simulated enem line. Within a half minute the first blank round of 90m ammunition was on its way.

All along the line guns and caliber .50 and .30 machir guns opened up. And within a minute the engine of eve vehicle roared its readiness to move. The task force coul have charged at Shot plus one minute but for safety an scientific reasons the test directors fixed the jumpoff Shot plus eight.

In three minutes—and it could have been done in ha a minute if test rules had permitted—radio communicatio was established, thus proving that communication equi ment was not vulnerable to the blast, radiation and therm effects of the great explosion.

At Shot plus eight minutes the whole force surged fo ward. From the loader's hatch of Tank 21 I could see th whole force spewing gunfire. Hanging low over Task Forc Razor was the roiling mushroom cloud that soon billowe up to 40,000 feet. Some of the right flank vehicles cam within 1,000 yards of ground zero, where they were turne away by radiological safety officers. Then the whole forc pivoted on B Company, roaring westward toward Synclin Ridge, the objective, eight miles away.

At Shot plus nine minutes, H-19 helicopters on an ai strip about 16,000 yards from ground zero picked up platoon of infantry and placed it on the objective nin minutes later. Then as the armor arrived, the choppe were back with barrels of fuel for the tanks and armore carriers.

Task Force Razor, men and vehicles, had transited th

H-19 helicopters carrying a platoon of infantry fly over tank column to secure high ground that lies ahead.

Robert Phillips from Black Star

Lieutenant Colonel John G. Wheelock, Razor commander, and his staff pose before his mobile APC CP.

omic field unscathed. The only casualty was a finger ashed under a hatch cover.

Γ would be wrong to let this story minimize the power of a tactical atomic bomb with the force of 30,000 to ;,000 tons of dynamite. The landscape for miles around as like an inferno; the thermal wave ignited hundreds of shua and yucca trees. It was a strange and awesome sight. The explosion had other impressive effects. One Patton nk, unoccupied and placed at a forty-five degree angle)0 yards from ground zero, was blown over one and a lf times. It was found lying on its turret, both tracks ɔwn off and its fender skirts rolled up.

Another Patton at 500 yards facing the tower squarely, e the tanks of the task force, was rolled back ten feet, forty-eight tons of it. Another Patton, turned broadside 500 yards, had its right track blown off, its light metal s wrapped around the gun and its gasoline leaked out. At 600 yards an old M24 light tank was blown to ces, its turret and tracks tossed 100 yards, its gun 300 ds. A jeep that had survived previous atomic blasts and ced at 500 yards vanished without trace.

Also the explosion had freak effects. The men of Task rce Razor felt no thermal effects. Yet two big Army rchlights hidden behind a 55-foot ridge at 4,900 yards on ne Mountain, had their lenses fused and made opaque, ıough the glass was turned away from the explosion. o in these rear areas the plastic windows of helicopters e sucked out and some vehicle windows smashed. In task force a few aluminum panels covering APC ;ines were sucked out.

All this shows that the power of the tactical atomic ıb is to be respected but that its force and effects can calculated fairly well. The test showed that the comıder who chooses his atomic target well can use the nic weapon with safety to himself and can exploit its devastating effect upon the enemy instantly. Or, if he is on the receiving end, he can minimize losses substantially by sound battlefield deployment.

TASK Force Razor was an improvised outfit, put together at Camp Irwin in March. It was built around the 723d Tank Battalion, 71st Infantry Division, equipped with fifty-five M48 medium tanks, two M41 light tanks in the recon platoon, twenty-four M59 armored personnel carriers, and four 105mm howitzers, plus 200 or so wheeled vehicles.

Fort Hood, Texas furnished the other components of the task force. Its 4th Armored Division contributed the infantry elements from the 510th Armored Infantry Battalion. This consisted of Company C and the 1st Platoon, Company B. Battery A, 22d Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 1st Platoon, Company C, 24th Armored Engineer Battalion were also contributed by the 4th Armored Division. The 1st Armored Division sent the makings of the 1st Provisional Aviation Company, consisting of seven H-19 helicopters, three H-23 light reconnaissance helicopters, and three L-20 DeHaviland Beavers.

Razor's three-day march from its Mohave Desert camp to Yucca Flat was in itself a feat. The tracked vehicles went cross-country all the way. The terrain was mostly eroded desert flats with intermittent mountains. The soil was generally firm except in the dry washes and swamp areas in the Amargosa River bed, a stream that surfaces only in December, January and February. A tank going off route in some of its swamp areas might well sink out of sight. Visibility was not obstructed by the terrain except when going through several mountain passes and defiles. In a number of places it was necessary for the engineers to clear and widen narrow passages with bulldozers.

The task force left Camp Irwin at 7 A.M., April 18 with the wind blowing 45 miles an hour and the temperature around forty-five degrees. So the advance briefing for the

first day—"very flat, very mountainous, very dry, dusty, hot, very little vegetation"—was only partly true.

The task force headed north in two columns, one minute between march units. After going eight miles it "coiled" in an all-around defensive position, much like covered wagons in Indian country a hundred years ago.

Despite the strong wind, aviation units taking off from Bicycle Lake, one of the dried alkaline beds so common in the region, were soon flying over the column, serving as aerial cavalry such as that advocated by Lieutenant General James M. Gavin.

WHEN the reconnaissance platoon encountered an assumed enemy, indicated by the explosion of dynamite in Avawatz Pass, 3,100 feet, the aviation company lifted an infantry platoon to secure the causeway. Before the force could break out of the Avawatz Mountains it had to breach a field of actual mines armed only with detonators.

Then Task Force Razor descended into the gray, desolate dried bed of the Amargosa River in Death Valley, crossed over into the Ibex Mountains and coiled for the night in the approach to the pass. It had made forty-five miles.

Complete blackout was maintained at night. The men had hot meals for breakfast and supper but ate cold assault rations for lunch while on the move.

The second day the task force made only twenty-seven miles, bivouacking in Deadman's Pass of the Greenwater Mountain Range. Features of the tactical exercise were the laying of spanners by the engineers so that the tanks and armored personnel carriers could cross two hard-topped roads without damaging them. Choppers lifted infantry to secure these crossings.

On the third day Maj. Gen. William Dean, deputy commander of the Sixth Army, dropped down in a helicopter to observe the task force.

As the Medal of Honor general watched the great force roll by—tanks, armored personnel carriers loaded with infantry, the self-propelled howitzers, the light aircraft buzzing over the column,—he recalled the desperate first days of the Korean War when he had to throw his understrength 24th Infantry Division into combat against overwhelming hordes of Communist troops.

"Boy, if we had this," he said, waving his hand toward the column emerging from the desert dust. "If we had som of these choppers on that river above Taejon! These cho pers make all the difference in communications."

ON this last day on the march a stiff wind blew straigh down the column, enveloping it in dense clouds of dus Visibility was so bad that tank commanders often coul not see their own 90 millimeter guns, let alone the tan in front. General Sheldon said afterward he had neve seen worse tank driving conditions. It was a day devote mostly to a crossing of salt flats and marshes and by nigh fall the task force reached its bivouac north of Cam Desert Rock near Skull Mountain.

Some observers felt the rate of march during the fir two days was too slow, that the task force had failed to e ploit its mobility to the fullest extent.

But within four hours after arriving at Yucca Flat, Tas Force Razor had every one of its ninety tracked vehicles i on their own power. Those that broke down enroute wer repaired in place. Enroute the 810 horsepower engines c two tanks had to be replaced for causes other than norm wear. One broke down because of a malfunction caused b dust that got into an air cleaner, and the other brok down from vibration. Incidentally, the 723d had used the tanks to train thirteen tank battalions for six weeks eac

Exact fuel consumption by the Pattons is classified, bu it was learned that they consumed from 3.4 to 4.8 gallo a mile. This was deemed excellent in view of the roug terrain. Estimates before the march were based on five ga lons to the mile. With the task force was Dr. Howar Olson of the Human Resources Research Office, Fort Kno Kentucky, who was making controlled studies of fu consumption in selected platoons. His findings have n been disclosed yet.

It was estimated that the APCs consumed gasoline the rate of one to one and one-half gallons to the mil

Some of the APC crewmen said their carriers shoul have more speed. But others believe the men would n have made this complaint if they had not been traine first with the M75 which is a bit faster. It was their beli that the M59 has all the speed that would be needed i combat. It is said to have a top speed of 32 miles an hou while the speed of the M75 has been reported to be 4

Infantry, dismounted fro APCs, move to secur ridges overlooking th pass into Death Valley s that the task force coul move through safely

Robert Phillips from Black Star

An armored infantry company moves forward to secure a summit overlooking a pass through which the task force passed.

Robert Phillips from Black Star

les an hour. The general feeling was that the M59 is more comfortable and efficient vehicle to ride in than e M75.

"They are a pretty efficient vehicle," said Captain Rol- ıd McMillan, Company C, 510th Armored Infantry ttalion. "They get you where you're going, and the intenance problem on them was no greater than on y other tracked vehicle. They go wonderfully up hill. ıey have got plenty of power if the drivers keep them und up."

The M59 is wider and lower than the M75 and Captain Millan said he runs his company out of his carrier. By ng able to sit alongside the driver, he added, he can tch the speed and better supervise him.

There were a few breakdowns among the tanks and the Cs, most of them due to the abrasive desert dust. The k force had put 850 gallons of fresh oil into the vehicles en it started. When it reached its final bivouac it ordered 00 gallons more for a complete change.

IE force had several days to wait for shot day and it sed them to overhaul equipment. But as the shot was poned night after night from 26 April the men of k Force Razor experienced a lot of tough field soldier- They were in pup tents the night of April 25-26, when a gale with hurricane gusts up to 81 miles an hour struck the area and blew down 115 squad tents in Camp Desert Rock. But as the delays continued squad tents were brought in for the task force.

The motto of the Armored Center is: "The Combat Arm of Decision." That may well be. It is good for every outfit to feel it is the best. But Task Force Razor's experience doesn't mean the United States Army is going to convert its infantry divisions into armor. There are many places in the world where armor might not be the best weapon. The infantry division may get armored carriers partly as a result of Apple II, but it will still be infantry.

Task Force Razor's experience is a stimulant to Army leaders who think hard about ways to make the Army more mobile. They are already experimenting with three types of Diesel engines for tanks, with the idea of giving them more range with less fuel. We have the M59 and the M75, and experiments are under way with other armored carriers.

One objective in current Army thinking is to put as much of the Army on tracked vehicles as the terrain will permit. One idea is to get a poor man's M59, perhaps in both wheeled and tracked versions, for general use in the infantry regiment. From the desolation of Yucca Flat ideas like this are already blossoming.

THE MONTH'S READING

We Need Ready Forces

ADMIRAL ARTHUR RADFORD
Address Before Aviators' Post No. 743,
American Legion, New York City
11 April 1955

When I use the term airpower, I usually mean it in its broadest sense. I mean it to include the Air Force, Naval Aviation, including Marine Corps, Army Aviation, our tremendous aircraft industry, and our air transportation systems.

I also mean it to include our communications and electronics industry; our construction, chemical, and metals industries; our fuel, rubber, and steel industries; and every other industry which contributes to the development and maintenance of airpower. Each element has an important role.

And last, but by no means least, I include that all-important factor: "the air-mindedness" of you, the American people. . . .

Because of that, the United States needs Armed Forces which are varied in their nature and employment, and as invulnerable to surprise attack as we can make them. We will not commit an aggression, but we must always be ready to defeat one. Therefore, we need ready forces which can answer aggression with whatever forces are best suited, anywhere and any time it is necessary for our defense.

Accordingly, we have sought to design a pattern for our Armed Forces which will give us just such a military readiness—a sturdy but flexible combination of land, sea, amphibious and air forces. And within this pattern, our military forces are prepared, if necessary, to use nuclear weapons.

But this does not commit us to sole reliance on nuclear weapons. Planes that can carry atomic bombs can also carry conventional bombs. In other words, emphasis is on the ability to apply quickly whatever force is required to stop any kind of aggression where it starts—at its source —before it can expand into a global war.

What Is Militarism?

C. J. BERNARDO & EUGENE H. BACON
American Military Policy
The Military Service Publishing Co., 1955

Many people have long opposed a strong military force for fear "the military" would exert a dangerous and baneful influence upon our institutions. The specter of militarism has been one of the most potent influences in blocking the strength and development of our armed forces. Actually, our military chieftains have never disputed their subordination to civil authority and have been zealous guardians of our most cherished beliefs. The military also have been accused of possessing a "caste system" of which West Point and Annapolis are cited as glaring examples. P sumably under a "caste system" only West Point graduat could hope for rank and preferment in the Army, b neither Leonard Wood nor George Marshall were gra uates of that famed institution. It is also interesting point out that those military leaders who became Pre dent were most conscious of the demarcation betwe civil and military authority, and scrupulously adhered this line of policy.

Perhaps the factors which are really objected to are t military concepts of responsibility and authority witho which no military organization would be worthy of t name. The military services have been pointed out as u democratic, but what other institutions have gone so f and so fast in the problem of racial integration? Far fr being antagonistic or a threat to democracy, the natio armed forces are one of its principal bulwarks and inspi tions.

The tremendous cost of our military establishment indeed a severe drain on the country's economy and the course of years the cries of the purse-conscious will the air. Economy is desirable and laudable, but not at t expense of our national security. The country is faced wi a unique situation in the Cold War, a position that ca for patience, fortitude, and the long view. Victories p haps may be few, sacrifices many, but the rewards great America retains her strength, courage, and determinatic

Security in Europe

RAYMOND ARON
The Century of Total W
The Beacon Press, 19

The West has the resources necessary for winning total war if it should come; still more, therefore, has it t resources for re-establishing the balance of armed forc in time of warlike peace, and at the same time for diminis ing the risks of an upheaval. The whole question is wheth the democratic countries will have the courage to endu the sacrifices and efforts of semi-mobilization before t enemy legions move.

The world is living in a limited war. A semi-war requir semi-mobilization. Intercontinental equilibrium dictates a ditional duties. We must resign ourselves either to losi valuable territories in the early weeks of fighting, or keeping up a sufficient number of divisions in time peace. . . .

Semi-mobilization will not make it certain that aggr sion will be repelled. It is always to be feared that t Continental empire may accumulate, in a given sect forces superior to those on the defensive side. The difficul of resistance becomes for defeatist writers a motive f

passivism—an attitude that is literally absurd. An army of fifty divisions would not assure absolute safety in Europe. Indeed, it may be asked if anything of the sort ever exists in military affairs. But it would change the general strategic situation, reduce the probability of Soviet aggression, and contribute to the restoration of confidence in Europe.

The United States is learning that great powers must maintain their army, navy, and air force, and not disband them immediately following victory. For the present, American divisions must remain in Western Europe in order to fill the void created by the Second World War. But intervention would be of no use if the European countries remain definitely out of play and resign themselves to accept a precarious security from American protection and to suffer the invader's tyranny when the release of limitless violence bursts through the dams. In the long run, it is the work of Europeans to fill the European void. If they do not decide to do it, one day or another the United States will resign itself to a strategy of intercontinental war—in reply to European defeatism,.

Engineer as Manager

DR. JOHN BELL RAE
Speech to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
20 April 1955

There is another role of the engineer to which I wish especially to call attention. I am engaged at present in a study of the Engineer as Business Man in the United States, and one significant factor which has emerged is that during the last half-century there has been a steadily increasing flow of engineers into positions of executive responsibility in industry. In fact, while I do not yet have complete data, the evidence indicates that the present-day engineering graduate has about one chance in two of moving into management. I suspect that a similar trend, although on a smaller scale, exists in government.

What this means is that the engineer is not only the creator of technological change, but to a constantly greater degree is also the person who has to decide what to do about it. Here is both a responsibility and an opportunity of the first order.

A UN Legion?

CLARK M. EICHELBERGER
UN: The First Ten Years
Harper & Brothers; 1955

Resistance to aggression in Korea is one of the most important steps in the development of the United Nations. It marked a new point in history, for many nations demonstrated that collectively they could and would resist aggression. At the same time many lessons are to be learned from the United Nations first effort of this kind. . . .

Provisions for joint financing of contingents from countries unable to pay and train them should be worked out now. Ambassador Lodge is the authority for the statement that the United Nations could have had more troops in the field in Korea had it been willing to provide for their training and equipment when necessary.

A new military staff committee should be provided for. It must be sufficiently flexible to represent at any time those nations contributing troops or facilities to United Nations resistance to aggression. It should be able to appoint the Supreme Commander and assess the political consequences of his military acts in the field. It should serve either the Security Council or the General Assembly, whichever body authorizes resistance to aggression.

The United Nations should follow the suggestion of the Government of the United States and study the feasibility of a United Nations Legion. It should go further and establish this Legion.

This Legion, made up of men enlisting directly and wearing the uniform of the United Nations, could be rushed to any scene of potential or actual fighting. In most cases its presence might be sufficient to maintain or re-establish peace. Few nations would dare fire upon a United Nations army composed of young men who have enlisted from practically all of the United Nations member states. Any aggressor attacking such a force would not only be firing upon the collective symbol of the world community, but he would be firing upon citizens of practically every nation.

Masters of War

HAROLD LAMB
Tamerlane: Conqueror of the Earth
Bantam Books, 1955

Timur [Tamerlane], in common with Genghis Khan, had that strange genius for war that made them appear supermen. Much as we study the campaigns of a Caesar, the exploits of a Hannibal, or the inspired strategy of a Napoleon, upon reflection it is becoming clear that these two conquerors from Asia are, with Alexander, the masters of war upon the stage of the world. Their feats of arms may have been duplicated by others in miniature, but never upon the earth as a whole. Genghis Khan remains today a good deal of a mystery, and there is much in Timur that we cannot understand. Did Genghis Khan have a profound plan for the conquest of the world, or was he an inspired barbarian? We only know that he was wise, with a wisdom that proved terrible to the world we live in. And we can measure Timur's mighty achievement and ponder it, and still search in vain for the secret of his success.

Alexander we understand; he was the son of Philip of Macedon, heir to a mighty army, and in his conquest he swept without check over the area opened by the Persian empire that preceded him and which he overthrew. But between us and these two warriors of Asia there is the veil of distance and the strangeness of another world.

Some things we can say with assurance. Like Alexander they had immense endurance and a driving energy that would check at nothing. There the similarity ceases. Genghis Khan was patient, Timur impetuous; the great Mongol directed his campaigns from his headquarters, after his early years, but the lord of Samarkand could usually be found upon the scene of action. The nomad of the Gobi shared his responsibility among ministers and generals; the Tatar leader accepted all responsibilities himself.

The H-19 is an efficient work horse for short-distance missions

Helicopter or

The latest light aircraft are giving the helicopter a run for its money when it comes to performing Army aviation missions

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK G. FORREST

THE helicopter has caught the imagination of both the general public and the military. Able to rise and descend vertically, it appears to be an ideal vehicle in modern warfare. Nevertheless it seems unlikely that the helicopter will soon replace fixed-wing aircraft as the best method of moving numbers of troops by air.

The airplane is easier and less expensive to produce, operate, and maintain. Its principal disadvantage is that it needs prepared landing fields. But the aviation industry is now on the threshold of developing a plane that can take off and land without a runway. We do not yet have engines capable of developing enough thrust to get a troop transport off the ground from a vertical position, and aircraft designers are concentrating on the development of a conventional airplane that uses other methods to be able to take off and land with no ground run.

There are three approaches to this problem, all of which are aimed at developing lift with a minimum ground run. The first is to use engines that have a large horsepower-weight ratio and large propellers that will produce great thrust.

The second is to move air at a speed great enough to develop lift, while the wing remains stationary in relation to the ground. This may be done by installing engine-driven air pumps in the wings. The pumps will blow air from the leading edge of the wings and suck it in at the trailing edge.

The third approach is to provide the wing with high-lift devices, such as slots and flaps. Large flaps that deflect the air that passes under the wing 90 degrees downward will create additional lift. The flaps would be used during landings and take-offs, and could be retracted during level flight.

Several aircraft manufacturers have designs for large transport planes that will take off after a very short run. De-Havilland of Canada today produces the DHC-3 light transport, which can take off and land fully loaded in dis tances only slightly more than thos required by the Army's light L-19.

ANY comparison of the ability of th airplane and helicopter to perform the Army's transport mission must tak into account the factors of availability cruising speed, and cost of productio and operation.

Under field conditions helicopte availability today does not exceed 6 per cent, while aircraft availablity ca be kept as high as 90 per cent. Heli copters are difficult to maintain, sinc they are more complex than airplane and have many more moving parts Parts do not last as long. Althoug helicopters will be simplified and im proved in this respect, it seems likel that fixed-wing aircraft will always b easier to maintain and will have a higher availability rate than helicop ters.

Today's helicopters cruise at les than 100 mph. This will be increase

Fixed Wing?



The Canadian-built L-20 outperforms the H-19 on missions of over 40 miles

ı the future, but helicopter speeds are mited by retreating blade stall at high ›rward speeds. It is estimated that rge transport helicopters will have a ıaximum cruising speed of 175 mph, hile airplanes of the same class will uise at up to 300 mph.

During 1954 the Army conducted sts to compare the transport perform-ıce of helicopters and airplanes. The -19 and L-20 were used, and it was und the helicopter had a higher ton-ile per hour capability at distances less than forty miles, while the air-ane was superior on flights of over rty miles. The helicopter outper-rmed the airplane at short distances cause it required less ground time r loading and unloading. An airplane at is specifically designed for rapid ıding and unloading would be likely compare favorably with the helicop- even at short ranges. If delivery re made by air drop, the airplane uld also have a decided advantage. These tests also showed an enor-ıus disparity between the cost of eration of airplanes and helicopters. e overall cost per ton-mile was 42 ıts for the L-20 and $5.30 for the H- The L-20 was more economical in l and oil, parts expended, and man-ırs of maintenance. The L-20s need-$285 of parts, while the same number of H-19s, used over approximately the same number of ton-miles, needed $36,914.30 for this item. It is likely that costs will decrease when helicopters are improved, and that future airplanes with zero-run take-off capabilities will cost more to produce, operate, and maintain; but the advantage will remain with the airplane in the foreseeable future.

Fixed-wing aircraft have other advantages. They have higher payload-gross weight ratios than helicopters. In the event of war, they could easily be flown to areas where they were needed, while helicopters, needing more fuel, would in many cases have to be shipped by surface transportation.

IF the fixed-wing aircraft can meet the requirements for taking off and landing on unprepared fields, it should become the primary aircraft used by Army transport aviation units. In many instances a helicopter-type landing and take-off will not be needed, because ground troops will have secured fields and pastures on which planes can land.

At the present time, however, only a small fraction of the Army's transport aircraft should be fixed-wing airplanes. As more adequate airplanes that are now in the early development stage become available, the percentage of helicopters used should become lower. This should be especially true in the case of high-payload aircraft.

An agreement between the Army and the Air Force, stated in SR 95-400-5, allows the Army to procure and operate helicopters of any size but limits Army fixed-wing aircraft to those having an empty weight of under 5,000 pounds.

If airplanes can be produced that have the same capabilities as helicopters, but which cost one-fourth as much to purchase and operate as helicopters of the same payload class, it is clear that this agreement should be modified. It is suggested that the Army use fixed-wing transport aircraft of any weight, which are capable of developing induced lift equal to at least twenty-five per cent of the gross weight and are capable of becoming airborne in a ground run of not more than one hundred yards from a sod field.

Such a plane would have the greatest possible payload-gross weight ratio, but its fuel load would be small and its range comparatively limited. Nevertheless it seems unlikely that the helicopter will completely replace fixed-wing aircraft as the best method of providing air transport for the maneuver and supply of forces in the combat zone.

The 4.2-inch mortar is

An Artillery Weapon Now

Lieutenant Colonel Dean E. Painter

THE 4.2-inch mortar was originally conceived as a Chemical Corps weapon, later it was adopted by the infantry as a regimental heavy-support weapon, and now it is a field artillery weapon. The Artillery School is now developing new T/O&Es and techniques for the use of the 4.2 in an artillery role.

The capabilities of the 4.2 may be better understood by comparing it with the 105mm howitzer. However, this comparison is not intended to suggest that the 105 replace the mortar.

The mortar's simplicity means savings in time and money. Its cost is approximately $2,000, while the towed 105mm howitzer costs approximately $15,000. A round of ammunition for the 4.2 costs about $1.50 less than the cost of a 105 projectile.

Tactically, the mortar is capable of being emplaced in deeper defilade because of its high angle of fire. It is easier to conceal and camouflage than the howitzer, but unlike the howitzer it is incapable of *direct* fire. The mortar's light tube gives us a weapon weighing 670 pounds, while the towed 105 weighs 4,980 pounds. The mortar may be broken down into six major component parts, each weighing 162 pounds or less. A two-round box of mortar ammunition weighs approximately 40 pounds less than a two-round box of 105 ammunition.

The mortar can be hand-carried for short distances, towed by its crew on a light handcart, or towed in a quarter-ton trailer by a quarter-ton truck. It may be packed on four mules, or mounted in, and fired from, a self-propelled armored vehicle. The 4.2 is suitable for an airdrop, helicopter lift, or amphibious assault.

RECENT studies of the 4.2's lethality and accuracy indicate that observed fires upon targets most suitable for attack by mortars favor the 4.2 over the howitzer by a ratio of 1.5 to 1, increasing to 5 to 1 as the size of the target increases. High angle of fall of the projectile and greater bursting-charge-to-weight ratio of the ammunition also contribute to lethality.

The rate of fire of the mortar is higher for short periods of time. Some combat reports indicate the mortar projectile has a greater surprise effect on the enemy than a round fired from a gun or howitzer.

On the other hand, the 4.2 has several drawbacks. Its projectile has a longer time of flight than that of the 105 fired at low angle. Range dispersion is approximately double, but maximum range is only about half that of the howitzer. But these disadvantages diminish considerably when the performance of the mortar is compared with the howitzer's high-angle fire, The relative inaccuracy of the mortar is caused partially by the general looseness of its parts, each of which can be hand-carried. An artillery mortar that is towed or mounted on a vehicle would not need to come apart so readily, and could be assembled more tightly.

The sight is too fragile to remain on the weapon during firing, so it must be removed before each round is fired. The sight does not have a mil-graduated reticle or gunner's aid. There is no provision for handling site in conjunction with the elevation quadrant, which is a component part of the sight. The clumsiness of the traversing and elevating mechanism reduces the speed and accuracy of firing.

There are other drawbacks to the mortar. The preparation of the propelling charge is a difficult and slow process. The base ring is subject to damage in rocky or frozen terrain. Since only the muzzle end of the mortar barrel is open, removal of misfires is difficul

The boresighting system is compl cated by inability to see through th barrel of the mortar from end to en The combination aiming circle an distant-aiming-point system of bor sighting is time-consuming, since a aiming circle must be set up in rear each mortar and a visible distant air ing point is needed.

Two major departures from artille gunnery procedures are required whe firing the 4.2: the mortar is fired wi a constant elevation and the char is varied to obtain range charges. Th vertical interval between the tube ar the target is converted to a horizont range effect, based on the angle of fa and expressed as a site charge. This si charge, which appears on the ball tical data scale of the GFT fan, added to the range charge correctic corresponding to the chart range read from the GFT fan. The sum these two charge elements is the char which should be fired (*see sketch* Mortar ballistical scales have been d veloped which may be fitted over th 105mm howitzer ballistical scale f use with the GFT fan.

PRESENT field artillery observer pr cedure is suitable for mortars. The mortar gunnery methods have bec field-tested at Fort Sill and found be satisfactory. Additional firing an tests, particularly during student ser ice practices, will be conducted to d termine the accuracy with which a un can mass its mortars on a target.

Site charge sketch for the 4.2-inch mortar



CEREBRATIONS

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

Morale by Mail

HE Army has already taken over many of the procedures of the civilian vorld of business. A selling technique videly used in this country today is lirect-mail promotion; the Army would ɔe wise to adopt it.

Business firms, both reputable and ınsavory, pay vast sums annually to obain what are inelegantly called "suckr lists." Every time you put your ame on a business transaction, go to hospital, get a library card, father a hild, or in any way show that you ave a particular "interest," your name, ddress, and interest are snapped up y a professional name spotter, who eddles this information to a mailingst agency. The agency in turn sells sts of names to companies that can rofit from the interest.

For example, if you register your ife at the maternity ward of a hospil, a firm that sells babies' clothes or igh chairs gets your name and begins nding advertising and prospectuses rectly to you. This selling method 'idently pays off, for name-peddling a lucrative business for thousands people.

Every time a new draft levy registers a training center, the Army receives free list of names and addresses of rents or next of kin. The Army ould use this tested technique to sell elf to these people, whose major ıterest" is their inducted sons. Let's ay their fears and enlist their aid in :ause they will s''pport instinctively.

The present PIO releases to homevn newspapers should be supplented by a direct-mail sales program colorful, appealing letter, addressed the parents by name and actually ned by the CO of the draftee's ining company. It should be written Pentagon level, so that it reflects rent DA and DOD policies, and :ributed to training units for transtal to the parents. It should be eyecatching but not whimsical, complete but not verbose, grammatical but not high-brow. In short, it should neither insult a Ph.D. father nor be over the head of a lady-wrestler mother.

The letter would cover the following topics: length of the training; a list of basic-training subjects; identification of the letter-writer; description of military discipline; policy of the U. S. to build a team, not an unfeeling military machine; the right and duty of the citizen to bear arms; military training fits the soldier to be a better citizen afterwards; off-duty facilities, such as service clubs, chapels, hobby shops, movies; physical conditio..ing and care, including training courses, examinations, sick call, bed check; the part parents must play in influencing the soldier to have sober habits in regard to religion, sex, drinking, and general behavior; an invitation to the parent to call on the writer if he has any questions or trouble; and a note that the writer has the same military mailing address as the trainee.

This letter would stress the idea that the Army man comes out a more solid citizen, rather than "join the Army and learn a trade." We are submitting a completed version of this letter through the DOD suggestion-program channels, in the belief that this practice would help bring the Army the enthusiastic support of millions of civilians.

MAJ. JAMES W. KERR
CAPT. THOMAS G. McCUNNIFF

Aiding a General

MOST soldiers seem to believe that the primary duties of an aide are to help elderly ladies to the dinner table, supervise cocktail parties, and be a social ornament, resplendent in aiguillettes and special evening dress. Aides do these things, it is true, but it is too often forgotten that they are also staff officers on the general's personal staff.

The aide's job is to supervise and monitor those things which personally concern the superior he serves, leaving the other staffs free to perform their special duties. He must organize the other members of the personal staff into a smooth-working team which will perform the routine work of running the general's affairs. In Korea it was found useful for generals to have two aides, one concerned with operations and the other with administrative matters.

The operations aide travels with the general and arranges his personal affairs. He understands the picture in the field and keeps notes while on the road. His most important duty is to tip off subordinates as to what the general said, did, directed, or commented.

When one corps commander's operations aide reported for duty in Korea, he spent four weeks in the plans section of G3 and another two weeks in G4 before he was permitted to assume his duties. He became thoroughly familiar with the combat history of the corps. He worked on operations orders and plans, terrain studies and estimates. He knew every unit in the corps, its location, something of its history, and its key personnel. He spent several days on the MLR familiarizing himself with the terrain, units, and people. The

things he learned in those six weeks proved invaluable in the months that followed.

Important people are always visiting combat headquarters. Invariably they want to visit the troops in the forward areas. The operations aide has to plan their schedule in the most minute detail to minimize the possibility of injury. Artillery may be required to be lifted, or to smoke or neutralize known enemy OPs or gun emplacements while the party slips down a valley in a jeep or helicopter. The plans have to be coordinated and rehearsed for time-and-distance factors, road guides, guards, and escorts, and the aide de camp is the man who does this job.

Other important duties of the operations aide are to keep the general's journal and situation map. The journal is an extremely important item showing places, persons, and things that concern the general personally. Since it becomes a part of the unit's permanent history, it must be prepared with great care.

The general must have someone who is more or less removed from the chain of command, on whom the general can test his ideas and occasionally vent his anger. The aide must be a loyal companion to the general as well as his personal staff officer. There has to be someone to trim the boat and to bridge the differences in rank in order to keep the general aware of subordinates' ideas and opinions that they are reluctant to give themselves.

Let us now turn our attention to the administrative aide. His is the unglamorous job. He is responsible for personal correspondence, suspense file and follow-up, liaison on assignments in which the general is personally interested, and coordination of the general's personal public relations. He reviews the general's directives and follow-ups on directives from higher authority.

The aide should prepare acknowledgments of all letters which are sent directly to the general, and he should indicate to the writer what is being done with his letter. These acknowledgments should accompany the general's mail when he receives it. Each letter should be covered with an appropriate routing slip to the staff agency concerned.

One good system for handling correspondence is to make a file of model letters, including thank-you notes, letters of condolence, appreciation, discipline, recommendations, congratulations, and the like. The model file should also contain a copy of everything the general has written or drastically rewritten, so that his work will be reduced the next time the same thing comes up.

Generals often receive personal-type letters and sign the answers in the same way. Yet the whole subject is official and the correspondence should be available in the official files of others who have to handle the same subject. If such correspondence is buried in the general's file, an important policy statement is likely to be hidden from those who need it. The aide should see that all such correspondence passes into the proper channels and is not allowed to be hidden in the general's personal files.

The administrative aide should establish a suspense file and follow-up on personal correspondence and any other matters in which the general has taken a personal interest. When the general initiates an action, he expects to be given progress reports until it is completed. The aide keeps his eye on these reports and their due dates and needles the boss when there are laggards.

The aide should review the general's correspondence to insure that it is polite but concise and that it contains simple, direct language. The important thing is to see that the facts are stated precisely. For example, it is much better to say, "Paragraph 3, SR 100-3-5, 1 August 1952, states in part . . ." than "In a recent directive. . . ." The subject should be boiled down to essential *verified* facts which can be stated in simple English or in a chart or table. When you are satisfied that all the information is there, it is ready for the boss.

It is the aide's job to screen the papers that the general signs. Many persons make their superiors appear pompous and absurd by the things they send him to sign. The court of last appeals is the aide, who can eliminate many unnecessary papers and insure that what is signed is courteous and in good taste.

All generals have to make speeches and write articles, but someone else has to come up with ideas and facts around which the speech can be built. The aide supplies the facts in brief form and the general inserts the adjectives and gives it his special polish. The fact sheet should include this information: composition of the audience; interest of the audience; loca color; historical data on the locality organization, or event (that is, th occasion for the speech); names o important persons in the audienc who should be mentioned; time of da of the speech or event; whether there is TV, radio, newspaper coverage; wha immediately precedes or follows th speech (that is, lunch, parade, unveil ing of new equipment, and so on).

When the general is required to par ticipate in a formation or ceremony he should be briefed on his part i the performance *immediately* before h goes on stage. The aide has to giv the general his cues or make sure some one else does, so that he does not lool foolish or conspicuous by having t perform a complicated part without re hearsal.

Trips should be organized wit painstaking care. It is usually bette to arrive a little late than early. N one expects the general to be too early so the aide should calculate carefull the time required to make the trip. Th highest-ranking person gets into vehi cles and aircraft last. The aide has t take charge of things and herd th junior members on board, since ther is a common tendency to hang bac and hold open doors until the genera is all settled, before juniors take thei positions.

In planning a visit, the aide shoul never let anyone tell him: "The dir ner starts about 1930, but any time th general wants to arrive will be a right." That simply means that th dinner probably won't start until 203 and most guests will arrive about 201 The aide should pin the host down t the most minute details of arrival an departure times.

It can be seen that a wide range c responsibilities fall to the aide. Th very special staff officer has a fascina ing job and is an important member c the Army team. He must adapt h talents to the peculiar requirements c his general, but at the same time h must seize the initiative in the job a any general staff officer does, makin his presence felt in an equally respor sible way.

CAPT. JOHN R. THURMA

Use the Gunner's Badge

WHAT has happened to the expe gunner's badge so coveted in th "Old Army"? Between World War and World War II artillerymen wor

the expert gunner's badge with the same pride that the infantryman wore his expert rifleman badge. Since then the chests of many of our professionals have been covered with ribbons for bravery and service, but these ribbons do not necessarily denote proficiency with the wearer's primary weapon. The Quartermaster catalog still lists the gunner's badge, but it is now rare to see a man wearing one.

AR 600-70 states that qualification badges are awarded in recognition of attainment of a high degree of skill and proficiency in tests, competitions, and performance of duties. The basic qualification badge is awarded to indicate the highest qualification which a soldier has attained in a record course.

In small-arms qualification, an appropriate bar is worn with the badge to show the type of weapon with which the wearer has qualified. In the gunner's qualification, unit weapons are not individually designated, and the basic bar is inscribed with the words "Field Arty." Expert indicates expert gunner, sharpshooter indicates first-class gunner, and marksman indicates second-class gunner. The AR further states that to be eligible, the soldier must attain the qualification score prescribed for his weapon by current Army directive.

With one exception (the 75mm pack howitzer), the current field manuals covering service of the piece for the various artillery weapons prescribe the tests to be given in the qualification of gunners and specify qualification scores. A revised version of the field manual for the pack howitzer will include gunners' examinations and scores. The purpose of the tests is to determine the relative proficiency of the individual artilleryman in the performance of his duties as gunner. Minimum scores required for qualification are 90 for expert gunner, 80 for first-class gunner, and 70 for second-class gunner.

Commanding officers of regiments, groups, and separate battalions, and any commanding officer in the grade of lieutenant colonel or above may make the awards. The badges may be worn on the coat of dress and semidress uniforms, on the service jacket, or on the shirt when it is worn as an outer garment. Badges are not worn when the soldier is dressed for combat or simulated combat.

The number of expert gunner badges won by a unit might be a better indication of morale than some of the "morale indices" now used. Badges are visible testimony of performance that measure individual proficiency, the training of an organization, and the degree of emphasis that is placed on fighting skills.

LT. COL. DEAN E. PAINTER

RHIP but Not Many

THE Russians recently promoted a dozen more of their military leaders to Marshal's rank, the equivalent of our five-star grades of General of the Army, Fleet Admiral, and General of the Air Force. The American armed forces now have no one on actual active duty in these grades. Our top military men—the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and even the Chairman (a sadly unmilitary title) of the Joint Chiefs—all have only four-star rank although they frequently deal with Marshals and Fleet Admirals who hold similar positions in less powerful countries.

General Gruenther, as Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, has under him Field Marshal Montgomery and a varying number of officers who have similar rank, such as Marshal of France, for example. (It is possible that our five-star Army and Air Force officers would have been called marshals had it not been for the fact that the senior to be given that rank during World War II was named Marshall. Incidentally, only the rank of Marshal of the Royal Air Force is the equivalent of the top ranks in the British Army and the Royal Navy; Air Chief Marshal, Air Marshal, and Air Vice-Marshal correspond, respectively, to four-, three-, and two-star generals in our Air Force.)

Officers given responsibility but denied appropriate rank are put in the position of appearing, particularly to foreigners and sometimes to American subordinates, to be under test and not quite established in their jobs.

This fear of rank as such is not a new American failing. The Union Army, in marked contrast to the Confederate Army, often withheld table-of-organization rank from its commanders. At the end of World War II, four of our ten army commanders were still lieutenant generals, and all of our army-group commanders and many of our corps and other lower-level commanders were not given the rank which they had earned. In 1954, Congress gave ten of the World War II lieutenant generals a thank-you-this-doesn't cost-us-a-cent promotion to four-star rank, too late to do any of them much good and definitely too late for the four who were dead.

Does this affect junior officers of our armed forces? Of course, it does. They are not likely to be impressed by the standing in this country of a career where the men having the literally awful responsibilities of the top positions are not given rank commensurate with their counterparts in the rest of the world.

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY

Artillery Gadget

A FREQUENT problem for the S3 of an artillery unit is how many rounds, what fuze, and what type of ammunition he should use on a given target. In a fast-moving situation, he has to make a split-second decision, in order to neutralize the target effectively without wasting ammunition.

Could not a gadget be devised that would solve this problem? Something, perhaps, on the order of the multicolored, circular slide-rule-like device that many camera addicts use to get a proper time setting and lens opening for existing light conditions and the nature of his target.

Such a gadget for the S3 who is torn between his desire to blast the enemy and to honor an ammunition allocation, would be priceless. It might have two wheels, one inside the other. The outer wheel would contain many normal artillery targets, such as men in the open, men in foxholes with overhead cover, various emplacements and vehicles, smoke screens (here the solution arrow would point to certain number of rounds to keep the screen effective over a given area during a given amount of time). The inner, smaller wheel would contain an arrow and a window. When the arrow is set on the target desired, the S3 will be able to read the solution through the window, in terms of number of rounds, fuze setting, and type of rounds. There would be a different wheel for each type of weapon. The gadget would not have to be circular; it merely needs two moving faces that match up. A good deal of research would have to go into getting the data necessary to construct the gadget, but it would be an invaluable aid to the S3 when he is in a hurry.

LT. COL. EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, JR.

IRONS IN THE FIRE

Uses for Radioactive Wastes

Gamma radiation, the deadly product of radioactive substances, may soon be used for the sterilization of sewage, the Corps of Engineers' Research and Development Laboratories have announced. Waste products from atomic power plants can be used for this purpose without leaving residual radiation in the treated liquids. Gamma rays can also be used to sterilize certain drugs and antibiotics that are harmfully affected by heat, to preserve meat and other food by killing the bacteria that cause spoilage, and to decrease the number of bacteria in swimming pools without using chlorine.

Combat Transport



Lockheed Aircraft Corp. has announced that its C-130A Hercules "combat transport" is now in quantity production for the Air Force. The C-130A can lift a 155mm howitzer and its 13-ton tractor or 92 fully equipped combat troops. The plane weighs 54 tons and its four Allison T-56 turbines develop 15,000 horsepower. The entire 95-foot fuselage is heated, air-conditioned, and pressurized. It needs a take-off strip of only 800 feet and can land on unpaved strips of an even shorter length. The C-130A can fly safely at low altitudes and speeds for air-dropping troops, equipment, and supplies, or it can be used for long-range flights at high speeds. It has a wingspan of 132 feet, and its tail is 38 feet high.

Pilotless Plane

Ryan Aeronautical Co. has disclosed that the Firebee jet target drone has potential uses as a guided missile and for reconnaissance. The Department of Defense also has authorized disclosure of the specifications of the swept-wing pilotless plane, which was designed for antiaircraft gunnery practice. It has a maximum speed of 605 m.p.h. and a ceiling of 42,500 feet. The Firebee is 17 feet 3 inches long, and has a wingspan of 11 feet 2 inches. Its production cost is approximately one tenth that of piloted aircraft converted to drones. It also has a parachute recovery system.

For guided missile use, a warhead could be carried in the fuselage or in pods slung beneath the wing and mounted on the wing tips. For aerial reconnaissance, the Firebee could be equipped with aerial cameras, radar, Reconofax, and television installations. It could be catapulted from the ground, vectored over the target area, and brought back for parachute recovery. Its range could be increased by air-launching from a "mother" plane. A number of Firebees have been delivered to Army Ordnance for use as practice targets for the Nike guided missile and the Skysweeper antiaircraft gun.

New Vaccines

The Medical Corps is working on ne vaccines to combat influenza, measles, ar RI-67, an acute respiratory disease comm among trainees. The influenza vaccine pror ises to be a great improvement over the sho given currently. It will not require annu immunizations. The Army is also develo ing a portable machine for drilling tee that will allow dentists to call on patients to perform work in the field.

Supply Computer

An electronic machine, known as Bizma has been installed at the Ordnance Tan Automotive Command in Detroit that w give accurate information on the state of i ventories of parts. Reports from depo throughout the nation will be fed into t machine, and within minutes it will give t status of supply of any item.

Offshore Radar Base



A permanent, self-contained radar tow will be installed about 110 miles east Cape Cod, Mass., this month, the first of series of offshore warning stations to be s up in the Atlantic Ocean. It will consist a triangular platform, with 200-foot side resting on three hollow 200-foot steel ca sons. The radar base will generate its ow electric power, and will house 50 to 70 me In addition to three radar domes, there wi be sick bays, recreational facilities, mai tenance rooms, and a heliport. The tow was prefabricated by the DeLong Corpor tion and the Raymond Concrete Pile Cor pany, under the direction of the Navy D partment. It will be manned by Air Forc and Navy personnel.

British Heavy Tank

The British Army in Germany is testing :s latest, heaviest tank, the 65-ton Con- ueror. Powered by a Meteor engine, it :avels at 20 m.p.h. and carries a crew of ɔur. The gun is stabilized both vertically nd horizontally by electronic control.

lew Shoes

The Quartermaster and Medical Corps ave developed a new low-quarter dress shoe ıat will be used by all of the services. The ew footwear uses a new system of inter- ıangeable lasts and has reduced the num- er of shoe sizes from 235 to 113. The new ıoes will be issued when present stocks are khausted.

lobile Crane

The Navy recently demonstrated a mobile ane capable of lifting a four-engine bomber ıd moving it around. Nicknamed the Mon- er, the MB-1 mobile crane will be used for moving disabled aircraft and for inspect- g landing gear. The crane weighs 45 tons ıd has a lift capacity of 40 tons. It was ıilt by the LeTourneau-Westinghouse Co.

istilling Sea Water

An economical method of distilling fresh ıter from sea water has been discovered Britain's Royal Naval Scientific Service. new compound, one of the polyethylene ·cols, introduced into evaporators of exist- ; design, prevents scalding and the forma- n of foam, prolongs the operating life of evaporator five times, and increases its ciency by about 30 per cent. With the w compound, fresh water can be made m sea water on board ship at a cost of 68 a ton, as against $2.52 a ton by the old thod. This should save the British Navy ɔroximately $1½ million a year.

Electrical Radiation Device

An improved device for checking instruments that measure radiation has been invented by a German-born Army private at Fort Benning. PFC Guenter Hagedorn, who came to the U. S. in 1953, is completing experiments on an electrical device that can align radiaometers with a one-percent margin of error. This previously had to be done with expensive radioactive substances, and the margin for error was 25 percent. Hagedorn's method, which requires no radioactive materials, promises to be safer and faster. The device could be manufactured easily, using parts normally stocked by the Signal Corps. It can align a radiaometer in five minutes and can be built into a compact battery-operated set about 3 x 8 inches for field use.

Two-Way Mobile Radio

General Electric has developed a mobile two-way radio capable of transmitting up to a 110-watt signal. Previously, the highest power standard mobile radio could transmit only a 60-watt signal. The radio, which operates in the 25-50 megacycle band, can be mounted under the dashboard or in the trunk of a vehicle. The new radio was made possible by the development of circuitry allowing the use of two GL-6146 tubes as final amplifiers in the transmitter and a new 640-volt dynamotor power supply. The radio's transmitter, receiver, and power-supply chassis are connected only by electrical cables terminated in standard plugs that can be quickly disengaged. The radio may be used on vehicles having either 6- or 12-volt DC systems without electrical alterations.

Arctic "Subway"

Army engineers will start construction work this month on an experimental 15-mile-long tunnel under the Greenland icecap, which will eliminate the problems of surface travel for men operating the U. S. air station in that region. The tunnel will be an average of 25 feet below the ground, but in some places will reach a depth of 100 feet. It will be 25 feet high and 12 feet deep, and it may eventually contain an electric railroad.

Quick Change for Helicopter

Troops assigned to CONARC Board 45 Detachment at Camp Rucker, Ala., recently demonstrated a novel field expedient for replacing the transmission of an H-21C cargo helicopter. The helicopter was placed under a limb of an oak tree, and a chain-fall supported by the limb was used to lift out the transmission, which needed overhauling. The helicopter was then moved under a new transmission suspended from a second chain-fall supported by another limb of the tree. The speed of the operation demonstrated that units depending on helicopters can preserve their mobility even when hangars with overhead hoists are not available.

REUNIONS

1st Armored Division. 1-3 July. Hotel New Yorker, New York City. For details write: Sal Marino, 215 Del Balso Blvd., Wappinger Falls, N. Y.

1st Infantry Division. 26-28 August. Congress Hotel, Chicago. For details write: Arthur L. Chaitt, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.

3d Armored Division. 28-30 July. Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis. For details write: Paul W. Corrigan, 80 Federal St., Boston 10, Mass.

5th Infantry Division. 3-5 Sept. Hotel Benjamin Franklin, Philadelphia.

8th Armored Division. 1-3 July. Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: Henry B. Rothenberg, Suite 1300, 134 No. La Salle St., Chicago 2, Ill.

Ninth Army. 22-24 June. Treadway Inn, Coonamessett, Cape Cod, Mass. For details write: C. B. F. Brill, 202 East 44th St., New York 17, N. Y.

25th Infantry Division. 15-17 July. Warwick Hotel Philadelphia. For details write: 25th Infantry Division Association, PO Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

37th Infantry Division. 2-5 Sept. Biltmore Hotel, Dayton, Ohio. For details write: Jack R. McGuire, 21 W. Broad St., Rm. 1101, Columbus 15, Ohio.

41st Infantry Division. 29-31 July. Sheraton Hotel, Chicago. For details write: Robert C. Keller, 175 W. Jackson Blvd., Chicago 4, Ill.

76th Infantry Division. 18 June. Hotel Commodore, New York City. For details write: Henry C. Evans, 6 S. Calvert St., Baltimore 2, Md.

82d Airborne Division. 1-3 July. Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel, Detroit. For details write: 82d Airborne Division Association, Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel, Detroit 31, Mich.

94th Infantry Division. 21-24 July. Hotel Bellevue-Stratford, Philadelphia. For details write: Anthony H. Mirra, Jr., 2810 Springfield Rd., Broomall, Pa.

THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

(Continued from page 12)

Fixed Wing?" page 46), is currently assigned to the G3 Section, Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Va.

MORALE continues to be a major concern of our cerebrators (pages 49-51). Three of the five articles in that department are aimed at improving that intangible quality, which in the last analysis is the deciding factor of how a man fights. The other two cerebrations concern themselves with the problems of a general's aide and with a gadget (not yet invented). MAJOR JAMES W. KERR, Infantry, has a degree in chemistry from Davidson College and in physics from New York University. He is an occasional contributor to the JOURNAL. CAPTAIN THOMAS G. MCCUNNIFF, Infantry, is a 1945 graduate of the Military Academy. CAPTAIN JOHN R. THURMAN, Artillery, was an enlisted man from 1942 until 1943. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1946 and completed the Artillery School Guided Missiles Course the following year. His article is based on his experience as aide to Lieutenant General W. B. Palmer. LIEUTENANT COLONEL DEAN E. PAINTER is mentioned elsewhere in this department. MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, retired, a regular contributor, is presently on an extended visit to Europe, visiting many military stations. LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD M. FLANAGAN, JR., Artillery, is at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. He is a 1943 graduate of the Military Academy.

THIS month's book reviewers (pages 57-63) are men of experience in the field of military literature. COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, JAGD, is a regular contributor who will be remembered by many as the author of "Lament for a Skulker." COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY, Artillery-retired, entered the Army in 1909. JOURNAL readers will remember him as the author of "Pass in Review," a retrospective look at the U. S. Army, which appeared in the Fiftieth Anniversary issue (October 1954). LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG, Armor, is the author of *Red China's Fighting Hordes* and a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL. He is presently assigned to G3 in the Pentagon. MAJOR MARK M. BOATNER III, Infantry, is a third-generation Army man. He has just completed the course at the Command and General Staff College. COLONEL CHARLES W. MCCARTHY, Infantry, is on duty in Washington. BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG, retired, is a contributing Editor of the JOURNAL. RICHARD GORDON MCCLOSKEY is another frequent contributor.

THE MONTH'S FILMS

CAPTAIN JACK F. McAHON

Assembly of an Airborne Unit, TF 31-1926 (18 minutes), shows four methods that are used to gather an airborne unit into an effective fighting force immediately after the jump.

You in Germany, AFIF 67 (31 minutes), explains the role of soldiers and their dependents in Germany in fostering international good will.

Motor Vehicle First Aid Kit, SFS 8-194 (10 minutes), exhibits and explains the contents of the kit and their various uses.

Terrain Analysis, TF 7-1972 (9 minutes), teaches soldiers the important points to remember about terrain analysis and shows how the infantry battalion commander uses them in combat. The film is in color.

Weapons of the Antiaircraft Artillery, TF 44-1929 (18 minutes), also a color film, shows quad .50s; twin 40mm guns on the light-tank chassis; the Skysweeper, 90-mm, and 120mm guns; and the Nike. Firing scenes and fire control centers are shown.

The Investigating Officer, TF 15-1946 (49 minutes), follows a pre-trial investigating officer from the time he is appointed until the time he makes his final recommendations. The film stresses the seriousness of the assignment and the care that is needed so that the rights of both the government and the suspect are served to the utmost.

The Fourth Man, MF 61-8414 (9 minutes), explains the role of the civilian employee of the Army in supporting the combat soldier. His work includes testing and designing equipment, handling pay, maintaining and guarding military installations, purchasing, and certain phases of instruction.

6 This Concerns You

ROTC AND RESERVE COMPONENT DUTY

N peacetime the United States has always maintained a small standing my and a large pool of trained re-rves. The standing army must garri-n bases strategically located all over e world; provide a mobile, hard-hit-ıg striking force capable of meeting ıy attack on our country; give us ne to mobilize our reserves; and final-, but not by any means its least im-ırtant task, it must train the reserve rce and imbue it with a spirit of sponsibility. Every citizen must real-e the vital importance of his part in e defense of the nation. Well-trained, telligent, dedicated Regular Army of-ers and career reservists can do much build this spirit in the citizen soldier. The magnitude of the transition ım a small standing army to a well-ined military force of the propor-ns required in time of war can best illustrated by looking at the figures male officer strengths before and at e peak of World War II:

On 1 July 1940 there were 17,563 ıle officers on duty; of these 14,856 re Regulars and 2,707 were from erve components.

On 31 July 1945 there were 776,-5 male officers on duty; 15,145 were gulars and 760,571 were ORC, NG d AUS.

HESE figures clearly show why we ıaintain large reserves. But reserves l be dependable only if we have an ective reserve program.

The Regular Army's job of develop-our reserve force and providing a e for its expansion includes more n merely building reserve units. r nation cannot win the economic tle against its enemies and still af-l to maintain enough of its man-ver in reserve units to meet the ds of an all-out war. This means the authorized reserve units which maintained in a reserve status must be able to organize large numbers of draftees into an effective, well-disciplined military force. The professional knowledge and experience necessary to accomplish this mission must be absorbed during weekly drill periods and summer-camp training. Accordingly, active-army advisers to reserve units must possess the inspirational leadership and broad basic knowledge that will give members of reserve units the qualifications to perform their wartime job.

THE task of active-army officers on duty with the reserve components is psychological as well as technical. They must maintain a friendly liaison between the active army and the reserve forces. These officers, by their energy, enthusiasm, and example, must stimulate the reservist's interest in a military career. They must develop a dedicated corps of reservists who will be able to play their part in the mobilization effort.

The ROTC instructor must meet the standards of the educational institution to which he is assigned. As a member of the faculty, he is expected to have had an education at least equal to that of graduates of the school. Since only about forty per cent of all officers have college degrees, this eliminates many officers from consideration for duty at the senior ROTC colleges and universities. Because many schools are denominational, religious preference is a frequent consideration. In addition to these nonmilitary requirements, ROTC officers must of course be well qualified professionally in their branch.

The instructor must be able to identify the sincere, able students who possess the qualities of character and leadership to become succesful officers. He must be able to win the confidence, respect, and admiration of these students. The impression he makes is extremely important. His conduct both on and off the campus, his ability as an instructor, and the leadership he displays in obtaining the participation of able men in the reserve program all contribute to the success or failure of his mission.

THE advisers to National Guard and Army Reserve units have equally grave responsibilities. Their mission picks up where the ROTC instructor's leaves off. They must capture the interest of the Reserve and National Guard officers and present them with a continuing challenge to improve their value to the Nation. The instructor must not only be highly competent; he must be tactful and deft in his guidance. He can expect the members of the component to develop no greater interest and enthusiasm than he himself displays. He must strive to have the unit commanders seek and prize his leadership.

Although the educational requirements for an adviser may not be so rigid as those for the ROTC instructor, the requirements for professional competence, exemplary conduct and teaching ability are just as exacting. The National Guard unit adviser must be acceptable to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the state adjutant general.

More than 4,000 officers must be assigned to reserve component duty to carry out the responsibilities to the reserve forces. Individuals are carefully selected by the appropriate Career Management branch. Officers are seldom selected until they have completed six years' service. While only one tour of duty with the reserve components is normal, particularly well-qualified officers may be called upon for a second tour if their career patterns will permit such assignments.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

National Guard OCS

TIS now has the responsibility for preparing, publishing, and distributing instructional material for National Guard State Officer Candidate Schools. This was done formerly by The Army General School. The Department of Non-Resident Instruction is presently revising the 212-hour course, which is given to selected National Guard enlisted men during weekends. Students are commissioned as second lieutenants in the Guard upon successful completion of the course. There are approximately 1,000 of these officer candidates.

TIS is also taking over the administration of the 10 series, Army Extension Courses, and physical training courses from the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kan., which was discontinued on 1 May. The 10 series will continue to be administered from Fort Riley until expanded facilities at Fort Benning have been completed.

Infantry Instructors' Conference

Infantry instructors assigned to the various service schools will attend the annual Infantry Instructors' Conference at TIS on 6-11 June. The meeting will be devoted to discussion of infantry training, tactical principles, organization and logistics, new developments and trends, weapons and equipment, and new infantry techniques. The conferees will receive instructional material from the Airborne-Army Aviation, Weapons, Communications, Tactical, and Staff Departments of TIS.

New Training Films

The Airborne Soldier is tentatively scheduled for distribution to units in the field by September. Others films, which will be ready at the same time, will cover the following subjects: assembly problems after fifth novice jump; personnel parachute malfunctions and entanglements; parachute landing falls; parachute training on the 34-foot tower; conduct of a parachutist in the aircraft; the swing landing trainer; and parachute recovery during novice training.

Basic Functioning—M1 Rifle. Part I: Trigger Housing Group, Firing Pin, Cartridge. TF 7-2124. 5 Minutes. This film demonstrates the action of these vital parts of the M1 rifle, and concludes with a series of questions and answers on the functioning of the rifle.

New Assistant Commandant

Brigadier General Paul L. Freeman, Jr., Deputy Director, J-3 Division, Hq. U. S. European Command, is slated to become Assistant Commandant of TIS to replace Brigadier General Carl F. Fritzsche, who is scheduled to leave in the near future for Okinawa.

THE ENGINEER SCHOOL

Nike Instruction

A new course for Nike crewmen was started at TES in May. It includes classroom instruction in the operation and first-ech lon maintenance of engineer equipment used with the Nike and practical field exercises at local installations. Correct maintenance and operational procedures will be stressed. The principal items of engineer equipment in Nike installations are: air compressors with 3,500 psi capacity; 150-kw diesel generators; large hydraulically operated elevators; and frequency converters needed to raise 60-cycle commercial electric power to the higher cyclic rates used in the Nike installations.

Demolition Courses

"Explosives and Demolitions I and II" (10-15 and 30-2), two subcourses of TES extension course program, have been revised and are now ready for issue. Although the new courses contain no startling changes in doctrine or techniques, the instruction has been reorganized along more functional lines. An engineer who has take the courses should be able to handl explosives and demolitions efficientl with a minimum amount of actual e perience in the field.

"Explosives and Demolitions I" co ers theory, types, and uses of expl sives; and calculation, priming, firin and placement of charges. "Explosiv and Demolitions II" includes a revie of basic principles, uses of explosiv for construction, demolitions equi ment and typical engineer small-un demolition jobs.

Commanders' Conference

Engineer troop commanders from th major continental and oversea con mands met at TES in April for a mu tual exchange of views on problem of engineer training and operatior arising from the combat and comba support missions of engineer units.

THE SIGNAL SCHOO

Training in Washington

Thirty-seven officer students at TS recently completed a week's trainin course in Washington, D. C. Th course was the first of a series planne to familiarize students with the organ zatio, functions, and operations of th Office of the Chief Signal Officer i the Pentagon, and to acquaint the with military communications faciliti at DA level.

The students heard key officers i the major divisions of the Office of th Chief Signal Officer outline the fun tions of each division. They also visite the Signal Corps Army Pictorial Ser ice Laboratory in the Pentagon; r search and development projects co ducted by the Signal Corps at Fo Meade; the railway communicatior car operated by the White House Si nal Corps Agency for the Presiden Army Security Agency headquarters i Arlington, Va.; and other importan installations.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

ionest and Provocative

NITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
he Women's Army Corps
By Mattie E. Treadwell
Office of Chief of Military History, 1955
841 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $6.25

eviewed by
OLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

Here is the saga of the Wacs, pre-nted in a superbly written history by former member of the Director's staff. is complete, honest, utterly frank—nd very provocative.

For as the story unfolds, it becomes parent that both the WAAC and its ccessor, the WAC, suffered about ually from slander and from stupidity. The slander campaign that reached arming proportions in mid-1943 is care-lly analyzed; it was not fomented by azi propagandists, nor was it entirely e consequence of a few obscene col-nns written by a single notorious scrib-er. Rather, it reflected the foul-minded itude of the public generally, and more rticularly of its male fighting men, in-ding some with commissions. One's se of shame is only somewhat lessened learning that the several women's vices in England were exposed to simi-defamation, with as little factual ndation as here.

Most of the obstructions that the AAC and WAC encountered within Army seem to have originated in the per reaches of the Army Service Forces pire. In the matter of proper clothing, quate as to quantity, type, and design, obstacles thrown up reflect a per-seness that could only have been the lt of ingrained opposition to the en-idea of women serving in the Army. fact that the uniform question was settled until well into 1944, by per-al decisions of the Chief of Staff on nerous details, is surely a revealing mentary on the quality of this facet ASF administration.

imilarly, so long as the WAAC and C were layered under the ASF ech-s, decisions were postponed and papers ing War Department action were re-ed; not until the Office of the Direc-WAC, was moved up to General level as a part of G1 was it in a ion to function properly. This, ob-sly, is another reflection on ASF, great logistical domain that was al-so much more successful in dealing things than with people. Indeed, the needless frustrations encountered by Colonel Hobby were such that it is really a tremendous tribute to her devotion and patriotism that she refrained from throwing the entire business back into the faces of those who so consistently—and so unnecessarily—increased her difficulties.

Lessons for a future conflict are easily deducible from Colonel Treadway's text. First and foremost, not only morale among military women, but their mental health as well, is a matter of proper classification and assignment. Second, women should be administered by WAC officers, suitably selected, and given full powers of command and discipline. Third, effective utilization of women requires that WAC staff directors' recommendations be accorded the same respect as the recommendations of other special staff officers within their own specialties. Fourth, where the man-woman relationship between superior and subordinate breeds untoward favoritism, trouble results. Fifth, women in mental groups IV and V are virtually without military usefulness. Sixth, women's effectiveness falls when their working hours are too long and their environment is too unsuitable. (It was probably a mistake to have sent Wacs to the South Pacific.) There are other points, but those are the highlights.

The matter of the permanent peacetime WAC is touched on obliquely. Significantly enough, Colonel Hobby never favored it. Service in an emergency is one thing, a thirty-year military career for a woman quite another—particularly as the Wac then faces the crowning tragedy of her sex, namely, that whereas a man at forty-five is normally reaching his peak, a woman at that age is generally passing hers.

At the risk of repetition: This is splendid organizational history, and no officer who anticipates high command, which in the future inevitably will involve women as well as men, can afford not to read and study the present volume.

Hatching of a General

THE WEB OF VICTORY
By Earl Schenck Miers
Alfred A. Knopf, 1955
320 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $5.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

This is two stories woven into one: the story of the most daring, brilliant, and probably least-known campaign in the annals of the United States Army, and the story of the man who planned it and carried it out—Ulysses S. Grant. Also, it falls squarely into the "About Time Department." It has always seemed remarkable to this reviewer that the multitudinous bibliography of the Civil War, the blazoning of the deeds of the Blue and the Gray, should lack any comprehensive analysis of the events leading up to the siege of Vicksburg.

Gettysburg we know. Antietam, Chancellorsville, Shiloh, Petersburg, Appomattox, and a host of other stirring and important names in the Civil War have been recalled in literary abundance. Vicksburg too we know—to the extent that Grant took it and thereby gave rise to a slang expression denoting celerity and completion.

But what historical facts do the names of Raymond, Jackson, Champion's Hill, and Black River evoke?

This reviewer writes with some feeling about this matter. From 1931 to 1933 he was privileged to attend the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. There he learned much about war, including amphibious operations, river crossings, diversions, and the value of strategical and tactical surprise. But he does not remember hearing a single word of discussion of Grant's crossing of the Mississippi at Hard Times, or of the following twenty-day whirlwind campaign during which Grant, cutting loose from his line of communications, threw his army between Johnston at Jackson and Pemberton at Vicksburg to defeat them each in detail and then lock the latter up in his doomed stronghold. These things your reviewer had to learn for himself.

It is about this nub that Mr. Miers, with much sympathetic feeling and historical accuracy, has woven his story of the doings of a great general. Perhaps one could better say the hatching of a general, for the author reveals to us the man Grant, in all his intenseness of purpose, taking the step which led to his later selection as general in chief.

It is a very human Grant that Mr. Miers reveals, with a human frailty overridden by his virtues of tenacity, calmness, and simplicity. One senses the feeling of confidence this sometimes stolid leader aroused in his subordinates, down to the last man in the rear rank—the confidence that leadership alone can inspire.

One follows Grant, bedevilled, to be

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re, but outwardly unruffled, through e combined frustrations that Fate, a termined enemy in the field, and ter- n, plus yapping politicians behind him, posed. There is a villain in the piece)—the bewhiskered, conniving McCler- nd, who never lost an opportunity to vart or besmirch the man who he felt od in his own way to personal ad- ıcement.

And, of course, there is a *fidus Achates*, : fiery Sherman, himself emerging from : cocoon to spread wings of leadership, l proving his readiness and ability to ome Grant's strong right arm in the 's to come.

Back of it all in Washington one npses a brooding Lincoln searching for general; hoping that in this man ınt he might find him, despite the ectives of press and politicians. So ght appeared the promise that Stanton ıld send out a personal emissary who uld observe and report.

Grant's reception of Charles A. Dana ıis headquarters was indeed revealing ıis simplicity of character. Well know- that Dana was "a chiel . . . takin' es," Grant welcomed him into his ıest councils as an observer, kept him e beside him, afforded him every op- unity. Fortunately, Dana, newspaper- ı and trained observer, was also a man haracter who could and did give un- ed reports. There can be no doubt Grant's future was influenced for better by Dana's reports. Our author ly weaves Dana's views on Grant and generals into the story.

he author is to be congratulated on agnificent drama as well as an excel- and badly needed appreciation of the sburg campaign in its entirety. One ıt hope that the reader of this book be led to delve further into the story Grierson's raid—the important diver- launched by Grant, and lately told *Grierson's Raid*, by D. Alexander m, which was reviewed in the Feb- 1955 JOURNAL.

vo criticisms are necessary. In the place, the three maps are entirely equate. Second, the one brief men- of Nathaniel Lyon on page 8 is ngly unjust to the memory of the who held Missouri in the Union eer initiative and leadership.

ıis book is heartily recommended to udents of leadership in war.

ı of Integrity

OT
Major S. J. Watson
Bodley Head, 1954
Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50

wed by
R MARK M. BOATNER III

ory does not come until the very f careers," wrote Napoleon in 1800 nan he was trying to keep in his e as Minister of War. He was prom- ising more glory to a man who had already merited enough for three men. But the ex-engineer officer who had been the Revolution's "Organizer of Victory," who had appointed Napoleon to his first independent command, refused to serve a leader who he felt was more interested in personal aggrandizement than in the country.

The fact that this is the first comprehensive biography of Carnot to appear in English is further testimony that true greatness must often wait long for the recognition it deserves.

Who was this man Carnot?

Carnot began his career as an inconspicuous officer of the King's engineers. He had completed a little more than ten years' service when in 1784 he won a medal for an essay on Vauban, the great exponent of siege warfare. This put him right in the middle of a controversy raging at the time on the subject of siegecraft and fortification. Unfortunately for his immediate career, it got him in on the side opposing the official "doctrine" of his corps.

While still pressing for much-needed army reforms, Carnot became interested in the revolutionary clubs that were springing into existence. In accordance with the peculiar situation of the times, he was able to enter politics and was elected People's Commissioner of the district in which he was stationed.

Although his complete sincerity and honesty were political handicaps, his military qualifications made him indispensable to a government on which foreign enemies were converging. In 1794, as a captain of engineers, Carnot was successfully controlling the operations of twelve armies in the field.

Traveling ceaselessly throughout France, he accomplished much-needed army reforms. Capitalizing on the revolutionary ardor of the French troops that made up for their lack of professional competence, he urged his generals to audacity: *"Soyez attaquants, sans cesse attaquants!"* The professionals were swept away by the amateurs who just wouldn't stop attacking. At Wattignies, Carnot personally led the attack in civilian clothes.

But it was a professional eye that showed Carnot the need for an offensive campaign in Italy and that picked the man to execute it. "Who is this little blusterer who boasts that he will sweep away the Austrians in less than six weeks?" wrote an old colonel. "He is a very forceful little man," answered Carnot, "and he is quite capable of keeping his word."

The little blusterer, needless to say, was Bonaparte. It took him less than twenty days to defeat the Austrians at Montenotte and to force an armistice on the Sardinians.

In a field wide open for self-seeking, Carnot remained a man of complete in-

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Major Russell A. Gugeler

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Reviewers say:

". . . For anybody who has ever served in war, for anybody who will ever have to serve in war." George Barrett, in *New York Times Sunday Book Review.*

". . . Of considerable professional interest to any military student and of particular interest to those who were there." Maj. J. R. Stevens, in *Marine Corps Gazette.*

"The ground forces would do well to set this book up as required reading." Army Times' *The American Daily.*

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A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

AROUND THE U.S.A. IN 1,000 PICTURES. Edited by A. Milton Runyon and Vilma F. Bergane. Doubleday & Company, 1955. 384 Pages; Index; $5.00. A selection of pictures from all over the United States which does not constitute a travelogue but merely a sampling of America's vast panorama.

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES. By Lt. Col. F. O. Miksche. Frederick A. Praeger, 1955. 222 Pages; Index; $5.00. A famous Czechoslovakian military writer tries his hand on the complications of atomic weapons down to divisional level.

CAVES OF BIAK. By Harold Riegelman. The Dial Press, Inc., 1955. 292 Pages; Maps; $4.00. The Republican candidate for Mayor of New York in 1953 writes of his experiences in the Southwest Pacific as Chemical Officer of I Corps. There is little in it for the professional soldier but Reserve officers may read it with a great sense of personal satisfaction. It tells well the story of the citizen soldier and his devotion to duty.

THE CRECY WAR: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360. By Lt. Col. Alfred H. Burne. Oxford University Press, 1955. 366 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $7.00. One of England's most scholarly (but not stuffy) military historians offers a study of a period of military history little known by most Americans. More military history written in this manner would make scholars of some of our less-well-read officers.

DEPENDENT BAGGAGE. By Marie Di Mario Wann. The Macmillan Company, 1955. 248 Pages; $3.50. The early occupation of Germany from the viewpoint of the wife of a civilian official. Personal, down-to-earth, but in final analysis primarily a combination of gripes about German nastiness and official stupidity.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. By William L. Chenery. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955. 256 Pages; Index; $3.75. Some historical and current examples of the never-ending fight against censorship. Better books on the subject have been written but this is at present the most current text and it is undoubtedly valuable for those who are interested in the problem.

THE FRENCH BROAD. By Wilma Dykeman; Illustrated by Douglas Gorsline. Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1955. 371 Pages; $5.00. This, the forty-ninth of the "Rivers of America" series, is an unusually intimate story of a little known river that flows between the Blue Ridge and the Great Smokies.

THE GREAT RECONNAISSANCE. By Edward S. Wallace. Little, Brown & Co., 1955. 288 Pages; Index; $5.00. The story of the exploration, survey and mapping of the American boundary with Mexico after 1848. Written with much anecdote and humor, it is a very pleasant addition to the history of the Western portion of the United States.

HANDBOOK OF SELF-DEFENSE: In Pictures and Text. By John Martone. Greenberg, Publisher, 1955, 111 Pages; $2.95. We haven't seen one of these in several years—during and shortly after the war there was quite a rash of books on this subject. Considered favorably by General Howard and Colonel Bryant of our Military Police Corps.

HEADQUARTERS. By Quentin Reynolds. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 339 Pages; $3.95. A famous writer tells the story of the most decorated active New York policeman, Inspector Frank Phillips, Commanding Officer of the Detective Bureau. Here is good writing based on exciting action and it will explain how a big-city Police Department operates.

THE LONELY SKY. By William Bridgeman with Jacqueline Hazard. Henry Holt & Co., 1955. 316 Pages; Illustrated; $3.95. The story of one of our more famous civilian test pilots—which still doesn't quite answer the problem of why a man chooses this particularly hazardous occupation. Aviation enthusiasts will be particularly impressed because a large part of the book covers his testing of the Skyrocket.

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-45; THE ARAKAN OPERATIONS, 1942-45. By Lt. Col. N. N. Madan. Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan, 1955. 371 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index. The Indian and Pakistan governments follow the British lead in writing recent military history in a frank and open manner. Here is the complete story of a bitter campaign written with official coldness but with devotion in the face of adversity shining through.

AN OUTLINE OF ATOMIC PHYSICS. By Oswald H. Blackwood, Thomas H. Osgood and Arthur E. Ruark. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955. 501 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $7.50. The third edition of a standard work designed for readers who have an elementary knowledge of physics. Over 35% of it is new material.

REALISTIC COMBAT TRAINING AND HOW TO CONDUCT IT. By Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg. Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. 239 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50 hardbound, $2.75 paperbound. A considerable expansion of Colonel Rigg's material which appeared in the ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. Much good material though somewhat unattractively presented. Valuable to 3s and COs.

THE ROCKET PIONEERS ON THE ROAD TO SPACE. By Beryl Williams and Samuel Epstein. Julian Messner, Inc., 1955. 241 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. A history of rocketry which offers a quick survey of what is rapidly becoming a field of great importance; in layman's language.

SATELLITE GENERALS: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere. By Ithiel de Sola Pool. Hoover Institute Studies, Series B, No. 5. Stanford University Press, 1955. 165 Pages; $1.75. A study of the sources and the future of leadership of the satellite armies. It is interesting to note that the author does not believe these forces will be integrated into the Russian Army. Scholarly and surprisingly complete.

SERVOMECHANISMS AND REGULATING SYSTEM DESIGN, Vol. II. By Harold Chestnut and Robert W. Mayer. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955. 384 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $8.50. A technical book for designers. Builds on the fundamentals outlined in Volume I. Of particular interest to our Antiaircraft and Ordnance members.

THE SILENT CONTINENT. By William H. Kerns, Jr. and Beverley Britton. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 237 Pages; $3.50. "The discovery and exploration of Antarctica—told in terms of the adventures and heroism of the great explorers."

SOVIET MILITARY LAW AND ADMINISTRATION. By Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner. Harvard University Press, 1955. 208 Pages; Index; $4.00. A book that is guaranteed to make American soldiers much more satisfied with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A good example of how American soldiers would not care to be governed.

U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA, Vol. I, The Pusan Perimeter. By Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC. Historical Branch, United States Marine Corps, 1955. 271 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $2.00. The first of four volumes on the Marines in the Korean War. Short but extremely well illustrated. It is down to company and platoon level in some actions. Better reading than most official histories.

THE URANIUM PROSPECTOR'S GUIDE. By Thomas J. Ballard and Quentin E. Conklin. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 251 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.50. It appears that locating a fortune in uranium requires more than a burro and a pick. For those located within striking distance of the Colorado plateau and who know a little about geology or mining law this book would be extremely valuable. Parts of it require study rather than reading.

WALL STREET: MEN AND MONEY. By Martin Mayer. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 274 Pages; Index; $3.50. A layman's explanation, chatty and exceptionally understandable, of what makes the wheels of finance go around. Recommended highly for those who dabble in the stock market.

WHEELS WEST: The Story of the Donner Party. By Homer Croy. Hastings House, 1955. 242 Pages; Index; $3.75. Another view of one of the West's best-known epics. A grim story but the author keeps it far above the level of soap opera.

:egrity. When he realized the true nature of Napoleon's personal ambition, Carnot efused to serve him any longer. "You ıave to choose for your place in history o be either a Cromwell or a Washing-on," Carnot told Napoleon candidly. If you make a bad choice, you will be ıeading for a great fall."

Major Watson was first attracted to Car-ot while at Oxford. Ten years later, as a ıegular officer of the Royal Engineers ttending the Staff College at Camberley, e was amazed to find that no compre-ensive biography of Carnot existed in nglish. Combining the military phi-ısophy of direct action with the admi-ıble literary tradition of the British Ar-ıy, Major Watson wrote the book in ngland, finished correcting the proofs hile serving in Korea, and saw it pub-ıshed just before leaving England to at-nd our own Command and General :aff College at Fort Leavenworth.

›ng-Needed Facts

)UR ASSIGNMENT OVERSEAS: A Handbook · the Serviceman and His Family
By Major Vernon Pizer and Capt. Perry H. Davis II
W. W. Norton & Company, 1955
291 Pages; $3.50

viewed by
'. Col. Robert B. Rigg

From the quonset quarters in Golcuk, ırkey, to an apartment in Vienna, this ely text will tell you what to take and ıat to expect in almost every part of : globe. No military family should be :hout this book, which will more than ›ay its dollar cost on the next overseas ve—and make moving more efficient l economical. It is an insurance policy your household goods because it guides : in the correct disposition of personal ›ngings as related to various foreign ts manned by the armed forces.

The authors have described foreign ts in terms of living, and not just with l statistics. Sidi Slimane, Naples, ›nika, Berlin, Istanbul, Japan, Ger-ıy, Puerto Rico, Alaska, Okinawa, in, Labrador, Hawaii, and many other ıts of modern military service are dis-ed in what to bring, cost of servants, lities or lack of them, social life, ›ols, quarters, and so on. Facts about ›mobiles are plentiful. You do not one to Bermuda, a sturdy jalopy is ·ou will need in the Azores, it is well l legal) to sell your car in the Philip-s, and the roads of Eritrea will be h and few—but you can drive to is Ababa if you are adventurous. :e are helpful guides on insurance. ere is your way out of the electrical-ance maze. If your wife has blown se and burned out a fine 110-volt ance on a foreign 220-volt circuit, will never do so again if she reads fact-packed volume.

You may feel that your own experience qualifies you to prepare your family for any future station, but after you have read this book you will think differently. While Major Pizer and Captain Davis have lived in eight houses, nine apartments, countless hotel rooms, and one trailer, in their combined twenty-six years of service—many military families can say that this is anything but a record. However, the authors know their subject beyond the thirty-six foreign countries they have lived in, and they have gathered data that make them authorities in facts you can use.

Military attaché posts are not covered except in nations where there are U.S. military stations and missions. Iran and Yugoslavia might have been included, considering our advisory efforts there. Indochina is omitted, but Formosa is well covered.

In future editions the authors might well include some illustrations.

No single book exists which will match this one in practical facts for the moving military family. Non-military travelers can benefit by this text also. A handbook of this nature has been needed for a long time.

Frustration in High Places

ADMIRAL AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA
By Adm. William H. Standley and Rear Adm. Arthur A. Ageton
Henry Regnery Company, 1955
533 Pages; Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy

After reading this book one wonders why the title was not stated as a query. Admiral Standley never knew whether he had been sent as Ambassador to Moscow (that is, personal representative of the Chief of State) or as a figurehead who would not object to the Roosevelt custom of by-passing which prevailed not only in the diplomatic but in all the branches of the Executive under FDR.

One wonders why the delay in publishing an account of experiences which were terminated more than ten years ago. It could be that loyalty to the memory of the late President who was such a staunch supporter of the naval service deterred the old sailor. Maybe it took a ten-year cooling-off period for Admiral Standley before his views of the treatment he received could be committed to paper without having it burst into flame. The phrase most often repeated is "Of course, I was not informed." One develops a sympathy for the old man who received churlish treatment from the Russians and childish treatment from his own people.

The first hundred pages of the book are devoted to the author's naval career and the build-up for his appointment as Ambassador. Then there follows a rambling account of the eighteen months spent in Moscow, presented in part in chronological form and in part by separate accounts of the visits by plenipotentiaries and extraordinaries whom Mr. Roosevelt had dispatched and who in rapid succession marched across the toes of Admiral Standley. These include Wendell Willkie, Brig. Gen. Follett Bradley, Joe E. Davies, Arthur Sulzberger, Eddie Rickenbacker, Maj. Gen. Burns, and what seems like a host of others. The chronology becomes confused with the detailed accounts of the visits, which results in considerable repetition and backtracking. The book closes with an excellent chapter covering the author's appraisal of our errors in dealing with the Soviets and stating a philosophy for future dealings and a posture to satisfy that philosophy. In the author's own words, "I have derived certain lessons which I would like to present." It is unfortunate that one must read to page 520 before finding the real purpose of the book.

There are many evident errors regarding personages and places which might be attributed to the frailty of an 83-year-old memory, but the co-author is still young enough and a contemporary, so that he must be held responsible. While the student of history who knows better may not be disturbed by the statement that Sir Hastings Ismay was Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1941 (a job he never held) or that John Sullivan was Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1941 when he was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, or that General Joe McNarney was Admiral Kelly Turner's War Department counterpart when he sat on the Roberts Commission (McNarney was never Turner's opposite except during the temporary absences of General Gerow and left Washington to go to London as military observer in September 1941, not returning until just before the Roberts Commission was formed), still to the reader who has lived through the period it is a bit disturbing. One wonders how much erroneous reporting is included in the account of the Moscow activities, a scene that not all were privileged to observe.

If only the hurt feelings did not stick out from every page, some sections of the book would be fine reading and would constitute an excellent contribution to historical literature. In this regard, the accounts of the problem of the Polish refugees in Russia and the Katyn Forest episode are especially noteworthy. It is unfortunate that the Admiral did not write in more detail of the Katyn Forest massacre, particularly in view of his testimony before the Congressional committee. The accounts of the visits of Wendell Willkie and Joe E. Davies are interesting, and to this reviewer's knowledge are reported here for the first time by a witness to these events.

Like most of our military leaders, Ad-



HUMAN MEASUREMENTS

Of The Average Adult Male

Including 97.5 and 2.5 Percentile

Average Weight — 153.1 Lb.	202.0 118.0
Left Handed	6.6%
Color Blind	3.5%
Hard of Hearing	4.5%
Wear Glasses	43.6%

PORTRAIT OF JOE

This is Joe—the typical American man. He's the hero of Henry Dreyfuss' new book, *Designing for People*. Joe's dimensions help determine the size and shape of many of the everyday things that you use. Dreyfuss is an industrial designer who believes that machines should be built around the people who use them. He makes Joe his starting point when he has to decide how far buttons and levers can be placed away from the central controls of a machine, or the best size for an Army helmet.

Many of Dreyfuss' designs have been aimed at improving military efficiency. During World War II he redesigned the driver's compartment of a tank. Drivers had been becoming unduly fatigued in traveling over rough terrain in combat. Dreyfuss found that this was due to the cramped position in which they were forced to sit. With the help of Joe, he was able to design a more comfortable, and therefore more efficient, compartment. Controls were placed within easy reach and given different shapes so that they were easily identifiable in the dim interior.

A study of Joe's anthropometry reveals many interesting facts about ourselves. Likewise with Josephine, who is absent, this being a magazine for men.

miral Standley was never taken in by the Russians or Communism. From the beginning he recognized this "strange Alliance" for what it really was: military opportunity. He accepted the appointment to Moscow because he looked on it as a quasi-military task, only to find that even his small military responsibilities had to be shared with others. He came close to greatness when in blunt sailor fashion he tried to force the Kremlin to advise the Russian people of the magnitude of Lend-Lease and Russian relief and risked much by accusing Stalin at a press conference of withholding this information from the people. But in the end, old Navy discipline prevailed and Russian censorship combined with news handling by OWI softened the impact on the folk back home.

In the foreword the author reminds us that "Nations, like people, have a long memory where insult or injury is concerned." There is ample evidence here that this human weakness still prevails.

In a Realistic World

THE ADULT'S AMERICAN HISTORY: Pragmatic Democracy in Action
By Leland D. Baldwin
Richard R. Smith, Publisher, Inc., 1955
861 Pages; Index; Illustrated; $8.00

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

A serious deficiency in American education was discovered in the late war. Like many others who were closely associated in military training with the youth of this country, I found among them a disheartening ignorance of American history and of the meaning of the American experiment. Few could say with Lincoln had called our democracy "the last, best hope of earth." Few realized why Dr. Baldwin is justified in opening this history of our country with the words: "The United States is built upon the splendid faith that, given time and opportunity, the masses can become aristocrats in the best sense of that word. If we fail, all that can be said is that at least it was worth trying once in history."

Dr. Baldwin's history is therefore particularly gratifying because it emphasizes the ideal of democracy in the United States. In carrying out his purpose to show pragmatic democracy in action, he accounts for the unique role of the United States in history in advancing human dignity and freedom. If Dr. Baldwin can be said to have a frame of reference in writing his history, it is the American concept of democracy. His own Creed for Democracy serves as a prologue and in it he defines the term. On a single page he epitomizes in thoughtful and well-chosen words the purpose, method, rights and duties of the believer in Democracy. It's a good beginning for an American history. It's an extremely useful reminder

for the sophisticated as well as for the unlettered.

Although the word "adult" is used in the title, the reading level of this book requires no more than a high-school education. Certainly the more mature the mind, the greater will be the value of this history to the reader. It is, however, extremely readable, in fact enjoyable; and an unusually large number of well-drawn maps, charts, illustrations, and cartoons are visual aids of constant use and value.

Who Worries about Reds?

COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
By Samuel A. Stouffer
Doubleday & Company, 1955
279 Pages; Appendixes; $4.00

Reviewed by
RICHARD GORDON MCCLOSKEY

Here is an attempt to find out what 5,000 average citizens and 1,500 local community leaders think about Communism, civil liberties, and the right to have an opinion different from the neighbors'.

The Gallup Poll and the National Opinion Research Center of Chicago University made the survey. The results may surprise, shock, delight, dismay you —or bore you—depending on what your opinion is about your neighbors' opinions.

Without going into a welter of ifs, ands, and buts about the validity of the questions posed by the pollsters, the general results of the survey show:

Less than one per cent of the American people are even remotely worried about the threat of Communism in the United States, or about their civil liberties. "I don't worry about things like politics, because we have people who are paid to do that kind of worrying." What 80 per cent of Americans do worry about are health and finances, not Reds under the beds.

Generally, the better-educated and the younger generation are more tolerant than the less-educated and older generation. Women and rural residents are less tolerant than men and city folk. Community leaders—mayors, the president of the local PTA council, Community Chest chairmen, labor-union heads, American Legion commanders, and so on—are encouragingly better informed and more tolerant than the average citizen. This fact, I think, is the most important one to come out of the survey. If our leadership is responsible, the average citizen's tendency to let John worry about it is an unfortunate one, but perhaps not tragic. If, however, the citizen's indifference to national and world affairs leads him to vote for knaves and demagogues, then letting Joe worry it could lead to stark tragedy.

There is much of value to mull over in this survey. I don't suggest you rush out and buy a copy, but put your name on the list in the library to get it. It makes very interesting reading.

Pass In Review

During World War II, Ernest Hemingway edited a collection of war stories that we judged to be the really basic book of war literature. Unfortunately, the book was allowed to go out of print right after the war and is only now being reissued in a clothbound edition. It's called *Men at War* ($4.95) and contains 1,100 pages of the finest contributions to military literature. It includes portions of classics such as Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage; Horatius at the Bridge; The Trojan Horse;* and hundred of others from the Bible through Dunkirk in World War II. We're willing to stick our necks way out on this one, and recommend it highly.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg is well known to JOURNAL readers for his frequent contributions. He's been plugging for greater realism in training —which he discussed in part in his article, "Blow Up Your Commander," in the December 1953 issue of the The JOURNAL. He's compiled his thoughts on this subject in book form, aptly titled *Realistic Combat Training and How to Conduct It* (cloth $3.50, paper $2.75). It will be reviewed in detail in these pages, but for those who know Rigg's work this advance announcement will suffice.

The JOURNAL has also served as the advance vehicle for another book. You will recall the popular series we ran a year ago entitled "Around the Bases," dealing with what to expect in various overseas areas. These articles were by-lined "Marco Polo"—who can now be unveiled as Captain Perry H. Davis. Captain Davis has teamed with Major Vernon Pizer to bring out *Your Assignment Overseas* ($5.00). This useful book has answers to all the questions that come to mind when overseas orders are in the offing.

One new arrival this month promises to be of interest: *Atomic Weapons and Armies,* by Lt. Col. F. O. Miksche ($5.00). Miksche, author of several military semi-classics, served with the Fighting French Forces during World War II and put in some time at SHAEF. For the last five years he's been on the faculty of the Staff College of the Portuguese Army. In this book, he presents his views on the effects of atomic warfare at the division and army level.

Clay Blair, Jr., *Time's* enterprising representative at the Pentagon, has come out with a new book that sounds intriguing. It's called *Beyond Courage* ($3.50) and describes four survival and escape experiences from the Korean war. These heroic episodes were taken from actual case histories in Air Force records and rank right at the top in initiative, endurance, and courage.

Doubleday & Company is engaged in a most interesting publishing venture which it calls "Mainstream of America Series." It has contracted with some of the Nation's outstanding historians to prepare a series of books on American history written in highly readable, popular style. The three we have read so far have been excellent: Stewart Holbrook's *Age of the Moguls,* Paul Wellman's *Glory, God and Gold,* and most recently an unusually fine account of our Revolutionary War by Bruce Lancaster called *From Lexington to Liberty,* which Lynn Montross reviewed so favorably in last month's JOURNAL. The fourth is just coming out. It is by Clifford Dowdy and is entitled *The Land They Fought For* ($6.00). It deals with the Civil War South and will be followed by a companion volume by Bruce Catton on the Civil War North. Naturally, Lee and Jackson are the heroes of this account, and Lincoln is somewhat the villain.

Ken Giniger, former JOURNAL contributor, who is now vice president of Hawthorn Books, has just edited *The Compact Treasury of Inspiration* ($3.95) which is one of the finest things of its kind we've seen. He's included contributions from the Bible, all religious denominations, and such stirring essays as Conwell's "Acres of Diamonds" and Hubbard's "Message to Garcia." It's really an excellent gift item.

The prolific Lynn Montross, whom we mentioned earlier, is party to another bit of book news this month. With Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, he has written the first volume in the history of U. S. Marine Corps operations in Korea. This volume, *The Pusan Perimeter* ($2.00), is the first of four volumes which will describe Marine operations in the Korean conflict.

—R.F.C.

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JOURNAL

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The Delegation of Responsibility

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER L. WEIBLE

Management includes the development of managers. So pile the responsibility on the man who can produce; kick out the man who can't

DELEGATION of authority is one of the things that are always applicable in management. Regardless of the kind of management, the delegation of authority requires the greatest amount of good judgment and wisdom. There are some people who believe in sweepingly delegating authority to subordinates or to subordinate echelons. There are other people who won't delegate a bit of it but exercise the highest degree of centralized control. There isn't any categorical solution to when, how, or where to delegate authority. It depends upon your judgment; it depends upon the people with whom you are working. If you have the utmost faith, confidence and trust in them (all of which are based on sound knowledge of their capabilities), then you can delegate until "hell freezes over." If you haven't, you don't. Certainly everybody that works for you can't be put in the same category. There must be some whom you do trust even though there may be some whom you don't. You're the man who must "hold the sack" in the delegation of authority.

ON the other hand, decentralization, which I "preach" so much in the Department of the Army, depends upon the degree of responsibilities *you should be able to place upon a lower echelon.* It's an entirely different matter, because you can't be expected as an individual to do everything yourself; you must make certain other people or branches or sections or echelons be responsible for doing a certain part of it. Otherwise, the result is highly centralized control; when you're not there nothing happens; no decisions are made; everything goes to "pot." If you die, it takes your successor months to pick up the loose ends to find out what you were doing and why you were doing it. So the delegation of responsibility which is decentralization must be based on what you expect that particular branch, man, section, or echelon to do. What have you the right to expect should be done by them? Then you give them the responsibility. If they "fall on their face," you "kick" them out; get rid of them. We don't want them; we can't use them. But if you never give them the responsibility, if you assume it all yourself, they are going to be promoted time after time after time, until one da they're going to be in a position of responsibility. The when they fail, everybody says, "Why? That fello got wonderful reports throughout his career and no suddenly he fails us." Why? The fault was in th people who rated him in the days gone by. They pr moted him beyond his capabilities to assume, or accep or discharge responsibility; they never tested him b placing the responsibility squarely on his shoulders. we don't reverse this trend, we are not going to develo the type of people for the future who will be "runnin things; the future concerns me now. The future is your hands and in the hands of the people whom yo control; if you do a good job, then we need not worr But if you don't, all we're going to have in key positio in the future is a "bunch of nincompoops" who real don't know how to operate. It's not going to be whol their fault; it's going to be partially your fault.

SO I claim that an important part of manageme consists really in developing your own people; th succession for the future is a most important thing think of regardless of what field of management yo are in. Pile the responsibility on a man who can pr duce, let him grow. If he continually produces, you' got somebody and if he doesn't, rate him low ar eventually get rid of him. We can't use him; we don want him going "up the path" only to find some da ten or fifteen years from now that he's a failure. So, repeat—one of the greatest things in management is th development of the people for whom you are respo sible. There must be an unselfishness in this becau that fellow may some day take over your job, but th shouldn't stop you. It's a most comforting feeling to b able to leave your desk for a little while and know th everything isn't going to "pot," that you've got som fellow there whom you've developed who is going handle it for you and handle it well. It's a most uncom fortable feeling to leave with the idea that everythin may go "haywire" during your absence. So it is to yo everlasting credit if you devote some of your managerial ability toward developing those whom you control.

Drawn from a talk to the Army Supply Management Course Class at Fort Lee, Virginia, 22 April 1955

the world's shortest runway

In the event of surprise attack with today's weapons, a single bomb could wipe out a whole area. Meanwhile, longer and heavier runways are essential to the operation of today's aircraft.

Because of this, the Air Force has long been concerned with the need for entirely new ways of getting its fighter planes into the air by means which would eliminate the concentration of aircraft in the vulnerable areas of forward bases.

Martin engineers, working with the Air Research and Development Command, were given the job of finding a solution to this important problem—and shown here is their answer.

It is the world's shortest airstrip—a mobile zero-length launcher which is transportable by air or land and which operates in a space of only ten square yards. It is shown here blasting a piloted Republic F-84 into full flight without the necessity of any take-off run.

As an outgrowth of the work of the same Martin-ARDC team which produced the TM-61 Matador pilotless bomber and zero-length launcher, this important development is another example of Martin's contribution to American airpower and security.

MARTIN

BALTIMORE · MARYLAND

HELICOPTER LEADS DISASTER DRILL—The U. S. Coast Guard and the American Red Cross combine forces to practice highly effective rescue techniques in a simulated disaster. The drill took place off Brooklyn, New York. Having led two surfboats to the beach, a Coast Guard Sikorsky HO4S hovers nearby to effect any further rescues necessary. Versatile Sikorsky helicopters see extensive service in Coast Guard units.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



CONGO COPTER—Sabena Belgian World Airlines officials prepare to test one of three Sikorsky S-55 helicopters soon to fly over Belgian Congo jungles. The helicopters will spray and dust insecticides in the never ending battle against disease-bearing insects. Sabena will operate these S-55s along with the S-51s which pioneered this jungle work in the Leopoldville area.



HELICOPTERS RESCUE 93—Two H-19 Sikorskys from the U. S. Air Force's Air Rescue Service last March rescued 93 men, women and children from a storm-swept South Carolina lake. They were stranded on sandbars and small islands when violent storms struck suddenly. The helicopters made more than 23 trips to bring the marooned people to safety on the mainland.

ARMY GETS FIRST H-34s—Two big H-34s, Army versions of Sikorsky's new S-58 helicopter, take off on their delivery flight. First deliveries of this model began in March. The H-34 provides a substantial increase in size, capacity and performance over the Sikorsky H-19s already in wide use by Army units. The big H-34 has as its Navy counterpart the anti-submarine HSS.

HELICOPTER HISTORY:

First helicopters sent overseas by the Army

In November, 1943, the first helicopters to be sent overseas, Sikorsky R-4s, were delivered at Stratford, Connecticut to the Army Air Force. They were disassembled and loaded into cargo planes for the long flight to the China-Burma-India war theatre.

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"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security."

ASSOCIATION'S JOURNAL

INFORMED military circles in Washington (and probabl elsewhere) are discussing the speech the Chief of Informa tion made to the Civilian Aides Conference at West Point 2 May.

General Mudgett mentioned out loud some of the thing that have long bothered those of us who realize the Army' problems in gaining a favorable press, and the advantages o such a press at a time when the Army seems to be squeeze smaller and made less effective in favor of the more glamorou services.

He listed six Army-made obstacles to better understanding and six others over which the Army has little or no control.

In the first classification we have: (1) a lack of publi relations experience among the leaders from regimental com manders up; (2) the tradition of officer aloofness from th public; (3) the average Army officer's fear of reporters; (4 branch consciousness which prevents telling the *Army* story (5) too little advance planning in the field of information and (6) our unenthusiastic "alumni," which indicates un successful indoctrination.

The Army has little control over (1) the fact that the Arm always produces the largest casualty list; (2) the difficulty o glamorizing a foxhole and other evidences of the Army' rugged life; (3) the feeling that the Army is big becaus professional soldiers want it that way; (4) the large proportio of draftees and Reserve officers in the Army whose mai purpose seems to be to get out of the service; (5) the wide and therefore complicated role of the Army, which is difficul to present to the public; and (6) the fact that the Air Force an Navy benefit from industry's advertising, since these service absorb the entire output of many individual corporations.

MEMBERS of our Association may well be proud that Ger eral Mudgett singled it out for mention in offering sug gestions on how to improve the Army's position. He said:

"The Army has a great need for an organization similar t the Navy League and the United States Air Force Associatior These are basically civilian organizations devoted to the ac vancement of the uniformed Services they sponsor. Th Association of the United States Army though simila to the United States Air Force Association in name is nc similar in character or structure. Its Board of Directors i selected primarily from officers both active and retired wit the active duty members taking the most active part. Ther are some directors and members of The Association of th United States Army who believe it highly desirable t campaign for a greatly increased civilian membership of th Association and progressively to elect civilian directors unt control is eventually assumed to a great degree by non-un formed personnel. This would, of course, require amendmen of the Constitution of the Association to provide voting men bership for civilian members. Such a proposal is not ready fc presentation at this time but we may later ask for your advic and assistance in examining such a project. . . ."

Here, indeed, is something to think about.

THE Army's story needs to be told, better than it has bee in the past, and effectively enough to improve the futur of the Army, and thus the future of national defense. Genera Mudgett's speech is evidence that real consideration is bein given to the problem in the highest echelons of the Depar ment of the Army, and that your Association may have a important part to play in the solution. Your Association wi do its part, and your Journal, as the most vital activity of th Association, will keep you posted on developments.

The Publishe

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- Advance man's knowledge of warfare in the fields of strategy, tactics, logistics, operations, administration, weapons and weapons systems.
- Advance man's knowledge and understanding of the soldier as an individual, as a member of a trained unit, and as a member of the whole Army; emphasizing leadership, esprit, loyalty, and a high sense of duty.
- Disseminate knowledge of military history, especially articles that have application to current problems or foster tradition and create esprit.
- Explain the important and vital role of the United States Army in the Nation's defense and show that the Army is alert to the challenges of new weapons, machines, and methods.
- Advance the status of the soldier's profession.

(Adopted by the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, 21 June 1954)

The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

July 1955 Vol. 5, No. 12

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General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

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THE MONTH'S MAIL

Bring Back the Horseflesh

• The article on China in the May JOURNAL ("In China, Recon Is for Foot Soldiers") seems vividly to point out again that we made a great mistake several years ago when we chucked all our horse cavalry. The situation and terrain there clearly call for fast-moving horse reconnaissance outfits.

We found we needed them in Italy during the last war and should have learned a lesson about their employment from the Chinese Reds in Korea. The "four-legged jeep" worked in CBI during World War II and will no doubt come into his own again if we have to fight in that area in the future.

Light-mounted reconnaissance battalions on the order of the German infantry regiment's mounted reconnaissance battalion, or our 3d Infantry Division's provisional mounted reconnaissance squadron in Italy during World War II will be able to move rapidly across country in the rough terrain between those main roads twice as fast as dismounted patrols can and will keep those road-bound columns well informed on enemy activity. . . .

Let's hope Captain Little is wrong about his mass army, because there are a number of young men spending four years being trained for a way of life which no longer exists, if he is right. Take away the Army way of life and what do we have left to hope for in our careers? Here's to an army with plenty of *esprit de corps*, discipline, and morale!

CADET F. J. KLINE, '57

VMI
Lexington, Va.

Thank You, Sir!

• After three issues of THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, I am more than pleased. As you have guessed, I am ex-AAA, now Arty, and unfortunately, retired as well.

I regretted—not resented—the shuffle-off of the *Antiaircraft Journal*. Colonels Brady, Harris, and a host of others produced a whale of a good professional digest and I enjoyed it—even contributed to it a couple of times. However, even an irreconcilable would have a hard time being lonesome in the company of the distinguished Generals Lemnitzer, Weible, and others. And Colonel Bunker's revered father was one of my very best former COs.

I note the half impasse between AAA and FA, but in AAA circles I find a similar discussion going on relative to qualifications which must characterize the AAA and the GM officer. It is my own thought that only an extremely capable and necessarily small group can be interchangeable in this field alone. Time and experience are necessary to plot the trend which will determine the proficiencies required and the organization best fitted to apply them.

In the meantime, if we all remember that in all activities we are working for the same high ideal, the technical assignments will be resolved. I wish there was a way in which I could start all over.

COL. RUSSEL K. HAVIGHORST
Arty, Retired

7231 Sunset Drive
Miami 43, Fla.

Biased Umpires?

• As a member of the 51st AIB, I recently participated in Exercise BLUE BOLT here at Fort Hood. Particularly impressive to me was the speed of attacks launched both by Aggressor (4th Armored Division) and U.S. forces (1st Armored Division): The stock school phrase, "shock action," was brought home very vividly in the attack of armor columns.

However, I could not help but feel that the exercise did not nearly show the true effect of well-led and well-entrenched infantry. It seems to me that umpire-actioned armor exercises will never achieve a true perspective against infantry until a dummy round is developed for infantry antitank weapons.

Actual hits on armor by squash-head rounds will cause umpires to slow action, where the present tendency is to ride over the insignificant 3.5 rocket-launcher positions on a sort of weight-to-weight scoring basis, favoring the tanks by slightly biased odds.

LT. T. A. REHM

Hq CCA, 4th Armd Div.
Fort Hood, Texas

"Solidarity," Continued

• Captain Little, in the February JOURNAL, paints an accurate and gloomy picture of the decline of military virtues in our Army. Some comments expressed in your March issue are depressing in that the writers have apparently not grasped Captain Little's none too subtle irony and have not taken into consideration his quotation marks.

It seems to me that I understood the thoughts of this master craftsman in our language until his last paragraph:

"Still, the mass army will win wars or perform the tasks assigned to it. Mass soldiers will accept their jobs, the need to perform them and, if necessary, to sacrifice their lives in doing the task. But they will expect it to be done in a businesslike way, without fanfare and trumpets, and then go home."

If Captain Little is right in this judgment, then the character of the soldier has changed. Study of historical campaigns and reading of celebrated military writers is outmoded. I submit, first, that the mass army will *not* win wars and, second, that if it inconceivably could, all the ships at sea would not suffice for the subsequent "Operation Glory."

COL. REYNOLDS CONDON

Hq SWComd.
APO 9, San Francisco

• *See Page 53 for another blast at "Mass Armies." With the possible exception of a final rebuttal by Captain Little, this will close the debate, for the time at least.*

Harvard Salutes Princeton

• As a Harvard man, I was greatly interested and amused by Captain Richard P. Taffe's article, "Homburgs and Helmets" [April issue], comparing the USMA class of 1944 with the same class of Princeton.

As a footnote to Captain Taffe's article, it might be interesting to note that as of a year ago, the commanders of both of New York's Reserve divisions were Princeton men—the 77th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Julius Ochs Adler, now retired (Princeton 1914); and the 98th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General John Williams Morgan (Princeton 1916).

Congratulations on a splendid magazine which I look forward to each month.

LT. COL. GEORGE C. ALEXANDER
Arty, USAR

857 State Road
Mounted Route 17
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Shrapnel, Again

• Even general officers are human and are not immune to error. Major General H. W. Blakeley's article on mines in THE JOURNAL for May is excellent and timely. However, it contains one error which no well-informed member of the Army should make. In the second illustration from the right in the upper portion of page 33 is shown a Russian fragmentation or antipersonnel mine. It

is described as "a shrapnel mine." This is a grossly erroneous designation regardless of what anyone may say.

* * *

I am enclosing a reprint of a more detailed article on shrapnel by me, published in *The Military Surgeon* [now *Military Medicine*], September 1953, which I hope you will please send to General Blakeley. I received a highly complimentary letter on the article from the late Colonel Calvin Goddard.

COL. JOHN H. SCHAEFER
Medical Corps, Retired

535 S. Curson
Los Angeles 36, Calif.

• *General Blakeley, believe it or not, has made a minor crusade of the tendency of people to call shell fragments shrapnel. He has never overlooked an opportunity, in writing or conversation, to point out that shell fragments are not shrapnel. Further, the good General had nothing to do with the two-page picture spread in our May issue. The captions were written by one of the staff, who followed paragraph 99 of TM 5-223A, which definitely called the POMZ-2 a "shrapnel mine." We have now converted our staff member to be a member of the crusade. General Blakeley is quite familiar with Colonel Schaefer's article on shrapnel; indeed he pressed a copy into the hands of another member of the staff shortly after it appeared, pleading with him to be converted and quit misusing the word.*

Captain Tactic Gets His Lumps

I wonder how many Cerebrations will ood your office in answer to the claims f one Captain Tactic ("U.S. Grant Vasn't a Trooper") in the May JOUR-AL.

I can only presume that Captain actic is not an airborne officer. Conequently, I cannot be angered by his guments, but can only feel sorry for im that he has not had the great oportunity of taking airborne training. I ould like to dissect his arguments hrase by phrase, but I am sure that the erebrations section will be too crowded. t any rate, I must tackle his last sennce, word by word.

It reads: "This ill-considered scheme r the bedevilment of officers who alady have demonstrated ability and dee for Regular Army service stands to hieve little and lose much."

Ill-Considered? I have no knowledge how much staff wrangling was preninary to this program, but even if it as an impromptu affair, it is no less a ork of mild genius than if it were instakingly worked out.

Bedevilment? Certainly every officer ected should be highly pleased that has been selected for such important training so early in his career without having to make repeated attempts through channels, as I had to do.

Achieve little? We will gain thousands of better-trained and better-motivated officers.

Lose much? Exactly what?

I must agree with the Captain that this program accomplishes nothing that could not be accomplished by giving similar training to the entire Army. Unfortunately, that is not possible. But, admitting that we cannnot train the whole Army to be rangers and paratroopers, how can we state that the impact of any one or several successive West Point classes will be negligible? These men are our future leaders. They will lead the way they are trained and inspired.

I can speak only for airborne. I have not had the privilege of taking ranger training though I certainly would if I thought an officer of my grade and branch could get in. But speaking of airborne, I am ready to take the Captain's bets on his three prophesied results. The Regular Army will not lose any significant number of potentially excellent officers. I think the Captain hung himself here by including the qualifying term "potentially excellent." I cannot see how the prestige of airborne will be lowered by considering it an essential pursuit for every Regular Army combat officer.

I went through airborne training as a field-grade officer. I was in horrible physical condition at the time and I had a rough go of it. I remember distinctly sobbing out loud on one of the longer runs. The "sympathetic" reaction of the cadre sergeant was to yell, "Will the trainee who is groaning in the last squad please groan in cadence?" I cannot see a cadre of that caliber lowering standards for any number of West Point lieutenants.

Volunteering for airborne has never seemed to me to stand on the pureness of the motive behind the letter of application. I have known volunteers of many shades of reluctance; volunteers who desired to get out of a difficult situation; volunteers who preferred Stateside jumping with an airborne division to ground-pounding overseas; and men who were "volunteered" by a wife with an acute appreciation of the extra grocery money involved. The volunteering that counts is the voluntary step through the door of the aircraft at a thousand feet—and then voluntarily getting back into the aircraft to go back for more.

Please, Captain, do not make the suggestion that the technical services be saddled with officers who fail to meet the standards of fortitude required in the combat arms.

Physiologically, you are correct in stating that physical fitness is a fleeting achievement. Not so fleeting as thirty

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days, perhaps, but certainly it can go in six months. However, you fail to reckon with inspiration. Once I *did* get into physical shape I have been encouraged to keep it. Right now I am the only airborne officer in my unit, and when the results of the semiannual PT tests are tallied I stand at the top—well above the young lieutenants.

You are quite right in stating that jumping out of aircraft and helling around in a swamp are not strict requisites for effective military leadership. However, a certain bravado and a willingness to face danger and difficult situations have always been fairly good indicators. It seems a rather peculiar coincidence that a very large number of airborne officers are included in those now at the top of the military pyramid.

Just what are the magic properties instilled by completion of airborne training? Now that I frankly cannot answer. I can feel these properties, but I cannot describe them. My only suggestion is that if you wish an answer to that question, try it yourself.

LT. COLONEL MEDIC

• The article in the May issue by Captain Tactic will no doubt give rise to many warm discussions on the subject of requiring newly commissioned RA second lieutenants to take either airborne or ranger training. Never in the past had I considered myself a "self-styled hard guy." I fear now I fall well within the limits of such a category. I stand as a firm backer of the policy that newly commissioned officers take this training.

No one denies the fact that many wars have been won by non-airborne soldiers or by others lacking the rugged experience of ranger training in the less accessible parts of our Southland. This lack of denial amounts to very little, however. Many lives might have been saved in these very same wars had certain leaders been required to display beforehand a bit of courage that too late they discovered they did not have. General McClellan remains somewhat infamous for his inability to make decisions that would have won the Civil War at a considerably cheaper price. How long would he last if he could not decide in five seconds that his main chute would not open?

* * *

Finally, look at the matter this way. Keep the standards high and the level of performance remains high. West Point has proven this repeatedly. Maybe the rigid physical examination, the stringent academic requirements, and the constant calling upon a cadet to produce are not always necessary. But these things pay off. Almost all our officers at one time or another complain about the decreased standards of the Officers Corps. Enough complaining—let's face up and do something about it. Make that new officer reach for that bar and he will protect its value.

LT. DERYLE T. WHIPPLE

Hq 7812th AU
APO 227, N.Y.C.

Origin of Leader Reaction Course

• I read with interest and no small degree of satisfaction the item about the "Leader Reaction Course" [Infantry School News] in your May issue. I haven't written to THE JOURNAL since you so kindly published my first literary effort in 1932, while I was a second lieutenant of Infantry. So I thought I might renew acquaintance and tell you a little about the background of this course, as I introduced it into the United States and provided the original demonstration on it for representatives of The Infantry School.

In 1949, while a member of the faculty of the RAF Staff College in England, I was invited by the War Ministry to sit as an honorary member of the board for selection of cadets for the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. The selection board at that time was sitting at Knepp Castle in Sussex.

The castle itself was not a castle in the turreted and moated sense but rather an old manor house, capable of withstanding any neighborly attacks. Its Spartan surroundings, however, were quite impressive and certainly provided the atmosphere for a proper cadet-selection seat.

The selection board itself was headed by a major general and had a membership of approximately six lieutenant colonels and colonels, all with excellent combat records. Their assignment was for a three-year period and they were quite efficient and sincere about the job of selection. It is interesting to compare this experience level with that of a U.S. service where I helped install this course at their center. When I asked for the people who were to operate the project, I received one captain, two first lieutenants, and one second lieutenant.

In order to brief them properly I gave them the three-day selection test, at the end of which the raters, who had been rating for almost three years, determined that not only were two of these three not qualified to judge leadership, but great doubt was placed upon their qualification for commission. I mention this only to point out that this project is effective only if the raters are in the market for leaders and know how to judge them. It is impossible to expect a man to select a horse, unless you first show him one. Otherwise he wouldn't recognize one when he saw it. The same is true of leader selection.

About the applicants: They came to Knepp on the weekend and were ready for testing on Monday morning. The test was for three days, and one batch of approximately 20 to 25 went through each week. These young men came from all parts of the British Commonwealth and had already qualified for entrance to Sandhurst so far as the mental and physical requirements were concerned.

Actually, these qualifications provided them only with eligibility to undergo the leadership selection tests at Knepp rather than entrance to Sandhurst. It is here that the British recognize and prove the fact that a man may be mentally and physically qualified for entrance to the college but still, he isn't a leader. Many fail entrance at this point, and the refreshing thing about it is that the decisions are not made by object tests and Ph.Ds but by military leaders.

* * *

I became quite enthusiastic about the course and decided to bring the idea back to the United States. In 1950, while Commandant of the Air Tactical School, just before closing it, and while engaged in planning the Squadron Officer School at the Air University, I wrote the British War Ministry for drawings of the problems. They provided us with eight problems. To these we added four more of our own design and built models of each. Since we did not have the spaces or the wooded areas as did Knepp, we could not disperse the problems. So I designed a 60-by-20-yard stall system consisting of twelve stalls with a problem in each stall. In this way all twelve activities could be controlled from one point and the director could observe the quality of his raters.

Historically, the German Army used this selection device in the 1920s and 1930s. The British, so they tell me, got it from the Germans in the 1930s and have used it ever since.

Although in the four years it has been operating in the Squadron Officer School, it has been used as a means of demonstrating problem-solving and group cooperation. It has always selected leaders from the top and non-leaders from the bottom. Its true function is not a demonstration of problem-solving and leader reaction, but rather leader identification. It should be used as a device to select into a school, or out of a school where leadership is the aim. But it can't be done unless the raters are qualified. I have recently completed the preparation of a three-day test for cadets which may be of some value to the Leader Reaction Course at The Infantry School. If so, I will be glad to make it available to them.

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

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FRONT AND CENTER

THE Army, the President said at the Military Academy commencement exercises, isn't what it used to be and never was. He quoted the old saw to show that change is inescapable and that the Army in pursuing its duty of providing for the common defense must master evolving circumstances. Among the evolving circumstances the President touched upon were two points that he has mentioned before. First, nuclear war would mean the near end of civilization, and second, that understanding between East and West can be developed only over the course of many years of patient and cautious negotiation. Another war could be "a catastrophe approaching almost the extermination of mankind," he said in driving home the point that the "natural process of change has become a cataclysmic rush." He advised against accepting councils of despair or "apathetic acceptance that human ability is not equal to the immense problems newly arisen." His advice was that "we must think better and faster and more wisely than ever before." Peace and understanding may come only though efforts lasting a generation, he said. He told the cadets that "Your entire lives may and should be as seriously devoted to leading toward peace as in preparing yourselves for war. Almost certainly, many of you will sit at future council tables as principals or as staff advisers. Your second mission, then, will be to represent accurately the heart and purposes of America." There was no implication that the U. S. Army was outliving its usefulness.

The 30th Engineer Group (Topographic) is surveying 86,000 square miles of Alaska this summer using 47 helicopters—seven H-19s and 40 H-23s. The Group has an aviation section of some 300 men including 71 pilots. It flies surveying crews to areas where conventional aircraft can't land. Resupply is usually by air. The Group also uses light aircraft including L-19s, L-20s and six of the new U-1 Otters, equipped to operate with wheels, skis or floats.

THERE will never be agreement about where the line should be drawn between "need to know" and "nice to know," but it is plain that the breakthrough in military technology has been so rapid and so bountiful that some "need to know" information may have to be moved over into the "nice to know" department. As a quick example, is additional training in methods of evading the enemy when cut off from friendly forces and in escaping from the enemy when captured "need to know" or "nice to know" information? If it takes many months to train an artillery sergeant in his duties as a section chief with a guided missile or rocket weapon, will there also be time to train him as an infantryman able to protect his weapon from guerrilla bands or infilrators? It is as important as ever that soldiers have a working knowledge of the basic elements of military survival, but it is also necessary for the soldier to be on top of technological advances in his specialized field. Grave responsibilities face those who must decide what is vital and what is not quite so vital but certainly helpful.

What seems to have escaped the attention of the Hoover Commission in so far as its reports on the military services are concerned is that the business of the military is war and preparation for war. The Army is not a "make job" agency or a testing ground for industrial or business management methods. It spends most of its time building up an inventory of trained men, usable weapons, and instruments, and in storing away military knowledge and skill. Thus its books are in the red until V-day. At that time they show big profits. On V plus 1 they go into the red again.

AN air-transportable army is possible but to get it, there must be a singular concentration on removing every obstacle that stands in the way. Two of the greatest are weight and cost and, as Maj. Gen. Kenner F. Hertford reported to the House Appropriations Subcommittee, a decision must be made "whether to develop the full technical promise of light metals—or whether considerations of cost, durability, and logistic support requirements limit us." The Army must look for bigger (and more rugged) transport airplanes, helicopters and convertiplanes, and it must also get some priority in the use of light metals in developing new weapons and equipment that can be economically carried by aircraft. One of the principal requirements remains the problem of an antitank weapon that will definitely master masses of enemy armor. Many infantrymen believe it is possible and cite various new developments. If such a weapon appeared, armor probably wouldn't disappear from the battlefield. But certainly armored divisions would immediately have a need for far more infantry protection and the development might be towards one common type combat division, rather than the three we now have.

"Bizmac" is not an aid to digestion, but an electronic data-processing machine that may afford relief to ulcerous Ordnance officers who got that way from trying to keep track of the 170,000 different items kept in tank-automotive depots. The machine is being installed at the Tank-Automotive Command headquarters at Detroit to provide accurate and fast information on supply levels at all tank-automotive depots.

THE recent public hassle over whether the Russians have more or faster bombers than the U.S. wasn't very enlightening, but it was certainly in the democratic tradition of every man getting up on his feet and sounding off, whether informed or otherwise. Out of the welter of talk a dumb but honest man might have gotten the idea that the bombers were going to fight one another. The fact that they don't seems to make the whole argument rather silly, except as it indicates technological superiority—which is most important, of course. But it would seem that if the USAF has enough thermonuke carrying bombers to get through Soviet air defenses, we need not fret because the Russians have more of the same or maybe some that can fly a few knots an hour faster than ours. What we ought to fret about is whether our air defenses are good enough (or can be made good enough) to stop Russian bombers, whether or not they are more numerous or speedier than General LeMay's bombers.

✓ ✓ ✓

Note for those who like to keep their military nomenclature absolutely pure and up to date regulation-wise: Prisoners of war are no longer PWs, but POWs—like they used to be. However, the Society for the Advancement of the use of the Hyphen remains frustrated. The Society insists that the elimination of the hyphen between the G and the digit in G1, G2, G3, and G4, is discrimination against an honorable punctuation mark and probably subversive.

✓ ✓ ✓

THE retirement of Generals Ridgway, Bolté, and Hull and others has led to an almost musical chairs situation in which general officers are being shifted at an unusual rate. In its Washington headquarters the Army will have a number of new officers in positions of high responsibility. In addition to General Taylor as the new Chief of Staff, General W. B. Palmer is already installed as Vice Chief. Lt. Gen. Carter B. Magruder is the new Deputy Chief for Logistics, and Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin the new Deputy Chief for Plans and Research. A new G1 and G3 are expected. Some changes are also reported imminent among army commanders in the ZI.

The MOS code system is being revised with a new five-digit system, each digit providing a clue to the holder's special qualifications. In order of their appearance, the digits reveal occupational areas, entry groups, MOS, skill level, and special qualification.

✓ ✓ ✓

The Emergency Reinforcement Plan whereby officers and men who complete two years of active duty are assigned to reserve units even though they don't participate actively is far from ideal, but in the absence of authority to require men to participate it does have the virtue of creating machinery for quick call-up in the event of emergency mobilization. This plan and the new plan to give limited numbers of National Guard enlistees basic training for eight weeks indicates the jerry-built structure of our reserve programs. They are all good so far as they go but this wealthy and vigorous nation ought to be able to do better. Such cheap and inferior makeshifts cannot substitute for the kind of sound UMT and reserve program that Congress in its wisdom has refused to enact.

Association of the U.S. Army Plans to Meet at Fort Benning on 7-8 October

DRAW a red ring around 7-8 October right now. Those are the dates of the Annual Meeting of the Association of the U. S. Army and you'll want to be there.

The site of this year's meeting is Fort Benning, Georgia. It was selected by the planning committee because of its excellent housing facilities and experience in handling large groups of visitors. The Executive Council plans to rotate future Annual Meetings among other major Army installations.

The planning committee under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Walter L. Weible is lining up a program that will examine problems confronting the Army of the future. There will be major addresses by high Army leaders, civilian and military. There will be a demonstration of air mobility, displays of new and experimental equipment, and a symposium on subjects of major interest to the Army.

It is planned that Friday morning, 7 October, will be taken up with arrivals, registration and billeting, with the formal program getting under way at 1300. The afternoon will be taken up with the demonstration and county fair displays. In the evening there will be a reception followed by a dinner.

The program for Saturday morning, 8 October, will start with an important business meeting of the Association. It will be followed by the symposium with an address by a top Army leader to conclude the meeting.

General Weible's committee has followed the wishes of the Association's Executive Council in lining up a comparatively short, hard-hitting meeting which will be of wide professional interest to all members.

The committee has been working for several months on plans for the meeting, with the full cooperation of Lieutenant General A. R. Bolling, Commanding General, Third Army, and Major General Joseph H. Harper, Commandant, The Infantry Center. Fuller details will be announced in our next issue.

Meanwhile make plans now to be at Fort Benning on 7-8 October.

THE MONTH'S AUTHORS

IN the April JOURNAL Brigadier General Carl F. Fritzsche, Assistant Commandant of The Infantry School, described how the Infantry is meeting the almost mind-defying challenges of modern atomic and non-atomic warfare. In this issue, MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD T. WILLIAMS, Commandant of The Artillery and Guided Missiles School (formerly The Artillery School), shows how the Artillery looks toward the future—in terms of mobility and power. "Effective Artillery Support Isn't Accidental" (page 24) places our present-day problems in the perspective of the past, and General Williams imparts a compelling logic and lucidity to this complex subject.

General Williams graduated from the Military Academy in 1920, and later served as a battery commander, aide-de-camp, and ROTC instructor. In 1941 he was a military observer with the British Army in North Africa. In May 1943 he became artillery officer of the Third Army, and he served under General Patton in that capacity throughout the campaigns in western Europe. General Williams later served as chief of staff of U. S. Army, Europe, and Deputy Commanding General, Third Army.

IN "An Airpower Concept of Our Military Posture," two writers have teamed up to comment on *U. S. Military Doctrine,* a recently published book by Air Force Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, the implications of which can scarcely be accepted either by the Army or the American public. COLONEL WILLIAM B. BUNKER, Transportation Corps ("Is the Program Adequate?" page 36), takes up General Smith's basic ideas; while JONATHAN CARMEN ("A Massive Commercial All the Way," page 37) has some things to say, mostly unkind, about the book itself.

Colonel Bunker served in World War II as Deputy to the Assistant Chief of Transportation. In 1948, he was in charge of terminal operations in the Berlin Airlift. An expert on helicopters, he is presently Commandant of the Transportation School. Mr. Carmen is a Washington journalist who has written on military subjects for many years.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER L. WEIBLE ("The Delegation of Responsibility," cover 2) is Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration. JOURNAL readers will recall that in the November 1954 issue General Weible was the author of "Here's Why, Sergeant Bowles," in which he answered some pertinent questions of an Army sergeant.

CAPTAIN AVERY KOLB, Transportation Corps, USAR ("The Bitter Tea of Homer Lea," page 17), has dug up some thought-provoking information about a little-known American prophet and military figure. A civilian employee of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Captain Kolb is a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID R. FALKE, Quartermaster Corps ("I'm the Quartermaster Adviser to Iran," page 21), holds degrees from the Universities of Pittsburgh and Maryland. He has been a Reserve officer since 1932 and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1947.

MAJOR BERT DECKER, USAF ("Helicopter vs Jet," page 30), continues exploring interesting ideas for the use of helicopters. He writes: "Naturally some of my 'fly boy' pals will deem this highly sacrilegious or something but I think it points out one way to solve one of the most difficult tactical air problems of today; that is, how to stop low-level jet attack." We happen to know that some Pentagon star-wearers who read Major Decker's earlier articles in this magazine have encouraged him to continue using his imagination. Thus far he is the nearest thing to Sergeant Terry Bull of pre-World War II *Infantry Journal* fame we have been fortunate enough to publish.

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS TOM FORD ("Tactical Uses of Panoramic Photography," page 32) served in Korea as chief of the 45th Division's photography section. He is now a civilian and is living in Oklahoma.

CAPTAIN RICHARD A. MCMAHON, Infantry ("The Day We Took 312," page 46), served as a platoon sergeant and platoon leader in Korea in 195 and 1951. An OCS graduate, he ha been a training company commander an assistant regimental S2, and a mem ber of the U.S. Military Liaison Mis sion to the Soviet Zone of Germany.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONOVA YEUELL, JR., Artillery ("Are We Mas or Men?" page 53), graduated from th Military Academy in 1940. He recent ly received an MA in Internationa Relations from Georgetown Universit under the Army's civilian school pro gram. His article, "Soldiering Is a Wa of Life" [September 1954 issue] wo high praise from many military men Colonel Yeuell is now assigned to G in the Pentagon.

THIS month's cerebrators (pages 5 52) tackle problems of atomic wa fare, training, Army education, com mand, and research and development MAJOR JAMES D. ABTS, Artillery, i on duty with Army Extension Course Department of Publications and Non Resident Training, The Artillery an Guided Missiles School. CAPTAIN JOH P. GERACI, Infantry, is with the 771 Army Unit in Europe. LIEUTENAN COLONEL M. S. JOHNSTON, Corps o Engineers, is attending the Army Sup ply Management Course at Fort Le Virginia. SERGEANT FIRST CLASS MA MOUNCE is on duty with the U. S Army Advisor Group to the Idaho Na tional Guard, LIEUTENANT COLONE DENTON C. ROUNTREE, Infantry, i serving with the G4 Section, Hea quarters Third Army. CAPTAIN SA FORD M. ULLMAN, Infantry, is assigne to G3 Div., Hq. USAREUR, COM

THE month's book reviewers (pag 59-63) are all writers with practic military experience. BRIGADIER GE ERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG, retired, a contributing editor of the JOURNA COLONEL W. R. KINTNER, Infantr is assigned to the Office of the Secr tary of Defense. CAPTAIN CHARLES MACDONALD, Infantry, USAR, is historian in the Office of the Chief Military History and author of the bes selling *Company Commander*. LIE TENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG, A mor, is a frequent contributor.

Artillery Spotting

Communications

Wire Laying



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

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THE BITTER TEA OF HOMER LEA

One of the strangest figures in our history, Homer Lea prophesied two world wars and the rise of a militant and expansionist Russia

CAPTAIN AVERY E. KOLB

Courtesy of Joshua B. Powers and Harper & Brothers

OON after the beginning of the next total war, someone will dust : old library shelves, uncover two ed volumes, and rediscover Homer :a. "It's like reading today's news- per," they'll say, "except that it's so ıtorical."

This has happened two or three ıes already.

When the Kaiser's armies invaded lgium and crossed the French fron- r, British newspapers carried the re- :t: "Kaiser following strategy of ›mer Lea." A quarter century later, en Adolf Hitler launched his forces a predetermined plan, a French rnalist observed: "Passages of *Mein mpf* lifted from Homer Lea." Then, 1941, as Tojo's planes rained fire Pearl Harbor and Corregidor fell the assaulting Japanese, America :overed her own neglected prophet. *wsweek* and *Time* carried the no- . And in *The Saturday Evening t* the versatile Mrs. Clare Boothe :e told the remarkable story of the ı who foresaw it all thirty-five years ›re: "Ever Hear of Homer Lea?" the title.

Iomer Lea foretold the present ld situation, and described not only course of Russian expansion, but :ategy for world assimilation which ld go forward despite united ef- ; at containment, Korean-type set- :s, and the atomic bomb.

/ho was Homer Lea? A scrunch- ‹ed, hunchbacked little eighty-pound Californian who got laughed out of an Army recruiting office back at the time of the Spanish-American War. Who was Homer Lea? An anemic, myopic little twenty-four-year-old Chinese general who rallied Asia's ragged hordes and led them against the Manchus at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. Who was Homer Lea? He was Chief of Staff to Republican China's founding father, Sun Yat-sen; advisor to Britain's practical strategist, Field Marshal Lord Roberts; hostage of Japan's scheming Mikado and guest of Germany's plotting Kaiser. Who was Homer Lea? A half-blind cripple who explored the mountains and deserts of our Pacific coast on an ass in order to prove this country's utter defenselessness and who, in 1912, at the age of thirty-six, died, having written two books that foretold this century's global wars.

IT is through these works that Homer Lea is known. *The Valor of Ignorance* is Lea's angry warning to America. "It is charged with the bitterest apothegms ever penned against Isolation and Pacifism," wrote Mrs. Luce. "Like a battle drum it beats the need of militant patriotism in times of peace —so that times of war may be avoided." In it are foretold, with dramatic exactness, the Pearl Harbor attack, destruction of the Pacific fleet, the fall of Guam and the Philippines, and the capture of Corregidor.

The Day of the Saxon, Lea's equally prophetic book, is directed at Britain's swaggering complacency and fragile pride. It foretells the coming onslaughts of the Teuton against the Saxon sphere—the Low Countries and France—and the ultimate decay of Britain's world-girdling empire.

Lea also planned a third book to complete his military trilogy. But this was never finished. It was to be called *The Swarming of the Slav.* In his notes for this work Lea indicated that after a period of wars between Britain and Germany, America and Japan, the greatest and last war would come—the war for the world, the war with Russia.

Lea was not a prophet in the classical sense. He was more the military strategist, who plotted with exactitude all the motivations, the inherent capabilities, and the advantageous lines of action open to a potential enemy, and who followed this inquiry on through to the last possibility of success, knowing that only by thus placing ourselves in the mind of the enemy can we hope to counter his intentions and be victorious.

Lea foretold wars by a simple formula based on lessons from history: where certain volatile conditions existed between nations, as between a wealthy, extravagant America and a hungry, frugal Japan, or between an idealistically pacifist America and an insidiously pacifist Russia, the possibility of war increased with the convergence of their ambitions and the intensification of their differences. In the ensuing

conflict, the advantage was with the disciplined, militarist nation, and there was the fearful probability that the wealthy, pacifist nation would not be prepared, would find some excuse for not readying its men, some evasive plan for avoiding all-out commitment, some limited force idea upon which to pin its hopes, some wall behind which to hide, or some big, one-package deal with which to wrap up all its military problems—emplaced artillery in Lea's time, today the atomic bomb.

If this Republic were to achieve the greatness its founders hoped for it, then it had to possess the ability and potentiality—in a military sense—to be supreme over those nations whose ambitions were opposed to it. It was not the possession of this "ability and potentiality," argued Lea, that constituted the cause and the curse of war. Rather, the lack of them, those inherent measures for survival, constituted the crime of neglecting to support the principles which were the foundation of our Republic and the hope of mankind everywhere.

"The self-deception of a nation concerning its true militant strength increases at the same ratio as its actual militant capacity decreases." Why should this be? Because, argued Lea, the industrial nation of which America was the prototype was, in the final analysis, unable to distinguish economic wealth from military strength, machine power from the high-purposed martial spirit of men.

"Warfare . . . has never been nor will ever be mechanical. There is no such possibility as the combat of instruments. It is the soldier that brings about victory or defeat," Lea wrote. A nation's military force must possess a soul which is the martial spirit, the righteous wrath, the will-to-victory, of the men that compose it.

This was the source of Lea's bitterness. This the lesson behind his gloomy prophecies: "Whenever a nation becomes excessively opulent and arrogant, at the same time being without military power to defend its opulence or support its arrogance, it is in a dangerous position. Whenever the wealth and luxury of a nation stand in inverse ratio to its military strength, the hour of its desolation, if not at hand, approaches."

LEA foresaw that a militant Russia would be less frightened by American opulence than tempted by its wealth, when the day of its destiny brought it into a position of convergent interest with America.

The Russian enemy, described with remarkable clarity by Lea almost half a century ago, now looms before us in the awesome revelation of his words:

> In the development of the Russian Empire man has more nearly approached those characteristics that mark the measured, unhurried growth of Nature. In its extension it has moved onward with elemental propulsion. Like a glacier, its movement is only apparent by periods of time. So imperceptible is the terrible, imperturbable grind of its way that we do not perceive its progress until it has passed a given point. What it does not crush it erodes. What it does not erode it forces on in front until into some crevasse, great or small, it pushes the debris that impedes its way.
>
> It moves on.

Lea makes clear that it is not the net result of Russian growth and great size that inspires his belief in her invincibility. It is rather the *manner* of Russian progression. "The expansion of Russia, unlike that of most great empires, has never been erratic nor dependable upon fortuitous circumstances. Instead of being the result of an aggregate of fortunate expedients, it has been the ruthless exemplification of a predetermined plan."

This plan is not so much a documented policy as set down by any one leader or régime. Rather, it is something inherent in the land and its people, as persistent as the migratory urge of reindeer moving in masses down the barren steppes, forging ponderously on despite hazards and death to their members, setbacks and defeats to the group.

> As we follow the expansion and study the development of this nation, we seem to contemplate the gradual evolution of some irrepressible natural force rather than the struggle of man. . . . Russia in her progress is concerned no more with the devastation of her wars than is Russian nature with the havoc of her winters. As we regard the course of Russian expansion and witness the fortitude and determination with which it has been pursued, we are unable to believe in its voluntary abandonment. Heretofore, these same Russians have never faltered, never hesitated; without haste, always hopeful in defeat, reticent in victory, never seeing the ground they have furrowed with combat and hillocked with their dead; keeping their eyes constantly on those distant yet defined horizons toward which they have been directed.

"The twentieth century opened wi the defeat of the empire in Manchuri involving Russia in serious circur stances," Lea wrote. But defeat is a "old tragedy" and means nothing Russia. "It marks for her the begi ning of a new century. The eighteen began with Narva; the nineteenth wi Austerlitz; the twentieth with Mu den." But Narva was followed by vi tory over the Swedes at Poltava; Au terlitz, by the seizure of Paris. "Wh shall say that there is not a sequel Mukden?" There was; it came in 194

REGARDLESS of the conditions be faced in the present centur Russia would exert her power in e pansion. The very defeats that Russ might suffer at the hands of the Te ton, Lea says of the recent past, wou result in a "great awakening of t Slav to his own power." If thwart by a strong Germany she would e pand eastward; if thwarted by a stro Japan she would expand westward. on the other hand, both pressures we removed and a weakened Germa and Japan lay on her flanks, the "Ru sian octopus" would then, taking bo paths of opportunity, expand on t European continent and sweep dow into the Far Pacific.

> These repulses, strange as it m seem, accelerate rather than reta Russian expansion. So exact has t result been that we can reduce it this almost invariable law: that t impulse of Russian expansion alo alternate lines is measured by the d gree of retrocession on other lines aggression, the ratio of expansion that of retrogression being as three to two. It is because of this law th Russia continues to spread over A and Europe in defeat as well as in v tory.

In these few words is contained t key to understanding all-time Russi strategy for world conquest. Here the subterfuge our political lead must learn to counter, the deadly ga our military leaders must learn to fig and check. Here is the message statesmen should carry with the wherever they meet across the conf ence table with a Malik, or a Molot *The impulse of Russian expansi along alternate lines is measured the degree of retrocession on oth lines of aggression, the ratio of exp sion to that of retrogression being three is to two.*

Lea said: "A nation possesses fo

legrees of expansion—territorial, eco-
nomic, political, and racial." Russia, it
would seem, has learned to exercise
ll four, and in coordination. This
trategy applies not to the battlefield
lone. It extends to the conference
able, the assemblies of men, and even
the realm of men's minds. Thus,
ne renunciation of a Comintern and
ne imposition of a Cominform, the
retreat into words of peace and the
dvancement of plans for war, conces-
ons in treaty format and gains in
eaty aims—all of these are but mani-
estations of the same diabolical, dialec-
cal plan.

LL the verbal concessions and
signed-sealed victories, all the con-
rence-table stalemates and geopoliti-
l realizations that Russia has been
ble to achieve, demonstrate the awe-
me fact that she has attained an
ility hitherto unknown—to coordi-
ate, with complete objectivity, all the
cets of her national and international
istence.

Weigh this, then, against our own
ck of well-defined, long-range policy
d aims. "High purposed pronounce-
ents," Lea teaches, "do not alone
ake a national policy nor change a
itary military fact." And Lea had a
rase apropos this general condition:
national policy propounded by more
an one mind is as many times use-
s as are numbered the minds that
ect it."

The real strength and stamina need-
to guide the nation must come from
people themselves. Our leaders may
ark it, awaken it, direct it, but they
not create it with words designed
accomplish lesser aims.

The massive hordes of Eurasia are
potential menace not to be wished
ay by flaunting nuclear weapons.
hile disorganized masses present no
midable obstacle to regimented ar-
es, they are not susceptible to de-
ctive weapons alone. "Suddenly
y rise up," wrote Lea of the his-
cal eruption of vandals, "and, with
perennial power of poverty, disem-
vel the vainest and vastest empires
earth." In Lea's time it was the
ers. Two such eruptions in mod-
times mark the very beginnings of
régimes we now face in Russia
China.

The Communists today have insured
nselves the benefits of similar mass
ngs in the future. Side by side with
development of the atomic bomb
they have organized partisan forces.

Most military authorities agree: deterrent weapons alone are incapable of coping with the sheer mass of Eurasia. You cannot eradicate rodents with brickbats; and you cannot defeat with nuclear holocaust those who, like rodents, thrive on human misery and death.

> To Russia, having learned the philosophy of disaster, there comes no final defeat. Her policy of predetermined expansion, while cumulative with victory, is, on the other hand, concentrated by disaster. This concentration of national forces through national misfortune insures the empire not only against destruction from external forces, but eventual victory.
>
> Holding the interior lines of Eurasia, her radii of aggression are directed against those diverse portions of the world that are politically and geographically incapable of cohesive coalition. When Russian movement is checked in one sphere the propulsion of her expansion in other spheres receives that proportionate impetus we have indicated. The expansion of Russia in its intensity never ceases. Those tides that recede from one shore recede only to break upon another. Oceanic in its greatness, it is oceanic in the expression of its forces.

WHERE then will the oceanic tides roll next? Homer Lea sums it all up in a few brief and prophetic words: "This center will in due time move on to that natural objective determined upon two centuries ago. The conquest of Persia will be followed by that of India, by the control of Asia Minor and its environment on the west, Burma and its environment on the east. The possession of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean will then give to Russia the same domination in Africa and the Pacific now held by the Saxon race.

"At this period the Russian Empire draws to a close.

"It approaches the Empire of the World."

The conquest of Persia will be followed by that of India, by the control of Asia Minor and its environment on the west, Burma and its environment on the east. Thus wrote Homer Lea half a century ago, prophetically setting forth the initial phases of the third great war. Today as we contemplate the conditions in those areas—an explosive Near East, a troubled Iran, an uncertain India, and Burma's neighbor partitioned—we begin to perceive the realization of those words, to understand that the war he foretold is already under way, just as surely as though Russian guns roared.

DESPITE Lea's dismal prophecies and the more dismal realities around us in the world today, there is no reason to think we may not yet win the future. For there is hope in the lessons of Homer Lea.

Even in his bitterest moments, his most gloomy prophecies, we cannot help feel the really important and overriding message he sought to get across to his fellow countrymen. It was not just to be honored as a soldier by his native land that Lea wanted most in his brief, unhappy life. What he really wished, felt compelled to hope, was that America would heed his words and awaken in time.

Yes, there is hope in Homer Lea, and this is that hope. America may yet be saved from the end he predicted—and in a manner he suggested: ". . . by a revival of those primitive principles of the Republic . . . the militant patriotism of those who in simple, persistent valor laid with their swords the foundations of this national edifice and who after seven years of labor cemented with their own blood the thirteen blocks of its foundation. . . ."

Lest he be misunderstood, Lea distinguished true militant patriotism from "those dangerous forms of national fetishism which turn patriotism to all degrees of roguery," from the false patriotism of "uncompromising and general contempt for other nations," from the "popular illusions of national invincibility," and from the really false and dangerous form that "shows itself in vaingloriousness, whether over great deeds or great crimes."

To turn patriotism to one's own ambitious uses, to claim it is the monopoly of one or a group to the exclusion of others no less sincere in their love of country, this, according to Lea, is the deadly "negation of patriotism by which the nation is betrayed and given over to pillage."

This, then, is the manner in which America may yet survive and obtain supremacy: by converting the "national fetish" into a positive force for world leadership. By turning those misdirected hates and suspicions eating inward like ulcers into the national vitals, turning them outward in a great revival and upsurge of martial spirit against the real and ever-menacing enemy—Godless Russia.

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

rom an ancient wall in Teheran, trumpeters herald the new Imperial Iranian Army that is adopting U. S. military ways

I'm the Quartermaster Adviser to Iran

and it constantly amazes me that two nations as different in history, tradition and taste as the . S. and Iran can agree on such prosaic matters as chow, uniforms and military nomenclature

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID R. FALKE

3 Quartermaster Adviser to the Military Mission to Iran, I am amazed the wide and extreme range of artermaster subjects and problems it I encounter over a short period of ie. But they are also exceedingly eresting and challenging. From day day, questions arise on matters rang- from the percentage of moisture in stored for a given period of time, he wear-out period of U.S. helmet ers, to the basis for issue of five-gal- water cans. The larger and more iplex problems cannot be answered quickly and involve considerable ly, detailed work and research, ch of which has been made possible by the prompt cooperation and stance of the Office of The Quar- naster General in Washington.

typical long-range problem of the Quartermaster Department of the Imperial Iranian Army is the development of an emergency-type canned ration. Three or four years ago, the Iranian Quartermaster General purchased vast amounts of dehydrated food from France in an attempt to solve the problem. This order consisted of such items as potatoes, tomatoes, beans, and orange juice. It proved to be an unsatisfactory answer, because of lack of preparation flexibility, poor troop acceptability, lack of nutritional balance, and absence of adequate supplement.

Some form of canned ration was suggested. But then the question arose as to whether the ration should be purchased from another country and imported or be made in Iran. Facilities, costs, and technical know-how all entered into the determination of the final answer. Supposedly the Iranian Government had a modern canning factory located north of Teheran near the Caspian Sea, suitable for canning an emergency ration, but little was actually known about its facilities.

After several discussions with the Quartermaster General of the Iranian Army, it was decided to inspect the plant to determine whether it was usable for this purpose. The inspection party consisted of officers from the General Staff, the Quartermaster General, and myself.

Somewhat to my surprise we found a relatively modern two-story plant covering an area of approximately fifty-eight thousand square feet. The canning was done on the first floor while the cans were made on the second. The

-۲۳-

Remarks ملاحظات	User مورد استفاده	Expendable or Non-Ex. نوع دوام	Unit واحد	Stock Number شماره عمومی جنس	Nomenclature نوع جنس	No. ردیف
	اردبش	غیراستهلاکی	جفت	۱ - ب - ۲ - ۷۹/۱	بلوزپشمی سرمه افراد درپائی نمره ۱	۲۷۷
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۷۹/۲	« « « نمره ۲	۲۷۸
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۷۹/۳	« « « نمره ۳	۲۷۹
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۰/۱	بلوزپشمی فرمی موزیک دوبان نمره ۱	۲۸۰
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۰/۲	« « « نمره ۲	۲۸۱
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۰/۳	« « « نمره ۳	۲۸۲
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۱/۱	بلوزپشمی درجه داران هوائی نمره ۱	۲۸۳
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۱/۲	« « « نمره ۲	۲۸۴
	«	«	«	۲ - ۲ - ب - ۸۱/۳	« « « نمره ۳	۲۸۵
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۲/۱	بلوز پشمی فرمی افرادی نمره ۱	۲۸۶
	«	«	«	۲ - ۲ - ب - ۸۲/۲	« « « نمره ۲	۲۸۷
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۲/۳	« « « نمره ۳	۲۸۸
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۳/۱	پالتو فرمی دانشکده افسری نمره ۱	۲۸۹
	«	«	«	۱ - ۲ - ب - ۸۳/۲	« « « نمره ۲	۲۹۰

Almost as intelligible as one of our own supply catalogs, this Iranian QM catalog lists overcoats and blouses. If you insist on reading it, do as the Iranians do, and read from right to left

plant was primarily a meat cannery and contained two large cold-storage rooms capable of maintaining temperatures of approximately thirty-nine degrees Fahrenheit. It was suitable for canning an emergency-type ration in the quantity that would be required by the Iranian Army.

However, the absence of locally procured tin plate of suitable quality was a problem. Either tin plate had to be purchased outside the country or procured through U. S. financial aid.

MEANWHILE, it was decided that the Quartermaster General would work on such problems as the type of ration to be canned, the cost of the ration, the size of the individual can, and the number of days supply to be canned. As a starting point, quartermaster menus were carefully studied to determine just what was being served to the troops and the caloric value per meal. Troop acceptability of the various menus was closely analyzed, and it was determined that the three most popular dishes were *abegost, lobia,* and *rago.* The ingredients of these three dishes are somewhat similar and consist principally of mutton and potatoes and other vegetables.

After a number of conferences it was decided to make a trial pack of the three rations and submit it to the Food and Container Institute at Chicago for detailed analysis. Within a short time the answer came back with the necessary information.

In the meantime the ration size and approximate cost were computed and the number of days' supply agreed upon. With this as a basis, funds were requested through Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to obtain the necessary tin plate.

Another highly interesting and closely allied question is that of mobile kitchen units. As with the emergency ration, the Iranian General Staff has been aware of the need for an up-to-date mobile kitchen unit for some time, but lack of adequate funds and technical know-how has prevented the problem from being solved.

After a number of conferences with key quartermaster officers it was first clearly established that the U.S. Army mobile kitchen unit was not satisfactory because of the great difference in eating habits of the soldiers of the two countries and because of the complexities of the gasoline fire unit in the U.S. stove. Then, too, problems such as the type of fuel to use, type of fire unit, size and weight of the mobile kitchen unit, and finally the over-a design were discussed many times.

As a starting point it was decide to use the kerosene fire pot that is i the U.S. M1942 field oven. This ha the advantage of simplicity and flex bility since it may be used in both th mobile ovens and mobile ranges yet t be built. Also, kerosene is relativel plentiful and inexpensive. Once th fire unit was decided upon, a sma model range was designed and a pilc model was built. Initial tests have ir dicated that some changes will have t be made before a final workable mc bile range is produced. We may get model for field testing that will bur either kerosene or wood.

ALTHOUGH the subject of suppl catalogs is familiar to practicall every officer in our country, it wasn so in the Iranian Army. Quartermaste supply officers located in various se tions of the country had a number c names for the same item, and if th item came in various types or sizes eve more confusion existed. This was pa ticularly true of such items as cookin utensils, clothing, and footwear, whic came in both different sizes and di ferent types. Clearly an urgent nee existed for some kind of descriptiv list of quartermaster items with a sir gle name for each item and an ad quate description of it, including stock number for positive identific tion. None of the technical service had supply catalogs, so there was n guide or pattern to follow. Fortunat ly, a capable, energetic Iranian fiel grade officer, a graduate of our Qua termaster School advanced course, w available for the task.

Another fascinating problem was th nomenclature of certain MDAP item such as jackets, carbon paper, and ste cils, for which there were no Persia words. Should the English expressio be used? Should a Persian word b coined? Or should some group of exis ing Persian words somewhat simila but not exactly correct, be used? Aft much consideration it was finally d cided to use the English nomenclatur

Months of study and hard wor went into the preparation of these ca alogs. Numerous conferences we held, discussions with section chie were frequent, and many times I w called on for advice and assistance.

The completed catalogs divide th quartermaster items into eight class plus an introduction and index. The

:lasses are as follows: clothing and 'ootwear, bedding equipment, field and ndividual equipment, kitchen equipnent, subsistence, raw material, stationry, and miscellaneous items (includng such items as office furniture, band nstruments and music and medals).

NEW supply system was critically needed, since the existing one, alnough suitable for an Iranian Army f some years back, was entirely inadeuate for the logistical problems con-onting the new, up-to-date Iranian rmed forces. The inauguration of the merican supply procedure—an excelnt example of a joint endeavor by all the technical services advisers uner the able coordination of our Mison G4—was the answer. This has een one of the more difficult underkings because the idea was cometely foreign to the Iranian officers id entirely different from their own ipply system. The green light had een given by the Chief of Staff of the nperial Iranian Army, Major General ader Batmangholidje, who has orred all of the technical services to lopt the supply system as soon as posle, so we are assured of the utmost operation.

Our own well-known TM 38-403 tation Supply Procedure) was cometely rewritten and tailored to fit the pply needs of the Iranian Army. ne translation into Persian was a ijor undertaking, with such phrases "wash vouchers," "recurring issue," onrecurring issue," and "due-outs," quiring much explanation before and er translation. Likewise, the various pply forms had to be redesigned to Iranian needs. All of this work exded over a period of months. More nths went by during the transitional iod from the old stock books to new ck record cards and their attending ms.

To install this system in the divis and brigades was the next prob. About this time it became neces to call in the various quartermaster cers from the units to instruct them he proper fitting of the American forms and footwear which were besent here under MDAP. So it was ded to hold a conference with a fold purpose, one of the purposes ig detailed instruction in the Amer supply procedure.

reparing new tables of organiza and equipment for the Iranian

Major General Nader Batmangholidje, Chief of Staff, Imperial Iranian Army

Army was another momentous task for all of the advisers. The importance of this work cannot be overemphasized, since requests for aid under MDAP can be entertained only with a T/O&E justification. Iranian officers thoroughly familiar with organization and equipment of each technical service were selected from the G4 office of the Iranian Army as our counterparts to work on this task.

Reconciling the basic differences in our concepts called for many meetings and much give and take on both sides before the work was finished. Again nomenclature and language difficulties plagued us. On the completion of the T/O&Es, they were turned over to G1 of the Iranian Army for review and approval. Implementation of the tables, which is expected in the near future, will also present many difficulties, but none of them is insurmountable.

IN addition to my work on these special projects, unit inspection trips were made to various divisions and brigades located throughout Iran. These visits are quite similar to a quartermaster inspection visit to our own units.

Another problem of the adviser is that of recommending items which may be furnished under MDAP. Considerable responsibility falls on the adviser because he is familiar with the U.S. equipment. If equipment or supplies are requisitioned and it is later found that they cannot be used, the responsibility lies solely with the adviser. At times requests for items are received from the Iranian Quartermaster General which cannot be supplied either because the item does not meet the screening criteria set up by the Department of the Army or because it cannot be profitably used by the Iranian Army. In either case, good judgment must be displayed by the adviser in his explanation. At times exceptions are made to the screening criteria when adequate justification exists, or an item may be issued on a one-time basis.

Equally challenging is my work at the Military University, as adviser to the quartermaster section of the University, each technical service having a section. By having all the technical schools under the Military University, a vast saving in expenses and manpower is realized, since each separate service is not large enough to justify an entirely independent school.

The instructors in the quartermaster section of the University, all of whom speak English quite well, have been trained at our own Quartermaster School at Fort Lee. They have taken not only such courses as the company officer's course and the advanced course, but also specialized courses in such subjects as food service, and bakery operation. Consequently, the quartermaster section has a well rounded group of instructors who are fully competent and capable of meeting the exacting requirements of teaching.

The courses and instruction are patterned after the American system, although they are somewhat altered to meet the particular needs of the Imperial Iranian Army.

FROM the foregoing experiences it may be seen that an advisory assignment has much variety and interest. Everyday problems must be solved promptly and integrated carefully into over-all plans for the future, each solution strengthening the quartermaster support of the Iranian Army.

Every project and effort is based on the plans and policies of our commanding general, whose policy in turn is based on an over-all mission, the pattern of which is set in Washington. The successful fulfillment of this policy is to the mutual benefit of the United States and Iran. A strong modern and efficient Iranian Army is to the advantage of the free world.



The Honest John, a free-flying surface-to-surface rocket, is an integral member of the Artillery's weapons arsenal

MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD T. WILLIAMS

Commandant, The Artillery and Guided Missiles Center

EFFECTIVE ARTILLER

THE Artillery and Guided Missiles School is aggressively studyin and developing doctrine, tactics, technique, and new weapons i the light of atomic warfare. We are determined to develop metho for the most effective use of our recent technological advances. W are also determined to retain all of the sound basic tenets of artille employment. We believe that the rocket, the guided missile, an atomic artillery will greatly increase our capability to provide arti lery support to atomic-age infantry and armored ground-gainin forces.

The mission of surface-to-surface artillery is twofold: (1) T support the other arms by fire, neutralizing or destroying tho targets which are most dangerous to the supported arms; and (2 to give depth to combat and to isolate the battlefield by counterfir by fire on hostile reserves, by restricting movement in rear area and by disrupting hostile command facilities and other install

The 280mm atomic cannon spouts flame and smoke in recent firing tests



SUPPORT ISN'T ACCIDENTAL

cNair Hall at Fort Sill
:he Alma Mater of U.S.
eld Artillery officers

tions. The efficient exploitation of the capabilities of field artillery provides a powerful means of influencing the course of combat. These capabilities include the ability to:

¶ Maneuver massed fire rapidly within a large area and on a wide front without change of position;

¶ Displace quickly;

¶ Regroup units to bring greater fire power on important sectors;

¶ Deliver accurate fire with the appropriate caliber and type of ammunition on targets encountered under all conditions of visibility, weather, and terrain;

¶ Deliver effective fires with or without adjustment.

THE principles of war apply equally to field artillery as well as to other arms. The principles of mass, economy of force, surprise, and maneuver (flexibility) have special application in the case of field artillery as does the factor of cooperation. The proper tactical and technical employment of artillery fire power exploits the principles of mass and maneuver. Field artillery weapons and units are not physically massed in the manner implied for ground-gaining arms; rather, field artillery is employed so as to use its full capability in massing fires when and where required. Economy of force and surprise too are achieved through application of the techniques of control of fires. Let us turn back the pages of history briefly and see the development of the present tactical doctrine of field artillery support.

Field artillery is a relatively recent development in the history of heavy arms. Prior to the Polish campaigns of the Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, from 1622 to 1630, artillery was of varying sizes and weights but generally practically immobile in the field. In fact for some artillery pieces, because of road conditions thirty-two horses were required for pulling the weapon.

Gustavus Adolphus, however, adopted the 4-pounde as his standard light field piece. This weapon wa mounted on large wheels and could be drawn by thre men or a horse. The adoption of mobile field piece enabled the Swedish king to evolve the triple divisio of artillery which, under varying names, has survive to this day: regimental, divisional, and siege. Gustavu Adolphus' victories at Breitenfeld (1631) and Lütze (1632) resulted in great part from his ability to mov his artillery with rapidity and thereby use careful timin in tactical situations.

Frederick the Great borrowed from and improve upon the experiments in the use of massed fires initiate by Louis XIV of France. At the battle of Leuthe (1757), Frederick used twelve pieces of fortress artillery as "assault guns" to pave the way for the attack c his infantry in its famous "oblique order." Concerne with the protection and cover which hills provided bot attacking and defending forces, Frederick experimente with the use of howitzers; and, by 1762, he was usin a battery of forty-five such weapons in battle. He also be gan grouping his guns, abandoning the even distributio of artillery that was common in battle formations of the period. By so doing, he was best able to exploit an

First-rate artillery support counted for much in the brutal slugging match that the Army fought in Korea. Here a battery of 105mm howitzers of the 40th Division bombards enemy-held hill positions

ıspected weakness of terrain or disposition in the en-
ny's lines.

APOLEON did not begin to appreciate the full pos-
sibilities of artillery until rather late in his career.
t Friedland (1807) an improvised battery of thirty-six
eces in mass, hastily assembled by a subordinate, de-
ded the day. This, and his first major defeat at Lobau
809), brought forcibly home to Napoleon that the
e power of artillery was essential to a commander
ho was under any sort of tactical or numerical dis-
lvantage. In the gloomy hours of his defeat on Lobau
and, Napoleon wrote, "Missile weapons are now
come the principal ones; it is by fire and not by shock
at battles are won today . . . In the open field, as in
ge warfare, the gun plays the chief part; it has
ected a complete revolution. It is with artillery that
ır is made."

Napoleon, however, applied this lesson in a singular-
unimaginative fashion, since to obtain concentration
mass, he simply multiplied the number of 12-pound-
. Wellington, on the other hand, in fighting on the
rian Peninsula, combined Frederick the Great's suc-
s with the howitzer with the lethal effect of the
n recent invention of shrapnel to keep French troops
der continuous fire, even though they were using
ilade while forming for the attack. At Waterloo,
poleon paid bitterly for his failure to adopt howitzers
l shrapnel, for Wellington's troops, sheltered by a
ridge, could not be reached by the French artillery,
whereas French troops advancing on the ridge were terribly punished by British shrapnel.

French forces equipped with the first breechloading, rifled, steel field pieces demonstrated new possibilities for artillery at Solferino in 1859. The increased ranges obtained with these new field pieces enabled the French to give depth of fire to the battle, breaking up Austrian units while in the process of forming for the assault. Ironically, France herself was unaware of the cause of this victory, since one of the reasons for her subsequent defeat by Von Moltke in the war of 1870 was the poor quality and organization of French artillery in contrast to massed German fires from dispersed batteries.

GERMAN experiences on the Russian front in World War II demonstrated the need, in modern warfare, for both specialized weapons and that flexibility of fire that only centralized control can give. Owing to their severe numerical inferiority, the Germans soon found out that their only equalizer was their assault guns which, through centralized control, they could quickly mass at any critical point on the battlefield. The Russians, always firm believers in artillery, had by comparison an overabundance of artillery; and, as a result, were able to mass enough fires so that there were usually several penetrations of the German lines. The inadequate German reserves of assault guns, although effective wherever they were sent, eventually could not deal with all of the Russian breakthroughs. Nonetheless, the use of these assault guns by the Germans illustrates

the value of a specialized weapon under central control and demonstrates the value of artillery in reserve under very special but possible future circumstances; *i.e.*, in the face of a numerically superior enemy on an extended front in open terrain.

On the other hand, the Russians, although relying on and having a tremendous number of artillery pieces, did not use flexibility in fire control, with the result that their operations were frequently unnecessarily costly in men and matériel. Quite often, when the Russian forces moved in a manner not anticipated by prebattle planning, they received inadequate fire support.

THIS brief history clearly supports the assertion that "effective artillery support is not accidental." Today we know that artillery must be mobile, must be able to mass fires rapidly within a wide area without change of position, must have flexible control which permits the regrouping of units to bring greater fire power on important sectors, and must be able to deliver these fires accurately with the appropriate caliber weapon and type of ammunition on any target under all conditions of visibility, weather, and terrain.

Should another war come, many professional soldiers will again realize the increased importance that artillery will assume on the battlefield of tomorrow. Nowadays, there is a tendency to reject the lessons learned in warfare and substitute push buttons for artillery.

Thinking military men believe the combat army of the atomic age will be composed of small battle groups of two or three thousand men, widely dispersed over the battlefield so as not to invite an enemy atomic weapon. Some would attach artillery to the small battle groups despite the fact that the splitting of artillery fire or the dispersal of its support in small packets has generally resulted in diminished support.

Those who favor decentralized control of artillery (*i.e.*, attachment to the assault force) apparently have forgotten that there has been a calculated and systematic development of centralized control of artillery and that this control has proved to be essential to the proper delivery of effective fire. Fire power is not dependent entirely on the number of tubes but rather on their flexibility—their ability to mass fires from widely dispersed positions and to shift those fires at will. This massing of fires is, of course, dependent upon the range of the weapons and the ability of the units to be mutually supporting. Therefore, fire power must be realistically evaluated. One field artillery battery attached to each infantry battalion will guarantee that battalion the fire power of one battery and no more. The artillery battalion, intact, firing in direct support of a regiment, will, as a rule, give each infantry battalion the fire of a full artillery battalion whenever needed, and will also be flexible enough to engage targets of opportunity with a maximum of fire.

CONVERSELY, the fires of an attached unit are seldom available to other units. This is in direct contradiction to the currently accepted system of integrated fire power which makes it possible to have artillery always available. Moreover, in any attachment, the battery commander would be confronted with a flood of special artillery problems, now performed by the higher artillery staffs, such as target evaluation, photo intelligence, securing aerial coverage of the sector, and ammunition resupply.

Another factor which militates against decentralization through attachment is that the most favorable position area which will permit effective support by the artillery would not normally be in the area occupied by the supported unit, since the infantry requires commanding terrain while the artillery requires defilade and range to accommodate itself to its trajectories.

Further, decentralized control of artillery means that the fires of the various artillery units could not be coordinated and utilized for other requirements; whereas, under centralized control, the fires of many battalions of artillery are available to any unit in need. The sacrifice of mass for any other hypothetical advantage is dangerous, for as General Dwight D. Eisenhower stated, "Our massed fire technique was one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns throughout the world."

Finally, centralized control of artillery provides a means of echeloning fires so that continuous support may be rendered in a moving situation. Decentralized control and attachment would require that the small artillery unit move with its supported unit. Artillery on the road *is not* "shooting" artillery.

Some believe that the addition of the 4.2-inch mortar to the family of artillery weapons renders the standard light field piece, the 105mm howitzer, obsolescent, inasmuch as the terminal effects of the 4.2-inch mortar shell are nearly identical to those of the 105mm howitzer. However, they overlook the fact that the short range of the 4.2-inch mortar, coupled with the usual tactical disposition of the supported units, renders the problem of effectively massing the fires of this weapon with those of other mortars or other field artillery weapons disproportionately difficult.

Also, the characteristics of the 4.2-inch mortar preclude its rendering the close and continuous support in a moving situation which is currently furnished by the 105mm howitzer. Mortars provide a powerful fire augmentation of the defensive fires close to friendly troops; however, if our present mortars are emplaced so as to cover the entire defended area—a must under current doctrinal concept—they will then be unable to reach beyond the combat outposts. This means that the 105mm and 155mm howitzers must, as always, fulfill the requirement for those fires which are intended to break up the enemy assault before it reaches the battle position. It follows, therefore, that the 4.2-inch mortar under a centralized control and from positions to the rear of a battle position, can support at short range the maneuvers on the immediate perimeter of the supported unit; however, their fires must be supple

nented with the fires of howitzers and guns under the ame unified control. These latter weapons provide the ıecessary flexibility and mass, whereas the mortars pro- ide the formidable wall of fire close to a defended rea or a line of contact.

'HE free rocket, the guided missile, and atomic can- non are now an integral and very important part of ur family of surface-to-surface weapons. As we now now them, the rocket and the guided missile are es- ɜntially long-range artillery weapons. They are incor- orated into the fire-power capability of the artillery, ut, before they can replace guns and howitzers, they ıust have the same characteristics of flexibility, accu- ıcy, and massed fire power as conventional artillery, nd they must be developed to give the same speed of elivery and the same economical, continuous support ith the same reliability as the guns and howitzers. We e making intense efforts to improve our tactical and chnical ability to use these weapons. They definitely e an asset in giving greater depth to battle and pro- ding a great increase in the flexibility and destructive ower of long-range fires; however, they cannot yet be ıbstituted for all guns and howitzers.

The established guns and howitzers of the artillery mily at present continue to be absolutely essential in oviding fires against enemy infantry, mortars and tillery which are short of the minimum safety-range mits of the rocket weapons and beyond the immediate ıort-range capability of the mortar. At this time it is -advised and untimely to place guns and howitzers in minor role, or to eliminate them altogether in favor unproved weapons.

It is clearly apparent that the basic tactics of field tillery—mobility, massing of fires, flexibility of con- ɔl, and accuracy of delivery—so painfully learned rough several centuries of warfare and so painstak- gly and carefully analyzed and developed during 'orld War II and Korea, are not only valid today but ɜ in fact even more important. Contemplated changes doctrine for the employment of infantry and armor this atomic age should insure adequate artillery sup- rt. The promulgation of new doctrine of employment field artillery which would overlook or omit any of ese basic principles would be ill-advised and untimely d would jeopardize the success of infantry and nor in battle.

The effective artillery support that so ably assisted r infantry and armor to victory in past campaigns ıs not accidental, nor is such support accidental today. fective artillery support is a science nurtured and veloped by the same processes of trial and error, alysis, experiment and experience that have charac- ized the development of other of our exact sciences. ıe man who would lightly set aside the principles and apons upon which current effective artillery support ounded would be as unwise as one who would dis- ;ard the principles which form the base of any of : exact sciences.

Fire power is dependent upon the abil- ity to mass fires from widely dispersed positions and to shift those fires at will



Tomorrow's Air Support

HELICOPTER VERSUS JET

MAJOR BERT DECKER

THE Fifth Cavalry Copter Squadron had what its CO called an "interesting assignment." It was flying low-level cover for a regiment of Hot Rods which was to make a hundred-mile sweep around an enemy armored division. The Hot Rods were told to avoid the enemy and stab at his rear, severing the division's communications and destroying any infantry following the armor. All the copters had to do was:

¶ Not allow the Hot Rods to get too close to the armored division or be surprised by attack from the ground.

¶ Lead the Hot Rods to vulnerable enemy troops, positions and/or installations.

¶ Protect the Hot Rods from low-level air-attack.

Colonel Enthusiasm from Group had made it sound easy.

"Our jets have control of the air," he had said, "but they just can't stop low-level jet attacks. The enemy jets come in so fast below our radar that by the time our jets spot them it is too late.

"However," the Colonel had continued, "those low-level jet attacks are not very effective if you keep on the move, avoid open, level valleys, and keep your eyes peeled. We will have jets flying top to warn you of anything coming your way. Keep a few of your copters up at 500 feet or so depending on the terrain, to warn the rest if the jets jump you. You know the procedure. That's all!"

"HE thinks that's all!" mused Stuart, CO of the Fifth, as he gunned his copter to get more altitude. "This

terrain is rough. We have to check every inch of it or else lead the Hot Rods into an ambush, and watch 360 degrees of the horizon at the same time. And all at seventy miles per!"

Stuart had his squadron well spread to guard the Hot Rods. Twelve copters were up ah ·ad, flying low, checking the road. Four of them flanked the left side, four the right, the remaining four were flying tandem right down the road dipping under some of the few overhanging trees. The flankers were abreast dipping up and down over the rolling hills scanning the ground.

Stuart himself was a little higher, lying at about 500 feet directly over he leading element of the Hot Rods barreling along the road below him. He had two copter flankers out high nd wide on each side of him and one ail-end Charlie high behind him. The emaining eight copters were low, flying just over the leading Hot Rods.

The Hot Rods were really rolling. They seemed dangerously bunched for military convoy especially at the eventy miles per hour at which they ere travelling. They were staggered; ie first one hugged the right-hand de of the road, the second hugged ie left and so on. Even bunched, the 00 Hot Rods stretched along the acadam road for almost four miles.

"Nice target for napalm," mused uart. "I hope we get some warning anybody tries to hit us." He kept isting his neck, scanning the horin. He glanced skyward. High above m a V of jets was cutting diagonal- across his course. He spotted anher V high on his right flank.

"Ceiling unlimited," he thought. m glad those boys are up there."

"Fool Thirteen to Fool One!" came er Stuart's short-range FM radio. oad block! We are attacking!"

TUART glanced down at his advanced twelve copters scouting the d ahead. The four in the center re spreading and weaving. The kers from both sides were swinging He could see tracers from their s. One cut loose with rockets. Aner cut loose with rockets and he something burning on the road, l a man running. Tracers cut him vn.

Fool Thirteen to Fool One. All r!"

Nice work, Steve," said Stuart. y debris? Over!"

"One burning half-track on left side of road."

"Did you get that, Rod Blue One? Over!"

The CO of the Hot Rods came on the air. "Roger," he said. "Thanks, lads. Out."

The Hot Rods had not even slowed down. They were zooming by the burning half-track seconds later. Its dead crew were scattered on the side of the road where they had been surprised while cutting down a tree to make a road block.

A strange voice came over Stuart's radio.

"Top Zebra One to Fool One. Low-level E-jets dead ahead, thirty miles, crossing your course. How do you hear me?"

"Roger," said Stuart. "I hear you loud and clear. Watch them, please." He climbed a little, scanning the horizon ahead. "Rod Blue One, did you hear Top Zebra One? Over."

"Roger," answered the CO of the Hot Rods.

A minute later Top Zebra One broke in again. Stuart had just glanced at his watch. It was 1042 hours.

"Top Zebra One to Fool One! Same low-level E-jets approaching you at 2 o'clock, 20 miles out, closing fast!"

Stuart repeated that as he started to let his copter settle. "They will reach us in two minutes," he thought.

"Fool One to All Fools and Rod Blue One. E-jets coming in at 2 o'clock low!"

Rod Blue One snapped his order. "All Rod Blues! Execute Plan D!"

THE Hot Rods were braking, looking for openings on the sides of the road. Those riding the right-hand side of the road turned right, those riding on the left turned left. Within seconds the road was clear. The Hot Rods were bounding over fields, through woods; some had smashed through fences. They were skidding into any ditch or gully they could find and turning their quad .50s skyward.

The copters were dispersing also, hugging the ground, dipping down behind hills. All were watching Stuart who was still settling slowly.

"E-jets at 2 o'clock!" snapped Stuart as he spotted them and started to drop faster. "Watch my aiming burst." He cut loose with his tracers at the horizon.

Stuart was gauging his descent so he could just keep the fast-approaching enemy jets a little above his horizon. The closer they came the faster he dropped. Every second or so he cut loose with tracers in their direction although he knew they were still out of range.

"Fire on my next burst," he ordered. "Fire!"

Most of the jets never knew what hit them. The curtain of fire put up by the quad .50s of those four hundred Hot Rods and twenty-four copters was terrific. Only one of the eight jets even pulled up but he was afire and the pilot ejected at 5000 feet. Four of them just exploded in mid-air and rained hot steel and burning gasoline over the hillside. One veered off at a sharp angle, barrel-rolled and smacked into the ground upside down in a sheet of flame. Another smacked into the road and bounced into the trees out of sight. The eighth wobbled, veered off to one side, lost a wing, and crashed in a field, missing two Hot Rods by inches.

Stuart was climbing again. "Fool One to Rod Blue One," he reported. "All clear!"

"Roger," said Rod Blue One. "Rod Blue, assemble on road in convoy order!"

"Fool One to All Fools," said Stuart. "Convoy posts. Fools Fifteen, Sixteen and Seventeen, check for stragglers."

The Hot Rods were pulling back on the road. Their CO took off down the road again at about ten miles per hour. Behind them the Hot Rods in proper position hugged the right of the road, leaving the left open for those not in proper convoy order to race to their positions. Within two miles they were all in position. Stuart reported to Rod Blue One.

"Fool One to Rod Blue One," he said. "Your convoy seems in order. No stragglers spotted."

"Roger," said Rod Blue One. "I'll check. All Rod Blues, check and report missing!" He started to weave from one side of the road to the other to signal the same message for those who might not have heard him.

All Hot Rods behind him started to weave also, thus passing the visual signal back. Each checked the big, painted number of the Hot Rod behind him. No one was missing.

"Rod Blue One to all Rod Blues. Roll 'em!"

The Hot Rods rolled. The Cavalry copters covered them. Stuart glanced at his watch. It was 1050 hours.



Looking westward from Lower Alligator Jaw, the panoramic camera takes in the entire length of T-Bone. Outpost 6

TACTICAL USES OF



Sergeant First Class Tom Ford

In Korea this technique supplemented maps and aerial photographs in orienting patrols and forward observers, and aiding unit commanders

The 45th Division signal officer goes over photo strips of sections of the front with two combat photographers

Another view of T-Bone was taken from the high ground of Outpost 7, looking out toward the northwest. Outpost 8



or Jaw can be seen in the center foreground, while the tip of Upper Alligator Jaw is at the extreme right of the picture

PANORAMIC PHOTOGRAPHY

N old trick of the photographer's trade, the panoramic photograph, is now being used to help the tactical ommander. You simply put a camera on a tripod and ake multiple exposures of an area, turning the camera ach time to include new territory. The result is a picture f an entire sector of which unit leaders can make profitble use.

In December 1951, the 45th Infantry Division moved to ne Korean front. Forward lines had settled into semi-per-

he area of the front shown in the photographs. A comination of maps and photos ensures good orientation

e T is at the left center of the photograph. The crossbar, with Hill 290 on the left, stretches across the background

A panoramic view of the front, looking westward from Hill 347, just behind the main line of resistance. At the ex-

manent positions, and the battle sector of the division comprised only a small amount of real estate. It was vital for each commander to know every detail of his front if reconnaissance and combat patrols were to succeed.

Important points in the division sector were Old Baldy, Pork Chop, and T-Bone hills. The MLR extended west of Old Baldy to the 3rd Division and east to Chorwon where the 9th ROK Division was dug in. There was little available information. Maps were out of date and on a small scale. Aerial photographs were taken at high altitudes and often hard to interpret.

The 45th's photographers had done extensive aerial work during training. They tried to repeat the operation from light observation planes of the division. Strong ground fire made this impossible. Then one photographer thought of panoramic pictures.

After consulting with Lt. Col. E. B. January, division signal officer, the photographers went on infantry patrols to outposts and other points in no-man's-land. They took several panoramic photographs and distributed them to every unit commander down to company level.

One officer using the pictures was Brig. Gen. Frederick A. Daugherty, who was then CO of the 179th Infantry Regiment.

"The panoramic pictures were a fine supplement to our maps," General Daugherty says, "and actually the maps became a second-best choice. With a complete view of the regimental front in my tent, I could refer to the pictures in every phase of planning. The time and effort saved in not having to travel to the OPs was invaluable.

"It is often difficult for a layman to interpret high-altitude aerial photographs. It's like standing in Denver and looking at Chicago from an aerial picture taken over Kansas City. Another advantage is literally seeing 'the other side of the hill' with the photos, a view not seen from the OPs in our sector."

All the strips were taken with the regulation 4x5 press camera using a telephoto lens and tripod. The photographers started at one flank of the view and shot a continuous arc, overlapping each negative about 20 per cent on each side.

All the 45th's photographs were taken when enemy activity was at a minimum in the area, since accurate and careful work was essential. Any photographer who attempts to take a panoramic with a telephoto lens and no tripod produces sloppy pictures which are of no value for tactical planning.

The photographer must put the pivot point of the tripod directly under the lens, instead of under the back of the camera as is normally done. He should make a secondary head for his tripod, attaching the back of the camera to the second head, so that the back of the camera is turned instead of the front.

All prints should be processed and printed for the same tones, field conditions permitting. Use rubber cement or scotch tape to assemble the strips, since regular glue will warp the prints within an hour.

Let's look at some instances when panoramic pictures were of valuable aid to the small-unit commander. In May 1952, patrols around the Lower Alligator Jaw sector east of T-Bone were running into heavy ambushes at night. A week before, a panoramic strip of the east side of T-Bone had been taken from Hill 200 on the Lower Alligator Jaw. Capt. James W. Wilson was then a platoon leader in Company A, 279th Infantry Regiment.

"We couldn't figure exactly where the Chinks were coming from," says Wilson. "They moved in every night and our old maps had no trace of a trail in the sector. We looked over the pictures and spotted a fresh trail in the snow. By noting other terrain features on the photos, features not seen on our maps, we were able to set up an ambush."

On May 26, 1952, the infantrymen of the 279th ambushed and routed a large group of Chinese soldiers—thanks to their tactical pictures.

"Looking over the pictures before a patrol gave a lot of confidence to our men," Capt. Wilson explains. "They knew every aspect of the terrain and how it would look. That's a great comfort when you're out at night."

Panoramics were also used to coordinate larger attacks. During the winter of 1951-52, units of the 245th Tank Battalion were detached on the right



reme left is the northeast slope of Old Baldy, with Hill 223 almost directly behind it. Pork Chop is at right center

lank with units of the 9th ROK Di-ision. Their mission was to train the South Koreans in an infantry-tank ssault and to make such an attack in he area north of Chorwon.

"We were moving and planning in erritory completely unfamiliar to us," Maj. Bert T. Rodgers, battalion S-2, ays. "Before the strike, we ordered round and aerial pictures. After not-ng possible routes of attack, enemy un positions and trenches, the battalion S-3 used the pictorial information for detailed training of the ROK troops."

The attack was a success.

Artillery played a vital role in the last days of the Korean war. Effective fire was needed to destroy new enemy positions and cover the infantry sorties. Forward observers had to have a detailed knowledge of the terrain.

Maj. Charles V. Wheeler was regimental liaison officer from the 158th Field Artillery Battalion to the 179th Infantry. He used panoramic strips to orient new forward observers. The pictures gave the FOs a better knowledge of the features on his map.

There was never any claim in the 45th that panoramic photography provided a cure-all for tactical planning. There is no substitute for the tedious work of personal observation. But the pictures were a valuable supplement, giving every man a view of the terrain.

REUNIONS

1st Armored Division. 1-3 July. Hotel New Yorker, New York City. For details write: Sal Marino, 215 Del Balso Blvd., Wappinger Falls, N. Y.

1st Infantry Division. 26-28 August. Congress Hotel, Chicago. For details write: Arthur L. Chaitt, 5309 Germantown Ave., Philadelphia 44, Pa.

3d Armored Division. 28-30 July. Jefferson Hotel, St. Louis. For details write: Paul W. Corrigan, 80 Federal St., Boston 10, Mass.

4th Infantry Division. 27-30 July. Commodore Perry Hotel, Toledo. For details write: Bill Conrad, 321 Euclid Ave., Toledo, O.

5th Infantry Division. 3-5 Sept. Hotel Benjamin Franklin, Philadelphia.

7th Armored Division. 19-21 August. Hotel Roosevelt, New Orleans. For details write: Johnnie Walker, 335 Johnson Ave., Teaneck, N. J.

8th Armored Division. 1-3 July. Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: Henry B. Rothenberg, Suite 1300, 134 N. La Salle St., Chicago 2, Ill.

17th Airborne Division. 12-14 August. Columbus, Ohio. For details write: R. E. Wendelken, Rm. 2120, 50 W. Broad St., Columbus 15, O.

25th Infantry Division. 15-17 July. Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia. For details write: 25th Inf. Div. Assn., PO Box 101, Arlington 1, Va.

37th Infantry Division. 2-5 Sept. Biltmore Hotel, Dayton, Ohio. For details write: Jack R. McGuire, 21 W. Broad St., Rm. 1101, Columbus 15, O.

41st Infantry Division. 29-31 July. Sheraton Hotel, Chicago. For details write: Robert C. Keller, 175 W. Jackson Blvd., Chicago 4, Ill.

43d Infantry Division. 27-28 August. Hotel Statler, Hartford. For details write: Joseph E. Zimmer, Room 306, State Armory, Hartford 15, Conn.

82d Airborne Division. 1-3 July. Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel, Detroit. For details write: 82d Airborne Division Assn., Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel, Detroit 31, Mich.

94th Infantry Division. 21-24 July. Hotel Bellevue-Stratford, Philadelphia. For details write: Anthony H. Mirra, Jr., 2810 Springfield Rd., Broomall, Pa.

125th Infantry Regiment. 23-24 July. Flint National Guard Armory, 1101 Lewis St., Flint, Mich.



The Journal Dissects

AN AIRPOWER CONCEPT OF

IS THE PROGRAM ADEQUATE?

COLONEL WILLIAM B. BUNKER

SOME thirty-five years ago a majority of our Army leaders believed that the best military application of the capability of the airplane then coming onto the scene would be as an adjunct to the troops on the ground. Although some of them felt that this resource could best be exploited in giving firepower support directly against the opposing ground forces, most of them limited its function to one of serving the Army with reconnaissance and observation. With the evidence now before us of what air power can do it has now become quite popular to ascribe this attitude solely to a combination of stupidity and intrenched jealousy. While there may have been some of these rather human traits in the character of those who opposed the early struggles of the air-minded evangelists, it should also be recognized that the airplane of those days was really not much of a machine and there could have been a legitimate doubt about dissipation of resources into an area which was not capable of exercising any decisive influence on the outcome of current wars. There can be no doubt today that these men were mistaken, as were many others in all walks of life, as to the various roles that the airplane was destined to play; it could, however, have been an indication that they suffered from human fallibility rather than malignant stupidity. Also it could be an indication of some lack of sober argument on the part of advocates of the new system. In any case the argument has long since been settled; it is questionable if it delayed the development of the air arm's role, and continually flaunting it has now become of questionable value.

Now of late a new point of difference has arisen between the air arm of our national defense and those who have been left behind on the ground. Once again the old strategies are being resurrected and re-debated. Today our sister service is developing a theory not only covering air warfare but the whole area of international conflict. Again those who still feel the necessity to enter a few objections are being accused of being foolish romanticists who can't see their own obsolescence or, worse, of protecting their selfish interests in the unwarranted diversion of national strength into useless anachronisms. The old stories of our penchant for crucifixion of the leaders of the air arm, our stupidities in planning a Japanese invasion or stifling the rightful ascendancy of the airplane are disinterred to show that the objections of ground soldiers are symptomatic of military myopia and plodding, unimaginative planning.

Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, late of the Air War College and now in a key position on the Staff of the National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Office, has developed a full and complete treatise on the airman's concept of the nature of future warfare. While *U. S. Military Doctrine* contains the usual disclaimers of official sanction, it can be accepted as expressing the convictions of most, if not all, of our Air Force leaders. It is a valuable work for any Army officer to read and study, not only to become familiar with the Air Force thesis and reasoning, but also to examine his own motives if he feels compelled, as many of us will, to raise some objections.

The comments that follow do not represent the views of the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. Nor am I in a position, official or personal, to ascertain those views. This is merely one professional soldier's analysis of the airman's view.

GENERAL Smith's book traces the development of military theories from the old masters of both ground and air strategy down to the development of the current U.S. military concepts in a very complete and well-documented fashion. Unfortunately, there seems to be an excessive reliance on the mistakes or lack of vision on the part of past Army leaders to prove that any cur-

U. S. MILITARY DOCTRINE. By Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, USAF. Duell, Sloan & Pearce and Little, Brown, & Co., 1955; 256 Pages; Bibliography; Index; $3.50.

OUR MILITARY POSTURE

BRIG. GEN. DALE O. SMITH

nt objections from this source are not to be seriously onsidered. Generally this book takes the position that e theory of "instant and massive retaliation" is now e unequivocal policy of the United States—a thesis hich seems to be a little dubious from recent qualify-g remarks by many of our Administration and Con-essional leaders.

This book should encourage Army planners and inkers to analyze carefully their reactions to this licy *vis-à-vis* their own thoughts on the necessity for Army. If it is true that our eyes are blinded by manticism and past glories, this study should do much clear our vision. If we are being unduly swayed by ir intrenched interests and jealousies then we ought consider more seriously the national interest that we e sworn to uphold. If, on the other hand, after study-g the theories and reasoning behind the airman's eories of war we still feel that an army has a real d vital role or that there are weaknesses in the fabric of this concept, then we must learn how to express our objections so that there shall be no mistaking our motives. We should, if our reasoning is sound, be able to do this without questioning the intelligence or the motives of our brothers-in-arms and without waving the tired battle streamers of our past campaigns. Obviously, if we have not been able to carry our points with one of the most intelligent military students of the Air Force, we can't expect appreciation from the average citizen either in or out of the service.

The major portion of this work is devoted to the development of the "massive retaliation" theory of warfare following the genesis of the weapon and the delivery system. General Smith concludes that the airplane could, if fully exploited, have obviated the land invasion of Europe although he does not make clear whether this includes doing without the contribution of the Russian land armies or not. He states that air power, with some assistance from naval forces did, in fact,

MASSIVE COMMERCIAL ALL THE WAY

JONATHAN CARMEN

ENERAL Dale Smith is a huckster with a product to sell and his book a massive commercial. He lets noth-g get in the way of his main mis-n: selling airpower. He gives you first pitch right away—a JATO-pelled wowser, as I think they don't either on Madison Avenue or at axwell AFB.

It is General Smith's opinion that . John Foster Dulles, in his now nous "massive retaliation" speech of January 1954, enunciated a "realistic and dynamic policy, the like of which this nation had not seen since George Washington submitted to the Continental Congress in 1783 his 'Sentiments on a Peace Establishment.'"

That's what the book says, and it is constantly reiterated. Indeed the entire text of the speech is printed as a sort of appendix.

Now Mr. Dulles has made lots of public statements in the two and a half years he has been Secretary of State, but few have been more controversial than that "massive retaliation" one. But General Smith calls it a "mature" policy, surely surprising in view of the explanations and annotations that followed its delivery. Surprising, too, because it has never been more than part of a policy since the days the Russians got an A-bomb of their own, which was before Mr. Dulles enunciated it. The President himself annotated it considerably when he recognized that the power to retaliate massively can be held by both sides

eliminate the requirement for invasion of Japan. While these contentions are open to some argument, as is the contention that the War of 1812 should have been fought with sea power alone, obviously arguing the effect on history of a hypothesis is an idle pastime. As a matter of fact, elsewhere in the book, General Smith discounts this theory and its conclusiveness himself. Furthermore, I do not think that anyone has to believe that the airplane could have conquered Germany by itself in order to *know* that the airplane coupled with the thermonuclear bomb *could* destroy the economic and political structure of any country today any more than one has to believe in witch doctors to appreciate penicillin.

Air power today, in an all-out war bears no more relation to the demonstrations of World War II (even including Hiroshima) than World War II bore to that of its ancestor. General Smith comfortingly points out that it would take a *hundred* bombers to bring a modern nation to its knees—thousand-bomber raids in World War II had an effect that was actually fairly localized. If we do not confine our thoughts to today's bombers lumbering along at a leisurely Mach 1, but consider the possibility of the ballistical intercontinental missile and the undoubted growth of the weapons they would carry, any doubts that we might entertain on the effects of a determined aerial effort are erased.

CERTAINLY no one can disagree with the concept that we must have as powerful a Strategic Air Force as we can afford and operate; that its fundamental tactic must be to heap "instant and massive retaliation" on the enemy who uses a similar attack against us or our allies; that we will not be able to launch this attack as a preventive measure even against an enemy whose belligerent intentions are known. I think that we also will all agree that this capability in being has so far acted as a strong deterrent against the present aggressive international force using its military strength in an all-out effort to take over the West. I believe we in the Army fully understand the military force of supersonic aircraft and megaton weapons and their essentiality in the present international climate.

On the other hand, perhaps we are disinterested enough professionally to question a little the permanence of his balance of technological power. As Senator Jackson said recently in a talk to the students at The Transportation School: "A ten year old child does not remain twice as old as a five year old indefinitely." Superiority is a relative matter and recent reports of developments of Soviet weapons and their delivery vehicles might well indicate that our margins of advantage in these areas are shrinking. We have enough faith in our industries and our engineers—yes, and in our Air Force, too—to believe that we will always manage to be somewhat better than the other fellow, but this philosophy of international force would seem to require a technical superiority as massive as the weapons themselves. If in every other measure of military strength we allow ourselves to become conspicuously weaker than our opponent, then a slight margin of strength in this area might be overlooked or even accepted as unimportant.

There are a few points in the discussion of the theory of all-out strategic warfare that still seem weak. For example, in discussing the effect of the first bomb on us, it seems that our nation will withstand this attack "because we must"—at the same time the efficacy of this means of defense by the opponent is discounted. There is an intimation that we will have bombs falling on our opponent before or at least at the same time as his are annihilating us. This is a problem in identification and arithmetic that seems too easily dismissed; surely this leaves us open to be the aggressor by launching an irretrievable bolt on suspicion or on what was really only a feint. The very difficult problem of what aerial support is to be given directly to our own forces and those of our allies already deployed in the NATO area is not mentioned. The critical and absolutely irreplaceable nature of this resource would seem to require that its direct support and protection must enjoy the highest priority for air support and air superiority. But most interesting to the military student is the ease with which the air "lines of siege" are drawn over the enemy's country. While it is quite obvious that a strong and determined strategic air force—his or ours—can get

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and suggested that such a "countervailing military power" could develop into "a form of world stalemate."

Now this does not preclude the need for a powerful thermonuclear-armed strategic air force. Indeed, such is requisite. But General Smith has nothing directly to say on the subject of "thermonuclear stalemate."

Luckily for you and me, Colonel Bunker, who is much better qualified than I am, is handling the really basic problems raised by General Smith, so my part in this dual endeavor to size up *U. S. Military Doctrine* is to roam about through the 256 pages looking at various aspects of it.

In his introductory chapter General Smith writes that his purpose is "to review the doctrines and policies expressed by [Brig. Gen.] Emory Upton [in *The Military Policy of the United States*] and to carry on from where Upton left off." If General Smith had failed in this attempt, we couldn't seriously find fault with him. After all, military doctrine, like fire power, has made a quantum jump in complexity since the days of General Upton, and the task today is ever so much more difficult.

But General Smith didn't fail, because he wasn't writing such a book. He obviously went into this work with certain preconceived ideas about air power and he wrote a book that traces the history of military doctrine with special application to airpower. So, instead of being "a study and appraisal

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GENERAL JOHN M. SCHOFIELD

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BRIGADIER GENERAL EMORY UPTON



DENNIS HART MAHAN

hrough current defenses and thrust home a severe and lamaging attack in the opening hours of the war, it is ıot equally plain how we are so sure that we will be ble rapidly to establish air dominance over his country vhich General Smith says is the first step in setting ıp the aerial siege which will rapidly bring even the ıost determined enemy to his knees.

But even with all of the problem areas which still emain to be worked out, we still must agree that *if* the nemy starts a thermonuclear war this leaves us no hoice of battlefield. And there can be little question ıat if this is to be the form of war there is no real role ɔr troops on the ground until this phase either ends ıe war or is abandoned by mutual exhaustion. This ecognition was the reason for the suggestion which I dvanced in these pages some months ago that under ıch circumstances Army forces in the U.S. should e trained to render maximum assistance to our bombed ities; I cannot feel that relying on present Civil Deense systems or pure necessity as General Smith ıggests, will be enough. I certainly feel that this is a etter and more realistic role than that suggested by Ir. Finletter in his *Power and Policy* where he stated ıat all we need is a "thin line of khaki" overseas hose primary mission is to get overrun by the enemy so that the President can declare war. I don't think that there are many leaders in any branch of the service who do not feel that the only answer to an atomic attack on our country or those of our allies must be instant and massive retaliation; our difference lies in the seriousness with which we regard the effects of their attack on us, the difficulties of establishing the "aerial siege" and the permanence with which we can rely on the necessary massive technological superiority. The overwhelming nature of this kind of warfare makes it vital that no effort be spared to work it out to the very best of our ability. Accurate estimates of the necessary forces, priority assignment of personnel and an adequate research effort, particularly in the intercontinental missile, are essential for this program even at the expense of other Air Force projects, of the Army, the Navy or anything else. Here we have no choice.

IT is, however, in the adequacy of this program as a complete *U. S. Military Doctrine* that we must take some exception to General Smith's thesis. While from time to time he states that there is still a requirement for ground forces, it is difficult to find where he intends to use them. He says that even if the indiscriminate bombing of industrial and urban areas could be out-

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U.S. military doctrine," it is a study ıd appraisal of only a part of today's ilitary doctrines. General Gavin, Adiral Burke, and Dr. Lapp could write ghly useful books on the same subct, and none would be similar in all spects. General Smith's title is too oad.

To aspire publicly to follow in the ɜps of Upton is certainly laudable, quiring considerable self-assurance nd humility, surely), but also large ıantities of perseverance in the grub-by business of digging into military history, meticulous care in the handling of facts, and intellectual objectivity in analyzing them. The book displays a commendable number of footnotes and a respectable bibliography, thus suggesting that General Smith was diligent in his research, although I must observe that his citations sometimes betray a willingness to rely on other researchers rather than go back to the original. For example, he cites Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy on Dennis Hart Mahan rather than going back to Mahan himself. Colonel Dupuy is certainly reliable, but still a "secondary source" as the history-writing trade has it. And while we are on the subject of footnotes, this must surely be the first "sober and objective" book on military policy that cites as full authority a statement in a campaign speech of a Presidential candidate! The statement may be without blemish, but is hardly authoritative. Perhaps General Smith has forgotten the estimate of

OUR greatness as a nation can be largely attributed to our ingenuity in learning the relationships of men to machines in our peaceful pursuits. We have adjusted our working and living habits to exploit the hidden helpers in technology. Sometimes adjustment has been painful, but the total result has increased the general welfare. Will our military thinking fail to make these painful adjustments and cling to the questionable neo-Clausewitz doctrine of massed land troops until we lose our sovereignty? Will we stubbornly hold to archaic relationships through the uncritical worship of nineteenth-century platitudes on the art of war? Will we, like the lemmings that migrate yearly to a place long sunk beneath the sea, commit mass suicide rather than change our habit patterns?

Opponents of the air-power theory will insist that they too believe in applying technology to warfare. Is not the atomic gun an example? But the marriage of atomic projectiles to a gun is the application of a new force to an old device. It would have been as reasonable after gunpowder had been invented to project explosive cannon balls from catapults. It is the same kind of thinking that put an arrow in the first cannon and a gasoline engine in a buggy. This sort of application of technical knowledge confines it to the precise limits of the land battlefield in strict conformance to the narrow concept of war that existed before the gasoline engine, the airplane, and atomic power were invented. *(Pages 112-113)*

lawed, warfare would just become an all-air war. He states that the problem of Korea could better have been solved by the use of air power alone although the results would have been different. One is forced to conclude that General Smith really feels that there is no true need for ground troops today. Perhaps he wants them as an indication that there is, in fact, some flexibility in the means of our "instant retaliation" although he does point out that it takes too long to commit such forces in comparison to air power. Not solely because it happens to be our profession and we dread unemployment, but because we honestly feel that there are still real missions to be performed on the ground, it is here that we must disagree with the adequacy of this statement of a satisfactory national military concept.

General Smith's solution to Korea, and I assume similar problems in Indochina or elsewhere, would be to allow the Communists to overrun the country without committing our own ground troops. If the native armies can hold off the enemy, all is well, but in any case we will apply our strength solely from the air against his industries, his transportation and his power while we use naval and air power to seal him from outside communications. This philosophy would, it seems, ignore that this is still a war of ideology that we are fighting and that when we put our ground troops into action in South Korea—which action certainly made up in "instant-ness" what it lacked in "massive-ness"—we stiffened a weak government into resistance and finally built up a respectable South Korean Army.

It is contended that the conquered non-Communists will stoically accept their share of our bombs because they know they are being liberated, and the example of the French in World War II is cited. General Dean's account of the reactions of his North Korean hosts to our bombing does not indicate any such attitude existed in that area; it would seem that in areas where people have less direct interest in government and less political tradition than the French, they might not be so long suffering. It would appear that such a tactic would lose the political side of the struggle before the military side were placed in issue, particularly if the enemy were astute enough to restrict *his* action to opposing military forces and not damaging the interests of the masses of peasants and little businessmen who make up these countries. Might this not have been the reason that the thesis of using naval and air power alone against Indochina was rejected when the Army advised that it could not make a successful contribution? The nature of the present international conflict would seem to demand that we use no greater force than does our major opponent if we want to retain the vital support of our system of alliances. It is unreasonable to expect our allies to permit us—and they have a strong veto—to change the complexion of a limited war into a crescendo of thermonuclear fury unless their own

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the worth of campaign oratory made by the late Wendell Willkie.

General Smith has some hard things to say about minds that insist on "immutable principles" of war. Well, I've got a footnote and bibliographic insert for him to use in his next commercial. Anything harsh he has to say on this subject was said double by a professional ground soldier in an Army magazine before World War II. I refer him to "Word Magic of the Military Mystics," in the September-October 1939 issue of *Infantry Journal*. Where the best General Smith can do is to say that "the fixed belief that these principles of war, written and implied, are immutable has been a stultifying influence on the evolution of military thinking," the author of that article, a then Major Thomas R. Phillips, punctured more than a few gaseous bags of military nonsense. One of the most hilarious of his findings was the discovery that Marshal Foch had listed four principles of war and then added "etc." "Just what the great principle of 'etc.' is has never been discovered," Major Phillips wrote. He then delivered himself of a priceless estimate: "Perhaps the secret of Foch's success lay in the great principle of 'etc.'" While General Smith quotes from Foch, he doesn't quote the "etc." I can't resist adding one apt quotation from Major Phillips's 1939 nonsense-deflator: "Foch often lacks a reason but never lacks a quote. . . ."

In his historical survey General

ıurvival were at stake. They are near enough and ex-
ɔerienced enough to know that even in winning, the
vounds can be mortal. It would therefore appear that
f we are to rely on air power alone we must accept
he loss of those areas where it is impossible safely
o open the Pandora's box, and that the determination
ɔf the degree of safety rests with those who are far
nore cautious in this doctrine than we.

In spite of references to British use of air power
ıgainst border tribes and descriptions of precision use
ɔf non-atomic air forces, it is difficult to accept an all-
ıir concept of limited warfare. It would seem that if
ve are going to hold our present lines we must be pre-
ɔared, on a global basis, to place our manpower shoulder
o shoulder with that of our allies to resist the type
f aggression of which Korea was an example. This is
hard decision to make and an expensive one as we
iscovered, but unless we take it, the consequences
night well be further Communist victories as blood-
ess as was that of Czechoslovakia. Adequate ground
roops to meet these requirements will not be small, and
hey must be supported by a sizeable home force and
raining establishment.

'HERE is also some reason to believe that even an
all-out global war might not take the form that our
ıir Force leaders expect. The vision of a war conducted
y each SAC against the opposing nation with such
dmittedly porous assistance as an air defense system
ıay render, is becoming less positive every day. When
ıe very real deterrents placed on purely *military*
rategies by the people even in a dictatorship are
ppreciated, there is at least a strong possibility that
ıch a form of warfare will never occur. Here it appears
ıat one of the few permanent truisms of Clausewitz,
hich General Smith frequently mentions, has been
ɔrgotten. War *is* an extension of the policy of the
ɔvernment and these policies and the degree of their
xtension do not always, as General MacArthur dis-
ɔvered, follow what might be considered to be the
est military strategy. As this book points out, the
ready tremendous power of thermonuclear warfare
growing every day and even the Russian people are

LET us analyze how the Korean War might have been fought with an air and naval strategy. First, South Korea would have been overrun by the Communists. They would have had full possession of the territory. This "victory" might soon have turned sour indeed if Korea then had been sealed off from outside communications, with its industrial, power, and transportation capacity progressively destroyed by sustained air attack. A tight air and naval blockade might eventually have driven the nation back to medieval living conditions. No government could have endured such hardship. The people, North and South alike, would have forced their masters to sue for a cease fire. In time, famine, riot, and disorder would have resulted from such a quarantine. And in the end, it is decidedly open to question whether more people would have died than died under the conditions of invasion and occupation, where artillery zeroed on every forward village because it might be harboring enemy troops.

* * *

If such a war is to be limited in any case, it would seem reasonable to wait patiently for the enemy's demise through horizontal and vertical blockade rather than to rush in with surface forces for physical occupation. This is siege strategy accelerated by rapid attrition from air attack; a strategy as old as warfare and commonly practiced before abstractions of the Clausewitz philosophy began to grip mankind. *(Pages 82-83)*

being made aware of its potency. Our British and European allies are already thoroughly convinced of the havoc which such a form of warfare can wreak and of the surety that such havoc will not be confined to one side of the struggle. General Smith dismisses this thought with a statement that, in case of an all-out war, President Eisenhower said that a Chief Executive who failed to act vigorously should be hanged; under the NATO system the decision is not his alone. This still does not imply to me that if Russia started across the Elbe with two hundred divisions we should, or indeed could, loose the power of SAC against her homeland while her strategic bombers remained hangared. Far from protecting our country, such action

nith veers skyward at about the point
time when the Wright Brothers
ɔk off at Kitty Hawk. After that ıe
cks closely to Air Marshal Sir Hugh
ɔenchard (founder of the RAF), Billy
itchell, and Giulio D.uhet, making
ly occasional forays into the minds
"ground" generals and admirals. And
ıen he does this he is sometimes less
ın kind. He seizes on General Ga-
ı's comment that "mass retaliation
ds no justification in human experi-
ce as an exclusive and self-sufficient
means of victory" to remark that he hadn't heard anyone in authority say it was. The courteous retort is to say the same thing about General Smith's statement that "the charge that air forces are only able to conduct all-out war of the atomic type, that limited wars must be handled exclusively by troops on the ground, cannot be upheld by the facts." Who in authority or out has said that limited wars can be fought exclusively by troops on the ground? Surely General Smith has heard of the Army's desire for good close support by tac air, and he must be aware that the Army is doing its best to create a useful cargo- and transport-carrying air corps. Such, as Admiral Radford once said, is airpower too.

The Army isn't against airpower, although General Smith is bitter about soldiers who once were hostile to it. There were such once. But they no longer exist. The problem now is airpower enthusiasts who are against armies. They exist today.

would put us to the supreme test of evaluating the validity of the one-hundred-bomber estimate of our resistance capability.

A strong strategic air force is indeed a real deterrent force to an all-out atomic war. And in view of the well-known strength of the Russian equivalent, there is no way in which we can avoid the necessity of maintaining one. But just as we say that we should avoid attacking the ground forces of the enemy because of his margin of superiority in the area, he will avoid attacking us here so long as we maintain a conspicuous lead in weapons and delivery vehicles for strategic air warfare, this does not mean that he will withhold his ground armies indefinitely. And I believe there has been, and always will be (or at least until someone devises a perfect air defense system), a public rejection of the thesis that employment of such a retaliation against a surface attack is acceptable. General Smith rejects the moral objection to his thesis on the grounds that past actions of the Soviet leaders and the number of people killed by ground warfare put our enemy outside the moral pale but when weapons have the indiscriminate area coverage of thermonuclear bombs and their "fall out," a moral question is most definitely present. It is interesting to note how carefully General Smith refers to the victims as industries, transportation facilities, communications and similar inanimate agencies and neglects to mention that the location of such targets in urban areas means that these broad area weapons will mainly eliminate people—one has the feeling that his moral convictions are being somewhat strained too. This is not only a moral compunction against the wholesale slaughter of the enemy's citizenry but an even stronger moral reluctance of any government (which in our case necessarily includes the NATO and probably the SEATO powers) to expose its own non-combatants to the same consequences.

THEREFORE, while the ever-growing power of thermonuclear warfare is undoubtedly a deterrent to a sudden strategic air attack, it becomes, of itself, less and less of a deterrent to aggression by more archaic forms of warfare. It demonstrably has not deterred the nibbling aggression of the Communists since World War II. This leads to the anomaly, so widely misinterpreted by our sister service, that the stronger and more invincible that SAC grows the more vitally important it becomes that we have a strong land army and its related tactical air power capable of stopping the ground attack of the Soviet armies. It is becoming clearer every day that if war does come, the primary mission of such massive weapons might well be to neutralize each other by their presence and not by their use. The West will have to build an army as strong as that of its enemies.

General Smith's book is extensively cross-referenced to the famous "massive retaliation" speech of Secretary Dulles of January 12 of last year. In view of the clearance of this speech by the National Security Council, the position is taken that this is a complete statement of our national military policy. While this speech refers to "a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing," the general inference is that the only important "means" is thermonuclear assault by SAC and the only "place" is the Soviet homeland.

General Smith has tried to demonstrate that this limited interpretation of retaliation is a natural development of warfare and weapons. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the conclusion from Secretary Dulles' remarks that it was really an economic "Hobson's Choice." While obviously we always have the requirement of cutting our suit to fit the cloth, we should not insist that we really want shorts when we need trousers. Requirements for national security should be clearly analyzed on the basis of the facts of warfare—if the obtainable military posture must be less for economic reasons any resultant weakness should not be hidden from our Congressional leaders or even from our people by building a false sense of value in a one-weapon system. We should have learned from the aftermath of our support of Louis Johnson's economy program that to claim our needs are less than they actually are is really a disservice. Under these circumstances there should be a complete analysis of the minimum and the effective maximum *required* strength in every area of military posture, and the National Security Council should have a clear idea of the net effect of holding one force at or below its minimum while the other is built to the maximum.

THE implications of strategic air warfare are changing rapidly every day. In the long history of the military art, seldom has the complexion of warfare been in such a flux in times of nominal peace. When all the ramifications are considered, it is even possible that this form of strategy could become obsolete without the test of battle. As General Smith points out, we cannot allow military doctrine to become blind dogma. It could be that the imaginative aggressive doctrines of Hugh Trenchard, Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell are approaching that category. It is essential to keep our policy from becoming irretrievably committed to such an all-encompassing theory as to rob us of any freedom of choice, we must, as General Phillips recently pointed out and every airman knows, make a careful and accurate analysis of our position *before* we reach the Point of No Return.

This book on the Air Force's concept of warfare of the future should be required reading in Army higher schools as it is very apt to become in those of the Air Force. A full understanding of the thesis is essential to every professional soldier whether he subscribes to all of its tenets or not. It is only regrettable that no one in the Army has explained the philosophy of the ground forces as lucidly; perhaps this will lead one of our scholars to take up the chore. We cannot accuse anyone of lack of understanding in rejecting the requirement for armies if we haven't been able to tell our story.

7 | This Concerns You

COMMISSIONED SPECIALISTS

T one time or another during his career, every officer asks himself hether he should specialize. This ticle will attempt to emphasize the oints that he must consider in reach-ig his decision.

Within the broad field of branch ecialization most officers receive a umber of assignments in one partic-lar type of duty, such as personnel, erations, intelligence, or logistics; but is may be done without any in-ention of making a specialist of him. Ve are here primarily concerned with e officially recognized fields of spe-alization, in which repetitive assign-ents are essential in order for the ficer to attain a degree of proficiency. hese include the atomic energy, in-lligence, and foreign-area fields, hich are covered by current special gulations, and the recently estab-hed research and development field itlined in Memorandum 611-108-1, ited 10 November 1954. A second tegory of specialization is recognized TM 20-605 and covered only by reer management policies. This in-udes public information, comptroller, d legislative liaison fields.

What effect will specialization have on my branch assignments?

TM 20-605 points out that branch signments, including military hools, will be interspersed with as-gnments in a specialized field. The erage officer receives numerous as-gnments on staffs of higher head-arters and on the staffs and fac-ties of senior service schools, which e branch immaterial in nature. These signments occur with about the same gularity as the assignments the spe-alist will receive in his specialized ld. The specialist does not neces-ily lose out on the choice assign-ents within his branch, but he does ve closer supervision over his anch-immaterial assignments and a rrower field from which to choose.

Will specialization hurt my chances for higher military schooling?

The combat arms have adopted a uniform school-selection system. Cred-it is given under that system for a wide variety of assignments as well as man-ner of performance. Limitations placed on the branch-immaterial assignments would tend to handicap the specialist under this system, but action has been taken within Career Management Di-vision to prevent this. Under school se-lection procedures, specialists compete among themselves for a pro rata share of the spaces allocated to their respec-tive branches.

Will specialization affect my chance for promotion?

The various specialized fields have not been in existence long enough for a statistically proven answer to be given. A review of the records of a number of the officers recently selected for general-officer rank indicated that their careers have followed a pattern which we would now term specializa-tion. There are certainly no indications that specialization will jeopardize a chance of promotion. On the contrary, there are certain general-officer posi-tions that can be filled only by those who have had a highly specialized career in the particular field con-cerned.

What are the advantages of special-ization?

It has been said that we do best that which we like to do. Since the currently recognized specialized pro-grams are all on a voluntary basis, it can be assumed that every commis-sioned specialist has a particular in-terest in or aptitude for assignments in the area of his specialization. Repeti-tive assignments will provide a greater degree of background and experience. The result should be a greater degree of proficiency. In this respect, Career Management feels that what is good for the officer is good for the Army.

THE MONTH'S FILMS

CAPTAIN JACK F. McAHON

TF 9-1935, Interchangeability Features of Heavy and Very Heavy Artillery (34 minutes), takes the viewer step-by-step through the replacing of a 155mm tube with one from an eight-inch howitzer and the switch of an eight-inch howitzer tube to a 240mm carriage.

FB 280, Infantry Weapons and Their Effects—81mm and 4.2-inch Mortars (14 minutes), shows a crew firing various types of ammunition used by the mortars, while the narrator covers the nomenclature, tactical uses, and capabilities of the weapons. The film is in color.

FB 273, Infantry Weapons and Their Effects—U. S. Pistol, Cal. 45, Submachine Gun, Cal. 45, U. S. Carbine, Cal. 30 (8 minutes), presents firing demonstrations of each weapon and explains their tactical employment, capabilities and characteristics.

TF 11-1976, Radio Transmission Security (28 minutes), shows how an invasion nearly failed because of a lack of intelligent radio security, including breaking of radio silence, failure to monitor assigned frequencies, failure to check correct assigned frequency prior to transmission, and transmitting without authentication.

AFIF 60, Panama (19 minutes), covers the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, and their relationship to each other and to the U. S. It explains the role of the Canal Zone as a part of our national defense and the mission of the military stationed there.

TF 9-1948, Recoil Mechanisms, Principles of Operation, Hydropneumatic Type—Part I (12 minutes), uses cutaway models to explain how the hydropneumatic type of recoil mechanism works. Of particular interest to artillerymen and tankers.

THE MONTH'S READING

The Profession of Arms

BRIG. GEN. DALE O. SMITH
U. S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal
Little, Brown & Company, 1955

. . . the military man must become truly professional. The laurels of war, as Upton [in his *Military Policy of the United States]* so clearly demonstrated, have gone more often to the professional because of his superior skill and discipline. Modern times require the professional to digest a prodigious body of knowledge, technical as well as military. So a factor of extended education has been added. If speed and ability are required as foremost elements for success in war, then the concept of arming our nation with part-time soldiers who rotate in and out of the service is untenable. The modern profession of arms contains an infinite body of complex knowledge; it demands intricate skills. Learning these is often as arduous as perfecting the art of surgery. A full lifetime career is demanded of the soldier, sailor, or airman if he is to gain even a modicum of proficiency in discharging his responsibilities. Add to this the stakes involved in case the military man's performance is less than optimum, and the course of action appears crystal clear. For the long haul, the military must become a highly professional career service.

This does not mean, of course, that all services must consist wholly of regulars. The concept of the regular officer was based on an expandable, wartime-mobilization type of organization; consequently, regulars constitute a very small fraction of the professionals now serving. Reserves serving full time as a career are usually as professional as the regulars. The concept of the regular establishment has become outmoded with the new order. Even the civilian scientist, historian, operations analyst, production expert, and so on, is, when devoting full time as a career in national-security matters, as professional as the uniformed regular.

Moreover, if we are to survive in the long haul, military education must be offered in curricula of all institutions of higher learning, and even to some extent in secondary schools. This kind of military education should not be given in the form of training to provide legions for war machines, but in such a way as to give each voting citizen a working knowledge of war and to provide opportunities for potential statesmen to learn the higher arts of war.

When Spenser Wilkinson took the endowed chair of the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford in 1909, he eloquently expressed the view which today has become a real necessity:

"In our school of Literae Humanores we study the idea of the state; in our schools of History, the life and growth of states. It is to this part of the University's work that the Study of War belongs. For war is one of the modes of human intercourse. . . . We are thus bound to study war if we are to cultivate true ideas or to advance a healthy learning."

Perhaps no other subject is discussed so widely and so heatedly with such ignorance as the subject of war. Avoiding the study of war because of its repugnant consequences is as shortsighted as would be the avoidance of the problem of disease because of its harm to mankind. If war is looked upon as a social disease that needs understanding before it can be controlled, just as human disease is regarded as a physiological phenomenon, then perhaps we can study war without the emotional overtones that tend to mask all real learning. The most repulsive human diseases are dispassionately analyzed by hosts of learned investigators. Yet the rare and courageous individual who attempts to dissect the most injurious ailment of mankind, the social disease of war, is apt to be treated as suspiciously as the eighteenth century medical student who dissected a cadaver.

* * *

The Morrill Act, passed during the American Civil War [1862], was essentially a military measure to get higher education in tune with the hard reality of the times. Land-grant colleges were required to give military instruction in addition to the practical sciences. For some reason, the military phase failed to catch on. The spirit of isolationism, combined with the dim fears of our European feudal past when men-at-arms prevented freedom, defeated this enlightened measure to establish military education.

After our rude awakening between 1914 and 1918 ROTC was established. These departments were appended to educational institutions, but very little military science was integrated into the higher-education program. Consequently, most military education in universities was kept on a rather elementary level.

Thus it became necessary for higher military education to be conducted almost exclusively within the military services. There were few colleges in this country, for example, where one could then, or even now, take a course in military history, military management, military strategy, logistics, tactics, or military law. Such broad areas of knowledge are essential to modern military organization and employment. Scholars who were willing to learn, spread, and advance these military disciplines were sorely needed.

To fill the void, service schools, for the purpose of advancing the professional education of officers, began to appear

ward the end of the last century. The first was the Army's Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. General Sherman opened its doors in 1881. Another first was the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island (1884), and Admiral Mahan became its second commandant. Colonel Tasker H. Bliss of the Army was detailed as Mahan's assistant, and when the Army War College was established by Elihu Root in 1901, Bliss became its second commandant.

Today all three armed services have numerous advanced service schools. The Air University established at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 1946, directs a whole system of institutions, including an Air War College comparable to the Army and Navy War Colleges. Moreover, a few joint schools, such as the National War College in Washington, D. C., have been organized since the second World War.

Yet in view of the immense volume of knowledge in the military field and of the fact that new knowledge is pouring forth in ever-increasing torrents, the service schools are too small and understaffed to assimilate the vast material alone. Military budgets are so pared and manpower so tightly organized into operating units designed to provide maximum D-day protection that advanced schooling in the services is run on an austere basis. Such schools can permit no more than a smattering of indoctrination with the available knowledge. Good textbooks, revised yearly with new data, are rare, and research in the art of war by true professionals is a luxury seldom afforded. If the art and science of war is to advance at a speed which will assure a consistent lead over potential enemies, civilian institutions must incorporate it into the whole educational program of the nation, giving this study attention and nature equal to business, political science, or engineering.

One-Man TI&E Team

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 90
Headquarters XV Corps
20 April 1863

II. General [Lorenzo] Thomas [The Adjutant General], from the Headquarters of the Army, Washington City, D. C., proposes to address the troops at this camp at 10 a.m. to-morrow (Tuesday), on the "policy of the war." The brigades of the Second Division and regiments of the First Division, not detached, and companies of artillery and cavalry, will be formed on their respective parade grounds without arms or accouterments, but dressed in their best uniforms and marched to a point facing the levee near General Blair's headquarters, at a point to be selected by him, and the troops, on arrival, will be arranged by General Blair according to the nature of the ground. A single gun, from Hart's battery, will be the signal for attention, and officers and men will listen to the remarks of General Thomas, and heed them as the voice of our Government. A second gun from the same battery will be the signal for marching the troops back to their respective brigades. Officers and men will preserve their places in ranks during the speaking, and conduct themselves as they know good soldiers should. General Blair will make all arrangements necessary to carry this order into effect.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman:

R. M. SAWYER
Assistant Adjutant General

Morale and Training

RICHARD TAYLOR
Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army
Destruction and Reconstruction
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955

The value of "initiative" in war cannot be overstated. It surpasses in power mere accession of numbers, as it requires neither transport nor commissariat. Holding it, a commander lays his plans deliberately, and executes them at his own appointed time and in his own way. The "defensive" is weak, lowering the morale of the army reduced to it, enforcing constant watchfulness lest threatened attacks become real, and keeping commander and troops in a state of anxious tension. These truisms would not deserve mention did not the public mind ignore the fact that their application is limited to trained soldiers, and often become impatient for the employment of proved ability to sustain sieges and hold lines in offensive movements. A collection of untrained men is neither more nor less than a mob, in which individual courage goes for nothing. In movement each person finds his liberty of action merged in a crowd, ignorant and incapable of direction. Each obstacle creates confusion, speedily converted to panic by opposition.

Camels in Texas

EDWARD S. WALLACE
The Great Reconnaissance
Little, Brown & Co., 1955

One of Jeff Davis's pet projects became a legend in the Southwest which has grown in romance with the telling through the years. This was the great experiment with camels in the arid and desert regions along the Mexican border. The experiment failed, not because the imported camels could not succesfully adapt themselves to the conditions of Texas and points west—quite the contrary, they were enthusiastically praised by all who gave them a fair trial—but because the Civil War disrupted our whole military organization in those regions, and the camels, who had not really as yet had a chance to establish themselves thoroughly, were perforce abandoned or surrendered to the Confederates along with many military posts and much equipment. And the Confederates had neither the time nor the resources to pursue anything unproved or theoretical. So the camel experiment, after a promising start, died on the vine and the loss was a potential camel corps to the United States Army and possibly, years later, to Hollywood. Also the present young fry, who blossom forth in cowboy suits and six-shooters, have been deprived of the colorful alternatives of the burnooses and robes of Arabian sheiks and camel riders.

THE DAY WE TOOK 312

There is no such thing as a lost cause

CAPTAIN RICHARD A. McMAHON

I HAD recently returned from Korea. The personnel officer who was screening my records was an old friend I had known before the war. He picked up a paper and began reading dramatically.

"With razor-sharp bayonets glittering in the sun, the gallant soldiers bayoneted and killed the Communists in courageous individual assaults."

I winced.

He read on, grinning. "The battle hung in balance as the lines swayed back and forth on the crest of the hill. Battle cries could be heard above the noise of exploding grenades and the clanging of slashing steel blades."

It sounded more like something out of Hollywood than a citation from General Orders. Why can't words ever do justice to events?

"Well," said my friend, "it must have been nearly as dramatic as it sounds, because a Medal of Honor came out of it."

"And a DSC, some Silver Stars, and a flock of Purple Hearts," I added.

"I prefer this account," I said, taking a letter from under my 201 file.

The letter was addressed to Captain Richard D. Wolf, Company A, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and it was from the Commanding General, IX Corps, Korea. It read:

> The official report of the brilliant action of your company in assaulting its objective with the bayonet on 30 January has been received. I know of no more determined or brilliant assault on the part of a company of Infantry, in either World War II or the present Korean War. The work done by you and your men in this assault and the casualties inflicted on the enemy in hand-to-hand combat is worthy of the highest Infantry tradition. I shall take great pride in reporting this incident officially to the Eighth Army Commander.
>
> [Signed] BRYANT E. MOORE, Major General, USA

"Some day you're going to have to tell me how it really happened," said my friend as he put my papers back in their jacket.

As I walked back across the parade ground, my mind was full of memories that had been stirred up by the conversation. I sat down at the bar of the officers' club



nd ordered a beer, thinking of that leak January day and Hill 312. . . .

* * *

FIRST saw the hill while riding in a jeep on the way back from the ospital to rejoin my unit. It was late ı the afternoon and the high ground) our front was being plastered by rtillery. Round after round whistled verhead, ending its journey in a crash-ıg ball of orange flame, which looked rangely beautiful against the green-h brown hill and bright blue sky.

"What's going on?" I asked the driver, indicating the barrage up ahead.

"That's Hill 312, sir," he said. "The battalion has been trying to take it all day."

"Looks like I got back just in time," I said.

The company CP was located in a farmhouse in a small village, and as I made my way into the only room, I could see the company commander squatting Korean-style in one corner, listening to a radio receiver. He nodded and waved me to a seat. The others in the room were the key men in the company—the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. Some of them I knew, most of them I did not. You don't have to be away from a line company long for the faces to change.

Although there was only one headset, the transmissions were coming in loud enough to be heard all over the room. The conversation was between the battalion CO and the company commander of Charley Company. Charley, with artillery and tank support, was trying to take the hill. The radio transmissions between the two commanders provided a blow-by-blow description of the action and I settled back to listen.

The attack had been going well until the company had got to within about a hundred yards of the crest of the hill. There the cover gave out, and the Chinese were concentrating everything they had on the advancing Americans. Finally the company commander reported he could not continue the attack. The last seventy-five yards were straight up a bare, almost cliff-like slope, which was swept by enemy fire. The men were exhausted and in no condition for the bitter fight they would have to wage even if they succeeded in gaining the crest. The battalion commander pleaded with him to make one more concerted effort, and he said he would do his best.

WE could hear the shouts of command coming over the set amid the noise of battle, and one platoon of Baker Company, which was attached to Charley for this action, succeeded in breaking from cover and scrambling desperately up the slope. For a while it seemed as though they might make it. They managed to work slowly up the slope, but just before they reached the trenches a hail of grenades descended on them, and they came tumbling back down the hill, demoralized and suffering heavy casualties.

The battalion commander ordered a withdrawal. Captain Wolf put down the headset. "Well, you heard it," he said. "Might as well get some sleep. If they don't attack us tonight, you know damn well we'll have to attack them in the morning. Let's get what rest we can."

As we filed out, I introduced myself to some of the new men in the oufit. One of them was a tall, thin lieutenant with a heavy beard, who made no particular impression on me until I heard his name. "McGovern?" I said, going back over the years. "Aren't you the McGovern who graduated with me from OCS in '47?"

"That's me," he replied. "And don't tell me I've changed that much," he said reprovingly. "How are you, Dick?"

We ate chow together and talked about old times and old friends. Somehow things seemed a little better for both of us, and tomorrow wasn't quite so near.

When I finally rejoined my men, my platoon sergeant, MSgt Alvin St. Clair, took time out from the perpetual poker game to talk over the situation. "They really go for that new looey over in the second platoon," he told me, after we had made our plans.

"What do you mean?" I asked.

"He's a friend of yours, ain't he?" he said. Seeing my nod, he went on. "Well, I thought you might know. They tell me he sure talks a great war. He came here from the 187th Airborne on account of they're overstrength in officers. Hell, lieutenant, you know they ain't seen any fightin' yet compared to us, and he's been goin' around telling the guys in the platoon how to act in combat. Why they probably all have more time on the line than he has in Korea."

"Hell, St. Clair, that's harmless enough," I said. "He just wants to make sure they know their stuff before he gets in action with them, that's all. I would do the same thing if I had come back to a new outfit, instead of here."

"Sure, I know that, and you know it, but the guys in the platoon don't," he said. "They think he's trying to snow them. Besides, he's always talking about what he's going to do when he gets a crack at the Chinks."

"Well, he'll get his chance tomorrow," I said. "And for that matter, so will we. Meanwhile let's get some sleep."

THE morning of 30 January 1951 dawned grey and cold. The company awoke sluggishly and struggled to throw off the stiffness that comes from sleeping out in below-zero weather by swallowing gallons of coffee and heavy helpings of powdered eggs. The company commander had been called to battalion late the night before, and right after breakfast all the platoon leaders assembled to receive the attack order. It was just about as we had expected. Baker Company would launch a diversionary attack on the right and hold up at the base of the hill, where they would attempt to draw the enemy's fire. Under cover of this maneuver, we were to move up the road to approach 312 from the left, and make the assault.

With a section of tanks for flank protection, we stumbled sleepily through the morning mist. The exceptionally heavy blanket hid everything, and Captain Wolf had to rely solely on his map in choosing an approach. Leaving the road, the company wound its way single file across the rice paddies and began working its way up the steep slope. The 2d Platoon—Lieutenant McGovern's—led the way.

The ascent was uneventful but tiring. We forgot temporarily about the enemy, the war, and everything else except the tedious job of putting one foot in front of the other. It was slow going except, apparently, for the 2d Platoon. Twice Wolf had to send them word to hold up because they were getting too far ahead of the main body. The Captain was plainly worried. We had been climbing for over an hour and were still not out of the mist. The sound of firing had begun on the right, indicating that Baker Company had begun its feint. I thought I could hear answering fire from somewhere above us, but there was no way to be sure. The wrong move could put us between Baker Company and the enemy, exposed to the fire of both.

SUDDENLY the radio at my shoulder crackled, and McGovern's voice sounded clearly, "Able six, this is Able two. Enemy in sight. Request permission to attack."

It took Wolf as much by surprise as anyone else, and it was several seconds before he answered, "This is Able six. Hold your position until I get there. Platoon leaders join me."

As I moved forward, I could feel the familiar pounding in my veins, and my throat was suddenly dry. I joined Wolf and the platoon leaders, crouched on a small knoll. The haze was lifting, and there above us, not seventy-five yards away, loomed the crest of 312!

It took Wolf only an instant to formulate his plan of attack. He ordered the 1st and 2d Platoons into a skirmish line under cover of the knoll, and placed mine, the 3d, in position to provide support fire. Then, on his signal, the skirmishers jumped off. They had advanced almost halfway up the slope before the Chinese recovered from their surprise and turned their fire in the new direction. Many of them were so taken aback that they stood up in their trenches to shoot or hurl grenades. These became easy prey for the men of the 3d Platoon, who picked them off at the close range with excited shouts and curses.

The full force of the enemy's fire now began to hit the attacking troops, but the unexpectedness of our assault had given us a decided advantage. Our men had begun to get in so close that many of the Chinese machine guns could not be depressed enough to fire at them.

Anxiously, I watched the progress of the attack. I could not see the 1st Platoon, which was hidden by the small knoll we were on; but over on the right the 2d Platoon was moving straight up the steep incline against the strongest part of the Chinese defenses. McGovern was out in front by over twenty yards, advancing like a madman. He was caught in a burst of fire, fell, but regained his feet instantly, and continued forward. Another burst of fire shot his carbine out of his hands. He stopped long enough to draw his pistol and then disappeared over the crest of the hill. A shout went up from his platoon and they scrambled frantically after him.

TO the left I could see four men inching their way up the steep, rocky slope, only yards from the enemy trenches. The Chinese in these positions would no longer risk exposing themselves to our deadly fire, and remained crouched in their holes. The rest of the platoon was coming into view now, slowly making its way up the hill. Suddenly the air seemed filled with hand grenades flying from the enemy emplacements, the long wooden handles and stubby noses making awesome silhouettes against the sky. The remnants of the platoon scattered and tumbled back down the hill in disorder. But the original four men stayed where they were, clinging tenaciously to their positions like flies on a wall. They ignored the continuing barrage of grenades and even managed to throw some of their own. I rushed over to where Wolf was watching the progress of the attack.

"Captain," I yelled, "how about the 3d Platoon?"

"No, not yet, not yet!" he shouted back. The 2d Platoon was now engaged in a desperate struggle for the right portion of the crest, and he was reluctant to commit his reserve until he knew where it was needed most.

I jumped over the rise to see what uld be done and ran toward the base the final rise to the peak. Here I ınd platoon sergeant Fred L. Poe ing to rally the men who had been ced down the hill by the grenade rage. To my surprise there were ite a few. Shouting encouragement, nanaged to get them started once re up the hill. As we neared the , another murderous barrage of nades fell all around us.

"Down!" I shouted, and everyone gged the dirt. After the explosions l rocked the air, showering us with t, I stood up and shouted, "OK, s go!"

t became a chant. The grenades ne down in volleys, and when we v them everyone would yell, own!" After the explosions, we uld all shout, "Let's go!" and the surged forward. The fever became tagious, and even the wounded rose uting and pushed on.

As we approached, the enemy rose the trenches to meet our assault. eir slow, cumbersome bolt-action s were no match for the M1s, ARs, automatic carbines that greeted m, tearing huge holes in their ranks. unreal, nightmarish atmosphere deded over everything, and time d still.

NFUSION and carnage, king and queen of all battles, now reigned reme on the crest of 312. The 3d oon had been committed, and the nese were reinforcing the trenches men who had been in dugouts the reverse side of the hill. But ite their greater numbers, they becoming hopelessly demoralized. re was not enough room for them he trenches, and some of them e unarmed. Many just milled nd until they got shot or threw selves on American bayonets in e unarmed assaults. Vicious handnd fighting was waged across the ne, as weight of numbers tried to down weight of steel.

hen all at once it was over. Men ed shooting because they suddy realized there wasn't anyone left oot. A few forlorn figures staged down the reverse slope in an pt to escape, and were peppered tlessly by small-arms fire. Orders shouted and men and equipment l back and forth across the hill. ine guns were brought up, and ortars went into position. Forward



The attack on Hill 312. Enemy positions are in color

observers scanned the area through their glasses, and riflemen eagerly searched for something to shoot at. Baker Company had come over to join the fight, and over a hundred men were now on the hill, spoiling for trouble.

But the trouble didn't come, and gradually the fever evaporated. Then began the dirty job of cleaning up the litter. The wounded had all been taken care of or evacuated, but the bodies of the dead, like sawdust-filled dummies, sprawled everywhere. The air was heavy with the sickish sweet smell of a butcher shop on a hot summer afternoon.

Wearily, Able Company began to total the score. They counted over two hundred Chinese dead on the hill. There was no way of determining how many had fallen that day, and how many had been victims of the artillery barrage and Charley Company's attack the day before. Able Company sustained between forty-five and sixty casualties, one fourth of whom had been killed. But many others had received minor wounds and had been treated on the spot without going back to the medics.

One of the dead was McGovern. His platoon had been halted by a machine-gun position, and he had charged it single-handedly. Although seriously wounded, he continued forward, armed only with a pistol and grenades. When found, he was only inches from the gun he had silenced, his left hand still clutching his pistol. The man who had talked a great war had fought an even greater one. No one would ever say anything against Lieutenant McGovern again.

* * *

I ORDERED another beer, and sipped it slowly. They were calling it a futile war now—a lost cause. But the men who had taken 312 had not fought a futile war. Lieutenant McGovern and all the countless others had not died fighting for nothing, because free men will not give up their lives for nothing. McGovern had received a Medal of Honor. A copy of the order was posted on the bulletin board in the bar, in a blue frame, and surrounded by thirteen stars. But more important than the medals that came out of 312 was the spirit of the men that took it—the teamwork, the sacrifice, and the determination of each man to do his part. So long as men are inspired to do these things, I thought, there is no such thing as a lost cause.

CEREBRATIONS

This department is designed to accommodate the short, pithy and good humored expression of ideas—radical and reactionary, new and old. We pay for all contributions published but you deserve to be put on notice that the rate of payment depends upon the originality of the subject and the quality of writing rather than length. This department is hungry for contributions, so shoot that good idea in . . . today.

"Bold New Advances" in R&D

THE recent decision to restrict items entering the supply system to those which could be classified as "bold new advances" is one of the best things that have happened in the field of military supply in recent years. It is just a modern way of saying, "Better let well enough alone," or "Don't swap horses in mid-stream." It is no bar to true progress, but it does put a checkrein on anyone who would introduce piddling changes.

In the past there have been too many changes in equipment and spare parts which all too frequently did not result in much improvement over what was then in use. In procurement, often before the item is put into production, the R&D people will have requested some design changes. Before the last item is delivered from the production line many changes are often incorporated, with the result that Widget, M1, seriol No. 1935, will require some different spare parts than Widget, M1, serial No. 1936. Obviously, this is no way to supply a big army. So, we are trying here to spread the gospel to R&D people and all others to adopt the "bold advance" theory and try to be satisfied with something "almost as good" until they can produce something a whole lot better. .

Another fallacious notion is that every item required by the military must meet every conceivable demand. Such things as fungus-proofing and radio-interference suppression have been applied across the board on items which could not conceivably require these refinements under any imaginable conditions of use.

During the early days of the Korean emergency, the Army purchased a large number of commercial-type, five-ton dump trucks at a cost of approximately $5,000 each. This truck was identical to the model used by construction contractors almost everywhere and was thoroughly satisfactory for 95 per cent of engineer uses. In spite of this, as soon as Ordnance completed the development of the Government five-ton, 6x6 dump truck, a forced exchange was made to T/O&E units on a one-for-one basis. The cost of the Ordnance-developed truck was approximately $16,000, and this truck would do nothing that needed to be done that the commercial truck wouldn't do. If an engineer unit building a road needs front-wheel drive on its dump trucks which will haul gravel, it should be obvious that the access road to the point of construction has not been constructed properly.

So let's take the gilt edges off our specifications and let's stop introducing changes into production runs unless we do *in fact* have a bold new advance to introduce into the system.

LT. COL. M. S. JOHNSTON

Survive—and Stay to Fight

I CONCUR with Captain Tanham when he states ["The Survivor," February] that a doctrine must be established which will permit us to accomplish our tactical mission after an atomic attack. Soldiers must give realistic study to the problem of small-unit actions in the face of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons.

What about the actions of small units subjected to an atomic attack during defensive operations? In an atomic war our defense dispositions will probably be extremely mobile. They will be built around a series o strongpoints, composed of reinforce battalion combat teams, far enoug apart so that one atomic weapon ca destroy only one of them. The stron points should be mutually supportin the gaps should be covered with a sorts of minefields, obstacles, demol tions, aggressive motorized patrols, ar by long-range fires.

The mobile reserve will be place in the rear, where it can be brougl into play anywhere along the defensiv position in the shortest time.

The enemy launches his atomic a tack and scores a direct hit on one o the strongpoints. Should the men wl have not become casualties evacua the area and move to prearranged "ra ly points," or should they remain in th area?

I think they should remain in th area. This is where the enemy wish to launch his ground attack, and is here that we must hold. Eve though there will be destruction, ca ualties, chaos, and havoc, there wi not be complete annihilation. The will be survivors. They must rec ganize immediately; they must hav prepared supplementary positions fro which they can carry out their defe sive mission. Continuity of commar must be insured at all times. The ro of the junior leader will be of gre importance during this phase.

Men must be taught that their liv depend upon the speed with whic they restore their battle positions. Th may have suffered up to eighty p cent casualties, but are there not mar historical examples in which a detc mined few effectively slowed down stopped the attack of many?

The enemy's ground attack will many cases be most devastating. I order to exploit the advantage gaine by the explosion, the attacking for will be highly mobile. It might we be suicidal for the survivors to try leave the area. What more welcon sight is there for a tank command than troops fleeing in the open?

Another problem must be considered. Let's suppose you instructed survors that immediately following an omic attack they must repair to Rally oint Able. Some would think their ghting days were over for this operaon; others would think they were serting their less fortunate buddies; hile still others would be likely to se their way. All this would add up one thing: the enemy would have complished his mission. He would ve created a gap through which his rces could pass.

But let us now suppose that the men re told to remain on their position d reorganize as rapidly as possible. e higher commander, knowing that s is the area in which the enemy ll make his main effort, will readily mmit the reserve. The enemy ound attack will suddenly meet retance where no resistance was excted; it will be temporarily halted til the size and force of the resistce can be determined. During this riod the reserve arrives, and the emy is forced to withdraw to look another opening. A possible objecn is that the reserve might not be e to reach the devastated area before enemy cracks the remaining thin ll. Although this may be true in tain cases, it must be remembered t the enemy must place his line of parture some distance from the point detonation in order to avoid casual; among his own troops.

Our reserve should have detailed d well-rehearsed counterattack ns. Every junior leader should be roughly familiar with the terrain, routes of approach, and the neces- timing. A number of alternate nterattack plans should be estabed. Immediately after the explosion commander might dispatch one npany from each adjacent strongnt to the devastated area. This plan the added advantage of establishing mmunications and control rapidly.

CAPT. JOHN P. GERACI

sponsibility Comes First

M sure that everything Colonel . N. Dupuy has to say in "High ndards and Morale" [COMBAT CES JOURNAL, March] has met alt complete agreement on all sides particular, his remarks on the efncy-report system.

ut there is one point where, in my ion, Colonel Dupuy puts the cart re the horse. He says that "the lowering of professional competence in the Army is alarming" and goes on to state that most officers and NCOs fail to continue professional studies on their own in order to achieve competence. I believe that, while such studies are often necessary, the widespread increase in the number of officers who attend service schools tends to eliminate the necessity for as intensive study as in the past, when most officers had to get their military education largely on their own. For example, in the 2d Division it is difficult to find a lieutenant who has not attended either the Basic or the Company Officers' Course in his own branch. Most captains have completed the Advanced or Associate Advanced Course.

The professional knowledge is there, but the professional competence is not. I believe the reason is that most officers and NCOs are not permitted to use their professional knowledge. They are not permitted to develop competence or to gain true command experience, and the result, as Colonel Dupuy points out, is that they are "less qualified for command than in the past."

They are told *exactly* what to do. The officer who tries to seize the responsibilities and initiative to which his rank and position would seem to entitle him often runs into a superior who frowns severely on such practice. So the officer must conform to his superiors' insistence on blind obedience or suffer the results of an adverse efficiency report. On the other hand, as Colonel Dupuy says so succinctly, "an officer who performs minimum duties in a mediocre manner and who has avoided serious trouble" continues blithely upward and onward to the grade of lieutenant colonel. Yet it is the man who grasps responsibility and initiative who is vital in combat.

We will have competence and efficiency when we put responsibility back where it belongs—with the junior officers and NCOs. And increased reponsibility would lead to the desire for further study in professional subjects that is urged by Colonel Dupuy.

CAPT. SANFORD M. ULLMAN

New Assignment Checklist

YOU have just received a new assignment. Even if you are an experienced officer, you will very likely find your new job somewhat confusing. This checklist may prove helpful.

The first question that must be answered is "How does the commander want the job done?" Your sources of information here are:

(1) Your predecessor.
(2) Your executive officer or adjutant.
(3) The commander's executive officer, adjutant, or chief of staff.
(4) The policy file.
(5) The commander himself.

You will then want to know the responsibilities of the staff sections, and their relationship to you, each other and the commander. For this, the above sources and the staff sections themselves can be used.

Upon receiving a new assignment, ask for and study the SOPs of your command or section, of higher headquarters, and of subordinate commands that you are concerned with. Check the dates of the SOPs of the last revision. Ask: "Does this need revising?"

Find out whether any projects are outstanding, of what they consist, and when they are due for completion. Request a list of current and prospective projects, including this information:

(1) A brief description.
(2) Who is working on it?
(3) When is it due to be completed?
(4) Is the commander familiar with it?

Study the organization of your new assignment carefully. Go over an organization chart with your predecessor or executive. Get a clear definition of your mission and analyze it. Don't hesitate to ask, "Why do you do it this way?" Check whether the organization is as efficient as possible. Find out if the section has had a recent inspection. Study the inspection reports.

Study the personnel files of the organization. Make notes and keep them for your interviews. Then call the men in individually and find out these facts about them:

(1) Their experience.
(2) The time they have to serve in their present assignment.
(3) Their families.
(4) Their last or next leave.

If you have a staff section, ask each person to write out an explanation of his job, and then compare this with the organization chart and assigned missions.

As early as possible, request a written inventory of all classified material charged to your section or command. Find out how this material is received, forwarded, handled, and stored. Request a list of the security clearances of the men under your command,

showing names and types of clearences. Check to see that they have access only to material for which they are cleared.

Request a list of all reports required of your section or command by higher headquarters and of those that your section or command requires of subordinate commands. Get this information for each report that goes to higher headquarters:

(1) Its nature and purpose.
(2) Who prepares it?
(3) When and how often is it due?
(4) Who receives or handles it in your section or command?

Find out what equipment your section or command is authorized. Ask who is responsible and have an inventory made. Inspect field equipment thoroughly. If equipment is missing, check the status of replacement items. Follow up closely on requisitions. Ask if any equipment modification lists are authorized. If so, review them carefully. Check: "What is authorized?" "Is it on hand?" "What is its condtion?"

Find out what files you have, what is in them, who keeps them, and what filing system is used. Screen your files for information and compliance with orders.

As soon as possible, visit your counterparts at higher and subordinate commands, first familiarizing yourself with their problems. Find out how much time your predecessor spent in his office. Unless the job is exceptional, most of his time should have been spent outside the office. If he spent most of his time in his office, restudy the organization structure of the section or command.

LT. COL. DENTON C. ROUNTREE

Training the Recruit

IN these troubled times, when deadly new weapons are the topic of nearly every conversation, we are prone to overlook our greatest weapon, the "common" soldier. I am not speaking of the "uncommon" soldier with genuine potentialities of leadership, but the soldier who has no ability or desire to be a leader.

Since the end of World War II we have rightly stressed leadership, but unfortunately it has been at the expense of the great number of men in our ranks who, because of lack of initiative or ability, refuse to accept the responsibilities of leadership. As an NCO with regular infantry and airborne units, I have discovered that most of these men are good patriotic Americans who are in the Army to do a job and come home in one piece when everything is over.

We should do more to teach this man his duties and improve his chances for survival, in order to ensure ultimate victory over an enemy. I do not believe that we put enough stress on individual training at the start of a soldier's period of service.

It might be a good idea to revise our methods of training the recruit. A great deal can be learned from the training procedures of the Airborne and Ranger Schools.

The instructors at these training camps would be the very best of our professional soldiers. They would be assured of staying at the same job for a number of years, and they would not be affected by overseas quotas until a long stabilized tour of duty had been completed. These instructors would be tough and impartial, and their only concern would be to make soldiers out of civilians.

Basic training would last approximately twelve weeks. It would be the most memorable twelve weeks of the recruit's life. All the "frills" (TIP, PXs, Service Clubs) would be left off, and physical training would be stressed instead. When the gate closed for those twelve weeks it would close completely on the outside world, and it would be possible to concentrate on discipline.

This period of basic training would prepare the man to go to the station or division in which he would serve the remainder of his enlistment. He would have confidence, know how to take care of himself and his equipment, and be able to obey a simple order. We would develop, for his own good as well as the Nation's, our greatest weapon—the "common" soldier.

SFC MAC D. MOUNCE

Army Extension Courses

IT is hardly necessary to remind civilian-component officers how they can profit from Army Extension Courses, but it's a different story with those on active duty. Extension courses do not offer a short cut to retirement. No lieutenant on active duty ever made the eligibility list for promotion because he finished the 40 series. For these men, Army Extension Courses offer nothing except a sound self-study course in the basic skills of their branch.

Unfortunately, few active-duty officers take advantage of this education program. Of almost 8,000 students enrolled in extension courses given The Artillery and Guided Missil School, only 19 per cent are on acti duty. Some people may be surpris that active-duty officers participate all, but the fact is that a great numb of infantrymen, artillerymen, and s diers of other branches are passing a very practical and convenient meth of continuing their military educatio

The argument that the resident i struction of service schools makes e tension courses superfluous to those active duty is not valid. Most office can benefit from the courses at vario times during their careers. An offic who attends the advanced course his branch school and then gets a st assignment, lasting a year or two, c use a refresher course before he is signed to a unit. Officers who fi themselves assigned to jobs that requ specialized knowledge, such as batt ion S4, air officer in the Artillery, communications officer, can bene from Army Extension Courses.

Of course, the extension course p gram is no panacea, but it can in ma ways serve the individual well. It a system of military education co ducted by mail. It is divided into series numbered from 10 to 60. Ea series is for a specific rank or expe ence level. The 10 series, for examp is designed for enlisted men and w rant officers. It is a kind of primer the higher-numbered series. It deals basic, branch-immaterial subjects. the other end is the 60 series, which prepared at the Command and Gene Staff College for lieutenant colone

The remaining series are prepar by the branch schools. The 20 and series are roughly equivalent to t basic officers' course, while the 40 a 50 series are equivalent to the associa advanced officers' course. The lack rank or grade is not necessarily a b to enrollment in any course. A m can begin extension course study the level of his rank and advan through all the series of the progra

The program is flexible. If a stud wishes to specialize, he may enroll selected sub-courses of any series. other system of Army education is m available than extension courses. tually anyone in any of the com nents of the Army may join. Acti duty men can obtain the details of h to enroll from their commanding o cer, or by writing to the Army Ext sion Course Division of their bran school.

MAJ. JAMES D. A

Are We Mass or Men ?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DONOVAN P. YEUELL, JR.

The American philosophy of war is based on the leadership of individuals

SERTIONS that the group has eplaced the individual as a dom- it element of American society and therefore we now have a mass y which has to be considered not n army of individuals, but as an egation of groups, pose a funda- tal question that professional sol- rs must face squarely. One onent of this line of thought in cent article in this magazine (Cap- Roger W. Little, "Solidarity Is the to the Mass Army" February 5) made the point that "solidarity" omething peculiar to "the mass y," and then sought to show that ways of the "Old Army" are dead that soldiering is no longer a dis- tive way of life.

challenge such ideas, and from the ent of the "letters to the editor" rtment of recent issues of this azine it is apparent that a good y other readers also challenge n. It is necessary, I think, that we why we challenge such ideas and t we stand for.

'hat is mass man? For one thing, nplies acting in accord with the or desires of a group, which sug- that the group has a mind of its . But the fact is that sociologists, hologists and philosophers do not e on the question of the group l. There is no evidence that a p has the attributes of a human g. Surely, experience indicates that ither civil societies or armies the p is led or controlled by individ- not some hidden force or power.

denying that groups have ds," I would not exclude group *acter*. It is quite widely accepted modern *nations* do have particular acteristics which the individuals e more or less in common. When n becomes a soldier his character dy has been molded. The duty and challenge of military leadership are to accentuate the best and sublimate the worst of the individual and group characteristics. It would be a sorry lot of troops in which both the good and bad features of the individuals were given free rein. The ugliness of war requires that soldiers live by extraordinarily high standards of behavior lest they fall prey to the evil instincts that lurk in every man. This, as much as the need for efficient performance, underlies military discipline. And, as any modern army of consequence must be based upon the character of its people, the standards of American soldiering must fit the peculiarities of American men.

Has the American character so changed that the traditional ideas of Duty, Honor, Country must be replaced by "images of mass society and the industrial plant"? I say emphatically *no!* After a lifetime in the Army as a soldier's son and a soldier, I am convinced that the soldierly qualities of American manhood are at least as good as if not b tter than ever. This is not to say that nothing has changed, but that no fundamental changes have occurred in the worthiness and nature of American men.

Many Americans, including Army men, have made the mistake of underestimating their national qualities. Any unit in the Army can count on having a proportion of men with self-reliance, initiative, courage, perseverance, fairness—these and other characteristics considered typically American. Often it would be desirable to have more such men, but usually there are enough. The soldierly qualities are there, waiting to be stimulated and shaped into a way of life. It may be true that certain features of "mass society" are useful to the Army; for example, in supply and administration. But it certainly does not follow that the Army therefore is composed of "mass men." The great danger is not that the American character actually has changed to that extent, but that people will think it has. It is vital that the Army not be misled by such thoughts.

Things like honesty and dishonesty, right and wrong, courage and cowardice—these may be hard to define, but they have remained basically unchanged since man's creation. Few peoples have been blessed with so solid a foundation of these features as we have. In this tense and unsure world, it is vital that the American people and their Army draw strength from the virtues of their heritage. From our past we can learn how best to live the present and face the future. To be sure, the Army needs to stay abreast of the times—technically, tactically, and strategically. *But it should not experiment with its soul.* The traditional fundamentals of soldiering—rooted in the rich qualities of the American people and dressed in appropriate frills—will not only keep the Army up with the times, but will see it through the harsh trials that lie ahead. What needs to be done is to take a new lease on the priceless qualities and the proven methods that already are ours.

GROUP actions that appear to be spontaneous invariably can be traced to a variety of potent factors, among which leadership and organization are predominant. Groups mean nothing except as they are composed of individuals who either desire or are forced to do certain things. In democratic societies, all group action—including military—is achieved through a large degree of individual willingness or consent. This has been the case in the majority of societies throughout

history. Men have been tyrannized and degraded from early times, but seldom have even the lowliest been so shorn of personality as to be mere automatons within a monolithic group. The most complete efforts to reduce man to the mass undoubtedly have been made by the modern totalitarian states.

The position of the individual in society is the crux of the issue under discussion. He becomes a mass man when he loses his freedom of choice; when he can no longer act and move at will in society; when "the general welfare" is used as an excuse to oppress him rather than as a policy of improving his lot. He begins to lose his identity as an individual when he lives in dread of his government; when there is no enforceable Bill of Rights; when God is replaced by the state; when ethics, law, and morality are no more or less than what the state says they are; and when he has no source of impartial judicial appeal. When man's thoughts and actions must conform to the arbitrary will of others, when he has no life of his own, then man is part of mass society, and indeed he then becomes a "mass man."

SUCH conditions do not prevail in the United States. It is true that the complexities of modern life create a greater interdependence among groups within society, but has the group submerged the individual to a decisive extent? Some persons say that rugged individualism has been succeeded by a desire to "get along," to "play on the team." Some say these trends represent a loss of individual independence resulting from industrialization, urbanization, the disappearance of the frontier, and a desire for social security and material comforts. From the soldier's standpoint, it has been feared that such tendencies may give rise to what has been called the "military eunuch."

In rejoinder, it has been said that such trends are not at all foreboding, but merely a fulfillment of the goals set in the Preamble to the Constitution. Those who believe this say that the groups are the instruments of the component individuals and that group action serves individual needs. Some authorities point out that technology is reducing routine jobs to automatic operations, thus giving man more opportunity for individual pursuits.

Undoubtedly many influences are at work which tend to reduce man to membership in a mass, but I for one say the American people still possess the qualities of greatness that will save them from becoming mass men. Actually U. S. Army life resists these trends, and in that sense it serves its country by sustaining the virtues upon which the nation is founded. More than one army has lifted a faltering people in times of social upheaval.

THOSE who refer to "mass army" usually do not know what they are talking about. The principles of war prescribe that sufficient mass be concentrated at the time and place to be decisive in battle. This common-sense maxim, applicable to all skirmishes and campaigns alike, is not what the mass army shibboleth refers to. Another sense, other than tactical, in which the term "mass" might be intended could be that army life "regiments" men. If that means there is discipline in the Army, I have no quarrel, but if it means a blind obedience to arbitrary authority, then whoever says it fails to understand the traditional American basis for discipline. Of course, obedience is required, but underlying it is the continuing pattern of building mutual confidence in the leader and the led, and instilling a willingness to do one's duty through an understanding of "why." The curtailment of personal liberty in the U. S. Army is not such that American soldiers even resemble regimented members of a mass.

To be sure, the term "mass" has a legitimate meaning in the modern world. In the last century or two there have been tremendous increases in industrial and agricultural production, in the field of communications, in transportation, in building, in education, and in population.

But it is a very superficial reading of history or of contemporary trends that would equate the shape of modern society directly with mass production methods, mass education, or mass-destruction weapons. The slaves of the Pharaohs were a mass society and the phalanxes of the Greeks were mass armies in a far more accurate sense than anything in modern times; yet it can be argued that even they were not "mass man."

IT is absurd to say that any army is not different from the society in which it lives. In the first place, much of a modern army finds itself living on foreign soil, not in its own soci Even more to the point, most of functions of an army have no civil counterpart, and those that do, hav distinctive military flavor. A particu distinction that works against a tr "mass man" being developed in army is the great variety of jobs t must be done by any military u There is little danger of "mass" p chology in a vocation where every n is a jack-of-many-trades. The work a mode of living are definitely differ from those of civil society. Whereas factory worker may look at his vocat as just a job, the soldier—even a sh term one—cannot hold such an different view, else there will be army worthy of the name.

The discipline of the factory, mine, or even the farm, is a utilitar one which the worker accepts to s alive, unless he happens to like it its own sake. But the discipline o proper army will not work unless diers are imbued with either fear willingness. The U. S. Army does use fear as a driving force. Hence must develop in its soldiers a d devotion to country, duty, and hon It is precisely because the Uni States is still capable of produc soldiers motivated by moral and spi ual strength that I say the "mass arm theory is wrong. Devotion to the gro is not enough to explain the acts high courage, selflessness, and pe verance that continue to character all ranks of the American army. Th remain ingrained traits of indiv ualism that defy interpretation by "group behavior" theory. An ur spired effort might not handicap efficiency of a factory but it wo ring the death knell of the U.S. Ar

AMERICAN soldiers are individu Officers and men who have ser in the U. S. Army in recent ye know from experience that we h no mass army either in spirit, size, ganization, or method of operati Apart from the probability that Army is below the strength of land forces actually needed for Am ican security, it is a relatively la army. But this has nothing to do w "mass." It is an army of individu operating in very small teams or dependently. Where can one f "mass" in any sense? In the infan rifle squad? the artillery gun cre the medical detachment? the ta crew? the transportation truck platoo

quartermaster depot crew? the en-
eer demolitions team? Is any of the
ıdreds of small units really part of
mass" formation? The group may
tter more or less to different men,
I have never heard of a soldier
his right mind who did not view
ıself as an individual foremost.
ve you ever really considered your-
as being a mere element of a group
ıer than Old Number One?
The entire American philosophy of
—from grand strategy to large-
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The better military leaders have al-
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E Army can and should learn all
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larity is not new. *Esprit de corps*
the feeling of duty to one's com-
ons have been traditional elements
he life of a soldier. The things I
ıssed in "Soldiering is a Way of
" [September 1954] and which
tain Little called obsolete are practical aspects of the U. S. Army. Let "catchwords" like *esprit, discipline* and *morale* be swept aside if there is anything to be gained from it, but if you would have an army that can fight, you must cling to the things represented in those words. All significant military experience bears out the soundness of such factors. I claim that the better traits of soldiering learned by long experience are the only practical basis for the U. S. Army. We cannot afford to gamble on untried methods and beliefs. The fundamentals and the frills have worked when properly applied; they worked in World War II and Korea and are proving their merit today in numerous fine American units all over the world. It seems to me that theories like that of "the mass army" should be discussed, but once their fallacies are laid bare they should be cast aside.

To be sure, army attitudes and meth ods must change as the world changes. But the evolution should be careful in order not to destroy the valuable things of the past in frantic efforts to keep up with the times. Perhaps the Army has been overconservative in staying abreast of some changing conditions, but it is more likely that in many cases the Army, sincerely trying to be "modern," has adopted too many features smacking of "mass society."

Referring again to Captain Little's article, he admits the need for frills or "prestige symbols"; that is, a good uniform, decorations, and the like. But he says the frills are useful only so long as they symbolize group solidarity. That may be, but who decides whether they so symbolize: the group, or the individual? The fact is that such symbols have been important for thousands of years regardless of the kind of army.

He says that military units have become like crowds. Then he contends that the soldier as a member of a fluid mass army stands alone; this train of thought I am unable to follow. In comparing present military organization to the image of the industrial plant, he points out that the adoption of civilian practices has been accompanied by the discard of rituals and traditions. One must agree that such adaptations have occurred in the Army, and in some cases to an extreme degree. But judging from the number of military ceremonies that most American communities conduct, there is still a strong liking for "pageantry" in this country.

Next, he discusses the tendency to specialize and to handle soldiers on a personnel "assembly line." In a large and complex organization, there is indeed a need to specialize and also to treat men rather impersonally. But one who looks closely at the U. S. Army recognizes the great number of assignments in which many skills and wide knowledge are required. And one realizes that the Army can never be specialized to the extent of industry. The personnel management efforts sincerely aim to combine the need for specialists with the necessity for versatility and human considerations.

IF the United States is tending toward mass man, it is the duty of the Army to counteract the trend by *making soldiers out of its men.* The Army cannot and must not entertain ideas of "mass society." To allow a re-shaping of military philosophy and practice in the image of a spiritless, materialistic society of mass men is wrong. It will not work and it would destroy the very virtues, institutions, beliefs, and laws which the Army exists to uphold.

Apparently the U. S. Army believes that "mass theories" are wrong. Consider the plans for new uniforms, the revived emphasis on tradition, ceremony, and other outward frills or symbols. Look at the efforts to increase solidarity by unit rotation and increased housing on posts. And bear in mind the continuing efforts to elevate morale by improved personnel management and pay—not merely to make soldiering more like civil life but to make it feasible for men willingly to take up the Army's own distinctive way of life.

The institutions and methods may change, but the spirit and principles of an army ought not to change.

To accept the thesis of the mass soldier is to indict the American people as lacking the fortitude to survive. For mass man implies a deterioration of society and character that spells doom for a free people. The kind of army that such a degraded people could raise would lack so much in spirit that the nation could not hope to be defended against its external foes. In short, the United States should reject the theory of a soul-less, uninspired mass army for the time-honored reasons stated centuries ago by Marshal de Saxe: The human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war.

IRONS IN THE FIRE

Power Jack

A self propelled hydraulic power jack for the surfacing of military railroad tracks has been developed by the Corps of Engineers' Research and Development Laboratories and the Kershaw Manufacturing Co. of Montgomery, Ala.

Propelled by a hydraulic motor with a two-speed transmission, the unit can travel 12 miles an hour. Its working speed is 3 miles an hour. It has rail "cogs" which operate automatically on any size track as the foot is lowered between ties. One man can operate the unit.

Stick Control for Subs

A new device developed by the Office of Naval Research will enable seamen to receive training in single-stick control of submarines. This control, so new that it has been installed on fewer than a dozen submarines, gives to underwater navigation many of the characteristics of flying an aircraft. In the past, one man steered the ship from left to right, while two others operated planes that controlled vertical movement. Now one man, using a device like the stick control of an airplane, can do the whole job.

The trainer consists of a platform, representing the control room of a submarine. It is mounted on a movable cradle, activated by an electronic computer, that responds to the controls. It can be made to pitch about, to simulate heavy seas. The device is being built by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corp.

Eye Adapter Sought

Scientists at Illinois Institute of Technology, working under the sponsorship of the Air Research and Development Command, are seeking to design an instrument that would hasten the adaptation of fighter pilots' eyes to darkness after a bright flash of light. They have discovered that photochemical changes take place in the vitreous humor, a jellylike substance between the lens and the retina of the eye, when a change in light is encountered. The instrument, which may take ten years to develop, would emit radiations capable of altering the chemical structure of the vitreous humor and so adapt the eye quickly to darkness. This research not only might have several military applications, but would also be useful for criminal investigators in determining the cause of deaths, and in the fields of television, photography, and motion pictures.

Balloons Tested in Lab

A method for testing aerological sounding balloons in the laboratory has been developed by the National Bureau of Standards. The balloons carry radiosondes into the stratosphere to obtain meteorological data, and are used extensively by military and civilian weather services. Previously, the only way to test the balloons was in flight, at a considerable expense. In the new method, a section of the balloon is clamped around its circumference and inflated until it bursts. During this process, various measurements are taken, and scientists are able to predict the performance of the balloons.

Radiation Lab



The Army has set up a mobile field la oratory for determining the amount of radi tion to which troops have been exposed whi participating in atomic maneuvers. All me in the vicinity of a nuclear blast are require to wear dosimeter film badges, which mea ure radiation exposure. Immediately after blast, these badges are collected and sent the mobile laboratory, which is operated b men of Fort Huachuca's 16th Signal Ba talion. In the photo above, the man at le is reading a densitometer, which measur the strength of radiation from the fil badges, while the man at right is translatir the finding into roentgens.

Electronic Diagnoster

A machine has been developed that n only detects failures in electronic equipme but also can predict when a tube is weake ing and about to fail. Known as a diagnoste it was built by the Elsin Corp. under co tract with the Office of Naval Research. is designed for use with military equipmen but it can be adapted to any type of ele tronic device, including commercial tele sion.

All-Glass Paper

The National Bureau of Standards has pr duced an all-glass paper eight times as stror as that first made in 1951. This paper pror ises to be useful in gas masks, chemic filters, and electrical equipment. All-gla paper also can be used as an insulator, sin it has a high resistance to heat, moistur chemicals, and micro-organisms. The proje is sponsored by the Naval Research Labor tory.

ırable Plastic

Dura-lite, a new plastic developed by the ›malite Corp., promises to have many litary and industrial applications. Com- tely formable and machinable, it is high- resistant to weather conditions and to rosive chemicals such as DDT or gasoline. s transparent and does not chip or shatter. s suitable for instrument panels and dials, l as a hood or shield covering dangerous chines and vats of harmful chemicals.

iit Salad Frame

A frame, designed to keep displays of cam- gn ribbons properly aligned, has been in- ted by a tailor at Quantico, Va. It con- s of straps of metal on which rows of ›ons can be sewn. The entire display is n attached to the uniform. The frame, ch cannot be seen, keeps the ribbons allel and prevents them from buckling. e family of the inventor, Alfred Bolog- e, has been outfitting Marine officers e 1918.

Self-Propelled Crane

A new self-propelled diesel-electric revolving crane has been built by R. G. LeTourneau, Inc. Among its innovations are electrically pow- ered outriggers which are set and retracted from within the operator's cab, facilitating spot-to-spot loading. The crane has individually pow- ered wheels, which make it particularly useful in off-road operation. The unit can unload cargo from a dock, transport it on a self-contained platform across loose beach sand, and then reload the cargo onto trucks. The crane has a 150-foot-ton capacity.

Speed Control Gauge

Fairchild C-123B assault transports now being delivered to the Air Force have been equipped with a lift-measuring instrument that tells the pilot the best speed to fly on landing, take-off, and other low-speed flight conditions. The device, known as a Speed Control System, con- sists of a small vane on the lower leading edge of the wing. Changes in lift caused by varying loads, power settings, landing flap positions, wind gusts, acceleration, and other factors are recorded by the vane. The in- formation is passed electrically through a lift computer to a simple in- strument on the panel. To fly at the best speed, the pilot keeps the pointer on the gauge centered. The instrument was developed by the Safe Flight Instrument Corp.

CONVERTIPLANES IN THE NEWS

For the first time in aviation history, a flight has been made in which an aircraft converted from helicopter flight to conventional forward flight and back again. The XV-1 convertiplane (top), which was developed by the McDonnell Aircraft Corp. under a joint Army-Air Force contract, recently demonstrated this capability to an audi- ence of press and military observers.

The XV-1 has a rotor for vertical lift and a pusher propeller and short wings for forward flight. It carries three passengers in addition to the pilot, and can perform many helicopter missions, but at far greater speeds than a helicopter.

The convertiplane is powered by a Continental engine located at he rear of the fuselage. Air compressors feed air to the tips of the otor blades, where it is expelled through jets, turning the blades. When the convertiplane is moving through the air at a sufficient peed for the wings to provide lift, the pusher propeller is started nd the rotor is kept spinning at a reduced speed.

Several other models of convertiplanes are in the process of de- elopment, but this is the first successful demonstration of conversion. Bell Aircraft Corp. is developing the XV-3 (right), which has twin otors that tilt forward 90 degrees for forward flight. Conversion is ompleted in 10 to 15 seconds while the plane is still climbing.

THE WORD FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

TIS Instructional Material

The following new instructional materials suitable for non-resident as well as resident instruction may be ordered from the Book Department, TIS, Fort Benning, Georgia at the prices shown.

Rifle Platoon as Advance Party of Advance Guard, 20 T1-USAR, 2 hours. Security measures assigned to small units moving on foot with contact imminent. 20¢.

Recoilless Rifle Platoon in Attack, 2063-USAR, 2 hours. Organization and equipment, duties of key personnel, communications, missions, conduct of fire, methods of tactical employment, selection of firing position areas, displacement, ammunition resupply, reorganization, and consolidation. 40¢.

Regiment in Penetration Attack, 2311, 4 hours. A conference and map exercise illustrating a regiment as an interior unit in the attack and emphasizing selection of a zone of penetration, employment of supporting arms, troop leading and the conduct of the attack. The planning phase includes selection of objectives, formation, organization for combat, fire support planning, and troop leading. $1.25.

Front-Line Battalion Coordinated Fire Plan, 2408-USAR, 4 hours. A description of long-range fires, close defensive fires, final protective fires, and fires within the battle position; roles of machine guns, 81mm mortars, heavy mortars, and field artillery. 30¢.

Battalion Coordinated Antitank Defense Plan, 2413-USAR, 1 hour. Development of AT plan, the use of obstacles, characteristics and tactical employment of AT weapons organic to the battalion and those weapons normally in support of the battalion. 20¢.

Command and Leadership Problems in Combat, 6127-USAR, 2 hours. Problems that may confront a company commander in combat, including: training during combat; development of positive attitude in subordinate commanders; maintaining momentum in the attack; support of isolated units; control of rumor, fear, and panic; and the importance of information. 15¢.

Personnel Procedures, 6436-USAR, 2 hours. A problem prepared in support of the USAR school program which stresses the procedures of classification and assignment and shows how classification is an aid to the commander. The problem also discusses the career management program and enlisted promotions. 20¢.

Regimental and Battalion Staffs, Infantry Regiment, 6904A-USAR, 1 hour. Organization of the regimental and battalion staffs, infantry regiment, command and staff relationship, general duties of staff officers. 15¢.

New Training Films

A series of seven training films on the techniques of machine-gun fire has been made at Fort Benning and should be available in Signal Corps film libraries by 1 October. It consists of: Introduction, Part I (30 minutes), which explains the need for teamwork and discusses fire and target designation; Introduction, Part II (30 minutes), which covers fire distribution, control, and commands; Engagement of Targets and Direct Laying (30 minutes); Preparation of Range Cards (30 minutes); Expedients for Pre-Determined Fire (30 minutes); Overhead Fire (15 minutes); and Position Defilade (25 minutes).

THE AAA & GM SCHOOL

Revised Manual

A revised edition of Field Manual 44-4, "Medium and Heavy Antiaircraft Artillery," 23 December 1954, has been distributed to the field. It supersedes FM 44-4, 20 November 1950, to include C1, 23 October 1952; C2, 30 March 1953; and TC 11, 3 May 1954. Gunnery is discussed for 90mm and 120mm batteries equipped with either the SCR-584, M-9, M-10 combination, or the AAFCS M33. Velocity fire, the primary method of preparatory fire for units equipped with the AAFCS M33, is discussed in detail. A separate section is devot to gun grouping, a subject stressed instruction at the School.

THE ENGINEER SCHOO

Combat Real Estate

TES is presently engaged in a search project to examine the metho that have been used in the past wi respect to real-estate procedures. war, after terrain has been won, t Army must often assure satisfacto compensation for use made of pro erty. The Corps of Engineers is t sole Army agency responsible for t job, which reached massive prop tions during World War II.

The problem will vary according whether the combat zone is in friend or enemy territory, and to the sta of development of the area. Costs ha ranged from the rental for a buildi to reimbursement of owners for co nut palms that were bulldozed as so that air fields could be built.

The purpose of the research proj is to standardize procedures and bri policies, doctrines, and techniques to date.

Water Supply Course

TES is offering an eight-week cou for enlisted water-supply specialists active and reserve engineer units. T course is conducted by the Departm of Mechanical and Technical Equ ment and teaches current techniq in using standard water-supply equ ment.

The equipment includes a diatom filtrating unit that replaces the sa filter used during World War II. T new filter gets its name from diato the skeletal remains of minute mar animals. They form a kind of ea that is placed in suspension on filter base and strains impurities. Fift 35-, and 15-gallon-per-minute diatom filters are in current use. The engin water supply company has nine gpm sets with a capacity of 600,0 gallons per day and a tanker hauli potential of 21,000 gallons at time.

THE MONTH'S BOOKS

opean View of Atomic War

ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES
By Lt. Colonel F. O. Miksche
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1955
222 Pages; Index; $5.00

iewed by
ONEL W. R. KINTNER

book on the impact of atomic weap- to land armies, by a military writer Miksche's reputation, is a welcome ribution to the fluid military think- of our times, especially since it is first comprehensive work written by ropean on the subject. Much of its e as well as its deficiencies can be d to Miksche's necessarily indirect act with the problems involved in evolutionary American adaptation tomic weapons to ground strategy tactics.

he introduction to the main subject first half of the book—is an overly survey of World War II for a work ted to atomic armies. It serves to duce Miksche's basic theme that army which bases its doctrine on *power plus machines* instead of *ma- es plus manpower"* rests upon a much der foundation.

e chapter on atomic tactics is full series of interesting but sometimes adictory ideas. The first is that an ic war between comparatively evenly hed opponents will likely follow the model of World War I. This point veloped by a tactical playback of German offensive against the West- allies in May 1940. In this war both sides use atomic weapons gly and cautiously before the strug- apses into a state of stagnation on ground and the battle switches to tual atomic air blitz against the key of Germany, France, and England.

e "playback" script seems unrealis- Thousands of conventional sorties ixed with atomic strikes while nei- side concentrates on trying to knock he tactical airfields from which the es are mounted. Subsequently, he criticizes the script by suggest- hat the air forces would probably bombardments to a depth of a hundred miles to separate the front from the rear. Among other things, Miksche suggests that the armies of the future adopt a linear type of defense comprised of a series of thin defensive belts in lieu of the more common dispersed strong-point system. Finally, the author speculates that decision on land may be impossible since atomic weapons will almost prohibit maneuver. "In such circumstances the issue will be decided principally by air power . . ." and ". . . the front as such becomes merely a necessary barrier protecting the bases of the strategic air forces and of the war industries from large scale and wide-spread infiltration." It is regrettable that Miksche did not put this conclusion into proper focus prior to developing the concepts contained in the chapter entitled "Future Armies," which imply a far more decisive role for armies.

Miksche winds up the book with critical comments on prevalent Western (U.S.) military doctrine and tactics: Physical occupation is indispensable. . . . The unwieldy division of the Atlantic Powers hardly meets the exigencies of atomic warfare. . . . Should every lieutenant have a jeep and every battalion a whole general staff? . . . Fire and cross-country movement are no longer in equilibrium. . . .

Taking a look at the characteristics of Communist and Western armies, Miksche advocates that the West might well avoid mobile warfare altogether in the initial phase of a future conflict, adopt a defensive attitude and ward off hostile invasion from the secure shelters of a kind of atomic Maginot Line. In view of 1940, this prescription for a new Maginot approach, although it may have some technical validity, should be viewed with extreme caution.

Beneath Miksche's sometimes dogmatic assertions as well as his occasional contradictions lies an underlying theme which is likely to confront the U.S. with growing frequency: "The pattern of forces we require is almost the opposite of the 'New Look' strategy." Western strategy, which underestimates the human factor in war, is based on "bombs that are too big and armies that are too small; whereas the East has both at its disposal."

Will time confirm Miksche's judgment?

They Deserve Better

U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA: Volume I: The Pusan Perimeter
By Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC
Government Printing Office, 1954
259 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index; $2.00

Reviewed by
CAPTAIN CHARLES B. MACDONALD

"The reputation of the U.S. Army," someone wrote recently, "is too great to be diminished by honest criticism of some of its doctrines or a few of its members." The reputation of the U.S. Marine Corps is similarly solidly entrenched. The first of a projected four volumes on Marine participation in the Korean conflict does not reflect confidence in this fact.

The opening half of the volume provides a sparsely annotated capsule history of Korea, an account of the North Korean People's Army and its aggression, and the story of events leading to commitment of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The second half describes the Marine role in three engagements within the Pusan Perimeter during August and early September 1950: the Sachon offensive and two engagements along the Naktong River.

The main trouble with the book is its tone. The Americans never made a mistake. How presumptuous of the "Asiatic peasants" to challenge us!

It is hard to believe that all was lily-white—even from a Marine viewpoint—during those early, miserable days in Korea. If the book is to have true educational value for the Marine Corps, if it is to present a factual account to the American public, some attention must be paid the errors, the misdeeds, and the failures that are inevitable in any armed conflict.

One of the few recorded instances of this type happened the first night

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ıore when the Marines in their assem- / area engaged in indiscriminate fir- ;. But "being Marines," to repeat a rase, they listened when their com- ınder "made it known in ı uncertain ms that such conduct would not be erated again." "From that time on," : authors tell us, "every man in the igade took him at his word."

The writing in many places is op- essively histrionic. The dramatics often scure educational aspects of the book, e the advantages of the Marines' sely integrated air-ground team. An session with claiming "firsts" and with ng superlatives is particularly apparent two final summary sections. The au- ors appear to have forgotten that ac- ns speak louder than words.

The narration of the three combat gagements is much more workman- e and restrained. One of the actions he first Naktong bulge—comes vividly o focus. The small-unit level of nar- ion inevitably invites comparison with ajor Russell A. Gugeler's *Combat Ac- ns in Korea,* which is unfortunate. ajor Gugeler was free to relate selected ions, while the Marine historians had cover all Marine engagements. Not combat actions are inherently inter- ing to read about. Nor can the Ma- es through postwar letters and erviews provide the kind of realistic tle detail which emerges from inter- ws obtained in the field by historians ompanying the troops.

The size and format of the book and photographs are excellent. A real vice could be provided the reader by p references in the text. This would ninate the frustration of discovering nap several pages after it is needed. e maps themselves are no more than quate. On the maps inside the covers, phase lines in several instances are ng, and the enemy situation has been en from contemporary G2 maps rather n from more accurate captured enemy uments.

The book is not the kind to excite fidence in official history. It is to be ed that in their forthcoming volumes Marines may return to the factual and hurried look at their activities which racterizes their World War II mono- ohs. The contributions of the U.S. rines who fought in Korea deserve ıore realistic, less journalistic, more ective historical monument.

ietizing Slavs and Satellites

LLITE GENERALS: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere
Ithiel de Sola Pool
over Institute Studies
anford University Press
5 Pages; $1.75

ewed by
COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG

When Moscow's militarists made world headlines in Warsaw on 14 May by ratifying the obvious, there was already on the market a fine study of the ill-defined aspects of the obvious.

"Konev Heads Unified Red Military Setup" was a headline already described in explicit terms by the Hoover Institute's excellent and timely study on the satellite generals of the nations in the new Soviet alliance designed to counteract NATO and West German rearmament.

Ithiel Pool's text is more than one on the military élite; it is an insight into the Soviet policy and technique of handling and influencing the military forces so recently placed under Marshal Konev. It is a description of the *de facto* condition the Russians made appear new.

This is a study of leadership in Communist armies. More precisely, it is an examination of the conflict between two needs which the Reds face in building up satellite armies: "The need for loyal military leaders and the need for skilled ones. A free society asks only basic loyalty and not doctrinaire fanaticism. The Communists demand adherence to every detail of the dogmatic line. It must favor untutored rebels over experienced leaders. Because it is revolutionary and fanatical it often beheads its most skilled leaders."

Laying its foundation on the basis of purges and proven policies of the past, the text faces up to the future with the conclusion: There is a popular theory that the satellite armies are temporary jerry-built structures riven by inner tension and designed as makeshift until the Soviet decides to incorporate them within the Soviet Army. "Our research leads to a different conclusion, namely that the Soviet plan has been to build up the satellite armies for a long stint." While it is possible for the Russians to incorporate the fringe nations into the USSR, the author and his well-qualified assistants hold that it is improbable. "Our findings indicate rather a Soviet plan to develop the satellite forces into important strong but separate offensive forces completely subordinate to and allied with, but not a part of the Soviet Army."

When it is considered that the bulk of the author's hard-to-get material and later research had a general cut-off date of 1952, this conclusion was prophetic.

The consequences and meaning of purge emerge clearly in this study which has focus on the future. Within the satellite ranks "the lines of tension are already fairly clear. The career officers must know that their days are numbered, recognizing the portents of a purge in the rise of a new generation of officers."

Nation by nation, the leaders and cliques of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and China are examined in terms of personalities, politics, background, and the overruling forces of past, purge, and the persuasiveness of the Soviets.

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By

Major Russell A. Gugeler

Here is the war in Korea—at the fighting level. The true accounts of outstanding small-unit actions written by a trained soldier-observer and historian from on-the-spot observations and interviews with the men who actually did the fighting. Working as a member of the observer team from the Office of the Chief of Military History, Major Gugeler has made the most of his unique opportunity and material to bring out the drama and boredom, the gallantry and fear, the flashes of brilliance and stupidity which add up to a splendid digest of combat lessons that every soldier should read.

Reviewers say:

". . . For anybody who has ever served in war, for anybody who will ever have to serve in war." George Barrett, in *New York Times Sunday Book Review.*

". . . Of considerable professional interest to any military student and of particular interest to those who were there." Maj. J. R. Stevens, in *Marine Corps Gazette.*

"The ground forces would do well to set this book up as required reading." Army Times' *The American Daily.*

$5.00

260 Pages

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1529 18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

While ruthless, demoralized, and uneducated political hatchet men may fill important security and political posts, the author reveals that the Communists have turned to professional military men whenever they felt they could trust them. In each satellite army in Europe the text reveals the tenuous balance between the professional leader and the bumptious Communist newcomer—a balance that must hold until a new generation of Communist-indoctrinated officers can take over. The text points to some places where in Europe the take-over is not far off.

The balance is not the same in each border nation. In Poland there was no trustworthy core of professional officers, so the Russians transformed Soviet Army officers into Poles, securing skilled and loyal leadership. Some readers may not agree with the authors, who cite Poland as having the strongest military potential, but the text documents its case. The fac at the Polish Army is working hard or its educational program shows that ar army of the future is being concentrate upon. Those who knew the Polish Car pathian Division in Italy and the Fre Poland forces of the West will recal their justified anti-Soviet attitude. Th book shows how many went back to thei native land.

The purges are tabulated for Rumania

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

BEYOND COURAGE. By Clay Blair, Jr. David McKay Company, 1955. 247 Pages; $3.50. A group of escape tales concerning Air Force people who made their way from Korean captivity back to the American lines. The author seems to have used his descriptive writing skill to better advantage than in his previous books, *The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover* and *The Hydrogen Bomb*. The six tales are packed with excitement.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE SUGAR ISLANDS, 1759. By Marshall Smelser. University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 212 Pages; Index; $5.00. An example of painstaking research and masterly writing of an early amphibious campaign. It is almost but not quite C. S. Forester with footnotes. A scholarly work with a touch of humor. Guadeloupe and Martinique are the scenes of the action.

CHURCHILL: HIS LIFE IN PHOTOGRAPHS. Edited by Randolph S. Churchill and Helmut Gernsheim. Rinehart & Company, 1955. Index; $5.00. A collection of photographs of one of the great statesmen of our time, edited by his son. The printing reproduction is good though not excellent, and the selection of material is superb.

CIVIL WAR ON THE WESTERN BORDER, 1854-1865. By Jay Monaghan. Little, Brown & Company, 1955. 454 Pages; Index; $6.00. A clear, well-written, scholarly outline of the Western Border troubles from the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act to the end of the Civil War.

THE DAY THE CENTURY ENDED. By Francis Irby Gwaltney. Rinehart & Company, 1955. 312 Pages; $3.50. A beautifully written, stirring, exciting novel of the war in the Pacific which, unfortunately, would give the inexperienced reader the idea that all National Guard officers are idealistic, patriotic and exceptional leaders and that practically all Regulars are small, mean, petty and cowardly. Already sold to Hollywood.

DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION: Personal Experiences of the Late War. By Richard Taylor, Lieutenant General in the Confederate Army. Edited, with a preface by Richard Harwell. Longmans, Green & Company, 1955. 380 Pages; Index; $7.50. A literate Southern general writes his Civil War reminiscences with a pen dipped in acid and honey. Well edited and annotated and with a short but adequate index.

FAILURE OF A REVOLUTION. By Rudolf Coper. Cambridge University Press, 1955. 294 Pages; Index; $5.00. Political events in Germany between November 1918 and March 1919. An object lesson for those who believe that internal revolution is the answer to any question. Ebert was the most rational although dishonest of the important characters.

THE HOLSTEIN MEMOIRS. Edited by Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher. Cambridge University Press, 1955. 216 Pages; Index; $5.00. The first volume of the memoirs of a middle-rank member of the German foreign office who had much to do with shaping Germany's foreign policy up to the period of World War I. Doubtful that any reader would want it for his personal library but it should be available in the larger official libraries.

THE LAND THEY FOUGHT FOR. By Clifford Dowdey. Doubleday & Company, 1955. 438 Pages; Index; $6.00. Another volume in the excellent and rapidly growing "Mainstream of America" series—this one "The story of the South as the Confederacy, 1832-1865."

THE MEN'S GUIDE TO EUROPE. Edited by Eugene Fodor. David McKay Company, 1955. 650 Pages; Illustrated; $4.50. A useful travel guide, unfortunately slanted toward the rather well-heeled male, and which carries the additional gimmick of a Readers Club Membership Card which offers some discounts and "special attention" at shops and restaurants participating in the plan. The style is a cross between *Esquire* and the normal dull travel book.

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD, Volume II. By Major General J. F. C. Fuller. Funk & Wagnalls, 1955. 561 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.00. This volume shows how warfare altered history and describes the battles that changed the destiny of nations from the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 to the Battle of Waterloo, 1815.

PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE AND RELATED GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL, fifth edition. By Associates in the Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy. Military Service Publishing Company 1955. 207 Pages; Index; $1.50. A solid explanation of a much confused tool in estate planning. Offers some rather clear explanations of the foggy paragraphs in most life insurance contracts.

PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL FINANCE FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL. By Colonel Robert F. McDermott and Associates in the Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy. Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. 178 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $1.50. Designed primarily for the younger officer, this how-to-do-it text contains much good, solid information and any arguments as to its conclusions would be matters of opinion rather than fact. Of limited value to the soldier who is forty-plus but still would make a fine gift to every youngster who is making the military his career. It follows a conservative philosophy.

STRANGE CREATURES OF THE SEA. By A. Hyatt Verrill. L. C. Page & Company, 1955. 236 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. For those who like to gather shells, eat sea food or go fishing, here is an incredibly simple layman's guide to some of the lesser known species of sea dwellers.

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE TECHNICAL SERVICES. THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: ORGANIZATION, SUPPLY AND SERVICES, Volume II. By Erna Risch and Chester L. Kieffer. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955. 433 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.00. QM activities in the ZI during World War II. There is a particularly thought-provoking section about procurement and training of officers and enlisted personnel. Another reminder of the varied activities performed by the QMC.

THE VIKING ROCKET STORY. By Milton W. Rosen. Harper & Brothers, 1955. 242 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $3.75. A gee-whiz-aren't-we-wonderful story of the test flights of the Viking rocket. Scientific adventure in readable and sometimes exciting form.

ıose main military leadership has been ıwn from ex-POWs. There is a pre-:tion of a future conspiracy in Ruma-ı, as well as of a circumspect purge Hungary.

One must consider the thought that ıile the top leadership is in a state of nsition, there lie below the leaders of lay armies that have been greatly mod-nized, and the lower leadership is ongly Red-indoctrinated and disci-ned.

While General Peng Teh-huai cl.:ered : Warsaw agreement, his nation and army stand apart from the European ellites in several aspects. The study is ıerally correct in stating that Red ıina's army does not face an overriding ralty problem among leaders. However, ıina's geography, limited communica-ns, and regional variances are factors npeting with the Red dictatorship on long-range basis, and the text might ll have devoted a little more attention future possibilities. The recent purge two Red generals is evidence of oppor-ıism or ambition motivating even the ll indoctrinated to try new fields or y from the party line. Peking's 1954 :ngthening of its power over regional nmands gives researchers cause to look possible future fissures. The author :s hint that the new generation of offi-s may well expect more privileges and hforts than the old guerrilla warriors l.

The Chinese leaders are well analyzed l their influence adequately defined. e author points to the fact that re-nal factionalism and schisms between field armies, while a potential danger Peking, are not likely to materialize ept under conditions of defeat. This point to bear in mind. History shows t large bodies of Chinese can collapse separate suddenly in war once the ssure strikes the right portion.

Treatment of East German leaders ıld have strengthened this volume. ewise, more space on China. But the ly is excellent, definitive, and straight-vard in its approach. The military ler will find this a "must"—and he find the text attacks the problem ı success.

w to Keep the Wolf Away

NNING YOUR FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE
r John E. Leibenderfer
niversity of Oklahoma Press, 1955
94 Pages; Index; $3.95

iewed by
3. Gen. Donald Armstrong

you are not within hailing distance hose threescore years and ten, and if would welcome advice on managing finances, this book is for you. It is tly superior to the average "how to" :. It is a serious analysis by a com-nt authority and it deserves the im-t of an outstanding university press.

Mr. Leibenderfer is a registered investment adviser and a member of the faculty of the University of Oklahoma. His recommendations for reaching financial independence in spite of small salaries and high cost of living are practical an.. attainable with some help and will power on the part of the reader.

The problems faced in meeting the objective vary with the age of the head of the family and the number and ages of the children. Consequently after explaining the rules of the game of capital accumu lation—and close attention and thought are needed to understand this technique —the author examines specific case histories of family finance. Here we learn the fundamentals of insurance and social security, of home ownership versus renting, of investment in stocks and bonds and other media for savings. The suggestions for controlling family expenses will almost certainly help budgeting procedure.

This is a most constructive and useful L ok for members of the armed forces whose salaries and standard of living necessitate careful financial management. It is well worth the price of admission and many hours of careful study.

More High-Standard Fuller

A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD: Volume II: From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588, to the Battle of Waterloo, 1815
By Major General J. F. C. Fuller
Funk & Wagnalls, 1955
561 Pages; Maps; Index; $6.00

Reviewed by
Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong

Two climactic turning points in history mark the beginning and end of General Fuller's second volume of his monumental study of war in the Western World. Both happen to be decisive victories for England. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 impressively emphasized the meaning of sea power in the rise and fall of nations. The battle of Waterloo ended the hegemony of France in Europe.

The strategy and tactics of these campaigns and of the other more significant military events in between are adequately explained. But military history cannot be understood unless the politi..l and economic causes of wars and the relationship of war with the wealth and power of nati..ns are effectively shown. General Fuller is exceptionally well qualified to prove that war is a continuation of politics when diplomacy fails, and the political results are always amply discussed. Consequently this trilogy is of exceptional value for everyone concerned with war, from second lieutenants to heads of states. The layman who would like to understand the time of troubles in which we live will also find these volumes profitable reading. Entertaining too, since General Fuller has a rich store of story and anecdote to enliven the grim picture of warfare.

For example, in Wolfe's Quebec campaign in 1759 we read that Wolfe objected to flogging and his maintenance of discipline was unorthodox, as this example, dated August 22, shows: "Two men, Darby and Everson, who had taken alarm during the night and shown 'evident tokens of fear,' were punished as follows: they were made to 'stand one hour at ye necessary house [latrine] each with a woman's cap upon his head . . . as a small punishment for the dishonour they have brought upon the corps and their brother soldiers.' Such a humiliation must have been far more effective than the usual five score of lashes."

Many people look at the possibilities of atomic war today and deny the imp rtance of military history of earlier epochs when battles were fought with simpler and more primitive weapons. General Fuller looks for the enduring less..ns which we can neglect only at our peril. For example, he observes that the naval campaign ending with the defeat of the Spanish Armada profoundly influenced naval strategy and he lists the principles derived from analyzing this campaign at sea.

In this volume wars on the American continent appear in military history for the first time. Wolfe, who was only thirty-two, brilliantly led the small force which ended the long struggle between England and France for supremacy in North America, and General Fuller gives an equally brilliant account of this n..table campaign. It has been called "a boys' campaign"; most of the top-ranking officers being under thirty years of age.

The summary of the causes of the American Revolution provides an excellent introduction to the more detailed study of the Saratoga campaign, the battle of the Chesapeake and the siege of Yorktown. From the successful outcome of the Revolution, "a new nation, in potential rivalling all the nations of Europe combined, was added to the Western world."

The scene shifts back to Europe with the outbreak of the French Revolution. Valmy was followed by the long struggle between France on the one hand and England and the European coalition on the other. Trafalgar, Jena, and other decisive battles led finally to Waterloo and Napoleon's downfall.

As was to be anticipated in studies by General Fuller, the role of weapons in modifying tactics is adequately described throughout this volume. The great value today of General Fuller's view of military history, however, is his emphasis on the permanent elements in warfare which are human rather than material. His study of war describes the essentials without oversimplifying the complexities of grand strategy and without dwelling on the minutiae of battles and campaigns.

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